A Beautiful Woman Enters the Assembly

There are nine fetters — namely, the fetter of craving, up through the fetter of stinginess. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of craving, is it likewise bound by the fetter of hatred? Such chapter-headings, and the explanation of their meaning, having already been grasped, ought next to be explained at length. Here, ‘matter’ is of five kinds — first, the matter of own-nature; second, the matter of the object; third, the matter of binding; fourth, the matter of cause; fifth, the matter of embracing. The matter of own-nature is exemplified by what the Consciousness Aggregate states: if a matter is capable of penetrating, is that matter thereby capable of full comprehension? Suppose a matter is capable of full comprehension — is that matter thereby capable of penetrating? — there, the very own-nature of the forbearances and the cognitions is expressed by the word ‘matter’; and, further, it states: if a matter has already been attained, is that matter possessed? Suppose a matter is possessed — has that matter already been attained? There are those who say: the own-nature of every dharma whatsoever is expressed by the word ‘matter.’ There are those who say: whatever dharma is capable of being attained is expressed by the word ‘matter.’ The matter of the object is exemplified by what the Prakaraṇapāda states: every dharma whatsoever is known by cognition, in accordance with its own matter — what is meant by ‘in accordance with its own matter’? Whatever dharma is the very object upon which that cognition operates is, with respect to that object, expressed by the word ‘matter.’ Yet scripture states: I shall now teach you the forty-four matters of wisdom, and the seventy-seven matters of wisdom — the various Ābhidharma treatise-masters state: that scripture speaks of the matter of own-nature, that is, the forbearances and cognitions that take the limbs of existence as their object are expressed by the word ‘matter.’ The Venerable Ghoṣa states as follows: that scripture speaks of the matter of the object, that is, the limbs of existence that the forbearances and cognitions take as their object are expressed by the word ‘matter.’ The matter of binding is exemplified by what is stated here: for a given matter that is bound by the fetter of craving, is it likewise bound by the fetter of hatred? — and so on, at length. Here, the dharmas of the five sections are expressed by the word ‘matter,’ that is, the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, its arising, its cessation, the path, and by cultivation — these being the very matter bound by the five sections' own affliction, and are therefore named the matter of binding. The matter of cause is exemplified by what the Prakaraṇapāda states: what is a dharma possessing a matter? What is a dharma without a matter? — its own intent stating this as the dharma possessing a cause and the dharma without a cause. Further, a verse states:

A monk whose own mind is stilled
is capable of forever cutting off every matter;
since his own birth and death is thereby exhausted,
he undergoes no further existence.

The verse's own intent states: all birth and death depends entirely upon cause; because there is a cause, there is birth and death; because the cause is cut off, birth and death is exhausted, and, on this very account, one no longer undergoes future rebirth within the three existences. The matter of embracing is exemplified by what scripture states: one ought to relinquish the mind that embraces the matter of one's fields, the matter of one's house, and the matter of one's wealth; one ought to abandon the karma that embraces the matter of one's fields, the matter of one's house, and the matter of one's wealth. Further, a verse states:

Whoever, with respect to the matter of fields, wealth,
oxen, horses, servants, and the rest,
sons, daughters, and kin, holds separate desire —
such a person is named one of the utmost greed.

Further, a householder speaks in this way: I embrace this matter, I hold this matter — such things as these are named the matter of embracing. There are further five matters — first, the matter of realm; second, the matter of sense-field; third, the matter of aggregate; fourth, the matter of time; fifth, the matter of moment. Among these ten matters,

this discourse is composed with reference solely to the matter of binding, not with reference to the remaining nine.

The various Ābhidharma treatise-masters state: the matter bound is real, and the fetter that binds is likewise real, while the person is a mere designation. The Vātsīputrīyas state: the matter bound is real, the fetter that binds is likewise real, and the person, too, is real. The Dārṣṭāntikas state: the fetter that binds is real, while the matter bound is a mere designation, and the person, too, is a mere designation. One asks: for what reason do they state that the matter bound is a mere designation? The answer: they state that, since whether an object is defiling or non-defiling is not fixed, the object is thereby known not to be real — that is, suppose there is a beautiful woman, adorned in every manner, who comes into an assembly: some, seeing her, give rise to respect; some, seeing her, give rise to desire; some, seeing her, give rise to hatred; some, seeing her, give rise to jealousy; some, seeing her, give rise to disgust; some, seeing her, give rise to compassion; some, seeing her, give rise to equanimity. One should understand that, here, her own children, seeing her, give rise to respect; those indulging in desire, seeing her, give rise to craving; her enemies, seeing her, give rise to hatred; her co-wives, seeing her, give rise to jealousy; those who cultivate the contemplation of impurity, seeing her, give rise to disgust;

sages already free of desire, seeing her, give rise to compassion, thinking to themselves: this wondrous form and appearance will, before long, be destroyed by impermanence; arhats, seeing her, give rise to equanimity — and it is on this very account that the object is known to possess no real substance. This statement is not tenable — for what reason is this so? Were the object not real, it could not serve as the condition giving rise to mind and mental factors; and, were this so, there would be no defiled or purified dharma whatsoever. The person is certainly not really existent,

since the Buddha teaches that there is no self and nothing belonging to a self.

Some afflictions are associated with the five sense-consciousnesses; some are associated with the mental consciousness. As for those associated with the five sense-consciousnesses: should the affliction be past, it binds the past matter; should it be present, it binds the present matter; should it be future and destined to arise, it binds the future matter; should it be future and not destined to arise, it binds the matter of all three times. As for those associated with the mental consciousness: whether past, future, or present, they are all capable of binding the matter of all three times. Further, the affliction associated with eye-consciousness constitutes an object-binding with respect to the form sense-field, and constitutes an associated-binding with respect to its own associated mind sense-field and dharma sense-field. The affliction associated with ear-consciousness constitutes an object-binding with respect to the sound sense-field, and constitutes an associated-binding with respect to its own associated mind sense-field and dharma sense-field.

The affliction associated with nose-consciousness constitutes an object-binding with respect to the smell sense-field, and constitutes an associated-binding with respect to its own associated mind sense-field and dharma sense-field. The affliction associated with tongue-consciousness constitutes an object-binding with respect to the taste sense-field, and constitutes an associated-binding with respect to its own associated mind sense-field and dharma sense-field. The affliction associated with body-consciousness constitutes an object-binding with respect to the touch sense-field, and constitutes an associated-binding with respect to its own associated mind sense-field and dharma sense-field. The affliction associated with mental consciousness constitutes an object-binding with respect to all twelve sense-fields, and constitutes an associated-binding with respect to its own associated mind sense-field and dharma sense-field. This, then, is the brief exegesis of the Single-Class-of-Conduct. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of craving, is it likewise bound by the fetter of hatred? The answer: whatever matter is bound by the fetter of hatred is certainly bound by the fetter of craving; there are also matters bound by the fetter of craving yet not bound by the fetter of hatred — that is, with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, craving remains uncut. Here, the fetter of craving spans all three realms and all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading; the fetter of hatred belongs solely to the desire realm, spanning all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading. For one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter: whatever is bound by craving is likewise bound by hatred, and whatever is bound by hatred is likewise bound by craving; with respect to the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by craving but not by hatred. For one not fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter: wherever craving remains uncut, that matter is bound by craving and is likewise bound by hatred; wherever craving has already been cut off, that matter is bound by neither. With respect to the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter: wherever craving remains uncut, that matter is bound by craving but not by hatred; wherever craving has already been cut off, that matter is bound by neither — since craving is the longer-reaching, and hatred the shorter-reaching, of the two. The question posed ought therefore to be answered by the reverse of its own clause: whatever matter is bound by hatred is certainly bound by craving — that is, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter not yet entirely cut off; there are also matters bound by craving yet not bound by hatred — that is, with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, craving remains uncut. Here, there may be eight grounds not yet cut off, up through the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception alone not yet cut off; within a given ground, there may be all five sections not yet cut off, up through solely what is abandoned by cultivation not yet cut off; within a given section, there may be all nine grades not yet cut off, up through solely the very lowest grade not yet cut off — the word ‘uncut’ here being spoken in a general sense. One asks: for what reason do the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned dharmas possess no binding by the fetter of hatred?

The answer: this is because the two higher realms possess no fetter of hatred. One asks: for what reason do the two higher realms possess no fetter of hatred? The answer: this is because they are not a suitable vessel for the fetter of hatred. Further, yogins, growing weary of and disgusted with the fetter of hatred, seek out the two higher realms; were the two higher realms to possess the fetter of hatred, yogins ought not to seek them out and diligently cultivate the effort required — and, were a dharma present in a lower ground also present in a higher ground, there would then be no such thing as a gradual, sequential cessation, and, were this absent, there would likewise be no such thing as a final, ultimate cessation, since the latter is drawn forth by the former; and, were one to deny the existence of final, ultimate cessation, one would thereby also have to deny liberation and emancipation itself — and, in order that no such fault arise, the two higher realms possess no fetter of hatred. Further, the fetter of hatred necessarily depends upon a coarse and rough mental continuum; the form and formless realms' own mental continuum, being subtle and smooth, nourished by superior calm abiding, possesses no fetter of hatred. Further, should a given realm possess the displeasure and pain faculties, it would thereby possess the fetter of hatred, since sentient beings, relying on the displeasure and pain faculties, give rise to hatred toward another's own continuum; the form and formless realms, possessing neither the displeasure nor the pain faculty, possess no fetter of hatred. Further, should the desire realm possess shamelessness and lack of moral dread, it would thereby possess the fetter of hatred, since sentient beings, relying upon shamelessness and lack of moral dread, give rise to hatred toward another's own continuum; the two higher realms, possessing neither shamelessness nor lack of moral dread, possess no fetter of hatred. Further, should a given realm possess envy and stinginess, it would thereby possess the fetter of hatred, since sentient beings, relying upon envy and stinginess, give rise to hatred toward another's own continuum; the form and formless realms, possessing neither envy nor stinginess, possess no fetter of hatred. Further, should a given realm possess the male and female faculties, it would thereby possess the fetter of hatred, since sentient beings, relying upon the male and female faculties, give rise to hatred toward another's own continuum; the form and formless realms, possessing neither the male nor the female faculty, possess no fetter of hatred. Further, should a given realm possess craving for solid food, it would thereby possess the fetter of hatred, since sentient beings, relying upon craving for solid food, give rise to hatred toward another's own continuum; the form and formless realms, possessing no craving for solid food, possess no fetter of hatred. Further, should a given realm possess sexual craving, it would thereby possess the fetter of hatred, since sentient beings, relying upon sexual craving, give rise to hatred toward another's own continuum; the form and formless realms, possessing no sexual craving, possess no fetter of hatred. Further, should a given realm possess the five heavy hindrances, it would thereby possess the fetter of hatred, since sentient beings, relying upon the five heavy hindrances, give rise to hatred toward another's own continuum; the form and formless realms, possessing no five heavy hindrances, possess no fetter of hatred. Further, should a given realm possess the five wondrous sensual pleasures, it would thereby possess the fetter of hatred, since sentient beings, relying upon the five wondrous sensual pleasures, give rise to hatred; the form and formless realms, possessing no five wondrous sensual pleasures, possess no fetter of hatred. Further, should a given realm possess the marks of enmity, it would thereby possess the fetter of hatred — the marks of enmity referring to the nine grounds for vexation; the form and formless realms, possessing no marks of enmity, possess no fetter of hatred, and it is on this very account that the Venerable Ghoṣa states: should a sentient being encounter the marks of enmity, the fetter of hatred thereupon arises — and, the two higher realms possessing none of the marks of enmity, they possess no fetter of hatred. Further, loving-kindness is the proximate antidote to the fetter of hatred; the form realm, possessing loving-kindness, possesses no fetter of hatred, exactly as, wherever the vairambhaka wind blows, cloud and mist can never remain there — the form realm possessing none, the formless realm, too, possesses none — it is not the case that every affliction absent from a lower ground is thereby present in a higher one merely through some sequential process of cutting-off. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of craving, is it likewise bound by the fetter of conceit? The answer: it is indeed so. Suppose there is binding by the fetter of conceit — is there likewise binding by the fetter of craving? The answer: it is indeed so — that is, the fetters of craving and conceit both span all three realms and all five sections, both take solely a contaminated object, neither universally pervading, and are equal in their own longer and shorter reach.

The question posed ought therefore to be answered by this very clause: for one fully bound, the matter of all five sections across all three realms is bound by both fetters; for one not fully bound, wherever already cut off, there is no binding by either fetter, while wherever not yet cut off, there is binding by both — there may be nine grounds, or eight, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be five sections, down to a single section; within a given section, there may be nine grades, down to a single grade — and it is for this reason that the answer is ‘it is indeed so.’

For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of craving, is it likewise bound by the fetter of ignorance? The answer: whatever matter is bound by craving is certainly bound by ignorance; there are also matters bound by ignorance yet not bound by craving — that is, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, the ignorance-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising remains uncut. Here, the fetter of craving spans all three realms and all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading; the fetter of ignorance spans all three realms and all five sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not. For one fully bound, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms: whatever is bound by craving is likewise bound by ignorance, and whatever is bound by ignorance is likewise bound by craving. For one not fully bound, with respect to what has already been cut off: there may be binding by the universally-pervading ignorance-fetter without binding by craving, since ignorance is the longer-reaching, and craving the shorter-reaching, of the two. The question posed ought therefore to be answered by its own forward clause — that is, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms, whatever is bound by craving is certainly bound by ignorance; there are also matters bound by ignorance yet not bound by craving, to be explained at length exactly as above — that is, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, the craving and ignorance abandoned by seeing suffering, with respect to their own section's own matter, have already been entirely cut off, and are therefore incapable of binding either; the universally-pervading ignorance-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising constitutes an object-binding with respect to the matter abandoned by seeing suffering; the craving-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising, with respect to the matter abandoned by seeing suffering, constitutes neither an object-binding, since it is not universally pervading, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another section. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of craving, is it likewise bound by the fetter of view? The answer should be given as a tetralemma. Here, the fetter of craving spans all three realms and all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading; the fetter of view spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not. For one fully bound, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms:

whatever is bound by craving is likewise bound by view, and whatever is bound by view is likewise bound by craving. For one not fully bound: craving, spanning all five sections, is the longer-reaching in that respect, yet, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading, is the shorter-reaching in another; view, belonging solely to four sections, is the shorter-reaching in that respect, yet, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not, is the longer-reaching in another — these two thus each possessing their own longer and shorter reach. The question posed ought therefore to be answered as a tetralemma. There is binding by craving without binding by view — that is, once the cognition regarding its cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path,

and with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, craving remains uncut. Here, the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path refer to wrong view's own nature, together with view-clinging, clinging to rules and vows, doubt, greed, hatred, conceit, and the specific ignorance not shared with these, whether within their own cluster, associated or dissociated. With respect to these dharmas, craving remains uncut, and there is therefore binding by craving — such craving, within its own cluster, constituting both an object-binding and an associated-binding; with respect to another cluster, constituting an object-binding but not an associated-binding. There is no binding by view — for what reason is this so? The universally-pervading view-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off; the remainder, not yet cut off, with respect to these dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter, constitutes no object-binding, since it takes an uncontaminated object; nor does it constitute an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster, own-nature not being associated with own-nature. With respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, craving remains uncut, and there is therefore binding by craving — there may be nine grounds where craving remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be nine grades where craving remains uncut, down to a single grade — there being no binding by view, for what reason is this so? The universally-pervading view-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off, and the section abandoned by cultivation possesses no view-fetter at all. Further, once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path,

with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, and with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, craving remains uncut. Here, the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path are exactly as stated above; with respect to these dharmas, and with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, binding by craving without binding by view is likewise exactly as stated above. Further, a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen still has craving uncut with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation — here, once the subsequent-class cognition regarding the path has arisen, one who has fully seen the four noble truths across all three realms is named ‘one who has fully seen’; with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, craving remains uncut, and there is therefore binding by craving — there may be nine grounds where craving remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be nine grades where craving remains uncut, down to a single grade — there being no binding by view, for what reason is this so? Every view-fetter whatsoever has already been cut off by such a one. There is binding by view without binding by craving — that is, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, the view-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising remains uncut. Here, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, both the craving-fetter and the view-fetter abandoned by seeing suffering have already been cut off, while the view-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising remains uncut, and there is therefore, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, an object-binding; the craving-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising, though remaining uncut, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, constitutes neither an object-binding, since it is not universally pervading, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster. There is binding by both together — that is, for one fully bound, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. One asks: why is such a one named ‘fully bound’? The answer: because this being's every limb whatsoever is capable of binding, and every limb whatsoever is itself bound, he is named ‘fully bound’ — ‘every limb whatsoever capable of binding’ referring to the fact that the affliction of all five sections is capable of binding; ‘every limb whatsoever itself bound’ referring to the fact that the dharmas of all five sections are themselves bound. This one fully bound, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, has one section bound by craving and two sections bound by view; with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, likewise. With respect to the dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation, he has one section bound by craving and three sections bound by view; with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter, he has one section bound by craving and three sections bound by view;

with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing the path, likewise. With respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, he has one section bound by craving and two sections bound by view. Further, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, its cessation, the path, and by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. Here, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, he has one section bound by craving and one section bound by view; with respect to the dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation, he has one section bound by craving and two sections bound by view; with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter, he has one section bound by craving and one section bound by view; with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing the path, likewise; with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, he has one section bound by craving and one section bound by view. At that time, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, though there is binding by view, there is no binding by craving, and this is therefore not spoken of here. Further, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, there is binding by both fetters. Here, with respect to the dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, each has one section bound by craving and one section bound by view. At that time, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, and with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, though there is binding by craving, there is no binding by view, and this is therefore not spoken of here. Further, once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, there is binding by both fetters. Here, with respect to the dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, he has one section bound by craving and one section bound by view. At that time, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, and with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, though there is binding by craving, there is no binding by view, and this is therefore not spoken of here. There is binding by neither together — that is, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, there is binding by neither fetter; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, its arising, and cessation, there is binding by neither fetter; a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the form realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire and form realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the formless realm's own defilement, with respect to all three realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter — here, since both what binds and what is bound have, in these dharmas, already been entirely cut off, both fetters are alike disjoined, namely, both craving and view being disjoined. On this, a further, occasional question and answer ought to be given: are there any dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path that are bound by craving, not bound by view, yet whose latent tendency of view has not thereby failed to increase? The answer: there are —

that is, one who, having already cut off six grades of fetter, has entered the certainty of freedom from birth — once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the first six grades of the dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, there is binding by craving; craving toward the latter three grades, remaining uncut, yet there is no binding by view, since the universally-pervading view-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off, and, within its own section, the view-fetter of the first six grades that takes an uncontaminated object has likewise already been cut off; the view-fetter of the latter three grades, within its own section, taking an uncontaminated object, though remaining uncut, with respect to the dharmas associated with the view-fetter of the already-cut first six grades, constitutes no object-binding, since it takes an uncontaminated object, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster — yet the view-latent-tendency has not thereby failed to increase, since view-clinging and clinging to rules and vows, in their own section's latter three grades, still increase with respect to the first six grades, the view-latent-tendency spanning all five views, while the view-fetter belongs solely to the first three views. Exactly as with the view-fetter,

so too with the doubt-fetter — that is, exactly as the view-fetter spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not,

so too the doubt-fetter — and it is on this account that craving, with respect to the doubt-fetter, should be understood exactly as with the view-fetter. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of craving, is it likewise bound by the fetter of grasping? The answer should be given as a tetralemma. Here, the fetter of craving spans all three realms and all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading; the fetter of grasping spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking a contaminated object, either universally pervading or not. For one fully bound, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms: whatever is bound by craving is likewise bound by grasping, and whatever is bound by grasping is likewise bound by craving. For one not fully bound: craving, spanning all five sections, is the longer-reaching in that respect, yet, being solely non-universally-pervading, is the shorter-reaching in another; grasping, being either universally pervading or not, is the longer-reaching in that respect, yet, belonging solely to four sections, is the shorter-reaching in another — these two thus each possessing their own longer and shorter reach. The question posed ought therefore to be answered as a tetralemma. There is binding by craving without binding by grasping — that is, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, craving remains uncut; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, craving remains uncut; a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, still has craving uncut. Here, there may be nine grounds where craving remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be nine grades where craving remains uncut, down to a single grade — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by craving without binding by grasping. For what reason is this so? The universally-pervading grasping-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off; the non-universally-pervading grasping-fetter that remains uncut, once cut off, is incapable of binding the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, since the section abandoned by cultivation possesses no grasping-fetter at all. There is binding by grasping without binding by craving — that is, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, the grasping-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising remains uncut. Here, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, both the craving-fetter and the grasping-fetter abandoned by seeing suffering have already been cut off, while the grasping-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising remains uncut, and there is therefore, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, an object-binding; the craving-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising, though remaining uncut, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, constitutes neither an object-binding, since it is not universally pervading, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster.

There is binding by both together — that is, for one fully bound, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. Here, this one fully bound, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, has one section bound by craving and two sections bound by grasping; with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, likewise. With respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation, he has one section bound by craving and three sections bound by grasping; with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing the path, likewise. With respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, he has one section bound by craving and two sections bound by grasping. Further, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, cessation, the path, and by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. Here, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, he has one section bound by craving and one section bound by grasping; with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, each has one section bound by craving and two sections bound by grasping; with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation,

he has one section bound by craving and one section bound by grasping. At that time, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, though there is binding by grasping, there is no binding by craving, and this is therefore not spoken of here. Further, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, there is binding by both fetters. Here, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, each has one section bound by craving and one section bound by grasping. At that time, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, though there is binding by craving, there is no binding by grasping, and this is therefore not spoken of here. Further, once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing the path, there is binding by both fetters. Here, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing the path, he has one section bound by craving and one section bound by grasping. At that time, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, though there is binding by craving, there is no binding by grasping, and this is therefore not spoken of here. There is binding by neither together — that is, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, there is binding by neither fetter; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, its arising, and cessation, there is binding by neither fetter; a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the form realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire and form realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the formless realm's own defilement, with respect to all three realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter — here, since both what binds and what is bound have, in these dharmas, already been entirely cut off, both fetters are alike disjoined, namely, both craving and grasping being disjoined. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of craving, is it likewise bound by the fetter of envy? The answer: whatever matter is bound by envy is certainly bound by craving; there are also matters bound by craving yet not bound by envy —

that is, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, craving remains uncut. Here, the fetter of craving spans all three realms and all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading; the fetter of envy belongs solely to the desire realm's own section abandoned by cultivation, taking a contaminated object, not universally pervading. For one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation: whatever is bound by craving is likewise bound by envy, and whatever is bound by envy is likewise bound by craving; with respect to the desire realm's own four sections abandoned by seeing, and the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by craving without binding by envy. For one not fully bound: should he not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters; with respect to the three realms' own four sections abandoned by seeing, wherever not yet cut off, there is binding by craving without binding by envy, while wherever already cut off, there is binding by neither; with respect to the form and formless realms' own matter abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by craving without binding by envy. Should he already be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by neither; with respect to the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, wherever not yet cut off, there is binding by craving without binding by envy, while wherever already cut off, there is binding by neither — since craving is the longer-reaching, and envy the shorter-reaching, of the two. The question posed ought therefore to be answered by the reverse of its own clause: whatever matter is bound by envy is certainly bound by craving — that is, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation, not yet disjoined; there are also matters bound by craving yet not bound by envy —

that is, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing, craving remains uncut — here, there may be all four sections where craving remains uncut, down to a single section; with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, craving remains uncut — here, there may be eight grounds where craving remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be five sections where craving remains uncut, down to a single section; within a given section, there may be nine grades where craving remains uncut, down to a single grade — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by craving without binding by envy. For what reason is this so? The section abandoned by seeing possesses no envy-fetter at all, and the form and formless realms likewise possess no envy-fetter, these possessing neither envy nor stinginess, exactly as already explained above with respect to hatred. Exactly as with the envy-fetter, so too with the stinginess-fetter — that is, envy and stinginess alike belong solely to the desire realm's own section abandoned by cultivation, taking a contaminated object, not universally pervading. Exactly as craving's own comparison with the latter constitutes a single class of conduct, conceit's own comparison with the latter likewise constitutes a single class of conduct — that is, craving and conceit both span all three realms and all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of hatred, is it likewise bound by the fetter of conceit? The answer: whatever matter is bound by hatred is certainly bound by conceit; there are also matters bound by conceit yet not bound by hatred — that is, with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, conceit remains uncut. Here, the fetter of hatred belongs solely to the desire realm, spanning all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading; the fetter of conceit spans all three realms and all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading. For one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter: whatever is bound by hatred is likewise bound by conceit, and whatever is bound by conceit is likewise bound by hatred; with respect to the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by conceit without binding by hatred. For one not fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter: wherever not yet cut off, there is binding by hatred and likewise by conceit, while wherever already cut off, there is binding by neither. With respect to the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter: wherever not yet cut off, there is binding by conceit without binding by hatred, while wherever already cut off, there is binding by neither — since hatred is the shorter-reaching, and conceit the longer-reaching, of the two. The question posed ought therefore to be answered by its own forward clause: whatever matter is bound by hatred is certainly bound by conceit — that is, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter not yet entirely cut off; there are also matters bound by conceit yet not bound by hatred — that is, with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, conceit remains uncut. Here, there may be eight grounds not yet cut off,

down to a single ground not yet cut off; within a given ground, there may be all five sections not yet cut off, down to a single section not yet cut off.

within a given section, there may be nine grades not yet cut off, down to a single grade not yet cut off. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of hatred, is it likewise bound by the fetter of ignorance? The answer: whatever matter is bound by hatred is certainly bound by ignorance; there are also matters bound by ignorance yet not bound by hatred — that is, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, the ignorance-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising remains uncut. Here, the fetter of hatred belongs solely to the desire realm, spanning all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading; the fetter of ignorance spans all three realms and all five sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not. For one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter: whatever is bound by hatred is likewise bound by ignorance, and whatever is bound by ignorance is likewise bound by hatred; with respect to the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by ignorance without binding by hatred. For one not fully bound, with respect to what has already been cut off within the desire realm: there may be binding by the universally-pervading ignorance-fetter without binding by hatred; with respect to what has not yet been cut off within the form and formless realms, likewise — since hatred is the shorter-reaching, and ignorance the longer-reaching, of the two. The question posed ought therefore to be answered by its own forward clause: whatever matter is bound by hatred is certainly bound by ignorance — that is, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter not yet entirely cut off; there are also matters bound by ignorance yet not bound by hatred — that is, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, the ignorance-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising remains uncut. Here, ‘not yet free of the desire realm's own defilement’ refers to the fact that, should one already be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas, both fetters would already be absent, and it is on this account that one is said to be ‘not yet free of it.’ Once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, both hatred and ignorance abandoned by seeing suffering have already been cut off, while the universally-pervading ignorance abandoned by seeing its arising still remains uncut, and there is therefore, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, an object-binding; the hatred-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, constitutes neither an object-binding, since it is not universally pervading, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster. Further, with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, ignorance remains uncut — here, there may be eight grounds where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be five sections where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single section; within a given section, there may be nine grades where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single grade — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by ignorance without binding by hatred, since these realms possess no fetter of hatred. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of hatred, is it likewise bound by the fetter of view? The answer should be given as a tetralemma. Here, the fetter of hatred belongs solely to the desire realm, spanning all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading; the fetter of view spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not. For one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter: whatever is bound by hatred is likewise bound by view, and whatever is bound by view is likewise bound by hatred; with respect to the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by view without binding by hatred. For one not fully bound: hatred, spanning all five sections, is the longer-reaching in that respect, yet, belonging solely to the desire realm, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading, is the shorter-reaching in another; view, spanning all three realms, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not, is the longer-reaching in that respect, yet, belonging solely to four sections, is the shorter-reaching in another — these two thus each possessing their own longer and shorter reach. The question posed ought therefore to be answered as a tetralemma. There is binding by hatred without binding by view — that is, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, and with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, hatred remains uncut. Here, the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path refer to wrong view's own nature, together with view-clinging, clinging to rules and vows, doubt, greed, hatred, conceit, and the specific ignorance not shared with these, whether within their own cluster, associated or dissociated. With respect to these dharmas, hatred remains uncut, and there is therefore binding by hatred — such hatred, within its own cluster, constituting both an object-binding and an associated-binding; with respect to another cluster, constituting an object-binding but not an associated-binding, there being no binding by view. For what reason is this so? The universally-pervading view-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off; the remainder, not yet cut off, with respect to these dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter, constitutes no object-binding, since it takes an uncontaminated object, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster, own-nature not being associated with own-nature. With respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, hatred remains uncut, and there is therefore binding by hatred — there may be nine grades where hatred remains uncut, down to a single grade, there being no binding by view. For what reason is this so? The universally-pervading view-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off, and the section abandoned by cultivation possesses no view-fetter at all. Further, once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, and with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, hatred remains uncut. Here, the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path are exactly as stated above; with respect to these dharmas, and with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, binding by hatred without binding by view is likewise exactly as stated above. Further, a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, not yet free of the desire realm's own defilement, still has hatred uncut with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation — with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, hatred remaining uncut, there is therefore binding by hatred without binding by view, to be understood exactly as above. There is binding by view without binding by hatred — that is, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, the view-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising remains uncut; with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, view remains uncut.

Here, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, both the hatred-fetter and the view-fetter abandoned by seeing suffering have already been cut off, while the view-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising remains uncut, and there is therefore, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, an object-binding; the hatred-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising, though remaining uncut, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, constitutes neither an object-binding, since it is not universally pervading, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster. With respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas,

view remains uncut — here, there may be eight grounds where view remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be four sections where view remains uncut, down to a single section — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by view without binding by hatred, since these realms possess no fetter of hatred. There is binding by both together — that is, for one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. This one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, has one section bound by hatred and two sections bound by view;

with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, likewise. With respect to the desire realm's own dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation, he has one section bound by hatred and three sections bound by view; with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter, he has one section bound by hatred and two sections bound by view; with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing the path, likewise. With respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, he has one section bound by hatred and two sections bound by view. Further, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, cessation, the path, and by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. Here, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, he has one section bound by hatred and one section bound by view; with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation, he has one section bound by hatred and two sections bound by view; with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter, he has one section bound by hatred and one section bound by view; with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing the path, likewise. With respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, he has one section bound by hatred and one section bound by view. At that time, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, though there is binding by view, there is no binding by hatred, and this is therefore not spoken of here. Further, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, there is binding by both fetters. Here, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, each has one section bound by hatred and one section bound by view. At that time, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, and with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, though there is binding by hatred, there is no binding by view, and this is therefore not spoken of here. Further, once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, there is binding by both fetters. Here, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, he has one section bound by hatred and one section bound by view. At that time, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, and with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, though there is binding by hatred, there is no binding by view,

and this is therefore not spoken of here.