Five Hundred Lifetimes in a Single Thought

Among sentient beings, there are those who circulate onward, and there are those who return and cease — "circulating onward" refers to receiving further birth; "returning and ceasing" refers to proceeding toward nirvāṇa. If a sentient being is born within the desire or form realm, or if an ordinary being is born within the formless realm, then, for one who cultivates the knowledge of others' minds, with respect to that same being's own mind and mental concomitants, the knowledge of others' minds is attained by virtue of two matters — first, the capacity to take as object; second, manifest arising. If a sentient being has already entered complete nirvāṇa, or if a noble one is born within the formless realm, then, for one who cultivates the knowledge of others' minds, with respect to that same being's own mind and mental concomitants, the knowledge of others' minds is attained by virtue of a single matter alone — that is, solely the capacity to take as object, without manifest arising. One asks: can a noble one born within the formless realm still cultivate the knowledge of others' minds belonging to a lower ground? There are those who say: he cannot, since it is utterly impossible for it ever to arise there. The verdict: it ought to be said that, although it certainly does not arise, he can nonetheless still cultivate it, since one born above can still cultivate the undefiled dharmas of below, exactly as with the dharma-cognition category, this being consistent with principle; an ordinary being born there possesses no such cultivation at all.

There exists mind and mental concomitants that are the object of a buddha's own knowledge of others' minds, but not of a solitary-realizer's or disciple's; there exists mind and mental concomitants that are the object of a buddha's and a solitary-realizer's own knowledge of others' minds, but not of the various disciples'; there exists mind and mental concomitants that are the object of a buddha's, a solitary-realizer's, and a disciple's own knowledge of others' minds all alike. Exactly as the scripture states: monks, you should know that, within the Great Snow Mountains, there exist such places as these — where a monkey and a human being alike are unable to travel; there exist such places as these — where a monkey is capable of traveling, yet a human being is not; and there exist such places as these — where a monkey and a human being are both alike capable of traveling.

Within this same scripture, "the Great Snow Mountains" displays the dharma to be known; "such places as these" displays the fifteen moments belonging to the path of seeing; "monkey" displays the solitary-realizer; "human being" displays the disciple; "capable of traveling" and "not capable of traveling" display the various knowledges of others' minds. Yet the knowledge of others' minds is capable of knowing solely mind and mental concomitants of its own same kind, not of a different kind — that is, what is contaminated knows the contaminated; what is undefiled knows the undefiled; what is previously attained knows what is previously attained; what is not previously attained knows what is not previously attained; what belongs to the category of dharma-cognition knows what belongs to the category of dharma-cognition; what belongs to the category of subsequent cognition knows what belongs to the category of subsequent cognition. The disciple's own knowledge of others' minds is, within the path of seeing, capable of knowing solely two moments of mind; the solitary-realizer's own knowledge of others' minds is, within the path of seeing, capable of knowing solely three moments of mind; the buddha's own knowledge of others' minds is, within the path of seeing, capable of knowing, in sequence, all fifteen moments of mind — for what reason is this so? The buddha's own knowledge of others' minds does not depend upon preparatory effort in order to manifest in the present; the solitary-realizer's own knowledge of others' minds attains manifestation through an inferior grade of preparatory effort; the disciple's own knowledge of others' minds attains manifestation only through a middling or superior grade of preparatory effort — that is, when the one practicing insight is about to enter the path of seeing, a disciple wishing to know that same person's own path-of-seeing mind first cultivates the preparatory effort of the knowledge of others' minds belonging to the dharma-cognition category; once this same practitioner of insight has already entered the path of seeing, this same preparatory effort for the knowledge of others' minds is thereby already complete, and he becomes capable of knowing those same two moments of mind — namely, the forbearance regarding suffering, a dharma-cognition, together with the mind co-arising with the knowledge of suffering, a dharma-cognition. Once this same practitioner of insight enters the subsequent-cognition category, the disciple further cultivates the preparatory effort of the knowledge of others' minds belonging to the subsequent-cognition category, and, after thirteen moments of preparatory effort have passed, this same preparatory effort is only then complete, and he becomes capable of knowing this same person's own sixteenth moment of mind — that is, although he originally wished to know this same person's own third moment of mind, he comes, instead, only to know this same person's own sixteenth moment of mind, and it is for this reason that a disciple's own knowledge of others' minds is capable of knowing solely the path of seeing's own first two moments of mind. When the one practicing insight is about to enter the path of seeing, a solitary-realizer wishing to know that same person's own path-of-seeing mind likewise first cultivates the preparatory effort of the knowledge of others' minds belonging to the dharma-cognition category; once this same practitioner of insight has already entered the path of seeing, this same preparatory effort for the knowledge of others' minds is thereby already complete, and he becomes capable of knowing those same two moments of mind — namely, the forbearance regarding suffering, a dharma-cognition, together with the mind co-arising with the knowledge of suffering, a dharma-cognition. Once this same practitioner of insight enters the subsequent-cognition category, the solitary-realizer further cultivates the preparatory effort of the knowledge of others' minds belonging to the subsequent-cognition category, and, after five moments of preparatory effort have passed, this same preparatory effort is only then complete, and he comes to know this same person's own eighth moment of mind — that is, although he originally wished to know this same person's own third moment of mind, he comes, instead, only to know this same person's own mind co-arising with the subsequent knowledge of accumulation. There are those who say: he comes to know this same person's own fifteenth moment of mind, since twelve moments of preparatory effort are required for it to be complete. There are those who say: the solitary-realizer is capable of knowing four moments of mind — namely, knowing the first two moments, together with the eighth and the fourteenth moments. There are further teachers who say: he is capable of knowing the first two moments, together with the eleventh and the twelfth moments — this being precisely the forbearance regarding cessation, a subsequent cognition, together with the mind co-arising with the knowledge of cessation, a subsequent cognition. The buddha's own knowledge of others' minds, not depending upon any preparatory effort at all, fully knows every one of these fifteen moments of the path of seeing.

The buddha's own wisdom, with respect to all three paths, is capable of knowing both the particular and the general characteristic; the solitary-realizer's own wisdom, with respect to the solitary-realizer's own and the disciple's own path, is capable of knowing both the particular and the general characteristic, while, with respect to the buddha's own path, is capable of knowing solely the general characteristic, not the particular; the disciple's own wisdom, with respect to the disciple's own path, is capable of knowing both the particular and the general characteristic, while, with respect to the buddha's and the solitary-realizer's own path, is capable of knowing solely the general characteristic, not the particular. One asks: at the very moment the disciple enters direct realization, is he capable of directly realizing the buddha's and the solitary-realizer's own path? Suppose this were so — what fault would there be? If he is capable of directly realizing it, then how is it that the disciple's own knowledge of others' minds is incapable of knowing the buddha's or the solitary-realizer's own mind? If he is incapable of directly realizing it, then how is it that he can still take it as an object of undefiled confirmed purity through it, and, further, ought not direct realization, when it occurs, to fully observe the truth of the path in its entirety? The answer: it ought to be said that, at the very moment the disciple enters direct realization, he is indeed capable of directly realizing the buddha's and the solitary-realizer's own path as well. One asks: if this is so, then how is it that the disciple's own knowledge of others' minds is incapable of knowing the buddha's or the solitary-realizer's own mind? The answer: at the very moment of entering direct realization, he knows solely their general characteristic, not their particular characteristic, whereas the knowledge of others' minds capable of direct realization knows solely the particular characteristic, and it is for this reason that this same knowledge of others' minds does not know the buddha's or the solitary-realizer's own mind.

One asks: the knowledge of others' minds present within a single sentient being's own continuum is capable of knowing every sentient being's own mind and mental concomitants, each according to what is fitting — does this same knowledge, with respect to those same beings, know them as a single, gathered category, or does it know each single moment individually? Suppose either were so — what fault would there be? If it knows them as a single, gathered category rather than each single moment, then how can it be capable of knowing each single moment individually? If it knows each single moment individually, then how is it that this same knowledge's own support is not thereby manifold — that is, my own cluster of the knowledge of others' minds, consisting of twenty-one dharmas, takes as its object a single sentient being's own single moment of feeling; exactly as with a single moment of feeling, so too with every single moment of feeling; exactly as the moments of feeling are measureless and boundless, so too are every remaining moment of every remaining mind and mental concomitant likewise measureless and boundless; exactly as a single sentient being's own moments of mind and mental concomitants are measureless and boundless, so too are every remaining sentient being's own moments of mind and mental concomitants likewise measureless and boundless — in this way, my own mind and mental concomitants would then be manifold, and, since every remaining sentient being is likewise known by manifold knowledge, its own support would thereby be manifold as well. There are those who say: it knows them as a single, gathered category, not each single moment individually. One asks: if this is so, then how can it be capable of knowing each single moment individually? The answer: this is not the case at all — yet, for the sake of distinguishing it, suppose that the knowledge capable of knowing a given category were already exhausted with respect to it — with respect to any remaining moment, it would then no longer wish to know it; and, were it to still wish to know it, it would nonetheless be incapable of knowing it.

If the knowledge has not yet been exhausted, then, wishing to know it, it thereupon knows it. Further, this same knowledge of a given category has, with respect to the various moments, no wish to know each one individually; and, were there a wish to know each one individually, it would nonetheless be incapable of doing so. Whatever wishes to know anything at all does so solely with respect to the category as a whole. There are, further, those who say: it knows each single moment individually. One asks: if this is so, then how is it that this same knowledge's own support is not thereby manifold? The answer: there is no such fault at all, since this and that are equal — that is, exactly as my own cluster of the knowledge of others' minds, consisting of twenty-one dharmas, possesses measureless and boundless moments, and, with respect to every remaining sentient being's own every mind and mental concomitant, is capable of taking each single moment individually as its object, so too does every remaining sentient being's own cluster of the knowledge of others' minds likewise each possess measureless and boundless moments, and is likewise capable of taking each single moment individually as its object with respect to every remaining sentient being's own every mind and mental concomitant — and it is for this reason that there is no fault of the knowledge's own support becoming disproportionately manifold. The verdict: it should be understood that the latter position, stated here, is the better one, since the object taken by mind and mental concomitants is fixed and determinate.

One asks: does the knowledge of others' minds pervade all three times as its object, or does it take solely the present as its object? The answer: every knowledge of others' minds takes solely the present as its object. One asks: if this is so, then how is one to reconcile this with what another treatise states — namely, that past and future dharmas are known by nine kinds of knowledge, excepting the knowledge of cessation? The answer: it ought to be said that past and future dharmas are known by eight kinds of knowledge, excepting the knowledge of cessation; present dharmas of the knowledge of others' minds are known by nine kinds of knowledge, excepting the knowledge of cessation. As for why it is not stated in this way, one should understand there to be a separate underlying intent — that is, this same kind, known by the nine kinds of knowledge, if it belongs to the past, is then known by the past-belonging knowledge of others' minds, and is also known by the knowledge of others' minds that knows future non-arisen dharmas; if it belongs to the future, it is known solely by the future-belonging knowledge of others' minds; if it belongs to the present, it is then known by the present-belonging knowledge of others' minds, and is also known by the knowledge of others' minds that knows future non-arisen dharmas. It is in reliance upon this same underlying intent that it is said that past and future dharmas are known by the nine kinds of knowledge — it is not said that past and future dharmas are known by the present knowledge of others' minds. There are, further, those who wish to hold that, at the very moment the knowledge of others' minds manifests in the present, it is capable of knowing another's own continuum's three moments of mind — namely, the one presently manifesting, the one that has just ceased before it, and the one that will arise just after it — the treatise, in reliance upon this same account, likewise does not contradict itself. The verdict:

this same account ought not to be made, since the knowledge of others' minds knows solely another's present mind and mental concomitants, not any other dharma. One asks: does the knowledge of others' minds take a single thing as its object, or does it take a co-arising cluster of mind and mental concomitants as its object? Suppose either were so — what fault would there be? If it takes a single thing as its object, then how is one to reconcile this with what the scripture states? Exactly as the scripture states: with respect to a mind possessing craving, one genuinely knows, in accordance with reality, that this is a mind possessing craving, and so on, stated at length — if, at a single moment, one knows both craving and mind, is this not taking a cluster as object? And how is one to reconcile this with what another scripture states? Exactly as the Bhagavān states: with a single mental application, I fully know the very thoughts present in the minds of the entire assembly of monks — if it takes a cluster as its object, then for what reason does the knowledge of others' minds possess three distinct applications of mindfulness? The answer: it ought to be said that, within the span of a single moment, the knowledge of others' minds that arises takes solely a single thing as its object. One asks: if this is so, then how is one to reconcile this with what the scripture states — exactly as it is said, with respect to a mind possessing craving, one genuinely knows, in accordance with reality, that this is a mind possessing craving? The answer: "a mind possessing craving" refers to the mind associated with craving; yet, at the very moment of knowing the craving, one does not, at that same moment, know the mind, and, at the very moment of knowing the mind, one no longer knows the craving — exactly as, observing a soiled garment, if one observes the stain, one does not, at that same moment, observe the garment, and, if one observes the garment, one no longer observes the stain — this, too, is just the same, and it is for this reason that there is no contradiction here. One asks: if this is so, then how is one to reconcile this with what another scripture states — exactly as the Bhagavān states: with a single mental application, I fully know the very thoughts present in the minds of the entire assembly of monks?

The answer: that same scripture does not speak of the knowledge of others' minds — it speaks solely of inferential knowledge, that is, the Buddha, first, by means of a single instance of the knowledge of others' minds, observes a single monk's own mental thought, and, afterward, by means of inferential knowledge, observes, in general, the thoughts present in the minds of the assembly of monks, knowing that they all abide in tranquil, correct conduct. There are those who say: this is neither the knowledge of others' minds nor inferential knowledge, but is, rather, wish-knowledge, generally knowing every thought present in the minds of the monks. There are, further, those who say: this is neither the knowledge of others' minds, nor inferential knowledge, nor wish-knowledge, but rather this: at the very moment the Bhagavān's own knowledge of exhaustion manifests in the present, he attains, with respect to the desire realm, a neutral-and-unobscured mind and mental concomitants of this same kind, never previously attained, which, without entering dhyāna and without giving rise to any superknowledge, is, through a single mental application, capable of fully knowing the thoughts present in the minds of the assembly of monks. There are those who say: this is attained at the very moment the Bhagavān's own desire-realm wholesome mind and the knowledge of exhaustion co-arise — this being precisely a supreme, resolved wisdom. There are further teachers who say: every knowledge of others' minds is indeed capable of taking a co-arising cluster of mind and mental concomitants as its object. One asks: if this is so, then for what reason does the knowledge of others' minds possess three distinct applications of mindfulness? The answer: at the very moment of its initial development, it possesses three applications of mindfulness; once it later reaches full perfection, it takes as its object, all together, the co-arising mind and mental concomitants, constituting the mixed-object application of mindfulness on dharmas. The verdict: every knowledge of others' minds, within the span of a single moment, takes solely a single dharma as its object,

takes solely a genuine, real thing as its object, observes solely a particular characteristic, observes solely the present time, observes solely another's own continuum, observes solely mind and mental concomitants; it does not exist within the path of seeing, does not co-arise with the emptiness or the signless concentration, and is not gathered within the knowledge of exhaustion or of non-arising; within the uninterrupted path, it is neither cultivated nor caused to arise, being gathered within the very category of a leisurely path.

What is the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge? The answer: whatever knowledge is accomplished through cultivation, is the fruit of cultivation, relies upon cultivation as its support, and, once attained, is never lost, capable of manifestly recollecting and knowing every matter of one's own former abodes, together with their various characteristic-forms and utterances — this is named the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge. Here, "whatever knowledge is accomplished through cultivation" refers to the fact that this takes the wisdom accomplished through cultivation as its own-nature; "is the fruit of cultivation" refers to the fact that this is the fruit of the four-branch and five-branch dhyānas; "relies upon cultivation as its support" refers to the fact that this is accomplished in reliance upon repeated habituation; "once attained, is never lost" refers to the fact that, once genuinely realized, it is never relinquished. One asks: for what reason does the text not speak of "not yet attained" or "already lost"? The answer: this ought indeed to be so stated, and that it is not so stated here should be understood to be a case whose meaning has been left over for elsewhere. Further, it is with reference to whatever knowledge, by virtue of which one is said to possess the very mastery of the superknowledge of former abodes, that this is spoken of here; the various recollection-of-former-abodes knowledges that are not yet attained or already lost possess no such meaning, and it is for this reason that these are not spoken of. As for "capable of manifestly recollecting and knowing every matter of one's own former abodes": this refers to the fact that this same knowledge is capable of clearly recollecting and knowing whatever matter belonging to one's own or another's continuum, within the desire or form realm, occurred during a past life. As for "together with their various characteristic-forms and utterances": rebirth, the fundamental state, and the moment of death are named "various characteristic-forms," since these are capable of being shown, their own characteristic-forms being distinct from one another; the intermediate state is named "utterances," since the intermediate-state body is subtle, describable only in speech, incapable of having its own distinct characteristic-form displayed. There are those who say: the intermediate state is named "various characteristic-forms," since it resembles the fundamental state; while rebirth, the fundamental state, and the moment of death are named "utterances," since one can speak of these in terms of a distinct caste, such as kṣatriya and the rest, and since, during the fundamental state, one is capable of giving rise to every manner of verbal discourse and activity. There are, further, those who say: "various characteristic-forms" briefly displays the matter of a former life, while "utterances" fully displays the matter of a former life. There are further teachers who say: "various characteristic-forms" displays what is expressed by a past age; "utterances" displays what does the expressing of a past age. Exactly as the scripture states: the Buddha said to Ānanda: if there exists a characteristic-form, and there exists an utterance capable of being posited, then there exists a body designated by name; if there exists no characteristic-form, and no utterance capable of being posited, is there then a contact of the additional-word kind, or a contact of the resistance kind, or not? Ānanda addressed the Buddha, saying: there is not, Bhagavān. Here, the six internal sense-fields are named "characteristic-form"; the six external sense-fields are named "utterance." There are those who say: the six external sense-fields are named "characteristic-form"; the six internal sense-fields are named "utterance" — for what reason is this so? Because it is in dependence upon the six internal sense-fields that one can speak of the six consciousnesses and the six contacts, exactly as one speaks of eye-consciousness and eye-contact, and so on, up through mental consciousness and mental contact. Further, the scripture states: by relying upon such characteristic-forms as these, one enters and abides fully in the first dhyāna — here, "characteristic-form" (相) refers to the very characteristic of preparatory effort; "form" (狀) refers to the very form of the object taken. Exactly as the treatise states: whatever excludes the aforementioned characteristics; "characteristic" refers to what is thereby named, exactly as a verse states:

Whoever possesses the eight kinds of knowledge, and the sixteen aspects, is, like the pure gold of Jambudvīpa, such that none can speak of his own fault. Here, the term "characteristic" (相) speaks of undefiled wisdom. It should be understood that, here, every matter of one's own former abodes, together with their various characteristic-forms and utterances, all display the object of the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge — this being precisely the contaminated five aggregates of one's own or another's past lives within the desire or form realm.

This same recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge might, alternatively, be spoken of as a single thing — this referring to the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge as a superknowledge and as a guiding faculty. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as two things — this referring to the previously attained and the not previously attained. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as three things — this referring to the lower, middle, and upper grades. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as four things — this referring to the fruit of the four dhyānas. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as six things — this referring to the previously attained and the not previously attained, each of three grades. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as eight things — this referring to the fruit of the four dhyānas, each having a previously attained and a not previously attained form. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as nine things — this referring to the lowest of the low grade up through the highest of the high grade. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as twelve things — this referring to the fruit of the four dhyānas, each of three grades. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as eighteen things — this referring to the previously attained and the not previously attained, each of nine grades. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as twenty-four things —

this referring to the fruit of the four dhyānas, each having a previously attained and a not previously attained form, each of these, further, having three grades. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as thirty-six things — this referring to the fruit of the four dhyānas, each of nine grades. It might, alternatively, be spoken of as seventy-two things — this referring to the fruit of the four dhyānas, each having a previously attained and a not previously attained form, each of these, further, having nine grades. Were one to distinguish it according to each single moment present within the body, one ought to speak of it as measureless and boundless — here, it is spoken of in general as a single recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge. One asks: what does this same recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge take as its own-nature? The answer: it takes wisdom as its own-nature. This is named the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge's own own-nature, own substance, own inherent nature, and own characteristic.

Having already stated its own-nature, what it is so named for ought now to be stated. One asks: for what reason is it named the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge? What, precisely, is the meaning of "recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge"? The answer: every past life's own contaminated five aggregates is named "former abode"; it is by the very force of mindfulness that one becomes capable of knowing them, and it is for this reason that this is named the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge — that is, although this same cluster contains many dharmas, it is because the force of mindfulness predominates within it that it is spoken of as "recollection" — exactly as the four applications of mindfulness, although taking wisdom as their own substance, are, because the force of mindfulness predominates, named "applications of mindfulness"; exactly as the mindfulness of breathing, although taking wisdom as its own substance, is, because the force of mindfulness predominates, named "the mindfulness of breathing";

exactly as the inherent, connatural recollection-born knowledge, although taking wisdom as its own substance, is, because the force of mindfulness predominates, named "the inherent, connatural recollection-born knowledge"; exactly as subduing the perception of form, although taking wisdom as its own substance, is, because the force of perception predominates, named "subduing the perception of form" — this, too, is just the same: although its own substance is wisdom, it is, because the force of mindfulness predominates, named the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge.

As for the realm this same recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge belongs to: it is the form realm. One asks: for what reason does the formless realm possess no recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge? The answer: because it is not a fitting vessel, and so on, stated at length. Further, the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge is drawn forth in dependence upon form; the formless realm being without form, it is thereby without this same knowledge. As for ground: it exists solely within the four fundamental dhyānas, not within the access grounds or the formless realm, since these grounds are incapable of giving rise to the five superknowledges. One asks: by the knowledge belonging to which ground is every matter of former abodes belonging to the intermediate dhyāna recollected and known? There are those who say: it is known by the superior grade of the recollection-knowledge of the first dhyāna. There are, further, those who say: it is known by the inferior grade of the recollection-knowledge of the second dhyāna. The verdict: it ought to be said

that all three grades of the first dhyāna's own recollection-knowledge are capable of knowing it — for what reason is this so? Because it is gathered within the very same ground. As for what it relies upon as its support: it arises solely in dependence upon a body belonging to the desire or form realm. As for its aspect: it takes an unclear aspect, not being gathered within the sixteen aspects. As for its object: the first dhyāna's own recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge takes as its object the desire realm's and the first dhyāna's own former, contaminated five aggregates; and so on, up through, the fourth dhyāna's own recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge takes as its object the desire realm's and the four dhyānas' own former, contaminated five aggregates. This same knowledge is incapable of taking as its object any matter of former abodes belonging to the formless realm, since that same ground is superior — exactly as the first dhyāna's own recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge does not know any matter of former abodes belonging to the second dhyāna and above, so too does the third dhyāna's own recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge not know any matter of former abodes belonging to the fourth dhyāna and above, and it is for this reason that the fourth dhyāna's own recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge does not know any matter of former abodes belonging to the formless realm. One asks: is whatever matter of the formless realm arose for one who was once born within the desire or form realm the object taken by this same knowledge, or not? The answer: it is not the object taken, exactly as one who does not know the effect likewise does not know its cause. One asks: if the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge is incapable of knowing any matter of former abodes belonging to the formless realm, then how is one to reconcile this with what the scripture states — exactly as the scripture states, the Bhagavān, with respect to every matter of his own former abodes, whether possessing form or not possessing form, whether possessing perception or not possessing perception, is, together with their various characteristic-forms and utterances, fully capable of recollecting and knowing them all? There are those who say: "possessing form" refers to the fact that, within the desire or form realm, the form of rebirth, the fundamental state, and the moment of death is coarse; "not possessing form" refers to the fact that the form of the intermediate state is subtle. The verdict: this account ought not to be made — for what reason is this so? Were it to be made in this way, then the disciple, too, would know this, and how, then, would this differ from the Buddha, such that Śāriputra would praise the Buddha's own unsurpassed virtue on this very account? It ought to be said that "possessing form" refers to the desire and form realms; "not possessing form" refers to the formless realm — yet the Buddha does not use the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge to recollect and know any matter of former abodes belonging to the formless realm, but rather uses solely inferential knowledge to know these same matters of former abodes belonging to the formless realm. One asks: if this is so, then the outside paths and the various disciples, too, possess inferential knowledge — how, then, does this differ from the Buddha, such that Śāriputra would praise the Buddha's own unsurpassed virtue on this very account? The answer: it should be understood that inferential knowledge is, in brief, of three kinds — first, the outside paths'; second, the disciples'; third, the Buddha's own. Wishing to observe every matter of former abodes, the outside paths, if they observe the desire or form realm and, for twenty thousand kalpas, see nothing, or, for forty thousand kalpas, see nothing, or, for sixty thousand kalpas, see nothing, or, for eighty thousand kalpas, see nothing, then declare it to be utterly annihilated. The disciples, wishing to observe every matter of former abodes, if, observing the desire or form realm, they see nothing for twenty thousand kalpas, then declare that this same being was born within the sphere of infinite space — yet he may, in fact, have been born within a ground above and, his own lifespan not yet exhausted, have died there instead; if, observing the desire or form realm, they see nothing for forty thousand kalpas, they then declare that this same being was born within the sphere of infinite consciousness — yet he may, in fact, have been born again within the sphere of infinite space, or may have been born within a ground above and died there, his own lifespan not yet exhausted; if, observing the desire or form realm, they see nothing for sixty thousand kalpas, they then declare that this same being was born within the sphere of nothingness — yet he may, in fact, have been born three times within the sphere of infinite space, or once or one and a half times within the sphere of infinite consciousness, or may have been born within the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception and died there, his own lifespan not yet exhausted; if, observing the desire or form realm, they see nothing for eighty thousand kalpas, they then declare that this same being was born within the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception — yet he may, in fact, have been born four times within the sphere of infinite space, or twice within the sphere of infinite consciousness, or once, or in part, within the sphere of nothingness. The Bhagavān, wishing to observe every matter of former abodes, if he observes the desire or form realm's own mind at the very moment of death, or at the very moment of conception-linking, then genuinely knows, in accordance with reality: this sentient being will be born within the sphere of infinite space, or will pass away from it; this sentient being will be born within the sphere of infinite consciousness, or will pass away from it; this sentient being will be born within the sphere of nothingness, or will pass away from it; this sentient being will be born within the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, or will pass away from it — with respect to these same four spheres, whether he dies with his own lifespan exhausted, or dies with his own lifespan not exhausted, he genuinely knows every one of these, in accordance with reality. It is for this reason that the outside paths' own inferential knowledge holds these to be utterly annihilated; the disciples' own inferential knowledge is sometimes as the matter genuinely is, and sometimes not as the matter genuinely is; the Buddha's own inferential knowledge, bright, pure, supreme, and wondrous, knows every one of these, in accordance with reality, in every case. As for the ordinary being belonging to the inner dharma, and the various solitary-realizers, their own inferential knowledge of the formless realm's own matters of former abodes should be understood to bear the same characteristic as that of the various disciples. One asks: does the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge arising from the fourth dhyāna, within a single moment, take all together, as one, the matters of former abodes belonging to the five grounds as its object, or does it take each ground's own matters separately? Suppose either were so — what fault would there be? If it takes all five grounds together as one, then how can it know both the coarse and the subtle simultaneously? If it takes each ground separately, then for what reason is it said that this same knowledge is capable of taking the five grounds as its object? The answer: it ought to be said that it takes each ground separately. One asks: if this is so, then for what reason is it said that this same knowledge is capable of taking the five grounds as its object? The answer: it is said solely that this same knowledge is capable of taking the five grounds as its object — it is not said that it does so all at one and the same time — what fault would there be in this? The lower three dhyānas should be understood according to this same pattern. There are those who say: at the very moment of its initial development, it takes each ground separately as its object;

once it has reached full perfection, it is capable of taking all five grounds together as one as its object. As for the applications of mindfulness it belongs to: it belongs solely to the mixed-object application of mindfulness on dharmas. The Venerable Ghoṣa speaks as follows: it pervades all four applications of mindfulness, exactly as the scripture states: I recollect that, in the past, I experienced pleasant feeling and painful feeling — since he recollects and knows pleasant and painful feeling, this is thereby precisely the application of mindfulness on feeling. The verdict: it ought to be said that recollecting the various pleasant and painful supports of the past age is what is named recollecting pleasant and painful feeling, not that it takes solely feeling as its object — and it is thereby no proof of the contrary position. Rather, the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge, generally observing the distinct stages of a former life, is solely gathered within the mixed-object application of mindfulness on dharmas.

As for the kinds of knowledge it belongs to: it is solely worldly knowledge. The Venerable Ghoṣa speaks as follows: it pervades six kinds of knowledge — this referring to, among the eight kinds of knowledge, excepting the knowledge of others' minds and the knowledge of cessation — excepting the knowledge of others' minds because that same knowledge takes the present as its object, while this one takes the past as its object; excepting the knowledge of cessation because that same knowledge takes the unconditioned as its object, while this one takes the conditioned as its object. The verdict: it ought to be said that this is solely worldly knowledge, since it takes former matters as its object. As for whether it co-arises with a concentration: it does not co-arise with any concentration, being solely contaminated. As for the faculties it is associated with: it is associated with three faculties — namely, pleasure, joy, and equanimity. As for the three times: it takes the three times as its object — with respect to the past and the present, it takes the past as its object; with respect to the future, it takes all three times as its object. As for wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral: it is solely wholesome; taking the wholesome, the unwholesome, and the neutral as its object, it takes all three kinds as its object. As for bound and unbound: it is bound solely to the form realm; taking the bound and the unbound as its object, it takes solely the desire and form realms' own bound dharmas as its object. As for the learner, the non-learner, and neither: it belongs solely to neither the learner nor the non-learner; taking the learner, the non-learner, and neither as its object, it takes solely neither as its object. As for abandoned by seeing, abandoned by cultivation, and not to be abandoned: it is solely abandoned by cultivation; taking as its object what is abandoned by seeing, by cultivation, and what is not to be abandoned, it takes what is abandoned by both seeing and cultivation as its object. As for taking a name or a meaning as its object: it takes both a name and a meaning as its object. As for taking its own or another's continuum, or what is not a continuum, as its object: it takes both its own and another's continuum as its object. As for whether it is attained through preparatory effort or through freedom from defilement: it pervades both attainment through preparatory effort and through freedom from defilement. As for attainment through freedom from defilement: this refers to the fact that one belonging to the first dhyāna attains it at the very time of becoming free of the desire realm's own defilement, and so on, up through, one belonging to the fourth dhyāna attains it at the very time of becoming free of the third dhyāna's own defilement, or it may also be attained through cultivation at the very time of becoming free of the defilement of one's own ground or of a ground above.

As for attainment through preparatory effort: this refers to the fact that it is attained at the very time of cultivating the practice of further advancement, and is caused to manifest in the present through engaging in preparatory effort — that is, the various disciples attain it through a middling or superior grade of preparatory effort; the solitary-realizer attains it solely through an inferior grade of preparatory effort; the Buddha does not cause it to manifest in the present through any preparatory effort at all. As for what is attained: it is solely accomplished through cultivation, existing within concentration.

As for whether it is previously attained or not previously attained: every noble one, and every ordinary being belonging to the inner dharma, pervades both what is previously attained and what is not previously attained; the ordinary being belonging to an outer dharma possesses solely what is previously attained. There are those who say: the ordinary being abiding in his own final existence, and every noble one, pervades both what is previously attained and what is not previously attained; every remaining ordinary being possesses solely what is previously attained.

One asks: what is the preparatory practice for cultivating the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge? The answer: the *Prajñaptiśāstra* states as follows: the one first taking up this practice, having already attained self-mastery within worldly concentration, repeatedly gives rise to it in the present, causing it to become ever clearer and sharper; first, he carefully recollects, and, once he has recollected and known the mind that ceased just before, he next carefully recollects the mind that ceased a long time before that, and, once he has recollected and known it, he proceeds onward in this way until the preparatory effort reaches full perfection. Here, there are those who say: the point at which one gradually and carefully recollects backward until the single moment of mind immediately preceding entry into the mother's womb is named the preparatory effort's own accomplishment and full perfection. Were one to make this same account, it would not be a genuinely proper full perfection — for what reason is this so? The single moment of mind immediately preceding entry into the mother's womb belongs to the intermediate state, and this same intermediate state is itself gathered within this very life, there being no distinction in terms of the very same common class of existence — to still be recollecting this same life, how could this be called a genuinely proper full perfection? It ought to be said that the point at which one gradually and carefully recollects backward until the single moment of mind immediately preceding this same intermediate state is named the preparatory effort's own accomplishment and full perfection, since this belongs to the mind of the very moment of death of the former life, and being capable of recollecting and knowing it is thereby named a genuinely proper full perfection. One asks: at the very time of cultivating this same preparatory effort, gradually and carefully recollecting, does one do so moment by moment, or by stage? The answer: this is done by stage, not moment by moment — were one to recollect gradually, moment by moment, then, before half of one's own life had been traversed, one's own life would already have come to its end — how, then, could one cultivate this all the way to the preparatory effort's own full perfection? That is, one first recollects this same life's own stage of old age; next, one further recollects this same life's own stage of middle age; next, one further recollects this same life's own stage of youth; next, one further recollects this same life's own stage as a child; next, one further recollects this same life's own stage as an infant; next, one further recollects this same life's own praśākhā stage; next, one further recollects this same life's own ghana stage; next, one further recollects this same life's own peśī stage; next, one further recollects this same life's own arbuda stage;

next, one further recollects this same life's own kalala stage; next, one further recollects the very stage of entering the mother's womb; next, one further recollects the very stage of dwelling in the intermediate state;

next, one further recollects the very first moment of taking up the intermediate state; and, last of all, one recollects the very moment of the former life's own death — at this point, this same knowledge's own preparatory effort has reached full perfection.

One asks: at the very time of cultivating this same preparatory effort, does one rely upon one's own continuum, or upon another's continuum? There are those who say: one relies upon one's own continuum.

If this is so, then this would be fitting for one whose own former life was spent within the desire or form realm — but if one's own former life was spent within the formless realm, how could this be fitting? There are, further, those who say:

one relies upon another's continuum. If this is so, then this would be fitting where another's former life was spent within the desire or form realm — but if that other's former life was spent within the formless realm, how could this be fitting?

The verdict: it ought to be said that, at the very time of cultivating this same preparatory effort, one relies both upon one's own continuum and upon another's continuum. As for relying upon one's own continuum in cultivating this preparatory effort: if one's own former life was spent within the desire or form realm, then one relies upon one's own continuum for this same preparatory effort to reach full perfection; if one's own former life was spent within the formless realm, one then instead relies upon another's continuum for this same preparatory effort to reach full perfection. As for relying upon another's continuum in cultivating this preparatory effort: if another's former life was spent within the desire or form realm, then one relies upon another's continuum for this same preparatory effort to reach full perfection; if another's former life was spent within the formless realm, one then instead relies upon one's own continuum for this same preparatory effort to reach full perfection. One asks: at the very time of cultivating this same preparatory effort, does one rely upon the desire realm, or upon the form realm? The answer: there are, here, four cases — there is one who, relying upon the desire realm, first cultivates this same preparatory effort, and afterward, relying upon the form realm, brings this same preparatory effort to full perfection — that is, dwelling together in one place with another difficult to get along with, of violent and fierce temperament, one reflects: this person surely died from the desire realm in his former life; then, gradually and carefully recollecting, one comes to find, instead, that this same person died from the form realm in his former life.

There is one who, relying upon the form realm, first cultivates this same preparatory effort, and afterward, relying upon the desire realm, brings this same preparatory effort to full perfection — that is, dwelling together in one place with another easy to get along with, of well-regulated, gentle temperament, one reflects: this person surely died from the form realm in his former life; then, gradually and carefully recollecting, one comes to find, instead, that this same person died from the desire realm in his former life. There is one who, relying upon the desire realm, first cultivates this same preparatory effort, and, still relying upon the desire realm, brings this same preparatory effort to full perfection — that is, dwelling together in one place with another difficult to get along with, of violent and fierce temperament, one reflects: this person surely died from the desire realm in his former life; then, gradually and carefully recollecting, one confirms that, indeed, he died from the desire realm in his former life. There is one who, relying upon the form realm, first cultivates this same preparatory effort, and, still relying upon the form realm, brings this same preparatory effort to full perfection — that is, dwelling together in one place with another easy to get along with, of well-regulated, gentle temperament, one reflects: this person surely died from the form realm in his former life; then, gradually and carefully recollecting, one confirms that, indeed, he died from the form realm in his former life. Exactly as with the distinctions in cultivating this preparatory effort in reliance upon a given realm, so too should the same be understood with respect to a given destiny, and the like.

One asks: does this same recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge recollect and know solely what has been experienced before, or does it also recollect and know what has never been experienced before? The answer: this same knowledge recollects and knows solely what has been experienced before. One asks: if this is so, then this same knowledge ought to be incapable of recollecting and knowing any matter belonging to the five Pure Abodes, since one has, from beginningless time, never yet been born there.

The answer: what has been experienced before is, in brief, of two kinds — first, what has been directly seen before; second, what has been heard of before. Although one has never directly seen any matter belonging to the five Pure Abodes,

one has nonetheless heard of it, and is thereby still capable of recollecting and knowing it. The same principle should be understood to apply to every other exceedingly remote, exceedingly supreme, and difficult-to-know matter belonging to the desire and form realms.

One asks: does this same recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge, upon entering a single concentration, know solely a single lifetime, or does it know many lifetimes upon entering a single concentration? The answer: at the very moment of its initial development, upon entering a single concentration, it knows solely a single lifetime; once it has later become fully matured, upon entering a single concentration, it knows a hundred or a thousand lifetimes. The Bhagavān, whether at the very beginning or afterward, upon entering a single concentration, is capable of knowing a hundred or a thousand lifetimes in every case. One asks: is this same recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge capable of setting aside a hundred or a thousand nearer lifetimes and instead knowing a hundred or a thousand more distant lifetimes? The answer: at the very moment of its initial development, it is incapable of this; once it has later become fully matured, it is then capable of it. The Bhagavān, whether at the very beginning or afterward, is capable of it in every case.

One asks: this same recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge, having gradually recollected and known the measureless matters of former abodes belonging to a former age, when it wishes to withdraw and emerge from this state, does it do so by gradually withdrawing back along the very path it entered by, or does it emerge all at once? There are those who say: it must necessarily withdraw gradually, back along the very path it entered by. The verdict: it ought to be said that, according to one's own inclination, one is capable of withdrawing either gradually or all at once. One asks: once one has, by means of the recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge, recollected and known the matters of a former age, is one then capable of giving rise, immediately and without interruption, to the knowledge of death and rebirth, so as to observe the matters of death and rebirth belonging to a future age? The answer: the Buddha is capable of this, no one else — since every one of the Buddha's own virtues and qualities is capable of manifesting in the present without depending upon preparatory effort, whereas the solitary-realizer, the disciple, and the various outside paths necessarily require engaging in preparatory effort before they become capable of giving rise to it.

One asks: within the span of a single moment, how many lifetimes is this same recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge capable of knowing? The answer: it is capable of knowing a single lifetime. How is this to be known as so? Because there exists noble scriptural authority for it — exactly as the Vinaya states: the Venerable Śubha addressed the various monks, saying: with a single arising of mind, I recollect and know the matter of five hundred past lifetimes. At that time, the various monks, all together, rebuked and expelled him, saying: you have falsely claimed to have attained a dharma beyond that of an ordinary person — you ought not to dwell together with us, since there is certainly no possibility of a single moment of mind arising and thereby knowing many lifetimes. At that time, the Buddha said to the various monks: you ought not to rebuke and expel Śubha, since, speaking in accordance with a genuine perception, he has committed no grave offense — that is, this same Śubha was once born among the beings of the heaven of percept-less beings, with a lifespan of five hundred kalpas, and it is this same matter that he now recollects; since he speaks of these five hundred kalpas in accordance with a genuine perception of it as five hundred lifetimes, he has thereby committed no grave offense. It is by virtue of this that it is proven and known that, within the span of a single moment, one knows solely a single lifetime. One asks: within the span of a single moment, how many destinies is this same recollection-of-former-abodes knowledge capable of knowing? There are those who say: this same knowledge, within the span of a single moment, knows solely a single destiny — that is, it may know the hell-destiny, and so on, up through, it may know the heavenly destiny. There are, further, those who say: this same knowledge, within the span of a single moment, is capable of knowing two destinies — that is, it may know the hell-destiny and the animal destiny, or it may know the hungry-ghost-realm and the animal destiny, or it may know the human and the animal destiny,

or it may know the heavenly and the animal destiny. The verdict: it ought to be said that this same knowledge, within the span of a single moment, is capable of knowing, according to what is fitting, many destinies at once — that is, were one to recollect the matter of a wheel-turning king, then, within the span of a single moment, one would thereby know three destinies at once — the human, the hungry-ghost, and the animal — if one knows the wheel-turning king's own ministers and retinue, this is named knowing the human destiny; if one knows the ghosts capable of turning the wheel and receiving offerings, and the like, this is named knowing the hungry-ghost destiny; if one knows the elephants, horses, and the like, this is named knowing the animal destiny. If one is capable of recollecting the matter of King Māndhātṛ gathering together with Śakra, the lord of the gods, one thereby knows four destinies, excepting solely the hell-destiny, knowing the remaining three — stated fully as before. As for knowing the heavenly destiny: this refers to knowing Śakra and his own retinue. Were the five destinies to gather together in a single place, then, within the span of a single moment, one would be capable of recollecting and knowing them all — and it is for this reason that this same knowledge, within the span of a single moment, is capable of knowing many destinies at once, according to what is fitting.

Exactly as the scripture states: eternalist theorists' own recollection and knowledge of the matters of former abodes admit of three distinct kinds — first, there are eternalist theorists capable of recollecting and knowing the matters of twenty thousand kalpas; second, there are eternalist theorists capable of recollecting and knowing the matters of forty thousand kalpas; third, there are eternalist theorists capable of recollecting and knowing the matters of eighty thousand kalpas. There is, further, a separate recitation stating that the third kind recollects and knows the matters of sixty thousand kalpas. One asks: what kind of eternalist theorist is capable of recollecting and knowing the matters of twenty thousand kalpas, and so on, up through, what kind of eternalist theorist is capable of recollecting and knowing the matters of eighty thousand kalpas? The answer: the eternalist theorists' own faculties are of three grades — if one is of inferior faculty, he is capable of recollecting and knowing twenty thousand kalpas; if one is of middling faculty, he is capable of recollecting and knowing forty thousand kalpas; if one is of superior faculty, he is capable of recollecting and knowing eighty thousand kalpas. Further, the eternalist theorists are capable of recollecting and knowing the matter of three kinds of kalpa-destruction — if one is capable of recollecting and knowing the matter of destruction by fire, he is capable of recollecting and knowing twenty thousand kalpas; if one is capable of recollecting and knowing the matter of destruction by water, he is capable of recollecting and knowing forty thousand kalpas; if one is capable of recollecting and knowing the matter of destruction by wind, he is capable of recollecting and knowing eighty thousand kalpas. Further, the eternalist theorists are capable of recollecting and knowing the matter of the destruction of three faculties — if one is capable of recollecting and knowing the matter of the destruction of the joy faculty, he is capable of recollecting and knowing twenty thousand kalpas; if one is capable of recollecting and knowing the matter of the destruction of the pleasure faculty, he is capable of recollecting and knowing forty thousand kalpas; if one is capable of recollecting and knowing the matter of the destruction of the equanimity faculty, he is capable of recollecting and knowing eighty thousand kalpas. Further, the eternalist theorists possess distinctions among the three vehicles' own inherent dispositions — whoever possesses the disciple's own inherent disposition is capable of recollecting and knowing twenty thousand kalpas;

whoever possesses the solitary-realizer's own inherent disposition is capable of recollecting and knowing forty thousand kalpas; whoever possesses the buddha's own inherent disposition is capable of recollecting and knowing eighty thousand kalpas. These, then, are the three kinds of distinct conditions for recollection and knowledge. One asks: having already stated the own-nature of these two kinds of knowledge, their own relationships of overlap and non-overlap ought now to be stated. Does every knowledge of others' minds presently know another's mind and mental concomitants? The answer: a tetralemma ought to be cast. Here, the knowledge of others' minds pervades all three times, while presently knowing another's mind and mental concomitants exists solely in the present — yet this pervades both the knowledge of others' minds and what is not the knowledge of others' minds, and it is for this reason that there are four clauses. There is a knowledge of others' minds that is not a presently knowing of another's mind and mental concomitants — namely, the past and future knowledge of others' minds, since this possesses the characteristic of the knowledge of others' minds, yet lacks the very function of presently knowing another's mind and the like — that is, with respect to the past, its own function has already ceased; with respect to the future, it does not yet possess any function at all. There is a presently knowing of another's mind and mental concomitants that is not the knowledge of others' minds — namely, such cases as these: there is one who, through beholding a sign, or through hearing speech, or through the knowledge attained upon a certain birth, is capable of presently knowing another's mind and mental concomitants. As for presently knowing another's mind and mental concomitants through beholding a sign: within the human destiny, there is such a case as Upananda the Śākyan, who, arriving at the home of a certain lay devotee, saw, beside its own gate, a spotted calf, and thereupon said to this same lay devotee: were one to obtain bedding such as the hide of that spotted calf of yours at your own gate, would this not be excellent indeed? At that time, this same lay devotee thought as follows: this same śākya-son surely wishes to obtain the hide of my own spotted calf, to make into his own bedding — and thereupon killed the spotted calf and gave its own hide to the śākya-son, who accepted it and returned to his own dwelling place; the calf's own mother, grieving and bellowing, followed behind it as it went. It is thereby known that, within the human realm, there exists the knowledge that comes from beholding a sign. As for presently knowing another's mind and mental concomitants through hearing speech: within the human destiny, there is such a case as Upananda the Śākyan, who, seeing a certain householder wearing a new, fine garment entering the Jetavana, thereupon said to him:

were one to obtain three robes and bedding resembling that garment you are wearing, would this not be excellent indeed? At that time, this same householder thought as follows: this same śākya-son surely wishes to obtain the garment I am wearing, to make into robes and bedding — and thereupon took it off and gave it to him. It is thereby known that, within the human realm, there exists the knowledge that comes from hearing speech. There are those who say: both of the two examples cited above are gathered within the knowledge that comes from hearing speech, or, alternatively, both are gathered within the knowledge that comes from beholding a sign. This being the base treatise's own text, it ought rather to be said: through beholding a sign, or through divination and prognostication, one is capable of presently knowing another's mind and mental concomitants. As for "through beholding a sign": this is exactly as stated before, together with every other case of knowing another's mind through seeing or hearing a sign of bodily or verbal karma. As for "through divination and prognostication": this refers to such cases as the various outside paths' own various methods of divination and prognostication for knowing another's mind. As for presently knowing another's mind and mental concomitants through the knowledge attained upon a certain birth: this refers to such cases as the hell-realms, and the like — what, precisely, is this matter? Even within the hells, too, there exists the knowledge attained upon that same birth, capable of knowing another's mind and the like, yet there exists no separately manifest matter that can be cited to illustrate it. One asks: at what time do they know another's mind and the like? The answer: at the very moment of first being born within the hells, before yet undergoing suffering — once they have already begun to undergo suffering, they are then incapable even of knowing their own mind's own thoughts, how much less capable of knowing another's mind and mental concomitants.

One asks: abiding in what kind of mind do they know another's mind and the like — the wholesome, the defiled, or the neutral-and-unobscured? The answer: all three kinds are capable of knowing it. One asks: is it while abiding in mental consciousness, or while abiding in the five sense-consciousnesses, that they know another's mind and the like? The answer: solely while abiding in mental consciousness. One asks: is it while abiding in a deportment-related mind, a craft-related mind, or a ripening-born mind, that they know another's mind and the like? The answer: solely while abiding in a deportment-related mind — for what reason is this so? They possess no manifest craft-related mind at all, and their own ripening-born mind exists solely within the five sense-consciousnesses.