The Great Debate on the In-Between

Continuing the Sentient-Being Nyāsa within the second, the Fetters Aggregate, part seven. Among these beings, how many latent tendencies increase, and how many fetters bind, an ordinary person or a noble one in the desire realm? The answer: for an ordinary person, ninety-eight latent tendencies increase, and nine fetters bind him; for a noble one, ten latent tendencies increase, and six fetters bind him. Here, 'these' refers to the six kinds of being, in total, spoken of earlier among every sentient being — that is, each of the three realms possessing both an ordinary person and a noble one. An ordinary person in the desire realm possesses the full increase of all ninety-eight latent tendencies, and the full binding of all nine fetters. A noble one in the desire realm possesses only the increase of the ten latent tendencies abandoned by cultivation, since every latent tendency abandoned by seeing has already been cut off.

As for the six fetters that bind him: excluding wrong view, view-clinging, and doubt, these three having likewise already been cut off by a noble one. How many latent tendencies increase, and how many fetters bind, an ordinary person or a noble one in the form realm? The answer: for an ordinary person, sixty-two latent tendencies increase, and six fetters bind him; for a noble one, six latent tendencies increase, and three fetters bind him.

As for an ordinary person's sixty-two latent tendencies that increase: this refers to thirty-one apiece in the form and formless realms, the desire realm's own thirty-six having already been cut off. As for the six fetters that bind him: excluding hatred, envy, and stinginess, since a fixed realm possesses none of these. As for a noble one's six latent tendencies that increase: this refers to three apiece abandoned by cultivation in the form and formless realms, the desire realm's own four abandoned by cultivation having already been cut off by him. As for the three fetters that bind him: craving, conceit, and ignorance, every other fetter having already been cut off. How many latent tendencies increase, and how many fetters bind, an ordinary person or a noble one in the formless realm? The answer: for an ordinary person, thirty-one latent tendencies increase, and six fetters bind him; for a noble one, three latent tendencies increase, and three fetters bind him. As for an ordinary person's thirty-one latent tendencies that increase: this refers to the formless realm's own thirty-one kinds, every other latent tendency having already been cut off. As for the six fetters that bind him: excluding hatred, envy, and stinginess, since that realm possesses none of these. As for a noble one's three latent tendencies that increase: this refers to the formless realm's own three abandoned by cultivation, every other latent tendency having already been cut off. As for the three fetters that bind him: craving, conceit, and ignorance, every other fetter having already been cut off. One asks: a being in the desire realm does not have the latent tendencies of the upper two realms increasing upon him — for what reason, then, does this treatise say that an ordinary person in the desire realm possesses the full increase of all ninety-eight latent tendencies, and that a noble one in the desire realm has the ten latent tendencies abandoned by cultivation increasing upon him? And a being in the form realm does not have the formless realm's own latent tendencies increasing upon him — for what reason, then, does this treatise say that an ordinary person in the form realm has sixty-two latent tendencies increasing upon him, and that a noble one in the form realm has six latent tendencies abandoned by cultivation increasing upon him? The answer: this is stated with reference to the acquisition of those latent tendencies not yet having been released — that is, although an ordinary person in the desire realm does not have the form and formless realms' own latent tendencies increasing upon him, since he has not yet been released from the acquisition of those latent tendencies, they are said to increase upon him; although a noble one in the desire realm does not have the form and formless realms' own latent tendencies abandoned by cultivation increasing upon him, since he has not yet been released from the acquisition of those latent tendencies, they are said to increase upon him. By this same principle, it likewise carries no contradiction with reason to say that an ordinary person or a noble one in the form realm has the formless realm's own latent tendencies increasing upon him. Further, this is stated with reference to the current manifestation of that acquisition — that is, although an ordinary person in the desire realm does not have the form and formless realms' own latent tendencies increasing upon him, since that acquisition still turns in present operation, they too are said to increase upon him; although a noble one in the desire realm does not have the form and formless realms' own latent tendencies abandoned by cultivation increasing upon him, since that acquisition still turns in present operation, they too are said to increase upon him. By this same principle, it likewise carries no contradiction with reason to say that an ordinary person or a noble one in the form realm has the formless realm's own latent tendencies increasing upon him. Further, this is stated with reference to that acquisition already attained, not yet attained, and presently being attained, and this too carries no contradiction with reason — already attained refers to his own past acquisition; not yet attained refers to his own future acquisition; presently being attained refers to his own present acquisition — that is, although an ordinary person or a noble one in the desire or form realm does not have the upper realm's own latent tendencies increasing upon him, since that acquisition of those latent tendencies still circulates across the three times, never having been cut off, they are said to increase upon him. Further, this is said with reference to their capacity to presently arise — that is, although an ordinary person or a noble one in the desire realm does not have the form and formless realms' own latent tendencies increasing upon him, since they remain capable of presently arising, they too are said to increase upon him, this capacity to presently arise remaining precisely because he has not yet become free of desire's own defilement. By this same principle, it should be understood likewise that an ordinary person or a noble one in the form realm is said to have the formless realm's own latent tendencies increasing upon him. Although, once he regresses, he too becomes capable of presently manifesting a lower realm's own latent tendencies, since these have already been cut off, and since there exists a capacity to never again regress at all, the lower realm's own latent tendencies are not said to increase upon him. Further, this is likewise said, with no contradiction with reason, in order to display that their own outflow has, at some time, previously manifested — that is, a being in the desire realm, from a beginning point that cannot be known, has never once failed to give rise to the form and formless realms' own latent tendencies, and it is for this reason that they are said to increase upon him; a being in the form realm, from a beginning point that cannot be known, has never once failed to give rise to the formless realm's own latent tendencies, and it is for this reason that they are said to increase upon him. One asks: a being in the form or formless realm, from a beginning point that cannot be known, has never once failed to give rise to the desire and form realms' own latent tendencies — for what reason, then, does this treatise not likewise say that the lower realm's own latent tendencies increase upon him? The answer: although he too has, at some time, previously given rise to them, since these have already been cut off, they are not said to increase upon him. One asks: there also exists a noble one who possesses the full ninety-eight latent tendencies at once, namely, one fully bound who abides at the receptivity of dharma-cognition regarding suffering — for what reason, then, does this treatise say that a noble one in the desire realm has only ten kinds of latent tendency increasing upon him? The answer: although this case too exists, since its own duration is so brief, this treatise speaks only of the ten latent tendencies that increase — that is, at the very first thought-moment, the full ninety-eight are indeed present, but immediately after this thought-moment, ten are already cut off, and, in the twinkling of an eye, one arrives at the sixteenth thought-moment — the interval being so brief, this treatise speaks only of the ten latent tendencies abandoned by cultivation that increase. Further, those who enter the path of seeing number seventy-three; of these, the first nine kinds of being, at the very first thought-moment,

although they do indeed possess all ninety-eight kinds at once, none of these manifest in operation, since, at the stage of the path of seeing, not even a contaminated wholesome mind is able to arise, let alone a defiled or a neutral-and-unobscured one. Here, this treatise establishes the distinction between the stages of a sentient being solely with reference to affliction currently manifesting in operation, and it is for this reason that it says a noble one, at the very most, has only ten latent tendencies increasing upon him, since only these ten kinds remain capable of presently manifesting. Elsewhere too, the distinction between the stages of a sentient being is established with reference to affliction currently manifesting in operation. As the scripture states: a certain brahmin came to where the Buddha was and asked: World-Honored One, are you to be reckoned a deva? The Buddha said: no. He asked further: are you to be reckoned a nāga, an asura, a gandharva, a garuḍa, a kiṃnara, a mahoraga, a yakṣa, a rākṣasa, or some other non-human, or a human being? The Buddha said: no. For what reason is this so? Brahmin, you should know: whoever has contaminants not yet cut off, not yet fully known, and currently manifesting in operation — such a one, destined to be reborn among the devas, may properly be reckoned a deva, and so on, at full length, up through: destined to be reborn among humans, may properly be reckoned a human. But I myself have already cut off, and already fully known, every contaminant — exactly as one who cuts off a tree's own root, severing the very crown of a palm tree — and it is by this that every contaminant of mine never again manifests in operation, having attained the very dharma of no further arising with respect to any future existence. I am therefore certainly not to be reckoned a deva, and so on, at full length, up through: not to be reckoned a human. In another place, too, the distinction between the stages of a sentient being is established with reference to a ripened result currently manifesting in operation. As a verse within the scripture states:

'The Buddha is the true person — ever self-mastered, ever in concentration, forever wandering the Brahmā-road, his mind delighting in stillness.' Whoever, having received a given realm's own ripened result, sustains that continuity, is thereby named a sentient being reborn in that very realm — that is, whoever, having received the desire realm's own ripened result, sustains that continuity, is thereby named a sentient being reborn in the desire realm; whoever, having received the form realm's own ripened result, sustains that continuity, is thereby named a sentient being reborn in the form realm; whoever, having received the formless realm's own ripened result, sustains that continuity, is thereby named a sentient being reborn in the formless realm. The Buddha, having received the human's own ripened result and sustained that continuity, and having, moreover, realized the truly real dharma, is for this reason named the true person. This very treatise likewise establishes the distinction of a sentient being's own realm and stage with reference to a ripened result currently manifesting in operation, exactly as stated in the ten gateways: who possesses the eye-faculty? — one born in the form realm, or one born in the desire realm who has already attained it and not yet lost it. Who does not possess the eye-faculty? — one born in the formless realm, or one born in the desire realm who has not yet attained it, or has already lost it. This is stated with reference to the continuity of a ripened result across the three realms — whenever this becomes presently manifest, one is named as reborn in that very realm; every other dharma, being indeterminate, is not spoken of on this same basis. One asks: for what reason does the Venerable Compiler, within this very nyāsa, so often compose his treatise with reference to the intermediate state? The answer: in order to put a stop to other schools and to display the correct principle. That is, there are those who hold that rebirth across all three realms, in every case, involves no intermediate state at all, as the Vibhajyavādins do; there are others, further, who say that rebirth in the desire and form realms definitely does involve an intermediate state, as the Proponents of Correct Reasoning do. One asks: on what measure of valid cognition do the Vibhajyavādins rely in holding that there is no intermediate state? The answer: they rely upon the measure of scriptural authority — that is, as the scripture states, whoever commits and augments any of the five acts of immediate retribution is, without any interval, certainly reborn in hell; and, since it is said that he is reborn in hell without any interval, it is thereby known that the intermediate state certainly does not exist. A verse, further, states:

'Twice-born one, you have now passed your prime, drawing near to decline, close now to the Lord of Death — you wish to journey the road ahead, yet carry no provisions for it, and, seeking somewhere to stand along the way between, find nowhere at all to rest.' Since this states that there exists nowhere at all to rest along the way between, it is thereby known that the intermediate state certainly does not exist. A further argument by way of consequence is offered to prove that the intermediate state does not exist: that, exactly as there is no interval or gap between shadow and light, so too should it be understood between a death-existence and a rebirth-existence. One asks: on what measure of valid cognition do the Proponents of Correct Reasoning rely in holding that the intermediate state does exist?

The answer: they too rely upon the measure of scriptural authority. As the scripture states, entering a mother's womb requires that three matters all become presently manifest together: first, that the mother's own body be, at that time, in a fit and healthy condition; second, that father and mother unite in mutual desire and affection; and third, that a gandharva be presently manifest. Apart from an intermediate-state being, what could this gandharva possibly be? And, the preceding aggregates already having perished, what could possibly be presently manifest at all? It is therefore certain that this gandharva is precisely the intermediate state. A further scripture, moreover, speaks of one who attains final nirvāṇa midway.

Were the intermediate state not to exist, upon what could this term properly be founded? A further scripture, moreover, states: this present body already destroyed, and the next body not yet arisen, a mind-made being clings to grasping by relying upon craving. Since the World-Honored One himself states that, this present body already destroyed, and the next body not yet arisen, a mind-made being establishes his grasping by relying upon craving, it is thereby known that the intermediate state certainly does not fail to exist — for, were there no intermediate state, what could this term 'mind-made being' possibly denote? A further argument by way of consequence is offered to prove that the intermediate state does exist: that of one who dies on this very continent and is reborn, say, in Uttarakuru — were there no intermediate state, this present body already having perished, and that future body not yet having arisen, the interval between the two ought properly to be a genuine break in continuity, in which case that future body would come to exist though it never previously existed at all, while this present body, though it once genuinely existed, would come to utterly cease existing — and every dharma whatsoever ought then to be subject to this same principle, coming to exist though never previously existing, and, having once existed, ceasing to exist once again. Lest such a fault as this be incurred, the intermediate state must exist. One asks: how do the Proponents of Correct Reasoning explain away the scriptural authorities cited by the Vibhajyavādins, while still maintaining that the intermediate state exists and does not fail to exist? The answer: the scriptures they cite are of provisional meaning, being merely a provisional designation, carrying a further, particular intent.

For what reason is this so? First, as for that scripture's own statement that whoever commits and augments any of the five acts of immediate retribution is, without any interval, certainly reborn in hell: this scripture's own intent is to rule out other destinies and other kinds of karma, not to rule out the intermediate state. As for ruling out other destinies: this refers to the fact that an act of immediate retribution certainly summons hell alone, and summons no other destiny — whoever possesses such karma is, upon death, certainly reborn among the hell-beings, and in no other destiny. As for ruling out other kinds of karma: this refers to the fact that an act of immediate retribution is experienced in the very next life, not experienced in this present life, and not experienced in some later life beyond the next — by the force of this karma, upon death, one certainly falls among the hell-beings to experience its ripened result. This is the very intent that scripture speaks of. Were one to take its meaning strictly according to the letter of the text, that scripture states that whoever commits and augments any of the five acts of immediate retribution is, without any interval, certainly reborn in hell — but would this mean that whoever commits only four, three, two, or one of these acts, or some other kind of karma, is thereby not reborn in hell at all, that only the number five is spoken of? And, further, as for its saying that one is reborn in hell without any interval — would this mean that, having committed this karma, one falls into hell at the very second thought-moment thereafter? Yet, having committed this karma, a hundred years may well pass before one finally falls into hell. It is therefore improper to take the meaning strictly according to the letter of the text and thereby hold that the intermediate state certainly does not exist. The verse that is cited should likewise be explained in this same way — that it rules out other destinies and rules out other kinds of karma in speaking of there being no interval between, and does not thereby rule out the intermediate state. One asks: how do the Proponents of Correct Reasoning explain away the argument by consequence that the Vibhajyavādins raise, while still maintaining that the intermediate state certainly exists and does not fail to exist? The answer: their proposed objection need not even be explained away at all, for what reason? Because it is not drawn from the Tripiṭaka — a worldly analogy is one thing, the dharma of the noble ones is quite another, and one ought not cite a merely worldly analogy to raise objections against the dharma of the noble ones. Yet, were it necessary to explain it away regardless, one should offer a counter-analogy exposing its own fault — for, once its own fault is exposed, it fails to serve as any proof at all. That is, shadow and light are not even counted among sentient beings, possessing neither faculty nor mind — how, then, could a death-existence and a rebirth-existence be equated with them at all? And, further, shadow and light arise simultaneously together — would a death-existence and a rebirth-existence likewise arise simultaneously together? And, further, this very analogy of shadow and light having no interval or gap between them in fact proves that the intermediate state exists and does not fail to exist — for, exactly as shadow and light have no interval, no gap, between them, so too, at the moment of proceeding from a death-existence to an intermediate-state existence, there is no interval, no gap, and, further, at the moment of proceeding from an intermediate-state existence to a rebirth-existence, there is likewise no interval or gap — and it is for this reason that the intermediate state certainly exists and does not fail to exist. One asks: how do the Vibhajyavādins explain away the scriptural authorities cited by the Proponents of Correct Reasoning, while still holding that the intermediate state certainly does not exist? The answer: the scriptures they cite are of provisional meaning, being merely a provisional designation, carrying a further, particular intent. For what reason is this so? First, as for the first scripture's own statement that entering a mother's womb requires three matters, and so on, at full length, up through: a gandharva being presently manifest — this term 'gandharva' ought not, in that scripture, to denote a being lacking drums and every other kind of musical instrument, and so it ought instead to denote the mere continuous activity of the aggregates, this being precisely the meaning of that continuous activity of the aggregates. The Proponents of Correct Reasoning thereupon put this objection to them: even granting that this speaks of the mere continuous activity of the aggregates, or of a gandharva together with it, both alike prove that the intermediate state exists and does not fail to exist — for what, apart from this same continuous activity of the aggregates, could that term possibly denote at all?

The Vibhajyavādins raise a further objection, saying: you claim that all four modes of birth involve an intermediate state — granting that womb-birth and egg-birth may indeed involve these three matters entering the womb, how could this possibly hold for moisture-birth and apparitional birth as well? The scripture you cite is therefore not properly reasoned at all. The Proponents of Correct Reasoning offer this counter-analogy in reply: the three matters entering the womb are spoken of exactly as is fitting to the case at hand — who ever claimed that these three matters must apply uniformly across all four modes of birth? This statement was never meant to rule out the intermediate state at all. The Vibhajyavādins then explain away the second scripture, saying: there exists an intermediate heaven, and it is by dying there that one attains extinction, and it is with reference to this that the scripture speaks of attaining final nirvāṇa midway. Or else: one who, having forsaken the desire realm yet not yet arrived at the form realm, attains extinction is named one who attains final nirvāṇa midway; or one who, having received the form realm's own common class of being, yet not many years having passed, attains extinction, is named one who attains final nirvāṇa midway; or one who, born in the form realm, his own lifespan not yet exhausted, attains extinction, is named one who attains final nirvāṇa midway — and it is for this reason that this term does not prove the intermediate state at all. The Proponents of Correct Reasoning thereupon put this objection to them: where does the Buddha himself ever speak of this so-called intermediate heaven? Scripture states only that there exist twenty-eight heavens,

namely, the assembly of the Four Great Kings, up through the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception — it does not speak of any intermediate heaven at all; upon what, then, do you rely in speaking of it? And, further, the scripture speaks of one who attains final nirvāṇa upon birth — you ought, by this same reasoning, to admit a heaven named 'upon-birth,' by dying in which one attains extinction. And, further, the scripture speaks of one who attains final nirvāṇa with effort, up through one who streams upward — you ought, by this same reasoning, to admit a heaven named 'with-effort,' up through 'streaming-upward.' Since there exists no separate heaven named 'upon-birth' and the rest, how could you separately establish a heaven named 'midway'? And, further, what you yourself say — that one who, having forsaken the desire realm, yet not yet arrived at the form realm, attains extinction, is named one who attains final nirvāṇa midway — this too fails to accord with reason, for what reason? Because, having already forsaken the desire realm, yet not yet having arrived at the form realm, were there no intermediate state, upon what body could he possibly abide in order to attain final nirvāṇa at all? Your own statement is therefore empty, devoid of any real meaning. And, further, what you yourself say — that one who, having received the form realm's own common class of being, yet not many years having passed, attains extinction, is named one who attains final nirvāṇa midway — this too is unreasonable, for what reason? Because the term 'nirvāṇa upon birth' is properly founded upon precisely this same case. And, further, the formless realm too ought then to be said to possess a 'nirvāṇa midway,' since one reborn there, not long afterward, may exhaust his remaining fetters and attain extinction — but, were this so, the formless realm too ought to be said to possess the seven kinds of superior person's destiny, which would directly contradict scripture, since scripture states that the seven kinds of superior person's destiny belong to the form realm alone. And, further, what you yourself say — that one born in the form realm, his own lifespan not yet exhausted, who attains extinction, is named one who attains final nirvāṇa midway — this too is unreasonable, for what reason? Because every sentient being, for the most part, dies midway through his own lifespan, excepting only those born among humans in Uttarakuru, and the bodhisattva bound to but one further birth who abides in Tuṣita — and so every other being who dies midway through his lifespan and attains extinction ought then, likewise, to be named one who attains final nirvāṇa midway, in which case this term would not belong to the form realm alone at all. Every one of your own explanations therefore fails to accord with reason. The Vibhajyavādins explain away the third scripture, saying: the term 'mind-made being' refers precisely to the formless realm. That is, there was once a brahmin named Vātsīputra who had gone forth from the household, and who, already free of the desire realm's own defilement, had attained the divine eye. He had a fellow student who, already free of the form realm's own defilement, had died before him and been reborn in the formless realm. The brahmin Vātsīputra, by means of his divine eye, searched everywhere throughout the desire and form realms, yet could not see him, and thereupon thought to himself: has he been utterly annihilated? — and, in order to resolve his own doubt, he came to where the Buddha was, and, presenting the matter he doubted, said to the Buddha: Gautama, World-Honored One, I pray you explain this to me — this present body already destroyed, and the next body not yet arisen, upon what dharma does a mind-made being rely in establishing his own grasping? The World-Honored One told him: brahmin, you should know — this present body already destroyed, and the next body not yet arisen, a mind-made being establishes his grasping by relying upon craving. The Buddha's own intent, in telling him this, was to say:

'your fellow student, having died, is reborn in the formless realm, establishing his grasping by relying upon craving — he has not been annihilated at all.' The Proponents of Correct Reasoning thereupon put this objection to them: the scriptural term 'mind-made' bears several distinct senses — it may denote an intermediate-state being, or a transformation-body, or the very first humans at the beginning of an aeon, or a being of the upper two realms. By what reasoning do you know that, here, it denotes the formless-realm gods, and does not denote the intermediate state? The Vibhajyavādins say as follows: how, indeed, do you yourselves know that this term denotes solely the intermediate state, and does not denote the formless realm? The Proponents of Correct Reasoning say as follows: it is by this very scripture itself that we know it denotes the intermediate state — for this scripture states that this present body already destroyed, and the next body not yet arisen, a mind-made being establishes his grasping by relying upon craving; and this present body already destroyed, the next body not yet arisen — how could a mind-made being, in such a state, ever be apart from the intermediate state? For the formless realm can in no way be named 'not yet arisen.' Their own explanation of this scripture is therefore certainly unreasonable.

One asks: how do the Vibhajyavādins explain away the argument by consequence raised by the Proponents of Correct Reasoning, while still holding that the intermediate state certainly does not exist? The answer: whoever proceeds from a death-existence to a rebirth-existence does so only by first attaining the rebirth-existence, and only thereupon relinquishing the death-existence — exactly as an inchworm, climbing along grass and trees, first plants its front foot, and only thereupon moves its hind foot. It is for this reason that there is, in fact, no genuine break between death and rebirth. The Proponents of Correct Reasoning thereupon put this objection to them: were this position held, a most serious fault would follow — that is, one who dies among humans and is reborn in hell ought first to attain every one of the hell-being's own aggregates, and only thereupon relinquish every one of the human's own aggregates. Were this so, his destiny would already be ruined while his very support-body was still ruined, and two minds would arise simultaneously within a single body. As for his destiny being already ruined: this refers to his being, at that very moment, gathered within the destiny of a hell-being and also gathered within the destiny of a human being. As for his support-body being ruined: this refers to his being, at that very moment, a hell-being's body and also a human being's body. As for two minds arising simultaneously within a single body: this refers to the mind of a death-existence and the mind of a rebirth-existence arising simultaneously together — one sentient being's body, yet two minds arising together at once, and, a mind already being twofold, its body ought then to be no longer single either. Their own explanation, therefore, fails to serve as any resolution of the difficulty at all. One asks: as regards these two schools, disputing over this one and the same intermediate state — one holding that it exists, the other maintaining that it does not —

which of these two positions prevails? The answer: the position of the Proponents of Correct Reasoning prevails, since the Vibhajyavādins are unable to explain away either the scriptural authorities cited against them or the argument by consequence raised against them. The Vibhajyavādins' own position is, in truth, the fruit of ignorance, the fruit of utter darkness, the fruit of nescience, the fruit of failing to apply diligent effort — and it is owing to this that they so resolutely deny the intermediate state outright. Yet this intermediate state is a genuinely existent thing, its own nature and characteristics corresponding to those of every other genuinely existent thing. It is thus in order to put a stop to what other schools maintain, and to display what one's own school maintains as the correct principle, that this treatise is composed. Further, this treatise is composed not merely in order to put a stop to other schools and display one's own school's own position, but in order to display the correct principle of every dharma, and thereby awaken and enlighten students.

One asks: is the intermediate state, in every case, included within a destiny, or is it not included within a destiny? Whichever position is granted, what fault follows? Both alternatives carry a fault. For what reason is this so?

If it is included within a destiny, then how is the Prajñaptiśāstra's own statement to be reconciled? As that treatise states: do the five destinies include the four modes of birth, or do the four modes of birth include the five destinies? The answer: the four modes of birth include the five destinies, not the five destinies the four modes of birth — and, as for what is not included, it is precisely the intermediate state that is not included. And how, further, is the Dharmaskandha's own statement to be reconciled? As that treatise states: what is the eye-element? The answer: the pure form derived from the four great elements is the eye — this comprising the eye-faculty, the eye-sense-field, and the eye-element belonging to hell-beings, animals, hungry ghosts, gods, and humans, the eye attained through cultivation, and the intermediate-state being's own eye. And how, further, is the Prakaraṇapāda's own statement to be reconciled? As that treatise states: what is the eye-faculty? It refers to the pure form derived from the four great elements, capable of viewing and of seeing, gathered within the eye-element, the eye-sense-field, and the eye-faculty — this comprising the eye belonging to hell-beings, animals, hungry ghosts, gods, and humans, or, further, every remaining kind, including the intermediate-state being's own eye. If, on the other hand, it is not included within a destiny, then how is the Venerable Dharmadatta's own statement to be reconciled? As he states: an intermediate state proceeding toward a given destiny is thereby included within that very destiny — exactly as a rice-sprout, though not itself a grain of rice, is nevertheless named 'rice,' since it is capable of drawing forth that very grain. There are those who say: every destiny's own intermediate state is thereby included within that very destiny. One asks: granting this, it soundly reconciles the Venerable Dharmadatta's own statement — but how, then, is the Prajñaptiśāstra's own statement to be reconciled? The answer: the Prajñaptiśāstra's own text ought properly to state that the four modes of birth and the five destinies mutually include one another, each according to its own kind — and, where it fails to state this, one should understand that its own text has simply been mis-recited by whoever transmitted it. One asks: and how, further, is the Dharmaskandha's own statement to be reconciled? The answer: the Dharmaskandha's own text ought properly to speak of the eye belonging to hell-beings, animals, hungry ghosts, gods, and humans, and the eye attained through cultivation, without any further need to speak, in addition, of the intermediate-state being's own eye — and, where it nevertheless speaks further of this, a further, particular intent lies behind it. That is, although the intermediate-state being's own eye is indeed included within a destiny, since it is so subtle and fine, the text singles it out for separate mention once again — exactly as, although a bandit-chief is himself included among the bandit-army, since his own crime is so especially grave, having already denounced the bandits as a whole, one denounces him once again, separately; or exactly as, although the instruments of desire are themselves included among the objects of desire, since their own fault is so especially grave, having already condemned the objects of desire as a whole, one condemns them once again, separately — and the intermediate-state being's own eye is exactly the same, being indeed included within a destiny, yet, since it is so subtle and fine, singled out once again for separate mention.

though indeed included within a destiny, being singled out once again, separately, on account of its own subtlety and fineness — and it is by this same reasoning that the Prakaraṇapāda's own statement has already been reconciled as well. There are those who say: the intermediate state is not, in fact, included within a destiny at all. One asks: granting this, it soundly reconciles the Prajñaptiśāstra and the rest — but how, then, is the Venerable Dharmadatta's own statement to be reconciled? The answer: his own statement need not be explained away at all, since it is not drawn from the Tripiṭaka — a verse composed in mere literary form may or may not accord with truth, and Dharmadatta, being himself but a composer of literary verses, speaks with more rhetorical flourish than strict accuracy, and so his statement need not be explained away. Were it necessary to explain it away regardless, one should seek out his own underlying intent — that is, since every intermediate-state being resembles, in its own outward form, the very destiny it is proceeding toward, it is spoken of as included within whichever destiny it is heading toward: a hell-bound intermediate-state being's own form resembles a hell-being's, and so on, up through a human-bound intermediate-state being's own form resembling a human's — while, in reality, the intermediate state is not, in fact, included within a destiny at all. The compilers say: of these two positions, the latter is the sound one. For what reason is this so? Because a destiny denotes precisely what is proceeded toward, that is, the very place finally arrived at,

whereas the intermediate state, proceeding toward that destiny, is not itself the place finally arrived at, being merely like the road traveled along the way — and it is for this reason that it is not included within a destiny. Further, a destiny is undisturbed, while the intermediate state is disturbed,

and it is for this reason that the intermediate state is not included within a destiny. Further, a destiny is, for the most part, a place of settled abiding, while the intermediate state does not abide at all, exactly like the wind or a mirage — and it is for this reason that it is not included within a destiny.

Further, the destinies are an effect, while the intermediate state is a cause, and a cause is never identical to its own effect — and it is for this reason that it is not included within a destiny; exactly as a cause is not its effect, an agent is not the object acted upon, a grasper is not the object grasped, and that which proceeds toward something is not the object proceeded toward, so too should this be understood here. Further, the destinies' own characteristic is coarse, while the intermediate state's own characteristic is subtle, and the subtle is never identical to the coarse — and it is for this reason that it is not included within a destiny; exactly as the subtle is not the coarse, the imperceptible is not the perceptible, and the unclear is not the clear, so too should this be understood here. Further, the intermediate state lies precisely between those two destinies, and it is for this reason that it is not included within a destiny — exactly as a field, a town, and the earth's own space between them are not themselves included within 'field' and the rest. Further, a destiny is summoned by root wholesome or unwholesome karma, while an intermediate state is summoned by preparatory karma — the cause in each case being genuinely different, and it is for this reason that the two are not included one within the other.

One asks: in which realms, stages, and locations does the intermediate state exist? There are those who say: whoever's karma is forceful has no intermediate state at all, while whoever's karma is sluggish does possess an intermediate state — and it is by this same reasoning that hell and every heaven alike possess no intermediate state whatsoever, their own karma being forceful, while humans, animals, and hungry ghosts either possess an intermediate state or do not, their own karma being indeterminate. Others, further, say: an apparitionally-born being possesses no intermediate state at all, its own karma being forceful,

while a being born by the other three modes either possesses an intermediate state or does not, their own karma being indeterminate. Other masters say: whoever is summoned to rebirth by fixed-retribution karma has no intermediate state at all, while whoever is summoned to rebirth by not-fixed-retribution karma does possess an intermediate state. One should instead say as follows: rebirth in the desire and form realms definitely does involve an intermediate state, since it connects the separate places of a death-existence and a rebirth-existence, preventing any break in continuity between them; rebirth in the formless realm definitely does not involve an intermediate state at all. One asks: for what reason does the formless realm definitely possess no intermediate state? The answer: because it is not a fit vessel for one — that is, form is precisely the vessel of an intermediate state,

and, since rebirth in the formless realm possesses no form whatsoever, it definitely possesses no intermediate state at all. Further, an intermediate state arises precisely in order to connect the separate places of a death-existence and a rebirth-existence, preventing any break in continuity between them — but rebirth in the formless realm possesses no separate spatial location whatsoever, there being nothing there requiring such a connection, and it is for this reason that the formless realm definitely possesses no intermediate state. Further, wherever a given realm or stage receives the ripened result of two distinct kinds of karma, an intermediate state exists there. As for these two kinds of karma: first, karma directed toward the intermediate-state existence; second, karma directed toward the rebirth-existence. There is, further, another pair: first, karma directed toward the activating existence; second, karma directed toward the generative existence. There is, further, another pair: first, karma directed toward the activating ripened result; second, karma directed toward the generative ripened result. There is, further, another pair: first, karma yielding a subtle fruit;

second, karma yielding a coarse fruit. The formless realm receives the ripened result of only one such kind of karma, and it is for this reason that it possesses no intermediate state — this one kind of karma referring to karma directed toward the rebirth-existence, up through karma yielding a coarse fruit. Further, wherever a given realm or stage receives the ripened result of both preparatory and root karma, an intermediate state exists there; the formless realm receives the ripened result only of root karma, and it is for this reason that it possesses no intermediate state. Further, wherever a given realm or stage receives the ripened result of two distinct kinds of karma, an intermediate state exists there. As for these two kinds of karma: first, karma possessing form; second, karma possessing no form. There is, further, another pair: first, associated karma; second, dissociated karma. There is, further, another pair: first, karma possessing a support; second, karma possessing no support. There is, further, another pair: first, karma possessing an object; second, karma possessing no object. There is, further, another pair: first, karma possessing an aspect; second, karma possessing no aspect. There is, further, another pair: first, karma possessing alertness; second, karma possessing no alertness. The formless realm receives the ripened result of only one such kind of karma, and it is for this reason that it possesses no intermediate state — this one kind of karma referring to formless karma, up through karma possessing alertness.

Further, wherever a given realm or stage receives the ripened result of both the journeying karma and the destination-directed karma, an intermediate state exists there; the formless realm receives the ripened result only of destination-directed karma, and it is for this reason that it possesses no intermediate state — exactly as with journeying and destination, so too should the connecting act and the connected be understood likewise. Further, wherever a given realm or stage receives the ripened result of the three kinds of karma of body, speech, and mind, an intermediate state exists there; the formless realm receives the ripened result of only one kind, mental karma alone, and it is for this reason that it possesses no intermediate state. Further, wherever a given realm or stage receives the ripened result of the five wholesome aggregates, an intermediate state exists there; the formless realm receives the ripened result only of the four wholesome formless aggregates, and it is for this reason that it possesses no intermediate state. Further, wherever a given realm or stage receives the ripened result of the ten wholesome courses of action, an intermediate state exists there; the formless realm receives the ripened result only of the latter three wholesome courses of action, and it is for this reason that it possesses no intermediate state. Further, wherever a given realm or stage receives the ripened result of black-and-black, white-and-white, or mixed black-and-white karma, an intermediate state exists there; the formless realm receives the ripened result of none of these three kinds of karma, and it is for this reason that it possesses no intermediate state. Further, wherever a given realm or stage possesses both a pure-white cause and a pure-white fruit, an intermediate state exists there; the formless realm, although possessing a pure-white cause, possesses no pure-white fruit, and it is for this reason that it possesses no intermediate state. Further, wherever a given realm or stage possesses both a going and a coming, an intermediate state exists there; the formless realm possesses neither a going nor a coming, and it is for this reason that it possesses no intermediate state. One asks: in the case of one who dies in a given place and is reborn in that very same place — as when it is heard that someone dies and is reborn within his own corpse — since there is, in such a case, no going or coming at all, what need is there for an intermediate state to connect the two existences and prevent a break in their continuity? The answer: once a sentient being has died, he is reborn either in an evil destiny, or among humans, or among the gods, or else attains final nirvāṇa. For one reborn in an evil destiny, consciousness departs, ceasing at the feet; for one reborn among humans, consciousness departs, ceasing at the navel; for one reborn among the gods, consciousness departs, ceasing at the crown of the head; for one who attains final nirvāṇa, consciousness departs, ceasing at the heart. As for any who, having died, are reborn within their own corpse as a maggot or the like: before dying, such a person greatly cherished his own face, and so, once dead, he is reborn upon that very same face — and, since consciousness thus proceeds from the feet to become reborn upon the face, who, apart from an intermediate state, could possibly connect the two? There is, in truth, no genuine case of dying in a given place and being reborn in that very same place without any movement at all — relinquishing one body and receiving another body always involves a genuine transition. And, even granting that such a case did exist, the formless realm still possesses no such case at all, and it is for this reason that the formless realm definitely possesses no intermediate state. One asks: for one who, dying in the formless realm, is reborn in the desire or form realm, since the intermediate state manifests directly at the very place of his coming rebirth, with no genuine going or coming involved at all, what use is there for an intermediate state in such a case?

The answer: he has, at some prior time, already created the very karma that summons an intermediate state — and so, even without any genuine going or coming, he must still, of necessity, give rise to an intermediate state, being drawn forth by the force of that karma.

One asks: can the intermediate state be diverted, or can it not be diverted? The Dārṣṭāntikas say: the intermediate state can indeed be diverted, since every kind of karma whatsoever can be diverted.

They hold that even the karma of the five acts of immediate retribution, once committed, can still be diverted, how much more so the karma of an intermediate state. Were the karma of an act of immediate retribution incapable of being diverted, then no one could ever be capable of surpassing the very peak of existence, since the peak of existence's own wholesome karma is the most excellent of all — yet, since it is admitted that there does exist one capable of surpassing the peak of existence, the karma of an act of immediate retribution must therefore likewise be capable of being diverted. The Abhidharma masters say: the intermediate state can be diverted in none of these respects — neither in realm, nor in destiny, nor in place — since the karma that summons an intermediate state is exceedingly forceful. One asks: if the intermediate state cannot be diverted in realm, how, then, is the case of the unlearned monk to be reconciled? There was once a son of good family who, having but recently gone forth from the household within the Buddha's own teaching, had not yet studied to become learned, and who thereupon dwelt in a forest retreat, firmly upholding the moral precepts, his mind delighting in stillness. Riding upon the power of some prior cause, he cultivated worldly concentration — and, whenever he gave rise to the worldly first dhyāna, he supposed that he had thereby attained the fruit of stream-entry, and so on, up through: whenever he gave rise to the worldly fourth dhyāna, he supposed that he had thereby attained the fruit of arhatship. Throughout the whole of that one life, he gave rise to overweening pride, supposing he had attained what he had not attained, supposing he had obtained what he had not obtained, supposing he understood what he did not understand, supposing he had realized what he had not realized, and seeking no further progress at all. At the moment of his own death, the fourth dhyāna's own intermediate-state sign became presently manifest before him, and he thereupon thought to himself: every fetter and bond of mine has already been permanently severed — I ought now to attain final nirvāṇa, there being no further place of rebirth left for me at all.

'For what reason, then, does this sign of an intermediate state still manifest itself before me?' — and, upon this thought, he thereupon gave rise to a wrong view, denying liberation outright, thinking: were liberation to exist at all, I ought already to have attained it. And, by the very force of this wrong view denying nirvāṇa, the fourth dhyāna's own intermediate-state sign thereupon vanished, and the intermediate-state sign of unrelenting hell manifested itself before him instead — and, upon his death, he was thereafter reborn in the very hell of unrelenting torment. Is this not, then, a case of the intermediate state being diverted in realm — how, then, could it be said that it cannot be diverted in realm at all? The answer: this transition took place while he still abode in his death-existence, not at the stage of the intermediate state itself, and so this raises no contradiction at all. That is, as he was on the verge of dying, by the very force of his own karma, the fourth dhyāna's own sign of coming rebirth became presently manifest before him,

and, having beheld this, he thereupon thought to himself: every fetter and bond of mine has already been permanently severed — I ought now to attain final nirvāṇa, there being no further place of rebirth left for me at all — for what reason, then, does this sign of coming rebirth still manifest itself before me? And, upon this thought, he thereupon gave rise to a wrong view, denying liberation outright, thinking: were liberation to exist at all, I ought already to have attained it. And, by the very force of this wrong view denying nirvāṇa, the fourth dhyāna's own sign of coming rebirth thereupon vanished, and the sign of coming rebirth in unrelenting hell manifested itself instead — and, upon his death, he was thereafter reborn in the very hell of unrelenting torment. This transition took place while he still abode in his death-existence, not at the stage of the intermediate state itself, and so this raises no contradiction with reason at all. One asks: if the intermediate state cannot be diverted in destiny, how, then, is the case of the virtuous man and the wicked man to be reconciled? There were once, long ago, in the kingdom of Śrāvastī, two men — one who ever cultivated virtue, the other who constantly committed evil. The virtuous man, throughout the whole of his one life, ever cultivated virtuous conduct, never once committing an evil deed; the wicked man, throughout the whole of his one life, constantly committed evil conduct, never once cultivating virtue. At the very moment of his own death, the virtuous man, by the force of an evil karma yet to ripen in some subsequent later life, suddenly had the intermediate-state sign of hell manifest itself before him, and he thereupon thought to himself: throughout my whole life, I have ever cultivated virtuous conduct, never once committing an evil deed — I ought properly to be reborn among the gods. For what reason, then, does this sign of an intermediate state manifest itself before me? — and he thereupon gave rise to this further thought: I must certainly possess some evil karma destined to ripen in a subsequent later life, and it is this that has now ripened, and it is for this reason that this intermediate-state sign of hell manifests itself before me. He thereupon called to mind, of his own accord, all the virtuous deeds he had cultivated throughout his one life, and gave rise to profound joy — and, by the very presence of this superior, wholesome reflection, the intermediate-state sign of hell thereupon vanished of itself, and the intermediate-state sign of the heavenly destiny suddenly manifested itself instead, and, upon his death, he was thereafter reborn among the gods. The wicked man, at the very moment of his own death, by the force of a wholesome karma yet to ripen in some subsequent later life, suddenly had the intermediate-state sign of the heavenly destiny manifest itself before him.

He thereupon thought to himself: throughout my whole life, I have constantly committed evil conduct, never once cultivating virtue — I ought properly to be reborn in hell. For what reason, then, does this sign of an intermediate state manifest itself before me? — and he thereupon gave rise to a wrong view, denying wholesome and unwholesome deeds and their own ripened result outright, thinking: were there truly a wholesome or unwholesome ripened result, this ought not to be happening to me at all.

And, by the very force of this wrong view denying cause and effect, the intermediate-state sign of the heavenly destiny thereupon vanished at once, and the intermediate-state sign of hell suddenly manifested itself instead, and, upon his death, he was thereafter reborn in hell. Is this not, then, a case of the intermediate state being diverted in destiny — how, then, could it be said that the intermediate state cannot be diverted at all? The answer: this transition took place while he still abode in his death-existence, not at the stage of the intermediate state itself, and so this raises no contradiction at all. That is, at the very moment of their own death, sentient beings have signs of coming rebirth, whether desirable or undesirable, manifest themselves before them, exactly as the scripture states: at the very moment of his own death, one who has cultivated virtue beholds splendid halls and towers, gardens, groves, ponds and pools, music and fragrant flowers, jeweled ornaments and carriages arrayed everywhere, seemingly coming forth to welcome him; while one who has committed evil, at the very moment of his own death, beholds perilous ravines and chasms, raging fire and billowing smoke, mountains of blades and forests of swords, thickets bristling with poisoned thorns, foxes and jackals, wildcats and civets, graves and burial mounds, every kind of filthy and repugnant thing, seemingly coming forth to welcome him as well. At the very moment of his own death, the man who has cultivated virtue, by the force of an evil karma yet to ripen in some subsequent later life, has the sign of coming rebirth in hell manifest itself before him,

and, having beheld this, he thereupon thinks to himself: throughout my whole life, I have ever cultivated virtuous conduct, never once committing an evil deed — I ought properly to be reborn among the gods. For what reason, then, does this sign of coming rebirth manifest itself before me? — and he thereupon gives rise to this further thought: I must certainly possess some evil karma destined to ripen in a subsequent later life, and it is this that has now ripened, and it is for this reason that this sign of coming rebirth in hell manifests itself before me. He thereupon calls to mind, of his own accord, all the virtuous deeds he has cultivated throughout his one life, and gives rise to profound joy — and, by the very presence of this superior, wholesome reflection, the sign of coming rebirth in hell thereupon vanishes of itself, and the sign of coming rebirth in the heavenly destiny suddenly manifests itself instead, and, upon his death, he is thereafter reborn among the gods.

The man who has committed evil, at the very moment of his own death, by the force of a wholesome karma yet to ripen in some subsequent later life, suddenly has the sign of coming rebirth in the heavenly destiny manifest itself before him, and, having beheld this, he thereupon thinks to himself: throughout my whole life, I have constantly committed evil conduct, never once cultivating virtue — I ought properly to be reborn in hell. For what reason, then, does this sign of coming rebirth manifest itself before me? — and he thereupon gives rise to a wrong view, denying wholesome and unwholesome deeds and their own ripened result outright, thinking: were there truly a wholesome or unwholesome ripened result, this ought not to be happening to me at all. And, by the very force of this wrong view denying cause and effect, the sign of coming rebirth in the heavenly destiny thereupon vanishes at once, and the sign of coming rebirth in hell suddenly manifests itself instead, and, upon his death, he is thereafter reborn in hell. This transition took place while he still abode in his death-existence, not at the stage of the intermediate state itself, and so this raises no contradiction with reason at all. One asks: if the intermediate state cannot be diverted in place, how, then, is the case of King Bimbisāra to be reconciled? There was once, long ago, in the kingdom of Magadha, a great king named Bimbisāra, who ever delighted in accumulating the most excellent, wholesome karma leading to Tuṣita Heaven. Upon his death, riding upon the very body of that intermediate state, he journeyed toward that heavenly realm, and, arriving beside the palace of Vaiśravaṇa, the Multi-Hearing Heavenly King, at the flank of Mount Sumeru, he happened upon a feast then being prepared for that king — its color fresh and radiant, its fragrance most exquisite. Beholding this, craving arose within him, and he thought to himself: I wish only to be reborn here first, that I might partake of this very feast, and only thereafter proceed on to Tuṣita Heaven.

The very moment this thought arose, the Tuṣita heaven's own intermediate-state sign at once vanished, and the intermediate-state sign of a son of Vaiśravaṇa manifested itself instead, and, by this means, he was thereupon reborn in Vaiśravaṇa's own heavenly realm. Is this not, then, a case of the intermediate state being diverted in place — how, then, could it be said that the intermediate state cannot be diverted at all? The answer: this transition took place while he still abode in his death-existence, not at the stage of the intermediate state itself, and so this raises no contradiction at all. That is, King Bimbisāra had been imprisoned by his own so-called son, King Ajātaśatru, who had cut off all his food and drink and flayed the very skin from the soles of his feet, so that, pressed by hunger and thirst, he suffered every torment. At that time, the Buddha, then dwelling upon Vulture Peak, was moved to compassion for him, and, from his own body, sent forth a light of loving-kindness that entered through the prison window and touched the king's own body, granting him, for a brief while, ease of body and mind. The king thereupon thought to himself: the World-Honored One's own great compassion — could he truly fail to take pity on me and rescue me from this suffering affliction? The World-Honored One, knowing the very thought in the king's mind, thereupon told the Venerable Mahāmaudgalyāyana:

'Go quickly to where King Bimbisāra is, and speak these very words of mine: Great king, you should know — everything that I ought to do on your behalf, I have already accomplished, having already permanently uprooted the suffering of every evil destiny for you; a brief span of unwholesome karmic suffering, while still among humans, even the Buddha himself cannot escape — how much less could a king, a lesser noble one, hope to escape it? You should therefore set your own mind at ease, and not be too greatly troubled or grieved.' At that time, the Venerable Mahāmaudgalyāyana, having received the Buddha's own words, thereupon entered a supreme concentration, gave rise to his own supernormal power of movement, vanished from Vulture Peak, and emerged within the king's own palace — exactly as one who dives in and out of a spring or a pool, appearing and disappearing entirely at will — and suddenly sprang into view before King Bimbisāra, telling the king: great king, you should know — the Thus-Come One's own great compassion speaks with but a single voice, seeing deeply into cause and effect, and being well capable of foretelling what is to come — it is for this reason that he has sent me here to comfort and console you, bidding me to tell you: great king, you should know — everything that I ought to do on your behalf, I have already accomplished, having already permanently uprooted the suffering of every evil destiny for you; a brief span of unwholesome karmic suffering, while still among humans, even the Buddha himself cannot escape — how much less could a king, a lesser noble one, hope to escape it? You should therefore set your own mind at ease, and not be too greatly troubled or grieved. At that time, the Venerable Mahāmaudgalyāyana thereupon further expounded various dharma teachings for the king's own sake — but the king, being so pressed and afflicted by hunger and thirst, was unable to comprehend the meaning of what was being taught, and said to Maudgalyāyana: among the foods of the various heavens, which heavenly realm's own solid food is the most exquisite of all? I pray you tell me of it, for I long to hear. The Venerable Mahāmaudgalyāyana thereupon praised and described, one by one, the exquisite foods found among the six heavens of desire — and, upon first hearing described the exquisite food found within Vaiśravaṇa's own palace, in the realm of the Four Great Kings, the king at once gave up his life, and was reborn within that very heavenly palace, becoming the crown prince of King Vaiśravaṇa himself, who bestowed upon him the name Most Victorious Honored One.

Not long after, he came down from that very heaven to where the Buddha was, and, having arrived, bowed his head to the World-Honored One's own two feet, overjoyed and exultant, repeating his own new name again and again: I am the Most Victorious Honored One — may the Buddha graciously be mindful of me. At the very moment of his own death, while he still abode in his death-existence, the sign of coming rebirth in Tuṣita Heaven first appeared before him; and, at the very moment he came to crave the exquisite food within Vaiśravaṇa's own hall, the sign of coming rebirth in Tuṣita Heaven thereupon vanished, and the sign of coming rebirth as Vaiśravaṇa's own son manifested itself instead. Upon his death, he received that very intermediate state, and, riding upon that intermediate state, was reborn in that very heavenly realm. This transition took place while he still abode in his death-existence, not at the stage of the intermediate state itself, and so this raises no contradiction at all.