The Donor Who Gave Unequal Gifts

There is binding by neither together — that is, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, together with the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by neither fetter.

Once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, its arising, and cessation, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, together with the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by neither fetter. A disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, not yet free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the form realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire and form realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the formless realm's own defilement, with respect to all three realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter — here, since both what binds and what is bound have, in these dharmas, already been entirely cut off, both fetters are alike disjoined, namely, both hatred and view being disjoined. One asks: the desire realm possesses hatred, and, once one becomes disjoined from the hatred-fetter there, this may properly be spoken of as disjunction; but the form and formless realms possess no hatred-fetter to begin with — how, then, can one speak of their own hatred-fetter as disjoined? The answer: disjunction is of two kinds — first, disjunction attained from a former binding; second, that which, by its own original nature, was never bound at all — both being named disjunction. The desire realm's own dharmas, possessing the hatred-fetter, are, upon attaining liberation, said to have attained disjunction from a former binding;

the higher two realms' own dharmas, by their own original nature, never possessing the hatred-fetter, are said to be, by their own original nature, disjoined. Since the very word ‘disjoined’ carries both these senses, this is said to be disjoined in both cases together — exactly as the Vinaya states that there are two kinds of person named pure: first, one who, from the very outset, has never once transgressed the moral precepts; second, one who, having transgressed, repents and removes the transgression in accordance with the Dharma — the first being named pure since, by his own original nature, he is free of defilement; the second being named pure since he attains purity from a former defilement. Disjunction should be understood in just the same way, and no fault therefore follows. One asks: what, precisely, are the form and formless realms' own dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path? The answer: wrong view's own nature, together with view-clinging, clinging to rules and vows, doubt, greed, conceit, and the specific ignorance not shared with these, whether within their own cluster, associated or dissociated. The associated dharmas refer to the mind and mental factors within the cluster of wrong view's own nature, view-clinging, up through the specific ignorance; the dissociated dharmas refer to the four characteristics, and the marks and the marked within the various attainments, present within the cluster of wrong view, up through the specific ignorance. Exactly as with the view-fetter, so too with the doubt-fetter — that is, exactly as the view-fetter spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not, so too the doubt-fetter — and it is on this account that hatred, with respect to the doubt-fetter, should be understood exactly as with the view-fetter. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of hatred, is it likewise bound by the fetter of grasping? The answer should be given as a tetralemma. Here, the fetter of hatred belongs solely to the desire realm, spanning all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading; the fetter of grasping spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking a contaminated object, either universally pervading or not. For one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter: whatever is bound by hatred is likewise bound by grasping, and whatever is bound by grasping is likewise bound by hatred; with respect to the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by grasping without binding by hatred. For one not fully bound: hatred, belonging solely to the desire realm, not universally pervading, is the shorter-reaching in that respect, yet, spanning all five sections, is the longer-reaching in another; grasping, belonging solely to four sections, is the shorter-reaching in that respect, yet, spanning all three realms, either universally pervading or not, is the longer-reaching in another — these two thus each possessing their own longer and shorter reach. The question posed ought therefore to be answered as a tetralemma. There is binding by hatred without binding by grasping — that is, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, hatred remains uncut; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, hatred remains uncut; a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, not yet free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, still has hatred uncut. Here, there may be nine grades where hatred remains uncut, down to a single grade — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by hatred without binding by grasping. For what reason is this so? The universally-pervading grasping-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off; the non-universally-pervading grasping-fetter, whether uncut or cut off, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, is in neither case capable of binding, since the section abandoned by cultivation possesses no grasping-fetter at all. There is binding by grasping without binding by hatred — that is, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, the grasping-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising remains uncut; with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, grasping remains uncut. Here, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, both the hatred-fetter and the grasping-fetter abandoned by seeing suffering, within the desire realm, have already been cut off, while the grasping-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising, within the desire realm, remains uncut, and there is therefore

with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, an object-binding; the desire realm's own hatred-fetter abandoned by seeing its arising, though remaining uncut, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, constitutes neither an object-binding, since it is not universally pervading, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster. With respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, grasping remains uncut — here, there may be eight grounds where grasping remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be four sections where grasping remains uncut, down to a single section — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by grasping without binding by hatred, since these realms possess no hatred. There is binding by both together — that is, for one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. This one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, has one section bound by hatred and two sections bound by grasping; with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, likewise. With respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation, he has one section bound by hatred and three sections bound by grasping; with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing the path, likewise. With respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, he has one section bound by hatred and two sections bound by grasping. Further, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, cessation, the path, and by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. Here, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, he has one section bound by hatred and one section bound by grasping; with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, each has one section bound by hatred and two sections bound by grasping; with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, he has one section bound by hatred and one section bound by grasping. At that time, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, though there is binding by grasping, there is no binding by hatred, and this is therefore not spoken of here.

Further, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, there is binding by both fetters. Here, should one likewise not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, each has one section bound by hatred and one section bound by grasping. At that time, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, though there is binding by hatred, there is no binding by grasping, and this is therefore not spoken of here. Further, once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing the path, there is binding by both fetters. Here, should one likewise not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing the path, he has one section bound by hatred and one section bound by grasping. At that time, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, though there is binding by hatred, there is no binding by grasping, and this is therefore not spoken of here. There is binding by neither together — that is, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by neither fetter; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, its arising, and cessation, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by neither fetter; a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, not yet free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the form realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire and form realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the formless realm's own defilement, with respect to all three realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter — here, since both what binds and what is bound have, in these dharmas, already been entirely cut off, both fetters are alike disjoined, namely, both hatred and grasping being disjoined. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of hatred, is it likewise bound by the fetter of envy? The answer: whatever matter is bound by envy is certainly bound by hatred; there are also matters bound by hatred yet not bound by envy — that is, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing, hatred remains uncut. Here, the fetter of hatred belongs solely to the desire realm, spanning all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading; the fetter of envy belongs solely to the desire realm's own section abandoned by cultivation, taking a contaminated object, not universally pervading. For one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation: whatever is bound by hatred is likewise bound by envy, and whatever is bound by envy is likewise bound by hatred; with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by seeing, there is binding by hatred without binding by envy. For one not fully bound: should he not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters; with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by seeing, wherever not yet cut off, there is binding by hatred without binding by envy, while wherever already cut off, there is binding by neither. Should he already be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by neither; with respect to the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, whether fully bound or not, there is at every time binding by neither — since hatred is the longer-reaching, and envy the shorter-reaching, of the two. The question posed ought therefore to be answered by the reverse of its own clause: whatever matter is bound by envy is certainly bound by hatred — that is, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation, not yet disjoined; there are also matters bound by hatred yet not bound by envy — that is, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing, hatred remains uncut. Here, there may be all four sections where hatred remains uncut, down to a single section — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by hatred without binding by envy. For what reason is this so? The section abandoned by seeing possesses no envy-fetter at all. Exactly as with the envy-fetter, so too with the stinginess-fetter —

that is, envy and stinginess alike belong solely to the desire realm's own section abandoned by cultivation, taking a contaminated object, not universally pervading.

For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of ignorance, is it likewise bound by the fetter of view? The answer: whatever matter is bound by view is certainly bound by ignorance; there are also matters bound by ignorance yet not bound by view, and so on, at length. Here, the fetter of ignorance spans all three realms and all five sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not; the fetter of view spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not. For one fully bound, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms: whatever is bound by ignorance is likewise bound by view, and whatever is bound by view is likewise bound by ignorance. For one not fully bound: ignorance is the longer-reaching, and view the shorter-reaching, of the two. The question posed ought therefore to be answered by the reverse of its own clause: whatever matter is bound by view is certainly bound by ignorance — that is, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms where view remains uncut; there are also matters bound by ignorance yet not bound by view — that is, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, and with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, ignorance remains uncut. Here, the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path refer to wrong view's own nature, together with view-clinging, clinging to rules and vows, doubt, greed, hatred, conceit, and the specific ignorance not shared with these, whether within their own cluster, associated or dissociated. With respect to these dharmas, ignorance remains uncut, and there is therefore binding by ignorance — such ignorance, within its own cluster, constituting both an object-binding and an associated-binding; with respect to another cluster, constituting an object-binding but not an associated-binding, there being no binding by view. For what reason is this so? The universally-pervading view-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off; the remainder, not yet cut off, with respect to these dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter, constitutes no object-binding, since it takes an uncontaminated object, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster, own-nature not being associated with own-nature. With respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, ignorance remains uncut, and there is therefore binding by ignorance — there may be nine grounds where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be nine grades where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single grade — there being no binding by view, for what reason is this so? The universally-pervading view-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off, and the section abandoned by cultivation possesses no view-fetter at all. Further, once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, and with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, ignorance remains uncut. Here, the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path are exactly as stated above; with respect to these dharmas, and with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, binding by ignorance without binding by view is likewise exactly as stated above. Further, a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen still has ignorance uncut with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation — here, there may be nine grounds where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be nine grades where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single grade — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by ignorance without binding by view. For what reason is this so? Every view-fetter whatsoever has already been cut off by such a one. Exactly as with the view-fetter, so too with the doubt-fetter — that is, exactly as the view-fetter spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not, so too the doubt-fetter — and it is on this account that ignorance, with respect to the doubt-fetter, should be understood exactly as with the view-fetter. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of ignorance, is it likewise bound by the fetter of grasping? The answer: whatever matter is bound by grasping is certainly bound by ignorance; there are also matters bound by ignorance yet not bound by grasping, and so on, at length. Here, the fetter of ignorance spans all three realms and all five sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not; the fetter of grasping spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking a contaminated object, either universally pervading or not.

For one fully bound, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms: whatever is bound by ignorance is likewise bound by grasping, and whatever is bound by grasping is likewise bound by ignorance. For one not fully bound: ignorance is the longer-reaching, and grasping the shorter-reaching, of the two. The question posed ought therefore to be answered by the reverse of its own clause: whatever matter is bound by grasping is certainly bound by ignorance — that is, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms where grasping remains uncut; there are also matters bound by ignorance yet not bound by grasping — that is, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, ignorance remains uncut; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, ignorance remains uncut; a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, still has ignorance uncut. Here, there may be nine grounds where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be nine grades where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single grade — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by ignorance without binding by grasping. For what reason is this so? The universally-pervading grasping-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off; the non-universally-pervading grasping-fetter, whether uncut or cut off, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, is in neither case capable of binding, since the section abandoned by cultivation possesses no grasping-fetter at all. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of ignorance, is it likewise bound by the fetter of envy? The answer: whatever matter is bound by envy is certainly bound by ignorance; there are also matters bound by ignorance yet not bound by envy — that is, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, ignorance remains uncut. Here, the fetter of ignorance spans all three realms and all five sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not; the fetter of envy belongs solely to the desire realm's own section abandoned by cultivation, taking a contaminated object, not universally pervading. For one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation: whatever is bound by ignorance is likewise bound by envy, and whatever is bound by envy is likewise bound by ignorance; with respect to the desire realm's own four sections abandoned by seeing, and the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by ignorance without binding by envy. For one not fully bound: should he not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters; with respect to the three realms' own four sections abandoned by seeing, wherever not yet disjoined, there is binding by ignorance without binding by envy, while wherever already disjoined, there is binding by neither; with respect to the form and formless realms' own matter abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by ignorance without binding by envy. Should he already be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by neither; with respect to the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, wherever not yet disjoined, there is binding by ignorance without binding by envy, while wherever already disjoined, there is binding by neither — since ignorance is the longer-reaching, and envy the shorter-reaching, of the two. The question posed ought therefore to be answered by the reverse of its own clause: whatever matter is bound by envy is certainly bound by ignorance — that is, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation, not yet disjoined; there are also matters bound by ignorance yet not bound by envy — that is, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing, ignorance remains uncut. Here, there may be all four sections where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single section; with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, ignorance remains uncut. Here, there may be eight grounds where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be five sections where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single section; within a given section, there may be nine grades where ignorance remains uncut, down to a single grade — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by ignorance without binding by envy. For what reason is this so? The section abandoned by seeing possesses no envy-fetter at all, and the form and formless realms likewise possess no envy. Exactly as with the envy-fetter, so too with the stinginess-fetter — that is, envy and stinginess alike belong solely to the desire realm's own section abandoned by cultivation, taking a contaminated object, not universally pervading. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of view, is it likewise bound by the fetter of grasping? The answer: whatever matter is bound by view is certainly bound by grasping; there are also matters bound by grasping yet not bound by view, and so on, at length. Here, the fetter of view spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not; the fetter of grasping spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking a contaminated object, either universally pervading or not. For one fully bound, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms: whatever is bound by view is likewise bound by grasping, and whatever is bound by grasping is likewise bound by view. For one not fully bound, there are dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path that are bound by grasping without being bound by view — since view is the shorter-reaching, and grasping the longer-reaching, of the two. The question posed ought therefore to be answered by its own forward clause: whatever matter is bound by view is certainly bound by grasping — that is, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms not yet disjoined from the view-fetter; there are also matters bound by grasping yet not bound by view — that is, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, grasping remains uncut; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, grasping remains uncut. Here, the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path are exactly as stated above. With respect to these dharmas, grasping remains uncut, and there is therefore binding by grasping — such grasping, within its own cluster, constituting both an object-binding and an associated-binding; with respect to another cluster, constituting an object-binding but not an associated-binding, there being no binding by view. For what reason is this so? The universally-pervading view-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off; the remainder, not yet cut off, with respect to these dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter, constitutes no object-binding, since it takes an uncontaminated object, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster, own-nature not being associated with own-nature. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of view, is it likewise bound by the fetter of doubt? The answer should be given as a tetralemma. Here, the fetter of view spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not; the fetter of doubt, likewise. For one fully bound, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms: whatever is bound by view is likewise bound by doubt, and whatever is bound by doubt is likewise bound by view. For one not fully bound: both the view-fetter and the doubt-fetter, each possessing binding within its own cluster, are the longer-reaching in that respect, yet, each possessing no binding within another cluster, are the shorter-reaching in another — and it is on this account that the question posed ought to be answered as its own genuine tetralemma. There is binding by view without binding by doubt — that is, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, view remains uncut; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, view remains uncut. Here, the dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path refer to the mind and mental factors associated with wrong view itself. The view-fetter, within these, constitutes an associated-binding, since it remains uncut, but no object-binding, since it takes an uncontaminated object.

The doubt-fetter, within these, constitutes no binding whatsoever — for what reason is this so? The universally-pervading doubt-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off; the remainder, not yet cut off, with respect to these dharmas associated with the view-fetter, constitutes no object-binding, since it takes an uncontaminated object, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster. There is binding by doubt without binding by view — that is, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas associated with the doubt-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, doubt remains uncut; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas associated with the doubt-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, doubt remains uncut. Here, the dharmas associated with the doubt-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path refer to the mind and mental factors associated with doubt itself. The doubt-fetter, within these, constitutes an associated-binding, since it remains uncut, but no object-binding, since it takes an uncontaminated object. The view-fetter, within these, constitutes no binding whatsoever — for what reason is this so?

The universally-pervading view-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off; the remainder, not yet cut off, with respect to these dharmas associated with the doubt-fetter, constitutes no object-binding, since it takes an uncontaminated object, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster. There is binding by both together — that is, for one fully bound, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. This one fully bound, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, has two sections bound by view and two sections bound by doubt; with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, likewise. With respect to the dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation, he has three sections bound by view and two sections bound by doubt;

with respect to the dharmas associated with the doubt-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation, he has three sections bound by doubt and two sections bound by view; with respect to the dharmas dissociated from either the view-fetter or the doubt-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation, he has two sections bound by view and two sections bound by doubt; with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing the path, likewise.

With respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, he has two sections bound by view and two sections bound by doubt. Once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, cessation, the path, and by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. Here, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing its arising, he has one section bound by view and one section bound by doubt; with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation, likewise. With respect to the dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation, he has two sections bound by view and one section bound by doubt; with respect to the dharmas associated with the doubt-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation, he has two sections bound by doubt and one section bound by view; with respect to the dharmas dissociated from either fetter abandoned by seeing cessation, he has one section bound by view and one section bound by doubt; with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing the path, likewise. With respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, he has one section bound by view and one section bound by doubt. There is binding by neither together — that is, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, and with respect to the dharmas dissociated from either the view-fetter or the doubt-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, together with the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by neither fetter; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, its arising, and cessation, and with respect to the dharmas dissociated from either fetter abandoned by seeing the path, together with the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by neither fetter; a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the form realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire and form realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the formless realm's own defilement, with respect to all three realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter — here, since both what binds and what is bound have, in these dharmas, already been entirely cut off, both fetters are alike disjoined, namely, both view and doubt being disjoined. The dharmas dissociated from either the view-fetter or the doubt-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, though not yet disjoined from their own section's own binding, are, with respect to the view-fetter and the doubt-fetter, unbound there, and are therefore named as having binding by neither. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of view, is it likewise bound by the fetter of envy? The answer should be given as a tetralemma. Here, the fetter of view spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not; the fetter of envy belongs solely to the desire realm's own section abandoned by cultivation, taking a contaminated object, not universally pervading. For one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation: whatever is bound by view is likewise bound by envy, and whatever is bound by envy is likewise bound by view; with respect to the desire realm's own four sections abandoned by seeing, and the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by view without binding by envy. For one not fully bound: should he not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the three realms' own four sections abandoned by seeing, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own matter abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by view without binding by envy; with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. Once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation or the path, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by envy without binding by view; with respect to the three realms' own dharmas associated with the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation or the path, there is binding by view without binding by envy; with respect to the three realms' own dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, and the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, there is binding by neither. Should he already be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by neither; with respect to the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, wherever view remains uncut, there is binding by view without binding by envy, while wherever view is already cut off, there is binding by neither — these two thus each possessing their own longer and shorter reach. The question posed ought therefore to be answered as a tetralemma. There is binding by view without binding by envy — that is, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, view remains uncut. Here, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing, where view remains uncut, there may be all four sections where view remains uncut, down to a single section; with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, where view remains uncut, there may be eight grounds where view remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be four sections where view remains uncut, down to a single section — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by view without binding by envy. For what reason is this so? The section abandoned by seeing, and the two higher realms, possess no envy-fetter. There is binding by envy without binding by view — that is, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, envy remains uncut; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, envy remains uncut; a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, not yet free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, still has envy uncut. Here, there may be nine grades where envy remains uncut, down to a single grade — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by envy without binding by view. For what reason is this so? The universally-pervading view-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off; the remainder, not yet cut off, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, is incapable of binding, since it takes an uncontaminated object, and the section abandoned by cultivation possesses no view-fetter at all. There is binding by both together — that is, for one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. This one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, has two sections bound by view and one section bound by envy. Further, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. Here, ‘not yet free of the desire realm's own defilement’ refers to the fact that there may be nine grades not yet freed of, down to a single grade not yet freed of; once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, he has one section bound by view and one section bound by envy. There is binding by neither together — that is, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, and with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, together with the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by neither fetter; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, its arising, and cessation, and with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, together with the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by neither fetter; a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, not yet free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the form realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire and form realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the formless realm's own defilement, with respect to all three realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter — here, there may be binding by neither on account of already being cut off, or binding by neither on account of never having been present to begin with. Exactly as with the envy-fetter, so too with the stinginess-fetter — that is, envy and stinginess alike belong solely to the desire realm's own section abandoned by cultivation, taking a contaminated object, not universally pervading. Exactly as view's own comparison with the latter constitutes a single class of conduct, doubt's own comparison with the latter likewise constitutes a single class of conduct — that is, view and doubt both span all three realms yet belong solely to four sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not.

For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of grasping, is it likewise bound by the fetter of doubt? The answer: whatever matter is bound by doubt is certainly bound by grasping; there are also matters bound by grasping yet not bound by doubt, and so on, at length. Here, the fetter of grasping spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking a contaminated object, either universally pervading or not; the fetter of doubt spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not. For one fully bound, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms: whatever is bound by grasping is likewise bound by doubt, and whatever is bound by doubt is likewise bound by grasping. For one not fully bound, there are dharmas dissociated from the doubt-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path that are bound by grasping without being bound by doubt — since grasping is the longer-reaching, and doubt the shorter-reaching, of the two. The question posed ought therefore to be answered by the reverse of its own clause: whatever matter is bound by doubt is certainly bound by grasping — that is, with respect to the matter of the five sections across all three realms not yet disjoined from the doubt-fetter; there are also matters bound by grasping yet not bound by doubt — that is, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the doubt-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, grasping remains uncut; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the doubt-fetter abandoned by seeing the path, grasping remains uncut. Here, the dharmas dissociated from the doubt-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path refer to doubt's own nature, together with view-clinging, clinging to rules and vows, greed, hatred, conceit, and the specific ignorance not shared with these, whether within their own cluster, associated or dissociated. With respect to these dharmas, grasping remains uncut, and there is therefore binding by grasping — such grasping, within its own cluster, constituting both an object-binding and an associated-binding; with respect to another cluster, constituting an object-binding but not an associated-binding, there being no binding by doubt. For what reason is this so? The universally-pervading doubt-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off; the remainder, not yet cut off, with respect to these dharmas dissociated from the doubt-fetter, constitutes no object-binding, since it takes an uncontaminated object, nor an associated-binding, since it belongs to another cluster, own-nature not being associated with own-nature. For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of grasping, is it likewise bound by the fetter of envy? The answer should be given as a tetralemma. Here, the fetter of grasping spans all three realms yet belongs solely to four sections, taking a contaminated object, either universally pervading or not; the fetter of envy belongs solely to the desire realm's own section abandoned by cultivation, taking a contaminated object, not universally pervading. For one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation: whatever is bound by grasping is likewise bound by envy, and whatever is bound by envy is likewise bound by grasping; with respect to the desire realm's own four sections abandoned by seeing, and the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by grasping without binding by envy. For one not fully bound: should he not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the three realms' own four sections abandoned by seeing, and the form and formless realms' own matter abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by grasping without binding by envy; with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. Once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation or the path, with respect to the desire realm's own matter abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by envy without binding by grasping; with respect to the three realms' own matter abandoned by seeing cessation or the path, there is binding by grasping without binding by envy; with respect to the three realms' own matter abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, there is binding by neither. Should he already be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own five-sectioned matter, there is binding by neither; with respect to the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned matter, wherever grasping remains uncut, there is binding by grasping without binding by envy, while wherever grasping is already cut off, there is binding by neither — these two thus each possessing their own longer and shorter reach. The question posed ought therefore to be answered as a tetralemma. There is binding by grasping without binding by envy — that is, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, grasping remains uncut. Here, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by seeing, where grasping remains uncut, there may be all four sections where grasping remains uncut, down to a single section; with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas, where grasping remains uncut, there may be eight grounds where grasping remains uncut, down to a single ground; within a given ground, there may be four sections where grasping remains uncut, down to a single section — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by grasping without binding by envy. For what reason is this so? The section abandoned by seeing, and the two higher realms, possess no envy-fetter. There is binding by envy without binding by grasping — that is, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, envy remains uncut; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, envy remains uncut; a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, not yet free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, still has envy uncut. Here, there may be nine grades not yet cut off,

down to a single grade not yet cut off — and, since it remains uncut, there is binding by envy without binding by grasping. For what reason is this so? The universally-pervading grasping-fetter that takes the five sections as its object has already been cut off; the remainder, not yet cut off, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, is incapable of binding, not being an object-condition there, and the section abandoned by cultivation possesses no grasping-fetter at all. There is binding by both together — that is, for one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. This one fully bound, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, has two sections bound by grasping and one section bound by envy.

Further, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters. Here, ‘not yet free of the desire realm's own defilement’ refers to the fact that there may be nine grades not yet freed of, down to a single grade not yet freed of; once the cognition regarding suffering has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding its arising, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, he has one section bound by grasping and one section bound by envy. There is binding by neither together —

that is, should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, once the cognition regarding its arising has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding cessation, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering and its arising, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by neither fetter; once the cognition regarding cessation has arisen, prior to the cognition regarding the path, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, its arising, and cessation, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by neither fetter; a disciple of the World-Honored One who has fully seen, not yet free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by seeing, and with respect to the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the form realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire and form realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter; one already free of the formless realm's own defilement, with respect to all three realms' own dharmas, has binding by neither fetter — here, there may be binding by neither on account of already being cut off, or binding by neither on account of never having been present to begin with. Exactly as with the envy-fetter, so too with the stinginess-fetter — that is, envy and stinginess alike belong solely to the desire realm's own section abandoned by cultivation, taking a contaminated object, not universally pervading.

For a given matter that is bound by the fetter of envy, is it likewise bound by the fetter of stinginess? The answer: it is indeed so. Suppose there is binding by the fetter of stinginess — is there likewise binding by the fetter of envy? The answer: it is indeed so — that is, envy and stinginess both belong solely to the desire realm's own section abandoned by cultivation. The question posed ought therefore to be answered by this very clause: should one not yet be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to the desire realm's own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by both fetters; with respect to the three realms' own dharmas abandoned by seeing, and the form and formless realms' own dharmas abandoned by cultivation, there is binding by neither. Should one already be free of the desire realm's own defilement, with respect to all three realms' own dharmas, there is binding by neither — since their own longer and shorter reach are alike, the answer is ‘it is indeed so.’ One asks: the envy-fetter operates with respect to another, while the stinginess-fetter operates with respect to oneself — for what reason, then, is each posed as a question toward the other, yet both alike answered ‘it is indeed so’? There are those who say: envy is capable of taking another as its object, and also actually manifests toward another, but does not actually manifest toward oneself as its object; stinginess is capable of taking oneself as its object, and also actually manifests toward oneself, but does not actually manifest toward another as its object — this is spoken with reference to what actually manifests, and it is therefore said ‘it is indeed so.’ There are further those who say: these two are both capable of arising taking either oneself or another as their object. One asks: envy's arising while taking another as its object may well be so — but how can it arise taking oneself as its object? The answer: suppose there is a donor who provides requisites for two monks, one set turning out well-made, the other poorly made; the one who receives the poorly made set, seeing this, gives rise to envy, thinking to himself: were these very requisites instead what I myself had received, would that not have been excellent? — such envy is thereby capable of arising while taking oneself as its object as well. One asks: stinginess's arising while taking oneself as its object may well be so — but how can it arise taking another as its object? The answer: suppose there is a certain kind of person who, seeing another give something away, thereupon gives rise to a stingy mind, thinking to himself: what use is it for that person to give his own things away to another? — even though the thing given away belongs entirely to the other, and he himself has no share in it whatsoever — such stinginess is thereby capable of arising while taking another as its object as well. The answer: it is indeed so, and no contradiction to principle follows.