Butter on Sunlit Water

What is meant by "difficult to satisfy"? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to analyze the meaning of scripture — that is, scripture states that there is difficulty in being satisfied and difficulty in being sustained, yet, though scripture states this much, it does not analyze its meaning; scripture is the very root this treatise depends upon, and what it leaves unstated, this treatise should now state, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. What is meant by "difficult to satisfy"? The answer: whoever eats heavily, gorges heavily, eats much, gorges much, eats greatly, gorges greatly, such that little is never enough to satisfy him — this is called difficult to satisfy. The terms "eats heavily" and the rest, though differing in wording, are undivided in substance,

all alike serving to display the meaning of difficult to satisfy. What is meant by "difficult to sustain"? The answer: whoever is gluttonous, extremely gluttonous, ravenous, extremely ravenous, indulgent, extremely indulgent, craving, extremely craving, delighting in chewing, delighting in savoring and sipping, selecting what he eats, selecting what he gorges upon, such that whatever comes his way is never enough to sustain him — this is called difficult to sustain.

The terms "gluttonous, extremely gluttonous" and the rest, though differing in wording, are undivided in substance, all alike serving to display the meaning of difficult to sustain. What distinction is there between difficult to satisfy and difficult to sustain? The answer: precisely what has already been stated above constitutes their distinction. One asks: why is this treatise further composed? The answer: it is composed in order to bring those in doubt to a settled resolution — that is, these two dharmas so closely resemble one another that, seeing one who is difficult to satisfy, the world commonly calls him difficult to sustain, and, seeing one who is difficult to sustain, the world commonly calls him difficult to satisfy; there are those who thereby give rise to the doubt that these two are, in fact, one and the same — and it is in order to bring this doubt to a settled resolution, revealing that these two possess genuinely distinct meanings, that this treatise is composed. That is, as already stated, eating and gorging heavily and the rest, such that little is never enough to satisfy, is what is difficult to satisfy; being ravenous, extremely ravenous, and the rest, such that whatever comes one's way is never enough to sustain, is what is difficult to sustain. Further, great desire is what is difficult to satisfy, since one yearns for so much food; dissatisfaction is what is difficult to sustain,

since one selects what he eats. This passage's own wording is abbreviated, speaking only with reference to food; one should understand that clothing and the like likewise carry this same twofold meaning. There is a version of this text that lacks this question-and-answer on their distinction. One asks: why does this passage not ask about their distinction here? The answer: this ought properly to have been asked, and that it is not asked should be understood as a matter of surplus meaning left implicit. Further, since the answer does not differ from what was already stated above, it is not asked again — unlike the case of great desire and dissatisfaction, where the answer does differ from what was stated before, and is therefore asked.

What is meant by "easy to satisfy"? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to analyze the meaning of scripture — that is, scripture states that there is ease in being satisfied and ease in being sustained, yet, though scripture states this much, it does not analyze its meaning; scripture is the very root this treatise depends upon, and what it leaves unstated, this treatise should now state. Further, having already spoken of difficult to satisfy and difficult to sustain, the treatise now wishes to speak of their own immediate antidotes, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. What is meant by "easy to satisfy"? The answer: whoever does not eat heavily, does not gorge heavily, does not eat much, does not gorge much, does not eat greatly, does not gorge greatly, such that little is enough to satisfy him — this is called easy to satisfy. The terms "does not eat heavily" and the rest, though differing in wording, are undivided in substance, all alike serving to display the meaning of easy to satisfy. What is meant by "easy to sustain"? The answer: whoever is not gluttonous, not extremely gluttonous, not ravenous, not extremely ravenous, not indulgent, not extremely indulgent, not craving, not extremely craving, does not delight in chewing, does not delight in savoring and sipping, does not select what he eats, does not select what he gorges upon, such that whatever comes his way is enough to sustain him — this is called easy to sustain. The terms "not gluttonous" and the rest, though differing in wording, are undivided in substance, all alike serving to display the meaning of easy to sustain. What distinction is there between easy to satisfy and easy to sustain? The answer: precisely what has already been stated above constitutes their distinction. One asks: why is this treatise further composed? The answer: it is composed in order to bring those in doubt to a settled resolution — that is, these two dharmas so closely resemble one another that, seeing one who is easy to satisfy, the world commonly calls him easy to sustain, and, seeing one who is easy to sustain, the world commonly calls him easy to satisfy; there are those who thereby give rise to the doubt that these two are, in fact, one and the same — and it is in order to bring this doubt to a settled resolution, revealing that these two possess genuinely distinct meanings, that this treatise is composed. That is, as already stated, not eating heavily and the rest, such that little is enough to satisfy, is what is easy to satisfy; not being gluttonous and the rest, such that whatever comes one's way is enough to sustain, is what is easy to sustain. Further, few desires is what is easy to satisfy, since one does not yearn for food; contentment is what is easy to sustain, since one does not select what he eats. This passage's own wording is likewise abbreviated, speaking only with reference to food; one should understand that clothing and the like likewise carry this same twofold meaning. There is a version of this text that lacks this question-and-answer on their distinction. One asks: why does this passage not ask about their distinction here? The answer: this ought properly to have been asked, and that it is not asked should be understood as a matter of surplus meaning left implicit. Further, since the answer does not differ from what was already stated above, it is not asked again — unlike the case of few desires and contentment, where the answer does differ from what was stated before, and is therefore asked. One should understand that, within this discussion, there may be one who eats little who is nonetheless called difficult to satisfy — as when one who could be fully provided for by a single mouthful instead eats two, and so on, at length —

and there may be one who eats much who is nonetheless called easy to satisfy — as when one who requires a full measure of grain to be fully provided for eats only that much, and no more. In ancient times, there was a female elephant named Māthā, who once carried a relic of the Buddha from a distant land into the country of Kaśmīra; by the power of this very merit, at the end of her life, she was reborn as a man, went forth, cultivated the path, and attained arhatship. Yet, on account of the habitual force of his former life, he still required a full measure of grain each day to be fully provided for. As he was about to enter final nirvāṇa, he gathered the nuns who had once attended upon him, saying: I shall now expound for you my own supreme Dharma. The assembly of nuns mocked him, saying: the Venerable One is indeed easy to satisfy — such a supreme Dharma indeed! The arhat replied: do not look down upon me so — I am, in truth, easy to satisfy. The nuns said: eating a full measure of grain each day — how can this be called easy to satisfy? The arhat answered: you do not know that, in a former life, I was a female elephant who carried a relic of the Buddha into this land — it was through this very wholesome karma that I now obtain a human body, go forth, cultivate the path, and attain arhatship; yet, on account of the force of habitual tendency, I ought properly to require a full measure and five pecks of grain each day, and it is only through my own constant restraint that I eat merely a single measure — such easy satisfaction as this, who else could claim it but I? At that time, the assembly of nuns bowed at his feet in reverent apology. Further, King Prasenajit, through the power of his own merit, was able each day to eat a full two great measures of rice and drink two great measures of sugarcane juice — this juice and this rice both growing from a single stalk of sugarcane and a single stalk of rice — yet, through his own constant restraint, he ate and drank only a single measure of each. Such cases as these, of eating much and yet being called easy to satisfy, do occur. There may be one who selects his food who is nonetheless called difficult to sustain — as when one who could be fully sustained by coarse food instead gorges and selects among fine foods out of sheer gluttony. And there may be one who selects his food who is nonetheless called easy to sustain — as when one who cannot sustain his own body on coarse food alone must select his food in order to be fully provided for, yet whose mind harbors no craving attachment even toward fine food.

There may be one who craves much yet eats little, exactly as with the owl and the kite; there may be one who eats much yet craves little, exactly as with the elephant and the horse; there may be one whose craving and eating are both great, exactly as with the cat and the dog; and there may be one whose craving and eating are both slight, exactly as with the tortoise and the crab. Difficult to satisfy and difficult to sustain both belong to the desire realm, spanning all six consciousnesses, and are both the unwholesome root of greed; easy to satisfy and easy to sustain are both bound to the three realms and unbound alike, spanning all six consciousnesses, and are both the wholesome root of non-greed. As scripture states, there are four kinds of noble lineage, all of which have contentment as their own inherent nature — these four are broadly explained, as in the Non-Returner Nyāsa of the Concentration Aggregate.

Vibhāṣā, Miscellaneous Aggregates, Chapter One, the First Part of the Volition Nyāsa: "What is volition? What is deliberation?" Having already grasped the sense of such topics as these, one ought now to set them forth fully. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to refute other schools and to reveal the correct meaning — that is, there are those who hold that volition and deliberation are simply mind itself, as the Dārṣṭāntikas maintain, who say that volition and deliberation are merely distinctions within mind, possessing no distinct substance of their own; in order to block this position, and to reveal that volition and deliberation are mental factors possessing their own distinct substance,

or, further, there are those who hold that, although the terms "volition" and "deliberation" differ in wording, their substance is undivided, as the grammarians maintain, who say that the sounds and syllables of these two words, though differing, possess no distinct substance — in order to block this position, and to reveal that these two possess distinct substances of their own as well, this treatise is composed. What is volition? The answer: whatever is deliberate intention, equal deliberate intention, augmented deliberate intention, the very nature of intending, the very class of intending, mental conduct, or verbal-mental karma — this is called volition. The master of this treatise, having attained skill with respect to the meaning of synonymous expressions, thus displays the substance of volition through a variety of names, the wording differing though the substance remains undivided. One asks: which kind of volition does this passage speak of? There are those who say: this speaks of the volition that draws forth the class of homogeneous being. There are yet other masters who say: this speaks of the volition that fulfills and completes the class of homogeneous being. The verdict: it should be said that this speaks, broadly, of every kind of mental karma — whether it draws forth the class of homogeneous being or fulfills and completes it, whether contaminated or uncontaminated, whether belonging to the mental ground or to the five sense-consciousnesses — all such are called volition, since every one of them bears the mark of construction and formation. What is deliberation? The answer: whatever is deliberating, equal deliberating, augmented deliberating, weighing, measuring, and observant discernment — this is called deliberation. The master of this treatise, having attained skill with respect to the meaning of synonymous expressions, thus displays the substance of deliberation through a variety of names, the wording differing though the substance remains undivided. One asks: which kind of deliberation does this passage speak of? There are those who say: this speaks of the deliberation that penetrates the four noble truths — that is, the deliberation belonging to the path of seeing and the like, which directly observes the four noble truths exactly as they are. There are yet other masters who say: this passage properly speaks of the deliberation consisting in cultivation —

that is, the deliberation belonging to the stages of heat, summit, forbearance, and the supreme mundane dharma. There are also those who say: this passage properly speaks of the deliberation consisting in reflection — that is, the deliberation belonging to the contemplation of unattractiveness, the mindfulness of the breath, and the rest, up through the mindfulness-foundations. There are yet others who say: this passage properly speaks of the deliberation consisting in hearing — that is, the deliberation that discriminates the particular and shared characteristics of every dharma, establishes the particular and shared characteristics of every dharma, and removes the delusion regarding a thing's own substance and the delusion regarding its object, neither adding to nor subtracting from any dharma. There are also those who say: this passage properly speaks of the deliberation attained at birth — that is, the deliberation by which one upholds, transmits, and thoroughly propagates the three canonical baskets together with the twelvefold division of the teaching. The verdict: it should be said that this passage speaks, broadly, of every kind of wisdom whatsoever — whether attained at birth, consisting in hearing, consisting in reflection, consisting in cultivation, or penetrating the truths, whether contaminated or uncontaminated, whether belonging to the mental ground or to the five sense-consciousnesses — all such are called deliberation, since every one of them bears the mark of observant discernment. What distinction is there between volition and deliberation? One asks: why is this treatise further composed? The answer: it is composed in order to bring those in doubt to a settled resolution — that is, these two dharmas so closely resemble one another that, seeing one of much volition, the world commonly says this person deliberates much, and, seeing one of much deliberation, the world commonly says this person exercises much volition; there are those who thereby give rise to the doubt that these two are, in fact, one and the same — and it is in order to bring this doubt to a settled resolution, revealing that these two possess genuinely distinct substances, that this treatise is composed. What distinction is there between volition and deliberation? The answer: volition is karma; deliberation is wisdom — such, then, is their distinction. Further, volition bears the mark of construction and formation; deliberation bears the mark of observant discernment. Further, that which is able to distinguish a desired from an undesired fruit, without confusion between them, bears the mark of volition; that which is able to distinguish the particular and shared characteristics of every dharma, without doubt or confusion, bears the mark of deliberation. One asks: every unwholesome and every wholesome contaminated dharma is capable of drawing forth a desired or undesired ripened fruit — why, then, does this passage speak only of volition as distinguishing the desired from the undesired fruit, and not of any other dharma? The answer: it is because volition is the most preeminent among them that this passage speaks in this way — that is, volition is the most preeminent in its power to draw forth a desired or undesired fruit, and it is for this reason that this passage speaks of it in particular, exactly as, in a certain verse, it is said that, although a garment's own dyeing depends on many further conditions, it is the person doing the dyeing who is credited with it, on account of his own preeminence — this, too, is exactly the same. One asks: every other mind and mental factor is likewise capable of distinguishing the particular and shared characteristics of dharmas — why, then, does this passage say that this is wisdom, and not any other dharma? The answer: it is because wisdom is the most preeminent among them that this passage speaks in this way — that is, wisdom is the most preeminent in its power to distinguish the particular and shared characteristics of dharmas, and it is for this reason that this passage speaks of it in particular; the illustration is exactly as given above. One asks: which kind of wisdom is capable of distinguishing the particular characteristics of dharmas, and which kind of wisdom is capable of distinguishing their shared characteristics? The answer: that which distinguishes the characteristic of a single thing is the discernment of a particular characteristic; that which distinguishes the characteristic shared among many things is the discernment of a shared characteristic.

Further, that which distinguishes each single aggregate and the like individually is the discernment of a particular characteristic; that which distinguishes two or three aggregates together is the discernment of a shared characteristic. Further, the wisdom consisting in hearing and reflection tends, for the most part, to discern particular characteristics; the wisdom consisting in cultivation tends, for the most part, to discern shared characteristics. Further, wisdom not subsumed within the sixteen aspects tends, for the most part, to discern particular characteristics; wisdom subsumed within the sixteen aspects discerns only shared characteristics. Further, wisdom exercised while practicing the truths individually tends, for the most part, to discern particular characteristics; wisdom exercised during direct realization discerns only shared characteristics. Further, wisdom that observes each truth separately is called the discernment of particular characteristics; wisdom that observes every truth together is called the discernment of shared characteristics. One asks: how are these two kinds of wisdom to be understood? The answer: exactly as when a variety of objects, brought close to a sapphire gem, lose their own particular appearance and take on that same single color throughout — the wisdom that discerns shared characteristics should be understood in just this way. And exactly as when a variety of objects, held far from a sapphire gem, display their own blue, yellow, and other colors distinctly and separately — the wisdom that discerns particular characteristics should be understood in just this way. Further, exactly as when the sun rises, its light universally illuminates every place at once, dispelling every darkness in a single instant — the wisdom that discerns shared characteristics should be understood in just this way. And exactly as when, after the sun has already risen, it gradually illuminates every object in turn, so that walls, crevices, mountain cliffs, and hidden thickets are, one by one, all made manifest — the wisdom that discerns particular characteristics should be understood in just this way. Further, exactly as when a person carries a lamp into a dark room, and the darkness is dispelled all at once, in its entirety — the wisdom that discerns shared characteristics should be understood in just this way. And exactly as when, after the lamp has entered, it gradually illuminates the jars, garments, vessels, boxes, and every other object in turn — the wisdom that discerns particular characteristics should be understood in just this way. Further, exactly as when a mirror reflects something from a distance, and its particular features are not clearly displayed — the wisdom that discerns shared characteristics should be understood in just this way. And exactly as when a mirror reflects something from close by, and its particular features are clearly and distinctly displayed — the wisdom that discerns particular characteristics should be understood in just this way. Further, exactly as when a person views a mountain forest and the like from a distance — the wisdom that discerns shared characteristics should be understood in just this way. And exactly as when a person views a mountain forest and the like from close by — the wisdom that discerns particular characteristics should be understood in just this way. One asks: what is the nature of the wisdom consisting in hearing, reflection, and cultivation, as spoken of in this passage? There are those who say: whatever wisdom is by which one upholds, transmits, and thoroughly propagates the three canonical baskets together with the twelvefold division of the teaching is called the wisdom consisting in hearing; in dependence on this, the wisdom consisting in reflection arises;

and, in dependence on this, in turn, the wisdom consisting in cultivation arises, which cuts off the afflictions and realizes nirvāṇa — exactly as gold arises in dependence on a gold mine, and, in dependence on this gold, a diamond in turn arises, capable of shattering mountains and stone and every other such thing. The verdict: it should be said that whatever wisdom is by which one upholds, transmits, and thoroughly propagates the three canonical baskets together with the twelvefold division of the teaching is what is attained at birth; in dependence on this, the wisdom consisting in hearing arises; in dependence on this, in turn, the wisdom consisting in reflection arises; and, in dependence on this, in turn, the wisdom consisting in cultivation arises, which cuts off the afflictions and realizes nirvāṇa — exactly as a sprout arises in dependence on a seed, and a stalk arises in dependence on the sprout, and, from the stalk, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruit successively arise in turn. Further, wisdom arising in dependence on hearing is called the wisdom consisting in hearing; wisdom arising in dependence on reflection is called the wisdom consisting in reflection; wisdom arising in dependence on cultivation is called the wisdom consisting in cultivation. Further, wisdom drawn forth by hearing is called the wisdom consisting in hearing; wisdom drawn forth by reflection is called the wisdom consisting in reflection; wisdom drawn forth by cultivation is called the wisdom consisting in cultivation. Further, wisdom arising through the power of a condition is called the wisdom consisting in hearing; wisdom arising through the power of a cause is called the wisdom consisting in reflection; wisdom arising through the combined power of both is called the wisdom consisting in cultivation. Further, wisdom arising through another's power is called the wisdom consisting in hearing; wisdom arising through one's own power is called the wisdom consisting in reflection; wisdom arising through the combined power of both is called the wisdom consisting in cultivation. Further, wisdom arising through the power of provisions is called the wisdom consisting in hearing; wisdom arising through the power of one's own nature is called the wisdom consisting in reflection; wisdom arising through the combined power of both is called the wisdom consisting in cultivation. Further, wisdom arising through an external power is called the wisdom consisting in hearing; wisdom arising through an internal power is called the wisdom consisting in reflection; wisdom arising through the combined power of both is called the wisdom consisting in cultivation. Further, wisdom arising through the power of the teaching is called the wisdom consisting in hearing;

wisdom arising through the power of meaning is called the wisdom consisting in reflection; wisdom arising through the power of concentration is called the wisdom consisting in cultivation. One asks: what distinction is there among these three kinds of wisdom? The answer: the wisdom consisting in hearing, at every time, comprehends meaning only in dependence on names — that is, one reflects as follows: what meaning is intended by what is spoken in the sūtras, the vinaya, and the abhidharma? What meaning is intended by what my preceptors, instructors, and fellow practitioners of the pure conduct have spoken? What meaning is intended by what every other treatise has spoken? — and, in accordance with whatever he reflects upon, he is able to comprehend it. The wisdom consisting in reflection, at times, comprehends meaning in dependence on names, and, at times, comprehends meaning without depending on names. The wisdom consisting in cultivation, at every time, comprehends meaning without depending on names at all — exactly as, among three people entering a pool to bathe, the first has not yet learned to swim, the second has learned but not yet mastered it, and the third has mastered it thoroughly: the one who has not yet learned to swim, at every time, must cling to the bank, the grass, or the like before he is able to bathe — the wisdom consisting in hearing should be understood in just this way. The one who has learned but not yet mastered swimming may, at times, cling to something, and, at times, not, and yet is still able to bathe — the wisdom consisting in reflection should be understood in just this way. The one who has thoroughly mastered swimming, at every time, is able to bathe freely, without clinging to anything at all — the wisdom consisting in cultivation should be understood in just this way. Further, the wisdom consisting in hearing serves as the cause of all three kinds of wisdom; the wisdom consisting in reflection is solely the cause of the wisdom consisting in reflection, not of the wisdom consisting in hearing, since that would be inferior to it, nor of the wisdom consisting in cultivation, since that belongs to a different realm. The wisdom consisting in cultivation is solely the cause of the wisdom consisting in cultivation, not of the wisdom consisting in hearing, since that would be inferior to it, nor of the wisdom consisting in reflection, since that, too, would be inferior to it, and belongs to a different realm as well. Further, the wisdom consisting in hearing is solely the fruit of the wisdom consisting in hearing, not the fruit of the other two, since those are superior to it; the wisdom consisting in reflection is the fruit of both of the first two kinds of wisdom, not the fruit of the wisdom consisting in cultivation, since that is superior to it, and belongs to a different realm; the wisdom consisting in cultivation is the fruit of both the wisdom consisting in reflection and of itself, not the fruit of the wisdom consisting in reflection alone, since that belongs to a different realm. Further, when the wisdom consisting in hearing manifests before one, it cultivates only the wisdom consisting in hearing; when the wisdom consisting in reflection manifests before one, it cultivates only the wisdom consisting in reflection; when the wisdom consisting in cultivation manifests before one, it is able to cultivate all three kinds of wisdom. One asks: why is it that, when the first two kinds of wisdom manifest before one, they cultivate only their own kind, while the wisdom consisting in cultivation is able to cultivate all three kinds? The answer: the first two kinds of wisdom do not arise in dependence on concentration, and, their force being inferior, when they manifest before one, they cultivate only their own kind — that is, this very act of practicing and habituating is itself what is called cultivation, and they do not cultivate any future dharma of another kind, whether of their own kind or another's. The wisdom consisting in cultivation, by contrast, arises in dependence on concentration, and, its force being superior, when it manifests before one, it is able to cultivate both its own kind and another kind — cultivating its own kind means that, in the present, it practices and habituates itself, and, in the future, it will be cultivated further; cultivating another kind means only that it will be cultivated in the future. Further, when the first two kinds of wisdom, not yet previously attained, manifest before one for the very first instant, they possess only the present; from the second instant onward, as they manifest before one, they possess both the past and the present; and, once they no longer manifest before one, they possess only the past. When the wisdom consisting in cultivation, not yet previously attained, manifests before one for the very first instant, it possesses the future; from the second instant onward, it possesses all three time-periods; and, once it no longer manifests before one, it possesses only the past and the future. There are yet other masters who say: when the first two kinds of wisdom, having become superior through repeated habituation, manifest before one, they, too, cultivate a future dharma of their own kind — this position speaks of possession differently from what has just been stated.

As for these three kinds of wisdom, with respect to realm: the desire realm possesses two — namely, the wisdom consisting in hearing and the wisdom consisting in reflection; the form realm possesses two —

namely, the wisdom consisting in hearing and the wisdom consisting in cultivation; the formless realm possesses only the wisdom consisting in cultivation. One asks: why does the desire realm lack the wisdom consisting in cultivation? The answer: the desire realm is an unsettled realm, neither a realm of cultivation nor a realm free from defilement — should one wish to cultivate wisdom there, it inevitably falls instead into the wisdom consisting in reflection.

One asks: why do the form and formless realms lack the wisdom consisting in reflection? The answer: the form and formless realms are settled realms, realms of cultivation, realms free from defilement — should one wish to reflect there, it inevitably falls instead into the wisdom consisting in cultivation. One asks: why does the formless realm lack the wisdom consisting in hearing? The answer: that realm possesses no ear-faculty by which to hear the Dharma, and the wisdom consisting in hearing must, by way of the ear-faculty hearing the Dharma, in turn draw forth its own manifestation. There are those who say: the desire realm possesses all three kinds of wisdom; the form and formless realms are as stated above. As for the desire realm's own wisdom consisting in cultivation: this refers, for instance, to the conventional knowledge on the border of direct realization, conjoined with the concentrations of emptiness, emptiness-of-emptiness, wishlessness, wishlessness-of-wishlessness, signlessness, and signlessness-of-signlessness, and, at the time of the knowledge of exhaustion, the desire-realm wholesome roots that are cultivated in association with it — yet, since this is so exceedingly slight, most passages do not speak of it. There are yet other masters who say: the desire and form realms both possess all three kinds of wisdom in full; the formless realm possesses only the wisdom consisting in cultivation. There are also those who say: the desire and form realms both possess all three kinds of wisdom in full; the formless realm possesses two kinds — namely, the wisdom consisting in reflection and the wisdom consisting in cultivation. There are yet others who say: all three realms possess all three kinds of wisdom in full. The verdict: it should be known that the first position stated is sound. As for stage: the wisdom consisting in hearing exists across five stages — namely, the desire realm and the four dhyānas. There are those who say: it exists across six stages — namely, the aforementioned five, together with the intermediate stage of the first dhyāna. There are those who say: it exists across seven stages — namely, the aforementioned six, together with the stage of preparatory approach. The wisdom consisting in reflection exists in only a single stage — namely, the desire realm. The wisdom consisting in cultivation, if contaminated, exists across seventeen stages — namely, the four dhyānas, their four proximate stages, the intermediate stage of the first dhyāna, the four formless attainments, and their four proximate stages; if uncontaminated, it exists across nine stages — namely, the four dhyānas, the stage of preparatory approach, the intermediate stage, and the lower three formless attainments. As for basis: the wisdom consisting in hearing depends on a body belonging to the desire or form realm; the wisdom consisting in reflection depends on a body belonging to the desire realm; the wisdom consisting in cultivation depends on a body belonging to any of the three realms. As for aspect: there are those who say: the wisdom consisting in hearing and reflection is not subsumed within the sixteen aspects, being contaminated; the wisdom consisting in cultivation is subsumed within the sixteen aspects, or within other aspects. The verdict: it should be said that all three kinds of wisdom span both the sixteen aspects and other aspects, since the sixteen aspects span both the contaminated and the uncontaminated. One asks: if all three kinds of wisdom span both the sixteen aspects and other aspects, then what distinction remains among these three kinds of wisdom? The answer: the manifold distinctions already stated above remain — that is, the wisdom consisting in hearing and reflection, arising through their own power, possess no future cultivation, while, arising through another's power, they do possess future cultivation; the wisdom consisting in cultivation, arising through its own power, possesses future cultivation — such, then, is their distinction. As for object: all three kinds of wisdom take every dharma as their object. As for mindfulness-foundation: all three kinds of wisdom span all four mindfulness-foundations. As for knowledge: the wisdom consisting in hearing and reflection is solely conventional knowledge; the wisdom consisting in cultivation spans all ten kinds of knowledge. As for conjunction with the faculties: the wisdom consisting in hearing and cultivation is conjoined with three faculties — namely, bliss, joy, and equanimity; the wisdom consisting in reflection is conjoined with two faculties — namely, joy and equanimity. As for conjunction with concentration: the wisdom consisting in hearing and reflection is not conjoined with concentration, being contaminated; the wisdom consisting in cultivation is conjoined, or not conjoined, with the three kinds of concentration. As for the three time-periods: these three kinds of wisdom all fall within the three time-periods, and take the three time-periods, and what is beyond time, as their object. As for wholesome, unwholesome, or undefined: these three kinds of wisdom are all wholesome, and take all three kinds as their object. As for bound or unbound: the wisdom consisting in hearing is bound to the desire and form realms; the wisdom consisting in reflection is bound solely to the desire realm; the wisdom consisting in cultivation is bound to the form and formless realms, and is also unbound; all three kinds of wisdom take what is bound to the three realms and what is unbound as their object. As for learner, non-learner, or neither: the wisdom consisting in hearing and reflection is solely neither a learner's nor a non-learner's; the wisdom consisting in cultivation spans all three kinds; all three kinds of wisdom take all three kinds as their object. As for abandoned by seeing, by cultivation, or by neither: the wisdom consisting in hearing and reflection is solely abandoned by cultivation; the wisdom consisting in cultivation spans what is abandoned by cultivation and what is unabandoned; all three kinds of wisdom take all three kinds as their object. As for taking an object versus taking a meaning: all three kinds of wisdom take both a name and a meaning as their object.

As for their own continuum, another's continuum, or neither: all three kinds of wisdom take all three kinds as their object. As for whether they occur on the mental ground or within the five sense-consciousness bodies:

they occur solely on the mental ground, since there exists no wholesome dharma attained through applied practice within the five consciousnesses. As for whether attained through applied practice, through freedom from defilement, or innately: all three kinds of wisdom may be attained through applied practice or through freedom from defilement, but not innately; the wisdom consisting in hearing and reflection is attained through freedom from defilement at the very moment freedom from defilement with respect to the peak of existence is attained. There are those who say: although all three kinds of wisdom are attained through applied practice, it may also be said that they are attained innately, since, when one falls from a higher stage and is reborn in a lower one, this, too, constitutes a form of attainment. There are yet other masters who say: the wisdom consisting in hearing, if belonging to the desire realm, is attained solely through applied practice; if belonging to the form realm, it may be said to be attained either through applied practice or innately — it may be said to be attained through applied practice in the sense that one, while in the desire realm, applies himself to cultivating the wisdom consisting in hearing, contemplating and observing the particular and shared characteristics of dharmas, and, once this has become thoroughly ripened, attains it only upon falling from the desire realm and being reborn in the form realm; and it may be said to be attained innately in the sense that, although one, while in the desire realm, applies himself to cultivating the wisdom consisting in hearing in this way, so long as he has not yet been reborn there, he is still unable to attain it — it is only once reborn in the form realm that he attains it there. The wisdom consisting in reflection is attained solely through applied practice; the wisdom consisting in cultivation spans all three kinds of attainment, being attained through applied practice, through freedom from defilement, or innately at the moment of birth. One asks: of these three kinds of wisdom, how many does a śrāvaka possess in full, how many a pratyekabuddha, and how many the Tathāgata? The answer: although the Tathāgata possesses all three in full, he is chiefly displayed through the wisdom consisting in cultivation. Why is this so? Because he spontaneously awakens, complete with the powers, the fearlessnesses, great compassion, and every other cultivated virtue. Although a pratyekabuddha possesses all three in full, he is chiefly displayed through the wisdom consisting in reflection. Why is this so? Although he, too, spontaneously awakens, he lacks the powers, the fearlessnesses, and every other cultivated virtue, and enters the path chiefly through extensive reflection.

Although a śrāvaka possesses all three in full, he is chiefly displayed through the wisdom consisting in hearing. Why is this so? He enters the path through hearing the sound of the Dharma. Further, all three kinds of wisdom may, in a broader sense, each be called by any of the three names — as it is said, extensive hearing enables one to know the Dharma, and so on, all such may be called the wisdom consisting in hearing; as it is said within this very passage, deliberation is itself wisdom, and, since deliberation resembles volition, it, too, may be called the wisdom consisting in reflection; and all such may be called the wisdom consisting in cultivation, as it is said, what is the dharma one ought to cultivate? It refers to every wholesome, conditioned dharma. Further, scripture states that there are three kinds of wisdom: first, the wisdom that culminates in verbal expression, which is precisely the wisdom consisting in hearing spoken of here; second, the wisdom that culminates in deliberation, which is precisely the wisdom consisting in reflection spoken of here; third, the wisdom that culminates in liberation, which is precisely the wisdom consisting in cultivation spoken of here — every wholesome mind and mental factor attained through applied practice is subsumed within these three kinds of wisdom. What is vitarka, or investigative thought? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to refute other schools and to reveal the correct meaning — that is, there are those who hold that vitarka and vicāra are simply mind itself, as the Dārṣṭāntikas maintain; in order to block this position, and to reveal that vitarka and vicāra are mental factors,

or, further, there are those who hold that vitarka and vicāra are merely nominal, without genuine substance; in order to block this position, and to reveal that these two are genuinely existent dharmas, this treatise is composed. What is vitarka? The answer: whatever mental seeking, discerning, revealing, displaying, inferring, constructing, or discriminating in kind — this is called vitarka. The terms "mental seeking" and the rest, though differing in wording, are undivided in substance, all alike serving to make manifest vitarka's own inherent nature. What is vicāra? The answer: whatever mental scrutiny, following-along, following-in-motion, following-in-flow, or following-in-attachment — this is called vicāra. The terms "mental scrutiny" and the rest, though differing in wording, are undivided in substance, all alike serving to make manifest vicāra's own inherent nature. What distinction is there between vitarka and vicāra? The answer: the coarse nature of mind is called vitarka; the subtle nature of mind is called vicāra — such, then, is their distinction. One asks: why is this treatise further composed? The answer: it is composed in order to bring those in doubt to a settled resolution — that is, these two dharmas so closely resemble one another that, seeing one of much vitarka, the world commonly says this person has much vicāra, and, seeing one of much vicāra, the world commonly says this person has much vitarka; there are those who thereby give rise to the doubt that these two are, in fact, a single substance — and it is in order to bring this doubt to a settled resolution, revealing that these two possess genuinely distinct substances, that this treatise is composed. One asks: what meaning does the "coarse nature" and "subtle nature" of mind, spoken of in this passage, reveal? There are those who say: this reveals the coarse and subtle nature of mind itself. If this is what is meant, then vitarka and vicāra would have to take mind itself as their own inherent nature, which cannot be correct, since a single thing cannot be both coarse and subtle at one and the same time.

There are yet other masters who say: this reveals that mind, at the moment it is coarse, possesses the nature of vitarka, and, at the moment it is subtle, possesses the nature of vicāra. If this is what is meant, then it ought to be shown that vitarka and vicāra never arise together within a single mind, since a mind's coarse and subtle moments occur at distinct instants. The verdict: it should be said that this passage reveals that, within one and the same mind, its coarse aspect is called vitarka, and its subtle aspect is called vicāra. If this is what is meant, then it is shown that a single mind contains both vitarka and vicāra together, vitarka rendering the mind coarse, and vicāra rendering it subtle. One asks: how can these two, coarseness and subtlety, coexist within a single mind without contradicting one another? The answer: it is because their respective functions differ — vitarka's own nature is forceful and keen, while vicāra's own nature is slow and dull, and, since they jointly assist one and the same mind, though one is coarse and the other subtle, they do not contradict one another. One asks: what are the actual characteristics of vitarka's coarseness and vicāra's subtlety? The answer: exactly as when a bird's feather is bound together with a needle, the resulting sensation, arising within the body, is at once sharp and dull — vitarka and vicāra are exactly the same. Further, exactly as when vinegar and water, mixed together in equal measure, are placed within the mouth, the resulting perception is at once sharp and dull — vitarka and vicāra are exactly the same. Further, exactly as when salt and flour, mixed together in equal measure, are placed within the mouth, the resulting perception is at once sharp and dull — vitarka and vicāra are exactly the same. The Prajñaptiśāstra states: exactly as when a bell, a hand-bell, or a bronze or iron vessel is struck, its resulting sound, once set in motion, is coarse at first and subtle afterward — vitarka and vicāra are exactly the same. The Dharmaskandha states: exactly as when heaven thunders, or a person blows a conch, the sound is great at first and faint afterward — vitarka and vicāra are exactly the same. It is further said: exactly as when a bird flies through the sky, beating its wings to soar aloft, coarse at first and subtle afterward — vitarka and vicāra are exactly the same. Every such statement as this reveals that vitarka and vicāra do not operate together in a single, undivided function, since their functions increase and diminish across an earlier and a later phase. There are those who say: exactly as when melted butter is placed upon cold water, and, touched by the light and warmth of the sun, it neither fully melts nor fully solidifies — so, too, is it with a single mind possessing both vitarka and vicāra, sustained by the joint power of these two forces, neither coarse nor subtle alone, and it is for this reason that vitarka and vicāra are able to be mutually associated, vitarka rendering the mind coarse, and vicāra rendering it subtle. Within this discussion, there are, in brief, three kinds of discrimination: first, discrimination of inherent nature, which refers to vitarka and vicāra; second, discrimination of recollection, which refers to mindfulness conjoined with mental consciousness; third, discrimination of investigation, which refers to the unsettled wisdom belonging to the mental ground. The five sense-consciousness bodies of the desire realm possess only the first kind, discrimination of inherent nature — though they do possess mindfulness, it is not discrimination of recollection, since they are incapable of genuine recollection; and though they do possess wisdom, it is not discrimination of investigation, since they are incapable of genuine investigation.

The mental ground of the desire realm possesses all three kinds of discrimination. The three consciousness-bodies of the first dhyāna possess only the first kind, discrimination of inherent nature — though they, too, possess mindfulness and wisdom, these are not the second or third kinds, for the reason already stated. The mental ground of the first dhyāna, if unsettled, possesses all three kinds of discrimination; if settled in concentration, it possesses two kinds — namely, discrimination of inherent nature and of recollection — for, although it does possess wisdom, this is not discrimination of investigation, since, were it to investigate, it would thereby depart from concentration. The minds of the second, third, and fourth dhyānas, if unsettled, possess two kinds of discrimination — namely, discrimination of recollection and of investigation, lacking discrimination of inherent nature, since they possess no vitarka or vicāra; if settled in concentration, they possess only a single kind, discrimination of recollection. The minds of the formless realm, if unsettled, possess two kinds, excepting discrimination of inherent nature; if settled in concentration, they possess only a single kind, discrimination of recollection. Every uncontaminated mind, depending on whichever stage it is unsettled within, may possess only two kinds, excepting discrimination of investigation; or may possess only a single kind, discrimination of recollection; none possesses all three kinds, since there exists no unsettled uncontaminated mind. What is restlessness? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to refute other schools and to reveal the correct meaning — that is, there are those who hold that restlessness and mental scatteredness possess no distinct substance of their own; in order to block this position, and to reveal that these two possess genuinely distinct substances, this treatise is composed. What is restlessness? The answer: whatever mind is unsettled, unstilled, agitated, restless — this restless nature of mind is called restlessness. The terms "unsettled" and the rest, though differing in wording, are undivided in substance, all alike serving to make manifest restlessness's own inherent nature. What is mental scatteredness? The answer: whatever mind is scattered, dispersed, drifting, unfixed, lacking singleness of object — this is called mental scatteredness. The terms "scattered" and the rest, though differing in wording, are undivided in substance, all alike serving to make manifest mental scatteredness's own inherent nature. What distinction is there between restlessness and mental scatteredness? The answer: the mark of being unsettled is called restlessness; the mark of lacking singleness of object is called mental scatteredness — such, then, is their distinction. One asks: why is this treatise further composed? The answer: it is composed in order to bring those in doubt to a settled resolution — that is, these two dharmas so closely resemble one another that, seeing one who is restless, the world commonly calls this mental scatteredness, and, seeing one whose mind is scattered, the world commonly calls this restlessness; there are those who thereby give rise to the doubt that these two are, in fact, one and the same — and it is in order to bring this doubt to a settled resolution, revealing that these two possess genuinely distinct substances, that this treatise is composed. The mark of being unsettled refers to the fact that it causes the mind to become agitated, obstructing the four or five factors of concentration; the mark of lacking singleness of object refers to the fact that it causes the mind to drift outward toward forms, sounds, scents, tastes, and tangibles. One asks: what are the actual characteristics of restlessness and mental scatteredness? The answer: exactly as when a person, seated upon a bed, is suddenly pulled up to standing — restlessness is exactly the same, setting the mind into motion. Exactly as when a person, once standing, is then driven forward to walk — mental scatteredness is exactly the same, causing the mind to shift repeatedly among its objects. Further, exactly as when water is made to gush forth from a spring — restlessness is exactly the same, causing the mind to become agitated; and exactly as when that water, once it has emerged, flows on to fill every pool in turn — mental scatteredness is exactly the same, causing the mind to disperse and scatter. One asks: what is the inherent nature of mental scatteredness? The answer: it has a defiled concentration as its own inherent nature. There are those who say: there exists a distinct mental factor named mental scatteredness, which is not concentration. The verdict: it should be said that the former position is sound — it is precisely a concentration associated with the afflictions, which causes the mind to shift repeatedly among its objects, that is called mental scatteredness. Restlessness and mental scatteredness, although they are forever mutually associated, nonetheless differ in the degree to which their function is increased, and four alternatives ought accordingly to be formulated. There is a mind that may be called possessing restlessness, yet not possessing mental scatteredness — namely, when concentration upon a single object is extremely agitated. There is a mind that may be called possessing mental scatteredness, yet not possessing restlessness — namely, when concentration upon many objects is not extremely agitated. There is a mind that may be called possessing both restlessness and mental scatteredness — namely, when concentration upon many objects is extremely agitated. There is a mind that may be called possessing neither restlessness nor mental scatteredness — namely, when concentration upon a single object is not extremely agitated. The Great Virtuous One states: whatever mind may be called possessing mental scatteredness may also be called possessing restlessness. There is a mind that may be called possessing restlessness, yet not possessing mental scatteredness — namely, when, as upon a single road, one runs on without ceasing.

Further, having spoken of this, mental factors ought also to be spoken of — that is, one should speak of the great-grounds dharmas and the rest. The great-grounds dharmas are of ten kinds: first, feeling; second, perception; third, volition; fourth, contact; fifth, desire-to-act; sixth, attention; seventh, resolute conviction; eighth, mindfulness; ninth, concentration; tenth, wisdom. The great-affliction-grounds dharmas are likewise of ten kinds: first, faithlessness; second, indolence; third, heedlessness; fourth, restlessness; fifth, ignorance; sixth, forgetful mindfulness; seventh, incorrect awareness; eighth, mental scatteredness; ninth, improper attention; tenth, wrongful resolute conviction. These two categories of great-grounds dharmas, though bearing twenty names, comprise only fifteen genuinely distinct substances — that is, among the great-grounds dharmas, feeling, perception, volition, contact, and desire-to-act are five in name and five in substance; among the great-affliction-grounds dharmas, faithlessness, indolence, heedlessness, restlessness, and ignorance are likewise five in name and five in substance; the remaining ten names comprise only five further substances — that is, among the great-affliction-grounds dharmas, forgetful mindfulness is simply the mindfulness already listed among the great-grounds dharmas; incorrect awareness is simply that same wisdom; mental scatteredness is simply that same concentration; improper attention is simply that same attention; and wrongful resolute conviction is simply that same resolute conviction.

Yet the great-grounds dharmas span both what is defiled and what is undefiled, while the great-affliction-grounds dharmas belong solely to what is defiled. Mindfulness and the other four dharmas favor the excellent, wholesome category,

being, for the most part, established among the various wholesome categories — and there are those who thereby give rise to the doubt that, since these are solely undefiled, they ought not properly to be spoken of again among the affliction-grounds. There are those who say: these five likewise favor the excellent, though also defiled, and it is for this reason that they are spoken of again. Torpor accords with concentration, and, unlike the others, is not pervasive across every defiled mind, and it is for this reason that it is not established among these grounds. Within this discussion, four alternatives ought to be formulated: there is what is a great-grounds dharma but not a great-affliction-grounds dharma — namely, feeling, perception, volition, contact, and desire-to-act. There is what is a great-affliction-grounds dharma but not a great-grounds dharma — namely, faithlessness, indolence, heedlessness, restlessness, and ignorance. There is what is both a great-grounds dharma and a great-affliction-grounds dharma — namely, forgetful mindfulness, incorrect awareness, mental scatteredness, improper attention, and wrongful resolute conviction. There is what is neither a great-grounds dharma nor a great-affliction-grounds dharma — namely, whatever remains apart from the foregoing. For those who hold that mental scatteredness is not concentration, they state that these two categories of great-grounds dharmas, though bearing twenty names, comprise sixteen genuinely distinct substances, and the four alternatives they formulate accordingly differ from those just given — the first alternative, on their account, comprises six dharmas, namely the aforementioned five together with concentration; the second alternative likewise comprises six dharmas, namely the aforementioned five together with mental scatteredness; the third alternative comprises four dharmas, namely the aforementioned five with mental scatteredness excluded; and the fourth alternative is as already stated. The verdict: the former position stated is sound. The minor-affliction-grounds dharmas are of ten kinds: first, anger; second, resentment; third, concealment; fourth, vexation; fifth, flattery; sixth, deception;

seventh, arrogance; eighth, stinginess; ninth, envy; tenth, harmfulness. The great wholesome-grounds dharmas are of ten kinds: first, faith; second, diligence; third, shame; fourth, moral dread; fifth, non-greed; sixth, non-hatred; seventh, tranquility; eighth, equanimity; ninth, heedfulness; tenth, non-harmfulness.

The great unwholesome-grounds dharmas are of five kinds: first, ignorance; second, torpor; third, restlessness; fourth, shamelessness; fifth, lack of moral dread.

The great covered-undefined-grounds dharmas are of three kinds: first, ignorance; second, torpor; third, restlessness. The great uncovered-undefined-grounds dharmas are of ten kinds, being precisely the same feeling and the other nine dharmas already listed among the great-grounds dharmas. One asks: what is the meaning of "the great-grounds dharmas" and the rest? The answer: whatever dharma may be found within every mind whatsoever is called a great-grounds dharma — that is, whether defiled or undefiled, whether contaminated or uncontaminated, whether wholesome, unwholesome, or undefined, whether bound to the three realms or unbound, whether belonging to a learner, a non-learner, or neither, whether abandoned by seeing, by cultivation, or by neither,

whether belonging to the mental ground or to the five sense-consciousness bodies — since it may be found within every such mind, it is called a great-grounds dharma. Whatever dharma may be found within every defiled mind is called a great-affliction-grounds dharma — that is, whether unwholesome or undefined, whether bound to the desire realm, the form realm, or the formless realm, whether abandoned by seeing or by cultivation, whether belonging to the mental ground or to the five sense-consciousness bodies, it may be found whenever affliction arises, and it is for this reason that it is called a great-affliction-grounds dharma. One should understand that, of these, faithlessness and the other four dharmas are found only together with every defiled mind, and are therefore established as great-affliction-grounds dharmas; forgetful mindfulness and the other four have already been explained above. Whatever dharma may be found within only a small portion of defiled minds is called a minor-affliction-grounds dharma — that is, anger and the other seven,

Further, anger and the other seven are bound solely to the desire realm; flattery and deception are bound to the desire realm and the first dhyāna; arrogance is bound to all three realms. Further, these ten kinds are solely abandoned by cultivation, and occur solely on the mental ground; whenever any one of them arises, none of the others can arise together with it, since they mutually contradict one another — and it is for this reason that they are called minor-affliction-grounds dharmas.

Whatever dharma may be found only within every wholesome mind is called a great wholesome-grounds dharma — that is, whether contaminated or uncontaminated, whether attained at birth or through applied practice, whether bound to the three realms or unbound, whether belonging to a learner, a non-learner, or neither,

whether belonging to the mental ground or to the five sense-consciousness bodies — since it may be found within every wholesome mind, it is called a great wholesome-grounds dharma. Whatever dharma may be found within every unwholesome mind is called a great unwholesome-grounds dharma — that is, whether abandoned by seeing suffering, seeing its origin, seeing cessation, seeing the path, or by cultivation, whether belonging to the mental ground or to the five sense-consciousness bodies, it may be found within every unwholesome mind, and it is for this reason that it is called a great unwholesome-grounds dharma. One should understand that, of these, shamelessness and lack of moral dread are found solely within every unwholesome mind, and are therefore called great unwholesome-grounds dharmas. Torpor and restlessness, being subsumed within the entanglements, are associated in common with every unwholesome mind, and, further, obstruct calm-abiding and insight with especially forceful effect, and are therefore also established among the unwholesome-grounds dharmas. Ignorance, being a single kind of latent tendency, is associated with every unwholesome mind pervasively, and is therefore also established among the unwholesome-grounds dharmas — no other latent tendency or secondary affliction possesses this same quality. Whatever dharma may be found within every covered-undefined mind is called a great covered-undefined-grounds dharma — that is, whether the mind associated with the desire realm's own view of the perishable aggregation of self and the extreme views, or the mind associated with every affliction of the form and formless realms, whether belonging to the mental ground or to the five sense-consciousness bodies, it may be found within every covered-undefined mind, and it is for this reason that it is called a great covered-undefined-grounds dharma.

One should understand that, in this case, there exists no distinct mental factor beyond these, only what belongs to the covered-undefined moral quality — ignorance, torpor, and restlessness alone are entanglements, obstructing calm-abiding and insight to a superior degree, or else are subsumed within the latent tendencies, found pervasively within every covered-undefined mind, and it is on this account that they are established among the covered-undefined grounds. Whatever dharma may be found within every uncovered-undefined mind is called a great uncovered-undefined-grounds dharma — that is, whether bound to the desire, form, or formless realm, whether belonging to the mental ground or to the five sense-consciousness bodies, whether arising as a ripened effect,

whether belonging to the class of deportment, whether belonging to the domain of skilled craft, or whether belonging to a mind arising from supernormal transformation — since it may be found within every such mind, it is called a great uncovered-undefined-grounds dharma.

One should understand that, in this case, too, there exists no distinct mental factor beyond these, only what belongs to the uncovered-undefined moral quality — it is precisely feeling and the other nine dharmas, already found universally within every uncovered-undefined mind, that are here established among the uncovered-undefined grounds.