Four Attendants for a Sick Man

Of how many conditions is the view of the perishable aggregation of self a condition for the view of the perishable aggregation of self? Of how many conditions is the view of the perishable aggregation of self a condition for clinging to rules and vows, up through of how many conditions is the formless realm's own latent tendency of ignorance abandoned by cultivation a condition — up through, of how many conditions is the formless realm's own latent tendency of ignorance abandoned by cultivation a condition for the formless realm's own latent tendency of ignorance abandoned by cultivation? Of how many conditions is the formless realm's own latent tendency of ignorance abandoned by cultivation a condition for the view of the perishable aggregation of self, up through the formless realm's own latent tendency of conceit abandoned by cultivation? — and so on, at length. One asks: for what reason is this discourse composed? The answer: it is in order to check other schools' own tenets and to make manifest the correct meaning — that is, there are those who hold that a condition possesses no real nature, as the Dārṣṭāntikas maintain. One asks: for what reason do these masters hold this view? The answer: it is on the strength of scripture that they hold this view, that is, scripture states, ignorance conditions formations — they state as follows: ignorance possesses no distinguishing characteristic, while formations do possess a distinguishing characteristic — how, then, can a dharma possessing no distinguishing characteristic serve as a condition for a dharma that does possess one, and yet possess a real nature? The Great Virtuous One states: the various masters, following their own conception, merely designate the name ‘condition,’ which possesses no real, existent nature. It is in order to check this very tenet and to make manifest that conditions do genuinely, really exist, that this discourse is composed. Were one to hold that conditions possess no real nature, then every dharma whatsoever would possess no real nature, since the four conditions together subsume every dharma whatsoever — that is, the cause-condition subsumes every conditioned dharma; the immediately-antecedent-condition subsumes every past and present mind and mental factor, excepting the very last mind and mental factors of a past or present arhat;

the object-condition and the dominant-condition together subsume every dharma whatsoever. Further, were the nature of conditions not truly existent, then no dharma whatsoever would possess any profound meaning — that is, whenever the whole of the dharmas is displayed, should they not be subsumed within, and examined through, their own conditions, they would appear coarse and superficial, readily comprehended; should they be subsumed within, and examined through, their own conditions, they would prove profound beyond the four great oceans, fathomable to their very depths solely by the Buddha's own seed-wisdom.

Further, were the nature of conditions not truly existent, the three kinds of awakening could not be established at all — that is, contemplating the nature of conditions through superior wisdom is named buddhahood's own awakening; contemplating the nature of conditions through middling wisdom is named the awakening of the solitary buddha; contemplating the nature of conditions through inferior wisdom is named the awakening of the śrāvaka.

Further, were the nature of conditions not truly existent, wisdom itself ought to possess no sense of progressing through three grades — that is, whatever wisdom is inferior ought to remain forever inferior,

whatever is middling ought to remain forever middling, and whatever is superior ought to remain forever superior. Yet wisdom that is inferior may become middling, and wisdom that is middling may become superior — and it is for this reason that the nature of conditions is certainly, really existent, possessing genuine causal efficacy. It is on this very account that the Venerable Ghoṣa states: were the nature of conditions not truly existent, a teacher would be incapable of causing his own student's wisdom to begin inferior and later become superior, and the student, too, would remain forever a student, never becoming a teacher himself. Yet, because the nature of conditions is genuinely, really existent, a teacher is capable of causing his own student's wisdom to increase by degrees, and the student, too, sometimes comes to attain the very status of teacher — and it is for this reason that the nature of conditions is certainly, really existent. One asks: if the nature of conditions is truly existent, how, then, is the scripture cited above to be reconciled?

The answer: though ignorance's own substance possesses no distinguishing characteristic, the karmic function it accomplishes does indeed possess a distinguishing characteristic — that is, through immeasurable gateways and immeasurable degrees, its own capacity differs, and it thereby serves as a condition for formations, exactly as a single person possessing five separate skills has but one substance, yet a fivefold function.

Further, it is in order to display that every conditioned dharma is feeble in its own nature, lacking self-mastery, dependent upon another, possessing no self-generated function, and not following its own desire, that this discourse is composed. ‘Feeble in its own nature’ refers to the fact that every conditioned dharma, its own nature arising from conditions, is thereby given the name ‘own-nature.’ There are those who say:

conditioned existence, possessing arising and cessation, is thereby feeble in its own nature. There are those who say: conditioned existence, arising from conditions, is thereby feeble in its own nature, exactly as scripture states: monks, you should know, form is impermanent, and the very causes and conditions capable of generating form are likewise impermanent — since it is impermanent causes and conditions that give rise to form, how could form itself be permanent? Feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness are likewise so. On account of this very feebleness, every conditioned dharma arises through either four conditions, or three, or two — there being not even a single condition capable of generating it alone, still less no condition at all — and it is for this reason that conditioned dharmas are feeble in their own nature, exactly as a sick, weakened person may be supported by four attendants, or three, or two, before he is finally capable of rising and standing — there being not even a single attendant alone capable of causing him to rise and stand, still less no attendant at all. ‘Lacking self-mastery’ refers to the fact that every conditioned dharma possesses no power or function of its own by which it might arise. ‘Dependent upon another’ refers to the fact that every conditioned dharma must depend upon another before it is capable of generating its own function. ‘Possessing no self-generated function’ refers to

the fact that every conditioned dharma is incapable of generating, of itself, the function of discrimination — who, then, creates me, and whom, then, do I create? ‘Not following its own desire’ refers to the fact that no conditioned dharma possesses any self-generated wish or delight — may I not arise, may I not cease — that is ever thereby fulfilled. Further, it is in order to disclose the correct principle of dependent origination to those confused about dependent origination that this discourse is composed — that is, there are those who hold that only the twelve links, from ignorance conditioning formations up through birth conditioning old age and death, are dharmas of dependent origination; it is in order to bring those so confused to understanding that this passage displays that every conditioned dharma whatsoever is, one and all, dependent origination — exactly as ordinary worldly speech says,

this ought to be stated here. Further, it is not in order to check others and display one's own tenet, but solely in order to disclose the correct principle of dependent origination and thereby bring others to understanding, that this discourse is composed.

The answer: the view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for the view of the perishable aggregation of self, may constitute either four, three, two, or one condition. One asks: why does this passage ask, of how many conditions is the view of the perishable aggregation of self a condition for the view of the perishable aggregation of self, and answer, either four, three, two, or one, while, later, within the Wisdom Aggregate, the question, of how many conditions is dharma-cognition a condition for dharma-cognition, is answered, the cause, immediately-antecedent, object, and dominant conditions? The answer: it is simply because the treatise's own author intended it so, and so on, at length. Further, though this passage and that ought properly to be the same, and yet differ, this is because the treatise's own author, through varied statement, produces varied text, thereby adorning the meaning, so that it not become confused, and remain easy to uphold.

Further, it is in order to display two gateways, two abbreviated approaches, two stairways, two ladders, two torches, two lights, two texts, and two reflections — exactly as what is stated here, so too ought what is stated there; exactly as what is stated there, so too ought what is stated here — that it is spoken in this way. Further, this passage carries a definitive meaning; that passage carries a provisional meaning. This passage carries no further, distinct intent; that passage carries a further, distinct intent. This passage carries no further, distinct cause; that passage carries a further, distinct cause. This passage is spoken with reference to ultimate truth; that passage is spoken with reference to conventional truth. Further, this discourse, composed here, relies on a fourfold distinction — first, distinguishing by realm; second, distinguishing by time; third, distinguishing by moment; fourth, distinguishing by the immediately-antecedent-condition. That discourse, composed there, relies on a single distinction — namely, distinguishing solely by the immediately-antecedent-condition — and it is for this reason that what is stated here differs from what is stated there. Here, what is meant by ‘four’? Exactly as the view of the perishable aggregation of self arises immediately following the view of the perishable aggregation of self, one contemplates that earlier-arisen and later-arisen pair as constituting four conditions — that is, within a single instant, the view of the perishable aggregation of self arises immediately following; within the second instant, the view of the perishable aggregation of self manifests before the mind — this later-arisen one thereby takes the earlier-arisen one as its object; the earlier and the later thereby together constitute all four conditions, namely, the cause, the immediately-antecedent, the object, and the dominant condition. As for the cause-condition: the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self and the later-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self constitute two causes — namely, the homogeneous cause and the universally-pervading cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the later-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self arises immediately following the earlier-arisen one. As for the object-condition: the later-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self arises taking the earlier-arisen one as its object. As for the dominant-condition: the earlier, with respect to the later, either simply presents no obstruction, or does not hinder its arising. Here, the cause-condition is exactly like a seed's own principle; the immediately-antecedent-condition is exactly like the principle of making way;

the object-condition is exactly like the principle of a leaning-staff; the dominant-condition is exactly like the principle of non-obstruction. The later-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self, embraced by the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self through these four conditions, is thereby capable of operating in the world, capable of obtaining its fruit, capable of accomplishing its karma, and capable of cognizing its condition. Here, what is meant by ‘three’? Exactly as the view of the perishable aggregation of self arises immediately following the view of the perishable aggregation of self, without contemplating that earlier-arisen and later-arisen pair, this constitutes three conditions, excepting the object-condition — that is, within a single instant, the view of the perishable aggregation of self arises immediately following; within the second instant, the view of the perishable aggregation of self manifests before the mind — this later-arisen one does not thereby take the earlier-arisen one as its object, but rather takes form, feeling, perception, formations, or consciousness as its object, or, excepting the earlier view of the perishable aggregation of self, takes the remaining formations-aggregate as its object; the earlier and the later thereby constitute only three conditions — namely, the cause, the immediately-antecedent, and the dominant condition. The explanation of these three conditions is exactly as stated at length above. The later-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self, embraced by the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self through these three conditions, is thereby capable of operating in the world, capable of obtaining its fruit, capable of accomplishing its karma, and capable of cognizing its condition. Or, the view of the perishable aggregation of self, arising immediately following, gives rise to some other mind, and only afterward the view of the perishable aggregation of self arises once more — one contemplates that earlier-arisen and later-arisen pair as constituting three conditions, excepting the immediately-antecedent-condition — that is, within a single instant, the view of the perishable aggregation of self arises immediately following;

within the second instant, the view of the perishable aggregation of self does not manifest before the mind, but rather the extreme view, or wrong view, or view-clinging, or clinging to rules and vows, or doubt, or greed, or hatred, or conceit, or ignorance, or a contaminated wholesome mind, or an unobscured-indeterminate mind manifests before the mind — and only thereafter does the view of the perishable aggregation of self arise once more, taking the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self as its object; the earlier and the later thereby constitute only three conditions — namely, the cause, the object, and the dominant condition. The explanation of these three conditions is exactly as stated at length above. The later-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self, embraced by the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self through these three conditions, is thereby capable of operating in the world, capable of obtaining its fruit, capable of accomplishing its karma, and capable of cognizing its condition. Here, what is meant by ‘two’? Exactly as the view of the perishable aggregation of self, arising immediately following, gives rise to some other mind, and only afterward the view of the perishable aggregation of self arises once more,

without contemplating that earlier-arisen and later-arisen pair, this constitutes two conditions — namely, the cause and the dominant condition — that is, within a single instant, the view of the perishable aggregation of self arises immediately following; within the second instant, the view of the perishable aggregation of self does not manifest before the mind, but rather the extreme view, up through an unobscured-indeterminate mind manifests before the mind — and only thereafter does the view of the perishable aggregation of self arise once more, this time not taking the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self as its object, but rather taking form, feeling, perception, formations, or consciousness as its object, or, excepting the view of the perishable aggregation of self, taking the remaining formations-aggregate as its object; the earlier and the later thereby constitute only two conditions — namely, the cause and the dominant condition. The explanation of these two conditions is exactly as stated at length above. The later-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self, embraced by the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self through these two conditions, is thereby capable of operating in the world, capable of obtaining its fruit, capable of accomplishing its karma, and capable of cognizing its condition.

Here, what is meant by ‘one’? The later-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self and the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self — should the later take the earlier as its object, this constitutes the object and the dominant condition; should it not take the earlier as its object, this constitutes solely the dominant condition, since the later, with respect to the earlier, possesses no sense of the cause-condition or the immediately-antecedent-condition. One asks: why does this passage's own question expect an answer of ‘one,’ and yet the answer given here is ‘two’? The answer: those who compose discourses establish their own dharma-points in various ways — some first refute, and only afterward answer; some first answer, and only afterward refute. ‘First refuting, then answering’ refers to what is stated here — ‘should it take the earlier as its object, this constitutes the object and the dominant condition’ is a refutation of the two-condition case; ‘should it not take the earlier as its object, this constitutes solely the dominant condition’ is the answer regarding the one-condition case. ‘First answering, then refuting’ refers to such things as stated within the discourse on a single class of conduct — ‘should the earlier not yet be cut off, it remains bound’ is the answer regarding what is bound; ‘should the earlier not yet have arisen, or, having arisen, already been cut off, it is not bound’ is the refutation of what is not bound. There are further those who say: this passage's own response is, in every respect, an answer — that is, the later, with respect to the earlier, should it take the earlier as its object, thereby constitutes two conditions, answering the earlier two questions; should it not take the earlier as its object, this constitutes solely one condition, answering this present, single question — the earlier answer, among its own two cases, having answered only one portion, what remained unanswered being answered here. Thereafter, by the very same principle, one should explain that future view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for past and present view of the perishable aggregation of self, should it take the earlier as its object, constitutes the object and the dominant condition; should it not take the earlier as its object, this constitutes solely the dominant condition. Future and present view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for past view of the perishable aggregation of self, should it take the earlier as its object, constitutes the object and the dominant condition; should it not take the earlier as its object, this constitutes solely the dominant condition. One asks: present view of the perishable aggregation of self genuinely possesses function, and is capable of taking an object; past view of the perishable aggregation of self's own function has already ceased — how, then, is it capable of taking an object at all? And yet this passage states that, should it take the earlier as its object, this constitutes the object and the dominant condition. The answer: past view of the perishable aggregation of self, having once, at the time it was present, taken that very object — an object that has since ceased — though it is now itself past, one may still, retrospectively, speak of that former function, and it is for this reason that the passage speaks in just this way. One asks: this passage earlier stated that the later-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self, with respect to the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self — should it take the earlier as its object, this constitutes the object and the dominant condition; should it not take the earlier as its object, this constitutes solely the dominant condition —

thereby stating that past later-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for past earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self, constitutes two conditions or one; why, then, does it not likewise state that future view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for future view of the perishable aggregation of self, constitutes two conditions or one? The answer: this, too, ought properly to be stated, and that it is not so stated should be understood as a matter of surplus meaning left implicit. Further, this passage speaks only of cases where there is an established earlier and later; that future case possesses no established earlier and later, and is therefore briefly not spoken of. One asks: doesn't the future's own not-yet-arisen state likewise lack an earlier and a later? The answer: since time itself carries no distinction there, this is not named ‘earlier and later.’ One asks: if so, then the past's own earlier-arisen and later-arisen, time itself likewise carrying no distinction, ought equally not to be named ‘earlier and later.’ The answer: that dharma, having once, at a time when it was present, carried a distinction of time, thereby comes to constitute ‘earlier’ and ‘later’; the future is not so, and it is therefore briefly not spoken of. The desire realm's own view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for the form and formless realms' own view of the perishable aggregation of self, constitutes solely a single dominant-condition — that is, the desire realm's own view of the perishable aggregation of self, with respect to the two higher realms' own view of the perishable aggregation of self, either simply presents no obstruction, or does not hinder its arising, and thereby constitutes a single dominant-condition. As for its not being a cause-condition: this is because realm and ground differ, and cause and fruit are thereby cut off from one another. As for its not being an immediately-antecedent-condition: this is because it is never the case that the lower ground's own affliction, arising immediately, is followed by the higher ground's own affliction manifesting before the mind.

As for its not being an object-condition: this is because it is decisively never the case that the higher ground's own affliction takes the lower as its object. Form and formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for desire-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self — should it take the immediately-antecedent role, this constitutes the immediately-antecedent and the dominant condition; should it not take the immediately-antecedent role, this constitutes solely the dominant condition — that is, should one, abiding in a mind co-arisen with form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, die, and thereupon give rise to a mind co-arisen with desire-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, thereby binding oneself to rebirth, that form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self and that desire-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self constitute the immediately-antecedent and the dominant condition — as for its not being a cause-condition, the sense is exactly as stated above; as for its not being an object-condition, this is because no view of the perishable aggregation of self ever takes another ground as its object. Should one, not abiding in a mind co-arisen with form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, die, and thereupon give rise to a mind co-arisen with desire-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, thereby binding oneself to rebirth, that form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self and that desire-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self constitute solely a single dominant-condition — as for its not being an immediately-antecedent-condition, this is because that desire-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self does not arise immediately following that form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self; as for the remaining two conditions, the sense is exactly as stated above. Form-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, constitutes solely a single dominant-condition, the sense exactly as stated above. Formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for form-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self — should it take the immediately-antecedent role, this constitutes the immediately-antecedent and the dominant condition; should it not take the immediately-antecedent role, this constitutes solely the dominant condition — every sense here should be understood by analogy with what was stated above. Exactly as with the view of the perishable aggregation of self as a condition for the view of the perishable aggregation of self, one should understand the view of the perishable aggregation of self as a condition for every other non-universally-pervading dharma, every other non-universally-pervading dharma as a condition for every non-universally-pervading dharma, and every universally-pervading dharma as a condition for every non-universally-pervading dharma, in just the same way — that is, the latent tendencies, distinguished by kind, are of ten classes, namely, the five views and the five non-views. The five views are the view of the perishable aggregation of self, the extreme view, wrong view, view-clinging, and clinging to rules and vows; the five non-views are doubt, greed, hatred, conceit, and ignorance. Among these, five are named universally-pervading, namely, wrong view, view-clinging, clinging to rules and vows, doubt, and ignorance; five are named non-universally-pervading, namely, the view of the perishable aggregation of self, the extreme view, greed, hatred, and conceit. Here, the view of the perishable aggregation of self and the extreme view, though they universally pervade their own ground, and are thereby named universally-pervading, do not extend to another ground, and are thereby also named non-universally-pervading — and it is on this account that they are subsumed within the non-universally-pervading class. Exactly as with the view of the perishable aggregation of self as a condition for the view of the perishable aggregation of self, one should understand the view of the perishable aggregation of self as a condition for every other non-universally-pervading dharma in just the same way — that is, exactly as one asks of how many conditions the view of the perishable aggregation of self is a condition for the view of the perishable aggregation of self, one likewise asks of how many conditions the view of the perishable aggregation of self is a condition for every other extreme view, greed, hatred, and conceit. Every other non-universally-pervading dharma as a condition for every non-universally-pervading dharma should be understood in just the same way — that is, exactly as one asks of how many conditions the view of the perishable aggregation of self is a condition for the view of the perishable aggregation of self, one likewise asks of how many conditions the extreme view is a condition for the extreme view, greed, hatred, conceit, and the view of the perishable aggregation of self; greed for greed, hatred, conceit, the view of the perishable aggregation of self, and the extreme view; hatred for hatred, conceit, the view of the perishable aggregation of self, the extreme view, and greed; and conceit for conceit, the view of the perishable aggregation of self, the extreme view, greed, and hatred. Every universally-pervading dharma as a condition for every non-universally-pervading dharma should be understood in just the same way — that is, exactly as one asks of how many conditions the view of the perishable aggregation of self is a condition for the view of the perishable aggregation of self, one likewise asks, of wrong view, view-clinging, clinging to rules and vows, doubt, and ignorance, each in turn, of how many conditions each is a condition for the view of the perishable aggregation of self, the extreme view, greed, hatred, and conceit. The view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for clinging to rules and vows, may constitute either four, three, two, or one condition. Here, what is meant by ‘four’? Exactly as clinging to rules and vows arises immediately following the view of the perishable aggregation of self, one contemplates that earlier-arisen and later-arisen pair as constituting four conditions — that is, within a single instant, the view of the perishable aggregation of self arises immediately following; within the instant following that, clinging to rules and vows manifests before the mind — this later-arisen one thereby takes the earlier-arisen one as its object; the earlier and the later thereby together constitute all four conditions, namely, the cause, the immediately-antecedent, the object, and the dominant condition. As for the cause-condition: the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self and the later-arisen clinging to rules and vows constitute two causes — namely, the homogeneous cause and the universally-pervading cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the later-arisen clinging to rules and vows arises immediately following the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self. As for the object-condition: the later-arisen clinging to rules and vows arises taking the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self as its object. As for the dominant-condition: the earlier, with respect to the later, either simply presents no obstruction, or does not hinder its arising. Here, the cause-condition is exactly like a seed's own principle; the immediately-antecedent-condition is exactly like the principle of making way; the object-condition is exactly like the principle of a leaning-staff; the dominant-condition is exactly like the principle of non-obstruction. The later-arisen clinging to rules and vows, embraced by the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self through these four conditions, is thereby capable of operating in the world, capable of obtaining its fruit, capable of accomplishing its karma, and capable of cognizing its condition. Here, what is meant by ‘three’? Exactly as clinging to rules and vows arises immediately following the view of the perishable aggregation of self, without contemplating that earlier-arisen and later-arisen pair, this constitutes three conditions, excepting the object-condition — that is, within a single instant, the view of the perishable aggregation of self arises immediately following; within the instant following that, clinging to rules and vows manifests before the mind — this later-arisen clinging to rules and vows does not thereby arise taking the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self as its object, but rather takes form, feeling, perception, formations, or consciousness as its object, or, excepting the view of the perishable aggregation of self, takes the remaining formations-aggregate as its object; the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self and the later-arisen clinging to rules and vows thereby constitute only three conditions — namely, the cause, the immediately-antecedent, and the dominant condition. The explanation of these three conditions is exactly as stated at length above. The later-arisen clinging to rules and vows, embraced by the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self through these three conditions, is thereby capable of operating in the world, capable of obtaining its fruit, capable of accomplishing its karma, and capable of cognizing its condition. Or, the view of the perishable aggregation of self, arising immediately following, gives rise to some other mind, and only thereafter clinging to rules and vows arises — one contemplates that earlier-arisen and later-arisen pair as constituting three conditions, excepting the immediately-antecedent-condition — that is, within a single instant, the view of the perishable aggregation of self arises immediately following; within the instant following that, clinging to rules and vows does not yet manifest before the mind, but rather the view of the perishable aggregation of self, or the extreme view, or wrong view, or view-clinging, or doubt, or greed, or hatred, or conceit, or ignorance, or a contaminated wholesome mind, or an unobscured-indeterminate mind manifests before the mind — and only thereafter does clinging to rules and vows arise, taking the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self as its object; the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self and the later-arisen clinging to rules and vows thereby constitute only three conditions — namely, the cause, the object, and the dominant condition.

The explanation of these three conditions is exactly as stated at length above. The later-arisen clinging to rules and vows, embraced by the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self through these three conditions, is thereby capable of operating in the world, capable of obtaining its fruit, capable of accomplishing its karma, and capable of cognizing its condition. Here, what is meant by ‘two’? Exactly as the view of the perishable aggregation of self, arising immediately following, gives rise to some other mind, and only thereafter clinging to rules and vows arises, without contemplating that earlier-arisen and later-arisen pair, this constitutes two conditions — namely, the cause and the dominant condition — that is, within a single instant, the view of the perishable aggregation of self arises immediately following; within the instant following that, clinging to rules and vows does not yet manifest before the mind, but rather the view of the perishable aggregation of self, up through an unobscured-indeterminate mind manifests before the mind — and only thereafter does clinging to rules and vows arise, this time not taking the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self as its object, but rather taking form, feeling, perception, formations, or consciousness as its object, or, excepting the view of the perishable aggregation of self, taking the remaining formations-aggregate as its object; the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self and the later-arisen clinging to rules and vows thereby constitute only two conditions — namely, the cause and the dominant condition. The explanation of these two conditions is exactly as stated at length above. The later-arisen clinging to rules and vows, embraced by the earlier-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self through these two conditions, is thereby capable of operating in the world, capable of obtaining its fruit, capable of accomplishing its karma, and capable of cognizing its condition. Here, what is meant by ‘one’? The later-arisen view of the perishable aggregation of self and the earlier-arisen clinging to rules and vows — should it take the earlier as its object, this constitutes the object and the dominant condition; should it not take the earlier as its object, this constitutes solely the dominant condition, since the later, with respect to the earlier, possesses no sense of the cause-condition or the immediately-antecedent-condition. The question and answer here should be understood exactly as above. Future view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for past and present clinging to rules and vows, should it take the earlier as its object, constitutes the object and the dominant condition; should it not take the earlier as its object, this constitutes solely the dominant condition. Future and present view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for past clinging to rules and vows, should it take the earlier as its object, constitutes the object and the dominant condition; should it not take the earlier as its object, this constitutes solely the dominant condition. The question and answer here should be understood exactly as above. Desire-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for form and formless-realm clinging to rules and vows, constitutes solely a single dominant-condition — that is, the desire realm's own view of the perishable aggregation of self, with respect to the two higher realms' own clinging to rules and vows,

either simply presents no obstruction, or does not hinder its arising, and thereby constitutes a single dominant-condition. As for its not being a cause-condition: this is because realm and ground differ, and cause and fruit are thereby cut off from one another.

As for its not being an immediately-antecedent-condition: this is because it is never the case that the lower ground's own affliction, arising immediately, is followed by the higher ground's own affliction manifesting before the mind. As for its not being an object-condition: this is because it is decisively never the case that the higher ground's own affliction takes the lower as its object. Form and formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for desire-realm clinging to rules and vows —

should it take the object role but not the immediately-antecedent role, this constitutes the object and the dominant condition — that is, should one, not abiding in a mind co-arisen with form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, die, and thereupon give rise to a mind co-arisen with desire-realm clinging to rules and vows, thereby binding oneself to rebirth, and should that desire-realm clinging to rules and vows take that form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self as its object as it arises, that form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self and that desire-realm clinging to rules and vows constitute the object and the dominant condition — as for its not being a cause-condition, the sense is exactly as stated above; as for its not being an immediately-antecedent-condition, this is because that desire-realm clinging to rules and vows does not arise immediately following that form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self. Should it take the immediately-antecedent role but not the object role, this constitutes the immediately-antecedent and the dominant condition — that is, should one, abiding in a mind co-arisen with form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, die, and thereupon give rise to a mind co-arisen with desire-realm clinging to rules and vows, thereby binding oneself to rebirth, and should that desire-realm clinging to rules and vows not take that form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self as its object as it arises, that form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self and that desire-realm clinging to rules and vows constitute the immediately-antecedent and the dominant condition —

as for its not being a cause-condition, the sense is exactly as stated above; as for its not being an object-condition, this is because it does not take the other as its object. Should it take both the immediately-antecedent and the object role,

this constitutes the immediately-antecedent, the object, and the dominant condition — that is, should one, abiding in a mind co-arisen with form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, die, and thereupon give rise to a mind co-arisen with desire-realm clinging to rules and vows, thereby binding oneself to rebirth, and should that desire-realm clinging to rules and vows take that form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self as its object as it arises, that form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self and that desire-realm clinging to rules and vows constitute the immediately-antecedent, the object, and the dominant condition — as for its not being a cause-condition, the sense is exactly as stated above. Should it take neither the immediately-antecedent nor the object role, this constitutes solely the dominant condition — that is, should one, not abiding in a mind co-arisen with form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, die, and thereupon give rise to a mind co-arisen with desire-realm clinging to rules and vows, thereby binding oneself to rebirth, and should that desire-realm clinging to rules and vows not take that form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self as its object as it arises, that form or formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self and that desire-realm clinging to rules and vows constitute solely a single dominant-condition — as for the remaining three conditions, the sense is exactly as stated above. Form-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for formless-realm clinging to rules and vows, constitutes solely a single dominant-condition, the sense exactly as stated above. Formless-realm view of the perishable aggregation of self, as a condition for form-realm clinging to rules and vows — should it take the object role but not the immediately-antecedent role, this constitutes the object and the dominant condition; should it take the immediately-antecedent role but not the object role, this constitutes the immediately-antecedent and the dominant condition; should it take both the immediately-antecedent and the object role, this constitutes the immediately-antecedent, the object, and the dominant condition; should it take neither, this constitutes solely the dominant condition — every sense here should be understood by analogy with what was stated above. Exactly as with the view of the perishable aggregation of self as a condition for clinging to rules and vows, one should understand the view of the perishable aggregation of self as a condition for every other universally-pervading dharma, every universally-pervading dharma as a condition for every universally-pervading dharma, and every other non-universally-pervading dharma as a condition for every universally-pervading dharma, in just the same way. That, exactly as with the view of the perishable aggregation of self as a condition for clinging to rules and vows, one should understand the view of the perishable aggregation of self as a condition for every other universally-pervading dharma in just the same way, refers to:

exactly as one asks of how many conditions the view of the perishable aggregation of self is a condition for clinging to rules and vows, one likewise asks of how many conditions the view of the perishable aggregation of self is a condition for wrong view, view-clinging, doubt, and ignorance. That every universally-pervading dharma as a condition for every universally-pervading dharma should be understood in just the same way refers to: exactly as one asks of how many conditions the view of the perishable aggregation of self is a condition for clinging to rules and vows, one likewise asks of how many conditions wrong view is a condition for wrong view, view-clinging, clinging to rules and vows, doubt, and ignorance; view-clinging for view-clinging, clinging to rules and vows, doubt, ignorance, and wrong view; clinging to rules and vows for clinging to rules and vows, doubt, ignorance, wrong view, and view-clinging; doubt for doubt, ignorance, wrong view, view-clinging, and clinging to rules and vows; and ignorance for ignorance, wrong view, view-clinging, clinging to rules and vows, and doubt. That every other non-universally-pervading dharma as a condition for every universally-pervading dharma should be understood in just the same way refers to: exactly as one asks of how many conditions the view of the perishable aggregation of self is a condition for clinging to rules and vows, one likewise asks, of the extreme view, greed, hatred, and conceit, each in turn, of how many conditions each is a condition for wrong view, view-clinging, clinging to rules and vows, doubt, and ignorance.

Among the dharmas, when one asks about subsumption, one ought to distinguish with reference to realm; when one asks about cognition, one ought to distinguish with reference to the truths; when one asks about consciousness, one ought to distinguish with reference to the sense-fields; when one asks about affliction, one ought to distinguish with reference to the sections — for, when the characteristics of the dharmas are thus distinguished, they become readily displayed and readily set forth. Here, since the question concerns affliction, it ought to be distinguished with reference to the five sections. The five sections are: what is abandoned by seeing suffering, its arising, its cessation, the path, and by cultivation. The affliction abandoned by seeing suffering is of two kinds — first, universally-pervading; second, not universally-pervading — and the affliction abandoned by seeing its arising, likewise. The affliction abandoned by seeing cessation is of two kinds — first, taking a contaminated object; second, taking an uncontaminated object — and the affliction abandoned by seeing the path, likewise. The affliction abandoned by cultivation is of solely one kind — namely, not universally-pervading. Here, the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, as a condition for the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, constitutes four conditions, namely, the cause, the immediately-antecedent, the object, and the dominant condition. As for the cause-condition, there are four causes —

namely, the associated cause, the co-existent cause, the homogeneous cause, and the universally-pervading cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering manifests before the mind immediately following the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering. As for the object-condition: the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering arises taking the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering as its object. As for the dominant-condition: this and that alike merely present no obstruction to their own arising. The universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, as a condition for the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, constitutes four conditions. As for the cause-condition, there are two causes — namely, the homogeneous cause and the universally-pervading cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering manifests before the mind immediately following the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering. As for the object-condition: the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering arises taking the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering as its object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. The universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, as a condition for the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing its arising, constitutes four conditions. As for the cause-condition, there is solely one cause — namely, the universally-pervading cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing its arising manifests before the mind immediately following the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering. As for the object-condition: the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing its arising arises taking the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering as its object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. The universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, as a condition for the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing its arising, and for every affliction abandoned by seeing its cessation, the path, and by cultivation, constitutes three conditions, excepting the object-condition. As for the cause-condition, there is solely one cause —

namely, the universally-pervading cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: these various afflictions manifest before the mind immediately following the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. As for its not being an object-condition: this is because these various afflictions, being non-universally-pervading, are incapable of taking another section as their object.

The non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, as a condition for the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, constitutes four conditions. As for the cause-condition, there are three causes — namely, the associated cause, the co-existent cause, and the homogeneous cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering manifests before the mind immediately following the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering. As for the object-condition: the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering arises taking the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering as its object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. The non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, as a condition for the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, constitutes four conditions. As for the cause-condition, there is solely one cause — namely, the homogeneous cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition:

the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering manifests before the mind immediately following the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering. As for the object-condition: the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering arises taking the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering as its object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. The non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, as a condition for the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing its arising, constitutes three conditions, excepting the cause-condition. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing its arising manifests before the mind immediately following the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering.

As for the object-condition: the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing its arising arises taking the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering as its object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. As for its not being a cause-condition: this is because a non-universally-pervading dharma does not serve as a cause for the affliction of another section. The non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering, as a condition for the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing its arising, and for every affliction abandoned by seeing its cessation, the path, and by cultivation, constitutes solely the immediately-antecedent and the dominant condition. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: these various afflictions manifest before the mind immediately following the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. As for its not being either of the remaining two conditions: this is because a non-universally-pervading dharma is certainly never a cause for the defiled dharma of another section, and a non-universally-pervading affliction is certainly never capable of taking the dharma of another section as its object. Exactly as with the two kinds of affliction abandoned by seeing suffering as conditions for the nine kinds of affliction, one should understand the two kinds of affliction abandoned by seeing its arising as conditions for the nine kinds of affliction in just the same way. The affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object, as a condition for the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object, constitutes four conditions. As for the cause-condition, there are three causes — namely, the associated cause, the co-existent cause, and the homogeneous cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object manifests before the mind immediately following the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object. As for the object-condition: the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object arises taking the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object as its object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. The affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object, as a condition for the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object, constitutes three conditions, excepting the object-condition. As for the cause-condition, there is solely one cause — namely, the homogeneous cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object manifests before the mind immediately following the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. As for its not being an object-condition: this is because the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object takes solely cessation-through-discernment as its object, which is not itself an affliction. The affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object, as a condition for the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, constitutes three conditions, excepting the cause-condition. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition:

the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising manifests before the mind immediately following the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object. As for the object-condition: the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising arises taking the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object as its object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. As for its not being a cause-condition: this is because a non-universally-pervading dharma carries no sense of serving as a cause for the defilement of another section. The affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object, as a condition for the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, and for every affliction abandoned by seeing the path and by cultivation, constitutes solely the immediately-antecedent and the dominant condition, being neither a cause-condition nor an object-condition. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: these various afflictions manifest before the mind immediately following the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. The sense of its not being a cause-condition is likewise exactly as stated above. As for its not being an object-condition:

this is because these various afflictions, being non-universally-pervading, do not take another section as their object. The affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object, as a condition for the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object, constitutes three conditions, excepting the object-condition. As for the cause-condition, there are three causes — namely, the associated cause, the co-existent cause, and the homogeneous cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object manifests before the mind immediately following the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object.

The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. As for its not being an object-condition: this is because that which it takes as its object is cessation-through-discernment, which is not itself an affliction. The affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object, as a condition for the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object, constitutes four conditions. As for the cause-condition, there is solely one cause — namely, the homogeneous cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object manifests before the mind immediately following the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object. As for the object-condition: the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking a contaminated object arises taking the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object as its object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. The affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object, as a condition for the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, constitutes three conditions, excepting the cause-condition. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object manifests immediately preceding, the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising manifesting before the mind. As for the object-condition: the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising arises taking the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object as its object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. As for its not being a cause-condition: this is because a non-universally-pervading affliction never serves as a cause for the defilement of another section. The affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object, as a condition for the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, and for every affliction abandoned by seeing the path and by cultivation, constitutes solely the immediately-antecedent and the dominant condition, being neither a cause-condition nor an object-condition. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: these various afflictions manifest before the mind immediately following the affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and taking an uncontaminated object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. As for its not being a cause-condition: this is because a non-universally-pervading affliction carries no sense of serving as a cause for the defilement of another section. As for its not being an object-condition: this is because these various afflictions, being non-universally-pervading, do not take another section as their object. Exactly as with the two kinds of affliction abandoned by seeing cessation as conditions for the nine kinds of affliction, one should understand the two kinds of affliction abandoned by seeing the path as conditions for the nine kinds of affliction in just the same way. The affliction abandoned by cultivation, as a condition for the affliction abandoned by cultivation, constitutes four conditions. As for the cause-condition, there are three causes — namely, the associated cause, the co-existent cause, and the homogeneous cause. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the affliction abandoned by cultivation manifests before the mind immediately following the affliction abandoned by cultivation. As for the object-condition: the affliction abandoned by cultivation arises taking the affliction abandoned by cultivation as its object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. The affliction abandoned by cultivation, as a condition for the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, constitutes three conditions, excepting the cause-condition. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: the affliction abandoned by cultivation manifests immediately preceding, the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising manifesting before the mind. As for the object-condition: the universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising arises taking the affliction abandoned by cultivation as its object. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. As for its not being a cause-condition: this is because a non-universally-pervading dharma does not serve as a cause for the defiled dharma of another section. The affliction abandoned by cultivation, as a condition for the non-universally-pervading affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, and for every affliction abandoned by seeing its cessation and the path, constitutes solely the immediately-antecedent and the dominant condition, being neither a cause-condition nor an object-condition. As for the immediately-antecedent-condition: these various afflictions manifest before the mind immediately following the affliction abandoned by cultivation. The dominant-condition is exactly as stated above. As for its not being a cause-condition: this is because a non-universally-pervading dharma does not serve as a cause for the defiled dharma of another section. As for its not being an object-condition: this is because every non-universally-pervading affliction is incapable of taking the dharma of another section as its object. Further, every affliction has fifteen sections —

that is, each of the three realms possesses five sections, from what is abandoned by seeing suffering up through what is abandoned by cultivation — and, among these, precisely how many conditions each one serves as for the full fifteen sections should be reasoned out accordingly. Further, each realm's own five sections of affliction may be divided into nine kinds, making twenty-seven in all — and, among these, precisely how many conditions each one serves as for the full twenty-seven should likewise be reasoned out accordingly.