Can an Arhat Regress?

From the three fetters through the ninety-eight latent tendencies — does the earlier category contain the later, or does the later contain the earlier? One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: in order once more to put a stop to the Vibhājyavādins' own attachment to containing another's nature, and once more to open up and display that the followers of correct principle speak of containing one's own nature, making the matter fully clear — for this reason the treatise is composed. The answer: the three fetters and the three unwholesome roots do not mutually contain one another, since their own natures are each distinct. The three fetters and the three contaminants, and the three fetters and a portion of two contaminants, do mutually contain one another, while the rest do not — that is, the three fetters mutually contain, within the desire-contaminant and the existence-contaminant, view-of-self, clinging to rules and vows, and doubt, since their own natures are the same, but do not mutually contain the ignorance-contaminant, nor a portion of the two contaminants, since their own natures differ — the same principle applies hereafter. The three fetters and the four floods, and the three fetters and a portion of three floods, do mutually contain one another, while the rest do not — that is, the three fetters mutually contain, within the flood of desire-existence and the flood of views, view-of-self, clinging to rules and vows, and doubt, but do not mutually contain the flood of ignorance, nor a portion of the three [other] floods. Exactly as with the four floods, so too the four yokes, since their own natures are the same. The three fetters and the four graspings, and the three fetters and a portion of three graspings, do mutually contain one another, while the rest do not — that is, the three fetters mutually contain the grasping of clinging to rules and vows, and, within the remaining three graspings, view-of-self and doubt, but do not mutually contain a portion of the remaining three graspings. The three fetters and the four bodily ties, and one fetter and one bodily tie, mutually contain one another, while the rest do not — that is, the fetter of clinging to rules and vows mutually contains the bodily tie of clinging to rules and vows, but does not mutually contain the remaining three bodily ties. The three fetters and the five hindrances, and one fetter and a portion of one hindrance, mutually contain one another, while the rest do not — that is, the unwholesome portion within the doubt-fetter mutually contains the doubt-hindrance, but does not mutually contain the remaining four hindrances. The three fetters and the five fetters do not mutually contain one another, since their own natures differ. The three fetters and the five lower-fetters, and the three fetters and three of the five lower-fetters, do mutually contain one another, while the rest do not — that is, the three fetters mutually contain, within the five lower-fetters, view-of-self, clinging to rules and vows, and the doubt-fetter, but do not mutually contain the remaining two fetters. The three fetters and the five upper-fetters do not mutually contain one another, since their own natures differ. The three fetters and the five views, and two fetters and two views, do mutually contain one another,

while the rest do not — that is, the aforementioned three fetters mutually contain, within the five views, view-of-self and clinging to rules and vows, but do not mutually contain the remaining three views. The three fetters and the six craving-bodies do not mutually contain one another, since their own natures differ. The three fetters and the seven latent tendencies, and the three fetters and one latent tendency and a portion of another, do mutually contain one another, while the rest do not — that is, the three fetters mutually contain the doubt latent tendency, and, within the view latent tendency, view-of-self and clinging to rules and vows, but do not mutually contain the remaining five latent tendencies, nor the remaining three views within the view latent tendency. The three fetters and the nine fetters, and the three fetters and one fetter and a portion of two others, do mutually contain one another, while the rest do not — that is, the three fetters mutually contain, among the nine fetters, the doubt-fetter, and, within the view-fetter, view-of-self, and, within the grasping-fetter, clinging to rules and vows, but do not mutually contain the remaining six fetters, nor the remaining two views within the view-fetter, nor view-clinging within the grasping-fetter. The three fetters and the ninety-eight latent tendencies, and the three fetters and twenty-one latent tendencies, do mutually contain one another, while the rest do not —

that is, the three fetters mutually contain, within the ninety-eight latent tendencies, the three instances of view-of-self, the six of clinging to rules and vows, and the twelve of doubt, but do not mutually contain the remaining seventy-seven latent tendencies. In just this way, on through the nine fetters and the ninety-eight latent tendencies — the [first] seven fetters and the ninety-eight latent tendencies do mutually contain one another, while the rest do not — that is, of the nine fetters, the first seven mutually contain the ninety-eight latent tendencies, while the latter two fetters do not mutually contain any latent tendency, since neither of these two is, by its own nature, a latent tendency. Here, the three fetters are taken as the initial case and the nine fetters as the final case, with their mutual containing expounded at length hereafter; the mutual containing of the three unwholesome roots through the seven latent tendencies with what follows is not stated in full, since it is easily understood by the same pattern.

From the three fetters through the ninety-eight latent tendencies — how many cause the continuity of existence in the desire realm, how many cause the continuity of existence in the form realm, and how many cause the continuity of existence in the formless realm? The answer: every case must be distinguished individually. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: in order to put a stop to other schools and to display one's own correct position. That is, there are those who hold that even an undefiled mind can cause the continuity of existence, as the Vibhājyavādins do. One asks: for what reason do they hold this? The answer: they hold this on the basis of scripture, that is, the scripture states that the Bodhisattva, with correct knowledge, enters the mother's womb, with correct knowledge dwells in the mother's womb, and with correct knowledge emerges from the mother's womb — and, since he possesses correct knowledge upon entering the womb, this correct knowledge must reside within an undefiled mind, and so an undefiled mind, too, can cause the continuity of existence. In order to put a stop to this position, and to display that only a defiled mind is capable of causing the continuity of existence, this treatise is composed. One asks: how, then, is the scripture they cite to be reconciled? The answer: the term "correct knowledge" is spoken with reference to the notion being free of distortion. That is, most sentient beings give rise to a distorted notion upon entering the womb: a male entering the womb gives rise to craving toward the mother and hatred toward the father; a female entering the womb gives rise to craving toward the father and hatred toward the mother — since each perceives the one parent as favorable and the other as unfavorable to itself. But when the Bodhisattva subsequently enters the womb, his mind is free of such distortion: he holds the notion "father" toward his father and the notion "mother" toward his mother, and, though he feels affectionate attachment toward both, his mind does not differ between them. Since there is affectionate attachment, his mind is defiled; since the notion is free of distortion, it is called correct knowledge. The scripture cited therefore does not contradict our own position. Further, the reason this treatise is composed is also this: there are those who hold that craving and hatred alone cause the continuity of existence, as the Sautrāntikas do. One asks: for what reason do they hold this? The answer: they hold this on the basis of scripture, that is, the scripture states that it is through the coming together of three things that entry into the womb is achieved:

first, the father and mother's own union in mutual affection; second, the mother's body being, at that time, in a suitable condition; third, the gandharva being presently manifest at that moment, at which time the gandharva gives rise to two minds alternately, namely, craving and hatred together — and, from this, it is known that craving and hatred alone cause the continuity of existence. In order to put a stop to this position,

to display that every affliction whatsoever can cause the continuity of existence, this treatise is composed. One asks: how, then, is the scripture they cite to be reconciled? The answer: the scripture states that, at the very moment the intermediate-state being's own mind actually links to rebirth, it is not craving and hatred alone — and so what we ourselves say does not contradict that scripture. Further, the reason this treatise is composed is also this: there are those who hold that rebirth-linking into an evil destiny occurs solely through a hateful mind, while rebirth-linking into a wholesome destiny occurs solely through a craving mind. In order to put a stop to this position, and to display that, throughout the entire desire realm, any one of its thirty-six latent tendencies becoming presently manifest is capable of causing rebirth-linking's own continuity; that, throughout the entire form realm, any one of its thirty-one latent tendencies becoming presently manifest is capable of causing rebirth-linking's own continuity; and that, throughout the entire formless realm, any one of its thirty-one latent tendencies becoming presently manifest is capable of causing rebirth-linking's own continuity — for this reason this treatise is composed. Further, the treatise is composed not merely in order to put a stop to other schools, but in order to display the correct principle of all dharmas and to awaken sentient beings to it. Now, the word "existence" is spoken with many different meanings. Here, some say it refers to the class-membership [that defines a type of being] together with the five aggregates possessed by a being sharing that class-membership — as when it is said that all those who die and are reborn within the desire realm receive desire-existence, and so on; this, too, speaks of class-membership together with the five aggregates possessed by a being of that class. As when it is said that those bound by the wrapping-defilements receive hell-existence, and so on; this, too, speaks of class-membership together with the five aggregates possessed by a being of that class. As when it is said that, at the moment of receiving desire-existence, how many faculties are first obtained, produced by which karmic actions, and so on; this, too, speaks of class-membership together with the five aggregates possessed by a being of that class. As when it is said that there are four existences — namely, the existence proper, the existence at death, the intermediate existence, and the existence at birth; this, too, speaks of class-membership together with the five aggregates possessed by a being of that class. As when it is said that those who relinquish desire-existence and take up desire-existence have all their desire-realm dharmas cease, and desire-realm dharmas become presently manifest, and so on; this, too, speaks of class-membership together with the five aggregates possessed by a being of that class. As when it is said, what is the dharma of existence? — meaning all contaminated dharmas; here, all contaminated dharmas themselves are named existence. As when it is said, Puṇṇa should know that the food of consciousness is capable of giving rise to future existence; here, the mind that links to rebirth, together with its retinue, is named existence. As when it is said, Ānanda should know that if karmic action is capable of causing the continuity of future existence, this is what is named existence; here, the volition that draws forth future existence is named existence. As when it is said that grasping conditions existence — the Ābhidharmikas say that this refers to the five aggregates of a given temporal span being named existence. The Venerable Ghoṣa says as follows:

he says that the karmic actions capable of drawing forth future existence are named existence. As when it is said that there are seven existences — first, hell-existence; second, animal-existence; third, hungry-ghost-existence; fourth, heavenly existence; fifth, human existence; sixth, karmic-action-existence; seventh, intermediate existence; here, he says that the five destinies, together with their cause and their means, are named existence — that is, hell-existence and the rest are themselves the five destinies, karmic-action-existence is their cause, and intermediate existence is their means. As when it is said, what is desire-existence? — meaning karmic actions bound to the desire realm, with grasping as their condition, capable of proceeding toward a future birth, and so on, at length; here, he says that karmic action and its ripened result are named existence, without mentioning grasping as condition. One asks: if this is so, how is what is stated in the Dvāra-śāstra to be reconciled — as when it states that desire-existence is where every latent tendency of the desire realm increases its own underlying disposition, form-existence is where every latent tendency of the form realm increases its own underlying disposition, and formless-existence is where every latent tendency of the formless realm increases its own underlying disposition?

Desire-existence may well be so, for what reason? Because the desire realm's own five-sectioned karmic actions are all capable of yielding a ripened result, and it is therefore proper that every latent tendency of the desire realm should increase its underlying disposition there. But how can form-existence and formless-existence be so, since those realms' karmic actions capable of yielding a ripened result belong solely to the section abandoned by cultivation? The answer: that Dvāra-śāstra ought properly to state that desire-existence is where every latent tendency of the desire realm increases its underlying disposition, form-existence is where the universally-pervading latent tendencies and those abandoned by cultivation in the form realm increase their underlying disposition, and formless-existence is where the universally-pervading latent tendencies and those abandoned by cultivation in the formless realm increase their underlying disposition — and, since it does not state it this way, there must be a different underlying intent, namely, that the mind accompanied by the fetters of the five sections is itself existence's own retinue, and is therefore provisionally spoken of as existence, and hence it is said that every latent tendency increases its underlying disposition there. There are those who say: that treatise has both chapters and gateways — within the chapters, only karmic action and its ripened result are named existence, without mentioning grasping as condition, while within the gateways, karmic action, its ripened result, and grasping as condition are all stated in full, and it is for this reason that every latent tendency is said to increase its underlying disposition. The verdict: this explanation should not be given, for what reason? Because that treatise's own authors first establish the chapter's own meaning and only afterward reconcile it through the gateways — how, then, could the gateways state something at odds with the chapter? For this reason, the earlier explanation is the sounder one, in principle.

One asks: for what reason is it named existence? The answer: because it possesses increase and decrease, it is named existence. One asks: if this is so, then the noble path likewise possesses increase and decrease, and ought likewise to be named existence. The answer: only that which, possessing increase and decrease, is also capable of nourishing, benefiting, sustaining, and upholding existence is named existence. The noble path, though it possesses increase and decrease,

diminishes, opposes, harms, and destroys the various existences, and is therefore not named existence. Further, only that which, possessing increase and decrease, also causes the various existences' own birth, old age, sickness, and death to continue without interruption is named existence. The noble path, though it possesses increase and decrease, causes the various existences' own birth, old age, sickness, and death to be entirely cut off and not continue, and is therefore not named existence. Further, only that which, possessing increase and decrease, is also a conduct tending toward suffering and its arising, a conduct tending toward the arising of the worldly existences' own birth, old age, sickness, and death, is named existence. The noble path, though it possesses increase and decrease, is a conduct tending toward the cessation of suffering, a conduct tending toward the cessation of the worldly existences' own birth, old age, sickness, and death, and is therefore not named existence. Further, only that which, possessing increase and decrease, is also a basis for the view of a real self, a basis for delusion, a basis for craving, a basis for the latent tendencies, a resting-place for greed, hatred, and delusion, possessing defilement, possessing poison, possessing fault, possessing thorns, being turbid, falling into existence, and falling within the truth of suffering and its arising, is named existence. The noble path, though it possesses increase and decrease, runs contrary to every one of these, and is therefore not named existence. There are further those who say: existence is named so because it is a cause for fear. One asks: if this is so, then nirvāṇa, too, may be a cause for fear, and ought likewise to be named existence, as the scripture states: "Monks, you should know that the untaught ordinary person, out of sheer delusion, fears nirvāṇa, thinking, 'In that place, I shall not exist, and what is mine shall not exist; I shall come not to exist, and what is mine shall come not to exist.'" The answer: only fear that arises from correct view is what makes something named existence — nirvāṇa, though it may be feared, is feared by one holding wrong view, and is therefore not named existence. Further, only fear that arises in common among both ordinary persons and noble ones is what makes something named existence — nirvāṇa, though it may be feared, is feared by ordinary persons, not by noble ones, and is therefore not named existence. There are those who say: existence is named so because it is a vessel for suffering. One asks: existence is likewise a vessel for pleasure, as the scripture states: "Mahānāma, you should know that if form were exclusively suffering, and not pleasure, not accompanied by pleasure, and not followed by even the slightest joy or delight, then there would be no sentient being who, seeking pleasure, becomes attached to form. Mahānāma, you should know that, since form is not exclusively suffering, but is also pleasure, is accompanied by pleasure, and is followed by some measure of joy and delight, there are sentient beings who, seeking pleasure, become attached to form." A further scripture states: three feelings are definitively established, without admixture —

first, pleasant; second, painful; third, neither painful nor pleasant. A further scripture states: the path depends on the requisites of the path, and nirvāṇa depends on the path — and, by the pleasure of the path, one realizes the pleasure of nirvāṇa. Therefore, the various existences are not solely a vessel for suffering — how, then, can "vessel for suffering" explain the name "existence"? The answer: although the dharmas of birth-and-death do contain some measure of pleasure, since suffering predominates, the name "vessel for suffering" is established, and it is on this basis that the various existences are named solely a vessel for suffering. It is like placing a single drop of honey into a jar of poison — this does not thereby make it named a jar of honey, but it is still named a jar of poison, since the poison predominates. Existence is exactly the same: since it is predominantly the basis for suffering, it is named solely a vessel for suffering.

Now, continuity, in brief, is of five kinds: first, the continuity of the intermediate existence; second, the continuity of the existence at birth; third, the continuity of temporal spans; fourth, the continuity of intrinsic nature; fifth, the continuity of moments. The continuity of the intermediate existence means this: when the aggregates of the existence at death cease, the aggregates of the intermediate existence arise, and these aggregates of the intermediate existence continue the aggregates of the existence at death — hence it is named the continuity of the intermediate existence. The continuity of the existence at birth means this: when the aggregates of the intermediate existence cease, or the aggregates of the existence at death cease, the aggregates of the existence at birth arise, and these aggregates of the existence at birth continue the aggregates of the intermediate existence, or continue the aggregates of the existence at death — hence it is named the continuity of the existence at birth. The continuity of temporal spans means this: when the aggregates of the temporal span from the embryonic stage through the prime of life cease, the aggregates of the temporal span from the following embryonic stage through old age arise, and these latter aggregates continue the former — hence it is named the continuity of temporal spans. The continuity of intrinsic nature means this: immediately upon a wholesome dharma's ceasing, an unwholesome dharma, or a neutral dharma, arises, and this unwholesome or neutral dharma continues the preceding wholesome dharma; immediately upon an unwholesome or a neutral dharma's ceasing, a dharma of another intrinsic nature likewise arises and continues it — this should be stated fully in every case — hence it is named the continuity of intrinsic nature. The continuity of moments means this: immediately upon one moment after another ceasing, the succeeding moment after moment arises, and this succeeding moment continues the preceding one — hence it is named the continuity of moments. These five kinds of continuity can also be subsumed within two kinds of continuity,

since the first three never depart from the continuity of intrinsic nature and the continuity of moments; and the continuity of intrinsic nature, too, can be subsumed within the continuity of moments, since every dharma whatsoever is, by its own nature, momentary. As for the realms to which these five kinds of continuity belong: the desire realm possesses all five; the form realm possesses only four, excluding the continuity of temporal spans; the formless realm possesses only three,

excluding the intermediate existence and temporal spans. As for the destinies: the hell-destiny possesses only four, excluding temporal spans, while the remaining four destinies all possess all five. As for the modes of birth: all four modes of birth possess all five kinds of continuity. This treatise, however, is composed with reference solely to the continuity of the intermediate existence and the existence at birth.

That is, when it is said that the three fetters cause the continuity of the three existences, this is stated with reference to their overall category. In fact, these three fetters span all three realms — the portion bound to the desire realm causes the continuity of desire-existence, the portion bound to the form realm causes the continuity of form-existence, and the portion bound to the formless realm causes the continuity of formless-existence,

since rebirth-linking occurs whenever any one of these becomes presently manifest at the very first moment of either the existence at birth or the intermediate existence. The remaining cases should be understood in accordance with principle, following the base treatise. One asks: a latent tendency is capable of causing the continuity of the various existences, while what is neither a wrapping-defilement nor a minor defilement is not firm enough to do so, and it is the afflictions of the mental faculty, not those of the five sense-consciousness bodies, that cause the continuity of existence —

since, at the very moment of rebirth-linking, mental consciousness is certainly present, while the five [sense] consciousnesses are absent. For what reason, then, does the base treatise state that the five hindrances, the fetters of envy and stinginess, and the craving-bodies born of nose-contact and tongue-contact cause the continuity of desire-existence; that the craving-bodies born of eye-contact, ear-contact, and body-contact cause the continuity of desire- and form-existence; and that restlessness and the upper-fetters cause the continuity of form- and formless-existence? The answer: the base treatise ought properly to state that greed, hatred, and the doubt-hindrance cause the continuity of desire-existence; that greed, conceit, ignorance, and the upper-fetters cause the continuity of form- and formless-existence; and that the craving-body born of mind-contact causes the continuity of all three existences — while the remaining two hindrances, the fetters of envy and stinginess, restlessness, the upper-fetters, and the craving-bodies born of the first five contacts do not cause the continuity of existence at all. As for why it does not state the matter this way, one should understand that the text carries a different underlying intent, namely, that one not yet liberated from the remaining two hindrances and the rest, upon dying, is reborn once again into desire-existence and so on, and it is on this basis that these are spoken of as capable of continuing desire-existence and so on — though, at the actual moment of rebirth-linking, it is not through their own power.

Further, it is on account of three conditions that the afflictions are said to cause the continuity of existence: first, because they remain uncut; second, because they are capable of yielding a ripened result of existence;

third, because, at the moment of rebirth-linking, they are capable of moistening existence. The unwholesome latent tendencies belonging to the mental faculty possess all three conditions in full; the neutral latent tendencies are incapable of yielding a result of existence, and possess only the first two conditions. The unwholesome latent tendencies belonging to the five [sense] consciousnesses are incapable of moistening existence, and possess only the first two conditions; the neutral latent tendencies there possess only the first condition, remaining uncut, and lack the remaining two. The unwholesome wrapping-defilements and minor defilements possess only the first two conditions, and are incapable of moistening existence; the neutral wrapping-defilements and minor defilements possess only the single condition of remaining uncut. Torpor, drowsiness, and the like, on account of remaining uncut, or on account of yielding a result of existence, are said to be capable of continuing existence, though not capable of moistening it — and there is no contradiction to principle in this.

From the three fetters through the ninety-eight latent tendencies — upon which absorption are they extinguished? One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: because it seeks to display the surpassing marvel that occurs when the Buddhas appear in the world. The Prajñapti-śāstra states: encircling Jambudvīpa there is a road belonging to the wheel-turning king, one league in breadth; when there is no wheel-turning king, it is covered by the ocean's own waters, and no one can see it, but when a wheel-turning king appears in the world, the great ocean's waters recede by one league, and this road of the wheel-king thereupon appears, spread with golden sand and adorned with every kind of jewel, sprinkled over with sandalwood-scented water — and the wheel-turning sage-king, making his royal progress across the continents and islands, travels this road together with his four kinds of army. Just so, before the Buddhas appear in the world, the ground of the fundamental stages remains unseen by anyone, and all cutting-off of fetters relies solely on the border regions; but when a king who turns the wheel of the Dharma, possessed of the ten powers, appears in the world, the ground of the fundamental stages thereupon appears, spread with the golden sand of the factors of enlightenment and adorned with every kind of meritorious jewel, sprinkled over with the four clear waters — and the Buddha, together with his immeasurable, boundless retinue, travels this road together toward the city of nirvāṇa. It is for this reason that this treatise is composed.

Further, the treatise is composed in order to put a stop to the Vibhājyavādins' claim that certain afflictions are extinguished without relying on absorption. They hold this position: if a noble one is reborn in the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, he possesses no capacity for the noble path to become presently manifest there, and, when his lifespan is exhausted, his afflictions are likewise exhausted, and he becomes an arhat — this being called "reaching the very summit." In order to put a stop to this position, and to display that there is no affliction that is extinguished without relying on absorption, this treatise is composed. Here, "absorption" displays the path of counteraction — that is, the path of counteraction is variously spoken of as absorption, as the path, as counteraction, as attention, or as practice; though the words differ, their meaning is not distinct. Here, "extinguished" displays final abandonment — that is, this final abandonment is variously spoken of as extinction,

as exhaustion, as freedom from defilement, as freedom from binding, or as liberation; though the words differ, their meaning is not distinct.

Formerly, within this tradition, there were two masters: the first named Sthavira, the second named Ghoṣavarman. The Venerable Sthavira held this position: what is here called final abandonment, abandonment without remainder, ultimate abandonment, abandonment leaving not even a trace — such final abandonment belongs to the noble ones alone, not to ordinary persons, and is achieved by the noble path alone, not by the worldly path. For what reason is this so? Because this treatise was composed on the basis of the Seven-Grounds Sūtra, and that sūtra speaks solely of the seven fundamental stages, namely, the four absorptions and the lower three formless [attainments] — the non-fundamental stages possess no worldly path capable of cutting off the afflictions, and hence it is known that only the noble ones, employing the uncontaminated path, achieve this abandonment. The Venerable Ghoṣavarman held this position: what is here called final abandonment, abandonment without remainder, ultimate abandonment, abandonment leaving not even a trace — such final abandonment belongs both to the noble ones and to ordinary persons, and is achieved both by the noble path and by the worldly path. One asks: is it not the case that this treatise is based on the Seven-Grounds Sūtra — how, then, can an ordinary person, relying on the fundamental stages, give rise to the worldly path and achieve final abandonment? The answer: it is for precisely this reason that the Abhidharma is said to illuminate the sūtras and the rest, just as a bright lamp does — what the sūtras and the rest have not stated, this treatise states; what they have not made manifest, this treatise makes manifest; where they leave something unstated, this treatise leaves nothing unstated. It is therefore the case that both the noble ones and ordinary persons, relying on the seven fundamental grounds and the eight border regions, giving rise to either the noble path or the worldly path, are alike capable of achieving final abandonment of the fetters. Both of these two explanations can thus be soundly reconciled, since this base treatise's own text admits of both senses.

The answer, that the three fetters are extinguished by relying either on the four, or on the not-yet-arrived, means this: "the four" refers to the four absorption-grounds; "the not-yet-arrived" refers to the not-yet-arrived ground and the intermediate absorption, since both of these alike are named the not-yet-arrived ground. One asks: for what reason is this ground named not-yet-arrived? The answer: because it has not yet entered the fundamental absorption capable of becoming presently manifest to cut off the afflictions, it is named not-yet-arrived. One asks: the scripture speaks solely of the fundamental grounds as the basis, not the not-yet-arrived ground — why, then, does this treatise say that the three fetters are extinguished by relying either on the four, or on the not-yet-arrived? The answer: this passage ought properly to say "relying either on the four, or on the not-yet-arrived," without the word "relying" before "not-yet-arrived extinguished" — yet, in saying "relying on the not-yet-arrived extinguished," there is a different underlying intent, namely, that the second occurrence of the word "relying" restates the fundamental ground once again. The intended meaning here is this: "the three fetters are extinguished by relying either on the four" means either extinguished by relying on the four fundamental grounds, or "extinguished by relying on the not-yet-arrived" means extinguished by relying on the not-yet-arrived ground of the four fundamental grounds — exactly as when one asks another, "Did you do this having entered the city, or without having entered the city?" — here, the single word "city" is stated twice, once before and once after; the word "relying" here is exactly the same, and no contradiction to principle follows. Further, the word "relying" has both a general and a specific sense: the specific sense speaks solely of the fundamental grounds, as in the Seven-Grounds Sūtra; the general sense speaks of both the fundamental grounds and the border regions together, as is stated here — and so this use of the word "relying" likewise does not contradict principle. Now, these three fetters can be found from the desire realm up through the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. In the desire realm, they are extinguished solely by relying on the not-yet-arrived ground;

in the first absorption, they are extinguished by relying either on the first absorption or on the not-yet-arrived ground; in the second absorption, by relying either on the second absorption or on the not-yet-arrived ground; in the third absorption, by relying either on the third absorption or on the not-yet-arrived ground; in the fourth absorption and the four formless [attainments], by relying either on the fourth absorption or on the not-yet-arrived ground. For what reason is this so? Because the three fetters' own final abandonment, abandonment without remainder, ultimate abandonment, abandonment leaving not even a trace, must be achieved by the path of seeing, and the paths of seeing rely solely on six grounds, namely, the four absorptions, the not-yet-arrived absorption, and the intermediate absorption.

If one enters the state of correct determination relying on the not-yet-arrived absorption, then these three fetters are extinguished by relying on the not-yet-arrived ground; and so on, up through if one enters the state of correct determination relying on the fourth absorption, then these three fetters are extinguished by relying on the fourth absorption. Although it is only in the fourth absorption and the four formless grounds that the three fetters are extinguished by relying either on the four or on the not-yet-arrived ground, the statement is made with reference to the overall category, and no fault attaches to the remaining grounds being included as well. Although, relying on the border regions of the eight grounds, one may give rise to the worldly path and thereby partially cut off the three fetters, this is not final abandonment, and is therefore not spoken of here. In fact, these three fetters' own final abandonment occurs solely at the moment of the subsequent receptivity regarding the path; if stated individually, the view-of-self fetter's own final abandonment occurs solely at the moment of the receptivity regarding suffering — hence it is said that they are extinguished by relying on the four, or on the not-yet-arrived. As for the statement that the three unwholesome roots and the desire-contaminant are extinguished by relying on the not-yet-arrived-ground alone, this is because they achieve final abandonment at the moment one becomes free of the desire realm's own defilement — whether ordinary person or noble one, whether by the contaminated or the uncontaminated path, both rely on the not-yet-arrived ground alone in becoming free of the desire realm's own defilement. As for the statement that the contaminated ignorance-contaminant is extinguished by relying either on the seven, or on the not-yet-arrived ground, "the seven" refers to the four absorptions together with the lower three formless [attainments], making seven; "relying on the absorption not-yet-arrived" refers to the not-yet-arrived absorption and the intermediate absorption,

since both of these alike are named the not-yet-arrived ground. Here, the contaminated existence-contaminant can be found from the first absorption up through the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception; the ignorance-contaminant can be found from the desire realm up through the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception; both of these alike achieve final abandonment only when one becomes free of the defilement belonging to the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, and that defilement is finally freed from by relying on the path of the ninth ground — hence it is said that they are extinguished by relying either on the seven, or on the not-yet-arrived ground. In fact, the ignorance-contaminant belonging to the desire realm is extinguished solely by relying on the not-yet-arrived ground; the contaminated existence-contaminant and the ignorance-contaminant belonging to the first absorption are extinguished by relying either on the first absorption or on the not-yet-arrived ground; belonging to the second absorption, by relying either on the second absorption or on the not-yet-arrived ground; and so on, up through belonging to the sphere of infinite consciousness, by relying either on the four absorptions and the lower two formless [attainments] or on the not-yet-arrived ground; belonging to the sphere of nothingness and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, by relying either on the four absorptions and the lower three formless [attainments] or on the not-yet-arrived ground. Stated with reference to the overall category, the remainder, too, can be said to be extinguished by relying either on the seven, or on the not-yet-arrived ground — this passage speaks solely of the two grounds of final abandonment. It is only the noble ones, using the uncontaminated path, who achieve this abandonment, namely, at the very last, through the vajra-like absorption. The remaining cases should be understood as appropriate, following the base treatise; the distinctions between ordinary persons and noble ones, and between the worldly and the noble path's own final abandonment, should be understood accordingly, in principle.

For fetters that are past, are they already-bound? — and so on, at length. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: in order to put a stop to other schools and to display the correct principle. That is, there are those who say that the past and the future do not truly, actually exist; there are further those who say that, once an affliction is cut off, it can never again regress. In order to put a stop to these positions, and to display that the past and the future truly exist, and that there is regression even after an affliction has been cut off, this treatise is composed. One should know that, here, the past is named already-bound, the future is named to-be-bound, and the present is named now-bound. Further, on this point, there are those who say: it is the fetter's own function that is named binding;

there are further those who say: it is the fetter's own possession that is named binding. Now, a fetter's relation to its own possession is of three kinds: first, like the lead ox drawing the possession forward in front of it; second, like the calf following the possession behind; third, like a physical form and its shadow, the possession accompanying it at once. "Like the lead ox" means the fetter comes first and the possession follows; "like the calf" means the possession comes first and the fetter follows; "like a physical form" means the fetter and the possession occur together. For fetters that are past, are they already-bound? The answer: fetters that are past are already-bound — that is, when a fetter is in the past, its own possession is likewise in the past, and, since it once served as binding, it is named already-bound. There is binding that is already-bound whose fetter is not itself past — that is, a fetter in the future or the present may already be binding, namely, when the fetters themselves are in the future or the present, while their own possession is in the past, having once served as binding — this being the case of the fetter following its possession like a calf. For fetters that are future, will they come to be bound? The answer should be given in four clauses, since the matter is not fixed. There is a fetter that is future whose binding will not come to be — that is, a fetter that is future, already cut off, already fully understood, already extinguished, already vomited out, and certain never to regress. Here, "already cut off" means the abandonment [of the fetter] has already been attained, together with its full understanding; "already fully understood" means the cognition of its full understanding has already been attained; "already extinguished" means analytical cessation has already been attained; "already vomited out" means the possession of binding has already been cut off, and the possession of freedom from binding has already been realized. There are those who say: "already cut off," "already fully understood," "already extinguished," and "already vomited out" all alike display the sense of relinquishment. "Certain never to regress" refers to a non-regressing arhat —

his future fetters abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, across all three realms, are certain never to regress. For a regressing arhat, his future fetters abandoned by seeing, across all three realms, are certain never to regress. For a non-regressing non-returner, should he already be free of the defilement of the sphere of nothingness, his future fetters abandoned by seeing, across all three realms, together with those abandoned by cultivation in the lower eight grounds, are certain never to regress; and so on, down to, should he not yet be free of the first absorption's own defilement, his future fetters abandoned by seeing, across all three realms,

together with those abandoned by cultivation in the desire realm, are certain never to regress. For a regressing non-returner, and for a once-returner or a stream-enterer, their future fetters abandoned by seeing, across all three realms, are certain never to regress. For a non-regressing ordinary person, should he already be free of the defilement of the sphere of nothingness, his future fetters abandoned by seeing, across all three realms, are certain never to regress; and so on, down to, should he not yet be free of the first absorption's own defilement, his future fetters abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, in a single ground, are certain never to regress. This is what is meant by a fetter that is future whose binding will not come to be. There is a fetter whose binding will come to be, though it is not itself future — that is, a fetter that is past, already cut off, already fully understood, already extinguished, already vomited out, yet certain to regress. Here, the meaning of each clause is exactly as explained above. "Certain to regress" means this: for a regressing arhat, his past fetters abandoned by cultivation, across all three realms, may be certain to regress. For a regressing non-returner, should he already be free of the defilement of the sphere of nothingness, his past fetters abandoned by cultivation, in the lower eight grounds, may be certain to regress; and so on, down to, should he not yet be free of the first absorption's own defilement,

his past fetters abandoned by cultivation, in a single ground, may be certain to regress. For a regressing ordinary person, should he already be free of the defilement of the sphere of nothingness, his past fetters abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, in the lower eight grounds, may be certain to regress; and so on, down to, should he already be free of the desire realm's own defilement, yet not free of the first absorption's own defilement, his past fetters abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, in a single ground, may be certain to regress. This is what is meant by a fetter whose binding will come to be, though it is not itself future. There is a fetter that is future whose binding will likewise come to be — that is, a fetter that is future, already cut off, already fully understood, already extinguished, already vomited out, yet certain to regress. Here, "already cut off" and the rest are as explained in the first clause; "certain to regress" is as explained in the second clause; only, where the earlier clause spoke of the past, this one speaks of the future. There is a fetter that is neither future, whose binding, too, will not come to be — that is, a fetter that is past, already cut off, already fully understood, already extinguished, already vomited out, and certain never to be bound, together with a present fetter. Here, each clause is as explained in the first clause; only, where the earlier clause spoke of the future, this one speaks of the past and of a present fetter, meaning this: a present fetter is likewise not future, since it is present; and its binding, too, will not come to be, since it is bound right now. For fetters that are present, are they bound right now? The answer: fetters that are present are bound right now — that is, present fetters certainly possess a present possession, just as a physical form and its shadow are certainly present together. There is binding that is bound right now whose fetter is not itself present — that is, a fetter in the past or the future may be bound right now, namely, when a past or a future fetter possesses a present possession; in the case of a past fetter, this is like the lead ox drawing the possession forward in front of it; in the case of a future fetter, this is like the calf following the possession behind — and, since their own possession is present, they are named bound right now. For those who employ a given path to cut off the desire realm's fetters, when they regress from that path, do they once again come to possess binding by those fetters? — and so on, at length. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: in order to put a stop to other schools and to display the correct principle. That is, there are those who hold that there is definitely no such thing as regression giving rise to afflictions once again, as the Vibhājyavādins do. They cite a worldly, visible simile as their proof, saying this: just as, once a jar is broken, there remain only its potsherds, and it can never again become a jar, so too the arhats — once the vajra-like absorption has shattered their afflictions, they ought never again to give rise to afflictions and regress;

and just as, once wood is burned, there remains only its ashes, and it can never again become wood, so too the arhats — once the fire of uncontaminated wisdom has burned away their afflictions, they ought never again to give rise to afflictions and regress. They cite these worldly, visible similes as proof that there is no such thing as regression giving rise to afflictions once again. In order to put a stop to this position, and to display that there is such a thing as regression giving rise to afflictions once again, this treatise is composed. If there were no regression, this would contradict the scriptures — the scripture states that there are two kinds of arhat: first, those subject to regression; second, those not subject to regression. A further scripture states that, on account of five causes, a temporarily-liberated arhat regresses, becomes obscured, and loses [his attainment] —

what are these five? First, being much occupied with worldly business; second, delighting in idle discourse; third, being fond of reconciling quarrels and disputes; fourth, taking pleasure in long journeys;

fifth, the body being constantly afflicted with much illness. A further scripture states that there was an arhat named Gotika, who, being temporarily liberated, had already regressed six times,

and, fearing that at the seventh occasion he would regress and lose his attainment yet again, took a knife and ended his own life, thereby entering final nirvāṇa — hence it is known that there is definitely such a thing as regression giving rise to afflictions once again. One asks: if there is indeed such a thing as regression, how, then, is the visible simile cited by the Vibhājyavādins to be reconciled? The answer: there is no need to reconcile it at all, for what reason? Because it is neither sūtra, nor vinaya, nor abhidharma, but merely a coarse, superficial, worldly simile — worldly dharmas are one thing, the dharmas of the sages and the noble ones are another, and one ought not cite a worldly dharma to challenge the dharma of the sages and the noble ones. But if it must nonetheless be reconciled, then let the simile's own faults be stated, that is, since faults can be shown in it, it fails as proof. Just as, once a jar is broken, there certainly remain potsherds — once one has attained arhatship, does there remain any affliction or not? If there remains an affliction, then one ought not to be an arhat; if there remains none, then the meaning and the simile diverge, and it cannot serve as proof. Just as, once wood is burned, there certainly remain ashes —

once one has attained arhatship, does there remain any affliction or not? If there remains an affliction, then one ought not to be an arhat; if there remains none, then the meaning and the simile diverge, and it cannot serve as proof. In fact, worldly wood, properly speaking, is never actually burned at all — rather, the subtlest particles of wood, serving as cause together with the subtlest particles of fire, cease; and these subtlest particles of fire, serving as cause together with the subtlest particles of ash, cease in turn. It ought properly to be said: wood is the cause of fire, and fire is the cause of ash;

yet the worldly notion holds that fire burns wood so that the wood becomes ash — the wood having already ceased, ash nonetheless remains, and it is not the case that nothing whatsoever remains; the simile and the actual matter it is meant to illustrate are therefore not truly alike. Moreover, when an arhat cuts off his afflictions, this does not mean that his past and future afflictions' own nature and characteristics cease to exist altogether, since they still, in truth, genuinely exist. When, within a given mental continuum, the path that opposes a given affliction has not yet become presently manifest, that affliction is, at that time, named uncut; when, within that continuum, the path that opposes it has already become presently manifest, cutting off the possession of binding and realizing the possession of freedom from binding, so that the affliction is no longer possessed, it is named already cut off. It ought properly to be said: the cultivation of the noble path is itself a rare and difficult achievement — an arhat, though he has cut off his afflictions, does not thereby make them cease to exist altogether. It is for this reason that the Venerable Ghoṣa says: an affliction's not operating within one's own person is what is called cutting it off, not making it cease to exist altogether — just as it is said that there is no Devadatta within a given house, this does not mean that Devadatta does not exist elsewhere at all; the cutting off of an affliction should be understood in just the same way, since it still exists in the past. If one then encounters a condition conducive to regression, serving as cause, this draws forth a future affliction once again — and it is for this reason that there must be such a thing as regression giving rise to afflictions. One asks: how, then, do the Vibhājyavādins themselves explain the scripture cited by the followers of correct principle? The answer: they say that, at the time of regression, it is the path that regresses, not the fruit, since the fruit of a śramaṇa is unconditioned. One asks: granting that there is regression, what difference is there between the path's own regression and the fruit's own regression, that one should be said not to regress? Moreover, when they grant that the path of no-further-training regresses, does one then attain the path of further training, or does one attain nothing at all? If one attains the fruit of the path of further training, then this fruit, too, ought to regress, since it is not the fruit of no-further-training that constitutes the path of further training; if one attains nothing at all, then a grave error follows — regressing from the path of no-further-training without attaining the path of further training would mean one ought then to abide in the state of an ordinary person. But if one is neither an ordinary person, nor one in further training, nor one beyond further training,

then there would have to exist some being altogether apart from both ordinary persons and noble ones, and this would mean one is then no longer a disciple of the World-Honored One at all — and it is for this reason that there must be admitted to be such a thing as regression giving rise to afflictions. The Vibhājyavādins further say: the latent tendencies are the seeds of the wrapping-defilements; the latent tendencies' own nature is dissociated from mind, while the wrapping-defilements' own nature is associated with mind; the wrapping-defilements arise from the latent tendencies, and it is because the wrapping-defilements become presently manifest that arhats regress — but, once the latent tendencies have already been cut off, the wrapping-defilements can no longer arise, so how could such a one regress? Hence, they say, holding that there is no regression accords with correct principle. Such a claim as this is the fruit of ignorance, the fruit of darkness, the fruit of nescience, the fruit of failing to apply diligent effort — for there truly is such a thing as regression giving rise to afflictions. In order to put a stop to that school's position, and to display that the doctrine of regression accords with correct principle, this treatise is composed.

One asks: what dharma constitutes regression's own nature? There are those who say: it is precisely the affliction that arises and the wrapping-defilement that becomes presently manifest, on account of which one regresses, that itself constitutes regression's own nature — and, if this is what is said, then regression's own nature would consist of the unwholesome and the obscured-neutral. There are further masters who say: whatever, at the moment of regressing and falling, conforms to and accompanies the regression, this itself constitutes regression's own nature — and, if this is what is said, then every dharma whatsoever would constitute regression's own nature, since, at the moment of regressing and falling, every dharma possesses the sense of conforming to the regression. The Venerable Sautrāntika says as follows: regression possesses no own nature at all, and is merely a provisional designation. For what reason is this so? Because, when a person who previously possessed various wholesome merits within himself now encounters a condition conducive to regression and loses these dharmas, what own nature could this loss itself possibly have?

It is like a person whose wealth is seized by a thief — should someone ask him, "What, now, is the very substance of your loss of wealth?", the owner of the wealth would answer, "I once possessed wealth, and it has now been seized by the thief; there is simply no wealth left — what substance, then, could there possibly be to know?" It is likewise like a person whose clothing is seized by another, so that he stands there exposed and unclothed —

should someone ask him, "What, now, is the very substance of your having no clothing?", the owner of the clothing would answer, "I once possessed clothing, and it has now been seized away; what substance, then, could there possibly be to know?" It is likewise like a person whose clothing is torn — should someone ask him, "What, now, constitutes the very nature of your clothing's being torn?", the one whose clothing is torn would answer, "My clothing was once whole, and it is now torn; what nature, then, could there possibly be to know?" Just so, when a person who previously possessed superior merits within himself now merely loses them through regression, what own nature could this possibly have? The verdict: regression's own nature is the non-possession that constitutes non-attainment, of the neutral, non-obscuring kind — this being precisely a dharma dissociated from mind, subsumed within the aggregate of formations dissociated from mind; it belongs, moreover, within the category of dharmas of this same kind dissociated from mind. One should understand that regression itself is distinct from the dharmas that conform to and accompany regression: regression takes non-possession, that is, non-attainment, as its own nature, subsumed within the aggregate of neutral, non-obscuring formations dissociated from mind, while the dharmas that conform to and accompany regression take every unwholesome or obscured-neutral dharma as their own nature. It is exactly like the distinction between a schism in the monastic community and the offense of causing a schism: the schism itself takes disharmony as its own nature, subsumed within the aggregate of neutral, non-obscuring formations dissociated from mind, while the offense of causing the schism takes false speech as its own nature — the community itself comes to possess the schism, while the person who caused the schism comes to possess the offense. Just as these two are thus distinct, so too regression and the dharmas that conform to and accompany it are distinct, and regression's own nature, genuinely and truly existent, is therefore subsumed within the aggregate of formations dissociated from mind — this being precisely non-possession, a conclusion firmly established by principle.