Every Dharma Contains Itself

For a given matter that is bound by the past craving-fetter, is it likewise bound by the past view-fetter? The answer: only if it remains uncut — that is, with respect to a given matter, if craving previously arose there and remains uncut, and view likewise remains uncut, then this matter likewise possesses the sense of being bound by the past view-fetter; if, with respect to a given matter, craving previously arose there and remains uncut, yet view has already been cut off, then this matter possesses no sense of being bound by the past view-fetter at all — as when the subsequent cognition of the path has already arisen, and, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, craving previously arose there and remains uncut; or when the subsequent cognition of its arising has already arisen, and, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, craving previously arose there and remains uncut. For this reason, the text here speaks only, in general, of remaining uncut, without specifying the stage prior to the subsequent cognition of the path's own arising, since at that stage there is likewise craving present without view. The fetters that delude with respect to a shared characteristic, once uncut in the past, certainly bind every matter across all three times, and are therefore not spoken of indefinitely, unlike craving and the rest. Suppose there is binding by the past view-fetter — is there likewise binding by the past craving-fetter? The answer: if it previously arose there and remains uncut, it binds; if it never previously arose there, or, having arisen, was already cut off, it does not bind — that is, with respect to a given matter, if view previously arose there and remains uncut, and craving likewise previously arose there and remains uncut, then this matter likewise possesses the sense of being bound by the past craving-fetter; if, with respect to a given matter, view previously arose there and remains uncut, yet craving never previously arose there — even though it may have arisen elsewhere, with respect to this particular matter it is likewise named as never having arisen — or, having arisen, was already cut off, then this matter possesses no sense of being bound by the past craving-fetter at all. For a given matter that is bound by the past craving-fetter, is it likewise bound by the future view-fetter? The answer: only if it remains uncut.

that is, with respect to a given matter, if craving previously arose there and remains uncut, and view likewise remains uncut, then this matter likewise possesses the sense of being bound by the future view-fetter; if, with respect to a given matter, craving previously arose there and remains uncut, yet view has already been cut off, then this matter possesses no sense of being bound by the future view-fetter at all — the remainder is exactly as stated above. Suppose there is binding by the future view-fetter — is there likewise binding by the past craving-fetter? The answer: if it previously arose there and remains uncut, it binds; if it never previously arose there, or, having arisen, was already cut off, it does not bind — that is, with respect to a given matter, if view remains uncut in the future, and craving likewise previously arose there and remains uncut, then this matter likewise possesses the sense of being bound by the past craving-fetter; if, with respect to a given matter, view remains uncut in the future, yet craving never previously arose there — even though it may have arisen elsewhere, with respect to this particular matter it is likewise named as never having arisen — or, having arisen, was already cut off, then this matter possesses no sense of being bound by the past craving-fetter at all. For a given matter that is bound by the past craving-fetter, is it likewise bound by the present view-fetter? The answer: only if it is presently manifest — that is, with respect to a given matter, if craving previously arose there and remains uncut, and view is also presently manifest there, then there is the sense of being bound by the present view-fetter; if, with respect to a given matter, some other fetter arises and becomes presently manifest, or a wholesome or a neutral, non-obscuring mind arises and becomes presently manifest, or view arises and becomes presently manifest elsewhere, or there is no mind present at all, then there is no sense of being bound by the present view-fetter. Suppose there is binding by the present view-fetter — is there likewise binding by the past craving-fetter? The answer: if it previously arose there and remains uncut, it binds; if it never previously arose there, or, having arisen, was already cut off, it does not bind — that is, with respect to a given matter, if view is presently manifest there, and craving also previously arose there and remains uncut, then this matter likewise possesses the sense of being bound by the past craving-fetter; if, with respect to a given matter, view is presently manifest there, yet craving never previously arose there — even though it may have arisen elsewhere, with respect to this particular matter it is likewise named as never having arisen —

or, having arisen, was already cut off, then this matter possesses no sense of being bound by the past craving-fetter at all. For a given matter that is bound by the past craving-fetter, is it likewise bound by both the past and present view-fetter? The answer should be given in three clauses. There is binding by the past craving-fetter without binding by either the past or present view-fetter — that is, with respect to a given matter, craving previously arose there and remains uncut, yet view has already been cut off. Here, craving having previously arisen there and remaining uncut shows there is binding by the past craving-fetter; view's having already been cut off excludes binding by either the past or present view-fetter — as when the subsequent cognition of its arising has already arisen, and, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, craving previously arose there and remains uncut; or when the subsequent cognition of the path has already arisen, and, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, craving previously arose there and remains uncut. There is binding by the past craving-fetter together with the past view-fetter, without the present — that is, with respect to a given matter, craving previously arose there and remains uncut, and view also remains uncut, yet is not presently manifest. Here, craving having previously arisen there and remaining uncut shows there is binding by the past craving-fetter; view remaining uncut shows there is binding by the past view-fetter, since, at the stage where it remains uncut, the matter it binds certainly possesses past binding by view; its not being presently manifest

excludes binding by the present view-fetter. There is binding by the past craving-fetter together with both the past and present view-fetter — that is, with respect to a given matter, craving previously arose there and remains uncut, and view is also presently manifest there. Here, craving having previously arisen there and remaining uncut shows there is binding by the past craving-fetter; view also being presently manifest shows there is binding by the present view-fetter; the past binding is thereby shown without needing separate statement, since view being presently manifest certainly entails past binding as well. Suppose there is binding by both the past and the present view-fetter — is there likewise binding by the past craving-fetter? The answer: if it previously arose there and remains uncut, it binds; if it never previously arose there, or, having arisen, was already cut off, it does not bind — the intended meaning here is exactly as stated above, at length. For a given matter that is bound by the past craving-fetter, is it likewise bound by both the future and present view-fetter? The answer should be given in three clauses. There is binding by the past craving-fetter without binding by either the future or present view-fetter — that is, with respect to a given matter, craving previously arose there and remains uncut, yet view has already been cut off. Here, craving having previously arisen there and remaining uncut shows there is binding by the past craving-fetter; view's having already been cut off excludes binding by either the future or present view-fetter — the remainder is exactly as stated above. There is binding by the past craving-fetter together with the future view-fetter, without the present — that is, with respect to a given matter, craving previously arose there and remains uncut, and view also remains uncut, yet is not presently manifest. Here, craving having previously arisen there and remaining uncut shows there is binding by the past craving-fetter; view remaining uncut shows

there is binding by the future view-fetter, since, at the stage where it remains uncut, the matter it binds certainly possesses future binding as well; its not being presently manifest excludes binding by the present view-fetter. There is binding by the past craving-fetter together with both the future and present view-fetter — that is, with respect to a given matter, craving previously arose there and remains uncut, and view is presently manifest there. Here, craving having previously arisen there and remaining uncut shows there is binding by the past craving-fetter; view being presently manifest shows there is binding by the present view-fetter; the future binding is thereby shown without needing separate statement, since view being presently manifest certainly entails future binding as well. Suppose there is binding by both the future and the present view-fetter — is there likewise binding by the past craving-fetter? The answer: if it previously arose there and remains uncut, it binds; if it never previously arose there, or, having arisen, was already cut off, it does not bind — the intended meaning here is exactly as stated above, at length. For a given matter that is bound by the past craving-fetter, is it likewise bound by both the past and future view-fetter? The answer: only if it remains uncut — the intended meaning here should be understood exactly as stated above. Suppose there is binding by both the past and future view-fetter — is there likewise binding by the past craving-fetter? The answer: if it previously arose there and remains uncut, it binds; if it never previously arose there, or, having arisen, was already cut off, it does not bind — the intended meaning here is exactly as stated above, at length. For a given matter that is bound by the past craving-fetter, is it likewise bound by the past, future, and present view-fetter together? The answer should be given in three clauses. There is binding by the past craving-fetter without binding by the past, future, or present view-fetter — that is, with respect to a given matter, craving previously arose there and remains uncut, yet view has already been cut off. Here, craving having previously arisen there and remaining uncut shows there is binding by the past craving-fetter; view's having already been cut off excludes binding by the view-fetter across all three times — as when the subsequent cognition of its arising has already arisen, and, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, craving previously arose there and remains uncut; or when the subsequent cognition of the path has already arisen, and, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, craving previously arose there and remains uncut. There is binding by the past craving-fetter together with both the past and the future view-fetter, without the present — that is, with respect to a given matter, craving previously arose there and remains uncut, and view also remains uncut, yet is not presently manifest. Here, craving having previously arisen there and remaining uncut shows there is binding by the past craving-fetter; view remaining uncut shows there is binding by both the past and the future view-fetter; its not being presently manifest excludes binding by the present view-fetter. There is binding by the past craving-fetter together with the past, future, and present view-fetter all at once — that is, with respect to a given matter, craving previously arose there and remains uncut, and view is also presently manifest there. Here, craving having previously arisen there and remaining uncut shows there is binding by the past craving-fetter; view also being presently manifest shows there is binding by the present view-fetter; both the past and future binding are thereby shown without needing separate statement, since view being presently manifest certainly entails both past and future binding as well. Suppose there is binding by the past, future, and present view-fetter all together — is there likewise binding by the past craving-fetter? The answer: if it previously arose there and remains uncut, it binds; if it never previously arose there, or, having arisen, was already cut off, it does not bind — the intended meaning here is exactly as stated above, at length. Exactly as with the view-fetter, so too with grasping and doubt, since all three belong solely to what the three realms abandon by seeing — craving's own comparison against them likewise forms the lesser seven clauses, exactly as against view, with a slight difference: with respect to grasping, only once the subsequent cognition of the path has already arisen, with respect to the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, does craving previously arise there and remain uncut, there being past craving but no grasping across the three times — unlike the view-fetter, where, once the subsequent cognition of its arising has already arisen, with respect to the dharmas dissociated from the view-fetter abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, craving previously arises there and remains uncut, there being past craving but no view across the three times; the difference is slight, and so this is not further stated. Exactly as craving's own comparison against what follows forms the lesser seven, so too, down through envy's comparison against stinginess, each forms the lesser seven as is appropriate to it. "As is appropriate" here means this: conceit alone, together with craving, spans all three realms and five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading, and so its own comparison against what follows forms the lesser seven exactly as craving's does. Ignorance spans all three realms and five sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not; view and doubt span all three realms yet belong solely to four sections, taking either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object, either universally pervading or not; the two graspings span all three realms yet belong solely to four sections, taking a contaminated object, either universally pervading or not; hatred belongs solely to the desire realm, spanning all five sections, taking solely a contaminated object, not universally pervading; envy and stinginess belong solely to the desire realm's own section abandoned by cultivation, taking a contaminated object, not universally pervading. Since these fetters thus differ in breadth, their own comparison against what follows in seven clauses is accordingly not uniform,

and it is for this reason that the text must specify, in each case, what is appropriate.

Exactly as with the lesser seven, so too the greater seven, differing in that it compares two fetters against one, up through eight fetters against one — that is, taking the past craving-fetter together with the past hatred-fetter, one first compares them against the past conceit-fetter, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, and finally against the past, future, and present together, forming seven clauses concerning the conceit-fetter. Exactly as the past craving-fetter and hatred-fetter, compared against the conceit-fetter, form seven clauses, so too their comparison against the ignorance-fetter, the view-fetter, the grasping-fetter, the doubt-fetter, the envy-fetter, and the stinginess-fetter, each forms its own seven clauses in just the same way. Next, removing the craving-fetter, one takes the past hatred-fetter together with the past conceit-fetter, and first compares them against the past ignorance-fetter, next against the future,

next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, and finally against the past, future, and present together, forming seven clauses concerning the ignorance-fetter. Exactly as the past hatred-fetter and conceit-fetter, compared against the ignorance-fetter, form seven clauses,

so too their comparison against the view-fetter, the grasping-fetter, the doubt-fetter, the envy-fetter, and the stinginess-fetter, each forms its own seven clauses in just the same way. Next, removing the hatred-fetter, one takes the past conceit-fetter together with the past ignorance-fetter, and first compares them against the past view-fetter, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, and finally against the past, future, and present together, forming seven clauses concerning the view-fetter. Exactly as the past conceit-fetter and ignorance-fetter, compared against the view-fetter, form seven clauses, so too their comparison against the grasping-fetter, the doubt-fetter, the envy-fetter, and the stinginess-fetter, each forms its own seven clauses in just the same way.

Next, removing the conceit-fetter, one takes the past ignorance-fetter together with the past view-fetter, and first compares them against the past grasping-fetter, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, and finally against the past, future, and present together, forming seven clauses concerning the grasping-fetter. Exactly as the past ignorance-fetter and view-fetter, compared against the grasping-fetter, form seven clauses, so too their comparison against the doubt-fetter, the envy-fetter, and the stinginess-fetter, each forms its own seven clauses in just the same way. Next, removing the ignorance-fetter, one takes the past view-fetter together with the past grasping-fetter, and first compares them against the past doubt-fetter,

next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, and finally against the past, future, and present together, forming seven clauses concerning the doubt-fetter. Exactly as the past view-fetter and grasping-fetter, compared against the doubt-fetter, form seven clauses, so too their comparison against the envy-fetter and the stinginess-fetter, each forms its own seven clauses in just the same way. Next, removing the view-fetter, one takes the past grasping-fetter together with the past doubt-fetter, and first compares them against the past envy-fetter, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present,

next against the past and future, and finally against the past, future, and present together, forming seven clauses concerning the envy-fetter. Exactly as the past grasping-fetter and doubt-fetter, compared against the envy-fetter, form seven clauses, so too their comparison against the stinginess-fetter forms seven clauses in just the same way. Further removing the grasping-fetter, one takes the past doubt-fetter together with the past envy-fetter, and

first compares them against the past stinginess-fetter, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, and finally against the past, future, and present together, forming seven clauses concerning the stinginess-fetter. Exactly as two fetters are compared against one, so too three, four, five, six, seven, or eight fetters compared against one, each in just the same way.

Exactly as the past craving-fetter and the rest, taken as the leading term, each yield seven clauses, so too, down through the past, future, and present craving-fetter and the rest taken together as the leading term, each likewise yield their own seven clauses — thus one should know there are seven sets of seven clauses. On this, there are those who explain it this way: taking the past craving-fetter and the rest as the leading term, one first compares them against the past hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the future,

next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, and finally against the past, future, and present together — comparing against the hatred-fetter and the rest, this forms the first set of seven clauses. Taking the past craving-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the future hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, and finally against the past — this forms the second set of seven clauses concerning the hatred-fetter and the rest. Taking the past craving-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the present hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present,

next against the past, and finally against the future — this forms the third set of seven clauses concerning the hatred-fetter and the rest. Taking the past craving-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the past and present hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, next against the future, and finally against the present — this forms the fourth set of seven clauses. Taking the past craving-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the future and present hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, next against the future, next against the present, and finally against the past and present — this forms the fifth set of seven clauses. Taking the past craving-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the past and future hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, and finally against the future and present — this forms the sixth set of seven clauses. Taking the past craving-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the past, future, and present hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the past, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, and finally against the past and future — this forms the seventh set of seven clauses. This is called the lesser seven. Taking the past craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one first compares them against the past conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, and finally against the past, future, and present together — this forms the first set of seven clauses concerning the conceit-fetter and the rest. Taking the past craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the future conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, and finally against the past — this forms the second set of seven clauses. Taking the past craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the present conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, and finally against the future — this forms the third set of seven clauses. Taking the past craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the past and present conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, next against the future, and finally against the present — this forms the fourth set of seven clauses. Taking the past craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the future and present conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, next against the future, next against the present, and finally against the past and present — this forms the fifth set of seven clauses. Taking the past craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the past and future conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, and finally against the future and present — this forms the sixth set of seven clauses.

Taking the past craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the past, future, and present conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the past, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, and finally against the past and future — this forms the seventh set of seven clauses. This is called the greater seven. What has been said in this way is a wasted effort — of no benefit to the text and no benefit to the meaning, since it merely restates the same content redundantly. It is not the case that there is only this one way of arriving at the seven sets of seven clauses; the matter should instead be stated as follows. Taking the past craving-fetter and the rest as the leading term, one first compares them against the past hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, and finally against the past, future, and present together — this forms the first set of seven clauses concerning the hatred-fetter and the rest. Taking the future craving-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the future hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, and finally against the past — this forms the second set of seven clauses. Taking the present craving-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the present hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, and finally against the future — this forms the third set of seven clauses. Taking the past and present craving-fetter and the rest,

one next compares them first against the past and present hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, next against the future, and finally against the present — this forms the fourth set of seven clauses. Taking the future and present craving-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the future and present hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, next against the future, next against the present, and finally against the past and present — this forms the fifth set of seven clauses. Taking the past and future craving-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the past and future hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, and finally against the future and present — this forms the sixth set of seven clauses. Taking the past, future, and present craving-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the past, future, and present hatred-fetter and the rest, next against the past, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, and finally against the past and future — this forms the seventh set of seven clauses. This is called the lesser seven. Taking the past craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one first compares them against the past conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, and finally against the past, future, and present together — this forms the first set of seven clauses. Taking the future craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the future conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, and finally against the past — this forms the second set of seven clauses. Taking the present craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the present conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, and finally against the future — this forms the third set of seven clauses.

Taking the past and present craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the past and present conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the future and present, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, next against the future, and finally against the present conceit-fetter and the rest —

this forms the fourth set of seven clauses. Taking the future and present craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the future and present conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the past and future, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, next against the future, next against the present, and finally against the past and present conceit-fetter and the rest — this forms the fifth set of seven clauses. Taking the past and future craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the past and future conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the past, future, and present, next against the past, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, and finally against the future and present conceit-fetter and the rest — this forms the sixth set of seven clauses. Taking the past, future, and present craving-fetter and hatred-fetter and the rest, one next compares them first against the past, future, and present conceit-fetter and the rest, next against the past, next against the future, next against the present, next against the past and present, next against the future and present, and finally against the past and future conceit-fetter and the rest — this forms the seventh set of seven clauses. If the matter is stated this way, the effort is not wasted — it is of benefit to the text and of benefit to the meaning, since nothing is redundantly restated; and there is, moreover, only this one way of arriving at the seven sets of seven clauses.

One asks: single-class-of-conduct, traversing the six, the lesser seven, and the greater seven — what distinguishes them? The answer: it is precisely their names that distinguish them, that is, the name single-class-of-conduct, the name traversing the six, the name lesser seven, and the name greater seven. Further, because the questions and answers proceed according to the single-class-of-conduct method, it is named single-class-of-conduct; because the questions and answers proceed according to the six-clause method, it is named traversing the six; because the questions and answers proceed according to the seven-clause method, comparing one against one, it is named the lesser seven; because the questions and answers proceed according to the seven-clause method, comparing two against one, up through eight against one, it is named the greater seven. Further, because the questions and answers compare one dissimilar dharma against another dissimilar dharma, without fixing the tense, it is named single-class-of-conduct; because the questions and answers compare one similar dharma against another similar dharma, fixing the tense, it is named traversing the six; because the questions and answers compare one dissimilar dharma against another dissimilar dharma, fixing the tense, comparing one against one, it is named the lesser seven; because the questions and answers compare one dissimilar dharma against another dissimilar dharma, fixing the tense, comparing two against one, up through eight against one, it is named the greater seven. Single-class-of-conduct, traversing the six, the lesser seven, and the greater seven — this is what distinguishes them.

From the three fetters through the ninety-eight latent tendencies — within the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many latent tendencies does each one contain? The answer: every case must be distinguished individually. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: in order to put a stop to other schools and to display the correct meaning. That is, there are those who hold that dharmas contain another's own-nature, not their own — as the Vibhajyavādins do, who, relying on scripture using conventional designations and on worldly common speech, make this claim. As for relying on scripture using conventional designations: the scripture states that, of all the parts making up a canopy-frame or the like, the central pole is what makes it a canopy-frame — the various timbers depend on it, and it is capable of sustaining them so that they do not scatter and collapse, and so the central pole is said to "contain" them. Yet the central pole is other than the various timbers, and it is nonetheless said to "contain" them — hence it is known that all dharmas contain another's own-nature, not their own. Another scripture likewise states that, among the five faculties, the wisdom-faculty is the most excellent, and the wisdom-faculty is capable of containing the remaining four faculties. Yet the wisdom-faculty is other than the four faculties, and it is nonetheless said to "contain" them — hence it is known that all dharmas contain another's own-nature, not their own. Yet another scripture states: the World-Honored One said to Elder Hastaka, "By what dharma do you attract your own followers? How do your followers come to be attracted by you?" Elder Hastaka replied, "The World-Honored One taught me the four means of attraction: first, giving; second, kind speech; third, beneficial conduct; fourth, cooperation. By means of these four, I attract my own followers, and by these my followers come to be attracted by me." Yet Elder Hastaka is other than his followers, and it is nonetheless said that he "attracts" the assembly — hence it is known that all dharmas contain another's own-nature, not their own. A further scripture states: right view, right intention, and right effort are contained by the wisdom-aggregate; right mindfulness and right concentration are contained by the concentration-aggregate. Yet right intention and right effort are other than the wisdom-aggregate, and right mindfulness is other than the concentration-aggregate, and it is nonetheless said that they are "contained" by them — hence it is known that all dharmas contain another's own-nature, not their own. As for relying on worldly common speech: the world says that a door-pivot "holds" a fan, that thread "holds" a garment, that glue "holds" firewood, and so on; a householder says, "I am able to hold my fields, livestock, wealth, servants, and household"; one gone forth says, "I hold my followers, requisites, robe, and bowl." In every such case, what holds and what is held are distinct — hence it is known that all dharmas contain another's own-nature. In order to put a stop to this position, and to display that every dharma contains only its own nature — this being containing in the ultimate sense — it must be shown that if containing another's nature were the ultimate sense, then one dharma's own-nature would have to be every dharma, one dharma's arising would entail the arising of every dharma, and one dharma's ceasing would entail the ceasing of every dharma. A further, separate fault would follow as well: what is abandoned by seeing suffering would then be contained within what is abandoned by seeing its arising, cessation, the path, and by cultivation, so that, upon cutting off what is abandoned by seeing suffering, the afflictions abandoned by seeing its arising and the rest ought likewise already to be cut off — and, if so, every path of counteraction cultivated afterward would become entirely useless. To avoid this very fault, it must be that every dharma contains only its own nature, and this alone is containing in the ultimate sense. One asks: if every dharma contains only its own nature, and this alone is containing in the ultimate sense, rather than another's, then how are the scriptures and the worldly common speech cited by the Vibhajyavādins to be reconciled? The answer: the scripture cited is of provisional, non-definitive meaning, spoken with reference to conventional designation and carrying a different underlying intent. That is, when the scripture states that, of all the parts making up a canopy-frame or the like, the central pole is what makes it a canopy-frame, the various timbers depending on it and being sustained by it so that they do not scatter and collapse, and so the central pole is said to "contain" them — this is a provisional application of the word "contain" with reference to the sense of sustaining, since the pole sustains the timbers so that they do not scatter and collapse; the name "contain" is provisionally established here, and this is not containing in the ultimate sense. Again, when the scripture states that, among the five faculties, the wisdom-faculty is the most excellent, and the wisdom-faculty is capable of containing the remaining four faculties — this is a provisional application of the word "contain" with reference to the sense of expedient means, since wisdom, serving as an expedient means, causes the remaining four faculties likewise to operate swiftly and accomplish great tasks,

the name "contain" being provisionally established here, and this is not containing in the ultimate sense. Again, when the scripture states that the four means of attraction attract one's followers — this is a provisional application of the word "attract" with reference to the capacity to draw them in and keep them from scattering, the name "attract" being provisionally established by the expedient means of enticement through the four means of attraction, and this is not containing in the ultimate sense. Again, when the scripture states that right intention and right effort are likewise contained by the wisdom-aggregate, and right mindfulness is likewise contained by the concentration-aggregate — this is a provisional application of the word "contain" with reference to the sense of conforming to, since right intention and right effort conform to the wisdom-aggregate, and right mindfulness conforms to the concentration-aggregate, the name "contain" being provisionally established here, and this is not containing in the ultimate sense. As for the worldly common speech they cite — that a door-pivot "holds" a fan, thread "holds" a garment, glue "holds" firewood, and so on — this is a provisional application of the name "contain" with reference to the sense of sustaining, and is not containing in the ultimate sense; a householder's saying that he "holds" his fields and the rest, and one gone forth's saying that he "holds" his followers and the rest, are provisional applications of the name "contain" with reference to the sense of benefiting, and are not containing in the ultimate sense. Containing another's own nature has its name "contain" established only by waiting on time or waiting on cause, and is therefore not the final, complete sense of containing. "Waiting on time" means that there are times when it is capable of containing and times when it is not; "waiting on cause" means that there are causes under which it is capable of containing and causes under which it is not — and, for this reason, it is not the final, complete sense. As there is a verse that says:

"There is a cause for craving to arise, / there is a cause for hatred to arise; / in the world there is no arising / of craving or hatred without a cause." Containing one's own nature, by contrast, possesses the sense of containing without waiting on either time or cause, and this is the final, complete sense of containing. "Not waiting on time" means that there is no time at which any dharma fails to contain its own nature, since it never, at any time, abandons its own substance; "not waiting on cause" means that dharmas contain their own nature without depending on any cause, since they possess their own substance without depending on causes and conditions. If one wishes to contemplate every dharma, one should first contemplate the sense in which it contains its own nature. One asks: when one contemplates the sense in which dharmas contain their own nature, what benefit is gained, what merit is attained? The answer: it removes the notion of a self and the notion of a single mass, and makes it easy to fulfill the cultivation of the notion of dharmas and the notion of their distinctness. That is, if sentient beings hold the notion of a self and the notion of a single mass, the afflictions of craving, hatred, delusion, and the rest grow strong, and, on account of their growing strong, one cannot be liberated from the calamities of birth, old age, sickness, death, sorrow, lamentation, grief, and suffering. But if one removes the notion of a self and the notion of a single mass, one then observes material dharmas as like a heap of flour and parched grain, soon to scatter and disperse, and observes immaterial dharmas as never coexisting, before and after, and soon to wear away and vanish.

Contemplating all conditioned dharmas together, one sees them as like a ball of sand, blown apart and scattered by the wind — and from this one attains a seed resembling the gate of the emptiness liberation. Contemplating conditioned dharmas as empty and without self, one comes to feel deep aversion toward birth-and-death, and from this one further attains a seed resembling the gate of the wishless liberation. Feeling aversion toward birth-and-death, one comes to feel deep aspiration toward nirvāṇa, and from this one further attains a seed resembling the gate of the signless liberation. Relying on these three concentrations, from the lower one gives rise to the middle, from the middle one gives rise to the higher, and from the higher one gives rise to wisdom; freeing oneself from the defilement of the three realms, one attains the three enlightenments and realizes eternal quiescence. Such are the benefits and merits gained when one contemplates the sense in which dharmas contain their own nature — and it is for this very reason that this treatise is composed. "Every case here must be distinguished" means this: from the three fetters through the ninety-eight latent tendencies, the latent tendencies each one contains differ from case to case, and so every one of them must be distinguished individually.

That is, among the three fetters, the view-of-self fetter contains three latent tendencies — meaning that this fetter, within the ninety-eight latent tendencies, contains three: namely, the view-of-self latent tendency abandoned by seeing suffering across all three realms. This is stated with reference to its overall category, containing three latent tendencies; distinguished individually, its desire-realm portion contains the desire realm's own view-of-self, its form-realm portion contains the form realm's own view-of-self, and its formless-realm portion contains the formless realm's own view-of-self.

Each of these realms is further distinguished by the three times: its past portion contains the past view-of-self, its future portion contains the future view-of-self,

and its present portion contains the present view-of-self. Each of these, in turn, has many further moments, each containing its corresponding counterpart — this should be understood by the same principle hereafter. The fetter of clinging to rules and vows contains six — meaning that this fetter, within the ninety-eight latent tendencies, contains six: namely, the latent tendency of clinging to rules and vows abandoned by seeing suffering and the path across all three realms. The doubt-fetter contains twelve — meaning that this fetter, within the ninety-eight latent tendencies, contains twelve: namely, the doubt latent tendency abandoned by seeing suffering, its arising, cessation, and the path across all three realms. Among the three unwholesome roots, the unwholesome roots of greed and of hatred each contain five — meaning they contain the desire realm's own five-sectioned greed and hatred; the unwholesome root of delusion contains four sections and a portion of a fifth — meaning it contains the desire realm's own latter four sections together with the unwholesome ignorance abandoned by seeing suffering. Among the three contaminants, the desire-contaminant contains thirty-one — meaning that, of the desire realm's own thirty-six latent tendencies, excluding the five forms of ignorance, it contains the remaining thirty-one; the existence-contaminant contains fifty-two — meaning that, of the form and formless realms' own sixty-two latent tendencies, excluding the ten forms of ignorance, it contains the remaining fifty-two; the ignorance-contaminant contains fifteen — meaning it contains the five-sectioned ignorance of each of the three realms.

Among the four floods, the flood of desire contains nineteen — meaning it contains the desire realm's own five-sectioned greed, hatred, and conceit together with its four-sectioned doubt; the flood of existence contains twenty-eight — meaning it contains the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned greed and conceit together with their four-sectioned doubt, in each realm; the flood of views contains thirty-six — meaning it contains twelve views in each of the three realms, that is, view-of-self and extreme-view each counting as one, clinging to rules and vows as two, and wrong view and view-clinging each as four, totaling twelve; the flood of ignorance contains fifteen — meaning it contains the five-sectioned ignorance of each of the three realms. The four yokes are exactly the same as the four floods, differing in name and wording but identical in substance. Among the four graspings, the grasping of desire contains twenty-four — meaning it contains the desire realm's own five-sectioned greed, hatred, conceit, and ignorance together with its four-sectioned doubt; the grasping of view contains thirty — meaning it contains ten views in each of the three realms, that is, of the twelve views stated above, excluding the two forms of clinging to rules and vows, the remaining ten views; the grasping of clinging to rules and vows contains six — meaning it contains two forms of clinging to rules and vows in each of the three realms; the grasping of attachment to one's own doctrine contains thirty-eight — meaning it contains the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned greed, conceit, and ignorance together with their four-sectioned doubt, in each realm. Among the four bodily ties, the bodily tie of craving and the bodily tie of hatred each contain five — meaning they contain the desire realm's own five-sectioned greed and hatred; the bodily tie of clinging to rules and vows contains six — meaning it contains two forms of clinging to rules and vows in each of the three realms; the bodily tie of holding this alone to be true contains twelve — meaning it contains four forms of view-clinging in each of the three realms. Among the five hindrances, the hindrance of greed and the hindrance of hatred each contain five — meaning they contain the desire realm's own five-sectioned greed and hatred;

the hindrance of doubt contains four — meaning it contains the desire realm's own four-sectioned doubt; the remaining hindrances contain nothing at all, since torpor-and-drowsiness and restlessness-and-remorse are, by their own nature, wrapping-defilements, and do not contain any latent tendency. Among the five fetters, the fetter of craving and the fetter of conceit each contain fifteen — meaning they contain the five-sectioned craving and conceit of each of the three realms; the fetter of hatred contains five — meaning it contains the desire realm's own five-sectioned hatred; the fetters of envy and stinginess contain nothing at all, since these two fetters are not, by their own nature, latent tendencies. Among the five lower-fetters, the fetter of craving and the fetter of hatred each contain five — meaning they contain the desire realm's own five-sectioned craving and hatred;

the view-of-self fetter contains three — meaning it contains one instance of view-of-self in each of the three realms; the fetter of clinging to rules and vows contains six — meaning it contains two forms of clinging to rules and vows in each of the three realms; the doubt-fetter contains twelve — meaning it contains four-sectioned doubt in each of the three realms. Among the five upper-fetters, the fetter of craving for the form realm contains a portion of one — meaning it contains a portion of the form realm's own craving abandoned by cultivation; the fetter of craving for the formless realm contains a portion of one — meaning it contains a portion of the formless realm's own craving abandoned by cultivation; the fetter of restlessness contains nothing at all, since it is not, by its own nature, a latent tendency; the fetter of conceit contains a portion of two — meaning it contains a portion of the form and formless realms' own conceit abandoned by cultivation, in each realm; the fetter of ignorance contains a portion of two — meaning it contains a portion of the form and formless realms' own ignorance abandoned by cultivation, in each realm. Among the five views, view-of-self and extreme-view each contain three — meaning they contain one instance of view-of-self and extreme-view in each of the three realms; wrong view and view-clinging each contain twelve — meaning they contain four-sectioned wrong view and view-clinging in each of the three realms; clinging to rules and vows contains six — meaning it contains two forms of clinging to rules and vows in each of the three realms. Among the six craving-bodies, the craving-bodies born of eye-contact, ear-contact, and body-contact each contain a portion of two — meaning each contains a portion of the desire and form realms' own craving abandoned by cultivation; the craving-bodies born of nose-contact and tongue-contact each contain a portion of one — meaning each contains a portion of the desire realm's own craving abandoned by cultivation; the craving-body born of mind-contact contains thirteen and a portion of two — meaning it contains the first four sections of each of the three realms, together with the formless realm's own craving abandoned by cultivation, and a portion of the desire and form realms' own craving abandoned by cultivation, in each realm. Among the seven latent tendencies, the latent tendencies of desire-craving and of hatred each contain five — meaning they contain the desire realm's own five-sectioned craving and hatred; the latent tendency of craving for existence contains ten — meaning it contains the form and formless realms' own five-sectioned craving and conceit, in each realm; the latent tendency of ignorance contains fifteen — meaning it contains the five-sectioned conceit and ignorance of each of the three realms; the latent tendency of view contains thirty-six — meaning it contains twelve views in each of the three realms; the latent tendency of doubt contains twelve — meaning it contains four-sectioned doubt in each of the three realms. Among the nine fetters, the fetters of craving, conceit, and ignorance each contain fifteen — meaning they contain the five-sectioned craving, conceit, and ignorance of each of the three realms; the fetter of hatred contains five — meaning it contains the desire realm's own five-sectioned hatred. The view-fetter and the grasping-fetter each contain eighteen — meaning the view-fetter contains one instance of view-of-self, one of extreme-view, and four of wrong view in each of the three realms, while the grasping-fetter contains two forms of clinging to rules and vows and four of view-clinging in each of the three realms; the doubt-fetter contains twelve — meaning it contains four-sectioned doubt in each of the three realms; the fetters of envy and stinginess contain nothing at all, since they are not, by their own nature, latent tendencies. Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, the desire realm's own view-of-self contains the desire realm's own view-of-self, and so on, down through the formless realm's own ignorance abandoned by cultivation containing the formless realm's own ignorance abandoned by cultivation —

each contains only its own nature. One asks: in what sense do dharmas each contain their own nature? The answer: because own-nature, with respect to own-nature, is existent, is real, is apprehensible, it is therefore named containing. Because own-nature, with respect to own-nature, is not different, not external, not separate, not distinct, and eternally not empty, it is therefore named containing. Because own-nature, with respect to own-nature, is not such as never to have already existed, not such as not to exist now, and not such as never to exist in the future, it is therefore named containing. Because own-nature, with respect to own-nature, neither increases nor decreases, it is therefore named containing. When the own-nature of dharmas contains its own own-nature, this is not like a hand grasping a finger, or fingers pinching a garment;

rather, each dharma simply holds fast to its own substance so that it does not scatter and decay, and it is for this reason that it is named containing — the name "containing" being established with reference to the sense of holding fast. And so, in the ultimate sense, containing contains only own-nature.