Resistance, the Buddha's Body, and the Three Times

There exist, further, two kinds of dharma: resistant dharmas, and non-resistant dharmas. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is in order to put a stop to the notion of a person,

and in order to display the superiority of wisdom. As for putting a stop to the notion of a person: this displays that there exists only the resistant and the non-resistant dharma.

and no genuinely real person whatsoever. As for displaying the superiority of wisdom: this refers to the fact that there exists a wisdom of surpassing brilliance and superiority, by which one penetrates everything whatsoever, since these two categories comprehensively gather within them every dharma there is. Further, this is in order to put a stop to what other schools maintain, and to display the correct principle — that is, there are those who hold that whatever occurs together with resistance is named resistant, and whatever does not occur together with resistance is named non-resistant, and, holding this, they say that the five sense-consciousness-bodies are themselves named resistant, since both their support and their object are mutually obstructive. Others, further, hold that whatever occurs together with aversion is named resistant, and whatever does not occur together with aversion is named non-resistant, and, holding this, they say that mind and mental factors of the category associated with aversion are themselves named resistant. It is in order to put a stop to this very intent that this treatise displays that it is precisely obstructive form that is named resistant, every remaining dharma being named non-resistant. It is owing to these three causes and conditions that this treatise is composed. One asks: what is a resistant dharma? The answer: ten sense-fields, namely, the five internal form-sense-fields and the five external form-sense-fields. One asks: what is a non-resistant dharma?

The answer: two sense-fields, namely, the mind-sense-field and the dharma-sense-field. One asks: what is the meaning of resistant and non-resistant? The answer: whatever is an accumulation of atoms is the meaning of resistant; whatever is not an accumulation of atoms is the meaning of non-resistant. Further, whatever admits of analysis is the meaning of resistant; whatever does not admit of analysis is the meaning of non-resistant. Further, whatever admits of accumulation is the meaning of resistant; whatever does not admit of accumulation is the meaning of non-resistant. Further, whatever possesses obstruction is the meaning of resistant; whatever lacks obstruction is the meaning of non-resistant. Further, whatever possesses a form and substance is the meaning of resistant; whatever lacks a form and substance is the meaning of non-resistant. Further, whatever is capable of containing and of obstructing is the meaning of resistant; whatever is incapable of containing and of obstructing is the meaning of non-resistant. The Venerable Pārśva says: whatever admits of analysis then admits of accumulation; whatever admits of accumulation then possesses obstruction; whatever possesses obstruction then possesses a form and substance; whatever possesses a form and substance is then capable of containing and of obstructing; whatever is capable of containing and of obstructing is the meaning of resistant, and whatever is the opposite of the foregoing is the meaning of non-resistant. The Venerable Vasumitra says as follows: whatever possesses the characteristic of a fine, minute portion, and the characteristic of obstruction, is the characteristic of the resistant; whatever lacks the characteristic of a fine, minute portion, and lacks the characteristic of obstruction, is the characteristic of the non-resistant. The Great Virtuous One says: whatever possesses the characteristic of being capable of containing and of obstructing is the characteristic of the resistant; whatever is incapable of containing and of obstructing is the characteristic of the non-resistant. The Venerable Ghoṣa says as follows: whatever can be designated as possessing the nature of an accumulation of atoms, the nature of a long or short visible color, or the nature of giving rise to a following sound, is the characteristic of the resistant, and whatever is the opposite of this is the characteristic of the non-resistant — here, the nature of an accumulation of atoms speaks of eight sense-fields' own visible color; the nature of a long or short visible color speaks of the color-sense-field; the nature of giving rise to a following sound speaks of the sound-sense-field. The Venerable Vasumitra says as follows:

the characteristic of resting in mutual, reciprocal obstruction by an accumulation of atoms is the characteristic of the resistant, and whatever is the opposite of this is the characteristic of the non-resistant. The Venerable Buddhadeva says as follows: whatever is capable of occupying a location and of mutually obstructing another is the characteristic of the resistant, and whatever is the opposite of this is the characteristic of the non-resistant.

It should be understood that the resistant is, altogether, of three kinds: first, obstructive resistance; second, objective-domain resistance; third, referential-object resistance. As for obstructive resistance: this refers to a hand striking a hand, a hand striking a stone, a stone striking a stone, a stone striking a hand, or a pestle striking a bell — each such pair mutually obstructing one another in turn, and this is named obstructive resistance. As for objective-domain resistance: this refers to the eye-faculty and every other faculty that possesses its own domain, each being confined and constrained within its own domain, and this is named objective-domain resistance. As for referential-object resistance: this refers to mind and mental factors that possess an object, each being confined and constrained within its own object, and this is named referential-object resistance. Such, then, are the three kinds;

within the resistant dharma spoken of here, however, only obstructive resistance is intended. One asks: among the ten form-sense-fields spoken of as obstructively resistant, how many of them possess, in turn, the very meaning of mutual obstruction? There are those who say that only the touch-sense-field possesses the meaning of mutual obstruction, the remaining eleven sense-fields lacking the meaning of mutual obstruction, since they are not touched. Others, further, say that only five sense-fields possess the meaning of mutual obstruction — namely, among the internal sense-fields, only the body-sense-field, and, among the external sense-fields, color, smell, taste, and touch — and, holding this, they say that if a hand strikes a hand, this is five striking five; if a hand strikes a stone, this is five striking four; if a stone strikes a stone, this is four striking four; if a stone strikes a hand, this is four striking five; and if a pestle strikes a bell, this too is four striking four. Others, further, say that only nine sense-fields possess the meaning of mutual obstruction, the sound-sense-field alone being excluded among the ten form-sense-fields,

for were it not so, then, when a hand and the like struck the eye-sense-field and the like, there ought to arise no pain at all. The compilers say: one should say as follows — all ten form-sense-fields possess the meaning of obstruction; were the sound-sense-field to lack obstruction, it ought then to lack the very meaning of accumulation, and ought further not to be named obstructively resistant at all. The Prajñaptiśāstra states: the eye is definitely resistant to color, and color is definitely resistant to the eye, and so on, at full length, up through, the mind is definitely resistant to a dharma and a dharma is definitely resistant to the mind —

that master relies solely upon objective-domain resistance in composing that treatise, and it is for this reason that he speaks in this way, saying: there exists an eye that is obstructed in water yet unobstructed on land, such as the eye of a fish and the like; there exists an eye that is obstructed on land yet unobstructed in water, such as the eye of a human and the like; there exists an eye that is obstructed both in water and on land, such as the eye of a water-rākṣasa or a fisherman and the like; there exists an eye that is unobstructed both in water and on land, such as, setting aside the foregoing cases, an eye that has become clouded by cataract; there exists an eye that is obstructed at night yet unobstructed by day, such as the eye of an owl and the like; there exists an eye that is obstructed by day yet unobstructed at night, such as the eye of a human and the like; there exists an eye that is obstructed both by day and by night, such as the eye of a horse, a deer, a cat, or a wildcat and the like; there exists an eye that is unobstructed both by day and by night, such as, setting aside the foregoing cases, an eye that has become clouded by cataract. Here, whatever is spoken of as obstructed refers to objective-domain resistance.

There exist, further, two kinds of dharma: contaminated dharmas, and undefiled dharmas. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is in order to put a stop to the notion of a person, and in order to display the superiority of wisdom. As for putting a stop to the notion of a person: this displays that there exists only the contaminated and the undefiled dharma, and no genuinely real person whatsoever. As for displaying the superiority of wisdom: this refers to the fact that there exists a wisdom of surpassing brilliance and superiority, by which one penetrates everything whatsoever, since these two categories comprehensively gather within them every dharma there is. Further, this is in order to put a stop to what other schools maintain, and to display the correct principle — that is, there are those who hold that the Buddha's own body is undefiled, as the Mahāsāṃghikas do. One asks: for what reason do they hold this? The answer: on the strength of a scripture — as the scripture states, monks, you should know, the Thus-Come One, born within the world and grown up within the world, abides transcending the world, unstained by the dharmas of the world — and, holding this, they say: since it is stated that the Thus-Come One abides transcending the world, unstained by the dharmas of the world, it is thereby known that the Buddha's own body is undefiled. It is in order to put a stop to this very intent that this treatise displays that the Buddha's own born body is solely contaminated — for were the Buddha's own born body undefiled, this would contradict scripture, as the scripture states: covered by ignorance, bound by the fetter of craving, the fool and the wise alike bring about a body accompanied by consciousness — and the World-Honored One, too, is gathered among the wise, so that his body ought certainly to be the very fruit of ignorance and craving, and it is for this reason that the Buddha's own body ought certainly to be contaminated. Further, were the Buddha's own body undefiled, then the incomparable woman ought not to have given rise to craving toward the Buddha's own born body, Aṅgulimāla ought not to have given rise to hatred, the arrogant ought not to have given rise to conceit, and Urubilvā Kāśyapa and the rest ought not to have given rise to delusion — yet, toward the Buddha's own born body, craving, hatred, conceit, and delusion have indeed all arisen,

and it is thereby known that the Buddha's own body is certainly not undefiled. One asks: if the Buddha's own born body is contaminated, how is the scripture just now cited to be reconciled? The answer: that passage speaks of the dharma-body, and it is for this reason that it fails to serve as any proof at all — that is, that scripture's own statement, that the Thus-Come One, born within the world and grown up within the world, speaks of the Buddha's own born body, while abiding transcending the world, unstained by the dharmas of the world, speaks of the Buddha's own dharma-body. Further, this is spoken with reference to the meaning that the Buddha does not turn along with the eight worldly dharmas, and it is for this reason that no fault whatsoever is incurred — that is, the eight worldly dharmas turn along with the world, and the world, too, turns along with the eight worldly dharmas, and, although the eight worldly dharmas turn along with the world, yet the Buddha does not turn along with the eight worldly dharmas. Further, this is spoken with reference to the meaning that the Buddha is liberated from the eight worldly dharmas, and it is for this reason that no fault whatsoever is incurred. One asks: yet the Buddha, too, once encountered these eight worldly dharmas — how, then, can it be said that the Buddha is liberated from them? That is, on a certain day the courageous elder once offered the Buddha three hundred thousand robes, and every such instance as this is named the Buddha's encountering gain. The Buddha once entered the brahmin village of Śāla to beg for food and returned with his bowl empty, and every such instance as this is named the Buddha's encountering loss. At the time of the Buddha's own birth, his fame rose as high as the Heaven of Free Enjoyment of Others' Emanations; at the time of his attaining bodhi, his fame rose as high as the Heaven of the Ultimate Limit of Form; at the time of his turning the wheel of dharma, his fame rose as high as the palace of the Great Brahmā king, and every such instance as this is named the Buddha's encountering renown. The Buddha was maligned with an evil heart by the brahmin girls Ciñcā and Sundarī, his own ill repute spreading throughout the sixteen great kingdoms, and every such instance as this is named the Buddha's encountering disrepute. The Buddha was reviled to his face by the brahmin youth Bharadvāja with five hundred verses, and every such instance as this is named the Buddha's encountering mockery — this very same brahmin youth, in but a moment, turned these same five hundred verses around and praised the Buddha to his face; Vālī, together with Upāli, likewise praised the Buddha with fine verses; the Venerable Śāriputra praised the Buddha's own supreme merit with countless verses; the Venerable Ānanda praised the Buddha's own rare and wondrous dharma with countless verses, and every such instance as this is named the Buddha's encountering acclaim. The Buddha possesses tranquil ease and the very finest experience of pleasure, surpassing what any sentient being whatsoever could attain, and this is named the Buddha's encountering pleasure. The Buddha suffered headache, backache, and stomachache, and suffered an injured foot with bleeding, and every such instance as this is named the Buddha's encountering pain — and, given that these events did indeed occur, how can he be said to be liberated from them at all? The answer: although he encountered these events, no defilement whatsoever arose in him, and it is for this reason that the World-Honored One is said to be liberated with respect to them — that is, although the Buddha encountered gain and the other three of these four dharmas, no elation, joy, or craving whatsoever arose in his own mind; and, although the Buddha encountered loss and the other three of these four dharmas, no dejection, sorrow, or aversion whatsoever arose in his own mind,

exactly as Sumeru, the most excellent of mountains, resting upon the golden wheel, cannot be shaken by the fierce winds of the eight directions — the World-Honored One, likewise, abiding upon the golden wheel of moral discipline, cannot be moved by these eight worldly dharmas, and it is for this reason that he is named liberated with respect to them. It is by this very liberation that he is said to be unstained, not meaning that his own born body is undefiled — his own born body, rather, arises from the contaminants, and it is for this reason that it is spoken of as contaminated, and it is capable of generating a further contaminant in another, and it is for this reason, too, that it is named contaminated. It is, therefore, in order to put a stop to what this other school maintains, and to display one's own school's own theory, free of any inverted principle, together with the two prior causes and conditions, that this treatise is composed. One asks: what is a contaminated dharma? The answer: ten sense-fields, together with a portion of two further sense-fields — namely, a portion of the mind-sense-field and the dharma-sense-field. One asks: what is an undefiled dharma? The answer: a portion of two sense-fields — namely, the very same portion of the mind-sense-field and the dharma-sense-field. One asks: what is the meaning of contaminated and undefiled? The answer: whatever dharma is capable of nourishing and growing every state of existence, of benefiting and sustaining every state of existence, and of upholding every state of existence, is the meaning of contaminated; whatever is the opposite of this is the meaning of undefiled. Further, whatever dharma causes every state of existence to sustain its own continuity of birth, old age, sickness, and death, circulating without cease, is the meaning of contaminated; whatever is the opposite of this is the meaning of undefiled.

Further, whatever dharma proceeds toward the very course of suffering's own accumulation, and likewise proceeds toward the very course of existence's own worldly birth, old age, sickness, and death, is the meaning of contaminated; whatever is the opposite of this is the meaning of undefiled. Further, whatever dharma is the very matter of the view of self, gathered within the truths of suffering and its accumulation, is the meaning of contaminated; whatever is the opposite of this is the meaning of undefiled. Further, whatever dharma is capable of causing the contaminants to grow is the meaning of contaminated; whatever dharma is capable of causing the contaminants to diminish is the meaning of undefiled. The Venerable Vasumitra says as follows: the characteristic of the contaminated is whatever bears the characteristic of arising from the contaminants, and whatever bears the characteristic of being capable of generating the contaminants; the characteristic of the undefiled is the opposite of this. The Great Virtuous One says: whatever, in the absence of this matter, would leave the contaminants without existence,

should be understood as the characteristic of the contaminated; whatever, in the absence of this matter, would still leave the contaminants existent, should be understood as the characteristic of the undefiled. The Venerable Buddhadeva says as follows: whatever dharma is the very ground upon which the contaminants are generated and grow is the characteristic of the contaminated; whatever is the opposite of this is the characteristic of the undefiled.

There exist, further, two kinds of dharma: conditioned dharmas, and unconditioned dharmas. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is in order to put a stop to the notion of a person,

and in order to display the superiority of wisdom. As for putting a stop to the notion of a person: this displays that there exists only the conditioned and the unconditioned dharma.

and no genuinely real person whatsoever. As for displaying the superiority of wisdom: this refers to the fact that there exists a wisdom of surpassing brilliance and superiority, by which one penetrates everything whatsoever, since these two categories comprehensively gather within them every dharma there is. Further, this is in order to put a stop to what other schools maintain, and to display the correct principle — that is, there are those who hold that the resistant dharma is conditioned and the non-resistant dharma is unconditioned, and others, further, who hold that the contaminated dharma is conditioned and the undefiled dharma is unconditioned. It is in order to put a stop to this very intent, and to display that both the non-resistant dharma and the undefiled dharma pervade both the conditioned and the unconditioned, that this treatise is composed — it is owing to these three causes and conditions that this treatise is composed. One asks: what is a conditioned dharma? The answer: eleven sense-fields, together with a portion of one further sense-field — namely, a portion of the dharma-sense-field.

One asks: what is an unconditioned dharma? The answer: a portion of one sense-field — namely, a portion of the dharma-sense-field. One asks: what is the meaning of conditioned and unconditioned?

The answer: whatever dharma possesses arising, possesses ceasing, possesses a cause, and possesses a fruit, and obtains the characteristic of the conditioned, is the meaning of conditioned; whatever dharma lacks arising, lacks ceasing, lacks a cause, and lacks a fruit, and obtains the characteristic of the unconditioned, is the meaning of unconditioned. Further, whatever dharma depends upon and belongs to the operative function of the convergence of causes and conditions is the meaning of conditioned; whatever dharma does not depend upon or belong to the operative function of the convergence of causes and conditions is the meaning of unconditioned. Further, whatever dharma is brought forth by birth, worn by age, and destroyed by impermanence, is the meaning of conditioned; whatever is the opposite of this is the meaning of unconditioned. Further, whatever dharma circulates within the world, is capable of taking a fruit, and possesses a function that discriminates its own object, is the meaning of conditioned; whatever is the opposite of this is the meaning of unconditioned.

Further, whatever dharma falls within the world, falls within the aggregates, is joined with suffering, and undergoes change earlier and later, admitting of a lower, middling, and upper grade, is the meaning of conditioned; whatever is the opposite of this is the meaning of unconditioned. The Venerable Vasumitra says as follows: what is the characteristic of the conditioned? It refers to whatever bears the characteristic of falling within the world and the characteristic of falling within the aggregates, this being the characteristic of the conditioned; what is the characteristic of the unconditioned? It refers to whatever does not bear the characteristic of falling within the world and does not bear the characteristic of falling within the aggregates, this being the characteristic of the unconditioned. The Great Virtuous One says:

whatever dharma, by a sentient being's own exertion, admits of gathering and of scattering, is the characteristic of the conditioned; whatever dharma, by a sentient being's own exertion, admits of neither gathering nor scattering, is the characteristic of the unconditioned. The Venerable Buddhadeva says as follows: whatever dharma is made by causes and conditions is the characteristic of the conditioned; whatever dharma is not made by causes and conditions is the characteristic of the unconditioned. The Venerable Ghoṣa says as follows: whatever dharma is joined together with the characteristic of the conditioned is the characteristic of the conditioned;

whatever dharma is not joined together with the characteristic of the conditioned is the characteristic of the unconditioned.

There exist, further, three kinds of dharma: past dharmas, future dharmas, and present dharmas. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is in order to put a stop to what other schools maintain, and to display the correct principle — that is, there are those who hold that time and formation are distinct, such as the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins, who say as follows: the very substance of time is permanent, while the very substance of a formation is impermanent — a formation moving through time exactly as fruit passes through a vessel, taken out of this vessel and transferred into that one, or exactly as a crowd of people leaves this dwelling and passes into that one; formations, too, are just the same, passing out of the future state and into the present state, and out of the present state and into the past state. It is in order to put a stop to this very intent, and to display that time and formation possess no distinction whatsoever in their own substance — that is, time itself simply is formation, and formation itself simply is time — that the Mahābhūta-skandhaka of this very treatise states as follows: what dharma is named time? It refers to whatever formations are designated by this very synonymous expression. There are, further, those foolish with respect to the own-nature of the three times, who deny the existence of past and future altogether, holding that the present alone is unconditioned. It is in order to put a stop to this very intent, and to display that the substance and characteristic of past and future are genuinely, truly existent, and that the present is a conditioned dharma, that this treatise is composed — and for what reason? Were past and future not genuinely existent, there ought to be no such thing as possession or non-possession at all, exactly as there exists no possession or non-possession of a second head, a third hand, a sixth aggregate, a thirteenth sense-field, or a nineteenth element — past and future dharmas, too, ought then to be just the same; and yet, since possession and non-possession do indeed exist, it is thereby known that past and future genuinely, truly exist.

One should further interrogate whoever denies the existence of past and future substance: were a ripening-cause present in the present time, in which of the three times would its own obtained fruit be said to lie — the past, the future, or the present? If it is said to lie in the past, then one ought to say that the past exists; if it is said to lie in the future, then one ought to say that the future exists; if it is said to lie in the present, then one ought to say that the ripening-cause and its fruit occur simultaneously, and this would then contradict what the verse itself states, as follows:

'One who does an evil deed does not at once experience its result — not as milk turns to curd at once — but rather as ash still covers a fire beneath: the fool treads upon it, and only then, after some time, is he burned.' If it is said that this fruit does not lie within the three times at all, then it ought to have no fruit whatsoever, since a ripening-fruit is not itself the unconditioned — and, were there no fruit, there ought to be no cause either, exactly as there is no second head or third hand. Further, were a ripening-fruit present in the present time, in which of the three times would its own corresponding cause be said to lie — the past, the future, or the present? If it is said to lie in the past, then one ought to say that the past exists; if it is said to lie in the future, then one ought to say that the future exists; if it is said to lie in the present, then one ought to say that the ripening-cause and its fruit occur simultaneously, and this would then contradict the verse already cited above.

If it is said that this cause does not lie within the three times at all, then it ought to have no cause whatsoever, since a ripening-cause is not itself the unconditioned — and, were there no cause, there ought to be no fruit either, exactly as there is no second head or third hand. Further, were past and future not genuinely existent, there ought to be no such thing as going forth from household life and receiving the full precepts, as a verse states:

'If one holds that no past exists, then there ought to be no past buddhas; if there are no past buddhas, then there is no going forth and no receiving of the full precepts.' Further, were past and future not genuinely existent, then every one of those who have gone forth from household life would, possessing correct knowledge, nevertheless be speaking falsely, as a verse states:

'If one holds that no past exists, yet still speaks of years being few or many, one's own years ought then to increase with every passing day, and correct knowledge would itself be a false utterance.' Further, were past and future not genuinely existent, then this very present world, too, ought to be non-existent, since the present is designated only in dependence upon the past and the future; and, were there no three times at all, there would then be no conditioned dharma whatsoever, and, were there no conditioned dharma, there would then be no unconditioned dharma either, since the unconditioned is established in dependence upon observing the conditioned; and, were there neither conditioned nor unconditioned dharma, there would then be no dharma whatsoever at all, and, were there no dharma whatsoever at all, there would then be no liberation, no renunciation, and no nirvāṇa — and one would thereby become a person of great wrong view. Lest such a fault as this be incurred, it is thereby known that past and future genuinely, truly exist. Further, the present world is not itself the unconditioned, since it arises from causes and conditions and possesses its own operative function, which the unconditioned does not. It is in order to refute what these other schools maintain, and to display the correct principle, that this treatise is composed.

One asks: what is a past dharma? The answer: a portion of each of the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields, and the eighteen elements. One asks: what is a future dharma? The answer: a portion of each of the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields, and the eighteen elements. One asks: what is a present dharma? The answer: a portion of each of the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields, and the eighteen elements. One asks: what serves as the own-nature of these three times? The answer: every conditioned dharma whatsoever serves as their own-nature, exactly as the treatise itself states with respect to own-nature —

one's own thing, one's own substance, one's own characteristic, one's own portion, and one's own inherent nature should all be understood in just the same way here. Own-nature has already been discussed; what is to be discussed next shall now be stated. One asks: for what reason is it named time? What is the meaning of time? The answer: the meaning of formation is the meaning of time. One asks: since formations neither come nor go, how can the meaning of formation be the meaning of time? For what reason is this so? If formations were to come, there ought then to be no meeting of a coming and a going characteristic; if formations were to go, there likewise ought to be no meeting of a going and a coming characteristic. Further, if formations were to come, then the place they came from ought to become vacant; if formations were to go, then the place they went to ought to become congested — and it is for this reason that the Venerable Vasumitra states as follows: formations neither come nor go at all, being momentary in their own nature, so that even the meaning of abiding, too, does not exist. Since formations possess no characteristic of coming or going at all, how, then, can the distinction of the three times be established at all? The answer: it is by operative function that the distinction of the three times is established, and it is precisely in dependence upon this very principle that the meaning of formation is spoken of — that is, a conditioned dharma not yet possessing operative function is named future; precisely possessing operative function is named present; its operative function already ceased is named past. Further, form not yet undergoing change and obstruction is named future; precisely undergoing change and obstruction is named present; its change and obstruction already ceased is named past. Feeling not yet experiencing is named future; precisely capable of experiencing is named present; its experiencing already ceased is named past. Perception not yet grasping an image is named future; precisely capable of grasping an image is named present; its grasping of an image already ceased is named past. Formations not yet performing an activity are named future;

precisely performing an activity is named present; the activity already ceased is named past. Consciousness not yet discerning is named future; precisely capable of discerning is named present; its discerning already ceased is named past. Further, the eye not yet seeing color is named future; precisely capable of seeing color is named present;

its seeing of color already ceased is named past — and so on, at full length, up through, the mind not yet cognizing a dharma is named future; precisely capable of cognizing a dharma is named present; its cognizing of a dharma already ceased is named past. One asks: if a present eye and the like, belonging to the counterpart class, lack the function of seeing and the like, ought it then not to count as present at all? The answer: although it lacks the operative function of seeing and the like, it definitely possesses the operative function of taking a fruit, being the homogeneous cause of a future dharma of its own kind — every conditioned dharma, while in the present time, is capable of serving as a cause taking an outflow-fruit of its own kind, and this fruit-taking function pervades every present dharma without any confusion whatsoever, and it is in dependence upon this that the distinction of past, future, and present is established. Further, every conditioned dharma possesses three conditioned characteristics — not yet having performed its function is named future; having performed it once, and presently performing it, is named present; having performed it a third time is named past. Further, every conditioned dharma not yet possessing the operative function of the four conditions is named future; precisely possessing the operative function of the four conditions is named present; the operative function of the four conditions already ceased is named past. Further, every conditioned dharma not yet possessing the operative function of the six causes is named future; precisely possessing the operative function of the six causes is named present; the operative function of the six causes already ceased is named past. Further, every conditioned dharma not yet taking or bestowing its own function-fruit is named future; precisely taking and bestowing its own function-fruit is named present; its taking and bestowing of its own function-fruit already ceased is named past. Further, every conditioned dharma not yet taking or bestowing its own outflow-fruit is named future; precisely taking or bestowing its own outflow-fruit is named present; its taking or bestowing of its own outflow-fruit already ceased is named past. Further, an unwholesome or wholesome contaminated dharma not yet taking or bestowing its own ripening-fruit is named future; precisely taking, though not yet bestowing, its own ripening-fruit is named present; its taking of its own ripening-fruit already ceased is named past. Further, every conditioned dharma not yet requiting its own associated-cause or its own co-existent-cause is named future; precisely requiting its own associated-cause or its own co-existent-cause is named present; its requiting of its own associated-cause or its own co-existent-cause already ceased is named past. Further, every conditioned dharma not yet requiting its own homogeneous-cause or its own universally-pervasive-cause is named future; having requited it but not yet ceased is named present; having requited it and already ceased is named past. Further, a karmically neutral ripening dharma not yet requiting its own ripening-cause is named future; having requited it but not yet ceased is named present; having requited it and already ceased is named past. Further, every conditioned dharma not yet having arisen and ceased is named future; having arisen but not yet ceased is named present; having arisen and already ceased is named past. Further, every conditioned dharma not yet having arisen and decayed is named future; having arisen but not yet decayed is named present; having arisen and already decayed is named past. Further, every conditioned dharma not yet having arisen and departed is named future; having arisen but not yet departed is named present; having arisen and already departed is named past — and exactly as arising is set against ceasing, decaying, and departing, so too should generation, set against ceasing, decaying, and departing, be understood in just the same way. Yet, within scripture, the future, too, is sometimes spoken of as already arisen and the like, and this is stated with reference to that very dharma's own kind — as it is said, there exists a dharma already arisen, already existent, already made,

conditioned, having what has been done, already generated, subject to exhaustion, subject to decay, subject to departure, subject to cessation, subject to decline — to wish it not to decline is impossible. Here, already arisen refers only to the generating dharma that has been generated; already existent displays that it possesses its own inherent nature; already made displays that it possesses a fault; conditioned displays that it possesses operative making; having what has been done displays that it possesses a karmic activity and a fruit; subject to exhaustion refers to the convergence of causes and conditions; the phrase possessing what is subject to exhaustion, decay, departure, cessation, and decline displays that it is certain to possess these, and that to wish it not to decline is impossible, this displaying that it lacks any freedom of its own. Further, every conditioned dharma standing before both of two times is named past; standing after both of two times is named future; standing amid both of two times is named present. Further, every conditioned dharma serving as the cause of three times is named past; serving as the cause of two times is named present; serving as the cause of one time is named future. Further, every conditioned dharma that is the fruit of three times is named future; that is the fruit of two times is named present; that is the fruit of one time is named past. Further, every conditioned dharma, observing past and present, is thereby designated as future — for it is not observing future that future is designated, since there exists no fourth time. And, observing future and present, past is thereby designated — for it is not observing past that past is designated, since there exists no fourth time. And, observing past and future, present is thereby designated — for it is not observing present that present is designated, since there exists no fourth time. Such, then, is named the distinction of the three times; it is in dependence upon this that the meaning of formation, as applied to the various formations, is established, and it is by this meaning of formation that the meaning of time is accomplished.

One asks: when a conditioned dharma arises in the future, does it arise as something already generated, or does it arise as something not yet generated? Suppose either is granted, what fault follows? Both alternatives carry a fault. For what reason is this so? If it arises as something already generated, how are formations then not simply reverting to what they already were? If it arises as something not yet generated, how are formations then not simply arising from utter non-existence? The answer: one should say as follows — owing to a certain cause and condition, it arises as something already generated, meaning that every dharma already possesses its own inherent nature, each abiding, from the very beginning, in its own substance and characteristic — since it already possesses this substance, it is said to be already generated, not that its own substance arises freshly from causes and conditions; it is rather that the convergence of causes and conditions gives rise to its arising, and it is for this reason that it is named arising. Owing to a further cause and condition, it arises as something not yet generated, meaning that a future dharma is named not yet generated, there existing a genuine arising from causes and conditions that has not yet occurred. One asks: when a conditioned dharma arises in the future, does it arise because it already exists, or does it arise because it does not yet exist? Suppose either is granted, what fault follows? Both alternatives carry a fault. For what reason is this so? If it arises because it already exists, what further use has its own already-existing substance for arising at all? If it arises because it does not yet exist, then every dharma ought to have been originally non-existent and only now to exist, and the doctrine that everything exists could then not be established at all. The answer: one should say as follows — it arises as something already existing. One asks: granting this, does this well resolve the difficulty raised afterward — namely, that its own already-existing substance would then have no further use for arising at all? How, then, is the earlier difficulty raised to be resolved? The answer: its own substance, although already existing, lacks operative function; now, meeting with causes and conditions, this operative function arises. One asks: are function and substance one and the same, or are they distinct? The answer: this cannot be settled as definitely one or definitely distinct — exactly as a single substance of a contaminated dharma possesses countless characteristics, such as impermanence and the rest, which likewise cannot be settled as definitely one or definitely distinct with that substance — so too is the case here, and one ought not to press this question further. One asks: is it this very dharma that arises that is this very dharma that ceases, or is it one dharma that arises and a different dharma that ceases? Suppose either is granted, what fault follows? Both alternatives carry a fault. For what reason is this so? If it is this very dharma that arises that is this very dharma that ceases, then the arising of the future ought itself to be the ceasing of the future; if it is one dharma that arises and a different dharma that ceases, then the arising of form and the rest ought to be the ceasing of feeling and the rest. The answer: one should say as follows — owing to a certain cause and condition, it is said that this very dharma arises and this very dharma ceases, meaning that it is the arising of the form-aggregate that is the ceasing of the form-aggregate, and so on, up through, it is the arising of the consciousness-aggregate that is the ceasing of the consciousness-aggregate. Owing to a further cause and condition, it is said that one dharma arises and a different dharma ceases, meaning that it is the arising of the future world that is the ceasing of the present world. One asks: when a conditioned dharma arises in the future, does the very substance of time arise, or does something arise within time? Suppose either is granted, what fault follows? Both alternatives carry a fault. For what reason is this so? If the very substance of time arises, then, at the moment one dharma arises, every dharma of the future ought to arise all at once, and, this having already arisen, there then ought to be no future left at all, and this, in turn, having already ceased, there ought then to be no present left at all, and the entire existence of all three times would thereby be destroyed. If something arises within time, how, then, are formations not distinct from time itself? The answer: one should say as follows — owing to a certain cause and condition, it is said that the very substance of time arises, meaning that, at the moment a single-momentary formation arises, this is precisely the arising of the future time itself. Owing to a further cause and condition, it is said that something arises within time, meaning that the future time possesses many moments, and it is only one single moment among them that arises. One asks: when a conditioned dharma arises in the future, does it arise through its own nature, or does it arise through another's nature? Suppose either is granted, what fault follows? Both alternatives carry a fault. For what reason is this so?

If it arises through its own nature, how is it not that its own nature, originally non-existent, now comes to exist — its own substance, originally without any real thing, now coming to possess a real thing? If it arises through another's nature, how does it not relinquish its own nature and take on the character of having no nature of its own at all? The answer: one should say as follows — it arises neither through its own nature nor through another's nature; rather, within its own nature, there simply exists this kind of dharma that, having arisen, then ceases.

One asks: if a dharma possesses the nature of form, is that dharma of the nature of the past? The answer: this ought to be cast as a tetralemma. There is a dharma of the nature of form that is not of the nature of the past, namely, future and present form's own nature. There is a dharma of the nature of the past that is not of the nature of form, namely, the past nature of the four remaining aggregates. There is a dharma that is both of the nature of form and of the nature of the past, namely, past form's own nature. There is a dharma that is neither of the nature of form nor of the nature of the past, namely, the nature of the four remaining aggregates in the future and present, and the nature of the unconditioned. Exactly as this tetralemma is cast with form's own nature set against the nature of the past, so too, with form's own nature set against the nature of the future and of the present, is each likewise to be cast as its own tetralemma; and exactly as the form-aggregate is set against the three times in three sets of tetralemmas, so too should feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness be set against the three times as well —

and it is in this way that there come to be fifteen tetralemmas altogether. One asks: if a dharma is of the nature of form, is that dharma of the nature of a location? The answer: if a dharma is of the nature of a location, it is then certainly of the nature of form; there is a dharma that is of the nature of form yet not of the nature of a location, namely, past and future form, and the nature of an atom and of unmanifest form in the present. One asks: if a dharma is of the nature of feeling, is that dharma not of the nature of a location? The answer: if a dharma is of the nature of feeling, it is then certainly not of the nature of a location; there is a dharma that is not of the nature of a location yet is not of the nature of feeling, namely, the perception-, formations-, and consciousness-aggregates, and the nature of an atom, of unmanifest form, and of the unconditioned. And exactly as with the feeling-aggregate, so too should the perception-, formations-, and consciousness-aggregates be understood, each in the corresponding manner.

One asks: if a dharma is form, does that dharma possess change and obstruction? The answer: if a dharma possesses change and obstruction, it is then certainly form; there is a dharma that is form yet lacks change and obstruction, namely, past and future form, and the atom and unmanifest form in the present. One asks: if a dharma is feeling, is that dharma capable of experiencing? The answer: if a dharma is capable of experiencing, it is then certainly feeling; there is a dharma that is feeling yet not capable of experiencing, namely, past and future feeling. One asks: if a dharma is perception, is that dharma capable of grasping an image? The answer: if a dharma is capable of grasping an image, it is then certainly perception; there is a dharma that is perception yet not capable of grasping an image, namely, past and future perception. One asks: if a dharma is a formation, is that dharma capable of performing an activity? The answer: if a dharma is capable of performing an activity, it is then certainly a formation; there is a dharma that is a formation yet not capable of performing an activity, namely, past and future formations. One asks: if a dharma is consciousness, is that dharma capable of discerning? The answer: if a dharma is capable of discerning, it is then certainly consciousness; there is a dharma that is consciousness yet not capable of discerning, namely, past and future consciousness. One asks: future dharmas possess an exit but no entry, while past dharmas possess an entry but no exit — why, then, is the future not designated as diminishing, and why is the past not designated as increasing? The Venerable Vasumitra says as follows: has one already reckoned a fixed sum, and only then says that the future is not designated as diminishing, or that the past is not designated as increasing? Since no such reckoning has ever been made, how could one possibly say that it cannot be designated that the future has diminished or that the past has increased? Rather, since past and future dharmas are boundless in their own measure, no increase or diminishment whatsoever can be designated of them at all — exactly as the water of the great ocean, immeasurable and boundless, shows no perceptible diminishment though a hundred thousand vessels be drawn from it, and shows no perceptible increase though a hundred thousand vessels be poured into it. Others, further, say: future dharmas, not yet having arisen and not yet having ceased, are not designated as diminishing; past dharmas, having already arisen and already ceased, are not designated as increasing. Others, further, say: future dharmas, not yet having arisen and already decayed, are not designated as diminishing; past dharmas, having already arisen and already decayed, are not designated as increasing. Others, further, say: future dharmas, not yet having arisen and already departed, are not designated as diminishing; past dharmas, having already arisen and already departed, are not designated as increasing — and exactly as arising is set against ceasing, decaying, and departing, so too, with generation set against ceasing, decaying, and departing, should this be stated at full length in just the same way. The Great Virtuous One says: if an obstructive thing were to circulate through the world, one might then speak of its diminishing or increasing; but a conditioned dharma, arising through the convergence of conditions, ceases the very instant it has arisen — how, then, could one designate the past as increasing or the future as diminishing at all? The Venerable Pārśva says: past and future dharmas possess no operative function at all — how, then, could one designate them as increasing or diminishing?

One asks: do past and future dharmas possess an accumulation, exactly as present-world walls and the like do, or do they possess no accumulation at all, each utterly scattered and dispersed? Suppose either is granted, what fault follows? Both alternatives carry a fault. For what reason is this so? If they possess an accumulation, exactly as present-world walls and the like do, how is it that a donor's own act of giving up some object is not rendered futile as an achievement? How is it that the past and the future possess no location at all? How is it that walls and the like are not, every one of them, permanent?

How is it that the past and the future cannot presently be seen at all? If they possess no accumulation at all, each utterly scattered and dispersed, how can it be said that there exists a past event at all — as a scripture states: in the past there was a king named Mahāsudarśana, whose capital was the City of Kuśāvatī, who dwelt in the Palace of the True Dharma, and every such matter as this, without limit or bound? How can it be said that there exists a future event at all — as a scripture states: in the future there will be a Buddha named Maitreya, at which time there will be a king named Śaṅkha, whose great capital will be named Ketumatī, and every such matter as this, without limit or bound? How could the knowledge of recollecting past abodes observe past events, the knowledge of death and rebirth observe future events, and the knowledge born of aspiration observe both past and future events at all? When future dharmas come to gather in the present, how is a gathered thing not originally non-existent and only now existent? When present dharmas scatter away into the past, how is a gathered thing not, having once existed, now returned to non-existence? There are those who say: past and future, too, do indeed possess an accumulation, exactly as present-world walls and the like do.

One asks: granting this, does this well resolve the difficulty raised afterward — how, then, is the difficulty raised before to be resolved? As for a donor's own act of giving up some object, how is its own expended effort not rendered futile? The answer: this is owing to the object's coming to be seen — that is, before it is made, the thing already exists, yet is not yet presently seen; once the donor has made it, only then does it come to be seen, and it is for this reason that no effort whatsoever is rendered futile. How is it that the past and the future possess no location at all? The answer: what fault is there, further, in granting that they do possess a location? How is it that walls and the like are not, every one of them, permanent? The answer: it is because momentary impermanence is joined with them. How is it that the past and the future cannot presently be seen at all? The answer: because they are not the domain of the present five sense-consciousnesses — it is only when joined as the domain of the present five sense-consciousnesses that they can presently be seen at all. The compilers say: past and future dharmas possess no accumulation at all, exactly as present-world things do, but are each, rather, utterly scattered and dispersed. One asks: granting this, does this well resolve the difficulty raised before?

How, then, is the difficulty raised afterward to be resolved? As for how it can be said that there exists a past event at all: the answer is that one speaks of it exactly as one would speak of something once present, and no fault whatsoever is thereby incurred. As for how it can be said that there exists a future event at all: the answer is that one speaks of it exactly as one would speak of something that will, in due course, be present, and no fault whatsoever is thereby incurred. As for how the knowledge of recollecting past abodes and the rest can observe past and future events at all: the answer is that one observes past and future events exactly as they were once undergone and exactly as they will, in due course, be received — what fault could there possibly be in this, that it cannot be resolved? Others, further, say: exactly as the various letters spoken in succession give rise to the phrases and sentences that display a stated meaning, even though those letters themselves admit of no accumulation whatsoever, and yet are still capable of giving rise to the phrases and sentences that display that meaning — so too, although past and future dharmas possess no accumulation at all, they are still capable of generating knowledge, each according to what is fitting, with respect to the object to be known. Others, further, say: it is by observing present events, of the same kind, that past and future events are observed, exactly as a farmer, by observing the present standing crop, comes to know what has gone before and what is yet to come. As for how, when future dharmas come to gather in the present, a gathered thing is not originally non-existent and only now existent, and how, when present dharmas scatter away into the past, a gathered thing is not, having once existed, now returned to non-existence: the answer is that the dharmas of the three times, whether serving as cause or as fruit, are each, in the appropriate manner, arranged in due sequence, their own substance being genuinely, constantly existent, with neither increase nor diminishment whatsoever — it is solely with reference to operative function that existence and non-existence are spoken of at all; every matter of accumulation depends upon a genuinely existent thing, and is only provisionally designated as existing, existing at one time and not existing at another. If this school's own admission of existence and non-existence in this sense incurs any fault or difficulty whatsoever, then it likewise cannot resolve the matter of phase — since existence and non-existence are, in just the same way, what this school, too, must admit.