Flowers and Fruit That Have Fallen

Of the three fetters, up through the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are abandoned by seeing suffering, up through how many are abandoned by cultivation? One asks: for what reason is this discourse composed?

The answer: the earlier gateway, though it has already checked the intent of monks who hold that cutting-off occurs all at once, has not yet refuted the intent of those who hold that direct realization occurs all at once, nor has it yet made manifest the sense in which direct realization occurs gradually.

It is now in order to refute and to display the sense of sudden versus gradual direct realization that this discourse is composed. There are those who say: the earlier gateway, though it has already refuted the intent of those who hold direct realization occurs all at once, and has already made manifest the sense in which direct realization occurs gradually, did not display this coarsely, clearly, and directly enough — and it is in order to make this coarsely, clearly, and directly visible that this discourse is now composed. There are others who say: it is now in order to display the five sections of affliction and their five antidotes that this discourse is composed — the five sections of affliction being what is abandoned by seeing suffering, up through what is abandoned by cultivation; the five antidotes being the forbearance and the cognition of suffering as the antidote to what is abandoned by seeing suffering, up through the forbearance and the cognition of the path as the antidote to what is abandoned by seeing the path, and suffering, its arising, its cessation, the path, together with worldly cognition, as the antidote to what is abandoned by cultivation. It is on account of this very reasoning that this discourse is composed. The answer: among the three fetters, the fetter of the view of the perishable aggregation of self is abandoned by seeing suffering. One asks: for what reason is the view of the perishable aggregation of self abandoned solely by seeing suffering? The answer: this view operates solely with respect to the topic of suffering, and is therefore cut off at the very moment suffering is contemplated. Further, this view operates solely with respect to the topic of a fruit, and is therefore cut off at the very moment a fruit is contemplated. Further, the fetter of the view of the perishable aggregation of self is, by its own nature, an inversion, and every inversion is cut off through seeing suffering — once the inversion is cut off, this view is likewise cut off, since they share the very same antidote. Further, this affliction, being coarse, is forever cut off the very moment the first uninterrupted path — the dharma-forbearance and subsequent-class forbearance regarding suffering — manifests before the mind; were this affliction subtle, it would require the later uninterrupted path — the diamond-like concentration — to manifest before the mind before it could finally be cut off entirely, exactly as, should a garment bear a stain not firmly set into it, a single washing suffices to cleanse it, while, should the stain be firmly set, only vigorous scrubbing with pure ash and the like will finally cleanse it; and exactly as, should a clay vessel's own greasy film not have penetrated deeply, a single rinsing with water suffices to cleanse it, while, should the greasy film have penetrated deeply, only boiling with hot water, or scorching with fire, will finally cleanse it. The Venerable Ghoṣa likewise states as follows: this view, being coarse, is forever cut off the very moment the first uninterrupted path manifests before the mind — the two similes of the garment and the vessel being exactly as stated above. Further, it is not that this view's own root penetrates deeply into the ground of its object; and, since it does not penetrate deeply, its own nature is feeble and weak, and it is forever cut off the very moment the first uninterrupted path — the dharma-forbearance and subsequent-class forbearance regarding suffering — manifests before the mind; were an affliction's own root to penetrate deeply into the ground of its object, it would require the later uninterrupted path — the diamond-like concentration — to manifest before the mind before it could finally be cut off entirely, exactly as, should a tree's own root not penetrate deeply into the earth, even a slight wind is sufficient to topple it, while, should its root penetrate deeply, only a mighty wind is capable of toppling it. The Venerable Vasumitra states as follows: this view of the perishable aggregation of self arises taking the five aggregates as its object, and, the moment one genuinely and directly perceives the five appropriated aggregates as they truly are, this view is thereby cut off. Further, this view of the perishable aggregation of self arises from the four notions of permanence, pleasure, purity, and self, and, the moment these four notions are cut off, this view is thereby cut off. The Great Virtuous One states as follows: this view of the perishable aggregation of self arises taking the existing body as its object, and is therefore named the view of the perishable aggregation of self; the moment one contemplates that existing body as devoid of a self and of what belongs to a self, this view is thereby cut off. It is for this reason that the fetter of the view of the perishable aggregation of self is abandoned solely by seeing suffering. Exactly as with the fetter of the view of the perishable aggregation of self, so too with the fetter of the view of the perishable aggregation of self among the five fetters pertaining to the lower portion, and with the view of the perishable aggregation of self and the extreme view among the five views — their own nature being identical, all alike being confused solely about suffering.

The fetter of clinging to rules and vows is of two kinds — either abandoned by seeing suffering, or abandoned by seeing the path. One asks: for what reason is clinging to rules and vows not abandoned by seeing its arising or its cessation? The answer: this is because the outsiders give rise to this clinging to rules and vows solely with respect to suffering and the path — that is, the outsiders are indeed capable of conceiving of the truth of arising as a place of filth, and are likewise capable of conceiving of the truth of cessation as a place of bathing; since they conceive of arising as a place of filth, they give rise to no aspiration toward it, while, since they conceive of cessation as a place of bathing, they mistakenly give rise to an aspiration toward it, and, through this mistaken aspiration, they take up every manner of pointless austerity.

the more one takes up pointless austerities, the more the defilement of affliction increases, further defiling body and mind and moving ever further from nirvāṇa — exactly as a person, seeking to remove the body's own filth, bathes instead in foul water: the more he bathes, the more his own filth and impurity only increase. It is for this reason that clinging to rules and vows spans solely these two sections. Further, this clinging to rules and vows operates solely with respect to these two topics, suffering and the path — operating with respect to suffering, it is abandoned by seeing suffering; operating with respect to the path, it is abandoned by seeing the path. Further, this clinging to rules and vows operates solely with respect to these two topics, defilement and purity — operating with respect to defilement, it is abandoned by seeing suffering; operating with respect to purity, it is abandoned by seeing the path. Further, this clinging to rules and vows is solely of two kinds, distinguished by whether it arises within the Buddhist path or among the outsiders — arising within the Buddhist path, it is abandoned by seeing suffering; arising among the outsiders, it is abandoned by seeing the path. Further, this clinging to rules and vows is solely of two kinds — mistaking a non-cause for a cause, and mistaking a non-path for a path; mistaking a non-cause for a cause, it is abandoned by seeing suffering; mistaking a non-path for a path, it is abandoned by seeing the path. Exactly as with the fetter of clinging to rules and vows, so too with clinging to rules and vows among the four graspings, the bodily tie of clinging to rules and vows among the four bodily ties, the fetter of clinging to rules and vows among the five fetters pertaining to the lower portion, and clinging to rules and vows among the five views — their own nature being identical. The fetter of doubt is of four kinds — either abandoned by seeing suffering, up through abandoned by seeing the path. One asks: for what reason is there no doubt that is abandoned by cultivation? The answer: at the time one has not yet seen a given matter, the mind harbors hesitation regarding it; once that matter has been seen, the hesitation is immediately removed, and it is for this reason that there is no doubt that is abandoned by cultivation. Exactly as with the fetter of doubt, so too with the view-flood among the four floods and yokes, view-clinging among the four graspings, this bodily tie of dogmatic attachment to what is real among the four bodily ties, the fetter of doubt among the five fetters pertaining to the lower portion, wrong view and view-clinging among the five views, the latent tendencies of view and doubt among the seven latent tendencies, and view-clinging and the fetter of doubt among the nine fetters — their own kind and class being identical. The three unwholesome roots are of five kinds, either abandoned by seeing suffering, up through abandoned by cultivation, since greed, hatred, and delusion are all present across all five sections. Exactly as with the three unwholesome roots, so too with every flood and yoke among the three contaminants and four floods and yokes excepting the view-flood, the grasping of desire and the grasping of self-doctrine among the four graspings, the bodily ties of covetous desire and hatred among the four bodily ties, every hindrance excepting worry and doubt among the five hindrances, the fetters of craving, hatred, and conceit among the five fetters, the fetters of covetous desire and hatred among the five fetters pertaining to the lower portion, the body of craving born of mind-contact among the six bodies of craving, every latent tendency excepting view and doubt among the seven latent tendencies, and the fetters of craving, hatred, conceit, and ignorance among the nine fetters — their own kind and class being identical. Though this is broadly stated as spanning all five sections in every case, a more particular analysis shows some spanning one section, some two, some four, and some five: among the desire-contaminant and the like, the view of the perishable aggregation of self, the extreme view, worry, envy, stinginess, anger, and concealment belong solely to one section; clinging to rules and vows belongs solely to two sections; wrong view, view-clinging, and doubt belong solely to four sections; and greed, hatred, conceit, and the like span all five sections. The hindrance of worry is abandoned by cultivation, being cut off through cognition — exactly as with the hindrance of worry, so too with the fetters of envy and stinginess among the five fetters, the five fetters pertaining to the higher portion, the first five bodies of craving among the six bodies of craving, and the fetters of envy and stinginess among the nine fetters — all alike operating with respect to the same object, of the same class and kind. Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, twenty-eight are abandoned by seeing suffering, since they operate with respect to the topic of suffering; nineteen are abandoned by seeing its arising, since they operate with respect to the topic of arising; nineteen are abandoned by seeing its cessation, since they operate with respect to the topic of cessation; twenty-two are abandoned by seeing the path, since they operate with respect to the topic of the path; and ten are abandoned by cultivation, since they operate with respect to their own object generally. One asks: which of these, here, are named abandoned by seeing suffering, up through which are named abandoned by cultivation? The answer: whatever possesses a determinate antidote and a determinate object of that antidote is named abandoned by seeing suffering, up through abandoned by seeing the path; whatever possesses an indeterminate antidote and an indeterminate object of that antidote is named abandoned by cultivation. Further, whatever possesses a determinate location and a determinate object of its antidote is named abandoned by seeing suffering, up through abandoned by seeing the path; whatever possesses an indeterminate location and an indeterminate object of its antidote is named abandoned by cultivation. Further, whatever has the forbearance and the cognition of suffering as its antidote is named abandoned by seeing suffering, up through whatever has the forbearance and the cognition of the path as its antidote is named abandoned by seeing the path; whatever has suffering, its arising, its cessation, the path, together with worldly cognition, as its antidote is named abandoned by cultivation. Further, whatever is cut off by the dharma-forbearance and subsequent-class forbearance regarding suffering is named abandoned by seeing suffering, up through whatever is cut off by the dharma-forbearance and subsequent-class forbearance regarding the path is named abandoned by seeing the path; whatever is cut off by the four dharma-and-subsequent-class cognitions, together with worldly cognition, is named abandoned by cultivation. Further, whatever is cut off through contemplating the truth of suffering is named abandoned by seeing suffering, up through whatever is cut off through contemplating the truth of the path is named abandoned by seeing the path; whatever is cut off through contemplating the truth of suffering, up through the truth of the path, or through contemplating some further matter, is named abandoned by cultivation. Further, whatever runs contrary to the contemplation of the truth of suffering is named abandoned by seeing suffering, up through whatever runs contrary to the contemplation of the truth of the path is named abandoned by seeing the path; whatever runs contrary to the contemplation of all four truths, and to the contemplation of some further matter, is named abandoned by cultivation.

Of the three fetters, up through the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are views, and how many are not views? One asks: for what reason is this discourse composed? The answer: it is in order to check other schools' own tenets and to make manifest the correct meaning — that is, there are those who hold that every affliction whatsoever is, by its own nature, a view — for what reason is this so? Because a keen and forceful aspect is what is named a view, and every affliction, with respect to its own particular function, possesses a keen and forceful aspect, exactly as the view of the perishable aggregation of self, gripping a self and what belongs to a self, possesses a keen and forceful aspect;

the extreme view, gripping annihilation or eternalism, possesses a keen and forceful aspect; wrong view, gripping non-existence, possesses a keen and forceful aspect; view-clinging, gripping what is supreme, possesses a keen and forceful aspect; clinging to rules and vows, gripping what is capable of purification, possesses a keen and forceful aspect; doubt's own hesitation possesses a keen and forceful aspect; greed's own attachment possesses a keen and forceful aspect; hatred's own aversion possesses a keen and forceful aspect; conceit's own elevation possesses a keen and forceful aspect; ignorance's own incomprehension possesses a keen and forceful aspect — and it is for this reason that every affliction whatsoever is, by its own nature, a view. There are further those who hold that no affliction whatsoever is, by its own nature, a view — for what reason is this so? Because fully comprehending the dharmas is what is named a view, and every affliction, with respect to its own object, fails entirely to comprehend it, and is therefore not, by its own nature, a view. It is in order to check this very intent that this passage makes manifest that, among the afflictions, some are, by their own nature, views, and some are not, that this discourse is composed. The answer: among the three fetters, two are views, and one is not a view — the two views being the view of the perishable aggregation of self and clinging to rules and vows; the one that is not a view being doubt. The rest should be understood at length exactly as in the root treatise. The meaning of ‘view’ has already been explained at length above, within the section on the five views.

Of the three fetters, up through the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many possess both investigation and examination, how many possess examination alone without investigation, and how many possess neither investigation nor examination? One asks: for what reason is this discourse composed? The answer: it is in order to check other schools' own tenets and to make manifest the correct principle — that is, there are those who hold that, from the desire realm up through the peak of existence, investigation and examination are present throughout, as the Dārṣṭāntikas maintain. For what reason do they hold this view? It is on the strength of scripture, that is, scripture states, the mind's own coarse nature is named investigation, and the mind's own subtle nature is named examination; and, since coarse and subtle mental nature is obtainable from the desire realm up through the peak of existence, it is thereby known that investigation and examination are present throughout all three realms. The Great Virtuous One states as follows: what the Ābhidharmika masters state is unreasonable — for what reason is this so? The mind's own coarse and subtle nature is present throughout all three realms, and scripture states that this is precisely investigation and examination; and yet they claim that investigation and examination exist solely within two grounds, namely, the desire realm and the Brahmā world — the Ābhidharmikas' own statement is therefore unreasonable, and ought to be named a poor statement, poorly upheld, not a good statement, well upheld. The various Ābhidharma treatise-masters reply: what we ourselves state and uphold is good, not poor — for what reason is this so? Because ‘coarse’ and ‘subtle’ are designated in many different ways. That is, in one place, it is stated that entanglement is coarse and latent tendency is subtle — here, investigation and examination are neither coarse nor subtle, since these two are neither an entanglement nor a latent tendency. In another place, it is stated that the aggregate of form is coarse and the four remaining aggregates are subtle — here, investigation and examination are subtle, not coarse, since they are subsumed within the aggregate of formations. In another place, it is stated that the desire realm is coarse and the first dhyāna is subtle — here, investigation and examination span both the coarse and the subtle grounds, since both possess investigation and examination alike. In another place, it is stated that the first dhyāna is coarse and the second dhyāna is subtle — here, investigation and examination are coarse, not subtle, since above the first dhyāna there is neither investigation nor examination. Since ‘coarse’ and ‘subtle’ are designated with so many different senses across such passages as these, one ought not to fix rigidly upon the notion that coarse nature alone is named investigation and subtle nature alone is named examination, nor ought one to hold that investigation and examination, as two distinct things, are present throughout all three realms. Rather, when scripture states that

investigation and examination are the mind's own coarse and subtle nature, this is spoken with reference specifically to the coarse and subtle nature of a mind capable of being disturbed within the lower two grounds; the second dhyāna, up through the peak of existence, being free of disturbance, possesses neither investigation nor examination. One asks further: since it has already been stated that investigation and examination exist above the second level of concentration, how, then, can the three grounds — possessing both, possessing examination alone, and possessing neither — be established as genuinely distinct? They answer as follows: the desire realm and the first dhyāna's every wholesome, defiled, and unobscured-indeterminate state, together with the dhyāna-interval's own defiled states, up through the peak of existence's own defiled states, are named the ground possessing both investigation and examination; the dhyāna-interval's own wholesome and unobscured-indeterminate states are named the ground lacking investigation, possessing examination alone; and the second dhyāna, up through the peak of existence, possessing wholesome and unobscured-indeterminate states, is named the ground lacking both investigation and examination. If this is so, how, then, is what scripture states to be reconciled? As scripture states: with investigation and examination stilled, in a state without investigation and without examination, one enters upon and abides fully in the second dhyāna, born of concentration, filled with joy and pleasure. They answer as follows: this scripture speaks with reference to wholesome and unobscured-indeterminate states, not with reference to defiled states, when it speaks of investigation and examination being stilled. This statement is not tenable — for what reason is this so? What cause or condition could there be for entering the second level of concentration to still investigation and examination solely in their wholesome and indeterminate form, and not their defiled form? It would be far better to say that defiled investigation and examination are stilled, not the wholesome and indeterminate — for what reason is this so? Because defiled dharmas are relinquished the very moment one becomes detached from them, while wholesome and indeterminate dharmas are relinquished only once one has transcended their own realm and ground entirely. The Dārṣṭāntikas, however, are the very fruit of ignorance, the fruit of utter darkness, the fruit of failing to apply diligent effort — the correct statement is, rather, that investigation and examination are present throughout all three realms, yet investigation together with examination exist solely within the lower two grounds, while the upper seven grounds possess neither. It is in order to check what these other schools state, and to make manifest the correct principle, that this discourse is composed. The answer: the three fetters are of three kinds — either possessing both investigation and examination, or lacking investigation and possessing examination alone, or lacking both. What is possessing both investigation and examination? It refers to what abides within the desire realm and the first dhyāna. What is lacking investigation, possessing examination alone? It refers to what abides within the dhyāna-interval. What is lacking both investigation and examination? It refers to what abides within the upper three dhyānas and the four formless spheres. The rest should be understood at length exactly as in the root treatise. One asks: which of these, here, is named possessing both investigation and examination, which is named lacking investigation and possessing examination alone, and which is named lacking both investigation and examination? The answer: whatever co-exists with, and is associated with, both investigation and examination, being their co-arising and their own turning, is named possessing both investigation and examination. Whatever does not co-exist with investigation, but co-exists with examination alone, is not associated with investigation, but is associated with examination alone, is not co-arisen with investigation but co-arisen with examination alone, investigation having already been stilled, turning through examination alone, is named lacking investigation and possessing examination alone. Whatever neither co-exists with, nor is associated with, nor is co-arisen with, nor turns through, either investigation or examination, is named lacking both. Further, whatever involves manifold seeking and manifold scrutinizing is named possessing both investigation and examination; whatever involves no manifold seeking, yet does involve manifold scrutinizing, is named lacking investigation and possessing examination alone; whatever involves neither manifold seeking nor manifold scrutinizing is named lacking both. Further, whatever involves repeated seeking and repeated scrutinizing is named possessing both investigation and examination; whatever involves no repeated seeking, yet does involve repeated scrutinizing, is named lacking investigation and possessing examination alone; whatever involves neither repeated seeking nor repeated scrutinizing is named lacking both.

Of the three fetters, up through the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are associated with the pleasure faculty, and how many with the pain, joy, displeasure, or equanimity faculties? One asks: for what reason is this discourse composed? The answer: it is in order to check other schools' own tenets and to make manifest the correct principle — that is, there are those who hold that dharmas, at the time of their arising, arise gradually, one by one, not all at once, as the Dārṣṭāntikas maintain. The Great Virtuous One states as follows: dharmas, at the time of their arising, arise in sequence, one after another, with no possibility of arising jointly — exactly as, on a narrow road, when a group of merchants passes along it, they pass one by one, there being no possibility of even two passing at the very same time, still less a greater number; every conditioned dharma, likewise, arises one by one from its own generating characteristic, and the principle of their combined, joint arising does not permit them to arise together. The various Ābhidharma treatise-masters reply: there is indeed cause and condition for saying that conditioned dharmas arise separately, each combined on its own, since each arises individually from its own generating characteristic; and there is likewise cause and condition for saying that conditioned dharmas arise as a single combined whole, since whatever is inseparable arises at one and the same time — that is, with reference to the generating characteristic, conditioned dharmas are said to arise separately, each combined on its own; with reference to the moment itself, conditioned dharmas are said to arise as a single combined whole, since whatever is inseparable necessarily arises together. There are further those who hold that the sense of power and powerlessness is the very meaning of association and non-association — that is, should a given dharma arise through the power of another, that dharma is said to be associated with that other; should a dharma not arise through the power of another, then, even should it arise simultaneously with that other, no sense of association follows. Exactly as, since this mind arises through the power of that mind, one may say that this mind is associated with that mind; and, since a mental factor arises through the power of mind, one may say that the mental factor is associated with mind; and, since a mental factor arises through the power of a further mental factor, one may say that this mental factor is associated with that mental factor — yet, since mind does not arise through the power of a mental factor, one cannot say that mind is associated with a mental factor. It is in order to check this very intent that this passage makes manifest that mind is indeed associated with mental factors, that mental factors are likewise associated with mental factors, and that mental factors, too, may be associated with mind — it is solely mind with mind that possesses no sense of association, since a single body cannot give rise to two minds at once. There are further those who hold that dharmas are each associated solely with their own nature, not with another's, who state as follows: the sense of mutual affection and esteem is the very meaning of association, and no dharma holds mutual affection and esteem for another dharma to the degree it holds for its own nature, and it is for this reason that a dharma is associated solely with its own nature. It is in order to check this very intent that this passage makes manifest that association exists solely with another's nature, since the very name and meaning of ‘association’ is established with reference to distinct entities regarding one another — exactly as mind and mental factors, mutually regarding one another, sharing one and the same basis, one and the same object, and the rest, never abandoning one another, are thereby named associated. There are further those who hold that dharmas possess, with respect to their own nature, neither the sense of association nor of non-association — the sense of non-association being absent because dharmas do not depend upon their own nature in order to arise; the sense of non-association not applying either, since mutual affection and esteem is the very meaning of association. It is in order to check this very intent that this passage makes manifest that the dharmas are, without confusion, genuinely associated, that this discourse is composed. One asks: why does this passage ask specifically about association with feeling? The answer: it is simply because the treatise's own author intended it so — since the treatise's own author composes his treatise according to his own intent, without contradicting the true characteristics of the dharmas, and this ought not to be pressed as an objection. Further, it is because feeling's own aspect, though each distinct from the next, does not contradict itself with respect to mere possession, yet does contradict itself with respect to actual manifestation, that this passage asks specifically about it — ‘not contradicting itself with respect to mere possession’ referring to the fact that a single body may indeed possess all five feeling-faculties at once; ‘contradicting itself with respect to actual manifestation’ referring to the fact that no two feelings can ever actually manifest at one and the same time. Further, it is because feeling arises by riding upon whichever faculty it turns through, five faculties being established upon a single feeling-substance, unlike any other dharma, that this passage asks specifically about feeling. Further, it is because feeling sits at the very hub of the wheel of the twelve links of dependent origination, exactly like a cart's own axle-hub, that this passage asks specifically about it. Further, it is because every dharma whatsoever ultimately converges upon feeling that this passage asks specifically about it. Further, apart from feeling, what further faculty could this passage possibly ask about in terms of association? Were it to ask about association with the life-faculty and the other seven faculties of that kind, this would be unreasonable, since these possess no association whatsoever; were it to ask about association with faith and the other four faculties, or the three uncontaminated faculties, this too would be unreasonable, since these are solely wholesome; were it to ask about association with the remaining defilements, or with perception, volition, and the other mental factors, this too would be unreasonable, since these possess no faculty-aspect, or are themselves, in some cases, of the very nature of affliction; were it to ask about association with mindfulness, concentration, or wisdom, this too would be unreasonable, for the very same reason — being associated with affliction yet possessing no faculty-aspect, or being, in some cases, of the very nature of affliction; were it to ask about association with the mind-faculty, this too would not be reasonable, since association is a dharma established with reference to mind itself, and mind's own association admits of no further distinction. Feeling alone possesses a genuine faculty-aspect, is not itself the very substance of affliction, and yet is capable of generating affliction, and it is for this reason that this passage asks about association specifically with respect to it. The answer: among the three fetters, the fetters of the view of the perishable aggregation of self and clinging to rules and vows are associated with three faculties, excepting the pain and displeasure faculties. One asks: why does this exclude the pain faculty? The answer: the pain faculty belongs to the five sense-consciousnesses, while these two fetters belong solely to the mental stage, and are therefore not associated. One asks: why does this exclude the displeasure faculty? The answer: displeasure operates through a sorrowful aspect, while these two fetters operate through a joyful aspect, and are therefore not associated. This broadly states that these two are associated with three faculties; more particularly distinguished: within the desire realm and the first two dhyānas, they are associated with the joy and equanimity faculties; within the third dhyāna, they are associated with the pleasure and equanimity faculties; within the fourth dhyāna and the formless realms, they are associated solely with the equanimity faculty.

and it is for this reason that this is broadly stated as associated with three faculties. The fetter of doubt is associated with four faculties, excepting the pain faculty. One asks: why does this exclude the pain faculty? The answer: the pain faculty belongs to the five sense-consciousnesses, while doubt belongs solely to the mental stage, and is therefore not associated. This broadly states that the fetter of doubt is associated with four faculties; more particularly distinguished: within the desire realm, it is associated with the displeasure and equanimity faculties; within the first two dhyānas, it is associated with the joy and equanimity faculties; within the third dhyāna, it is associated with the pleasure and equanimity faculties; within the fourth dhyāna and the formless realms, it is associated solely with the equanimity faculty — and it is for this reason that this is broadly stated as associated with four faculties. One asks: why is the fetter of doubt, within the desire realm, not associated with the joy faculty, while, within the first two dhyānas, it is indeed associated with the joy faculty? The answer: this is because their joyful and sorrowful aspects do not correspond — that is, doubt within the desire realm operates through a sorrowful aspect, while the joy faculty operates through a joyful aspect; their aspects being thus distinct, no sense of association follows. Within the first two dhyānas, doubt and the joy faculty both operate through a joyful aspect, and association therefore follows, since the sense of equality is the very meaning of association.

Further, within the desire realm, joy is coarse while doubt is subtle, and they are therefore not associated. One asks: why is joy coarse within the desire realm? The answer: it is because sentient beings of the desire realm give rise to it where it ought not to arise at all — and it likewise arises with respect to matters of the desire realm where it ought not to arise. How does it arise, among sentient beings of the desire realm, where it ought not to arise? That is, sentient beings of the desire realm, their own nature already suffering, upon encountering some further suffering, ought properly to give rise to disgust and renunciation, yet instead leap up in exuberant joy — is this not coarse indeed? How does it arise, with respect to matters of the desire realm, where it ought not to arise? That is, should one see another stumble and fall into error, one ought properly to give rise to compassion, yet instead bursts into laughter — is this not coarse indeed? The desire realm's own fetter of doubt, being contemplative and deliberative, is subtle; coarse and subtle being thus distinct, no sense of association follows. Within the first two dhyānas, doubt and joy are both subtle, and association therefore follows.

Further, within the desire realm, the fetter of doubt is weighty and grave, while the joy faculty is light and frivolous, and they are therefore not associated. Within the first dhyāna, the two are both weighty and grave, and association therefore follows.

Further, within the desire realm, the fetter of doubt operates through an internal gateway, while the desire realm's own joy faculty operates through an external gateway, and they are therefore not associated. Within the first two dhyānas, both operate through the internal gateway, and association therefore follows. Further, within the desire realm, the fetter of doubt is exactly like a host, while the joy faculty is exactly like a guest, and they are therefore not associated. Within the first two dhyānas, both are exactly like a host, and association therefore follows. Further, within the desire realm, the fetter of doubt, though not associated with the feeling of joy, is indeed associated with the feeling of displeasure;

within the first two dhyānas, were the fetter of doubt not associated with the feeling of joy, it would thereby possess no feeling whatsoever, since joy is precisely that ground's own inherent feeling; and, should a mental cluster involving doubt possess absolutely no feeling at all, this would contradict the principles of mutual dependence and of association among the dharmas — such a fault must not be allowed. It is for this reason that the fetter of doubt, within the first two dhyānas, is associated with the joy faculty. Among the three unwholesome roots, the unwholesome root of greed is associated with three faculties, excepting the pain and displeasure faculties, since pain and displeasure operate through a sorrowful aspect, while the unwholesome root of greed operates through a joyful aspect, and they are therefore not associated. The unwholesome root of hatred is associated with three faculties, excepting the pleasure and joy faculties, since pleasure and joy operate through a joyful aspect, while the unwholesome root of hatred operates through a sorrowful aspect, and they are therefore not associated. The unwholesome root of delusion, together with the ignorance-contaminant among the desire-contaminant, is associated with all five faculties, since these span all six consciousness-bodies, operating through both joyful and sorrowful aspects alike. Contamination in general is associated with three faculties, excepting the pain and displeasure faculties, since the form and formless realms possess neither the pain nor the displeasure faculty — the reason for their absence to be explained at length within the Faculties Aggregate. Excepting wrong view, the rest should be understood at length exactly as in the root treatise. Wrong view is associated with four faculties, excepting the pain faculty, since the pain faculty belongs to the five sense-consciousnesses, while wrong view belongs solely to the mental stage, and they are therefore not associated. This broadly states that wrong view is associated with four faculties; more particularly distinguished: within the desire realm, it is associated with three faculties, excepting the pleasure and pain faculties; within the first two dhyānas, it is associated with the joy and equanimity faculties; within the third dhyāna, it is associated with the pleasure and equanimity faculties; within the fourth dhyāna and the formless realms, it is associated solely with the equanimity faculty. One asks: within the desire realm, which particular wrong view is associated with the joy faculty, and which with the displeasure faculty?

The answer: there are those who, from the very start, were never inclined toward giving, never inclined toward affection, and never inclined toward offerings; should such a person later encounter a wrong-view outsider, and hear him teach that there is no giving, no affection, no offerings, no virtuous conduct, no unwholesome conduct, and no ripened fruit of virtuous or unwholesome karma, he, upon hearing this, rejoices, thinking to himself: from the very start, I was never inclined toward giving, and so on, up through offerings — how excellent this all is, since indeed there is no fruit and no ripening whatsoever.

Such a wrong view is associated with the joy faculty. There are those who, from the very start, delighted in giving, delighted in affection, and delighted in offerings; should such a person later encounter a wrong-view outsider, and hear him teach that there is no giving, no affection, no offerings, no virtuous conduct, no unwholesome conduct, and no ripened fruit of virtuous or unwholesome karma, he, upon hearing this, becomes sorrowful and distressed, thinking to himself: from the very start, I delighted in giving, and so on, up through offerings — what an utter waste this all was,

since indeed there is no fruit and no ripening whatsoever. Such a wrong view is associated with the displeasure faculty. The meaning of association has already been explained at length within the discussion of the six causes.

Of the three fetters, up through the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are bound to the desire realm, how many to the form realm, and how many to the formless realm? One asks: for what reason is this discourse composed? The answer: it is in order to check other schools' own tenets and to make manifest the correct principle — that is, there are those who hold that every affliction and secondary affliction present, by name, within the desire realm is likewise present within the form and formless realms; it is in order to check this very intent that this passage makes manifest that the desire realm is an undetermined ground, possessing many afflictions and secondary afflictions, while the form and formless realms, being determined grounds, possess few afflictions and secondary afflictions — such as the latent tendency of hatred, and worry, and the like, which are simply absent from those realms. There are further those who hold that contamination in general, the existence-flood and yoke, and the grasping of self-doctrine are likewise present within the desire realm, since they too arise dependent on an internal object, and thereby earn that very name; it is in order to check this very intent that this passage makes manifest that contamination in general and the rest do not extend to the desire realm, the higher two realms' own afflictions being specifically stored away and concentrated, for the most part arising dependent on what is internal, and thereby earning that very name. There are further those who hold that the two entanglements of envy and stinginess are likewise present within the Brahmā world, as the Vibhajyavādins maintain. One asks: for what reason do they hold this view? The answer: it is on the strength of scripture, that is, scripture states: the Great Brahmā King addressed his own heavenly assembly, saying: we need not go to where the ascetic Gautama dwells, to pay him respect and hear the Dharma from him — simply remain here, and I myself shall cause you to transcend birth, old age, and death, and to realize eternal, everlasting quiescence. They hold that the Brahmā King, his own mind entangled by the fetters of envy and stinginess, spoke in this way. It is in order to check this very intent that this passage makes manifest that the fetters of envy and stinginess exist solely within the desire realm. There are further those who hold that the entanglement of concealment, too, exists within the Brahmā world. One asks: for what reason do they hold this view? The answer: it is on the strength of scripture, that is, scripture states:

the Great Brahmā King, unable to answer the question put to him by the Venerable Aśvajit, and fearing that his own heavenly assembly might come to know of it, skillfully drew him outside the assembly and, with gentle words, apologized in shame. They hold that the Brahmā King, on account of the entanglement of concealment, drew him outside the assembly in order to confess his own inability there. It is in order to check this very intent that this passage makes manifest that the entanglement of concealment exists solely within the desire realm; rather, the Great Brahmā King, his own mind obscured by conceit, flattery, and deceit, simply spoke in this way. It is on account of this very reasoning that this discourse is composed.

The answer: the three fetters are of three kinds — either bound to the desire realm, or bound to the form realm, or bound to the formless realm. The rest should be understood at length exactly as in the root treatise. One asks: why are they named bound to the desire realm, bound to the form realm, and bound to the formless realm? The answer: bound within desire, they are named bound to the desire realm; bound within form, they are named bound to the form realm; bound within the formless, they are named bound to the formless realm — exactly as an ox, a horse, or the like, tied to a post or to a peg, is named tied to the post, and so on. Further, because one is bound by the desire realm's own foot, one is named bound to the desire realm; because one is bound by the form realm's own foot, one is named bound to the form realm; because one is bound by the formless realm's own foot, one is named bound to the formless realm — ‘foot’ referring to affliction, exactly as the verse states: the Buddha's own conduct is boundless, and footless — who, then, could lead him anywhere?

Exactly as a person possessing feet is capable of freely wandering in every direction, while one lacking feet cannot do so, sentient beings possessing the foot of affliction are thereby capable of wandering through the realms, destinies, and states of birth, while those lacking the foot of affliction are not so capable — every buddha, having forever cut off the foot of affliction, no longer wanders through the realms, destinies, and states of birth, and yet, through the power of concentration and wisdom, his own conduct remains boundless. Further, because the desire realm is where a den is stored away, and where self-clinging attaches, it is named bound to the desire realm; because the form realm is where a den is stored away, and where self-clinging attaches, it is named bound to the form realm;

because the formless realm is where a den is stored away, and where self-clinging attaches, it is named bound to the formless realm — ‘den’ referring to craving, ‘self-clinging’ referring to view. Further, because one is nourished by the desire realm's own craving, and attached to by the view of self and what belongs to a self, one is named bound to the desire realm; because one is nourished by the form realm's own craving, and attached to by the view of self and what belongs to a self, one is named bound to the form realm; because one is nourished by the formless realm's own craving, and attached to by the view of self and what belongs to a self, one is named bound to the formless realm. Further, because one is firmly attached to the desire realm's own pleasure and desire, one is named bound to the desire realm; because one is firmly attached to the form realm's own pleasure and desire, one is named bound to the form realm; because one is firmly attached to the formless realm's own pleasure and desire, one is named bound to the formless realm — ‘pleasure’ referring to craving, ‘desire’ referring to view. Further, because one is bound by the desire realm's own birth and death, one is named bound to the desire realm; because one is bound by the form realm's own birth and death, one is named bound to the form realm; because one is bound by the formless realm's own birth and death, one is named bound to the formless realm. Further, because one is defiled by the desire realm's own defilement, harmed by its poison, and stained by its filth, one is named bound to the desire realm; because one is defiled by the form realm's own defilement, harmed by its poison, and stained by its filth, one is named bound to the form realm; because one is defiled by the formless realm's own defilement, harmed by its poison, and stained by its filth, one is named bound to the formless realm — every affliction whatsoever is named ‘filth,’ not solely hatred, and it is for this reason that this spans all three realms. Further, because one is bound by the desire realm's own affliction, one is named bound to the desire realm; because one is bound by the form realm's own affliction, one is named bound to the form realm; because one is bound by the formless realm's own affliction, one is named bound to the formless realm.

Do fetters that fall within the desire realm exist within the desire realm? — and so on, at length. Here, ‘falling’ is of six kinds — first, falling by realm; second, falling by destiny; third, falling by person; fourth, falling by sense-field; fifth, falling by contamination; sixth, falling by own-body. Falling by realm refers to what is stated here — do fetters that fall within the desire realm exist within the desire realm, and the rest — the intent here being: whatever dharma belongs to a given realm is named as falling within that realm; if it is a dharma of the desire realm, it is named as falling within the desire realm; if it is a dharma of the form realm, it is named as falling within the form realm; if it is a dharma of the formless realm, it is named as falling within the formless realm. Falling by destiny refers to such things as a Dharma-teacher, at the time of performing the giving of the Dharma, making the vow: through this gift of the Dharma, may I cause sentient beings falling within every destiny to swiftly escape from birth, old age, sickness, and death. Falling by person refers to such things as the Vinaya states: there are three persons who fall within the monastic assembly's own number, thereby causing the assembly's own harmony. Falling by sense-field refers to such things as the Prakaraṇapāda states: what is the aggregate of form? It refers to the ten form sense-fields, together with the form that falls within the dharma sense-field. Falling by contamination refers to such things as the Prakaraṇapāda states: what is a falling dharma? It refers to a contaminated dharma. Falling by own-body refers to such things as

the Great Elements Aggregate states: what is the meaning of ‘grasped’? The answer: this expression displays a dharma that falls within one's own body. Among these six kinds of falling, this discourse's own discourse is based solely on falling by realm. Here, ‘existing’ is of four kinds — first, own-body existing; second, container existing; third, currently-manifesting existing; fourth, location existing. Own-body existing refers to the fact that every dharma each abides within its own body, its own self, its own substance, its own characteristic, its own portion, and its own original nature. Container existing refers to such things as a date existing within a basin, or a person named Devadatta existing within a house. Currently-manifesting existing refers to a dharma being obtainable through its currently manifesting in this place. Location existing refers to a dharma being obtainable at this particular location. This discourse, in general, relies on all four senses of existing together, whether completely or incompletely, as is appropriate, and this should be understood accordingly. Do fetters that fall within the desire realm exist within the desire realm? The answer should be given as a tetralemma: there are fetters that fall within the desire realm, yet do not exist within the desire realm — that is, an entanglement's own entangled being, having died within the form realm, arises within the desire realm's own intermediate state; dying within the form realm and being born within the desire realm occurs solely for an ordinary being; that intermediate-state being's own dharma, belonging to the desire realm yet arising within the form realm, ought properly to be understood in just this way — the death-state's own point of cessation and the intermediate-state's own point of manifestation occurring together, exactly as a seed's own point of cessation and a sprout's own point of manifestation occur together; from the moment of the death-state up through the intermediate state, one among the desire realm's own thirty-six latent tendencies manifests before the mind, thereby causing the continued succession of rebirth. And likewise, the evil Māra, dwelling within the Brahmā world, entangled by an entanglement, rebukes and resists the Tathāgata — as for this ‘entangled by an entanglement,’ there are those who say this is the entanglement of anger, since his own anger-entangled mind rebukes the Buddha; there are those who say this is the entanglement of concealment, since his own concealment-entangled mind rebukes the Buddha; there are those who say this is the entanglement of envy, since his own envy-entangled mind rebukes the Buddha; there are those who say this is the entanglement of stinginess, since his own stinginess-entangled mind rebukes the Buddha. The verdict states: it should rather be said that, among the nine entanglements, whichever one currently manifests, it is by means of that one that he rebukes and resists the Buddha, excepting drowsiness, which is incapable of generating verbal karma. One asks: why is he named Māra? The answer: because he severs the very life of wisdom; or because, being forever heedless, he thereby harms himself. One asks: why is he named evil? The answer: because he harbors an evil intention, accomplishes evil dharmas, and possesses evil wisdom. The Venerable Ghoṣa states as follows: the fierce and evil one — because he dies and is reborn in that very place again and again, he is therefore named evil. One asks: for what purpose does Māra dwell within the Brahmā world? The answer: in order to rebuke and resist the Buddha. One asks: what power does he possess, capable of dwelling within the Brahmā world? The answer: it is drawn forth by Brahmā himself, exactly as scripture states: at one time, the Blessed One dwelt at Śrāvastī, within the Jeta Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika's Park. At that time, there was a certain Brahmā deity dwelling within the Brahmā world who gave rise to an evil view, holding: this place is permanent, eternal, unchanging, purely and forever liberated — there exists no further permanent, eternal, unchanging, purely and forever liberated place beyond this one. At that time, the World-Honored One, knowing that deity's own mind, exactly as a mighty warrior bends and extends his own arm,

vanished from this very place and appeared within the Brahmā world, seating himself not far from that Brahmā deity. At that time, that Brahmā deity, seeing the Buddha from afar, addressed him, saying: welcome, great sage! This place is permanent, eternal, unchanging, purely and forever liberated — there exists no further permanent, eternal, unchanging, purely and forever liberated place beyond this one; that you are capable of renouncing and abandoning the calamity-ridden desire realm, and have come to this very place, is truly excellent indeed.

You ought properly to dwell here in peace and constancy. The World-Honored One told him: this place is not permanent, eternal, unchanging, or purely and forever liberated; and yet you hold it to be permanent, eternal, unchanging, and purely and forever liberated — it is because a heavy ignorance obscures your own mind that you speak thus. You ought to examine how the various Brahmā deities of the past, who have fallen into the desire realm, are exactly like flowers and fruit that have fallen — how, then, can you falsely suppose this place to be permanent, and so on? Even after that Brahmā deity had thus praised himself again and again, the Buddha likewise, again and again, refuted what he had said. At that time, that Brahmā deity, finding the Buddha's own majestic radiance difficult to withstand, and, further, dwelling as he did within a still, desire-free ground, took no pleasure in verbal contention, and thereupon thought to himself: who could possibly serve as a debate-opponent against the Buddha? Having thought this, he then recalled: Māra and the Tathāgata are eternal adversaries, certain to be able to contend against him. He thereupon, by his own spiritual power, drew Māra into the Brahmā world, transforming it to resemble the desire realm, and thereby settled him there. At that time, that Brahmā deity again addressed the Buddha, saying: this place is permanent, and so on, at length. The World-Honored One told him: this place is not permanent, and so on, exactly as stated above.

Māra then addressed the Buddha, saying: great sage, you ought to follow what Brahmā has stated, and not oppose it further, but rather obediently carry it out — should you oppose it, this would be exactly as when a person, visited within his own house by the auspicious goddess Śrī, drives her out with blade and staff; or exactly as when a person, falling from a height, releases his own hands and feet, and thereupon plunges into a deep pit; or exactly as when a person, falling from the top of a tree, releases his own hands and feet, and thereupon is certain to strike the ground — you ought therefore to obey and accord with what Brahmā has stated. He further addressed the Buddha, saying: do you not see how we, the Brahmā assembly, surrounding Brahmā, respectfully accord with his own words, not daring to oppose them? The Buddha then told him: you are neither Brahmā nor his own assembly — you are, rather, the evil Māra himself, possessing neither shame nor moral dread, coming here without cause to disturb me. At that time, the evil Māra, knowing that the Buddha had seen through him, his own mind filled with shame and vexation, was unable to withdraw of his own accord; Brahmā, by his own spiritual power, caused him to return to his own palace.

It is on the strength of that very scripture that this discourse is composed. This, then, is what is meant by: there are fetters that fall within the desire realm, yet do not exist within the desire realm — ‘falling within the desire realm’ referring to falling by realm, not by any other kind of falling; ‘not existing within the desire realm’ referring to the fact that it is obtainable within the form realm. This possesses three of the four senses of existing, excepting own-body existing, since it does not currently manifest within its own realm.