Eighteen Elements, Broadly Taught
Fascicle 71 opens the Ten Gates Nyāsa — the fourth and largest nyāsa of the Fetters Aggregate — with the eighteen elements: Śāriputra's fearless request that the Buddha teach both broadly and briefly, nine independent reasons why the Buddha taught elements, sense-fields, or aggregates depending on the listener, and a meticulous element-by-element definition turning throughout on the technical distinction between a same-class instance and its own counterpart-class. This page carries Ru-Yi's complete translation.
Translation Method
The Chinese source is Xuánzàng's seventh-century translation of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), preserved in the Taishō canon (T1545, vol. 27) via the CBETA digital edition — public domain text, translated directly from the Chinese. The English wording throughout is Ru-Yi's own, and the reading notes are original, grounded in standard Sarvāstivāda scholarship rather than a specific named commentator's lecture transcript.
Fascicle 71 opens the Ten Gates Nyāsa (結蘊第二中十門納息第四之一), the fourth and final nyāsa of the Fetters Aggregate, which will work systematically through forty-two chapters — the twenty-two faculties, the eighteen elements, and on through the ninety-eight latent tendencies. This fascicle covers only the very first of these, the eighteen elements, in painstaking technical detail. Terms established in earlier fascicles recur here and are not re-explained at each occurrence.
Classical text is set in the left-hand column below, our English in the right.
1. The Three Formats of Teaching: Elements, Processes, and Aggregates — Broad or Brief?
Opening the Ten Gates Nyāsa — the fourth and largest nyāsa of the Fetters Aggregate, spanning forty-two chapters from the twenty-two faculties to the ninety-eight latent tendencies — the treatise begins with the eighteen elements, noting that this teaching is itself relative: a brief teaching set against the Great Discourses, yet a broad teaching set against the twelve sense-fields, which is in turn broad against the five aggregates, which is broad against the single line that every sensation is suffering. Several rival accounts of what actually counts as broad or brief are canvassed before the treatise settles on its own: the Buddha first taught broadly as eighteen elements, then briefly as twelve sense-fields, then most briefly of all, excluding the unconditioned, as five aggregates.
結蘊第二中十門納息第四之一二十二根。乃至九十八隨眠。如是四十二章及解章義既領會已。應廣分別。二十二根者。謂眼根耳根鼻根舌根身根女根男根命根意根樂根苦根喜根憂根捨根信根精進根念根定根慧根未知當知根已知根具知根。此廣分別。如後根蘊根納息中十八界者。謂眼界色界眼識界耳界聲界耳識界鼻界香界鼻識界舌界味界舌識界身界觸界身識界意界法界意識界。此界契經亦名略說亦名廣說。名略說者。對大記經如大譬喻大涅槃等。名廣說者。對處契經彼處契經。亦名略說亦名廣說。名略說者對界契經名廣說者。對蘊契經。彼蘊契經亦名略說亦名廣說。名略說者對處契經。名廣說者。對諸所有受皆是苦等經。彼諸所有受皆是苦等經。但名略說不名廣說。有作是說。此界契經等亦名略說亦名廣說。即依自說不對餘經。謂界經中廣說色心。略說心所故。彼處契經亦名略說亦名廣說。即依自說不對餘經。謂處經中廣說色略說心心所故。彼蘊契經亦名略說亦名廣說。
Continuing the Fetters Aggregate, opening the Ten Gates Nyāsa, part one. The twenty-two faculties, and so on, up through, the ninety-eight latent tendencies — these forty-two chapters, together with their own explanatory sense, having already been comprehended, ought now to be broadly analyzed. As for the twenty-two faculties: the eye-faculty, the ear-faculty, the nose-faculty, the tongue-faculty, the body-faculty, the female faculty, the male faculty, the life-faculty, the mind-faculty, the pleasure-faculty, the pain-faculty, the joy-faculty, the distress-faculty, the equanimity-faculty, the faith-faculty, the diligence-faculty, the mindfulness-faculty, the concentration-faculty, the wisdom-faculty, the faculty of 'I shall come to know,' the faculty of 'I already know,' and the faculty of one who fully knows — these shall be broadly analyzed later, within the Faculties Aggregate's own Faculties Nyāsa. As for the eighteen elements: the eye-element, the color-element, the eye-consciousness-element; the ear-element, the sound-element, the ear-consciousness-element; the nose-element, the smell-element, the nose-consciousness-element; the tongue-element, the taste-element, the tongue-consciousness-element; the body-element, the touch-element, the body-consciousness-element; the mind-element, the dharma-element, the mind-consciousness-element. This scripture on the elements is named both a brief teaching and a broad teaching: it is named a brief teaching when set against the great discourses, such as the Great Analogy Sutra, the Great Nirvāṇa Sutra, and the like; it is named a broad teaching when set against the scripture on the sense-fields. That scripture on the sense-fields is likewise named both a brief teaching and a broad teaching: it is named a brief teaching when set against the scripture on the elements; it is named a broad teaching when set against the scripture on the aggregates. That scripture on the aggregates is likewise named both a brief teaching and a broad teaching: it is named a brief teaching when set against the scripture on the sense-fields; it is named a broad teaching when set against the scripture stating that every sensation whatsoever is suffering, and the like. That scripture stating that every sensation whatsoever is suffering, and the like, is named only a brief teaching, never a broad one. There are those who say: this scripture on the elements and the rest are likewise each named both a brief teaching and a broad teaching, judged solely with reference to its own statement, not set against any other scripture — that is, the scripture on the elements broadly expounds matter and mind, while briefly expounding the mental factors, and it is for this reason that this holds. That scripture on the sense-fields is likewise named both a brief teaching and a broad teaching, judged solely with reference to its own statement, not set against any other scripture — that is, the scripture on the sense-fields broadly expounds matter, while briefly expounding mind and the mental factors. That scripture on the aggregates is likewise named both a brief teaching and a broad teaching —
即依自說不對餘經。謂蘊經中廣說心所。略說色心故。彼諸所有受皆是苦契經但名略說不名廣說。復有說者。此界契經名為廣說亦攝一切法。彼大譬喻大涅槃等經雖名廣說而不攝一切法。彼處契經雖攝一切法而非廣說。是處中說故。彼蘊契經不名廣說。是略說故。
judged solely with reference to its own statement, not set against any other scripture — that is, the scripture on the aggregates broadly expounds the mental factors, while briefly expounding matter and mind. That scripture stating that every sensation whatsoever is suffering is named only a brief teaching, never a broad one. Other masters say: this scripture on the elements is named a broad teaching, and likewise gathers within it every dharma whatsoever; those scriptures such as the Great Analogy Sutra and the Great Nirvāṇa Sutra, though named broad teachings, do not gather within them every dharma whatsoever. That scripture on the sense-fields, though it does gather within it every dharma whatsoever, is not itself a broad teaching, since it speaks only in middling terms. That scripture on the aggregates is not named a broad teaching, being itself a brief teaching,
亦不攝一切法。但攝有為非無為故。彼諸所有受皆是苦等經不名廣說。是極略說故。於中亦有攝一切法者如說諸法空無我等。有餘師說。更無略說契經。如世尊說施有二種。一者法施。二者財施經等。更無廣說契經如大譬喻大涅槃經等。如是諸說雖各有義。然佛世尊於所知境。先作廣說後作略說。謂於所知境先廣說十八界。後即於此略說為十二處。復即於此除無為法略說為五蘊。是名世尊廣略說法。即依如是廣略說法。佛告尊者舍利子言。我於法寶能廣略說。而能解者甚為難得。復依如是廣略說法。尊者舍利子白佛言。
and it likewise does not gather within it every dharma whatsoever, gathering only the conditioned, not the unconditioned. That scripture stating that every sensation whatsoever is suffering, and the like, is not named a broad teaching, being itself the very briefest teaching of all — though even within it there is what gathers every dharma whatsoever, as when it states that every dharma is empty and without self, and the like. Other masters say: there exists, in truth, no further brief-teaching scripture beyond this, as when the World-Honored One states that giving is of two kinds — first, the giving of the dharma; second, the giving of wealth — and scriptures of this kind; and there exists no further broad-teaching scripture beyond this, as with the Great Analogy Sutra, the Great Nirvāṇa Sutra, and scriptures of this kind. Although each of these various statements carries its own genuine sense, the Buddha, the World-Honored One, with respect to what is to be known, first gave a broad teaching and only afterward gave a brief one — that is, with respect to what is to be known, he first broadly taught the eighteen elements, and only afterward, on this very same basis, briefly taught them as the twelve sense-fields, and, further, on this very same basis, excluding the unconditioned dharmas, briefly taught them as the five aggregates. This is named the World-Honored One's own broad and brief teaching of the dharma. It is precisely on the basis of this broad and brief teaching of the dharma that the Buddha told the Venerable Śāriputra: with respect to the jewel of the dharma, I am capable of teaching it both broadly and briefly, yet one capable of understanding it is exceedingly difficult to find. And it is, further, on the basis of this broad and brief teaching of the dharma that the Venerable Śāriputra said to the Buddha:
That broad and brief are relative terms rather than fixed properties of a teaching is the section's real insight: the very same eighteen-elements sutra is a brief teaching next to the Great Nirvāṇa Sutra and a broad one next to the twelve sense-fields, which means asking whether a teaching is broad or brief is really asking broad or brief compared to what — a question this treatise refuses to let go unanswered.
2. Śāriputra's Fearless Request, and the Simile of the Sea-Dragon-King's Clouds
When the Buddha declares that he can teach the dharma both broadly and briefly, yet finds few capable of understanding it, every disciple but Śāriputra trembles in fear — exactly as every plant and forest panics at the sea-dragon-king's own thunderclouds, dreading an endless deluge, while the great earth alone calmly invites the rain, confident in its own capacity to receive however much falls. Śāriputra alone, his wisdom cultivated across sixty aeons until it rivals the earth's own vastness, asks the Buddha to teach without fear, reasoning that the Buddha's own request already implies his own suitability as a vessel for it.
世尊唯願如來廣略說法此定當有解法寶者。於如是事應作譬喻。如海龍王久處大海。增長威勢上昇虛空。興布大雲遍覆空界。掣電晃曜震大雷音。普告世間我當注雨。一切藥草卉木叢林。聞如是聲皆大驚慴咸作是念。此大龍王處大海中久增威勢。今若注雨未有息期。我等皆當定為漂沒。爾時大地聞如是聲心不驚疑面無異色。虛懷仰請海龍王言。唯願恣情降注大雨。過百千歲我悉能受。世尊亦爾。曾於過去釋迦牟尼帝幢寶髻然燈勝觀。乃至最後迦葉波佛所。
World-Honored One, I pray only that the Thus-Come One teach the dharma both broadly and briefly — there will certainly then be one capable of understanding this very jewel of the dharma. With respect to a matter such as this, an analogy ought to be given: exactly as the sea-dragon-king, having long dwelt within the great ocean, gathers his own might and rises up into the empty sky, raising up great clouds that cover the whole of that empty realm, flashing lightning and thundering with a mighty roar, proclaiming to the whole world at large: I am about to send down rain! — every medicinal herb, every grass and tree, every thicket and forest, upon hearing such a sound, is struck with great terror, each thinking to itself: this great dragon-king, having long dwelt within the great ocean, gathering his own might, if he should now send down rain, there will be no end to it at all, and every one of us will surely be swept away and drowned. At that very time, the great earth alone, hearing this same sound, its own mind entirely untroubled and undoubting, its own face betraying no change at all, with an open, receptive heart, implores the sea-dragon-king, saying: I pray only that you release your own heart's desire and send down a mighty rain — though it should last a hundred thousand years, I myself am fully capable of receiving it all. The World-Honored One is exactly the same: in past times, before Śākyamuni Buddha, Dhvajottama, Ratnaśikhin, Dīpaṃkara, Praṇidhāna, and so on, at full length, up through the very last of them, Kāśyapa Buddha,
增長福德智慧資糧。昇有餘依涅槃空界。興大悲雲遍覆世間。發勝慧電普照一切。虛空非我無畏雷音。遍告所化舍利子等。我於法寶能廣略說。而能解者甚為難得。時諸所化除舍利子。聞佛此言皆生怯懼。咸作是念。佛得如是。昔所未得名句文身。為我等說恐不能解。唯舍利子六十劫中。增長智見猛利圓滿猶如大地。聞佛此言心不驚疑。面無異色能無所畏。而請佛言。唯願如來廣略說法。此定當有解法寶者。問亦應有法非諸聲聞獨覺境界。彼舍利子何緣無畏作如是請。答彼唯請佛聲聞所知非佛所知。聲聞境界非佛境界。聲聞所行非佛所行。聲聞根所及非佛根所及故不違理。復次知佛開許故作是請。謂舍利子作如是念。世尊慈悲諸所說法。必應稱量定有饒益。要於田器而雨法雨。所雨法雨終不唐捐。諸所發言必依法器。若非法器終不發言。世尊既知我有爾所堪受法器。作如是言。
he accumulated the very provisions of merit and wisdom, and, ascending into the very emptiness of nirvāṇa-with-residue, he raises up the great cloud of compassion, covering the whole world entirely, sending forth the lightning-flash of surpassing wisdom, illuminating all things everywhere, and, in a voice fearless as the very emptiness of no-self, proclaims to every one of his own disciples, Śāriputra and the rest at large: with respect to the jewel of the dharma, I am capable of teaching it both broadly and briefly, yet one capable of understanding it is exceedingly difficult to find. At that time, every one of his own disciples, excepting only Śāriputra, upon hearing the Buddha speak these words, gave rise to fear and trepidation, each thinking to himself: the Buddha has attained a body of names, phrases, and syllables the like of which has never before existed — were he to teach it for our own sake, I fear we could never understand it at all. Only Śāriputra, across sixty aeons having cultivated wisdom and vision, sharp, forceful, and utterly complete, exactly like the great earth itself, upon hearing the Buddha speak these words, his own mind entirely untroubled and undoubting, his own face betraying no change at all, capable of being entirely without fear, thereupon implored the Buddha, saying: I pray only that the Thus-Come One teach the dharma both broadly and briefly — there will certainly then be one capable of understanding this very jewel of the dharma. One asks: there ought also to exist a dharma that lies beyond the domain of every disciple or solitary-realizer whatsoever — for what reason, then, did Śāriputra, without any fear at all, make such a request as this? The answer: he requested only what a disciple is capable of knowing, not what only the Buddha himself is capable of knowing — a disciple's own domain is not the Buddha's own domain, a disciple's own conduct is not the Buddha's own conduct, and what a disciple's own faculty can reach is not what the Buddha's own faculty can reach, and it is for this reason that this raises no contradiction with reason at all. Further, he made this request precisely because he already knew that the Buddha had granted his permission — that is, Śāriputra thought to himself as follows: the World-Honored One's own compassion, in whatever dharma he teaches, must certainly be carefully weighed, and must certainly bring genuine benefit; he sends down the very rain of the dharma only upon a fitting vessel, and the rain of the dharma he sends down is never squandered in vain; whatever words he utters must rely upon a fitting vessel for the dharma — were it not a fitting vessel, he would never utter such words at all. Since the World-Honored One already knows that I myself am just such a vessel, capable of receiving this much, he has spoken these very words —
故知世尊開許我請。是故尊者請佛無畏。
and it is by this that I know the World-Honored One has already granted his own permission for my request. It is for this reason that the Venerable one made his request of the Buddha entirely without fear.
Śāriputra's own reasoning for his fearlessness is a small masterpiece of inference: he does not claim confidence in his own wisdom directly, but instead infers his own readiness backward from the Buddha's own known character — since the Buddha never wastes the rain of the dharma on unfit ground, the very fact that the Buddha has offered to teach is itself proof that Śāriputra is a fit vessel to receive it.
3. Why the Buddha Taught in Three Different Formats: Reasons Keyed to the Listener
A cascade of independent explanations accounts for why the Buddha sometimes taught eighteen elements, sometimes twelve sense-fields, sometimes five aggregates: matching whichever the listener was ignorant of; matching a beginner, a habituated practitioner, or one beyond conceptual effort; matching dull, middling, or sharp faculties; matching wisdom that opens, expounds, or draws onward; matching a preference for the broad, middling, or brief; matching pride in lineage, wealth, or life; matching ignorance of matter-and-mind, matter alone, or mental factors alone; and matching those who conceive of a self, those ignorant of what mind depends on and takes as object, or those prone to conceit.
問佛為何等所化有情。說蘊處界廣略三法。答佛隨所化所愚而說。
One asks: for the sake of what kind of sentient being to be converted does the Buddha teach the aggregates, the sense-fields, and the elements, in these three broad and brief forms? The answer: the Buddha teaches according to whatever each being to be converted is ignorant of.
謂愚於界者為說十八界。若愚於處者為說十二處。若愚於蘊者為說五蘊。復次世尊所化略有三種。一初習業。二已串修。三超作意初習業者為說十八界。已串修者為說十二處。超作意者為說五蘊。復次世尊所化有三種根。謂鈍中利為鈍根者說十八界。為中根者說十二處。為利根者說五蘊。復次世尊所化有三種智。一者開智。二者說智。三者引智。為開智者說五蘊。為說智者說十二處。為引智者說十八界。復次世尊所化有三種樂。謂廣中略。為樂廣者說十八界。為樂中者說十二處。為樂略者說五蘊。復次世尊所化有三憍逸。一恃姓憍逸。二恃財憍逸。三恃命憍逸。恃姓憍逸者為說十八界。謂族姓義是界義。種類貴賤無差別故。恃財憍逸者為說十二處。謂生門義是處義。隨有所生尋散盡故。恃命憍逸者為說五蘊。
That is, for one ignorant of the elements, he teaches the eighteen elements; for one ignorant of the sense-fields, he teaches the twelve sense-fields; for one ignorant of the aggregates, he teaches the five aggregates. Further, those the World-Honored One converts are, in brief, of three kinds: first, those just beginning their own practice; second, those already long habituated to it; third, those who have transcended mere conceptual application. For those just beginning their own practice, he teaches the eighteen elements; for those already long habituated to it, he teaches the twelve sense-fields; for those who have transcended mere conceptual application, he teaches the five aggregates. Further, those the World-Honored One converts possess three kinds of faculty, namely, dull, middling, and sharp — for those of dull faculty, he teaches the eighteen elements; for those of middling faculty, he teaches the twelve sense-fields; for those of sharp faculty, he teaches the five aggregates. Further, those the World-Honored One converts possess three kinds of wisdom: first, the wisdom that opens the way; second, the wisdom that expounds; third, the wisdom that draws one onward. For those possessing the wisdom that opens the way, he teaches the five aggregates; for those possessing the wisdom that expounds, he teaches the twelve sense-fields; for those possessing the wisdom that draws one onward, he teaches the eighteen elements. Further, those the World-Honored One converts possess three kinds of preference, namely, for the broad, the middling, and the brief — for those who prefer the broad, he teaches the eighteen elements; for those who prefer the middling, he teaches the twelve sense-fields; for those who prefer the brief, he teaches the five aggregates. Further, those the World-Honored One converts possess three kinds of prideful indolence: first, pride in one's own lineage; second, pride in one's own wealth; third, pride in one's own life. For those prideful in their own lineage, he teaches the eighteen elements, since the very meaning of clan and lineage is precisely the meaning of an element, there being no real distinction whatsoever between noble and base among the various kinds. For those prideful in their own wealth, he teaches the twelve sense-fields, since the very meaning of a gate of arising is precisely the meaning of a sense-field, whatever arises there being certain to soon scatter and be exhausted. For those prideful in their own life, he teaches the five aggregates,
謂積聚義是蘊義。有為積聚尋散滅故。復次世尊所化有三種愚。一者愚色心。二者愚於色。三者愚心所。愚色心者為說十八界。於此界中廣說色心略說心所故。愚於色者為說十二處。於此處中廣說色略說心心所故。愚心所者為說五蘊。於此蘊中廣說心所略說色心故。復次為計我者說十八界。謂一身中有多界別無一我故為愚所依及所緣者說十二處。謂分別識有六所依六所緣故。為我慢者說五蘊。謂身唯有生滅五蘊不應恃怙起我慢故。佛為此等所化有情說蘊處界廣略三法。
since the very meaning of accumulation is precisely the meaning of an aggregate, every conditioned accumulation being certain to soon scatter and cease. Further, those the World-Honored One converts possess three kinds of ignorance: first, ignorance regarding matter and mind together; second, ignorance regarding matter alone; third, ignorance regarding the mental factors. For one ignorant regarding matter and mind together, he teaches the eighteen elements, since, within this teaching on the elements, matter and mind are expounded broadly, while the mental factors are expounded briefly. For one ignorant regarding matter alone, he teaches the twelve sense-fields, since, within this teaching on the sense-fields, matter is expounded broadly, while mind and the mental factors are expounded briefly. For one ignorant regarding the mental factors, he teaches the five aggregates, since, within this teaching on the aggregates, the mental factors are expounded broadly, while matter and mind are expounded briefly. Further, for one who conceives of a self, he teaches the eighteen elements, since, within one single body, there exist many distinct elements, there being no single self at all; for one ignorant regarding what a thing depends upon and what it takes as its object, he teaches the twelve sense-fields, since discriminating consciousness possesses six distinct supports and six distinct objects; for one prideful with self-conceit, he teaches the five aggregates, since the body possesses nothing but the five aggregates' own arising and ceasing, affording no occasion at all for relying upon it to give rise to self-conceit. It is for the sake of sentient beings to be converted such as these that the Buddha teaches the aggregates, the sense-fields, and the elements, in these three broad and brief forms.
That a single doctrinal choice — eighteen elements versus twelve sense-fields versus five aggregates — can be justified by reference to nine entirely independent axes of listener-difference is this treatise's characteristic move: rather than settling on the one true reason the Buddha taught as he did, it treats the very多plicity of possible explanations as evidence of how precisely each teaching was fitted to its audience.
4. Seventeen or Twelve? The Eighteen Elements' Own Substance-Count
Though the eighteen elements bear eighteen distinct names, their own real substance numbers either seventeen or twelve, depending on how one counts: speak of the six consciousnesses and the mind-element vanishes into them, leaving seventeen substances; speak of the mind-element and the six consciousnesses vanish into it, leaving twelve. The eighteen are then shown to rest on three underlying matters — basis, dependent, and object — the six inner elements serving as basis, the six consciousness-elements as dependent, and the six outer elements as object.
問此十八界名有十八。實體有幾。答此界實體或有十七或有十二。
One asks: this name, the eighteen elements, numbers eighteen — but how many are there in real substance? The answer: this element's own real substance is, in some cases, seventeen, in others, twelve.
若說六識便失意界。離六識身無別意界。故十八界名有十八實體十七。若說意界便失六識。離此意界無別六識。故十八界名有十八實體十二。如名與體。名施設體施設。名異相體異相。名異性體異性。名差別體差別。名建立體建立。名覺體覺。應知亦爾。問若十八界名有十八。體或十七或十二者云何建立十八界耶。答以三事故建立十八。一以所依。二以能依。三以境界。以所依故立六內界。
If the six consciousnesses are spoken of, the mind-element is thereby lost, since, apart from the six consciousness-bodies, there exists no separate mind-element at all — and it is for this reason that this name, the eighteen elements, has, in real substance, seventeen. If the mind-element is spoken of, the six consciousnesses are thereby lost, since, apart from this mind-element, there exist no separate six consciousnesses at all — and it is for this reason that this name, the eighteen elements, has, in real substance, twelve. Exactly as with name and substance, so too should it be understood with designation and substance, distinct characteristic of name and distinct characteristic of substance, distinct nature of name and distinct nature of substance, distinct differentiation of name and of substance, distinct establishment of name and of substance, and distinct cognition of name and of substance. One asks: if this name, the eighteen elements, numbers eighteen, while its own substance is, in some cases, seventeen, in others, twelve, how, then, are the eighteen elements established at all? The answer: it is by three matters that the eighteen are established — first, by basis; second, by dependent; third, by object. By basis, the six inner elements are established,
謂眼界乃至意界。以能依故立六識界。謂眼識界乃至意識界。以境界故立六外界。謂色界乃至法界。問若以所依能依境界各有六故。
namely, the eye-element, up through the mind-element. By dependent, the six consciousness-elements are established, namely, the eye-consciousness-element, up through the mind-consciousness-element. By object, the six outer elements are established, namely, the color-element, up through the dharma-element. One asks: if it is because basis, dependent, and object each number six that
The seventeen-versus-twelve puzzle is not really a disagreement about how many things exist, but about how finely a single underlying reality gets carved by naming — exactly as calling something 'name and substance' or 'designation and substance' picks out the same thing twice under different descriptions, the mind-element and the six consciousnesses are two ways of counting one and the same continuous mental process, neither count more truthful than the other.
5. The Arhat's Last Thought-Moment, and Whether All Three Times Possess All Eighteen Elements
A genuine puzzle tests the basis/dependent/object framework: an arhat's very last thought-moment generates no subsequent consciousness at all, since he is about to enter final nirvāṇa — does this mean it fails to qualify as a mind-element? The treatise says no, since its failure to generate a successor is due to an external obstruction, not any deficiency in the moment itself, exactly as fertile soil remains a fit basis for a sprout even when some other condition prevents one from growing there. A further puzzle asks how the future and present, which do not yet fully exist as basis, could possess the very same eighteen elements as the past — resolved by grounding the elements in their own characteristic rather than their present function, a distinction that also explains why the immediately-preceding condition, unlike the mind-element itself, genuinely cannot be established in the future.
立十八界有差別者。諸阿羅漢最後念心應非意界。依彼不能生後識故。答彼亦是意界依彼不能生後識者非彼為障。但餘緣障故後識不起。設後起者亦作所依。如有餘緣不生芽等。豈沃壤地非芽等依。
the eighteen elements are established with this distinction, then an arhat's own very last thought-moment ought not to be a mind-element at all, since, relying upon it, no subsequent consciousness can ever arise. The answer: this too is indeed a mind-element — the fact that, relying upon it, no subsequent consciousness can arise, is not because that very moment itself constitutes any obstruction, but because some other condition obstructs it, and it is for this reason that no subsequent consciousness arises there; were some other condition present instead, it too would serve as a basis, exactly as, when some other condition prevents a sprout and the like from arising, this hardly means that rich, fertile soil is thereby no longer the very basis for a sprout and the like.
此十八界過去未來現在皆具。問過去可有此十八界。以六識身無間已滅名意界故。未來現在如何亦有十八界耶。答此十八界依相而立。三世各有十八界相。若未來現在識無意界相者。過去識亦應無以相無轉故。
These eighteen elements are complete across the past, future, and present alike. One asks: the past may indeed possess these eighteen elements, since the six consciousness-bodies, the very moment they cease without interruption, are named the mind-element — but how could the future and the present likewise possess all eighteen elements? The answer: these eighteen elements are established with reference to their own characteristic, and each of the three times possesses its own eighteen elemental characteristics. Were future and present consciousness to possess no characteristic of the mind-element at all, then past consciousness too ought to possess none, since a characteristic, once it exists, never turns into something else entirely.
問等無間緣未來未有。現在過去亦應不立。此既得立。意界應然。
One asks: the immediately-preceding condition does not yet exist in the future — present and past, too, ought then not to be established at all. Yet, since this is indeed established, the mind-element ought to be established in exactly the same way.
答等無間緣依用而立。未來未有等無間法故不可立等無間緣。設立於誰有此緣用。此十八界依相而立。未來雖無識所依用。而已有識可立所依。故此與彼不可為例。諸阿羅漢最後念心。雖非等無間緣而是意界准此應知。餘契經中世尊自說惡叉聚喻。說此喻已告諸苾芻。有情身中有多界性。彼亦攝在此十八界。所依能依境界攝故。
The answer: the immediately-preceding condition is established with reference to its own function, and, since no immediately-preceding condition-dharma exists in the future at all, no immediately-preceding condition can be established there — and, even were one to be established, for whom would this condition's own function even apply? These eighteen elements, by contrast, are established with reference to their own characteristic — even though, in the future, no consciousness yet exists to serve as a basis in actual function, there is already a consciousness there capable of having a basis established for it, and it is for this reason that the two cases cannot be taken as parallel at all. An arhat's own very last thought-moment, though it is not an immediately-preceding condition, is nevertheless a mind-element, and this same principle should be understood accordingly. Elsewhere, in a further scripture, the World-Honored One himself speaks of the simile of the akṣa-seed cluster, and, having spoken this very simile, tells the monks: within a sentient being's own body there exist many elemental natures — these too are gathered within these eighteen elements, being gathered within basis, dependent, and object.
Distinguishing a dharma's own characteristic from its own present function is the section's real conceptual tool, doing double duty: it rescues the arhat's last thought-moment from being disqualified as a mind-element by an external obstruction that says nothing about its own nature, and it explains, in the very same stroke, why the future can possess eighteen elemental characteristics without yet possessing anything capable of actually functioning as an immediately-preceding condition.
6. The Sixty-Two Elements Sutra, and Venerable Vāmalabdha's Fourfold Framework
A scripture describing sixty-two distinct elements, taught to counter the outsiders' own root view of self and its sixty-two associated views, is shown to be fully gathered within the same eighteen elements via the very same three matters of basis, dependent, and object. The Venerable Vāmalabdha then offers his own alternative fourfold framework — own-nature, product, agent, and aggregate-differentiation — mapping the eighteen elements onto the five aggregates themselves, before the treatise turns to an extended etymological meditation on the very word "element," rich with concrete similes: a single mountain containing many distinct lineages of ore, and segments of timber, fruit, bamboo, or bone and flesh arranged in sequence to yield an entirely new name.
又佛於彼多界經中說界差別有六十二。彼亦攝在此十八界。即所依等三事攝故。問何故世尊為眾說彼六十二界。答為對外道身見為本。有六十二見趣別故。又世尊告天帝釋言。憍尸迦當知。世有種種界。隨各所想。而各執著。隨各執著而各說之。各言此實餘皆愚妄。彼亦攝在此十八界。即所依等三事攝故。有作是說。彼經諸見以界聲說。皆唯攝在此法界中。尊者左受作如是說。以四事故立十八界。一自性故。二所作故。三能作故。四蘊差別故。以自性故建立色界乃至法界。以所作故建立眼識界乃至意識界。以能作故建立眼界乃至意界。以蘊差別故建立十八界。謂色蘊差別建立十界一界少分。識蘊差別建立七心界。三蘊攝在一法界中。如是名為諸界自性。我物自體相分本性已說界自性所以今當說。問何故名界。界是何義。答種族義是界義。段義分義片義異相義不相似義分齊義是界義。種種因義是界義。聲論者說馳流故名界。任持故名界。長養故名界。應知此中種族義是界義者。如一山中有多種族。謂金銀銅鐵白鑞鉛錫丹青等石。白墡土等異類種族。如是於一相續身中。有十八界異類種族。段義是界義者。如有次第安布段物得種種名。謂次第安布材木等段。名為宮殿臺觀舍等。次第安布餘甘子等段名阿摩洛迦。次第安布竹篾等段名蓋扇等。次第安布骨肉等段名男女等。
And, further, the Buddha, within the Sutra on Many Elements, speaks of a distinction of sixty-two elements — these too are gathered within these eighteen elements, being gathered within these very same three matters of basis and the rest. One asks: for what reason does the World-Honored One teach the assembly these sixty-two elements? The answer: it is in order to counter the outsiders' own view of self as their own root, there being sixty-two distinct courses of view. And, further, the World-Honored One tells Śakra, Lord of the Gods: Kauśika, you should know, the world possesses every kind of manifold element, each according to its own particular conception, and each clings to it accordingly, and, according to each one's own clinging, each speaks of it accordingly, each saying that this alone is real and every other view is mere folly and falsehood — these too are gathered within these eighteen elements, being gathered within these very same three matters of basis and the rest. There are those who say: every view spoken of in that scripture, expressed through the term 'element,' is gathered solely within this dharma-element. The Venerable Vāmalabdha says as follows: it is by four matters that the eighteen elements are established — first, by own-nature; second, by product; third, by agent; fourth, by aggregate-differentiation. By own-nature, the color-element, up through the dharma-element, are established. By product, the eye-consciousness-element, up through the mind-consciousness-element, are established. By agent, the eye-element, up through the mind-element, are established. By aggregate-differentiation, the eighteen elements are established — that is, the form-aggregate's own differentiation establishes ten elements and a portion of an eleventh; the consciousness-aggregate's own differentiation establishes the seven mind-elements; the remaining three aggregates are gathered within a single dharma-element. This is named the own-nature of the various elements. Having already spoken of the own-nature of the elements — their own substance, own character, and inherent nature — the very reason for this shall now be stated. One asks: why is it named an element? What is the meaning of 'element'? The answer: the meaning of lineage and clan is precisely the meaning of an element; the meaning of segment, of portion, of piece, of distinct characteristic, of dissimilarity, and of boundary, is precisely the meaning of an element; the meaning of manifold cause is precisely the meaning of an element; and the grammarians say that it is named an element on account of its flowing, on account of its sustaining, and on account of its nourishing. It should be understood that, here, the meaning of lineage and clan being precisely the meaning of an element is exactly as a single mountain contains many distinct lineages of ore — gold, silver, copper, iron, tin, lead, pewter, cinnabar, malachite, and every other kind of stone, chalk, clay, and the rest, each a distinct kind of lineage — so too, within a single continuous body, there exist eighteen distinct lineages of element. As for the meaning of segment being precisely the meaning of an element: this is exactly as, when segments of material are arranged in sequence, they receive every kind of distinct name — arranging segments of timber and the like in sequence yields the name palace, terrace, pavilion, or hall; arranging segments of āmalaka fruit and the like in sequence yields the name amalaka preserve; arranging segments of bamboo strips and the like in sequence yields the name canopy or fan; arranging segments of bone and flesh and the like in sequence yields the name male or female —
That a scripture cataloguing sixty-two distinct elements can be fully absorbed into the same eighteen-element framework used everywhere else in this treatise is a quiet demonstration of that framework's own claimed completeness: however finely a rival taxonomy slices reality, the treatise insists its own eighteen-fold division of basis, dependent, and object is granular enough to receive it without remainder.
7. What Does "Dhātu" Even Mean? Eight Etymological Glosses
The treatise offers a remarkably rich set of glosses for the very term "element" (dhātu): lineage or clan, since a single body contains eighteen distinct kinds exactly as a single mountain contains gold, silver, copper, and iron ore side by side; segment, portion, and piece, since arranging the eye and the rest in sequence yields the very segments named a person, exactly as arranging timber yields a palace or arranging bamboo yields a fan; distinct characteristic, dissimilarity, and boundary, since each element differs from every other; and manifold cause, since one element's own existence never explains another's. The grammarians add three further senses — flowing through birth and death, sustaining one's own nature, and nourishing another's.
如是次第安布眼等。十八界段名為有情摩納婆等。分義是界義者。
and, in just this same way, arranging the eye and the rest in sequence yields the very segments named a sentient being, a youth, and the like. As for the meaning of portion being precisely the meaning of an element:
謂男身中有十八分。女等亦爾。即十八界。片義是界義者。謂男身中有十八片。女等亦爾。即十八界。異相義是界義者。謂眼界相異乃至意識界相異。不相似義是界義者。謂眼界不似餘界。乃至意識界不似餘界。分齊義是界義者。謂眼界分齊異餘十七界。乃至意識界分齊異餘十七界。種種因義是界義者。謂因此故有眼界非即因此乃至有意識界。乃至因此故有意識界非即因此乃至有眼界。聲論者說。馳流故名界者。謂此諸界馳流三界五趣四生輪轉生死。任持故名界者。謂此諸界任持自性。長養故名界者。謂此諸界長養他性。
this refers to the fact that, within a male's own body, there exist eighteen portions, and likewise for a female — these being precisely the eighteen elements. As for the meaning of piece being precisely the meaning of an element: this refers to the fact that, within a male's own body, there exist eighteen pieces, and likewise for a female — these being precisely the eighteen elements. As for the meaning of distinct characteristic being precisely the meaning of an element: this refers to the fact that the eye-element's own characteristic differs, up through the mind-consciousness-element's own characteristic differing. As for the meaning of dissimilarity being precisely the meaning of an element: this refers to the fact that the eye-element does not resemble any other element, up through the mind-consciousness-element not resembling any other element. As for the meaning of boundary being precisely the meaning of an element: this refers to the fact that the eye-element's own boundary differs from the remaining seventeen elements, up through the mind-consciousness-element's own boundary differing from the remaining seventeen elements. As for the meaning of manifold cause being precisely the meaning of an element: this refers to the fact that it is owing to this that the eye-element exists, yet it is not owing to this very same thing that the mind-consciousness-element exists, and so on, up through: it is owing to this that the mind-consciousness-element exists, yet it is not owing to this very same thing that the eye-element exists. As for the grammarians' own statement that it is named an element on account of its flowing: this refers to the fact that these various elements flow across the three realms, the five destinies, and the four modes of birth, revolving through birth and death. As for its being named an element on account of its sustaining: this refers to the fact that these various elements sustain their own nature. As for its being named an element on account of its nourishing: this refers to the fact that these various elements nourish another's own nature.
是故種族義是界義。乃至長養故名為界。
It is for this reason that the meaning of lineage and clan is precisely the meaning of an element, and so on, up through: it is named an element on account of its nourishing.
That this treatise devotes an entire extended passage to nothing but etymology, stacking eight distinct glosses on a single technical term without ever choosing among them, reveals something about the culture producing this text: a word's own meaning is treated as something to be exhaustively catalogued from every possible angle, not narrowed down to the one correct definition.
8. Defining the Eye-Element: Same-Class and Counterpart-Class, Four Kinds or Five?
The eye-element is defined as whatever eye has seen, sees, or will see color, together with its own "counterpart-class" — the residual category of eyes that, at some point past, present, or future, fail to see color at all. This country's masters count four such counterpart-class kinds; the foreign masters count five, further dividing the eye that will never arise at all by whether it belongs to a conscious or an unconscious being. A further puzzle asks how a color-seeing eye and a non-seeing eye can be each other's own class and counterpart, resolved through six distinct relations binding them together — mutual causation, mutual generation, mutual drawing-forth, mutual transformation, mutual continuity, and shared membership within one and the same element, sense-field, and faculty.
已總說界立名所因。今當一一別說其相。問眼界云何。答諸眼於色已正當見。及彼同分是名眼界。已見色者。謂過去眼。正見色者。
Having now broadly stated the very reason for the name 'element,' each of the elements' own characteristics shall now be stated in turn. One asks: what is the eye-element? The answer: whatever eye has already, is presently, or is about to, see color, together with its own class, is named the eye-element. As for having already seen color: this refers to a past eye. As for presently seeing color:
謂現在眼。當見色者。謂未來眼。及彼同分者。此國諸師說有四種。一者過去彼同分眼。謂眼界不見色已滅。二者現在彼同分眼。
this refers to a present eye. As for being about to see color: this refers to a future eye. As for its own class: the masters of this country say there are four kinds. First, an eye of the past counterpart-class — this refers to an eye-element that, without seeing color, has already ceased. Second, an eye of the present counterpart-class —
謂眼界不見色正滅。三者未來彼同分眼。謂眼界不見色當滅。四者未來畢竟不生眼界。外國諸師說有五種三如前說。未來畢竟不生眼界分為二種。一有識屬眼界。二無識屬眼界。舊外國師同此國說。
this refers to an eye-element that, without seeing color, is presently ceasing. Third, an eye of the future counterpart-class — this refers to an eye-element that, without seeing color, is about to cease. Fourth, an eye-element that will, in the end, never arise at all in the future. The masters of foreign lands say there are five kinds, the first three being as stated above, while an eye-element that will, in the end, never arise at all in the future is further divided into two kinds — first, one belonging to a being possessing consciousness; second, one belonging to a being lacking consciousness. The former masters of foreign lands agree with this country's own account; the former masters of this country agree with the foreign lands' own account.
舊此國師同外國說。諸見色眼於自有情名同分眼。於餘有情亦名同分。諸不見色眼於自有情名彼同分眼。於餘有情亦名彼同分。有作是說。諸見色眼於自有情名同分眼。於餘有情名彼同分。諸不見色眼於自有情名彼同分眼。於餘有情亦名彼同分。復有說者。諸見色眼於自有情名同分眼。於餘有情非同分亦非彼同分。諸不見色眼於自有情名彼同分眼。於餘有情非同分亦非彼同分。彼不應作是說。
Every eye that sees color is, with respect to the very sentient being possessing it, named a same-class eye, and, with respect to every other sentient being, is likewise named a same-class eye; every eye that does not see color is, with respect to the very sentient being possessing it, named a counterpart-class eye, and, with respect to every other sentient being, is likewise named a counterpart-class eye. There are those who say: every eye that sees color is, with respect to the very sentient being possessing it, named a same-class eye, and, with respect to every other sentient being, is named a counterpart-class eye; every eye that does not see color is, with respect to the very sentient being possessing it, named a counterpart-class eye, and, with respect to every other sentient being, is likewise named a counterpart-class eye. There are yet others who say: every eye that sees color is, with respect to the very sentient being possessing it, named a same-class eye, and, with respect to every other sentient being, is neither a same-class nor a counterpart-class eye at all; every eye that does not see color is, with respect to the very sentient being possessing it, named a counterpart-class eye, and, with respect to every other sentient being, is neither a same-class nor a counterpart-class eye at all. This position ought not to be held,
云何有眼而非同分非彼同分。應作是說。於三說中初說應理。問豈用他眼能見色耶。答誰說能用他眼見色。問若無能用他眼見色。如何有情自見色眼於餘有情亦名同分。答以有用眼根恒定故。眼界用者。謂能見色。如眼於色有用已滅說為同分。於自於他此同分名恒無改轉。雖無能用他眼見色。而有用眼恒名同分。正滅當滅應知亦爾。問同分眼能見色。彼同分眼不能見色。云何見色眼是不見色眼之同分。不見色眼是彼見色眼之同分耶。答彼此二眼互為因故。謂見色眼與不見色眼為因。不見色眼亦與見色眼為因。復次彼此二眼互相生故。謂見色眼能生不見色眼。不見色眼復能生見色眼。復次彼此二眼互相引故。謂見色眼能引不見色眼。不見色眼復能引見色眼。復次彼此二眼互相轉故。謂見色眼能轉不見色眼。不見色眼復能轉見色眼。復次彼此二眼互相續故。謂見色眼能續不見色眼。不見色眼復能續見色眼。復次見色眼與不見色眼。俱一界攝。俱一處攝。俱一根攝。同一見性故。見色眼是不見色眼之同分。不見色眼復是彼見色眼之同分。如眼界耳鼻舌身界亦爾。同分彼同分品類差別皆相似故。
for how could there exist an eye that is neither a same-class nor a counterpart-class eye at all? One should say as follows: of these three positions, the first is the reasonable one. One asks: is it, then, by making use of another's own eye that one is capable of seeing color? The answer: who ever said that one is capable of seeing color by making use of another's own eye? One asks: if there is no such thing as making use of another's own eye to see color, how could it be that, with respect to every other sentient being, the eye by which one being sees color is likewise named a same-class eye? The answer: because the very function proper to an eye-faculty remains ever fixed and constant — the eye-element's own function refers precisely to its capacity to see color, and, exactly as an eye, its own function toward color already having ceased, is still spoken of as a same-class eye, so too, whether with respect to oneself or to another, this same-class name never undergoes any alteration at all. Though there is no such thing as making use of another's own eye to see color, an eye possessing this very function is ever named a same-class eye — and it should be understood that this holds equally for an eye presently ceasing or about to cease. One asks: a same-class eye is capable of seeing color; a counterpart-class eye is incapable of seeing color — how, then, could a color-seeing eye be the same-class counterpart of a non-color-seeing eye, and a non-color-seeing eye be the counterpart-class counterpart of that very color-seeing eye? The answer: because these two eyes, this one and that one, serve as cause for one another — that is, a color-seeing eye serves as cause for a non-color-seeing eye, and a non-color-seeing eye likewise serves as cause for a color-seeing eye. Further, because these two eyes mutually generate one another — that is, a color-seeing eye is capable of generating a non-color-seeing eye, and a non-color-seeing eye is, in turn, capable of generating a color-seeing eye. Further, because these two eyes mutually draw one another forth — that is, a color-seeing eye is capable of drawing forth a non-color-seeing eye, and a non-color-seeing eye is, in turn, capable of drawing forth a color-seeing eye. Further, because these two eyes mutually turn into one another — that is, a color-seeing eye is capable of turning into a non-color-seeing eye, and a non-color-seeing eye is, in turn, capable of turning into a color-seeing eye. Further, because these two eyes mutually sustain one another's continuity — that is, a color-seeing eye is capable of sustaining the continuity of a non-color-seeing eye, and a non-color-seeing eye is, in turn, capable of sustaining the continuity of a color-seeing eye. Further, a color-seeing eye and a non-color-seeing eye are both, alike, gathered within one and the same element, one and the same sense-field, one and the same faculty, sharing one and the same nature of seeing — and it is for this reason that a color-seeing eye is the same-class counterpart of a non-color-seeing eye, and a non-color-seeing eye is, in turn, the same-class counterpart of that very color-seeing eye. Exactly as with the eye-element, so too with the ear-, nose-, tongue-, and body-elements, the distinctions of kind between same-class and counterpart-class all resembling one another in every case.
The six relations offered to bind a seeing eye and a non-seeing eye together as same-class and counterpart-class read almost like a single idea restated six times for emphasis rather than six genuinely distinct arguments — and that repetition is itself the point: this treatise wants the reader to feel the sheer density of connection between two states of the very same faculty, not merely accept a single technical proof of it.
9. Defining the Color-Element: The Dancing Girl, the Preaching Monk, and Colors No One Ever Sees
A color-element's own same-class or counterpart-class status turns out to depend entirely on the viewer: a single new moon, seen by a hundred thousand people at once, is a same-class color to every one of them, exactly as a dancing girl's fine countenance or a dharma-teacher's dignified bearing is same-class to whoever's eye-consciousness takes it as object and counterpart-class to whoever's does not. Some colors, hidden away, are counterpart-class to countless beings at once; others are counterpart-class to literally everyone, forever — the very color at the heart of Mount Sumeru or the ocean's own floor, which not even a divine eye or a Buddha's own eye ever observes, simply because there is no purpose in doing so.
問色界云何。答諸色為眼已正當見及彼同分是名色界。已所見者。
One asks: what is the color-element? The answer: whatever color the eye has already, is presently, or is about to, see, together with its own class, is named the color-element. As for having already been seen:
謂過去色。正所見者。謂現在色。當所見者。謂未來色。及彼同分者。謂有四種彼同分色。一者過去彼同分色。謂色界不為眼所見已滅。二者現在彼同分色。謂色界不為眼所見正滅。三者未來彼同分色。謂色界不為眼所見當滅。四者未來畢竟不生色界。或有色界於一有情是同分。於二三四乃至百千諸有情等亦是同分。謂此色界是一有情眼所見。亦是二三四乃至百千諸有情等眼所見故。如百千人同觀初月。然此色界於諸緣彼生眼識者名同分。於不緣彼生眼識者名彼同分。又如眾中有一伎女。形容端正眾具莊嚴。諸有緣之起眼識者彼色界名同分。諸有不緣起眼識者即彼色界名彼同分。又如法師昇座說法。言辭清辯形貌端嚴。諸有緣之起眼識者彼色界名同分。諸有不緣起眼識者即彼色界名彼同分。或有色界於一有情名彼同分。於二三四乃至百千諸有情等亦名彼同分。謂彼色界在隱映處。無量有情不能見故。或有色界一切有情眼所不見。即彼色界於一切時名彼同分。如妙高山中心之色。及大地中大海下色。一切有情無有見者。問彼色豈非天眼境界。答彼色雖是天眼境界。而無用故此不觀之。復次非一切時天眼現起。故有彼色天眼不見。問彼色豈非佛眼境界。答彼色雖是佛眼境界。而無用故佛不觀之。復次非一切時有佛出世。如今無佛既無佛眼故。有彼色非佛眼見。
this refers to a past color. As for presently being seen: this refers to a present color. As for being about to be seen: this refers to a future color. As for its own class: there are four kinds of counterpart-class color. First, a color of the past counterpart-class — this refers to a color-element that, without being seen by the eye, has already ceased. Second, a color of the present counterpart-class — this refers to a color-element that, without being seen by the eye, is presently ceasing. Third, a color of the future counterpart-class — this refers to a color-element that, without being seen by the eye, is about to cease. Fourth, a color-element that will, in the end, never arise at all in the future. There is, further, a color-element that is a same-class color with respect to one sentient being, and is likewise a same-class color with respect to two, three, four, and so on, up through, a hundred thousand sentient beings — that is, this very color-element is seen by one sentient being's own eye, and is likewise seen by the eye of two, three, four, and so on, up through, a hundred thousand sentient beings, exactly as a hundred thousand people together behold the very same new moon. This color-element is, with respect to whoever gives rise to an eye-consciousness taking it as object, named a same-class color; with respect to whoever does not give rise to an eye-consciousness taking it as object, it is named a counterpart-class color. And, further, exactly as when there is, within an assembly, a certain dancing girl, her own countenance correct and fine, adorned with every ornament — this color-element is, with respect to whoever gives rise to an eye-consciousness taking her as object, named a same-class color, while, with respect to whoever does not give rise to such an eye-consciousness, this very same color-element is named a counterpart-class color; and, further, exactly as when a dharma-teacher ascends the high seat to expound the dharma, his own words clear and eloquent, his own appearance dignified and fine — this color-element is, with respect to whoever gives rise to an eye-consciousness taking him as object, named a same-class color, while, with respect to whoever does not give rise to such an eye-consciousness, this very same color-element is named a counterpart-class color. There is, further, a color-element that is a counterpart-class color with respect to one sentient being, and is likewise a counterpart-class color with respect to two, three, four, and so on, up through, a hundred thousand sentient beings — that is, this very color-element lies concealed within some hidden place, incapable of being seen by countless sentient beings. There is, further, a color-element that the eyes of every sentient being whatsoever fail to see — this very color-element is, at every single time, named a counterpart-class color, exactly as the color at the very center of Mount Sumeru, and the color at the very bottom of the great ocean within the great earth, which not a single sentient being has ever seen at all. One asks: is such a color not, then, the very domain of the divine eye? The answer: though such color is indeed the domain of the divine eye, since it serves no purpose at all, it is not observed by it. Further, the divine eye is not manifest at every single time, and it is for this reason that such color exists which the divine eye does not see. One asks: is such a color not, then, the very domain of a Buddha's own eye? The answer: though such color is indeed the domain of a Buddha's own eye, since it serves no purpose at all, the Buddha does not observe it. Further, a Buddha does not appear in the world at every single time — exactly as, at present, there is no Buddha, and hence no Buddha-eye at all — and it is for this reason that such color exists which no Buddha-eye ever sees.
問何故見色眼於自有情名同分。於餘有情亦名同分。而所見色於見者名同分。於不見者名彼同分耶。答容一色界多有情見。無一眼界二有情用故。謂有色界一有情見。容二三四乃至百千有情亦見是共見故。諸有見者此色界於彼名同分諸不見者此色界於彼名彼同分。
One asks: for what reason is a color-seeing eye, with respect to the very sentient being possessing it, named a same-class eye, and, with respect to every other sentient being, likewise named a same-class eye — while a seen color is, with respect to whoever sees it, named a same-class color, and, with respect to whoever does not see it, named a counterpart-class color? The answer: it is possible for a single color-element to be seen by many sentient beings at once, since there is no such thing as a single eye-element being made use of by two sentient beings — that is, given a color-element seen by one sentient being, it is entirely possible for two, three, four, and so on, up through, a hundred thousand sentient beings likewise to see it, this being a case of shared seeing; whoever does see it has this color-element named, with respect to himself, a same-class color; whoever does not see it has this color-element named, with respect to himself, a counterpart-class color.
That not even a Buddha's own eye bothers to observe the ocean floor's own hidden color is a striking limit on omniscience as this treatise conceives it: capability and actual observation are treated as entirely separate matters, and a Buddha's eye, however unlimited in its own reach, is never described as compulsively surveying everything it could see — only what serves some genuine purpose.
10. Why Eyes Are Exclusive but Colors, Sounds, Smells, Tastes, and Textures Can Be Shared
A single eye can never be used by two beings at once, which is exactly why an eye's own same-class status never varies with the viewer — but a single color can be seen by countless beings simultaneously, which is exactly why its own same-class or counterpart-class status shifts from viewer to viewer. This same asymmetry is then tested against smell, taste, and touch, with two rival theories on offer: that these are conventionally shared but, in ultimate truth, exclusive to each individual body (a single touch-element, pressed by two bodies from either side, actually consists of countless atoms, each body touching only its own portion), or that they are genuinely shared even in ultimate truth, at least before being actually consumed.
無一眼界二有情用。況多有情是不共故。諸用此眼能見色者此眼於彼名同分。諸餘有情眼若見色若不見色。此眼於彼亦名有作用。眼既是不共。於一切時相恒定故。如色界聲香味觸界亦爾。同分彼同分品類差別皆相似故。然於此義或有欲令唯嗅嘗覺各自身中諸香味觸。彼作是說。香味觸界依世俗理如色界說。謂諸世間作如是語。
There being no such thing as a single eye-element being made use of by two sentient beings, how much less could it be shared among many at all, being altogether exclusive — whoever makes use of this eye and is thereby capable of seeing color has this eye named, with respect to himself, a same-class eye; as for every other sentient being, whether their own eye sees color or does not see color, this eye is, with respect to them, likewise said to possess this very same function, since an eye, being altogether exclusive, possesses a characteristic that remains ever fixed and constant at every single time. Exactly as with the color-element, so too with the sound-, smell-, taste-, and touch-elements, the distinctions of kind between same-class and counterpart-class all resembling one another in every case. On this point, however, there are those who wish to hold that one smells, tastes, and feels only the smells, tastes, and textures found within one's own body alone — they say as follows: the smell-, taste-, and touch-elements, according to conventional truth, are exactly as stated for the color-element — that is, people in the world speak in just this way, saying:
汝所嗅香我等亦嗅。汝所嘗味我等亦嘗。汝所覺觸我等亦覺。依勝義理香味觸界如眼界說。謂一有情所嗅香界餘不能嗅。若一有情所嘗味界餘不能嘗。若一有情所覺觸界餘不能覺。問若一觸界二有情身各在一邊共所逼觸。豈非勝義如色界說。答如是觸界有多極微和集一處。二身逼觸各得一邊無共得者。故勝義理如眼界說。香味觸界准此應知。復有欲令亦嗅嘗覺他及非情諸香味觸。彼作是說。香味觸界若已受用及受用時。依世俗理如色界說。謂諸世間說共得故。依勝義理如眼界說。一所受用餘不得故。若未受用香味觸界。
the very fragrance you smell, we too smell it; the very flavor you taste, we too taste it; the very texture you feel, we too feel it. According to ultimate truth, the smell-, taste-, and touch-elements are exactly as stated for the eye-element — that is, the smell-element smelled by one sentient being cannot be smelled by any other; the taste-element tasted by one sentient being cannot be tasted by any other; the touch-element felt by one sentient being cannot be felt by any other. One asks: if a single touch-element is pressed and touched together by the bodies of two sentient beings, each from one of its own sides, is this not, then, a case of shared possession, exactly as stated for the color-element, according to ultimate truth? The answer: such a touch-element as this is composed of many atoms gathered together in a single place — the two bodies pressing and touching it each obtain one of its own sides, there being no shared possession involved at all — and so, according to ultimate truth, this remains exactly as stated for the eye-element. The smell-, taste-, and touch-elements should be understood accordingly, following this same principle. There are, further, those who wish to hold that one may also smell, taste, and feel the smells, tastes, and textures belonging to another, or to something not itself sentient — they say as follows: the smell-, taste-, and touch-elements, whether already made use of or presently being made use of, are, according to conventional truth, exactly as stated for the color-element — that is, people in the world speak of a shared possession. According to ultimate truth, they are exactly as stated for the eye-element — that is, what is made use of by one cannot be obtained by any other. As for the smell-, taste-, and touch-elements not yet made use of,
依勝義理亦有共得如色界說義。謂在未來當至現在。有多人等共得義故。若依前義應作是說。香味觸界依世俗理如色界說。依勝義理如眼界說。若依後義應作是說。香味觸界若已受用及受用時。依世俗理如色界說。依勝義理如眼界說。若未受用依勝義理。亦可得言如色界說。是故諸論皆作是說。如色界聲香味觸界亦爾。以香味觸可共得故。
according to ultimate truth, there is likewise a sense of shared possession, exactly as stated for the color-element — that is, while still future and about to arrive in the present, there is a sense in which many people share possession of it together. If one follows the former position, one ought to say as follows: the smell-, taste-, and touch-elements, according to conventional truth, are exactly as stated for the color-element, while, according to ultimate truth, they are exactly as stated for the eye-element. If one follows the latter position, one ought to say as follows: the smell-, taste-, and touch-elements, whether already made use of or presently being made use of, are, according to conventional truth, exactly as stated for the color-element, while, according to ultimate truth, they are exactly as stated for the eye-element; as for those not yet made use of, according to ultimate truth, one may likewise properly say that they are exactly as stated for the color-element. It is for this reason that every treatise says: exactly as with the color-element, so too with the sound-, smell-, taste-, and touch-elements, since smell, taste, and touch admit of shared possession.
The atomistic dissolution of a seemingly single shared touch-sensation into countless individually-touched atoms is a lovely example of this treatise's preferred strategy for resolving an apparent counterexample: rather than abandoning the general principle that sensory objects are ultimately exclusive to their perceiver, it simply zooms in one level further, until the apparent case of sharing dissolves into many separate cases of exclusive possession after all.
11. Defining Eye-Consciousness: Why Only Eye and Color Are Named as Its Conditions
Eye-consciousness arises conditioned by eye and color — though, strictly speaking, every dharma except its own nature contributes some condition to its arising. The treatise explains this selective naming through three converging criteria: the eye and color alone serve as eye-consciousness's own basis and object respectively, its own proximate dominant condition, and its own exclusive superior condition, surpassing every other contributing factor in each of these three respects at once.
問眼識界云何。答眼及色為緣所生眼識是名眼識界。問眼識生時除自性餘一切法皆作緣。何故但眼色為緣。答此中且說增勝緣故。謂若法是眼識所依所緣者。此中說之眼。是眼識所依色是眼識所緣。
One asks: what is the eye-consciousness-element? The answer: eye-consciousness, arising conditioned by the eye and by color, is named the eye-consciousness-element. One asks: at the moment eye-consciousness arises, every dharma whatsoever, excepting its own nature, serves as a condition for it — for what reason, then, does this passage speak only of the eye and color as its conditions? The answer: this speaks here only with reference to its own increasingly superior conditions — that is, whichever dharma serves as the basis and the object of eye-consciousness is spoken of here: the eye is the basis of eye-consciousness; color is the object of eye-consciousness,
是故偏說。餘法不爾。復次若法是眼識近增上緣者此中說之眼。及色與眼識作近增上緣。勝眼識上生住異滅。是故偏說。復次若法是眼識不共勝緣者此中說之眼。及色與眼識作不共勝緣。勝眼識生住異滅。是故偏說。問眼識亦以色為緣生。何故名眼識不名色識耶。
and it is for this reason that these alone are singled out; every other dharma is not treated in this same way. Further, whichever dharma serves as the proximate dominant condition of eye-consciousness is spoken of here: the eye and color serve as the proximate dominant condition of eye-consciousness, surpassing eye-consciousness's own arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing, and it is for this reason that these alone are singled out. Further, whichever dharma serves as the exclusive, superior condition of eye-consciousness is spoken of here: the eye and color serve as the exclusive, superior condition of eye-consciousness, surpassing eye-consciousness's own arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing, and it is for this reason that these alone are singled out. One asks: eye-consciousness, too, arises conditioned by color — for what reason, then, is it named eye-consciousness, and not named color-consciousness?
Naming only the eye and color as eye-consciousness's own conditions, when strictly every other dharma contributes something too, is less an oversight than a deliberate act of emphasis: this treatise is comfortable letting a technically incomplete list stand as the operative definition, so long as it captures whatever plays the decisive, structurally superior role.
12. Why "Eye-Consciousness," Not "Color-Consciousness"? Eight Reasons
Though one obscure scripture does call it color-consciousness, and though eye-consciousness genuinely arises conditioned by color as much as by the eye, every other scripture calls it eye-consciousness — defended by eight independent reasons: the eye is internal, color external; the eye is basis, color object; the eye is a faculty, color merely a faculty's object; the eye possesses a domain, color is itself the domain; the eye is exclusive, color shared; and naming always follows the basis a thing depends upon, exactly as a drum-sound is named for the drum, not for the air that carries it. A further puzzle asks why the first five sense-consciousnesses are not instead named after mind, which every one of them equally depends upon — resolved by distinguishing an unmixed, exclusive, undisturbed basis (each sense-organ, for its own consciousness) from a shared, mixed, disturbed one (mind, shared among all five).
答亦有經說此名色識。如說。色界為緣生色識。乃至法界為緣生法識。問但有一經作如是說。餘一切經皆說眼識。如何不說名色識耶。答眼是內故但名眼識。色是外故不名色識。復次眼是所依故但名眼識。色是所緣故不名色識。復次眼是根故但名眼識。色是根義故不名色識。復次眼是有境故但名眼識。色是境故不名色識。復次眼是不共故但名眼識。色是共故不名色識。復次諸立名者皆就所依顯所立名有差別故。眼是識所依根故但名眼識。乃至意是意識所依根故但名意識。如聲唯就所依立名。顯所立名有差別故。如依鼓起但名鼓聲。若依貝起但名貝聲。依箜篌等應知亦爾。問眼等六識皆依意生。何緣前五不名意識。答若法是識不雜不共不亂所依識名依。彼眼是眼識不雜不共不亂所依故名眼識。廣說乃至身是身識不雜不共不亂所依故名身識。意是五識雜共亂依。是故前五不名意識。問若爾。意識亦應不說名意識耶。答意識更無不雜不共不亂所依如前五識。是故但說名為意識。以是因緣應作四句。有法是眼識所依非等無間緣。謂俱生眼。有法是眼識等無間緣非所依。謂無間已滅諸心所法。有法是眼識所依亦是等無間緣。謂無間已滅意界。
The answer: there does indeed exist a scripture stating that this is named color-consciousness, as it states: consciousness arises conditioned by the color-element, and so on, up through: consciousness arises conditioned by the dharma-element. One asks: there is but a single scripture stating this, while every other scripture, without exception, speaks of eye-consciousness — why, then, do they not speak of it as color-consciousness instead? The answer: the eye is internal, and it is for this reason named only eye-consciousness; color is external, and it is for this reason not named color-consciousness. Further, the eye is the basis, and it is for this reason named only eye-consciousness; color is the object, and it is for this reason not named color-consciousness. Further, the eye is a faculty, and it is for this reason named only eye-consciousness; color is the meaning of a faculty's own object, and it is for this reason not named color-consciousness. Further, the eye possesses a domain, and it is for this reason named only eye-consciousness; color is itself the domain, and it is for this reason not named color-consciousness. Further, the eye is exclusive, and it is for this reason named only eye-consciousness; color is shared, and it is for this reason not named color-consciousness. Further, every act of naming follows the very basis a thing depends upon, in order to display the distinction of what is thereby named — the eye, being the very faculty a consciousness depends upon, is for this reason named only eye-consciousness, and so on, up through: the mind, being the very faculty mind-consciousness depends upon, is for this reason named only mind-consciousness. Exactly as sound is named solely with reference to what it depends upon, in order to display the distinction of what is thereby named — a sound arising by depending upon a drum is named only a drum-sound; a sound arising by depending upon a conch is named only a conch-sound — so too should this be understood with sounds depending upon a harp and the like. One asks: the six consciousnesses, the eye and the rest, all arise depending upon mind — for what reason, then, are the first five not named mind-consciousness? The answer: whichever dharma serves as an unmixed, exclusive, undisturbed basis for a consciousness is named that consciousness's own basis — the eye, being the unmixed, exclusive, undisturbed basis of eye-consciousness, is for this reason named eye-consciousness, and so on, at full length, up through: the body, being the unmixed, exclusive, undisturbed basis of body-consciousness, is for this reason named body-consciousness. The mind is a mixed, shared, disturbed basis for the five sense-consciousnesses, and it is for this reason that the first five are not named mind-consciousness. One asks: granting this, ought mind-consciousness, too, not to be named mind-consciousness at all? The answer: mind-consciousness possesses no further unmixed, exclusive, undisturbed basis besides mind itself, as the first five consciousnesses do, and it is for this reason that it alone is named mind-consciousness. By this same reasoning, this ought to be cast as a tetralemma: there is a dharma that is the basis of eye-consciousness but not its immediately-preceding condition — this refers to a co-arising eye. There is a dharma that is the immediately-preceding condition of eye-consciousness but not its basis — this refers to every mental factor that has just ceased without interruption. There is a dharma that is both the basis of eye-consciousness and its immediately-preceding condition — this refers to the mind-element that has just ceased without interruption.
The mind-versus-sense-organ puzzle is more interesting than it first appears: mind genuinely is a necessary basis for every one of the five sense-consciousnesses, which makes the treatise's insistence on naming by the exclusive rather than the merely necessary basis a substantive methodological choice, not an arbitrary linguistic convention — necessity alone does not earn a condition the right to lend its name.
13. The Fourfold Ledger of Basis and Condition, and Venerable Vasumitra's Nine Further Reasons
The relationship between a dharma's status as eye-consciousness's own basis and as its immediately-preceding condition is cast as a tetralemma: a co-arising eye is basis but not condition; a mental factor that has just ceased is condition but not basis; the mind-element that has just ceased is both at once; everything else is neither. The Venerable Vasumitra then supplies nine further, independent reasons why eye-consciousness is never called color-consciousness — the eye belongs to a single continuous series while color does not, the eye is always proximate and internal while color is indeterminate in this respect, the eye is exclusive while color is shared, and the eye admits of a graded quality (lower, middling, upper) that consciousness directly tracks, while color does not condition consciousness in this same graded way at all.
有法非眼識所依亦非等無間緣。謂除前相。乃至身識四句亦爾。若法是意識所依亦是等無間緣。有法是意識等無間緣而非所依。謂無間已滅諸心所法。尊者世友亦作是說。眼識亦以色為緣生。何緣眼識不名色識。答眼是眼識所依。色不爾故。復次眼是眼識勝緣。色不爾故。復次眼唯墮自相續。色不定故。復次眼唯在近。色不定故。復次眼唯在內。色不定故。復次眼是不共。色不爾故。復次眼唯有執受。色不定故。復次眼有損益。識隨損益。色不爾故。問色若有損益識亦隨損益。若無色者眼識不生亦應名色識。何緣但說名眼識耶。答此不應例。所以者何。有眼根者。雖一色壞更緣餘色眼識可生。若無眼根。雖有多色恒現在轉眼識不生。是故眼識損益隨根不隨於色。復次眼有下中上識隨下中上。色不爾故。復次眼是不共。色不定故。有緣一界色生二界眼識。無依一界眼生二界眼識故。有緣一趣色生五趣眼識。無依一趣眼生二趣眼識。況有多故。
There is a dharma that is neither the basis of eye-consciousness nor its immediately-preceding condition — this refers to whatever is excluded from the foregoing cases; and so on, up through, this same tetralemma holding equally for body-consciousness. If a dharma is the basis of mind-consciousness, it is likewise its immediately-preceding condition; there is a dharma that is the immediately-preceding condition of mind-consciousness yet not its basis — this refers to every mental factor that has just ceased without interruption. The Venerable Vasumitra likewise says as follows: eye-consciousness, too, arises conditioned by color — for what reason, then, is eye-consciousness not named color-consciousness? The answer: the eye is the basis of eye-consciousness; color is not so. Further, the eye is the superior condition of eye-consciousness; color is not so. Further, the eye belongs solely to its own continuous series; color is indeterminate in this respect. Further, the eye is always proximate; color is indeterminate in this respect. Further, the eye is always internal; color is indeterminate in this respect. Further, the eye is exclusive; color is not so. Further, the eye always possesses sentient appropriation; color is indeterminate in this respect. Further, the eye admits of both benefit and harm, and consciousness follows accordingly; color is not so. One asks: if color, too, admits of both benefit and harm, and consciousness likewise follows accordingly, and if, in the absence of color, eye-consciousness fails to arise, ought it not, then, likewise be named color-consciousness? The answer: this cannot be taken as a parallel case at all, for what reason? Because, given an eye-faculty, though one color should perish, eye-consciousness can still arise by taking some other color as its object; but, in the absence of an eye-faculty, though there be many colors continuously presently manifest, eye-consciousness simply fails to arise at all — and it is for this reason that eye-consciousness's own benefit and harm follows the faculty, not the color. Further, the eye admits of a lower, middling, or upper grade, and consciousness follows accordingly; color is not so. Further, the eye is exclusive; color is indeterminate in this respect — there is a case of one color-element conditioning eye-consciousness belonging to two realms, but no case of a single eye belonging to one realm generating eye-consciousness belonging to two realms; there is a case of one color-element belonging to one destiny conditioning eye-consciousness belonging to all five destinies, but no case of an eye belonging to one destiny generating eye-consciousness belonging to even two destinies, how much less to more.
Vasumitra's nine reasons and the eight offered earlier overlap substantially, yet the treatise never bothers to prune the redundancy — a recurring feature of this literature worth naming explicitly: multiple independent authorities converging on the same conclusion through partially overlapping arguments is treated as a strength of the case, not a stylistic flaw needing correction.
14. The Great Virtuous One's Account, and Reconciling the Scripture "Color Known by the Eye"
The Great Virtuous One reduces the whole question to a single elegant criterion: whenever the eye is obstructed, consciousness is obstructed likewise; whenever the eye is unobstructed, so is consciousness — and it is precisely this tight coupling to the eye specifically, rather than to color, that earns the name eye-consciousness. A vivid contrast makes the point concrete: destroy one color and eye-consciousness simply shifts to another color as its object, but destroy the eye-faculty itself and no eye-consciousness arises at all, however many colors remain presently manifest. The fascicle then reconciles an apparently contrary scriptural line — "color known by the eye," when strictly it is eye-consciousness, not the eye itself, that discerns color — through a cascade of explanations, from scribal abbreviation to the everyday convention of naming a performance, a dye, or a piece of writing after its single most excellent instrument rather than every contributing tool.
有緣一生色生四生眼識。無依一生眼生二生眼識。況有多故。復次眼是眼識勝增上緣。色不爾故。大德說曰。若眼有留難識亦有留難。若眼無留難識亦無留難。故名眼識不名色識。問若色有留難眼識亦有留難。無所緣色眼識不生故。答色有眾多。眼唯有一。不應為例。謂若有眼雖一色壞而緣第二眼識得生。若第二壞緣第三色眼識得生餘壞緣餘生識亦爾。若一身中眼根壞者。設有無量那庾多色正現在前。緣彼眼識皆不得生。是故眼識不名色識。乃至身識應知亦爾。問有契經言。眼所識色此有何意。諸色但是眼識所識。眼根不能了別色故。答彼於所依顯能依事。故不違理。謂佛世尊或於所依顯能依事。或於能依顯所依事。於所依顯能依事者。如彼經言眼所識色。於能依顯所依事者。如有處說。眼識所受眼識所了說名所見。復次彼經應言眼識所識色。誦者錯謬故彼但言眼所識色。復次彼經應言眼識所識色。略去中間故但說眼所識色。如說牛車擇滅等故。復次彼契經中依勝具說。故不違理。如伎染書依勝具說。此亦如是。如作伎樂時。雖有樂具及諸子女并餘助伴。而伎樂主偏得其名。是勝具故。又如染衣等時。非無水器染師助伴。而彼染色偏得其名。是勝具故。又如書時。非無水墨盛貯墨器及人葉等。而筆勝故偏得其名。此亦如是。雖識色時有多識具謂空明等。而眼勝故偏得其名。故彼經說眼所識色。復次眼是識色所依止故。彼契經言眼所識色。如言道路是商侶等所應行處。然彼道路但是腳足所應行處。彼商侶等是彼腳足所依止故偏得其名。此亦如是。如眼識界。
There is a case of one color-element belonging to one mode of birth conditioning eye-consciousness belonging to all four modes of birth, but no case of an eye belonging to one mode of birth generating eye-consciousness belonging to even two modes of birth, how much less to more. Further, the eye is the superior, dominant condition of eye-consciousness; color is not so. The Great Virtuous One says: whenever the eye is obstructed, consciousness too is obstructed; whenever the eye is unobstructed, consciousness too is unobstructed — and it is for this reason that it is named eye-consciousness, not color-consciousness. One asks: if color, too, is obstructed, consciousness is likewise obstructed, since eye-consciousness fails to arise in the absence of an object-color. The answer: color exists in great multiplicity, while the eye exists but singly — these cannot be taken as parallel cases at all. That is, given an eye, though one color should perish, taking a second color as its object, eye-consciousness can still arise; should this second color also perish, taking a third color as its object, eye-consciousness can still arise, and so on, with each subsequent perishing, consciousness continuing to arise by taking some other color as its object in just the same way. But should the eye-faculty within a single body be destroyed, then, even were countless myriads of colors presently manifest before it, no eye-consciousness taking them as object could ever arise at all — and it is for this reason that eye-consciousness is not named color-consciousness; and so on, up through, this same principle holding equally for body-consciousness. One asks: there is a scriptural passage stating 'color known by the eye' — what is the intent of this? For every color is known solely by eye-consciousness, the eye-faculty itself being incapable of discerning color at all. The answer: this speaks of what the dependent accomplishes in terms of the basis, and so this raises no contradiction with reason at all — that is, the Buddha, the World-Honored One, at times speaks of what the dependent accomplishes in terms of the basis, and, at other times, speaks of what the basis accomplishes in terms of the dependent. As for speaking of what the dependent accomplishes in terms of the basis: this is exactly as that scripture states, 'color known by the eye.' As for speaking of what the basis accomplishes in terms of the dependent: this is exactly as stated in a certain other place, that what is received by eye-consciousness, what is discerned by eye-consciousness, is named what is seen. Further, that scripture ought properly to state 'color known by eye-consciousness,' and it is owing to the reciter's own error that it states merely 'color known by the eye.' Further, that scripture ought properly to state 'color known by eye-consciousness,' but, abbreviating what lies in between, it states merely 'color known by the eye,' exactly as one speaks of an 'ox-cart' or a 'cessation-through-discernment,' and the like. Further, that scripture speaks with reference to the most excellent instrument involved, and so this raises no contradiction with reason at all — exactly as one speaks, with reference to the most excellent instrument involved, of a performer, a dyer, or a scribe, so too is it here. That is, exactly as, at the moment music is performed, although there exist musical instruments, and every performing boy and girl, together with every other assistant, it is the master of the performance alone who receives this very name, since he is the most excellent instrument involved; and, further, exactly as, at the moment cloth is dyed, it is not that there exists no basin of water, no dyer, no assistant, and yet it is that very dyed color which alone receives this very name, since it is the most excellent instrument involved; and, further, exactly as, at the moment of writing, it is not that there exists no ink and water, no vessel to hold the ink, no scribe, no leaf, and yet it is the brush, being the most excellent instrument, that alone receives this very name — so too is it here: although there exist many instruments of cognition at the moment color is known, such as empty space and light, it is the eye, being the most excellent, that alone receives this very name, and it is for this reason that that scripture speaks of 'color known by the eye.' Further, the eye is precisely that upon which the knowing of color depends, and it is for this reason that that scripture speaks of 'color known by the eye' — exactly as one speaks of a road as the very place merchants and their companions ought to travel, though that road is, in truth, merely the place the feet ought to travel, those merchants and companions being that which the feet themselves depend upon, and it is for this reason that they alone receive this very name. So too is it here. Exactly as with the eye-consciousness-element,
The performer, dyer, and scribe similes offered to explain "color known by the eye" reveal something genuinely useful about how this treatise thinks language works generally: ordinary naming conventions routinely credit the single most excellent or most proximate instrument involved in a process, silently passing over every other genuine contributor, and a scripture's own terse phrasing is held to the very same convention as everyday speech about musicians, dyers, and scribes.
15. Ear, Nose, Tongue, and Body Consciousness Alike; Defining the Mind-Element
Every reason and every reconciliation offered for eye-consciousness applies equally, without further argument, to the ear-, nose-, tongue-, and body-consciousness-elements. The treatise then defines the mind-element as whatever mind has discerned, discerns, or will discern any dharma, together with its own counterpart-class — with one striking asymmetry from every other element treated so far: there exists no past or present counterpart-class mind at all, only a future one, since mind and its mental factors can only ever arise by taking some object, meaning a mind-element that has genuinely existed in the past or present must, by that very fact, already have discerned something.
耳鼻舌身識界亦爾。緣生立名釋通經義皆相似故。問意界云何。答諸意於法已正當了。及彼同分是名意界。已了法者謂過去意界。正了法者謂現在意界。當了法者謂未來意界。及彼同分者謂未來畢竟不生意界。無有過去現在意界是彼同分。心心所法必託所緣方能起故。由此未來當生意界亦必是同分。問意界若緣十七界起是同分不。答亦是同分。如眼界等有見等用必是同分。意界亦爾。有了用者即名同分。
so too with the ear-, nose-, tongue-, and body-consciousness-elements, the conditions for their arising, the reasons for their naming, and the reconciliation of scriptural meaning all resembling one another in every case. One asks: what is the mind-element? The answer: whatever mind has already, is presently, or is about to, discern a dharma, together with its own class, is named the mind-element. As for having already discerned a dharma: this refers to a past mind-element. As for presently discerning a dharma: this refers to a present mind-element. As for being about to discern a dharma: this refers to a future mind-element. As for its own class: this refers to a mind-element that will, in the end, never arise at all in the future — there existing no past or present mind-element that is ever a counterpart-class at all, since mind and its mental factors must, of necessity, rely upon an object in order to arise at all, and it is by this very same principle that a future mind-element yet to arise, too, must, of necessity, be a same-class mind. One asks: if the mind-element arises by taking any of the remaining seventeen elements as its object, is it thereby a same-class mind? The answer: it is indeed a same-class mind, exactly as the eye-element and the rest, possessing the very function of seeing and the like, must, of necessity, be a same-class instance — so too with the mind-element: whichever possesses the function of discernment is named a same-class instance.
The mind-element's own missing past and present counterpart-class is a quietly elegant structural fact: every other element admits of genuine failure — an eye that never sees, a color no one beholds — but mind's own defining act of arising is inseparable from the very act of discernment, so that a mind which existed at all, at any point besides the not-yet-arisen future, simply could not have failed to discern something by the very terms of what it means to be a mind in the first place.
16. Defining the Dharma-Element: Why It Alone Has No Counterpart-Class
The dharma-element — whatever mind has discerned, discerns, or will discern — turns out to possess no counterpart-class whatsoever, since every dharma across all three times, without a single exception, falls under the discerning reach of some instance of mind-consciousness. This threatens to make every one of the remaining seventeen elements equally same-class with no counterpart at all, since mind-consciousness discerns them too — resolved by noting that those seventeen elements establish their own same-class and counterpart-class status not with reference to mind-consciousness's own universal reach, but with reference to each one's own specific paired faculty and object, exactly as eye stands opposite color alone.
問法界云何。答諸法為意已正當了是名法界。已為意了者。謂諸法界已為過去意界所了。正為意了者。謂諸法界正為現在意界所了。
One asks: what is the dharma-element? The answer: whatever dharma the mind has already, is presently, or is about to, discern, is named the dharma-element. As for having already been discerned by mind: this refers to whatever dharma-element has already been discerned by a past mind-element. As for presently being discerned by mind: this refers to whatever dharma-element is presently being discerned by a present mind-element.
當為意了者。謂諸法界當為未來意界所了。問法界為有彼同分不。
As for being about to be discerned by mind: this refers to whatever dharma-element is about to be discerned by a future mind-element. One asks: does the dharma-element possess any counterpart-class at all?
答無。所以者何。以無有法非去來今無量意識所了別故。有意識起一剎那中。唯除自性相應俱有。了別所餘一切法故。問餘十七界亦是意識所了別境。應皆是同分。便無彼同分。如何說有彼同分耶。
The answer: it does not, for what reason? Because there exists no dharma whatsoever, past, future, or present, that is not discerned by boundless instances of mind-consciousness — there existing an instance of mind-consciousness that, arising within a single thought-moment, discerns every other dharma whatsoever, excepting only its own nature and whatever is associated with it or co-arisen alongside it. One asks: the remaining seventeen elements, too, are the very object discerned by mind-consciousness — ought they not, then, all likewise be same-class instances, in which case there would exist no counterpart-class at all? How, then, can it be said that there does exist a counterpart-class?
答餘十七界不依意識立為同分及彼同分。但依各別根境相對。謂眼對色色對眼。乃至身對觸觸對身。問若爾。意界及意識界唯應對法界立同分彼同分。是則緣餘十七界者應非同分。答理應如是。然以意界及意識界能通了別一切法故。依自作用立為同分。如眼等根有見等用。必不立為彼同分故。有餘師說。法界總攝一切法盡。以十七界亦名法故無斯過失。彼不應作是說法名雖通而法界別故。由此前說於理為善。此中應作頗設問答。頗有俱有法有是同分。有是彼同分耶。答有。謂彼同分十七界上生住異滅。法界攝故恒名同分。
The answer: the remaining seventeen elements are not established as same-class or counterpart-class with reference to mind-consciousness at all, but rather with reference to each one's own particular faculty standing opposite its own particular object — that is, the eye standing opposite color, color standing opposite the eye, and so on, up through, the body standing opposite touch, touch standing opposite the body. One asks: granting this, then the mind-element and the mind-consciousness-element ought properly to establish their own same-class and counterpart-class solely with reference to the dharma-element alone — in which case, whatever arises by taking any of the remaining seventeen elements as its object ought not to be a same-class instance at all. The answer: this ought, in principle, to be exactly so — yet, since the mind-element and the mind-consciousness-element are alone capable of universally discerning every dharma whatsoever, their own same-class instances are established with reference to this very function of their own, exactly as the eye-faculty and the rest, possessing the very function of seeing and the like, are never established as any counterpart-class at all. Other masters say: the dharma-element comprehensively gathers within it every dharma whatsoever, since the remaining seventeen elements, too, are named dharmas, and it is for this reason that no such fault as this arises at all. This position ought not to be held, since, although the term 'dharma' applies universally, the dharma-element itself is genuinely distinct — and it is by this that the position stated earlier is the sound one. Here, one ought to raise the following tetralemma-style question and answer: is there a co-arisen dharma that is, in some respect, a same-class instance, and, in some respect, a counterpart-class instance? The answer: there is — namely, the arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing that occurs upon the seventeen counterpart-class elements, this being gathered within the dharma-element, and therefore ever named a same-class instance.
The resolution here rests on a subtle but crucial distinction between two entirely different senses in which something can be an "object": mind-consciousness's own universal capacity to discern absolutely anything is simply the wrong register on which to measure a same-class or counterpart-class relationship, which properly belongs instead to each sense-faculty's own narrow, dedicated pairing with its one designated kind of object — universality and exclusivity are not competing for the same explanatory job.
17. Two Closing Tetralemma Questions on Co-Arisen and Associated Dharmas
The fascicle closes with two final, precise tetralemma-style questions, each confirming that even a genuinely same-class dharma can arise upon what is, in its own right, a counterpart-class instance: the very arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing that occurs upon a counterpart-class element is itself gathered within the ever-same-class dharma-element, and the mental factors associated with a future, not-yet-arisen mind-element — themselves counterpart-class — are likewise carried along by matter gathered within the ever-same-class dharma-element of the dissociated formations.
頗有相應俱有法。有是同分有是彼同分耶。答有。謂未來不生意界意識界等是彼同分。彼相應心所法及彼隨轉色。不相應行法界攝故恒名同分。
Is there an associated, co-arisen dharma that is, in some respect, a same-class instance, and, in some respect, a counterpart-class instance? The answer: there is — namely, the mental factors associated with a future, not-yet-arisen mind-element or mind-consciousness-element and the like, which are themselves counterpart-class instances, together with the matter that follows in their train, this being gathered within the dharma-element of the dissociated formations, and therefore ever named a same-class instance.
That a counterpart-class dharma can still give rise to, or carry along, something genuinely same-class is the fascicle's final demonstration of a principle running through this entire discussion: same-class and counterpart-class are never fixed, permanent labels stamped onto a dharma once and for all, but relational statuses that can, and regularly do, diverge between a thing and whatever arises upon it or travels alongside it.
Fascicle 71 Complete
This closes fascicle 71 of Ru-Yi's translation, drawn from the treatise's true CBETA boundary. Fascicle 71 opens the Ten Gates Nyāsa (十門納息), the fourth and largest nyāsa of the Fetters Aggregate, spanning forty-two chapters from the twenty-two faculties to the ninety-eight latent tendencies. This fascicle worked through the very first of these matters, the eighteen elements: why the Buddha taught in three broad-and-brief formats, keyed to the listener in nine independent ways; the elements' own substance-count and etymology; and a detailed, element-by-element definition of the eye, color, eye-consciousness, mind, and dharma elements, each turning on the technical distinction between a same-class instance and its own counterpart-class. Fascicle 72 continues the same nyāsa.