Five Theses and a Schism

Exactly as the scripture states: the Buddha said to the wandering ascetic: whatever ascetic or brāhmaṇa relinquishes the wrong-view assemblages and does not grasp them is, you should know, rare among the rare. One asks: how is this same kind rare among the rare? The answer: among the sentient beings of the world, those whose own nature is dull and obtuse are as numerous as the earth's own soil; those whose own nature is intelligent and wise are as few as the soil upon a fingernail's tip; and even among those of intelligent and wise nature, those who hold wrong views are many, and those who hold right views are few, exactly as illustrated before — and it is for this reason that this is named rare among the rare. One asks: exactly as the *Dṛṣṭi*-skandhaka states, the eternalist and the annihilationist are mutually contradictory — how, then, can it be said here that there exists a certain kind who gives rise to this same view, "I accept some in part, and do not accept some in part," without any contradiction at all? The answer: it should be understood that what is spoken of here refers to a single person who, holding the form-aggregate to be eternal, holds the remaining four aggregates to be subject to annihilation, or, holding the remaining four aggregates to be eternal, holds the form-aggregate to be subject to annihilation — and it is for this reason that these two views are not mutually contradictory. The *Dṛṣṭi*-skandhaka speaks of two separate persons — one holding form to be eternal, the other holding form to be subject to annihilation, and so on, down to consciousness, likewise being held in these same two ways — and it is for this reason that these two views are, there, mutually contradictory. That same scripture, further, states: at the very time the Bhagavān taught this same dharma of the wrong-view assemblages, the long-nailed wandering ascetic became free of dust and free of defilement, giving rise to the pure dharma-eye with respect to the various dharmas; at that time, the Venerable Śāriputra, half a month having passed since his own full ordination, following along in observing this same dharma, attained arhatship. One asks: what dharma, at that time, did Śāriputra follow along in observing? The Venerable Vasumitra speaks as follows: the Venerable Śāriputra followed along precisely in observing the very dharma of the wrong-view assemblages that the Bhagavān taught to that same wandering ascetic, and thereby accomplished arhatship. There are, further, those who say: the Venerable Śāriputra followed along precisely in observing the very dharma observed on the path by which the wandering ascetic attained the fruit of stream-entry, and thereby accomplished arhatship. There are those who say: the Venerable Śāriputra followed along precisely in observing the very learner's dharma that the wandering ascetic realized upon attaining the fruit of stream-entry, and thereby accomplished arhatship. The Great Virtuous One speaks as follows: this same Śāriputra followed along in observing the very dharma of dependent origination's own twelve distinct branches, and thereby accomplished arhatship. This is named the dharma that Śāriputra followed along in observing.

Whoever gives rise to this view — that there exists an arhat molested by the heavenly Māra, discharging impurity — and so on, stated at length. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is in order to distinguish the evil views that arise, after the Buddha's own parinirvāṇa, among those falsely named monks, causing the wise to know them and thereby restrain them, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. Whoever gives rise to this view — that there exists an arhat molested by the heavenly Māra, discharging impurity — which of the five views is this gathered within, and by seeing which truth is this view cut off? The answer: reckoning what is not a cause to be a cause, gathered within clinging to precepts and vows, abandoned by seeing suffering. Here, "reckoning what is not a cause to be a cause" refers to the fact that this same impurity arises from affliction, and yet it is said that it issues forth because of being molested by the heavenly Māra, and it is for this reason that clinging to precepts and vows is its own self-nature; "abandoned by seeing suffering" displays its own counteraction — at the very moment the knowledge of suffering arises, it is capable of cutting off this same unreal investigation, this same unreal discrimination, and this same inverted evil view, causing it to be eternally extinguished, and it is for this reason that it is named abandoned by seeing suffering, stated fully as before. Whoever gives rise to this view — that there exists an arhat who, with respect to his own liberation, still possesses some ignorance — which of the five views is this gathered within, and by seeing which truth is this view cut off? The answer: slandering the arhat's own undefiled knowledge and vision, gathered within wrong view, abandoned by seeing the path. Here, "slandering the arhat's own undefiled knowledge and vision" refers to

the fact that the arhat, with respect to his own liberation, has, through undefiled knowledge and vision, already become free of ignorance, and yet it is said that he still possesses some ignorance, thereby denying and negating this same undefiled knowledge and vision, and it is for this reason that wrong view is its own self-nature; "abandoned by seeing the path" displays its own counteraction — at the very moment the knowledge of the path arises, it is capable of cutting off this same unreal investigation, and so on, stated at length, exactly as should be understood before. Whoever gives rise to this view — that there exists an arhat who, with respect to his own liberation, still possesses some hesitation and doubt — which of the five views is this gathered within, and by seeing which truth is this view cut off? The answer: slandering the arhat's own having crossed over hesitation and doubt, gathered within wrong view, abandoned by seeing the path. Here, "slandering the arhat's own having crossed over hesitation and doubt" refers to the fact that the arhat, with respect to his own liberation, has, through the undefiled path, already cut off hesitation and doubt, and yet it is said that he still possesses some hesitation and doubt, thereby denying and negating this same path, and it is for this reason that wrong view is its own self-nature; "abandoned by seeing the path" displays its own counteraction — at the very moment the knowledge of the path arises, it is capable of cutting off this same unreal investigation,

and so on, stated at length, exactly as should be understood before. Whoever gives rise to this view — that there exists an arhat who is liberated solely through another's guidance — which of the five views is this gathered within, and by seeing which truth is this view cut off? The answer: slandering the arhat's own unobstructed, unimpeded, directly-perceived wisdom-eye and self-mastery of bodily witness, gathered within wrong view, abandoned by seeing the path. Here, "slandering the arhat's own unobstructed, unimpeded, directly-perceived wisdom-eye and self-mastery of bodily witness" refers to the fact that the arhat has, in genuine truth, himself realized this same unobstructed, unimpeded, directly-perceived wisdom-eye and self-mastery of bodily witness, not attaining liberation solely through another — and yet it is said that he attains liberation solely through another, thereby slandering the noble path, and it is for this reason that wrong view is its own self-nature; "abandoned by seeing the path" displays its own counteraction — at the very moment the knowledge of the path arises, it is capable of cutting off this same unreal investigation, and so on, stated at length, exactly as should be understood before. Whoever gives rise to this view — that the path, and the path-branches, are summoned forth by the utterance of the word "suffering" — which of the five views is this gathered within, and by seeing which truth is this view cut off?

The answer: reckoning what is not a cause to be a cause, gathered within clinging to precepts and vows, abandoned by seeing suffering. Here, "reckoning what is not a cause to be a cause" refers to the fact that every noble path whatsoever must necessarily be cultivated before it is attained, and yet it is said that the utterance of the word "suffering" is capable of summoning it forth to arise, and it is for this reason that clinging to precepts and vows is its own self-nature; "abandoned by seeing suffering" displays its own counteraction —

at the very moment the knowledge of suffering arises, it is capable of cutting off this same unreal investigation, and so on, stated at length, exactly as should be understood before. This same view reckons the fruit of suffering to be the cause of the path, and it is for this reason that, at the very moment of seeing suffering, this same view is eternally cut off.

Having already stated the own-nature of these five evil views, together with their own counteraction, what is their own arising-condition? The answer: the causal circumstance of Mahādeva is this same arising-condition. Long ago, within the kingdom of Mathurā, there was a certain merchant-lord who, having married a wife while still young, had a single son born to him, whose own countenance was upright and handsome, and to whom he gave the name Mahādeva. Not long afterward, this same merchant-lord, carrying his own treasure, journeyed far to another country, engaging in successive trading there, and, a long span of time passing, he did not return; his own son, having grown to maturity, became defiled with his own mother.

Afterward, hearing that his own father was about to return, his own mind became fearful, and, together with his mother, he devised a scheme and thereupon killed his own father. Having already committed one act of immediate retribution, the matter gradually came to light, and, taking his mother with him, he fled and hid himself, moving from place to place, in the city of Pāṭaliputra. He afterward encountered an arhat monk whom his own native country had once supported, and, again fearing the matter would come to light, he devised a scheme and killed this same monk. Having already committed a second act of immediate retribution, his own mind grew troubled and sorrowful; afterward, further seeing his own mother consorting with another man, he said, in indignation and anger: it is for her sake that I have committed these two grave offenses, drifting and wandering to another country, restless and unsettled — and now she abandons me for another, better man; who could possibly bear such wanton defilement? — and, thereupon, by some scheme, he further killed his own mother. Having already committed a third act of immediate retribution, by virtue of the force of his own not-yet-cut-off wholesome roots, a deep sorrow and regret arose within him, and he could not rest in sleep, reflecting to himself: by what means might these grave offenses ever be extinguished? He afterward heard it said that the śramaṇas, the sons of the Śākyas, possessed a dharma for extinguishing offenses, and he thereupon went to the Kukkuṭārāma monastery, where, outside its own gate, he beheld a monk walking slowly along in meditation, reciting a verse that said:

If a person has committed a grave offense, and cultivates the wholesome in order to extinguish it, he is thereby able to illuminate the world, exactly as the moon emerges from behind clouded haze. Upon hearing this, he became joyful and leapt with excitement, knowing that taking refuge in the Buddha's own teaching could certainly extinguish his offenses, and so he went before this same monk, earnestly and repeatedly requesting to be granted ordination and renunciation. This same monk, seeing his earnest request, without carefully examining and questioning him, thereupon granted him ordination and renunciation, giving him back the name Mahādeva, and instructing and admonishing him in the teaching. Mahādeva was intelligent and wise, and, not long after his renunciation, was already able to recite and uphold the text and meaning of the Tripiṭaka, his own words clear and skillful, well able to guide and transform others, so that the whole of the city of Pāṭaliputra had none who did not look up to and revere him. The king, hearing of him, summoned him and repeatedly invited him into the inner palace, reverently making offerings and requesting him to expound the dharma. Afterward, once he had departed and was dwelling within the monastery, through improper mental application, he experienced a nocturnal emission of impurity while dreaming — yet he had earlier proclaimed himself to be an arhat,

and so he had his own disciple wash the soiled garment. The disciple addressed him, saying: an arhat is one whose every outflow has already been exhausted — how, then, can the Master still have such a matter occur? Mahādeva told him: it is the heavenly Māra's own molestation — you ought not to find this strange. There are, in brief, two kinds of what is discharged as an outflow — first, affliction; second, impurity. The outflow of affliction the arhat is without, yet he has not yet been able to avoid the outflow of impurity — for what reason is this so? Although every arhat's own affliction is indeed exhausted, how could he be without such matters as urination, defecation, weeping, and spitting? Yet the various heavenly Māras constantly harbor hatred and envy toward the Buddha's own teaching, and, upon seeing one who cultivates the wholesome, go to destroy it — even an arhat is thereby molested by them, and it is for this reason that I have discharged this impurity; this is that same Māra's own doing — you ought not, now, to entertain any doubt or suspicion about this. This is named the arising-condition of the first evil view. Mahādeva, further, wishing to cause his own disciples to rejoice and draw close to him, contrived a strategy and, in succession, predicted for them the four fruits of the ascetic life. At that time, this same disciple bowed his head and addressed him, saying: an arhat and the rest ought to possess the very knowledge of direct realization — how is it that we ourselves do not know this at all? He thereupon told them: every arhat, too, possesses some ignorance,

and you ought not, now, to lack faith in yourselves on this account. There are, in brief, two kinds of ignorance — first, defiled;

this the arhat is already without. Second, undefiled; this the arhat still possesses, and it is on this account that you, my disciples, are unable to know this of yourselves. This is named the arising-condition of the second evil view. At that time, these same disciples further addressed him, saying: we have heard it said that the noble ones have already crossed over hesitation and doubt — how is it, then, that we ourselves, with respect to the very truths of reality, still harbor hesitation and doubt? He, further, told them: every arhat, too, possesses some hesitation and doubt. Doubt is of two kinds — first, doubt of the nature of a latent tendency; this the arhat has already cut off. Second, doubt as to what is and is not the case; this the arhat has not yet cut off — even the solitary-realizer still possesses this, how much more so you, my disciples, who disparage yourselves by supposing you ought to be without any hesitation or doubt whatsoever with respect to the very truths of reality. This is named the arising-condition of the third evil view. Afterward, these same disciples, reading through the various scriptures, found it said that the arhat possesses the noble wisdom-eye, capable of bearing witness to his own liberation of himself, and thereupon addressed their own teacher, saying: were we ourselves arhats, we ought to bear witness to this of ourselves — how is it, then, that it is solely through our teacher's own causing us to enter this attainment, with no manifest knowledge whatsoever capable of bearing witness to it ourselves? He thereupon answered them, saying: there exist arhats who, solely through another, enter this attainment, without being able to know this of themselves — exactly as Śāriputra, foremost in wisdom, and Mahāmaudgalyāyana, foremost in supernormal powers — had the Buddha not himself made a prediction concerning them, they, too, would not have known this of themselves; how much more so one who enters this attainment through another, and yet is expected to understand it of himself?

You, therefore, ought not to press this matter to its utmost conclusion. This is named the arising-condition of the fourth evil view. Yet this same Mahādeva, although he had committed these various evil deeds, had not, on that account, entirely cut off his own wholesome roots, and so, afterward, in the middle of the night, reflecting to himself upon the gravity of his own offenses, and upon just where he would undergo such intense suffering for them, pressed by anxiety and dread, he repeatedly cried out, "suffering, alas!" The disciples dwelling nearby, hearing this, were startled and puzzled, and, in the morning, came to inquire after him, asking whether he was at peace. Mahādeva answered them,

saying: I am at perfect ease. The disciples then said: if this is so, then why, last night, did you cry out, "suffering, alas!"? He thereupon told them: I was summoning the noble path — you ought not to find this strange, for the various noble paths, unless invoked with the utmost sincerity, will, in the end, never manifest themselves — and it is for this reason that, last night, I repeatedly cried out, "suffering, alas!" This is named the arising-condition of the fifth evil view. Mahādeva afterward gathered together what he had earlier stated, these five evil matters, and composed a verse, saying:

Led astray by another; ignorance; doubt; entered through another; the path arises because of an utterance — this is the true teaching of the Buddha. Afterward, in due course, within the Kukkuṭārāma temple, the senior monks, for the most part, had already passed away, and, on the fifteenth night, at the time of the poṣadha recitation, it fell to Mahādeva to ascend the seat and recite the precepts; he thereupon himself recited this same verse he had composed. At that time, among the assembly, there were, whether learners or non-learners, many who were widely learned and who upheld the precepts and cultivated dhyāna, and, hearing what he said, there was none who was not startled and who did not rebuke him: alas, what a foolish person, to speak in such a way! This has never before been heard within the Tripiṭaka! — and they at once, in his very presence, reversed his own verse, saying:

Led astray by another; ignorance; doubt; entered through another; the path arises because of an utterance — this is not what you say it is, the Buddha's teaching. At this, the entire night was spent in tumultuous dispute, and, by the following morning, the factions had only grown more entrenched — the city's own officials and commoners, and even the great ministers, one after another came to try to reconcile them, yet none was able to bring the matter to rest. The king, hearing of this, himself came in person to the monastery. At this, the two factions each insisted upon their own recitation, and the king, upon hearing this, likewise gave rise to doubt within himself, and asked Mahādeva: which is wrong, and which is right? Upon which faction ought we, at present, to rely? Mahādeva addressed the king, saying: the precepts-scripture itself states that, wishing to bring a dispute to rest, one ought to rely upon the words of the greater number. The king thereupon caused the two factions of the saṅgha to dwell separately: among the faction of the noble and virtuous, although the senior elders were many, the monks' own number was few; among Mahādeva's own faction, although the senior elders were few, the multitude's own number was great. The king thereupon followed the greater number, relying upon Mahādeva's own assembly, and rebuked and subdued the remaining assembly, and, the matter having concluded, returned to his own palace. At that time, the dispute at the Kukkuṭārāma had still not come to rest, and, afterward, following their own divergent views, the saṅgha split into two divisions — first, the Sthavira, the Elders; second, the Mahāsāṃghika, the Great Assembly. At that time, the noble and virtuous ones, knowing the assembly to be at odds and divided, thereupon relinquished the Kukkuṭārāma, wishing to go elsewhere; the ministers, hearing of this, at once reported it to the king, and the king, upon hearing it, became angered, and commanded his own ministers, saying: they ought all to be led to the bank of the river Gaṅgā, placed aboard a broken vessel, and set adrift upon the current to sink and drown — this alone will prove whether these ones are noble or common. The ministers, receiving the king's own command, thereupon proceeded to test them in this way. At that time, the noble and virtuous ones each gave rise to their own supernormal power, and, exactly like a king of geese, rose into the empty air and departed, further using their own supernormal force to gather up, from within the vessel, those who had likewise relinquished the Kukkuṭārāma but had not yet attained supernormal power, manifesting various supernormal transformations, taking on every manner of form, and then, riding upon the empty air, departed toward the northwest. The king, upon hearing and beholding this, was overcome with deep shame and regret, and, swooning, fell to the ground, only reviving once sprinkled with water; he at once dispatched men to seek out where they had gone, and the messengers returned reporting that they were now dwelling in Kashmir. He again earnestly entreated them to return to the saṅgha, but all of them declined, on grounds of their own impending death. The king thereupon relinquished the whole of the kingdom of Kashmir to them, constructing monasteries there in which to establish the noble and virtuous assembly, and, in accordance with the various forms they had earlier manifested, he named these same monasteries accordingly, there coming to be, in this way, some five hundred monasteries called Kukkuṭārāma and the like; he further dispatched envoys, bearing abundant treasures, to provision and furnish them, making offerings to them. It is by virtue of this that, from that time to the present, this same country has possessed many noble and virtuous assemblies upholding the Buddha's own teaching, transmitted and constructed one after another down to this very day, still flourishing. The king of Pāṭaliputra, having thus lost that same assembly, led his own following in making offerings and dwelling among the monks of the Kukkuṭārāma. Afterward, Mahādeva, while wandering about the city and its outskirts, happened to be seen by a certain diviner, who secretly recorded his own prediction, saying: this śākya-son will, seven days hence, most certainly meet his end. His disciples, hearing of this, in anxious dread, reported it to him; he thereupon replied, saying: I have long known this already. He then returned to the Kukkuṭārāma and dispatched his own disciples, scattering throughout the city of Pāṭaliputra to proclaim to all: to the king, and to the various ministers, elders, and householders — seven days hence, I shall enter parinirvāṇa.

The king and the rest, upon hearing this, were, without exception, grieved and lamenting. When the seventh day arrived, he accordingly came to the end of his life; the king, the various ministers, and the officials and commoners throughout the city, in sorrowful longing, each prepared fragrant firewood, together with ghee, oil, flowers, incense, and other such things, and, having gathered them together in a single place, cremated him there. Yet, however they brought fire to light it, the flame, the moment it reached the pyre, was extinguished, and, by every manner of device, they were, in the end, unable to make it burn. There was a certain diviner who said to the assembled multitude: this body cannot bear so excellent a funeral apparatus — it would be fitting to sprinkle it with dog dung, defiling it. They accordingly followed his words, and the fire then blazed forth, and, within a short while, it was consumed and reduced entirely to ash; a sudden, violent wind then arose and scattered it, leaving nothing behind. This, then, is the arising-condition of the preceding evil views — those of wisdom ought to know to avoid it.

What is the knowledge of others' minds? What is the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge? And such chapters as these, together with their own explanatory meaning — having already comprehended them, they ought now to be fully explained in turn. One asks: for what reason does the Venerable compiler compose this treatise in reliance upon these two preceding kinds of knowledge? The answer: it is simply because this same Venerable compiler's own intention was thus — that is, the compiler of the base treatise, composing his treatise according to his own wish, does not contravene the characteristics of the dharmas, and it is thereby not to be faulted — exactly as this same Venerable compiler, within the Faculties Aggregate, composed his treatise in reliance upon the two kinds of dharma-cognition and subsequent cognition; within the Concentration Aggregate, composed his treatise in reliance upon the two kinds of knowledge of exhaustion and of non-arising; further, within the Faculties Aggregate, composed his treatise in reliance upon the four kinds of knowledge of suffering, accumulation, cessation, and the path; within the Fetters Aggregate, the Concentration Aggregate, and later within this very aggregate, composed his treatise in reliance upon the eight kinds of knowledge; and, in the section on the cultivation of knowledge and the like, composed his treatise in reliance upon the ten kinds of knowledge — in just the same way, this same Venerable compiler, at the very opening of this aggregate, composes his treatise in reliance upon these two kinds of knowledge, the knowledge of others' minds and the recollection of former abodes, exactly as a skillful potter first thoroughly kneads his own lump of clay and places it upon the wheel, and then, according to his own wish, fashions vessels and other objects from it — this same Venerable compiler, too, is just the same: having, through the wisdom of hearing, thinking, and cultivation, observed the characteristics of the dharmas, and cut off both the delusion regarding self-nature and the delusion regarding the object, he composes his treatise according to his own wish, and is thereby not to be faulted. Further, it is because these two preceding kinds of knowledge both pervade what is attained through preparatory effort and what is attained through freedom from defilement, both being accomplished through cultivation, both pervading the very own-nature of the superknowledges, and both being the fruit of the four-branch and five-branch dhyānas, that this treatise is composed with particular reliance upon them. Further, it is because these two preceding kinds of knowledge both take knowledge and vision as their own-nature, and both take hold of their own object according to a fixed boundary — that is, the knowledge of others' minds takes solely the present as its object, while the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge takes solely the past as its object — that this treatise is composed with particular reliance upon them. There are those who say: it is because these two kinds of knowledge both pervade the contaminated and the undefiled, these two categories, that this treatise is composed with particular reliance upon them. The verdict: this ought not to be said, since the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge is solely contaminated.

What is the knowledge of others' minds? The answer: whatever knowledge is accomplished through cultivation, is the fruit of cultivation, relies upon cultivation as its support, and, once attained, is never lost, capable of knowing another's own continuum's present mind and mental concomitants belonging to the desire or form realm, or his undefiled mind and mental concomitants — this is named the knowledge of others' minds. Here, "whatever knowledge is accomplished through cultivation" refers to the fact that this takes the wisdom accomplished through cultivation as its own-nature; "is the fruit of cultivation" refers to the fact that this is the fruit of the four-branch and five-branch dhyānas; "relies upon cultivation as its support" refers to the fact that this is accomplished in reliance upon repeated habituation; "once attained, is never lost" refers to the fact that, once genuinely realized, it is never relinquished. One asks: for what reason does the text not speak of "not yet attained" or "already lost"? The answer: this ought indeed to be so stated, and that it is not so stated here should be understood to be a case whose meaning has been left over for elsewhere. Further, it is with reference to whatever knowledge, by virtue of which one is said to possess the very mastery of the knowledge of others' minds, that this is spoken of here; the various kinds of knowledge of others' minds that are not yet attained or already lost possess no such meaning, and it is for this reason that these are not spoken of. As for "capable of knowing another's own continuum's present mind and mental concomitants belonging to the desire or form realm, or his undefiled mind and mental concomitants": this refers to being capable of genuinely knowing, in accordance with reality, another sentient being's own bodily continuum's present-world desire-realm or form-realm mind and mental concomitants, or his undefiled mind and mental concomitants — this states the very characteristic of the object taken by the knowledge of others' minds. There exists a separate recitation, which states: whatever knowledge, once manifest, genuinely knows, in accordance with reality, that another sentient being possesses something sought after, something examined, or something taken up and held, this being mind, and what belongs to mind, arisen from a multitude of conditions — this is named the knowledge of others' minds. Here, "whatever knowledge, once manifest" refers to the manifest activity of the knowledge of others' minds; "genuinely knows, in accordance with reality" distinguishes this from the knowledge of divination and prognostication, and the like; "another sentient being" distinguishes this from knowing one's own mind and mental concomitants; "something sought after" refers to the mind and mental concomitants of the desire realm and the first dhyāna; "something examined" refers to the mind and mental concomitants of the intermediate dhyāna; "something taken up and held" refers to the mind and mental concomitants of the latter three dhyānas. There are, further, those who say: "something sought after" displays the desire realm and the first dhyāna; "something examined" displays from the desire realm up through the intermediate dhyāna; "something taken up and held" displays from the desire realm up through the fourth dhyāna — here, this displays what is capable of "seeking," and the like, and it is thereby form and the other such dharmas that are not the object of this same knowledge. "Arisen from a multitude of conditions" refers to the fact that, exactly as the knowing knowledge itself arises from four conditions, so too what is known likewise arises from four conditions; "mind, and what belongs to mind" refers to the fact that "mind" is precisely the mind itself, while the various mental concomitants are named "what belongs to mind" — in this way, every one of these terms describes the object of the knowledge of others' minds. This same knowledge of others' minds might, alternatively, be spoken of as a single thing — this referring to the knowledge of others' minds as a superknowledge and as a guiding faculty. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as two things — this referring to the contaminated and the undefiled, the bound and the liberated, the fettered and the unfettered. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as three things — this referring to the lower, middle, and upper grades. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as four things —

this referring to the fruit of the four dhyānas. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as six things — this referring to the contaminated and the undefiled, each of three grades. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as eight things — this referring to the fruit of the four dhyānas, each having a contaminated and an undefiled form. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as nine things — this referring to the lowest of the low grade up through the highest of the high grade. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as twelve things — this referring to the fruit of the four dhyānas, each of three grades. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as eighteen things — this referring to the contaminated and the undefiled, each of nine grades. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as twenty-four things — this referring to the fruit of the four dhyānas, each having a contaminated and an undefiled form, each of these, further, having three grades. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as thirty-six things — this referring to the fruit of the four dhyānas, each of nine grades. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as seventy-two things — this referring to the fruit of the four dhyānas, each having a contaminated and an undefiled form, each of these, further, having nine grades. Were one to distinguish it according to each single moment present within the body, one ought to speak of it as measureless and boundless — here, it is spoken of in general as a single knowledge of others' minds. One asks: what does this same knowledge of others' minds take as its own-nature? The answer: it takes wisdom as its own-nature. This is named the knowledge of others' minds' own own-nature, own substance, own inherent nature, own characteristic, own portion, and own original nature. Having already stated its own-nature, what it is so named for ought now to be stated.

One asks: for what reason is it named the knowledge of others' minds? What, precisely, is the meaning of "knowledge of others' minds"? The answer: it is because it knows another's own mind that it is named the knowledge of others' minds. One asks: this same knowledge likewise knows another's various mental concomitants as well — for what reason, then, is it named solely the knowledge of others' minds? The answer: the various practitioners of yoga's own inclination and preparatory effort is to wish to know another's own mind, not another's own mental concomitants, and it is for this reason that solely the name "knowledge of others' minds" is established — taking mind as what comes first, it likewise thereby knows the mental concomitants as well, exactly as a person whose own inclination and preparatory effort is solely to wish to see the king — upon seeing the king, he sees the ministers and the rest as well. Further, the various dharmas' own names are established in reliance upon a great many different conditions — that is, some are established in reliance upon self-nature, some in reliance upon counteraction, some in reliance upon preparatory effort, some in reliance upon association, some in reliance upon support, some in reliance upon object, some in reliance upon aspect, and some in reliance upon both object and aspect together. As for names established in reliance upon self-nature: this refers to the five aggregates, the four truths, worldly knowledge, and the like. As for names established in reliance upon counteraction: this refers to dharma-cognition and subsequent cognition, since these counteract the desire realm and the two upper realms respectively. As for names established in reliance upon preparatory effort: this refers to the sphere of infinite space, the sphere of infinite consciousness, the sphere of nothingness, the concentration of direct vision in its five modes, the knowledge of others' minds, and the like. As for names established in reliance upon association: this is exactly as the *Prakaraṇapāda* states — what is the dharma associated with pleasurable feeling, and the like? This refers to whatever is associated with pleasurable feeling, and the like — every such case ought to be understood in just the same way. As for names established in reliance upon support: this refers to eye-consciousness, and the like. As for names established in reliance upon object: this refers to the four applications of mindfulness, the signless concentration, and the like. As for names established in reliance upon aspect: this refers to the knowledge of suffering and of accumulation, since these two possess an unmixed aspect but a mixed object. As for names established in reliance upon both object and aspect together: this refers to the knowledge of cessation and of the path, since these two possess both an unmixed object and an unmixed aspect. Such causes and conditions for establishing a name as these are, in fact, measureless — here, the knowledge of others' minds is named solely in reliance upon preparatory effort, and not otherwise. Further, among the associated category, mind is itself supreme, and it is in reliance upon knowing what is supreme that this same name for this knowledge is established, exactly as one speaks of "the king has come," without this implying that his ministers and the rest are not also present. Further, it is because it is in reliance upon mind that the mental concomitants are named, mind being the very ground of the universal, and it is because the various mental concomitants belong to it that mind alone is spoken of. Further, at the very stage of the uninterrupted path of cultivating the penetration into others' minds, one takes solely mind as one's object, and it is for this reason that solely the knowing of mind is spoken of.

As for the realm this same knowledge of others' minds belongs to: the contaminated knowledge of others' minds belongs to the form realm; the undefiled knowledge of others' minds is unbound to any realm. One asks: for what reason does the formless realm possess no knowledge of others' minds? The answer: because it is not a fitting vessel, and so on, stated at length. Further, cultivating the knowledge of others' minds arises in dependence upon form, and it is for this reason that, as to ground, it exists solely within the four fundamental dhyānas, not within the access grounds, since the formless realm's own grounds are incapable of giving rise to the five superknowledges. One asks: by the knowledge belonging to which ground is the mind and mental concomitants of the intermediate dhyāna known? There are those who say: it is known by the superior grade of knowledge of the first dhyāna. There are, further, those who say: it is known by the inferior grade of knowledge of the second dhyāna. The verdict: it ought to be said that all three grades of the first dhyāna's own knowledge are capable of knowing it — for what reason is this so? Because it is gathered within the very same ground. As for what it relies upon as its support: it arises solely in dependence upon a body belonging to the desire or form realm. As for its aspect: the undefiled knowledge of others' minds turns while taking the four aspects of the path-truth as its object; the contaminated knowledge of others' minds turns while taking an unclear aspect. As for its object: the first dhyāna's own knowledge of others' minds takes as its object the mind and mental concomitants belonging to the desire realm and the first dhyāna's own ground; the second dhyāna's own knowledge of others' minds takes as its object the mind and mental concomitants belonging to the desire realm and the former two dhyānas' own ground; the third dhyāna's own knowledge of others' minds takes as its object the mind and mental concomitants belonging to the desire realm and the former three dhyānas' own ground; the fourth dhyāna's own knowledge of others' minds takes as its object the mind and mental concomitants belonging to the desire realm and the four dhyānas' own ground. No knowledge of others' minds is capable of knowing the mind and mental concomitants of the formless realm, since that same ground is superior — exactly as the first dhyāna's own knowledge of others' minds, and the like, does not know the mind and mental concomitants of the second dhyāna, and the like. One asks: for one born within the desire or form realm who gives rise to the mind and mental concomitants of a formless ground, is this the object taken by the knowledge of others' minds, or not? The answer: it is not the object taken, exactly as one who does not know the effect likewise does not know its cause. As for the applications of mindfulness it belongs to: it belongs to three applications of mindfulness, excepting the application of mindfulness on the body. As for the kinds of knowledge it belongs to: it belongs to four kinds of knowledge — namely, dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, the knowledge of the path, and worldly knowledge — this being spoken of, in general, as the knowledge of others' minds. As for whether it co-arises with a concentration: the undefiled knowledge of others' minds co-arises with the concentrations of the path and of wishlessness; the contaminated knowledge of others' minds does not co-arise with any concentration. As for the faculties it is associated with: it is spoken of, in general, as being associated with these same three faculties — namely, pleasure, joy, and equanimity. As for the three times: it takes the three times as its object — that is, taking the past as its object with respect to the past, taking the present as its object with respect to the present, and, with respect to the future, taking the future as its object if the dharma is one that will arise, or taking all three times as its object if the dharma is one that will not arise. As for wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral: it is solely wholesome; taking the wholesome, the unwholesome, and the neutral as its object, it takes all three kinds as its object. As for bound and unbound: the contaminated knowledge of others' minds is bound solely to the form realm; the undefiled knowledge of others' minds is solely unbound; taking the bound and the unbound as its object, it takes both the desire and form realms' own bound dharmas, and the unbound, as its object. As for the learner, the non-learner, and neither: it pervades all three kinds; taking the learner, the non-learner, and neither as its object, it takes all three kinds as its object. As for abandoned by seeing, abandoned by cultivation, and not to be abandoned: the contaminated knowledge of others' minds is solely abandoned by cultivation; the undefiled knowledge of others' minds is not to be abandoned; taking as its object what is abandoned by seeing, by cultivation, and what is not to be abandoned, it takes all three kinds as its object. As for taking a name or taking a meaning as its object: it takes solely a meaning as its object. As for taking its own or another's continuum, or what is not a continuum, as its object: it takes solely another's continuum as its object. As for whether it is attained through preparatory effort or through freedom from defilement: it pervades both attainment through preparatory effort and through freedom from defilement. As for attainment through freedom from defilement: this refers to the fact that one belonging to the first dhyāna attains it at the very time of becoming free of the desire realm's own defilement, and so on, up through, one belonging to the fourth dhyāna attains it at the very time of becoming free of the third dhyāna's own defilement, or it may also be attained through cultivation at the very time of becoming free of the defilement of one's own ground or of a ground above. As for attainment through preparatory effort: this refers to the fact that it is attained at the very time of cultivating the practice of further advancement, and is caused to manifest in the present through engaging in preparatory effort — that is, the various disciples attain it through a middling or superior grade of preparatory effort; the solitary-realizer attains it solely through an inferior grade of preparatory effort; the Buddha does not cause it to manifest in the present through any preparatory effort at all.

As for whether it is previously attained or not previously attained: every noble one, and every ordinary being belonging to the inner dharma, pervades both what is previously attained and what is not previously attained; the ordinary being belonging to an outer dharma possesses solely what is previously attained.

One asks: what is the preparatory practice for cultivating the knowledge of others' minds? The answer: the *Prajñaptiśāstra* states as follows: the one first taking up this practice, having already attained self-mastery within worldly concentration, repeatedly gives rise to it in the present, causing it to become ever clearer and sharper, and, first, carefully observes his own own bodily and mental characteristics — whenever the body manifests such-and-such a characteristic, he then gives rise to a mind of this same characteristic; whenever he himself gives rise to a mind of this same characteristic, the body, at that time, manifests this same characteristic. Having already carefully observed his own own bodily and mental characteristics in this way, he next carefully observes another's own bodily and mental characteristics — whenever the body manifests such-and-such a characteristic, he then gives rise to a mind of this same characteristic; whenever another gives rise to a mind of this same characteristic, the body, at that time, manifests this same characteristic. Having already carefully observed another's own bodily and mental characteristics in this way, he next observes purely this same mind and its mental concomitants, reflecting as follows: I ought to observe this same mind and its mental concomitants — what does it seek after? What does it examine? What does it take up and hold? Having already reflected in this way, he purely observes this same mind's own continuum, its own distinct aspects before and after —

once his observation of this same mental characteristic has reached genuine maturity, this very point is named the accomplishment and full perfection of the preparatory practice for cultivating the knowledge of others' minds. The *Saṅgītiparyāya* states as follows: what is the preparatory practice for cultivating the knowledge of others' minds? It refers to carefully observing, with respect to the object of the five aggregates of clinging, the distinct aspects of the knowledge that it is suffering, impermanent, empty, and without self, gradually drawing forth the arising of undefiled knowledge, and thereby skillfully knowing another's own mind — this is named the knowledge of others' minds. One asks: the undefiled knowledge of others' minds is capable of taking as its object the knowledge belonging to all four truths — for what reason, then, is it stated here that it takes solely the knowledge of suffering as its object? The answer: it ought indeed to be stated that it takes the knowledge belonging to the remaining three truths as its object as well, and that this is not so stated here should be understood to be a case whose meaning has been left over for elsewhere. Further, what is spoken of here refers solely to the very initial entry into preparatory effort, taking solely the knowledge of suffering as its object, without speaking of its taking the remaining kinds of knowledge as its object; once it has continued for some time afterward, it takes the remaining kinds of knowledge as its object as well. One asks: what distinction is there between what was stated earlier in the *Prajñaptiśāstra* and what is stated afterward in the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, regarding the preparatory practice? The answer: what was stated earlier is the preparatory practice for the contaminated knowledge of others' minds; what is stated afterward is the preparatory practice for the undefiled knowledge of others' minds. Further, what was stated earlier is the preparatory practice for the knowledge of others' minds that is not yet supreme, wondrous, bright, and pure; what is stated afterward is the preparatory practice for the knowledge of others' minds that is supreme, wondrous, bright, and pure. Yet the knowledge of others' minds, although, at the very time of preparatory effort, it, too, takes form as its object, does not, once it reaches full perfection, take form as its object any longer — for what reason is this so? One first observes the coarse dharma in order to enter into the subtle. Further, the knowledge of others' minds, although, at the very time of preparatory effort, it, too, takes its own continuum as its object, once it reaches full perfection, takes solely another's continuum as its object — for what reason is this so? Taking one's own self as object is not named the knowledge of others' minds. Further, the knowledge of others' minds takes solely another's mind as its object, not the aspect of the object another's mind itself takes — were it to take the aspect of the object another's mind takes,

it would then be taking its own mind, not another's, as object, since one's own mind is itself both the object one takes and the very aspect of the mind that takes it. One asks: if the eye does not see form, is one still capable of knowing another's mind? The answer: he is capable of it, since the ear hears sound. One asks: if he does not see form or hear sound, is he still capable of knowing another's mind?

The answer: he is capable of it, since the nose smells scent. One asks: if he does not see form, hear sound, or smell scent, is he still capable of knowing another's mind? The answer: he is capable of it, since the tongue tastes flavor. One asks: if he does not see form, hear sound, smell scent, or taste flavor, is he still capable of knowing another's mind? The answer: he is capable of it, since the body senses tangible contact. One asks: if he does not see form, hear sound, smell scent, taste flavor, or sense tangible contact, is he still capable of knowing another's mind? There are those who say: he is incapable of it — for what reason is this so? Because the arising of the knowledge of others' minds depends upon a cause bound up with form. The verdict: it ought to be said that, at the very moment of its initial development, one is indeed incapable of it, but, once it has already reached full perfection, although one does not take form as one's object, one is nonetheless still capable of it. Previously attained contaminated mind and mental concomitants are of fifteen kinds, being the objects the knowledge of others' minds ought to take — this refers to the desire realm and the four dhyānas, each possessing a lower, middling, and upper grade of mind and mental concomitants. Previously attained contaminated knowledge of others' minds is of twelve kinds — this refers to the four dhyānas, each possessing a lower, middling, and upper grade of the knowledge of others' minds. Here, as for the first dhyāna's own previously attained contaminated lower-grade knowledge of others' minds: it is capable of knowing the desire realm's own three grades and the first dhyāna's own lower grade of previously attained contaminated mind and mental concomitants; the middling grade is capable of knowing the desire realm's own three grades and the first dhyāna's own lower and middling two grades of previously attained contaminated mind and mental concomitants; the upper grade is capable of knowing the desire realm's and the first dhyāna's own three grades apiece of previously attained contaminated mind and mental concomitants. In this way, proceeding onward, up through the fourth dhyāna's own upper-grade previously attained contaminated knowledge of others' minds, it is capable of knowing the desire realm's and the four dhyānas' own three grades apiece of previously attained contaminated mind and mental concomitants. Exactly as these twelve kinds of previously attained contaminated knowledge of others' minds know these fifteen kinds of previously attained contaminated mind and mental concomitants, so too do the twelve kinds of not-previously-attained contaminated knowledge of others' minds know these fifteen kinds of not-previously-attained contaminated mind and mental concomitants, in just the same way. Undefiled mind and mental concomitants are of twelve kinds, being the objects the knowledge of others' minds ought to take. The undefiled knowledge of others' minds is likewise of twelve kinds — this referring to the four dhyānas, each possessing three grades. Here, as for the second dhyāna's own lower-grade undefiled knowledge of others' minds: it is capable of knowing solely the lower grade of undefiled mind and mental concomitants belonging to the first and second dhyānas apiece; the middling grade is capable of knowing the lower and middling two grades of undefiled mind and mental concomitants belonging to the first and second dhyānas apiece; the upper grade is capable of knowing the three grades apiece of undefiled mind and mental concomitants belonging to the first and second dhyānas. In this way, proceeding onward, up through the fourth dhyāna's own upper-grade undefiled knowledge of others' minds, it is capable of knowing the three grades apiece of undefiled mind and mental concomitants belonging to the four dhyānas. One asks: for what reason is it that the lower and middling grade contaminated knowledge of others' minds of a higher ground is both equally capable of knowing the three grades of contaminated mind and mental concomitants of a lower ground, while the lower and middling grade undefiled knowledge of others' minds of a higher ground does not know the middling and upper grades of undefiled mind and mental concomitants of a lower ground? The answer: the establishment of contaminated and of undefiled mind and mental concomitants differs in each case — that is, contaminated mind and mental concomitants are established in reliance upon a given continuum, and a single bodily continuum can indeed accomplish all three grades of contaminated mind and mental concomitants at once; undefiled mind and mental concomitants are established in reliance upon a given faculty-grade, and no single bodily continuum accomplishes even two grades of undefiled mind and mental concomitants at once, how much less three — their own manner of establishment already differing, it is thereby known that they differ in this respect as well.

There exist fourteen kinds of all-pervading-fruit mind and mental concomitants, all being objects the knowledge of others' minds ought to take — this referring to the fact that the desire realm and the first dhyāna each possess the fruit of all four dhyānas; the second dhyāna possesses the fruit of the latter three dhyānas; the third dhyāna possesses the fruit of the latter two dhyānas; the fourth dhyāna possesses solely the fruit of the fourth dhyāna itself. One asks: how many kinds, among these, of the first dhyāna's own all-pervading-fruit mind and mental concomitants belonging to the desire realm and the four dhyānas, is the first dhyāna's own knowledge of others' minds capable of knowing? There are those who say: it is capable of knowing all four kinds — for what reason is this so? Because all of these are gathered within the desire realm. There are, further, those who say: it is capable of knowing solely the first dhyāna's own fruit, not the remaining three — for what reason is this so? Exactly as it does not know the cause, so too does it not know the effect.

Every knowledge of others' minds is incapable of knowing mind and mental concomitants that exceed it in ground, in faculty, or in person. As for being incapable of knowing mind and mental concomitants that exceed it in ground: this refers to the fact that the first dhyāna's own knowledge of others' minds is incapable of knowing the mind and mental concomitants of the second dhyāna and above, and so on, up through, the third dhyāna's own knowledge of others' minds is incapable of knowing the mind and mental concomitants of the fourth dhyāna and above. As for being incapable of knowing mind and mental concomitants that exceed it in faculty: this refers to the fact that the knowledge of others' minds belonging to one of dull faculty is incapable of knowing the mind and mental concomitants of one of sharp faculty.

As for being incapable of knowing mind and mental concomitants that exceed it in person: this refers to the fact that the learner's own knowledge of others' minds is incapable of knowing the non-learner's own mind and mental concomitants. One asks: is every non-learner's own knowledge of others' minds capable of knowing every learner's own mind and mental concomitants? The answer: it is not so —

that is, the knowledge of others' minds of one liberated in time is incapable of knowing the mind and mental concomitants of one who has arrived at insight; the knowledge of others' minds of one who has arrived at insight is likewise incapable of knowing the mind and mental concomitants of one liberated in time — for what reason is this so? The knowledge of others' minds of one liberated in time, with respect to the mind and mental concomitants of one who has arrived at insight, does not know them because it exceeds it in faculty; with respect to the mind and mental concomitants of one liberated in time, it does not know them because it exceeds it in person. One asks: the learner's own knowledge of others' minds belonging to a higher ground, and the non-learner's own knowledge of others' minds belonging to a lower ground — do these two mutually know one another? The answer: it is not so — for what reason is this so? The learner's own knowledge of others' minds belonging to a higher ground, with respect to the non-learner's own knowledge of others' minds belonging to a lower ground, does not know it because it exceeds it in person; the non-learner's own knowledge of others' minds belonging to a lower ground, with respect to the learner's own knowledge of others' minds belonging to a higher ground, does not know it because it exceeds it in ground. One asks: the disciple's own knowledge of others' minds belonging to a higher ground, and the Tathāgata's own knowledge of others' minds belonging to a lower ground — do these two mutually know one another? The answer: it is not so — for what reason is this so? The disciple's own knowledge of others' minds belonging to a higher ground, with respect to the Tathāgata's own knowledge of others' minds belonging to a lower ground, does not know it because it exceeds it in faculty; the Tathāgata's own knowledge of others' minds belonging to a lower ground,

with respect to the disciple's own knowledge of others' minds belonging to a higher ground, does not know it because it exceeds it in ground. As for the solitary-realizer, compared against the remaining vehicles, the same principle as before should be stated accordingly.

Neither the Tathāgata's own undefiled mind and mental concomitants, nor his own not-previously-attained contaminated mind and mental concomitants, are ever the object presently taken hold of by any knowledge of others' minds. As for his own previously attained contaminated mind and mental concomitants: whenever the Buddha wishes another to know his own mind, that other then knows it — that is, should the Buddha wish to cause one of dull faculty to know his own mind, then, leaving aside one of sharp faculty, even one such as a snake or a slave, too, would know the Buddha's own mind, while Śāriputra and the rest would all be incapable of knowing it; should he wish to cause a being of the animal destiny and the like to know his own mind, then, leaving aside the human and heavenly destinies, even the animal destiny and the like, too, would know the Buddha's own mind, while the human and heavenly destinies would all be incapable of knowing it. How is this to be known as so? Because the scripture states it to be so — that is, the scripture states: at one time, the Buddha was dwelling at the city of Vaiśālī, beside the Monkey Pool, within the many-storied lecture hall. At that time, the monks had placed both the Bhagavān's own alms bowl and their own bowls out in the open, and there was a certain monkey who, descending from a sāla tree, approached the place where the bowls lay. The assembly of monks, fearing that it would damage the bowls, competed with one another to drive it away. The Buddha said: you ought not to drive it away — it has a separate intention, which you shall shortly come to know. At that time, this same monkey took hold of the Bhagavān's own bowl, and, slowly, climbed back up into the tree, where it filled it to the brim with honey, and then, calmly and composedly, descended and offered it up to the Bhagavān. Because it contained insects, the Bhagavān did not accept it. The Buddha then gave rise to a previously attained contaminated mental state, causing the monkey to remove the insects; the monkey at once understood, and, withdrawing to one side, picked out and removed the insects, and then came again to offer it up to the Bhagavān. Because it had not yet been purified, the Buddha again did not accept it. The Buddha gave rise to a previously attained contaminated mental state, causing it to sprinkle it all over with water so as to purify it; the monkey at once understood, and, withdrawing to one side, sprinkled it with water to purify it, and then again offered it up to the Bhagavān. At this, the Bhagavān, out of compassion, accepted it. The monkey rejoiced and leapt about beyond measure, dancing and stepping backward, and, falling into a pit, died; by riding upon this same merit-karma, it attained rebirth among humans, and, growing to maturity, went forth into renunciation and diligently cultivated the pure conduct, and, not long afterward, attained the fruit of arhatship.

The world, in common, styled him the Elder Honey-Offerer. The Venerable Bala, by virtue of this same causal circumstance, praised the Buddha with a wondrous verse, saying:

The unsurpassed tamer of gods and humans is able to cause even those of an evil destiny, too, to know his own mind; yet were he to abide in a supremely profound, subtle concentration, then even humans and gods would be unable to comprehend it. The Buddha's own knowledge of others' minds is capable of knowing all three paths; the solitary-realizer's own knowledge of others' minds is capable of knowing two paths; the disciple's own knowledge of others' minds is capable of knowing solely one path.

One asks: can a buddha attain a knowledge of others' minds capable of taking another buddha as its object? There are those who say: he cannot — for what reason is this so? Because there are never two tathāgatas appearing in the world at one and the same time.

There are, further, those who say: he can — this speaking of a capacity to take as object, not of its actually manifesting in the present. One asks: can a solitary-realizer attain a knowledge of others' minds capable of taking another solitary-realizer as its object? The answer: as for the rhinoceros-horn-like solitary-realizer, this ought to be understood by the Buddha alone; as for the group-emerged solitary-realizer, he most certainly can attain a knowledge of others' minds capable of taking another group-emerged solitary-realizer as its object — this speaking both of a capacity to take as object and of its actually manifesting in the present. The disciple, too, most certainly can attain a knowledge of others' minds capable of taking another disciple as its object — this, too, speaking both of a capacity to take as object and of its actually manifesting in the present. The ordinary being most certainly can attain a knowledge of others' minds capable of taking another ordinary being as its object, exactly as stated for the group-emerged solitary-realizer and the various disciples. There are those who say: the rhinoceros-horn-like solitary-realizer, too, most certainly can attain a knowledge of others' minds capable of taking another rhinoceros-horn-like solitary-realizer as its object — this, too, speaking both of a capacity to take as object and of its actually manifesting in the present, since, in other world-systems, there exist rhinoceros-horn-like solitary-realizers appearing in the world, there being no principle that would prevent this. It is solely the Buddha's own undefiled mind and mental concomitants, and his own not-previously-attained contaminated mind and mental concomitants, that are, without exception, never taken as object by any manifestly arising knowledge of others' minds; every mind and mental concomitant of the formless realm is, without exception, never the object of any knowledge of others' minds, since it is simply not within its domain.