Mistaking Calm for Cure

One should understand that, within this discussion, there are two kinds of concentration: first, defiled; second, undefiled. The defiled kind is called both concentration and mental scatteredness;

the undefiled kind is called concentration, but is never called mental scatteredness. Concentration, accordingly, may be classified through twelve statements.

First, there is a concentration whose single object is scattered. Second, there is a concentration whose single object is unscattered. Third, there is a concentration whose single aspect is scattered. Fourth, there is a concentration whose single aspect is unscattered. Fifth, there is

a concentration whose single object and single aspect is scattered. Sixth, there is a concentration whose single object and single aspect is unscattered. Seventh, there is a concentration whose many objects are scattered. Eighth, there is a concentration whose many objects are unscattered. Ninth, there is a concentration whose many aspects are scattered. Tenth, there is a concentration whose many aspects are unscattered. Eleventh, there is a concentration whose many objects and many aspects are scattered. Twelfth, there is a concentration whose many objects and many aspects are unscattered. As for a concentration whose single object is scattered: this refers, for instance, to a certain kind of person who, reflecting upon the impurity of a single thing, his cultivation not yet thoroughly ripened, then, with respect to that same thing, contemplates it as livid discoloration, or as bloating, or as festering, or as broken apart, or as marked with strange redness, or as being devoured, or as scattered and separated, or as reduced to white bone, or as a jumbled heap of bones — his mind scattered, drifting, unfixed, lacking singleness of object — and, on account of these causes and conditions, his earlier concentration is lost and his later concentration fails to advance. As for a concentration whose single object is unscattered: this refers to a certain kind of person who, reflecting upon the impurity of a single thing, his cultivation already thoroughly ripened, then, with respect to that same thing, contemplates it, broadly, as livid discoloration all the way through to a jumbled heap of bones — his mind unscattered, not drifting, not unfixed, abiding and holding fast to a single object — and, on account of these causes and conditions, his earlier concentration is not lost, and he is able to advance to a later concentration. As for a concentration whose single aspect is scattered: this refers to a certain kind of person who reflects upon impermanence, his cultivation not yet thoroughly ripened, and who, on this very basis, contemplates now its increase and decrease, now its momentariness, now its alteration, now its wearing away — his mind scattered, drifting, unfixed, lacking singleness of object — and, on account of these causes and conditions, his earlier concentration is lost and his later concentration fails to advance. As for a concentration whose single aspect is unscattered: this refers to a certain kind of person who reflects upon impermanence, his cultivation already thoroughly ripened, and who, on this very basis, contemplates, broadly, its increase and decrease all the way through to its wearing away — his mind unscattered, not drifting, not unfixed, abiding and holding fast to a single object — and, on account of these causes and conditions, his earlier concentration is not lost, and he is able to advance to a later concentration. As for a concentration whose single object and single aspect is scattered: this refers to a certain kind of person who reflects upon the impermanence of material form, his cultivation not yet thoroughly ripened, and who, on this very basis, contemplates now its increase and decrease, broadly, all the way through to its wearing away —

his mind scattered, drifting, unfixed, lacking singleness of object — and, on account of these causes and conditions, his earlier concentration is lost and his later concentration fails to advance.

As for a concentration whose single object and single aspect is unscattered: this refers to a certain kind of person who reflects upon the impermanence of material form, his cultivation already thoroughly ripened, and who, on this very basis, contemplates, broadly, its increase and decrease all the way through to its wearing away — his mind unscattered, not drifting, not unfixed, abiding and holding fast to a single object — and, on account of these causes and conditions, his earlier concentration is not lost, and he is able to advance to a later concentration.

As for a concentration whose many objects are scattered: this refers to a certain kind of person who abides in the mindfulness-foundation of the body, following along in the contemplation of the body, his cultivation not yet thoroughly ripened,

and who then abides in the mindfulness-foundation of feeling, following along in the contemplation of feeling; abides in the mindfulness-foundation of mind, following along in the contemplation of mind; and abides in the mindfulness-foundation of dharmas, following along in the contemplation of dharmas — his mind scattered, drifting, unfixed, lacking singleness of object — and, on account of these causes and conditions, his earlier concentration is lost and his later concentration fails to advance. As for a concentration whose many objects are unscattered: this refers to a certain kind of person who abides in the mindfulness-foundation of the body, following along in the contemplation of the body, his cultivation already thoroughly ripened, and who then abides in the mindfulness-foundation of feeling, following along in the contemplation of feeling, and so on, up through abiding in the mindfulness-foundation of dharmas, following along in the contemplation of dharmas — his mind unscattered, not drifting, not unfixed, abiding and holding fast to a single object — and, on account of these causes and conditions, his earlier concentration is not lost, and he is able to advance to a later concentration.

As for a concentration whose many aspects are scattered: this refers to a certain kind of person who reflects upon impermanence, his cultivation not yet thoroughly ripened, and who then contemplates now suffering, now emptiness, now the absence of self — his mind scattered, drifting, unfixed, lacking singleness of object — and, on account of these causes and conditions, his earlier concentration is lost and his later concentration fails to advance.

As for a concentration whose many aspects are unscattered: this refers to a certain kind of person who reflects upon impermanence, his cultivation already thoroughly ripened, and who then contemplates now suffering, now emptiness, now the absence of self — his mind unscattered, not drifting, not unfixed, abiding and holding fast to a single object — and, on account of these causes and conditions, his earlier concentration is not lost, and he is able to advance to a later concentration.

As for a concentration whose many objects and many aspects are scattered: this refers to a certain kind of person who reflects that the body is impermanent, his cultivation not yet thoroughly ripened, and who then contemplates feeling as suffering, mind as empty, and dharmas as without self — his mind scattered, drifting, unfixed, lacking singleness of object — and, on account of these causes and conditions, his earlier concentration is lost and his later concentration fails to advance.

As for a concentration whose many objects and many aspects are unscattered: this refers to a certain kind of person who reflects that the body is impermanent, his cultivation already thoroughly ripened, and who then contemplates feeling as suffering, mind as empty, and dharmas as without self — his mind unscattered, not drifting, not unfixed, abiding and holding fast to a single object — and, on account of these causes and conditions, his earlier concentration is not lost, and he is able to advance to a later concentration.

What is ignorance? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to bring those in doubt to a settled resolution — that is, scripture states that, on account of failing to penetrate, failing to comprehend, and failing to know, this is called ignorance; incorrect awareness, too, bears the mark of failing to know, and there are those who thereby give rise to the doubt that ignorance is simply identical in substance to incorrect awareness, these two possessing no genuine distinction between them — and it is in order to bring this doubt to a settled resolution, revealing that these two possess genuinely distinct substances, that this treatise is composed. What is ignorance? The answer: absence of knowledge with respect to the three realms — this reading accords with correct principle, since absence of knowledge bound to the three realms fully subsumes every kind of ignorance. Were one instead to say that ignorance is named simply for failing to know the three realms, then this would fail to subsume the two kinds of ignorance that take cessation and the path as their object, since these do not take the three realms as their object at all. What is incorrect awareness? The answer: wisdom drawn forth by what is contrary to reason.

One asks: why does this passage's question narrow while its answer broadens? That is, incorrect awareness is solely a defiled wisdom, yet "wisdom drawn forth by what is contrary to reason" spans both the defiled and the undefiled — how is this known to be so? As the Karma Aggregate states: every mental misdeed is mental karma drawn forth by what is contrary to reason; yet there exists mental karma drawn forth by what is contrary to reason that is not a mental misdeed — namely, every covered-undefined mental karma, and a portion of uncovered-undefined mental karma — and it is thereby known that "wisdom drawn forth by what is contrary to reason" spans both the defiled and the undefiled. The answer: within this passage, "wisdom drawn forth by what is contrary to reason" should be understood to subsume solely defiled wisdom. Why is this so? Being drawn forth by what is contrary to reason is, in brief, of two kinds: first, in the conventional sense; second, in the ultimate sense. This passage speaks of what is contrary to reason in the ultimate sense, and it is thereby known that it subsumes solely defiled wisdom, since it is solely defiled dharmas that are named "contrary to reason" in the ultimate sense — the uncovered-undefined bears this name only in a conventional sense. What follows now is the manner in which the proponent of correct principle debates with the Vibhajyavādin, through question and answer and refutation and reconciliation, to establish at length the nature of incorrect awareness. Though incorrect awareness is indeed subsumed within wisdom drawn forth by what is contrary to reason, there nonetheless exists a sense in which one possesses correct awareness and yet still speaks falsely — "you say that incorrect awareness is subsumed within wisdom drawn forth by what is contrary to reason?" — this is the question posed by the Vibhajyavādin, fixing the opposing tenet with precision, since, without first fixing precisely what a rival school actually holds, to then state that school's own faults would be improper. "The answer: yes" is the reply of the proponent of correct principle, since the tenet just established involves no distortion. "What do you intend — do those who possess correct awareness and yet speak falsely all, in every case, do so because they have lost mindfulness through incorrect awareness?" — this, too, is the Vibhajyavādin's own question, raising the case of false speech in order to press once more upon his own tenet. "The answer: yes" is likewise the reply of the proponent of correct principle, since what has been said accords with the very tenet in question. "And do you further intend that there exists no case of possessing correct awareness and yet speaking falsely?" — this is the Vibhajyavādin, about to mount a challenge, fixing the opposing tenet once more in order to display its contradiction with correct principle. "The answer: no" is the proponent of correct principle, blocking this very question and showing that no contradiction in principle follows — that is, although incorrect awareness is indeed subsumed within wisdom drawn forth by what is contrary to reason, there nonetheless exists a genuine sense in which one possesses correct awareness and yet still speaks falsely, and this meaning is not thereby negated, and it is for this reason that the answer is "no." "Hear now what I have to say: if incorrect awareness is subsumed within wisdom drawn forth by what is contrary to reason, and if all those who possess correct awareness and yet speak falsely do so, in every case, because they have lost mindfulness through incorrect awareness, then it ought to follow that there exists no case of possessing correct awareness and yet speaking falsely; and if you do not hold that there exists no case of possessing correct awareness and yet speaking falsely, then you ought not to say that incorrect awareness is subsumed within wisdom drawn forth by what is contrary to reason, and that all those who possess correct awareness and yet speak falsely do so, in every case, because they have lost mindfulness through incorrect awareness — to maintain both of these together is, in either direction, improper" — this is the Vibhajyavādin, mounting his challenge by turning the two horns of the dilemma back and forth against one another: the first horn shows that the position, in according with its own tenet, contradicts principle; the second horn shows that, in according with principle, it contradicts its own tenet — since neither can be sustained, he concludes by summarizing that to maintain both together is, in either direction, improper. The intended force of this challenge is this: if incorrect awareness is simply identical with wisdom drawn forth by what is contrary to reason, then every deceptive utterance whatsoever is wisdom drawn forth by what is contrary to reason, and, this utterance arising precisely from incorrect awareness, one ought to be forced to say that there exists no case of speaking falsely with correct awareness.

"And, should one instead maintain that speaking falsely with correct awareness does exist, then one ought no longer to say that every such utterance arises from incorrect awareness" — thus does the position, taken in one direction, contradict correct principle, and, taken in the other direction, contradict its own tenet, a genuine difficulty following in either case. The proponent of correct principle, in reply, offers this reconciling explanation: although it is granted that every deceptive utterance whatsoever does indeed arise from incorrect awareness, it may nonetheless properly be described as speaking falsely with correct awareness. Why is this so? A deceptive utterance is one in which a person, possessing correct awareness of a given matter, nonetheless speaks falsely regarding it — that is, he possesses correct awareness of what he has seen and the rest, and yet distorts it in his speech, and it is for this reason that this is called speaking falsely with correct awareness. Further, a deceptive utterance is one in which a person possesses correct awareness of his own perception, and yet speaks falsely regarding it — that is, he possesses correct awareness of his own perception of seeing and the rest, and yet distorts it in his speech, and it is for this reason that this is called speaking falsely with correct awareness. Further, a deceptive utterance is one in which a person possesses correct awareness of his own view, and yet speaks falsely regarding it — that is, he possesses correct awareness of his own view of seeing and the rest, and yet distorts it in his speech, and it is for this reason that this is called speaking falsely with correct awareness. Further, a deceptive utterance is one in which a person, in circumstances that properly call for correct, forthright speech, nonetheless speaks falsely — that is, when addressing kings, ministers, and the like, in circumstances that properly call for correct, forthright speech, he instead distorts his speech, and it is for this reason that this is called speaking falsely with correct awareness. It is on account of such reasons as these that, although it is granted that every deceptive utterance whatsoever does indeed arise from incorrect awareness, it may nonetheless properly be described as speaking falsely with correct awareness. One asks: if this utterance arises from incorrect awareness, and yet is named only "speaking falsely with incorrect awareness" rather than "speaking falsely with correct awareness," then this same utterance also arises from the ten great-grounds dharmas and the rest — ought it not also, then, to be named "speaking falsely with feeling" and the like, rather than "speaking falsely with correct awareness"? This objection, raised by the proponent of correct principle against the Vibhajyavādin in turn, is meant to answer the earlier challenge by way of reversal. Among the three kinds of refutation, this is a refutation through matching the opponent — the nature of these three kinds of refutation has already been explained above. Yet, with respect to feeling and the other great-grounds dharmas, the treatise abbreviates by omitting the first and last, raising only the middle case of ignorance, in order to press this same challenge and thereby resolve the earlier difficulty — one ought, accordingly, to press the challenge in this way: "are all cases of ignorance associated with incorrect awareness?" — this is the question posed by the proponent of correct principle, fixing the opposing tenet with precision, since, without first fixing precisely what a rival school actually holds, to then state that school's own faults would be improper. "The answer: yes" is the reply of the Vibhajyavādin, since the question posed accords precisely with his own tenet. "What do you intend — do those who possess correct awareness and yet speak falsely all belong to the class of ignorance, entangled by ignorance, having lost mindfulness through incorrect awareness, and thereby speak falsely?" — this, too, is the proponent of correct principle's own question, raising the case of false speech in order to press once more upon the opposing tenet. "The answer: yes" is likewise the reply of the Vibhajyavādin, since what has been said accords with the very tenet in question. "And do you further intend that there exists no case of possessing correct awareness and yet speaking falsely?" — this is the proponent of correct principle,

about to mount a challenge, fixing the opposing tenet once more in order to display its contradiction with correct principle. "The answer: no" is the Vibhajyavādin, blocking this question and showing that no contradiction in principle follows — that is, although every case of ignorance is indeed associated with incorrect awareness, there nonetheless exists a genuine sense in which one possesses correct awareness and yet still speaks falsely, and this meaning is not thereby negated, and it is for this reason that the answer is "no." "Hear now what I have to say: if you maintain that every case of ignorance is associated with incorrect awareness, and that all those who possess correct awareness and yet speak falsely, belonging to the class of ignorance, entangled by ignorance, having lost mindfulness through incorrect awareness, thereby speak falsely, then it ought to follow that there exists no case of possessing correct awareness and yet speaking falsely; and if you do not hold that there exists no case of possessing correct awareness and yet speaking falsely, then you ought not to say that every case of ignorance is associated with incorrect awareness, and that all those who possess correct awareness and yet speak falsely, belonging to the class of ignorance, entangled by ignorance, having lost mindfulness through incorrect awareness, thereby speak falsely — to maintain both of these together is, in either direction, improper" — this is the proponent of correct principle, mounting his own challenge by turning the two horns of the dilemma back and forth against one another: the first horn shows that the position, in according with its own tenet, contradicts principle; the second horn shows that, in according with principle, it contradicts its own tenet — since neither can be sustained, he concludes by summarizing that to maintain both together is, in either direction, improper. The intended force of this challenge is this: if every case of ignorance is simply associated with incorrect awareness, then every deceptive utterance whatsoever is a case of forgotten mindfulness and incorrect awareness, this utterance arising precisely from ignorance, and one ought to be forced to say that there exists no case of speaking falsely with correct awareness — and, should one instead maintain that speaking falsely with correct awareness does exist, then one ought no longer to say that every such utterance arises from ignorance in this way. The Vibhajyavādin, according to what is proper, ought now to offer this same reconciling reply in turn: although it is granted that every deceptive utterance whatsoever does indeed arise from ignorance, it may nonetheless properly be described as speaking falsely with correct awareness, and ought not to be described as speaking falsely with ignorance. The proponent of correct principle ought then to tell him: our own tenet is, in fact, exactly the same — although it is granted that every deceptive utterance whatsoever does indeed arise from incorrect awareness, it may nonetheless properly be described as speaking falsely with correct awareness, not with incorrect awareness — and it is for this reason that his own challenge does not, in fact, hold. What is arrogance? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to analyze the meaning of scripture — that is, scripture speaks of a mind's arrogance and a mind's pride, yet, though scripture states this much, it does not analyze its meaning; scripture is the very root this treatise depends upon, and what it leaves unstated, this treatise should now state, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. What is arrogance? The answer: whatever mind is intoxicated, greatly intoxicated, stupefied, greatly stupefied, arrogant and self-indulgent, self-aggrandizing — this is called arrogance. The terms "intoxicated" and the rest, though differing in wording, are undivided in substance, all alike serving to make manifest arrogance's own inherent nature. What is pride? The answer: whatever mind has already taken pride, will take pride, or presently takes pride, its own self-elevating, self-aggrandizing nature — this is called pride. The terms "has already taken pride" and the rest, though differing in wording, are undivided in substance, all alike serving to make manifest pride's own inherent nature. What distinction is there between arrogance and pride? One asks: why is this treatise further composed? The answer: it is composed in order to bring those in doubt to a settled resolution — that is, these two dharmas so closely resemble one another that, seeing one of much arrogance, the world commonly says this person has much pride, and, seeing one of much pride, the world commonly says this person has much arrogance; there are those who thereby give rise to the doubt that these two are, in fact, one and the same — and it is in order to bring this doubt to a settled resolution, revealing that these two possess genuinely distinct inherent natures, that this treatise is composed. What distinction is there between arrogance and pride? The answer: that which, without reference to another, becomes attached to and indulgent in one's own qualities, arrogant and self-indulgent by nature, is properly called arrogance; that which, with reference to another, elevates and aggrandizes itself in comparison, is called pride — such, then, is their distinction. Here, arrogance

refers to that which, without reference to another, is merely attached to and indulgent in one's own family lineage, physical beauty, strength, wealth, rank, intelligence, and the like, arrogant and self-indulgent by nature; pride, here, refers to that which, with reference to another, elevates and aggrandizes itself in comparison with respect to one's own family lineage, physical beauty, strength, wealth, rank, intelligence, and the like. One asks: what is the inherent nature of arrogance? There are those who say: mind itself is its inherent nature, since the sounds "mada" and "māna" so closely resemble one another. There are yet other masters who say: craving is its inherent nature, since this passage speaks of attachment and indulgence in one's own qualities. There are also those who say: pride is its inherent nature, since the sounds "mada" and "māna" so closely resemble one another, yet, when directed with reference to another, it is called only pride, and, when not so directed, it is called pride as well as arrogance. The verdict: it should be said that there exists a distinct mental factor, drawn forth by craving, that is called arrogance, occurring solely on the mental ground, and solely abandoned by cultivation. This arrogance differs from pride in many respects: pride is an entanglement, while arrogance is not an entanglement; pride is subsumed within the fetters, the latent tendencies, the secondary afflictions, and the entanglements, while arrogance is not subsumed within the fetters, the latent tendencies, or the entanglements, being merely a secondary affliction; pride spans both what is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, while arrogance is solely abandoned by cultivation; pride is not subsumed within the great-grounds dharmas and the rest, while arrogance is subsumed within the minor-affliction-grounds dharmas. Yet pride and arrogance are both alike bound to all three realms. One asks: pride arises with reference to another — does the pride abandoned by cultivation, bound to the desire and form realms, arise with reference to another, its own outward-turned operation? Yet the pride bound to the formless realm, and the pride abandoned by seeing, do not arise with reference to another, their own operation being inward-turned — how, then, can these still be called pride? The answer: even the pride abandoned by cultivation, bound to the formless realm, though it does not arise with reference to another, nonetheless dwells within the very mark of pride, and is therefore still called pride. Further, it is because one first arose with reference to another, within the lower realms, that, by the force of habitual repetition, once reborn in the formless realm, this same pride now manifests there as well. There are those who say: although one is reborn in the formless realm, this pride does not there manifest, and yet, while still within the lower realm, one gives rise to that very pride — that is, two beings who have both attained a formless concentration, questioning one another back and forth about the marks of the concentration each has attained, thereby come to give rise to pride through this very comparison. As for the pride abandoned by seeing, though it does not arise with reference to another, it nonetheless dwells within the very mark of pride, and is therefore still called pride. Further, the pride abandoned by cultivation arises with reference to another, and, by the force of habitual repetition, draws forth the pride abandoned by seeing, causing it, too, to manifest. There are those who say: even the pride abandoned by seeing arises with reference to another — that is, exactly as those who hold the view of self, gathering together in one place, questioning one another back and forth about their own view of self, thereby give rise to pride through this comparison. The verdict: it should be said that not every kind of pride necessarily arises with reference to another — from beginningless time, through the force of habitual repetition, pride manifests even with reference to one's own continuum alone, exactly as scripture states: the Venerable Aniruddha went to where the Venerable Śāriputra was, and said as follows: I possess the pure heavenly eye, surpassing that of any ordinary human, able to observe a thousand world-systems without exerting any great effort. Śāriputra said: this is indeed your own pride — a pride that depends solely on one's own continuum, and arises without reference to another at all. Yet, in speaking of pride as generally arising with reference to another, this is spoken with reference to what applies to the majority of cases, since pride, for the most part, does arise with reference to another. If one gives rise to overreaching pride, taking "I see suffering as suffering," and so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to refute other schools and to reveal the correct meaning — that is, there are those who hold that pride possesses no object at all, or that pride takes another stage as its object, or that pride takes the uncontaminated as its object, or that pride takes the unconditioned as its object, or that pride takes another section as its object; in order to block these various mistaken positions, and to reveal that every kind of pride does indeed possess an object, yet never takes another stage, the uncontaminated, the unconditioned, or another section as its object, this treatise is composed. If one gives rise to overreaching pride, taking "I see suffering as suffering," or "I see origin as origin," what does this take as its object?

The answer: this refers to a certain kind of person who, drawing near to a good spiritual friend, hearing the true Dharma, and giving proper attention to it, thereby, on account of these causes and conditions, attains a forbearance in accordance with the truths. As one on the border of direct realization of suffering, he takes delight in and clearly perceives suffering through this forbearance; as one on the border of direct realization of origin, he takes delight in and clearly perceives origin through this forbearance.

Sustained by the power of this very forbearance's own attention, or else, in the interval between concentrations, lacking attention altogether, the view and doubt he once held fail to manifest before him — yet, though they fail to manifest, he does not perceive this, and so he thinks: I have seen suffering as suffering, or have seen origin as origin — and, on account of this, he gives rise to pride, having already taken pride, about to take pride, his mind self-elevating, self-aggrandizing — this is named overreaching pride. It takes precisely suffering, or precisely origin, as its object. Here, "a certain kind of person" refers to one cultivating the wholesome roots conducive to penetration. "Drawing near to a good spiritual friend" refers to drawing near to a virtuous friend — a virtuous friend being the Buddha and the Buddha's own disciples, who cause one to cultivate wholesome dharmas and thereby attain benefit and happiness. "Hearing the true Dharma" refers to that which denounces the flow of turning and praises the flow of return, drawing one toward superior conduct, called the true teaching — he is able to attend with his ear, hearing it without distortion. "Giving proper attention to it" refers to growing weary of and disgusted with the flow of turning, delighting in the flow of return, correctly reflecting on what he has heard, and proceeding to cultivate superior conduct. "On account of these causes and conditions" refers to these three serving as his own applied practice. "Attains a forbearance in accordance with the truths" refers to the forbearance found among the wholesome roots conducive to penetration, this forbearance according with the principle of the four noble truths, or according with the noble path, and it is for this reason called "in accordance with the truths." "As one on the border of direct realization of suffering, he takes delight in and clearly perceives suffering through this forbearance" refers to the forbearance in accordance with the truths that takes the truth of suffering as its object; "as one on the border of direct realization of origin, he takes delight in and clearly perceives origin through this forbearance" refers to the forbearance in accordance with the truths that takes the truth of origin as its object — "delight" and "clear perception" being synonyms for forbearance, both alike displaying the contemplative wisdom that observes the Dharma. "Direct realization" refers to the path of seeing; this forbearance stands close to it, and is therefore called its "border." This altogether displays dharma-following practice; within this, every one of the four factors of stream-entry is fully displayed — that is, drawing near to a good spiritual friend, and so on, up through dharma-following practice, culminating in the approach to and fruit of stream-entry, taking these as what precedes. "Sustained by the power of this very forbearance's own attention" refers to this yoga practitioner's own wholesome root being sustained by the power of his attention toward the truth as observed through forbearance, thereby causing view and doubt to fail temporarily to manifest before him. "Or else, in the interval between concentrations, lacking attention altogether" refers to the interval between having already emerged from an earlier concentration and not yet entered a later one, which is called "the interval.

"Improper attention" is what is meant by "lacking attention"; or this reveals the absence of any attention in accordance with reality. This then reveals that, afterward, whenever he acts, view and doubt fail to manifest, sustained by the power of the wholesome root of forbearance and attention. Here, "view" refers to the view of the perishable aggregation of self and the clinging to rules and vows; "doubt" refers to doubt itself. There are those who say: "view" refers to the view of the perishable aggregation of self, the extreme views, and the clinging to rules and vows, excepting only wrong view, since one who has attained forbearance no longer denies the four noble truths. The Western masters state: only the clinging to rules and vows is called "view" in this context, since one who has attained forbearance no longer grasps at a self. The verdict: it should be said that he, too, still grasps at a self, and it is for this reason that the former position stated is sound — although he still, for a time, grasps at a self, he does not thereby cling to it as permanent or as subject to annihilation; and although he still, for a time, conceives of it as pure, he does not thereby cling to it as supreme. Yet every affliction, on account of five causes and conditions, though not yet permanently cut off, nonetheless fails to manifest: first, through the power of calm-abiding; second, through the power of insight; third, through the power of a good teacher and friend; fourth, through the power of a favorable dwelling place; fifth, through the power of one's own nature being but thinly afflicted. This passage, for the sake of brevity, mentions only the first two — "insight" refers to attention, and "calm-abiding" refers to forbearance.

Sustained by the power of these two wholesome roots, view and doubt fail to manifest. "Yet, though they fail to manifest, he does not perceive this" refers to the fact that, the afflictions being so subtle, and his own discerning wisdom so weak, he does not perceive this. "And so he thinks: I have seen suffering as suffering," and so on, at length, refers to the fact that this contaminated forbearance, though it does indeed observe the truths of suffering and origin, causes him to suppose he has already attained the true, uncontaminated seeing, when in fact he has not — and this is named overreaching pride. "Arising from seeing suffering" refers to taking suffering as its object and condition; "arising from seeing origin" refers to taking origin as its object and condition. This contaminated forbearance, though it is indeed capable of observing the truths of suffering and origin both together and separately, is such that this overreaching pride is capable of taking only the separate object — that is, whatever is abandoned by seeing suffering takes only what is abandoned by seeing suffering, belonging to its own stage, as its object, and so on, up through whatever is abandoned by cultivation taking only what is abandoned by cultivation, belonging to its own stage, as its object. One asks: this overreaching pride ought also to be able to take as its object the mind and mental factors of the class of forbearance regarding suffering and origin — why, then, does this passage speak only of taking suffering and origin as its object? The answer: it ought indeed to be so stated, and that it is not so stated should be understood as a matter of surplus meaning left implicit. Further, taking the class of forbearance as its object is solely abandoned by cultivation, while taking suffering and origin as its object spans all five sections of pride — and it is because this passage speaks only of what pervasively takes an object across all sections that it does not speak of pride taking the class of forbearance as its object. Further, the contaminated class of forbearance is itself subsumed within suffering and origin, and it is for this reason that this passage speaks of taking suffering and origin as its object; and the wording "taking suffering and origin as its object" also blocks the mistaken grasp that this pride possesses no object at all, and further blocks the mistaken grasp that this pride is capable of taking another stage or another section as its object. There are yet other masters who say: "taking suffering and origin as its object" refers to taking the forbearance regarding suffering and origin as its object, not to taking suffering and origin themselves as its object — yet this position does not accord with correct principle, since, in what follows, with respect to the overreaching pride grounded in cessation and the path, this passage does not speak of taking cessation or the path itself as its object — and it is thereby that taking suffering and origin themselves as its object here involves no contradiction to correct principle.

If one gives rise to overreaching pride, taking "I see cessation as cessation," or "I see the path as the path," what does this take as its object? The answer: this refers to a certain kind of person who, drawing near to a good spiritual friend, hearing the true Dharma, and giving proper attention to it, thereby, on account of these causes and conditions, attains a forbearance in accordance with the truths. As one on the border of direct realization of cessation, he takes delight in and clearly perceives that this is cessation; as one on the border of direct realization of the path, he takes delight in and clearly perceives that this is the path. Sustained by the power of this very forbearance's own attention,

or else, in the interval between concentrations, lacking attention altogether, the view and doubt he once held fail to manifest before him — yet, though they fail to manifest, he does not perceive this, and so he thinks: I have seen cessation as cessation, or have seen the path as the path — and, on account of this, he gives rise to pride, having already taken pride, about to take pride, his mind self-elevating, self-aggrandizing — this is named overreaching pride. It takes precisely the mind and mental factors associated with that very forbearance itself as its object. Every phrase within this passage carries the same sense as already explained above. "It takes precisely the mind and mental factors associated with that very forbearance itself as its object" refers to the fact that this contaminated forbearance, observing the truths of cessation and the path, causes him to suppose he has already attained the true, uncontaminated seeing, when in fact he has not — and this overreaching pride, though the contaminated forbearance does indeed take cessation and the path as its object, is nonetheless able to take only the mind and mental factors of that class of forbearance as its own object, since cessation and the path are themselves too tranquil and still to serve as an object for pride. The wording "taking the mind and the rest as its object" blocks the mistaken grasp that this pride possesses no object at all, and further blocks the mistaken grasp that this pride is capable of taking the unconditioned or the uncontaminated as its object. One asks: is this overreaching pride bound to the desire realm, or to the form realm? Suppose either — what fault follows? If it is bound to the desire realm, then the desire realm possesses no forbearance conducive to penetration for it to take as its object; if it is bound to the form realm, then a person not yet free from the desire realm's own defilements ought to possess no such pride at all. There are those who say: this pride is bound to the form realm. One asks: if that is so, then would not a person not yet free from the desire realm's own defilements possess no such pride? The answer: this passage speaks, in brief, only of the case of one already free from desire. There are those who say: even one not yet free from desire is capable of giving rise to overreaching pride belonging to the stage of preparatory approach — yet this position ought not to be maintained, since one who has not yet become free from the defilements of a lower stage never gives rise to the afflictions of a higher stage. There are yet others who say: this pride, too, is bound to the desire realm. One asks: if that is so, then the desire realm possesses no forbearance conducive to penetration — what, then, does it take as its object? The answer: although the desire realm possesses no forbearance conducive to penetration proper, it does possess a wholesome root resembling it, and this overreaching pride arises by taking that resembling wholesome root as its object, since the desire realm is fully equipped with a resembling counterpart to every meritorious quality. If one gives rise to overreaching pride, taking "my own births are exhausted," and so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise further composed? The answer: the passage above spoke only of the overreaching pride given rise to by ordinary beings; this treatise now wishes to speak broadly of the overreaching pride given rise to by both ordinary beings and noble ones alike — just as with ordinary beings and noble ones, so too should one who has not yet seen the truths and one who has already seen them, one who has not yet directly realized them and one who has already directly realized them, one belonging to the undetermined group and one belonging to the rightly-determined group, and one without the noble path and one with the noble path, all be understood in just the same way. Further, the passage above spoke only of the overreaching pride belonging to one who has not yet attained any fruit; this treatise now wishes to speak broadly of the overreaching pride belonging to one who has not yet attained a fruit and one who has already attained one. Further, the passage above spoke only of the overreaching pride arising in dependence on the path of seeing; this treatise now wishes to speak broadly of the overreaching pride arising in dependence on the paths of seeing, cultivation, and the path beyond further training. Further, the passage above spoke only of the overreaching pride arising in dependence on the path of the learner; this treatise now wishes to speak broadly of the overreaching pride arising in dependence on the paths of both the learner and the non-learner. Further, the passage above spoke only of the overreaching pride belonging to the desire and form realms; this treatise now wishes to speak broadly of the overreaching pride belonging to all three realms — and it is for these reasons that this treatise is composed.

If one gives rise to overreaching pride, taking "my own births are exhausted," what does this take as its object? The answer: this refers to a certain kind of person who thinks as follows: this is the path, this is the practice — I, in dependence on this path and this practice, have already fully understood suffering, have already permanently cut off origin, have already realized cessation, and have already cultivated the path — my own births are exhausted. On account of this, he gives rise to pride, having already taken pride, about to take pride, his mind self-elevating, self-aggrandizing — this is named overreaching pride. It takes precisely birth as its object. Here, "this is the path, this is the practice" refers to whatever place he takes to be the path and the practice; "have already fully understood suffering," and so on, up through "have already cultivated the path," refers to whatever place he conceives as suffering, origin, cessation, and the path; "my own births are exhausted" refers to whatever aggregate he conceives as birth. "It takes precisely birth as its object" refers to the taking of what is to be exhausted, birth, precisely the contaminated aggregates, as its object. One asks: this overreaching pride ought also to be able to take, as its object, the mind and mental factors that its own holder has grasped as the path and the practice — why, then, does this passage speak only of taking birth as its object? The answer: it ought indeed to be so stated, and that it is not so stated should be understood as a matter of surplus meaning left implicit. Further, taking the class of path and practice as its object is solely abandoned by cultivation, while taking birth to be exhausted as its object spans all five sections of pride — and it is because this passage speaks only of what pervasively takes an object across all sections that it does not speak of pride taking the class of path and practice as its object. Further, the contaminated path and practice is itself subsumed within birth, and it is for this reason that this passage speaks of taking birth as its object. There are yet other masters who say: what he has grasped as the path and practice is itself named "birth," being capable of giving rise to further birth, and it is for this reason that this pride takes only the path capable of exhausting birth as its object — yet this position does not accord with correct principle, since, in what follows, with respect to the pride grounded in "the pure conduct has been established" and the rest, this passage does not speak of taking birth as its object — and it is thereby that taking birth to be exhausted as its object here involves no contradiction to correct principle.

If one gives rise to overreaching pride, taking "my own pure conduct has been established," what does this take as its object? The answer: this refers to a certain kind of person who thinks as follows: this is the path, this is the practice — I, in dependence on this path and this practice, have already fully understood suffering, have already permanently cut off origin, have already realized cessation, and have already cultivated the path — my own pure conduct has been established. On account of this, he gives rise to pride, having already taken pride, about to take pride, his mind self-elevating, self-aggrandizing — this is named overreaching pride. It takes precisely the mind and mental factors associated with that very path and practice as its object. Every phrase within this passage carries the same sense as already explained above. "My own pure conduct has been established" refers to whatever place he conceives as the pure conduct — arhats speak of the path of the learner as "already established," and of the path beyond further training as "now established." "It takes precisely the mind and mental factors associated with that very path and practice as its object" refers to the fact that this overreaching pride takes only the contaminated path and practice he himself has grasped as its object, since the uncontaminated pure conduct does not fall within its domain at all. If one gives rise to overreaching pride, taking "what was to be done by me has been done," what does this take as its object? The answer: this refers to a certain kind of person who thinks as follows: this is the path, this is the practice — I, in dependence on this path and this practice,

have already fully understood suffering, have already permanently cut off origin, have already realized cessation, and have already cultivated the path — I have already cut off the latent tendencies, have already slain the afflictions,

have already spat out the fetters, have already exhausted the contaminants, and what was to be done has been done. On account of this, he gives rise to pride, having already taken pride, about to take pride, his mind self-elevating, self-aggrandizing — this is named overreaching pride. It takes precisely the mind and mental factors associated with that very path and practice as its object. Every phrase within this passage carries the same sense as already explained above. "Have already cut off the latent tendencies," and so on, broadly, up through "have already exhausted the contaminants," is the master of this treatise, having attained skill with respect to the meaning of synonymous expressions, thus speaking through a variety of expressions — the wording differing, though the substance remains undivided, all alike serving to display the extinguishing of the afflictions. "Cutting off," "slaying," "spitting out," and "exhausting," when applied interchangeably to the latent tendencies and the rest, involve no contradiction whatsoever in meaning.

it is precisely the extinguishing of the afflictions that is called "what was to be done," and the fully satisfying accomplishment of this is called "has been done." "It takes precisely the mind and mental factors associated with that very path and practice as its object" refers to the fact that this overreaching pride takes only the contaminated path and practice he himself has grasped as its object, since the genuine extinguishing of the afflictions does not fall within its domain at all. If one gives rise to overreaching pride, taking "I shall undergo no further existence," and so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise further composed? The answer: the earlier passage spoke of the overreaching pride arising in dependence on liberation-in-due-time; this treatise now wishes to speak of the overreaching pride arising in dependence on liberation-not-dependent-on-time. Further, the earlier passage spoke of the overreaching pride arising in dependence on the knowledge of exhaustion; this treatise now wishes to speak of the overreaching pride arising in dependence on the knowledge of non-arising, and it is for these reasons that this treatise is composed. If one gives rise to overreaching pride, taking "I shall undergo no further existence," what does this take as its object?

The answer: this refers to a certain kind of person who thinks as follows: this is the path, this is the practice — I, in dependence on this path and this practice, have already fully understood suffering,

have already permanently cut off origin, have already realized cessation, have already cultivated the path — my own births are exhausted, the pure conduct has been established, what was to be done has been done, and I shall undergo no further existence. On account of this, he gives rise to pride, having already taken pride, about to take pride, his mind self-elevating, self-aggrandizing — this is named overreaching pride. It takes precisely existence as its object. Every phrase within this passage carries the same sense as already explained above; the further statement of "my own births are exhausted," and the rest, reveals that the knowledge of non-arising arises in dependence on the knowledge of exhaustion, exactly as the earlier knowledge of exhaustion arose in dependence on the path and practice, and it is for this reason that the path and practice are spoken of here as well. "I shall undergo no further existence" refers to the fact that, having attained the knowledge of non-arising, one no longer relapses or falls back into undergoing any further existence. "It takes precisely existence as its object" refers to the fact that this overreaching pride takes precisely the existence he himself will no longer undergo as its object. The questions and answers here should be understood exactly as before, since existence and birth share so closely related a meaning. There is a version of this text that speaks of taking the mind and mental factors as its object, thereby revealing that not undergoing further existence is itself precisely cessation and the path. One asks: why, then, is "my own births are exhausted" not treated in this same way? The answer: this, too, ought properly to be treated in the very same way, and the differing wording here is merely a matter of varied expression.

One asks: who gives rise to how many kinds of overreaching pride? There are those who say: an ordinary being gives rise to five kinds of overreaching pride — namely, with respect to superior contaminated wholesome roots, and with respect to the four śramaṇa-fruits of stream-entry and the rest. A stream-enterer gives rise to four kinds, excluding the first; a once-returner gives rise to three kinds, excluding the first two; a non-returner gives rise to two kinds, excluding the first three; and no arhat possesses any overreaching pride at all. One asks: how can a stream-enterer and the rest give rise to overreaching pride with respect to their own already-attained fruit? The answer: it is with respect to the superior grade of one's own nature that overreaching pride arises. There are those who say: an ordinary being gives rise to nine kinds of overreaching pride — namely, with respect to superior contaminated wholesome roots, and with respect to the four approaches and four fruits of the uncontaminated path. One who has attained the fruit of stream-entry gives rise to seven kinds, excluding the first two; one on the approach to the fruit of a once-returner gives rise to six kinds, excluding the first three; one who has attained the fruit of a once-returner gives rise to five kinds, excluding the first four; one on the approach to the fruit of a non-returner gives rise to four kinds, excluding the first five; one who has attained the fruit of a non-returner gives rise to three kinds, excluding the first six; one on the approach to arhatship gives rise to two kinds, excluding the first seven; and one who has attained the fruit of arhatship possesses no overreaching pride at all; nor does one merely on the approach to the fruit of stream-entry give rise to overreaching pride. The verdict: noble ones, too, are capable of giving rise to overreaching pride with respect to a superior contaminated wholesome root, and so, for each of the six kinds of noble one, the number stated above should be increased by one further. One asks: how can an ordinary being give rise to overreaching pride with respect to an arhat's own attainment? The answer: ordinary beings are of two kinds: first, those given to craving conduct; second, those given to views conduct. If one given to craving conduct cultivates the contemplation of unattractiveness, subduing the afflictions belonging to the craving section so that they no longer manifest before him, his own nature not giving rise to the afflictions belonging to the views section, he thereby comes, on his own, to suppose that he has attained the fruit of arhatship. If one given to views conduct cultivates the mindfulness of the breath, subduing the afflictions belonging to the views section so that they no longer manifest before him, his own nature not giving rise to the afflictions belonging to the craving section, he thereby likewise comes, on his own, to suppose that he has attained the fruit of arhatship. One asks: does this overreaching pride arise only in dependence on something that genuinely exists, or does it also arise in dependence on something that does not exist? The answer: it arises in dependence on both. That is, when an ordinary being gives rise to overreaching pride with respect to a contaminated wholesome root, this arises in dependence on something that genuinely exists; when he gives rise to overreaching pride with respect to an uncontaminated wholesome root, this arises in dependence on something that does not exist. When one who has attained the fruit of stream-entry gives rise to overreaching pride with respect to the fruit of stream-entry and to a contaminated wholesome root, this arises in dependence on something that genuinely exists;

when he gives rise to overreaching pride with respect to the approach to stream-entry and every stage from there up through the fruit of arhatship, this arises in dependence on something that does not exist — and so on, broadly, up through one on the approach to arhatship, who, giving rise to overreaching pride with respect to the approach to arhatship and to a contaminated wholesome root, does so in dependence on something that genuinely exists, while giving rise to overreaching pride with respect to the fruit of arhatship does so in dependence on something that does not exist. One asks: is one capable of giving rise to that overreaching pride which has not yet attained the root meditative absorption of the form or formless realms? There are those who say: he is not, since that affliction is bound up with the root meditative absorption of that very stage. It should rather be said that this is not fixed: one who has not yet attained it in full at all is certainly incapable of giving rise to it, since the afflictions of a higher stage never manifest before one who has not yet become free from the defilements of a lower stage; but one who has already attained it, yet has not yet given rise to it, may indeed be capable of giving rise to that pride, since even its proximate stage likewise possesses pride and every other such affliction.

What is meant by giving rise to pride while supposing oneself inferior? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to bring those in doubt to a settled resolution — that is, there are those who give rise to the doubt that only elevating oneself above another may properly be called pride, while regarding oneself as inferior and honoring another ought not properly to be called pride at all — and it is in order to bring this doubt to a settled resolution, revealing that there does indeed exist a self-deprecating pride, one that regards itself as inferior while yet honoring another, that this treatise is composed. What is meant by giving rise to pride while supposing oneself inferior?

The answer: this refers to a certain kind of person who, seeing another surpass himself in family lineage, clan, wealth, rank, skill, art, land, and dwelling, and the like, thinks as follows: he surpasses me only slightly, and I fall short of him only slightly — when, in truth, he falls short of that other person by many hundreds or thousands of times. On account of this, he gives rise to pride, having already taken pride, about to take pride, his mind self-elevating, self-aggrandizing — this is named giving rise to pride while supposing oneself inferior. Here, "family" refers to such classes as the kṣatriya and the brāhmaṇa; "lineage" refers to such names as Kāśyapa and Gautama; "clan" refers to one's paternal and maternal clans; "class" refers to fair or dark complexion and the like; "wealth" refers to gold, silver, and the like; "rank" refers to kingship, nobility, and the like; "skill" refers to craft and technique; "art" refers to writing and reckoning; "land" refers to fields, crops, and their place of origin; "dwelling" refers to the place where a person and the like reside; and "the like" refers to every other comparable matter, such as eloquence and cleverness. With respect to such matters as these, seeing that another surpasses oneself by a great margin and yet supposing this margin to be but slight, this constitutes self-deprecating pride — whereas, were one to measure and reckon the matter accurately, this would not properly be called pride at all.

Further, pride is, in brief, of seven kinds: first, pride proper; second, excessive pride; third, pride upon pride; fourth, the pride of self; fifth, overreaching pride; sixth, self-deprecating pride; seventh, wrongful pride. Pride proper is that which, with respect to an inferior, supposes oneself superior, or, with respect to an equal, supposes oneself equal — on account of this, one gives rise to pride, having already taken pride, about to take pride, one's mind self-elevating, self-aggrandizing. Excessive pride is that which, with respect to an equal, supposes oneself superior, or, with respect to a superior, supposes oneself equal — on account of this, one gives rise to pride, broadly, exactly as before. Pride upon pride is that which, with respect to a superior, supposes oneself superior — on account of this, one gives rise to pride, broadly, exactly as before. The pride of self is that which, with respect to the five aggregates subject to grasping, supposes them to be a self or belonging to a self — on account of this, one gives rise to pride, broadly, exactly as before. Overreaching pride is that which, with respect to a superior quality not yet attained, supposes it already attained, not yet obtained, supposes it already obtained, not yet touched, supposes it already touched, not yet directly realized, supposes it already directly realized — on account of this, one gives rise to pride, broadly, exactly as before. Self-deprecating pride is that which, with respect to another who greatly surpasses oneself, supposes oneself to be only slightly inferior — on account of this, one gives rise to pride, broadly, exactly as before. Wrongful pride is that which, possessing genuinely no virtue at all, supposes oneself to possess virtue — on account of this, one gives rise to pride, broadly, exactly as before. One asks: overreaching pride and wrongful pride both arise with respect to something not yet attained — what, then, is their distinction? The answer: overreaching pride may arise with respect either to something that exists or to something that does not exist; wrongful pride arises solely with respect to something that does not exist. Further, overreaching pride may arise with respect either to something already attained or to something not yet attained; wrongful pride arises solely with respect to something not yet attained. Further, overreaching pride arises with respect to an equal or a superior quality; wrongful pride arises with respect to no quality at all. Further, overreaching pride arises with respect to a resembling quality or a genuine quality; wrongful pride arises with respect to no quality at all. Further, both insiders and outsiders alike give rise to overreaching pride; only outsiders give rise to wrongful pride. Further, both ordinary beings and noble ones alike give rise to overreaching pride; only ordinary beings give rise to wrongful pride — such, then, is their distinction. One asks: of these seven kinds of pride, how many are abandoned by seeing, and how many by cultivation? There are those who say: one is solely abandoned by seeing — namely, the pride of self; one is solely abandoned by cultivation — namely, self-deprecating pride; the remaining five span both what is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation.

There are yet other masters who say: two are solely abandoned by seeing — namely, the pride of self and wrongful pride; one is solely abandoned by cultivation — namely, self-deprecating pride; the remaining four span both what is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation. The verdict: it should be said that all seven kinds of pride span both what is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation. One asks: how can the pride of self and wrongful pride span what is abandoned by cultivation? The answer: the view of the perishable aggregation of self and wrong view, with respect to the dharmas of all five sections, grasp at a self and what belongs to a self, or deny their existence altogether — and, afterward, taking as their object what is abandoned by seeing suffering, one gives rise to the pride of self and wrongful pride, or, taking as their object what is abandoned even by cultivation, one gives rise to the pride of self and wrongful pride — and it is for this reason that these two kinds of pride span what is abandoned by cultivation as well. One asks: how can self-deprecating pride be abandoned by seeing? The answer: exactly as those who hold the view of self, questioning one another back and forth about their own view of self, one thereby comes to know that another's view of self surpasses one's own, and yet, seeing that this margin is so much greater, one nonetheless supposes it to be but slight, thereby giving rise to self-deprecating pride — such self-deprecating pride as this is abandoned by seeing. One asks: to how many realms is each of these seven kinds of pride bound? There are those who say: the desire realm possesses all seven in full; the two higher realms possess only six, excluding self-deprecating pride, since those realms possess no comparison of family lineage and the like. The verdict: the form and formless realms, too, possess all seven kinds of pride in full. One asks: how, then, without any comparison of family lineage and the like, can self-deprecating pride exist there? The answer: although those realms possess no comparison of family lineage and the like, they do possess a comparative measure of meditative attainments and the like. Further, one first gives rise to this pride with reference to another while still in the desire realm, and, through the force of habitual repetition, later, reborn in the higher realms, this same pride is drawn forth to manifest there as well. There are those who say: although one, reborn in the higher realms, does not give rise to self-deprecating pride there, one nonetheless gives rise to that very pride while still in the desire realm — that is, two beings who have both attained a concentration of the higher realms, questioning one another back and forth about the marks of the concentration each has attained, thereby come, through this very comparison, to give rise to self-deprecating pride. The verdict: it should be said that not every kind of pride, including self-deprecating pride, necessarily arises through comparison with another — from beginningless time, through the force of habitual repetition, it manifests even though one is reborn in the higher realms, and it is for this reason that all three realms alike possess all seven kinds of pride in full.