The Loneliest God in the Universe

Exactly as the scripture states: what is wrong view? It refers to the view that there is no giving, no fond regard, no sacrificial offering, and so on, stated at length; what is right view? It refers to the view that there is giving, fond regard, and sacrificial offering, and so on, stated at length. One asks: what distinction is there among giving, fond regard, and sacrificial offering? There are those who say: there is no distinction at all — the three terms giving, fond regard, and sacrificial offering equally display one and the same meaning, there being no distinction among them,

exactly as a verse states:

If one gives to the field of merit of the saṅgha, this is named good giving, fond and joyful offering, praised by those who understand the world — he shall thereby obtain a great fruit. There are, further, those who say: there is indeed a distinction among them, this referring to a distinction of name alone — this is named giving, this is named fond regard, this is named sacrificial offering, the three names being distinct. There are those who say: these three, in meaning, too, are distinct. The outsider treatise-masters say: "no giving" refers to giving none of the three classes of merit; "no fond regard" refers to giving none of the merit reserved for a particular brāhmaṇa; "no sacrificial offering" refers to giving none of the merit reserved for the multitude of brāhmaṇas. Further, "no giving" refers to giving none of the three classes of merit; "no fond regard" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa not officiating at a great sacrifice; "no sacrificial offering" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa officiating at a great sacrifice. Further, "no giving" refers to giving none of the three classes of merit; "no fond regard" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa not dwelling at a heavenly shrine; "no sacrificial offering" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa dwelling at a heavenly shrine. Further, "no giving" refers to giving none of the three classes of merit; "no fond regard" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa who does not offer fire-sacrifice; "no sacrificial offering" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa who does offer fire-sacrifice. Further, "no giving" refers to giving none of the three classes of merit; "no fond regard" refers to giving none of the merit for a householder brāhmaṇa; "no sacrificial offering" refers to giving none of the merit for a renunciant brāhmaṇa. Further, "no giving" refers to giving none of the three classes of merit; "no fond regard" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa who does not cultivate concentration; "no sacrificial offering" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa who does cultivate concentration. Further, "no giving" refers to giving none of the three classes of merit; "no fond regard" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa who does not cultivate austerities; "no sacrificial offering" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa who does cultivate austerities. Further, "no giving" refers to giving none of the three classes of merit; "no fond regard" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa not skilled in reciting the Vedas and the auxiliary Vedic treatises; "no sacrificial offering" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa skilled in reciting the Vedas and the auxiliary Vedic treatises. Further, "no giving" refers to giving none of the three classes of merit; "no fond regard" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa lacking full understanding and conduct; "no sacrificial offering" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa possessing full understanding and conduct. Further, "no giving" refers to giving none of the three classes and the like of merit; "no fond regard" refers to giving none of the merit for a brāhmaṇa; "no sacrificial offering" refers to giving none of the merit of sacrificing to the gods. The inner treatise-masters say: "no giving" refers to no merit of the past; "no fond regard" refers to no merit of the future; "no sacrificial offering" refers to no merit of the present.

Further, "no giving" refers to no merit of bodily karma; "no fond regard" refers to no merit of verbal karma; "no sacrificial offering"

refers to no merit of mental karma. Further, "no giving" refers to no merit of the very nature of giving; "no fond regard" refers to no merit of the very nature of precepts; "no sacrificial offering" refers to no merit of the very nature of cultivation. Further, "no giving" refers to no merit of giving to the field of compassion; "no fond regard" refers to no merit of giving to the field of gratitude; "no sacrificial offering" refers to no merit of giving to the field of merit. Further, "no giving" refers to

no merit of joy at the very moment of about to give; "no fond regard" refers to no merit of a pure mind at the very moment of actually giving; "no sacrificial offering" refers to no merit of a joy free of regret once the giving is complete. Further, "no giving" refers to no pure faith capable of giving; "no fond regard" refers to no wealth or dharma to be relinquished; "no sacrificial offering" refers to no recipient to receive the gift. Further, "no giving" refers to no wealth or dharma to be relinquished; "no fond regard" refers to no recipient to receive the gift; "no sacrificial offering" refers to no merit-karma capable of giving. Further, "no giving" refers to no merit at the very moment of about to give; "no fond regard" refers to no merit at the very moment of actually giving; "no sacrificial offering" refers to no merit at the very moment of the recipient's enjoyment. Further, "no giving" refers to no merit at the very moment of bestowing the gift; "no fond regard" refers to no merit at the very moment of the recipient's enjoyment; "no sacrificial offering" refers to no merit of subsequent recollection. Further, "no giving" refers to no merit of the mental intention of relinquishment;

"no fond regard" refers to no merit of the bodily and verbal act of relinquishment; "no sacrificial offering" refers to no merit of that same recipient's enjoyment. Further, "no giving" refers to no merit capable of giving; "no fond regard" refers to no fruit obtained through giving; "no sacrificial offering" refers to no field to which one gives. Further, "no giving" refers to no merit of giving to one in an evil destiny; "no fond regard" refers to no merit of giving to one in the human destiny; "no sacrificial offering" refers to no merit of giving to one in a heavenly destiny. Further, "no giving" refers to no merit of giving to an ordinary being; "no fond regard" refers to no merit of giving to a learner noble one; "no sacrificial offering" refers to no merit of giving to a non-learner noble one. These are named the three kinds of distinction.

Is every deviant wisdom a fetter? And so on, stated at length. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is in order to put a stop to what other schools maintain, and to display the correct principle — that is, there are those who say: defiled wisdom is not, of its own nature, a fetter; they maintain as follows: how can wisdom, of all things, bear the meaning of binding? In order to put a stop to this same clinging, and to display that whatever defiled wisdom is of the very own-nature of a view is gathered within the fetters, this treatise is composed. Is every deviant wisdom a fetter? The answer: a tetralemma ought to be cast, since deviant wisdom and the fetters, in their own-nature, differ in breadth and narrowness. There is deviant wisdom that is not a fetter — namely, excepting two fetters, the remaining defiled wisdom; "excepting two fetters" refers to excepting the view fetter and the grasping fetter; "the remaining defiled wisdom" refers to the wisdom associated with craving, aversion, conceit, and doubt, and the ignorance not shared with others, together with the wisdom associated with the remaining entanglements and defilements — this possesses the characteristic of deviant wisdom but not the characteristic of a fetter. There is a fetter that is not deviant wisdom — namely, the seven fetters, this referring precisely to craving and the other six — this possesses the characteristic of a fetter but not the characteristic of deviant wisdom. There is what is both deviant wisdom and a fetter — namely, the two fetters, this being precisely the view fetter and the grasping fetter, these possessing both characteristics. There is that which is neither deviant wisdom nor a fetter — this refers to whatever excludes the aforementioned characteristics; "characteristic" refers to what is thereby named, exactly as fully stated before. What, precisely, is this? This refers to, within the formations-aggregate, whatever excludes the defiled wisdom and the remaining seven fetters, the remaining formations-aggregate, together with the whole of the four remaining aggregates, and the unconditioned dharma, constituting the fourth clause.

One asks: for what reason is it named "deviant"? What, precisely, is the meaning of "deviant"? The answer: its own inclination is deviant, falling into the deviant category, and it is for this reason that it is named deviant — this is precisely the meaning of turning aside and employing what is unskillful. Further, it runs counter to and transgresses the liberating, correct principle and the wholesome category, and it is for this reason that it is named deviant. Further, it is because it is inauspicious that it is named deviant — exactly as, with respect to a buddha, a noble one's own memorial shrine, or a divine sanctuary, whoever does not circumambulate it in the proper direction is, because this is inauspicious, said to be going the deviant way. Further, it is because its own employment is unskillful that it is named deviant — exactly as it is observed in the world that whoever employs the left hand is, without exception, said to be one lacking dexterity. Further, it is because his own conduct is not correct that it is named deviant — exactly as it is said that the followers of outside paths are people of the deviant path, since whatever they speak and whatever they practice is, without exception, not correct. One asks: if defiled wisdom is named deviant wisdom, then for what reason does one speak of the Buddha's own body possessing an accompanying light? The answer: the reason for establishing the name in each case differs — that is, defiled wisdom transgresses the liberating, correct principle and the wholesome category, and it is for this reason that the name is established; the Buddha possesses a constant light that attends and arises together with his own body, and, because it constantly abides there without departing, this same name is established, unlike every other light, which arises and ceases without fixity, since the Buddha's own body possesses a constant light extending a full fathom in every direction,

down to the very finest mote of dust and the most minute insect — wherever the might of this same light strikes, none can draw near his body. There are, further, those who say: the Buddha possesses three lights that overwhelm and eclipse every other light, causing it, too, to become "accompanying" — and it is for this reason that it is said the Buddha's body possesses this same accompanying light. The Buddha's three lights are: first, the light of the Buddha's own body, which is of the color of true gold — when this same light shines upon the various golden mountains, it causes their own might and radiance to sink out of sight and no longer appear; second, the light of the Buddha's own teeth, of an exceedingly bright white color — when this same light shines upon the Lord of Snowy Mountains, it causes its own might and radiance to sink out of sight and no longer appear; third, the light of the Buddha's own knowledge, pure and universally illuminating — when this same light shines upon the wrong treatises of the outside paths, it causes them all to be subdued and overcome, sinking out of sight and no longer appearing. These three lights, in this way, cause every other light to retreat and sink away, all becoming of this same accompanying nature, and it is for this reason that they are named accompanying. There are those who say: at the very moment the Buddha's own golden bodily light shines upon his own teeth, giving rise to their own bright white radiance, this displays the Buddha's own countenance as majestic and flourishing all the more,

exactly as an autumn day's own beautiful sunlight, shining upon the Snowy Mountains, causes that same Lord of Mountains' own majesty to become still more flourishing.

One asks: do every one of the buddhas possess this same accompanying light, pervading a full fathom around their own body and constantly shining forth? The answer: every one of the buddhas possesses this same accompanying light,

pervading a full fathom around their own body and constantly shining forth at every time. One asks: if this is so, then how is one to reconcile this with the past life of Dīpaṃkara Buddha, exactly as the scripture states: Tathāgata Dīpaṃkara, the Worthy One, the Perfectly and Fully Awakened One, his own body's light blazing forth, illuminated the city of Lamplight, encircling it to the full extent of a yojana, and, for the span of twelve years, day and night made no distinction, so that the people observed the opening and closing of flowers in order to know day from night — since this is so, how, then, can it be said that every one of the buddhas possesses this same constant light of a full fathom? The answer: that scripture does not state that Tathāgata Dīpaṃkara's own body emitted, in every direction, a constant light of a full fathom — it states only that this same Buddha, in order to transform sentient beings, manifested a great supernormal transformation, giving rise to a transformative light, and, for the span of twelve years, performed the Buddha's own work through it. There are those who say: it is not the case that every one of the buddhas' own bodies possesses this same constant light of a full fathom, since the Buddha's own bodily light is not gathered within the major and minor marks, being sometimes great and sometimes small, arising and ceasing without fixity. The verdict: it ought to be said that every one of the buddhas possesses this same accompanying light, pervading a full fathom around their own body and constantly shining forth at every time — although this is not gathered within the major and minor marks, it is nonetheless naturally and constantly present, since every one of the buddhas' own bodies constantly possesses a supreme, wondrous, majestic radiance.

What is the learner's own vision? And so on, stated at length. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: although the preceding treatise has already generally stated vision, knowledge, and wisdom, these three, it has not yet separately stated what the learner's own vision is, what the learner's own knowledge is, and what the learner's own wisdom is — the preceding treatise is the very root this one relies upon, and, what it has not stated, this treatise now ought to state, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. What is the learner's own vision? The answer: the learner's own wisdom, this referring to the undefiled forbearances, together with the learner's own eight kinds of knowledge — from the forbearance regarding suffering, a dharma-cognition, up through the vajra-like concentration, every undefiled wisdom is named the learner's own vision. What is the learner's own knowledge? The answer: the learner's own eight kinds of knowledge,

this referring to the four kinds of dharma-cognition and the four kinds of subsequent cognition. What is the learner's own wisdom? The answer: the learner's own vision together with the learner's own knowledge, altogether named the learner's own wisdom, since vision and knowledge alike possess the characteristic of investigation-of-dharma. Having already stated the own-nature of the learner's own vision, knowledge, and wisdom, their own relationships of overlap and non-overlap ought now to be stated. Is every one of the learner's own vision the learner's own knowledge? The answer: every one of the learner's own knowledge is likewise the learner's own vision, since whatever is the learner's own knowledge necessarily possesses the characteristic of discernment. There is what is the learner's own vision that is not the learner's own knowledge — namely, the undefiled forbearances, since this same forbearance does not yet possess the characteristic of a fully scrutinized decision. Is every one of the learner's own vision the learner's own wisdom? The answer: it is so. If a given wisdom is the learner's own wisdom, is it the learner's own vision? The answer: it is so — since, at the learner's own stage, vision and wisdom equally pervade the undefiled mind. Is every one of the learner's own knowledge the learner's own wisdom? The answer: every one of the learner's own knowledge is likewise the learner's own wisdom;

there is what is the learner's own wisdom that is not the learner's own knowledge — namely, the undefiled forbearances, the meaning being exactly as stated before. This same threefold gathering-in meaning should be understood exactly according to this same fixed pattern. Whoever possesses the learner's own vision, does he possess this same learner's own knowledge? The answer: whoever possesses the learner's own knowledge possesses vision as well, since knowledge is itself precisely vision. There is one who possesses the learner's own vision without possessing the learner's own knowledge —

namely, at the very moment the forbearance regarding suffering, a dharma-cognition, manifests in the present, since, at that very moment, one has not yet possessed undefiled knowledge. Whoever possesses the learner's own vision, does he possess this same learner's own wisdom?

The answer: it is so. If one possesses the learner's own wisdom, does he possess this same learner's own vision? The answer: it is so, since, at the learner's own stage, vision and wisdom are necessarily possessed together. Whoever possesses the learner's own knowledge, does he possess this same learner's own wisdom? The answer: whoever possesses the learner's own knowledge possesses wisdom as well. There is one who possesses the learner's own wisdom without possessing the learner's own knowledge — namely, at the very moment the forbearance regarding suffering, a dharma-cognition, manifests in the present, since this same forbearance possesses the characteristic of wisdom but not the characteristic of knowledge.

What is the non-learner's own vision? And so on, stated at length. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: although the preceding treatise has already generally stated vision, knowledge, and wisdom, these three, it has not yet separately stated what the non-learner's own vision is, what the non-learner's own knowledge is, and what the non-learner's own wisdom is — the preceding treatise is the very root this one relies upon, and, what it has not stated, this treatise now ought to state, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. What is the non-learner's own vision? The answer: excepting the knowledge of exhaustion and of non-arising, the non-learner's own remaining wisdom, this referring to the non-learner's own right view. What is the non-learner's own knowledge? The answer: the non-learner's own eight kinds of knowledge, this referring to the four kinds of dharma-cognition and the four kinds of subsequent cognition. What is the non-learner's own wisdom? The answer: the non-learner's own vision together with the non-learner's own knowledge, altogether named the non-learner's own wisdom, since vision and knowledge alike necessarily possess the characteristic of investigation-of-dharma. Having already stated the own-nature of these three, their own relationships of overlap and non-overlap ought now to be stated. Is every one of the non-learner's own vision the non-learner's own knowledge? The answer: every one of the non-learner's own vision is likewise the non-learner's own knowledge, since, within the non-learner's own stage, whatever is capable of discernment necessarily reaches a fully scrutinized decision. There is what is the non-learner's own knowledge that is not the non-learner's own vision — namely, the knowledge of exhaustion and of non-arising, this same knowledge having set its own seeking to rest, no longer engaging in discernment. Is every one of the non-learner's own vision the non-learner's own wisdom? The answer: every one of the non-learner's own vision is likewise the non-learner's own wisdom. There is what is the non-learner's own wisdom that is not the non-learner's own vision — namely, the knowledge of exhaustion and of non-arising, since this same knowledge possesses solely the two characteristics of investigation-of-dharma and of a fully scrutinized decision. Is every one of the non-learner's own knowledge the non-learner's own wisdom? The answer: it is so. If one possesses the non-learner's own wisdom, does he possess this same non-learner's own knowledge? The answer: it is so, since the non-learner's own knowledge and wisdom alike pervade the non-learner's own undefiled mind. This threefold gathering-in meaning should be understood exactly according to this same fixed pattern. Every arhat, without exception, possesses these three, and it is for this reason that these three, questioned reciprocally of one another, are, in every case, answered "it is so." Neither the learner's own three nor the non-learner's own three are spoken of as being cut off, since both are entirely without any cutting-off at all.

What is the vision belonging to neither the learner nor the non-learner? And so on, stated at length. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: although the preceding treatise has already generally stated vision, knowledge, and wisdom, these three, it has not yet separately stated what the vision belonging to neither the learner nor the non-learner is, what the knowledge belonging to neither is, and what the wisdom belonging to neither is — the preceding treatise is the very root this one relies upon, and, what it has not stated, this treatise now ought to state, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. What is the vision belonging to neither the learner nor the non-learner? The answer: the eye faculty, the five views, and worldly right view — these three characteristics of vision are stated fully as before, referring to observing and gazing, and the like. What is the knowledge belonging to neither the learner nor the non-learner? The answer: the wisdom associated with the five sense-consciousnesses, together with the contaminated wisdom associated with mental consciousness, both pervading all three kinds — namely, wholesome, defiled, and neutral-and-unobscured, stated fully as before. What is the wisdom belonging to neither the learner nor the non-learner? The answer: the wisdom associated with the five sense-consciousnesses, together with the contaminated wisdom associated with mental consciousness — the contaminated knowledge and wisdom alike pervading every contaminated mental grouping, all possessing the characteristic of a fully scrutinized decision and of investigation-of-dharma. Having already stated the own-nature of these three, their own relationships of overlap and non-overlap ought now to be stated. Is every vision belonging to neither the learner nor the non-learner the knowledge belonging to neither? The answer: a tetralemma ought to be cast, since this same vision and knowledge, in their own-nature, differ in breadth and narrowness. Here, the first clause refers to the eye faculty, this being capable solely of observing and gazing, not of reaching a fully scrutinized decision. The second clause refers to the wisdom associated with the five sense-consciousnesses and the like, this possessing the characteristic of a fully scrutinized decision,

but not the characteristic of discernment. The third clause refers to the five views and worldly right view, these all possessing both the characteristic of discernment and of a fully scrutinized decision. The fourth clause refers to whatever excludes the aforementioned characteristics; "characteristic" refers to what is thereby named, exactly as fully stated before. What, precisely, is this? This refers to, within the form-aggregate, whatever excludes the eye faculty, the remaining form-aggregate; within the formations-aggregate, whatever excludes the contaminated wisdom, the remaining formations-aggregate; together with the whole of the three remaining aggregates, and the unconditioned dharma, constituting the fourth clause. The tetralemma comparing the vision belonging to neither the learner nor the non-learner against the wisdom belonging to neither should likewise be cast in just this same way. The knowledge and the wisdom belonging to neither the learner nor the non-learner, being of the same own-nature and the like, are, in every case, answered "it is so." This threefold gathering-in meaning should be understood exactly according to this same fixed pattern. Possession and cutting-off, stated fully, should be understood exactly according to what was stated at the very first nyāsa — if one possesses any one of these three, he necessarily possesses the remaining two as well; whichever one has already been cut off and fully comprehended, the remaining two have likewise already been so — and it is for this reason that these three, questioned reciprocally of one another, are, in every case, answered "it is so."

Exactly as the Great Brahmā speaks as follows: I am Brahmā, the Great Brahmā, self-existent — and so on, stated at length. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is because the various evil wrong-view assemblages cause sentient beings, amid birth-and-death, to give rise to a great, defiling attachment, drawing forth great meaninglessness, serving as a great support for the suffering of birth-and-death — that is, whoever holds these views is necessarily bound, within the three realms, to travel back and forth in the cycle of rebirth, undergoing every manner of suffering and affliction, repeatedly entering the defiled, dark maternal womb, dwelling below the place where the food is digested and above the place where it is still raw, ever pressed and afflicted by every impurity, and, at the very moment of emerging from the birth canal, undergoing every manner of intense suffering,

and, once born, falling upon the grass and the like as though cut by a sharp blade — these sufferings being measureless and boundless, all arising from not knowing the calamity of the wrong-view assemblages — it is desiring that they come to know this, and thereby grow weary of it and bring it to a final end, that this treatise is composed. Exactly as the Great Brahmā speaks as follows: I am Brahmā, the Great Brahmā, self-existent; within the world, I am capable of creating and transforming, capable of giving rise to beings, and am their own father — which of the five views is this gathered within, and by seeing which truth is this view cut off? Here, the wrong-view assemblages are investigated by means of two factors — first, by means of self-nature; second, by means of counteraction. "By means of self-nature" refers to

investigating what these same wrong-view assemblages take as their own-nature; "by means of counteraction" refers to investigating what these same wrong-view assemblages take as their own counteraction. Within the *Saṃyukta*-skandhaka, the *Dṛṣṭi*-skandhaka, and the *Jñānaprasthāna* itself, every one of them likewise investigates the wrong-view assemblages by means of these same two factors — self-nature and counteraction. Exactly as the *Jñānaprasthāna* states as follows: the ascetic Gautama is himself an illusionist, deceiving the world — the Buddha, by means of this same path, has already transcended illusion and deception; whoever slanders this same path in this way is gathered within wrong view, this being its own self-nature, abandoned by seeing; its own counteraction is that, at the very moment the knowledge of the path arises, it is capable of cutting off this same unreal investigation, unreal discrimination, and inverted evil view, causing it to be eternally extinguished. And that same treatise, further, states: for what reason does the Bhagavān begrudge arhatship? — the Buddha, by means of this same path, has already transcended stinginess; whoever slanders this same path in this way is gathered within wrong view, this being its own self-nature, abandoned by seeing; its own counteraction is that, at the very moment the knowledge of the path arises, it is capable of cutting off this same unreal investigation, and so on, stated at length. The Brahmajāla Sūtra likewise investigates the wrong-view assemblages by means of two factors — first, by means of self-nature; second, by means of arising-condition. The Brahma-praśna Sūtra investigates the wrong-view assemblages by means of a single factor alone — namely, by means of arising-condition. In this way, taking every one of these sources together, the wrong-view assemblages are investigated by means of three factors — first, by means of self-nature;

second, by means of arising-condition; third, by means of counteraction. The Venerable Pārśva says: one ought not to investigate these various evil wrong-view assemblages — for what reason is this so?

what wise person would trouble himself to interrogate one who is ignorant, blind, and fallen into a pit? The verdict: the wrong-view assemblages ought indeed to be investigated by means of these three factors —

for what reason is this so? If the wrong-view assemblages are investigated by means of these three factors, then, although one remains an ordinary being still bound by the afflictions, one becomes, exactly like the noble ones, one in whom these various evil wrong-view assemblages never manifest at all. Here, one ought to relate the causal circumstance of the True Dharma-Master, exactly as it has already been fully stated within the *Saṃyukta*-skandhaka.

The answer: as for "I am Brahmā, the Great Brahmā, self-existent" — this refers to taking an inferior dharma and reckoning it supreme, gathered within view-grasping, abandoned by seeing suffering. Here, this Brahmā-king is, in genuine truth, not the true Brahmā, not the true Great Brahmā, and is not self-existent with respect to everything whatsoever, and yet he holds that he himself is genuinely the true Brahmā, the true Great Brahmā, universally self-existent with respect to everything whatsoever — he, with respect to an inferior dharma, calculates it to be supreme, and it is for this reason that this is gathered within view-grasping. For what reason is this so? Among dharmas, what is supreme is solely nirvāṇa; among sentient beings, what is supreme is solely the noble ones and the Buddha, whose own minds have attained self-mastery, and who, with respect to dharmas as well, have attained self-mastery; disciples and solitary-realizers, although they have not yet attained self-mastery with respect to the various dharmas, have nonetheless already attained self-mastery with respect to their own mind — the Brahmā-king, with respect to both of these two kinds of self-mastery, has attained neither, and yet he himself holds that he has already attained self-mastery, calculating the inferior to be supreme, and it is for this reason that this is gathered within view-grasping. At the very moment the knowledge of suffering arises, it is capable of cutting off this same unreal investigation, this same unreal discrimination, this same inverted evil view, causing it to be eternally extinguished — and it is for this reason that this is named being abandoned by seeing suffering, this being its own counteraction. It is by virtue of this same view-grasping that it arises within the very domain of suffering, and it is for this reason that, at the very moment of seeing suffering, this same view is eternally extinguished,

exactly as light frost, the very moment the sun rises, is at once dispersed; exactly as the dewdrop upon a blade of grass, once the wind stirs it, at once falls away. As for "within the world, I am capable of creating and transforming, capable of giving rise to beings,"

as for "and am their own father" — this refers to reckoning what is not a cause to be a cause, gathered within clinging to precepts and vows, abandoned by seeing suffering. Here, what is meant is that every class of sentient being is, each according to his own karma, drawn forth internally within his own body and externally with respect to external things — yet this same Brahmā-king holds that he himself is capable of transforming and giving rise to them, thereby reckoning what is not a cause to be a cause, and it is for this reason that this is gathered within clinging to precepts and vows, abandoned by seeing suffering, this being its own counteraction, exactly as should be understood before. Exactly as the Brahmā-multitude gods speak as follows: this is Brahmā, this is the Great Brahmā, self-existent; within the world, he is capable of creating and transforming, capable of giving rise to beings, and is our own father — which of the five views is this gathered within, and by seeing which truth is this view cut off? The answer: as for "this is Brahmā, this is the Great Brahmā, self-existent" — this refers to taking an inferior dharma and reckoning it supreme, gathered within view-grasping, abandoned by seeing suffering. Here, the Brahmā-multitude gods hold that the Great Brahmā-king is himself Brahmā, the Great Brahmā, universally self-existent, thereby taking the inferior and reckoning it supreme, gathered within view-grasping, this being its own self-nature, abandoned by seeing suffering, this being its own counteraction, stated fully as before. As for "within the world, he is capable of creating and transforming, capable of giving rise to beings, and is our own father" — this refers to reckoning what is not a cause to be a cause, gathered within clinging to precepts and vows, abandoned by seeing suffering. Here, the Brahmā-multitude gods hold that the Great Brahmā-king, universally within the world, is the creator and transformer, the one who gives rise to beings, being their own father — reckoning what is not a cause to be a cause, gathered within clinging to precepts and vows, this being its own self-nature, abandoned by seeing suffering, this being its own counteraction, stated fully as before.

One asks: here, what distinction is there among "is Brahmā," "is the Great Brahmā," and "is self-existent"? The answer: "is Brahmā" refers to holding that the Brahmā-king's own fruit, the five aggregates of clinging, is genuinely pure, tranquil, and blissful; "is the Great Brahmā" refers to holding that the Brahmā-king's own fruit, the five aggregates of clinging, is the very foremost among all things genuinely pure, tranquil, and blissful; "has attained self-existence" refers to holding that the Brahmā-king's own fruit, the five aggregates of clinging, possesses the very supreme function, universally gathering in and mastering all things. All of these are named taking the inferior for the supreme, this referring to reckoning what is impure and full of suffering to be genuinely pure and blissful, and holding that it possesses the supreme function of purity and bliss. As for what is genuinely blissful and pure: this refers to the truths of cessation and the path; these two truths, cessation and the path, are both genuinely supreme — among all dharmas, nirvāṇa is the most supreme,

being wholesome and eternal, surpassing every other dharma; among conditioned dharmas, the noble path is the most supreme, being capable of eternally transcending the dharmas of birth-and-death, since no latent tendency whatsoever increases with respect to it — exactly as a verse states:

Cessation, among all dharmas, is supreme; the path, among conditioned things, is supreme; among all sentient beings, the Tathāgata is the most supreme. One asks: within the Brahmā-world, the Brahmā-king is indeed the most supreme; observing him as supreme ought, then, to be right view — how, then, can it be said that this is an evil view? The answer: were it held that he is supreme solely within the Brahmā-world, this might not amount to an evil view; but since he holds that he is supreme with respect to all things whatsoever, it is thereby gathered within evil view, since he holds himself to be superior even to every buddha, solitary-realizer, disciple, and every god above him. Further, he falsely holds that the fruit of the five aggregates of clinging is identical to the genuine truths of cessation and the path, and it is for this reason that this, too, is gathered within evil view. One asks: here, what distinction is there between "within the world" and "is capable of creating and transforming, capable of giving rise to beings," and the like? The answer: "within the world" refers to both the sentient world and the receptacle world; "capable of creating and transforming" refers to being capable of fashioning the receptacle world and being capable of transformatively creating the sentient world; "capable of giving rise to beings" refers to being capable of giving rise to what does not belong to the sentient class, this doubling and reinforcing the meaning of "creating"; "is their own father," and the like,

refers to being the father of every sentient being, this doubling and reinforcing the meaning of "transforming." This same clinging is, in every case, reckoning what is not a cause to be a cause — this refers to holding that the Brahmā-king's own fruit, the five aggregates of clinging, is capable of creating and transformatively fashioning the whole of every world; yet every world's sentient beings arise, each according to his own karma and affliction,

while what does not belong to the sentient class arises through the combined, augmenting force of every sentient being's own karma — he, with respect to this inferior fruit, reckons it a supreme cause, and, since this is reckoning what is not a cause to be a cause, it is thereby gathered within clinging to precepts and vows. This, together with the preceding view-grasping, both deludedly misapprehend the domain of the fruit, and, since they arise within the truth of suffering, both are abandoned by seeing suffering.

Further, since he clings to the notion of a permanent self, drawn forth by that same force, both of these, too, become entirely abandoned by seeing suffering.

Having already stated the very own-nature of these evil views, together with their own counteraction and arising-condition, what the Brahmajāla Sūtra states as their own arising-condition ought now to be stated. Exactly as that same sūtra states: at the time the previous kalpa was destroyed, the various classes of sentient beings, for the most part, passed away from this world and were reborn as a common class among the gods of Streaming Radiance. At the time this same kalpa was formed, there first arose, within empty space, the palace of the Brahmā heaven. At that time, there was a certain being among the gods of Streaming Radiance whose own lifespan, karma, and merit had been exhausted, and who, passing away from that heaven, came to be reborn within the Brahmā palace, dwelling there alone, solemnly, for a long span of time. Afterward, a craving arose within him, and he thought longingly of a companion: how might I cause other sentient beings to be born as my own common class, to be my own companions? One asks: through what condition did this same craving and longing arise within him? The Venerable Pārśva says: one ought not to interrogate the ignorant, the blind, and the confused. There are those who say: whoever arrives at that place naturally, by the very law of things, gives rise to this same craving and longing — that is, it is the very force of natural law that serves as the condition for this arising. There are, further, those who say: from beginningless time, the various classes of sentient beings have delighted in mutual familiarity and closeness, and, by the force of this same repeated habituation, this same craving is drawn forth and arises — and it is for this reason that this same craving arises through the force of a cause. There are, further, those who say: he had not yet extinguished the craving for a gathered multitude — that is, having earlier, as a leader guiding the multitude, then been reborn in that same heaven, there still remained a residual habit, and it is by the force of this same habit that this same craving is drawn forth and arises. There are further teachers who say: the gods of Streaming Radiance came to the Brahmā world, manifesting the first dhyāna's own various transformed bodies, and, together with the Great Brahmā-king, entertained one another; afterward, they ceased their transformations and returned to their own heaven, and it was then that the Brahmā-king, longing for his companions, gave rise to this same craving. There are those who say: the Brahmā-king himself gave rise to a first-dhyāna transformation, creating the bodies of a Brahmā-multitude to entertain himself; afterward, once wearied, he ceased his supernormal power, and, once the transformed multitude had vanished, he thought as follows,

who is capable of constantly giving rise to these various transformed bodies? How might I cause other sentient beings to be born as my own common class, to be my own followers? There are further teachers who say: the Brahmā-king first gave rise to his own ground's own divine eye, gazing sidelong into other realms, and beheld the Great Brahmā-heaven, its own Brahmā-ministers and Brahmā-multitude, reverently encircling him — having seen this, he thought: their own form and countenance, majesty and radiance, are no more supreme than my own, yet they possess a following, while I alone have none — how might I cause other sentient beings to come and be born in my own place, to be my own following? That same sūtra, further, states: at the very moment the Brahmā-king gave rise to this same thought, the various other beings among the gods of Streaming Radiance whose own lifespan, karma, and merit were exhausted, all passed away from that heaven and came to be born in the Brahmā world — the Brahmā-king, having seen this, thought as follows: these various beings are of my own creation. One asks: for what reason did the Brahmā-king give rise to this same thought? The answer: it is because this same Brahmā-king had earlier given rise to this same thought and wish, that these beings would then be born in response to it, and it is for this reason that this same Brahmā-king gives rise to this same thought. There are those who say: once the Brahmā-king had transformatively created the various members of the Brahmā-multitude, he entered the intermediate concentration, and, having entered this concentration, the transformed multitude then vanished; it was at that very time that the beings among the gods of Streaming Radiance came to the end of their own life and were born in the Brahmā world. Afterward, the Great Brahmā-king, having arisen from his concentration, beheld the Brahmā-multitude and thought as follows: the previously transformed multitude ought already to have vanished; these beings now present before me either arose through the force of my own transformative power, or else were perhaps made by my own earlier thought and wish —

and it is by virtue of this that the Great Brahmā thinks as follows: these various beings are of my own creation. That same sūtra, further, states: the Brahmā-multitude, once born, themselves think as follows: we have, at some earlier time, seen such a being as this — long-lived and abiding for a long time. One asks: in what place did they see the Brahmā-king before? The answer: it was precisely while dwelling in the Brahmā world that they saw the Brahmā-king before, only they do not remember, or know, in which place they saw him — exactly as, at a gathering, one once sees a certain person, and, afterward, after a long span of time, again happens to meet him: although he is, upon waking, aware that they had met before, he does not remember the actual place of their meeting. There are those who say: they saw the Brahmā-king before while in the intermediate state.

If this is so, then how could they have seen the Great Brahmā long-lived and abiding for a long time? Since the intermediate-state body swiftly seeks its own place of rebirth, not abiding there for long. There are, further, those who say: they came from among the gods of Streaming Radiance to the Brahmā palace in order to entertain themselves, and it was at that time that they saw the Brahmā-king. One asks: since they had already lost the second dhyāna, how could they still remember an event from a former abode so far above? The answer: these various members of the Brahmā-multitude, having become free of the defilement of their own present ground, then relied upon the second dhyāna to give rise to the superknowledge of the recollection of former abodes, thereby becoming capable of remembering what they had once seen within a ground above their own. One asks: if this is so, then for what reason did they, taking the Great Brahmā-king as their object, give rise to this same evil view? The answer: it is because they had retrogressed from freedom from defilement that they again gave rise to this evil view, taking the Brahmā-king as their object. One asks: is it not the case that there exists no retrogression at all within the form realm? The answer: at the very time the kalpa was first formed, retrogression, too, existed there. There are further teachers who say: they, by means of an inherent, connatural recollection-born knowledge, remembered this event once seen above. One asks: is it not the case that the form realm possesses no inherent, connatural recollection-born knowledge at all? The answer: at the very time the kalpa was first formed, the form realm, too, could possess an inherent, connatural recollection-born knowledge. There are, further, those who say: the Brahmā-king first entered the intermediate dhyāna and abode there for a long span of time; these various members of the Brahmā-multitude, having passed away from a ground above, were born within the Brahmā world and beheld the Great Brahmā-king long-lived and abiding for a long time, his own majestic radiance blazing forth, and, not daring to draw near him, waited until he had emerged from his concentration, whereupon he summoned the Brahmā-multitude and mutually exchanged greetings with them — it was at that time that the various members of the Brahmā-multitude said to one another: we have, at some earlier time, seen such a being as this — long-lived and abiding for a long time. That same sūtra, further, states:

at that time, the various members of the Brahmā-multitude think as follows: we are all created by the Brahmā-king's own transformation, and it is from him that we have been born, and he is our own father. One asks: through what condition did this same thought arise within them? The answer: they had heard the Brahmā-king repeatedly say: I am capable of creating and transforming, I am capable of giving rise to beings, I am your own father — having heard this, they came to believe it deeply; further, they had once seen the Brahmā-king long-lived and abiding for a long time, and, since their own belief had thereby grown all the deeper, this same thought arose — exactly as there is a king who, in genuine truth, possesses no particular skill, yet who, before his own ministers and multitude, boasts of himself, saying: in former times, I possessed great might and valor, personally leading my own troops and subduing formidable enemies — his ministers and multitude, having heard this, without exception, believe and accept it, all saying: we are fortunate indeed to have encountered so great a king; our own friends, kin, and countrymen all thereby attain peace and well-being. There are, further, those who say: having heard the Brahmā-king speak repeatedly as stated before, and wishing to reach a fully scrutinized decision, they then gave rise to the superknowledge of the recollection of former abodes, observing their own and others' former aggregates and their own continuity, gradually tracing it back all the way to the very mind of initial conception-linking, yet unable to observe the stage prior to the very moment of their former death, since a lower superknowledge is incapable of observing an object belonging to a ground above. By the force of this same superknowledge, they thereby knew that the Great Brahmā-king had been born there before them and had long abided there; afterward, giving rise to the thought that they themselves came to be born there, and, by this means, coming to a decisive certainty, they thought: we are all created by the Brahmā-king's own transformation, and it is from him that we have been born, and he is our own father — and it is by the force of this same superknowledge that they gave rise to this same thought.

One asks: at the very time the kalpa was first formed, how many classes of sentient beings gave rise, simultaneously, to this same inverted conception and view, as stated before? There are those who say: within a small-thousand world-system, there exists one Great Brahmā, ten solitary Brahmās, and a thousand Brahmā-multitude gods; within a middle-thousand world-system, there exist a thousand Great Brahmās, ten thousand solitary Brahmās, and a thousand thousand Brahmā-multitude gods; within a great-thousand world-system, there exist a thousand thousand Great Brahmās, one koṭi of solitary Brahmās, and a hundred koṭis of Brahmā-multitude gods. There are, further, those who say: within a small-thousand world-system, there exists one Great Brahmā, a thousand solitary Brahmās, and ten thousand Brahmā-multitude gods; within a middle-thousand world-system, there exist a thousand Great Brahmās, ten thousand solitary Brahmās, and one koṭi of Brahmā-multitude gods; within a great-thousand world-system, there exist ten thousand Great Brahmās, one koṭi of solitary Brahmās, and a hundred koṭis of Brahmā-multitude gods. There is, further, a scattered account stating: within a great-thousand world-system, there exist one koṭi of Great Brahmās, a hundred koṭis of solitary Brahmās, and a hundred thousand koṭis of Brahmā-multitude gods. The verdict: it ought to be said that, within a great-thousand world-system, there exist one koṭi of Great Brahmās, a hundred koṭis of solitary Brahmās, and ten koṭi-nayutas of Brahmā-multitude gods, all of whom, at the very time the kalpa was first formed, simultaneously gave rise to this same inverted conception and view, exactly as stated before.

One asks: in what place does the Great Brahmā-king dwell? In what place do the Brahmā-ministers and the Brahmā-multitude dwell? The Western teachers speak as follows:

within the first dhyāna's own ground, there exist three separate places — first, the place of the Brahmā-multitude heaven; second, the place of the Brahmā-ministers heaven; third, the place of the Great Brahmā heaven — this same place being precisely the intermediate dhyāna. The teachers of Kashmir say: the first dhyāna's own ground possesses solely two places — that is, within the Brahmā-ministers heaven there exists an elevated, supreme, tranquil place, exactly as, near a human settlement, there exists a supreme garden grove — this same place, where the Great Brahmā-king constantly dwells, being precisely the intermediate dhyāna. One asks: what is the bodily measure of the Great Brahmā and the rest? The answer: the Great Brahmā-king's own bodily measure is one and a half yojanas; the Brahmā-ministers' own bodily measure is one yojana; the Brahmā-multitude's own bodily measure is half a yojana. One asks: what is the lifespan-measure of the Great Brahmā and the rest? The answer: the Great Brahmā-king's own lifespan-measure is a kalpa and a half; the Brahmā-ministers' own lifespan-measure is one kalpa; the Brahmā-multitude's own lifespan-measure is half a kalpa — it should be understood that, here, forty intermediate kalpas are combined together as a single kalpa. One asks: for what span of time does the Great Brahmā-king dwell alone by himself? For what span of time does he dwell together with a multitude? For what span of time does he again come to be separated from the multitude? There are those who say: he dwells alone by himself for five intermediate kalpas; he dwells together with a multitude for five intermediate kalpas; he again comes to be separated from the multitude for five intermediate kalpas. There are, further, those who say: he dwells alone by himself for ten intermediate kalpas; he dwells together with a multitude for ten intermediate kalpas; he again comes to be separated from the multitude for ten intermediate kalpas. The verdict: it ought to be said that he dwells alone by himself for half a kalpa; he dwells together with a multitude for half a kalpa; he again comes to be separated from the multitude for half a kalpa — twenty intermediate kalpas constituting this same measure of half a kalpa. The Brahmā-ministers and the Brahmā-multitude, at the very end of life, undergo conception-linking by relying upon the not-yet-arrived ground's own mind; the Great Brahmā, at the very end of life, undergoes conception-linking by relying upon the intermediate dhyāna's own mind — for what reason is this so? The mind of dying and of conception-linking is necessarily associated solely with the feeling of equanimity, and the feeling of equanimity exists solely within the access ground of the first dhyāna, not within the fundamental ground itself. Whoever gives rise to this same view, that I accept all things without exception — which of the five views is this gathered within? And so on, stated at length. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is in order to distinguish the meaning of the scripture — that is, the scripture states: the long-nailed wandering ascetic came before the Buddha and addressed the Buddha, saying: Gautama, you should know that I accept nothing at all, and so on, stated at length. Although the scripture speaks in this way, it does not state which of the five views this is gathered within, or by seeing which truth this view is cut off — scripture is the very root this treatise relies upon, and, what it has not stated, this treatise now ought to state, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. One asks: for what reason is he named the long-nailed wandering ascetic? The answer: because this same ascetic's own bodily nails, together with his own hair, were both long, and it is on this account that he is spoken of as the long-nailed wandering ascetic. One asks: for what reason did he keep these same long nails? The answer: he was so addicted to the habit that he had no occasion to cut them. There are those who say: he constantly dwelt in the mountains, and, his nails and hair having grown long, there was no one to cut and trim them. There are, further, those who say: while yet a householder, he delighted in practicing string and wind instruments, and, although he later renounced the household life, he still cherished his own long nails, and so did not cut them. There are further teachers who say: he had gone forth into renunciation within an outside-path dharma, and, within this outside-path dharma, there existed those who kept their nails — and it is on this account that he is spoken of as the long-nailed wandering ascetic. Here, the wrong-view assemblages are investigated by means of two factors — first, by means of self-nature; second, by means of counteraction — exactly as should be understood from the text itself. One asks: what is the arising-condition of this same evil wrong-view assemblage? The answer: the Venerable Śāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana's own casting themselves upon the Buddha to go forth into renunciation is this same arising-condition — that is, the long-nailed wandering ascetic was Śāriputra's own maternal uncle, who had once taught the Venerable Śāriputra the treatises of the outside paths; upon hearing that Śāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana had taken refuge in the Buddha and gone forth into renunciation, he became deeply grieved and regretful, and thought as follows: the domain of wisdom is without limit — even were one to resolve it to its most profound depth, there would, in the end, still be room for reversal; this Gautama's own broad learning and wisdom, although certainly surpassing that of Śāriputra and the rest, must nonetheless still have some other who surpasses even Gautama himself — and thus, turning the matter over and over, the domain of wisdom proves without limit, and so I ought not to fail to devise some strategy. Having thought this, he came before the Buddha and addressed the Buddha, saying: Gautama, you should know that I accept nothing at all. The Bhagavān addressed him, saying: do you, then, accept this very view that has arisen in you, or not? At that time, this same ascetic reflected as follows: were I to answer that I accept it, this would contradict what I have myself established; were I to say that I do not accept it, then I would have no thesis at all; and, were I to have no thesis at all, this would then not constitute a genuine debate. Having reflected thus, ashamed, he fell silent and stood there. Further, the long-nailed wandering ascetic was an annihilationist, who observed that everything whatsoever would, in the end, necessarily be cut off — and it was for this reason that the Buddha said to him: does the very view that has arisen in you, too, deserve to be cut off, or not? Further, the long-nailed wandering ascetic was one given to hesitation, who observed that everything whatsoever admitted of hesitation — and it was for this reason that the Buddha said to him: with respect to your own view, too, do you hesitate, or not? Yet this same ascetic possessed the knowledge of divination and prognostication, and, knowing of himself that his own thesis must necessarily fall into defeat, it was for this reason that this same ascetic fell silent and stood there. The Bhagavān addressed him, saying: measureless sentient beings share this same view as you, and you, too, are the same as they — that is, every being in the world relies upon one of three kinds of view: first, there is a certain class that gives rise to this same view, establishing this same thesis: I accept all things without exception; second, there is a certain class that gives rise to this same view, establishing this same thesis: I accept nothing at all; third, there is a certain class that gives rise to this same view, establishing this same thesis: I accept some in part, and do not accept some in part. Here, if one says, I accept all things without exception, then he, in reliance upon this same view, gives rise to craving and attachment; if one says, I accept nothing at all, then he, in reliance upon this same view, does not give rise to craving and attachment; if one says, I accept some in part and do not accept some in part, then he, in reliance upon this same view, in part gives rise to craving and attachment, and in part does not give rise to craving and attachment. One asks: every wrong-view assemblage without exception is capable of giving rise to craving and attachment — for what reason, then, does the Bhagavān state that, in reliance upon this view, there is a case in which it does not arise? The answer: it should be understood that this scripture carries a separate underlying intent — that is, the eternalist clings to the existence of a future life, and, with respect to the very intention that draws forth the karma giving rise to future existence, gives rise to craving and attachment; the annihilationist clings to the non-existence of a future life, and, with respect to the very intention that draws forth the karma giving rise to future existence, does not give rise to craving and attachment — this is the underlying intent of what that same scripture states. Yet every wrong-view assemblage without exception is, in fact, capable of giving rise to craving and attachment — that is, the annihilationist believes there exists a present entry into the womb as the very beginning, and the end of life as the very end, denying and negating any other world beyond — and, with respect to this same view, he gives rise to craving and attachment, being, in this respect, no different at all from the eternalist's own tenacious clinging.