Why Eight Kinds of Knowledge?

There is a single kind of knowledge that gathers in every kind of knowledge — namely, dharma-cognition, since dharma-cognition is not analogous to the rest, its own substance being dharma itself. There are two kinds of knowledge that gather in every kind of knowledge — namely, contaminated knowledge and undefiled knowledge. There are three kinds of knowledge that gather in every kind of knowledge — namely, dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, and worldly knowledge.

There are four kinds of knowledge that gather in every kind of knowledge — namely, the preceding three kinds of knowledge, together with the knowledge of others' minds. There are five kinds of knowledge that gather in every kind of knowledge — namely, worldly knowledge, together with the knowledge of suffering, of accumulation, of cessation, and of the path. There are six kinds of knowledge that gather in every kind of knowledge — namely, the preceding five kinds of knowledge, together with the knowledge of others' minds. There are seven kinds of knowledge that gather in every kind of knowledge — namely, among the eight kinds of knowledge, excluding the knowledge of others' minds. There are eight kinds of knowledge that gather in every kind of knowledge — namely, what is stated here: dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, the knowledge of others' minds, worldly knowledge, the knowledge of suffering, of accumulation, of cessation, and of the path. One asks: if these eight kinds of knowledge gather in every kind of knowledge,

there further exist eight kinds of knowledge — namely, the knowledge of the abiding of dharmas, the knowledge of nirvāṇa, the knowledge of death and birth, the knowledge of the exhaustion of the outflows, the knowledge of recollection of former abodes, the wondrous knowledge of aspiration, the knowledge of exhaustion, and the knowledge of non-arising — by which of these eight kinds of knowledge, then, are these further eight gathered in? The answer: in accordance with what is fitting, each is, in every case, gathered in among these same eight.

That is: the knowledge of the abiding of dharmas is the knowledge of causes, rightly knowing the causes by which the lower, middling, and upper fruits of the three realms' own dharmas abide — that same knowledge is gathered within these same four kinds of knowledge, namely, dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, worldly knowledge, and the knowledge of accumulation. The knowledge of nirvāṇa is the knowledge of cessation — that same knowledge is gathered within these same four kinds of knowledge, namely, dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, worldly knowledge, and the knowledge of cessation. The knowledge of death and birth is gathered within worldly knowledge alone. The Venerable Ghoṣa states: the knowledge of death and birth is gathered within four kinds of knowledge, namely, dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, worldly knowledge, and the knowledge of suffering. The verdict: it should be understood that the position stated first here accords with principle. As for the knowledge of the exhaustion of the outflows: for whoever wishes to hold that it is so named because it takes the exhaustion of the outflows as its object, it is gathered within four kinds of knowledge, namely, dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, worldly knowledge, and the knowledge of cessation; for whoever wishes to hold that it is so named because it is attained within a body free of the outflows, it is gathered within all eight kinds of knowledge. As for the knowledge of recollection of former abodes: it is gathered within worldly knowledge alone. The Venerable Ghoṣa states: the knowledge of recollection of former abodes is gathered within six kinds of knowledge — namely, among the eight kinds of knowledge, excluding the knowledge of others' minds, since it takes the past as its object, and excluding the knowledge of cessation, since it takes a conditioned dharma as its object. The verdict: it should be understood that the position stated first here accords with principle. The wondrous knowledge of aspiration is gathered within worldly knowledge alone. The Venerable Ghoṣa states: the wondrous knowledge of aspiration is gathered within all eight kinds of knowledge — namely, among the ten kinds of knowledge, excluding the knowledge of exhaustion and of non-arising, since it is of the very nature of vision. The verdict: it should be understood that the position stated first here accords with principle. The knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising are, both, gathered within six kinds of knowledge, excluding the knowledge of others' minds, since it is not of the very nature of vision, and excluding worldly knowledge, since it is undefiled. It is by virtue of this that these eight kinds of knowledge gather in every kind of knowledge.

The Venerable Saṃghavasu speaks as follows: it ought to be said that there is a single kind of knowledge — namely, determinate knowledge, since the meaning of being determinate is the meaning of knowledge. This same determinate knowledge admits of two distinctions: the first is contaminated, the second is undefiled. If it is contaminated, then, by virtue of its own inherent nature, it is named worldly knowledge. If it is undefiled, then, by virtue of a distinction in what it counteracts, two further kinds are established — that which counteracts the desire realm is named dharma-cognition; that which counteracts the form and formless realms is named subsequent cognition. These same preceding three kinds of knowledge, if capable of knowing the mind and mental concomitants of another, are named the knowledge of others' minds. Further, undefiled knowledge, by virtue of a distinction in aspect, further establishes four kinds — whatever turns by way of the four aspects with respect to the truth of suffering is named the knowledge of suffering,

and so on, up through, whatever turns by way of the four aspects with respect to the truth of the path is named the knowledge of the path. One asks: if determinate knowledge is solely of a single kind, or two, or three, how, here, are eight kinds of knowledge established? The answer: it is by virtue of five matters that eight kinds of knowledge are established — first, by virtue of what is counteracted, dharma-cognition and subsequent cognition are established; second, by virtue of inherent nature, worldly knowledge is established; third, by virtue of preparatory effort, the knowledge of others' minds is established; fourth, by virtue of aspect, the knowledge of suffering and of accumulation are established;

fifth, by virtue of aspect and object together, the knowledge of cessation and of the path are established. The Venerable Vāmalabdha speaks as follows: it is in order to counteract four kinds of confusion that eight kinds of knowledge are established. The four kinds of confusion are: first, confusion regarding realm; second, confusion regarding mind; third, confusion regarding dharmas; fourth, confusion regarding the truths. In order to counteract confusion regarding realm, dharma-cognition and subsequent cognition are established; in order to counteract confusion regarding mind, the knowledge of others' minds is established; in order to counteract confusion regarding dharmas, worldly knowledge is established; in order to counteract confusion regarding the truths, the knowledge of suffering, of accumulation, of cessation, and of the path are established. This, then, is named the eight kinds of knowledge's own inherent nature, own substance, own self-nature, own characteristic, and own fundamental nature — this having already stated the very own-nature of knowledge, what it is so named for ought now to be stated. One asks: for what reason is it named knowledge? What, precisely, is the meaning of "knowledge"? The answer: the meaning of being determinate is the meaning of knowledge. One asks: if this is so, then wisdom associated with doubt ought not to be named knowledge, since, with respect to its object, it is not determinate. The answer: this, too, is knowledge, since, within a single moment, it, too, is determinate with respect to its object; it is simply that, within this same aggregation, the force of doubt is dominant, causing the mind, across many moments with respect to its object, to remain undecided and hesitant, and it is thereby named an aggregation of doubt — exactly as concentration, within a single moment, abides constantly upon its object, yet, at certain times, when associated with restlessness, causes many moments, with respect to its object, to shift and change, and is thereby named distraction. Further, exactly as a sentient being who is much given to craving is named one who conducts himself by craving; one who is much given to aversion is named one who conducts himself by aversion; one who is much given to delusion is named one who conducts himself by delusion — in every single case, this does not mean he is without any further affliction whatsoever — this, too, is just the same, and it is thereby without fault.

The Dārṣṭāntikas say: if the mind possesses knowledge, then it is without ignorance; if the mind possesses doubt, then it is without determinacy; if the mind possesses the coarse, then it is without the subtle. Yet what the Ābhidharmikas state regarding the characteristics of dharmas is like a noisy thicket — that is, within a single mind, there is knowledge and there is ignorance; there is what is neither knowledge nor ignorance; there is doubt and there is determinacy; there is what is neither doubt nor determinacy; there is the coarse and there is the subtle; there is what is neither coarse nor subtle.

The various Ābhidharmika treatise-masters say: granting that dharmas co-arise, what fault is there in this? That is, the various mental concomitants, through their mutual, reciprocal force, give rise to a single mind's own associated dharmas, each with its own distinct function — wisdom is named knowledge; ignorance is named that which is neither knowledge nor ignorance, referring to the remaining mental concomitants; doubt is named hesitation; determinacy is named knowledge; that which is neither doubt nor determinacy refers to the remaining mental concomitants; the coarse is named initial inquiry; the subtle is named sustained inquiry; that which is neither coarse nor subtle refers to the remaining mental concomitants — exactly as the various dharmas of form, differing in kind, co-arise together, the mental concomitants, too, are just the same, and it is thereby without fault.

There are those who say: the meaning of weighty, decisive discrimination with respect to an object taken is the meaning of knowledge — every contaminated wisdom, from beginningless time, having repeatedly engaged in decisive discrimination with respect to its object, is, in every case, named knowledge; every undefiled wisdom that engages in weighty, decisive discrimination is, in every case, named knowledge — solely the undefiled forbearance, with respect to the four noble truths, not yet having engaged in weighty, decisive discrimination, is not named knowledge. There are, further, those who say: it is by virtue of two meanings that it is named knowledge — namely, the meaning of confirming knowledge, and the meaning of thorough knowledge. As for the meaning of confirming knowledge: it refers to confirming the knowledge of suffering, and so on, up through, confirming the knowledge of the path, and it is thereby named knowledge. As for the meaning of thorough knowledge: it refers to thoroughly knowing one's own continuum and thoroughly knowing another's continuum, and it is thereby named knowledge.

Having already, in general, stated the reason for each of the various kinds of knowledge being so named, each single reason ought now to be stated in turn. One asks: for what reason is it named dharma-cognition? The answer: its own substance is dharma itself, and it is thereby named dharma-cognition. One asks: if this is so, then the remaining kinds of knowledge, too, have dharma as their own substance — for what reason, then, are they not named dharma-cognition? The answer: although every kind of knowledge whatsoever has dharma as its own substance, the name "dharma" is established solely with respect to this one alone — exactly as the eighteen elements, the twelve sense-fields, the seven limbs of enlightenment, the six recollections, the four applications of mindfulness, the four confirmed purities, the four kinds of unhindered understanding, and the Three Jewels and three refuges, are all, every one, of the very substance of dharma, and yet the name "dharma" is established solely with respect to one among them — this, too, is just the same, and ought not to be pressed with an objection. Further, dharma-cognition possesses solely a single name — namely, its shared name; the remaining kinds of knowledge possess two names — namely, a shared name and an unshared name — and it is in order to distinguish it that the unshared name is spoken. Further, it is the dharma first known that is named dharma-cognition; it is the dharma known afterward that is named subsequent cognition. Further, it is by virtue of the knowledge associated with confirmed purity in the dharma, first attained, that it is named dharma-cognition; it is what is attained afterward that is named subsequent cognition. Further, it is with respect to a directly witnessed dharma, attaining direct-perception knowledge, that it is named dharma-cognition; it is what is attained afterward that is named subsequent cognition.

Further, the desire realm possesses in abundance the afflictions of non-dharma — namely, the associated afflictions of indignation, resentment, concealment, vexation, envy, and stinginess, and the like; whatever knowledge serves as their immediate counteraction is named dharma-cognition; the form and formless realms are without any such afflictions of non-dharma, and whatever counteracts them, being given rise to after dharma-cognition, is thereby named subsequent cognition. Further, if a kind of knowledge is gathered within six grounds, capable of taking a single ground as its object, it is named dharma-cognition; if a kind of knowledge is gathered within nine grounds, capable of taking eight grounds as its object, it is named subsequent cognition — this being stated with reference to the contaminated grounds. Further, if a kind of knowledge is gathered within six grounds, capable of taking six grounds as its object, it is named dharma-cognition; if a kind of knowledge is gathered within nine grounds, capable of taking nine grounds as its object, it is named subsequent cognition — this being stated with reference to the undefiled grounds. Further, if a kind of knowledge counteracts the eighteen elements, twelve sense-fields, and five aggregates, it is named dharma-cognition; if a kind of knowledge counteracts the fourteen elements, ten sense-fields, and five aggregates, it is named subsequent cognition. Further, if a kind of knowledge counteracts the wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral five aggregates, it is named dharma-cognition; if a kind of knowledge counteracts the wholesome and neutral five aggregates, it is named subsequent cognition. Further, if a kind of knowledge counteracts meritorious and non-meritorious formations, and unmoving formations, it is named dharma-cognition; if a kind of knowledge counteracts meritorious formations and unmoving formations, it is named subsequent cognition. Further, if a kind of knowledge counteracts craving for morsel food and for sexual union, it is named dharma-cognition; if a kind of knowledge counteracts craving for the various concentrations, it is named subsequent cognition. One asks: for what reason is it named the knowledge of others' minds? The answer: it knows another's mind, and it is thereby named the knowledge of others' minds. One asks: does this same knowledge not also know another's mental concomitants — for what reason, then, is it named solely the knowledge of others' minds? The answer: it is by virtue of the resolve specifically aimed at mind — that is, the practitioner of contemplation, first giving rise to this same resolve,

wishes to know another's mind; it is by virtue of this same resolve that, afterward, at the time of knowing the mind, he likewise comes to know the mental concomitants — exactly as a person whose own resolve is originally to see the king, upon afterward seeing the king, likewise sees his ministers and the rest. Further, the various dharmas obtain their own name by virtue of many kinds of condition — that is, some obtain their name by virtue of their own inherent nature, as with the truths, the aggregates, and worldly knowledge; some obtain their name by virtue of what is counteracted, as with dharma-cognition and subsequent cognition; some obtain their name by virtue of preparatory effort, as with the knowledge of others' minds and the like; some obtain their name by virtue of association, exactly as it is said: dharmas associated with the sensation of pleasure and the rest are named dharmas conforming to the sensation of pleasure and the rest; some obtain their name by virtue of what they rely upon, as with the eye-consciousness and the rest; some obtain their name by virtue of aspect, as with the knowledge of suffering and of accumulation; some obtain their name by virtue of object, as with the applications of mindfulness and the rest; some obtain their name by virtue of aspect and object together, as with the knowledge of cessation and of the path — and it is thereby, by virtue of preparatory effort, that it is named the knowledge of others' minds. Further, it is because mind is supreme that, although it, too, comes to know the mental concomitants, it is named solely the knowledge of others' minds — exactly as one speaks of a king's own arrival, and the like. Further, it is because mind is the great ground that,

the mental concomitants are named the great-ground dharmas. Further, it is because, at the time the unimpeded path directly witnessing the superknowledge of others' minds manifests, it takes solely mind as its object. Further, it is because it is said that mind travels far and travels alone, and the like. Further, it is because it is said that mind is what goes before, and the like. Further, it is because it is said that mind is the sovereign king. Further, it is because it is said that mind is the lord of the city. Further, it is because it is said that mind is the resort and refuge. Further, it is because it is said that mind is capable of giving rise to wholesome and unwholesome restraint. Further, it is because it is said that mind is capable of drawing forth wholesome and unwholesome destinies. Further, it is because mind is an internal sense-field, pervading every realm and ground, possessing an object. Further, it is because mind is the support, not a mental concomitant. Further, it is because, wherever mind goes, the mental concomitants follow after it. Further, it is because, when mind is tamed or untamed, the various mental concomitants are likewise so. Further, it is because, when mind is scattered or unscattered, the various mental concomitants are likewise so — it is by virtue of causes and conditions such as these that this same knowledge of others' minds, although it, too, knows the mental concomitants, is named the knowledge of others' minds. One asks: for what reason is it named worldly knowledge? The answer: it knows what is worldly, and it is thereby named worldly knowledge. One asks: does it not also know the supreme meaning — for what reason, then, is it named solely worldly knowledge? The answer: although it does, in a small part, know the aggregates, elements, sense-fields, the four noble truths, and the like, every one of these dharmas of supreme meaning, it knows, for the greater part, men and women coming and going, jars, garments, carts, houses, forests, mountains, and the like, worldly dharmas, and it is thereby named worldly knowledge. Further, this same worldly knowledge is, in genuine truth, without the characteristic of knowledge at all, and yet the various worldly people, in common, establish for it the name "knowledge" — exactly as one who is not of the royal lineage is, nonetheless, by the mere provisional designation of the assembled populace, in common, given the name "king." Further, this same worldly knowledge is something every sentient being, reciprocally, in common, acknowledges, without any dispute whatsoever — exactly as an elder monk of the sangha, exactly as one who delights the assembly, is acknowledged by the common consent of the multitude — and it is thereby named worldly. Further, this same worldly knowledge pervades every sentient being, taking every object as its own, and it is thereby named worldly. Further, this same worldly knowledge is what ignorance relies upon, being bound up with ignorance, being the very footing established by the ignorant, and it is thereby named worldly. The grammarians say: this same worldly knowledge is covered over by every form of ignorance — exactly as a thing within a vessel is covered over by the vessel — and it is thereby named worldly. Further, this same worldly knowledge is altered and ruined by the counteracting path, and is delighted in and esteemed by the ignorant, and it is thereby named worldly. One asks: for what reason is it named the knowledge of suffering, and so on, up through, the knowledge of the path? The answer: it turns by way of the four aspects with respect to the truth of suffering, and it is thereby named the knowledge of suffering; and so on, up through, it turns by way of the four aspects with respect to the truth of the path, and it is thereby named the knowledge of the path. One asks: does worldly knowledge, too, not turn by way of the four aspects with respect to each of the four truths — how, then, could it not be named the four kinds of knowledge? The answer: if it takes solely the truth of suffering as its object, turning solely by way of the four aspects, it is named the knowledge of suffering; and so on, up through, if it takes solely the truth of the path as its object, turning solely by way of the four aspects, it is named the knowledge of the path. Worldly knowledge, with respect to the four noble truths, either takes each singly and separately as its object, or takes two together as its object, or takes three together as its object, or takes all four together as its object, or takes some other dharma as its object, or, further, takes as its object, all together, whatever aspect has arisen — being, in this respect, not fixed, and it is thereby not named the knowledge of suffering, and so on, up through, the knowledge of the path, on account of this same admixture. Further, if it takes each of the four truths separately as its object, turning by way of the four aspects, and is not bound to the same fetter as the truth of suffering and of accumulation, it is named the knowledge belonging to the four truths; worldly knowledge, although it, too, possesses the capacity to take each of the four truths separately as its object, turning by way of the four aspects, is nonetheless bound to the same fetter as the truth of suffering and of accumulation, and it is thereby not named the knowledge belonging to the four truths. One asks: this same knowledge is not bound to the same fetter as the truth of cessation and of the path — for what reason, then, is it not established as the knowledge of cessation and of the path? The answer: since it was not so established at first, it is likewise not so established afterward. Further, if it takes each of the four truths separately as its object, turning by way of the four aspects, and is capable of counteracting affliction, it is named the knowledge belonging to the four truths; worldly knowledge, although it, too, possesses the capacity to take each of the four truths separately as its object, turning by way of the four aspects, is nonetheless incapable of counteracting affliction, and it is thereby not named the knowledge belonging to the four truths.

Further, if it takes each of the four truths separately as its object, turning by way of the four aspects, and, with respect to the four noble truths, witnesses and realizes them clearly, not being confounded by the view of and doubt about them, nor by ignorance, neither increasing affliction nor drawing forth the three forms of existence, being certain to proceed toward nirvāṇa, it is named the knowledge belonging to the four truths; worldly knowledge, lacking any such meaning, is thereby not named the knowledge belonging to the four truths. Further, if it takes each of the four truths separately as its object, turning by way of the four aspects, and is of the very nature of the noble ones, it is named the knowledge belonging to the four truths; worldly knowledge, not being gathered within the very nature of the noble ones, is thereby not named the knowledge belonging to the four truths.

As for these same eight kinds of knowledge: as for realm, the knowledge of others' minds, if contaminated, belongs to the form realm; if undefiled, is unbound; worldly knowledge pervades the three realms; the remaining six kinds of knowledge are unbound. As for ground: dharma-cognition exists within six grounds; subsequent cognition exists within nine grounds; the knowledge of others' minds exists within four grounds; worldly knowledge exists within eighteen grounds — namely, the eight fundamental attainments, the eight approaches to them, the intermediate dhyāna, and the desire realm; as for the remaining four kinds of knowledge,

whatever is gathered within dharma-cognition exists within six grounds; whatever is gathered within subsequent cognition exists within nine grounds. As for what they rely upon as support: dharma-cognition arises solely in reliance upon the desire realm; the knowledge of others' minds arises solely in reliance upon the desire and form realms; subsequent cognition and worldly knowledge both arise in reliance upon all three realms; as for the remaining kinds of knowledge, whatever is gathered within dharma-cognition arises solely in reliance upon the desire realm; whatever is gathered within subsequent cognition arises in reliance upon all three realms. As for aspect: dharma-cognition and subsequent cognition both give rise to sixteen aspects;

the knowledge of others' minds, if undefiled, gives rise to the four aspects of the path; if contaminated, gives rise to the unclear aspect; worldly knowledge gives rise to the sixteen aspects, and likewise gives rise to further aspects besides; the knowledge of suffering, of accumulation, of cessation, and of the path each give rise to their own four aspects. One asks: does every knowledge of suffering, in every case, turn by way of the aspect of suffering? The answer: a tetralemma ought to be cast. There is a knowledge of suffering that does not turn by way of the aspect of suffering — this referring to a knowledge of suffering that turns by way of the aspects of impermanence, emptiness, and non-self. There is what turns by way of the aspect of suffering, that is not a knowledge of suffering — this referring to the dharmas associated with the knowledge of suffering that turn by way of the aspect of suffering. There is what is both a knowledge of suffering and turns by way of the aspect of suffering — this referring to a knowledge of suffering that turns by way of the aspect of suffering. There is what is neither a knowledge of suffering nor turns by way of the aspect of suffering — if one takes solely this same category, this refers to the dharmas associated with a knowledge of suffering that turns by way of the aspects of impermanence, emptiness, and non-self; if one does not take solely this same category, this refers to whatever is excluded by the preceding cases. Exactly as this fourfold turning — already turned, turning now, and yet to turn — should be understood in just the same way. Exactly as the knowledge of suffering, set against the aspect of suffering, yields three or four such tetralemmas, so, too, should it be understood, set against the aspects of impermanence, emptiness, and non-self. Exactly as the knowledge of suffering has twelve such clauses, so, too, should it be understood for the knowledge of accumulation, of cessation, and of the path — there being, in this way, altogether forty-eight tetralemmas. As for object: dharma-cognition and subsequent cognition both take the four truths as their object; the knowledge of others' minds takes another's mind and mental concomitants as its object; worldly knowledge takes every dharma as its object; the knowledge of suffering takes the truth of suffering as its object; the knowledge of accumulation takes the truth of accumulation as its object; the knowledge of cessation takes the truth of cessation as its object; the knowledge of the path takes the truth of the path as its object. As for the application of mindfulness: the knowledge of others' minds is three applications of mindfulness, excluding the application of mindfulness on the body; the knowledge of cessation is the application of mindfulness on dharmas; the remaining kinds of knowledge pervade all four applications of mindfulness. As for knowledge: these eight kinds of knowledge are precisely these eight kinds of knowledge. As for concentration: dharma-cognition and subsequent cognition are both accompanied by all three concentrations; the knowledge of others' minds, if undefiled, is accompanied by the path and wishlessness concentrations; if contaminated, is not accompanied by any concentration; worldly knowledge is not accompanied by any concentration; the knowledge of suffering is accompanied by the emptiness and wishlessness concentrations; the knowledge of accumulation is accompanied by the accumulation and wishlessness concentrations; the knowledge of cessation is accompanied by the signless concentration; the knowledge of the path is accompanied by the path and wishlessness concentrations. As for associated faculties: worldly knowledge is associated with five faculties; the remaining kinds of knowledge are associated with three faculties, namely, pleasure, joy, and equanimity. As for the three times: these eight kinds of knowledge all pervade the three times. As for taking the three times as object: dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, and worldly knowledge all take the three times, together with what is free of time, as their object; the knowledge of others' minds, if past, takes the past as its object; if present, takes the present as its object; if future, and arising, takes the future as its object; if future, and not yet arising, takes the three times as its object; the knowledge of cessation takes what is free of time as its object; the remaining kinds of knowledge take the three times as their object. As for wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral: worldly knowledge pervades all three kinds; the remaining kinds of knowledge are solely wholesome.

As for taking the wholesome, the unwholesome, and the neutral as object: subsequent cognition takes the wholesome and the neutral as its object; the knowledge of cessation and of the path take solely the wholesome as their object; the remaining kinds of knowledge take all three kinds as their object. As for being bound to the three realms, or unbound: the knowledge of others' minds, if contaminated, is bound to the form realm; if undefiled, is unbound; worldly knowledge pervades being bound to the three realms; the remaining kinds of knowledge are unbound. As for taking as object what is bound to the three realms, or unbound: dharma-cognition takes what is bound to the desire realm, and what is unbound, as its object; subsequent cognition takes what is bound to the form and formless realms, and what is unbound, as its object; the knowledge of others' minds takes what is bound to the desire and form realms, and what is unbound, as its object; worldly knowledge takes what is bound to the three realms, and what is unbound, as its object; the knowledge of suffering and of accumulation take what is bound to the three realms as their object; the knowledge of cessation and of the path take what is unbound as their object. As for the learner, the non-learner, and neither: the knowledge of others' minds pervades all three kinds; worldly knowledge is solely neither the learner nor the non-learner; the remaining kinds of knowledge are the learner and the non-learner. As for taking the learner, the non-learner, and neither as object: dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, worldly knowledge, and the knowledge of others' minds all take all three kinds as their object; the knowledge of suffering, of accumulation, and of cessation take solely neither the learner nor the non-learner as their object; the knowledge of the path takes the learner and the non-learner as its object. As for abandoned by seeing or by cultivation, or not abandoned: the knowledge of others' minds, if contaminated, is abandoned by cultivation; if undefiled, is not abandoned; worldly knowledge is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation; the remaining kinds of knowledge are not abandoned. As for taking as object what is abandoned by seeing, by cultivation, or not abandoned: dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, worldly knowledge, and the knowledge of others' minds take all three kinds as their object; the knowledge of suffering and of accumulation take as their object what is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation; the knowledge of cessation and of the path take as their object what is not abandoned. As for taking a name or a meaning as object:

dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, worldly knowledge, the knowledge of suffering, and the knowledge of accumulation pervade taking both a name and a meaning as object; the remaining kinds of knowledge take solely a meaning as their object. As for taking one's own continuum, another's continuum, or what is not a continuum, as object:

dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, and worldly knowledge take all three kinds as their object; the knowledge of others' minds takes another's continuum as its object; the knowledge of suffering, of accumulation, and of the path take one's own continuum and another's continuum as their object; the knowledge of cessation takes what is not a continuum as its object. As for attained through preparatory effort, attained through freedom from defilement, or attained by birth: worldly knowledge pervades all three kinds; the remaining kinds of knowledge pervade attained through preparatory effort and attained through freedom from defilement. As for previously attained, or not previously attained: the knowledge of others' minds and worldly knowledge pervade both kinds; the remaining kinds of knowledge are solely not previously attained.

Further, dharma-cognition is of four kinds: first, it is named dharma-cognition since it is the very first knowledge of the dharma; second, it is named dharma-cognition since it is the direct, present knowledge of the dharma; third, it is named dharma-cognition since it is the genuine knowledge of the dharma; fourth, it is named dharma-cognition since it is the knowledge of the dharma's own transcendence. Subsequent cognition, too, is of four kinds: first, knowing the fruit by way of the cause, through analogy; second, knowing the cause by way of the fruit, through analogy; third, knowing the mind by way of bodily and verbal karma, through analogy; fourth, knowing the Buddha by way of the dharma spoken, through analogy. The knowledge of others' minds, too, is of four kinds — that is, it arises from four conditions, and is likewise capable of serving as four conditions; what this same knowledge knows is likewise so. Worldly knowledge, too, is of four kinds: first, the worldly convention of knowing a name; second, the worldly convention of knowing a bond; third, the worldly convention of knowing a provisional designation;

fourth, the worldly convention of knowing an attachment. The knowledge of suffering, too, is of four kinds: first, knowing the suffering of what is given rise to; second, knowing the suffering of turning and flowing on; third, knowing the suffering of burning affliction; fourth, knowing the suffering of what is gathered together. The knowledge of accumulation, too, is of four kinds: first, knowing karma; second, knowing affliction; third, knowing craving; fourth, knowing the matter itself. The knowledge of cessation, too, is of four kinds: first, knowing the everlasting cutting-off of the three fetters; second, knowing the diminishment of craving, aversion, and delusion; third, knowing the exhaustion of the five lower fetters; fourth, knowing the exhaustion of every fetter. The knowledge of the path, too, is of four kinds: first, knowing every task to be done throughout all the stages of the learner, from the eighth kind of person onward; second, knowing the subduing of one's own enemies; third, contemplating what one has already accomplished; fourth, contemplating the near exhaustion of the outflows. The knowledge of exhaustion, too, is of four kinds: first, not gathered within vision; second, remote from the emptiness concentration; third, not the knowledge of others' minds; fourth, sluggish in preparatory effort. The knowledge of non-arising, too, is of four kinds: first, by virtue of cause; second, by virtue of fruit; third, by virtue of continuum; fourth, by virtue of the person. What is spoken of here as the four dharmas of dharma-cognition and the rest is a broad exposition of the various distinct kinds of knowledge spoken of within the scriptures, not, in every case, precisely identical with what is gathered within dharma-cognition and the rest as such. Further, it should be said that the ten kinds of knowledge, taken all together, are a single knowledge — namely, dharma-cognition, since all of them take dharma as their own substance. It should be said that the ten kinds of knowledge, taken all together, are a single knowledge — namely, subsequent cognition, since all of them are of the noble lineage. It should be said that the ten kinds of knowledge, taken all together, are a single knowledge — namely, determinate knowledge, since the meaning of being determinate is the meaning of knowledge. It should be said that the ten kinds of knowledge, taken all together, are a single knowledge — namely, the knowledge of what is to be known, since it knows what is to be known, and since it decisively confirms it through repeated scrutiny. It should be said that the ten kinds of knowledge, taken all together, are a single knowledge —

namely, the knowledge of the path, since it is gathered within the truth of the path. It should be said that the ten kinds of knowledge, taken all together, are a single knowledge — namely, the knowledge of aspiration, since it is capable of fulfilling every aspiration. It should be said that the ten kinds of knowledge, taken all together, are a single knowledge — namely, the knowledge of exhaustion, since it is attained within the body of one whose afflictions are exhausted. It should be said that the ten kinds of knowledge, taken all together, are a single knowledge — namely, the knowledge of non-arising, since it does not retrogress and fall. What, precisely, is dharma-cognition? The answer: with respect to the desire realm's own formations, the cause of these same formations, the cessation of these same formations, and the path capable of cutting off these same formations, whatever undefiled knowledge there is is, in every case, named dharma-cognition. Here, "these same formations" refers to the truth of suffering; "the cause of these same formations" refers to the truth of accumulation; "the cessation of these same formations" refers to the truth of cessation; "the path capable of cutting off these same formations" refers to the truth of the path. Whatever undefiled knowledge is capable of knowing the desire realm's own four truths in this way is, in every case, named dharma-cognition. Further, whatever undefiled knowledge exists within dharma-cognition and the ground of dharma-cognition is what is termed dharma-cognition. One asks: for what reason is this further stated? The answer: although it was already stated above that this refers to whatever unimpeded path cuts off the desire realm's own formations, it had not yet been stated what the preparatory-effort path, the path of liberation, and the path of continued advancement are.

It is this that is now to be stated. Here, "dharma-cognition" refers to dharma-cognition belonging to the three kinds of path; "the ground of dharma-cognition" refers to the dharmas associated with, and co-existent with, dharma-cognition belonging to the three kinds of path, and the like. Further, "the unimpeded path" refers to the unimpeded path of dharma-cognition; "dharma-cognition" refers to dharma-cognition belonging to the remaining three kinds of path; "the ground of dharma-cognition" refers to the dharmas associated with, and co-existent with, dharma-cognition belonging to all four kinds of path, and the like, together with the four categories of the forbearance of the dharma. Further, "the unimpeded path" refers to the four kinds of undefiled dharma of the path capable of cutting off the desire realm's own afflictions; "dharma-cognition" refers to the dharma-cognition given rise to and cultivated at every other time; "the ground of dharma-cognition" refers to the dharmas associated with, and co-existent with, that same dharma-cognition. Subsequent cognition, following after this, should be understood according to this same standard; the knowledge of others' minds and the rest, exactly as the text sets forth at length, its characteristics should be known accordingly. Of dharma-cognition, up through the knowledge of the path, how many is each one gathered within, among these eight kinds of knowledge? One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is in order to put a stop to what other schools maintain, and to display the correct principle — that is, there are those who hold that, whenever a dharma is gathered, it gathers in another's own nature, not its own nature, as the Vibhajyavādins hold; in order to put a stop to this same holding, and to display that every dharma gathers in solely its own nature, not another's, this treatise is composed. The principle at work here is exactly as already broadly distinguished within the Fetters Aggregate. The answer: dharma-cognition gathers in dharma-cognition, and a small portion of five kinds of knowledge — namely, the knowledge of others' minds, of suffering, of accumulation, of cessation, and of the path — here, it is stated, in general, that dharma-cognition gathers in dharma-cognition; yet dharma-cognition exists within six grounds, and whoever is gathered within the not-yet-arrived concentration gathers in whoever is gathered within the not-yet-arrived concentration, and so on, up through, whoever is gathered within the fourth dhyāna gathers in whoever is gathered within the fourth dhyāna. Further, dharma-cognition is of four kinds — namely, the knowledge belonging to the four truths — the knowledge of suffering gathers in the knowledge of suffering, and so on, up through, the knowledge of the path gathers in the knowledge of the path. Further, dharma-cognition exists within the three times — whatever is past gathers in whatever is past; whatever is future gathers in whatever is future; whatever is present gathers in whatever is present; whatever is past or future, each across many moments, gathers in itself alone, moment by moment. As for this same dharma-cognition gathering in a small portion of the knowledge of others' minds: this refers to the fact that the knowledge of others' minds is, in part, contaminated, and, in part, undefiled — this gathers in solely the undefiled portion; that same undefiled portion, further, possesses a portion belonging to dharma-cognition, and a portion belonging to subsequent cognition — this gathers in solely the portion belonging to dharma-cognition, and it is thereby said to gather in a small portion of it. As for this same dharma-cognition gathering in a small portion of the knowledge of suffering, of accumulation, of cessation, and of the path: this refers to the fact that each of these same four kinds of knowledge possesses a portion belonging to dharma-cognition, and a portion belonging to subsequent cognition — this gathers in solely the portion belonging to dharma-cognition, and it is thereby said to gather in a small portion of it. Subsequent cognition gathers in subsequent cognition, and a small portion of five kinds of knowledge — namely, the knowledge of others' minds, of suffering, of accumulation, of cessation, and of the path — here, it is stated, in general, that subsequent cognition gathers in subsequent cognition; yet subsequent cognition exists within nine grounds, and whoever is gathered within the not-yet-arrived concentration gathers in whoever is gathered within the not-yet-arrived concentration,

and so on, up through, whoever is gathered within the sphere of nothingness gathers in whoever is gathered within the sphere of nothingness — the rest is stated at length exactly as with dharma-cognition. The knowledge of others' minds gathers in the knowledge of others' minds, and a small portion of four kinds of knowledge — namely, dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, worldly knowledge, and the knowledge of the path — here, it is stated, in general, that the knowledge of others' minds gathers in the knowledge of others' minds; yet the knowledge of others' minds exists within the four fundamental dhyānas — whoever is gathered within the first dhyāna gathers in whoever is gathered within the first dhyāna, and so on, up through, whoever is gathered within the fourth dhyāna gathers in whoever is gathered within the fourth dhyāna. Further, the knowledge of others' minds is, in part, contaminated, and, in part, undefiled — the contaminated gathers in the contaminated; the undefiled gathers in the undefiled. As for this same contaminated portion:

there is what is previously attained, and there is what is not previously attained — whatever is previously attained gathers in whatever is previously attained; whatever is not previously attained gathers in whatever is not previously attained. As for this same undefiled portion: there is a portion belonging to dharma-cognition, and a portion belonging to subsequent cognition — the portion belonging to dharma-cognition gathers in the portion belonging to dharma-cognition; the portion belonging to subsequent cognition gathers in the portion belonging to subsequent cognition. Further, this same knowledge of others' minds pervades the three times — whatever is past gathers in whatever is past; whatever is future gathers in whatever is future; whatever is present gathers in whatever is present; whatever is past or future, each across many moments, gathers in itself alone, moment by moment. As for this same knowledge of others' minds gathering in a small portion of dharma-cognition: this refers to the fact that dharma-cognition exists within six grounds — this gathers in solely whatever, among it, is gathered within the four fundamental dhyānas. Further, dharma-cognition is of four kinds — namely, the knowledge belonging to the four truths — this gathers in solely the knowledge of the path among it. Further, that same knowledge of the path possesses what takes its object separately, and what takes its object all together; what takes the present as its object, and what takes the past or future as its object; what takes one's own continuum as its object, and what takes another's continuum as its object; what takes mind and mental concomitants as its object, and what takes the remaining aggregates as its object — this gathers in solely whatever, among it, takes as its object the present mind and mental concomitants of another's continuum, taken separately, and it is thereby said to gather in a small portion of it. Exactly as it is said that this gathers in a small portion of dharma-cognition, so, too, is it said that this gathers in a small portion of subsequent cognition — there being this distinction: it should be said that subsequent cognition exists within nine grounds, and this gathers in solely whatever, among it, is gathered within the four fundamental dhyānas. Further, this same knowledge of others' minds gathering in a small portion of worldly knowledge: this refers to the fact that worldly knowledge exists within eighteen grounds — this gathers in solely whatever, among it, is gathered within the four fundamental dhyānas. Further, worldly knowledge is, in part, wholesome, in part, defiled, and in part, neutral-and-unobscured — this gathers in solely whatever, among it, is wholesome. Further, that same wholesome portion possesses what takes its object separately, and what takes its object all together, stated at length exactly as before — this gathers in solely whatever, among it, takes as its object the present mind and mental concomitants of another's continuum, taken separately, and it is thereby said to gather in a small portion of it. Further, this same knowledge of others' minds gathering in a small portion of the knowledge of the path: this refers to the fact that the knowledge of the path exists within nine grounds — this gathers in solely whatever, among it, is gathered within the four fundamental dhyānas. Further, that same knowledge of the path possesses what takes its object separately, and what takes its object all together, stated at length exactly as before — this gathers in solely whatever, among it, takes as its object the present mind and mental concomitants of another's continuum, taken separately, and it is thereby said to gather in a small portion of it. Worldly knowledge gathers in worldly knowledge, and a small portion of the knowledge of others' minds — here, it is stated, in general, that worldly knowledge gathers in worldly knowledge; yet worldly knowledge exists within eighteen grounds — whoever is gathered within the desire realm gathers in whoever is gathered within the desire realm, and so on, up through, whoever is gathered within the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception gathers in whoever is gathered within the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Further, worldly knowledge is, in part, wholesome, in part, defiled, and in part, neutral-and-unobscured — the wholesome gathers in the wholesome; the defiled gathers in the defiled; the neutral-and-unobscured gathers in the neutral-and-unobscured. Further, worldly knowledge pervades the three times — whatever is past gathers in whatever is past; whatever is future gathers in whatever is future; whatever is present gathers in whatever is present; whatever is past or future, each across many moments, gathers in itself alone, moment by moment. Further, this same worldly knowledge gathering in a small portion of the knowledge of others' minds: this refers to the fact that the knowledge of others' minds is, in part, contaminated, and, in part, undefiled — this gathers in solely whatever, among it, is contaminated, and it is thereby said to gather in a small portion of it. The knowledge of suffering gathers in the knowledge of suffering, and a small portion of two kinds of knowledge — namely, dharma-cognition and subsequent cognition — here, it is stated, in general, that the knowledge of suffering gathers in the knowledge of suffering; yet the knowledge of suffering exists within nine grounds — whoever is gathered within the not-yet-arrived concentration gathers in whoever is gathered within the not-yet-arrived concentration, and so on, up through, whoever is gathered within the sphere of nothingness gathers in whoever is gathered within the sphere of nothingness — the rest is stated as before. Further, this same knowledge of suffering gathering in a small portion of dharma-cognition: this refers to the fact that dharma-cognition possesses the knowledge of suffering, of accumulation, of cessation, and of the path — this gathers in solely its portion belonging to the knowledge of suffering, and it is thereby said to gather in a small portion of it. Exactly as it is said that this gathers in a small portion of dharma-cognition, so, too, is it said that this gathers in a small portion of subsequent cognition. Exactly as the knowledge of suffering gathers in a single kind of knowledge, and a small portion of two further kinds of knowledge, so, too, should the knowledge of accumulation and the knowledge of cessation be understood.

The knowledge of the path gathers in the knowledge of the path, and a small portion of three kinds of knowledge — namely, dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, and the knowledge of others' minds — here, it is stated, in general, that the knowledge of the path gathers in the knowledge of the path; yet the knowledge of the path exists within nine grounds — whoever is gathered within the not-yet-arrived concentration gathers in whoever is gathered within the not-yet-arrived concentration, and so on, up through, whoever is gathered within the sphere of nothingness gathers in whoever is gathered within the sphere of nothingness — the rest is stated as before. Further, this same knowledge of the path gathering in a small portion of dharma-cognition and of subsequent cognition: this is exactly as already stated above, that the knowledge of suffering gathers in a small portion of dharma-cognition and of subsequent cognition. Further, this same knowledge of the path gathering in a small portion of the knowledge of others' minds: this refers to the fact that the knowledge of others' minds is, in part, contaminated, and, in part, undefiled — this gathers in solely whatever, among it, is undefiled, and it is thereby said to gather in a small portion of it. As for "gathers," spoken of here: this refers to gathering in one's own nature — one's own nature, with respect to one's own nature, is genuinely and really obtainable, is not separated from and does not depart from it, abides constantly, and is not empty of it, being eternally an obstruction — it is on account of this that it is spoken of as gathering.

If one accomplishes dharma-cognition, and so on, stated at length. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is in order to put a stop to what other schools maintain, and to display the correct principle — that is, there are those who hold that there exists, in genuine truth, no nature of accomplishment or of non-accomplishment, as the Dārṣṭāntikas hold; in order to put a stop to this same holding, and to display that the nature of accomplishment, and of non-accomplishment, is decisively and genuinely real, this treatise is composed. If one accomplishes dharma-cognition, then, among these eight kinds of knowledge, how many does he accomplish, and how many does he not accomplish? The answer: he may accomplish three, four, five, six, seven, or eight — that is, at the time of the forbearance regarding the dharma-cognition of suffering, or the subsequent cognition of suffering, whoever is without the knowledge of others' minds accomplishes three; whoever possesses the knowledge of others' minds accomplishes four. Here, the three refers to dharma-cognition, the knowledge of suffering, and worldly knowledge; the four refers to the preceding three, together with the knowledge of others' minds.

If one has not yet become free of the desire realm's own defilement, and enters right determinacy, at that time he accomplishes three; if one has already become free of the desire realm's own defilement, and enters right determinacy, at that time he accomplishes four; what is stated hereafter should be understood according to this same standard. At the time of the dharma-cognition of suffering, dharma-cognition and the knowledge of suffering are accomplished in the present and the future — this being one and the same substance of knowledge, named dharma-cognition by virtue of what it counteracts, and named the knowledge of suffering by virtue of its aspect; worldly knowledge and the knowledge of others' minds are accomplished in the past and the future. At the time of the forbearance of the subsequent cognition of suffering, there is an increase of vision, of wisdom, and of the path — but neither of knowledge nor of name; at that time, dharma-cognition, the knowledge of suffering, worldly knowledge, and the knowledge of others' minds are all, in every case, accomplished solely in the past and the future, since none is present — what is stated hereafter should be understood according to this same standard. At the time of the subsequent cognition of suffering, and the forbearance of the dharma-cognition of accumulation, whoever is without the knowledge of others' minds accomplishes four; whoever possesses the knowledge of others' minds accomplishes five. Here, the four refers to dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, the knowledge of suffering, and worldly knowledge; the five refers to the preceding four, together with the knowledge of others' minds. At the time of the subsequent cognition of suffering, there is an increase of vision, of wisdom, of the path, of knowledge, and of name — that is, the name "subsequent cognition" is what is named the knowledge of suffering, since it had already been attained at the time of the dharma-cognition of suffering.

At the time of the forbearance of the dharma-cognition of accumulation, there is an increase of vision, of wisdom, and of the path, but neither of knowledge nor of name. From the time of the dharma-cognition of accumulation, up through the forbearance of the dharma-cognition of cessation, whoever is without the knowledge of others' minds accomplishes five; whoever possesses the knowledge of others' minds accomplishes six. Here, the five refers to dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, the knowledge of suffering, of accumulation, and worldly knowledge; the six refers to the preceding five, together with the knowledge of others' minds. At the time of the dharma-cognition of accumulation, there is an increase of vision, of wisdom, of the path, and of the name of knowledge — that is, the name "knowledge of accumulation" is what is named this same dharma-cognition, since it had already been attained at the time of the dharma-cognition of suffering. At the time of the forbearance of the subsequent cognition of accumulation, and of the subsequent cognition of accumulation, and of the forbearance of the dharma-cognition of cessation, there is an increase of vision, of wisdom, and of the path, but neither of knowledge nor of name — for what reason is this so? Because the name "knowledge of accumulation" attained at the time of the subsequent cognition of accumulation does not differ from the name "knowledge of accumulation" attained at the time of the dharma-cognition of accumulation; and the name "subsequent cognition" attained at that time does not differ from the name "subsequent cognition" attained at the time of the subsequent cognition of suffering. From the time of the dharma-cognition of cessation, up through the forbearance of the dharma-cognition of the path, whoever is without the knowledge of others' minds accomplishes six; whoever possesses the knowledge of others' minds accomplishes seven. Here, the six refers to dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, the knowledge of suffering, of accumulation, of cessation, and worldly knowledge; the seven refers to the preceding six, together with the knowledge of others' minds. At the time of the dharma-cognition of cessation, there is an increase of vision, of wisdom, of the path, and of the name of knowledge — that is, the name "knowledge of cessation" is what is named the forbearance of the subsequent cognition of cessation. At the time of the subsequent cognition of cessation, and of the forbearance of the dharma-cognition of the path, there is an increase of vision, of wisdom, and of the path, but neither of knowledge nor of name.

For what reason is this so? Because the name "knowledge of cessation" attained at the time of the subsequent cognition of cessation does not differ from the name "knowledge of cessation" attained at the time of the dharma-cognition of cessation; and the name "subsequent cognition" attained at that time does not differ from the name "subsequent cognition" attained at the time of the subsequent cognition of suffering. From the time of the dharma-cognition of the path, up through the subsequent cognition of the path, whoever is without the knowledge of others' minds accomplishes seven; whoever possesses the knowledge of others' minds accomplishes eight. Here, the seven refers to, among the eight kinds of knowledge, excluding the knowledge of others' minds; the eight refers to the preceding seven, together with the knowledge of others' minds. At the time of the dharma-cognition of the path, there is an increase of vision, of wisdom, of the path, and of the name of knowledge — that is, the name "knowledge of the path" is what is named the forbearance of the subsequent cognition of the path. At the time of the subsequent cognition of the path, there is an increase of vision, of wisdom, and of the path, but neither of knowledge nor of name — for what reason is this so? Because the name "knowledge of the path" attained at the time of the subsequent cognition of the path does not differ from the name "knowledge of the path" attained at the time of the dharma-cognition of the path; and the name "subsequent cognition" attained at that time does not differ from the name "subsequent cognition" attained at the time of the subsequent cognition of suffering. If one accomplishes subsequent cognition, and so on, up through, if one accomplishes the knowledge of the path — as to how many, or how few, of these eight kinds of knowledge are thereby accomplished, exactly as the text sets forth at length, its characteristics should be known accordingly, together with the increase of vision, of wisdom, of the path, and of the increase of the name of knowledge, its characteristics to be known exactly as within the section on dharma-cognition. Now, dharma-cognition and the knowledge of suffering are first accomplished at the time of the dharma-cognition of suffering; subsequent cognition is first accomplished at the time of the subsequent cognition of suffering; the knowledge of others' minds is first accomplished at the ninth path of liberation belonging to freedom from the desire realm's own defilement, and at the mind of rebirth-linkage upon passing from the formless realm and being reborn within the form realm; worldly knowledge has no first moment, since every sentient being originally and constantly accomplishes it; the knowledge of accumulation is first accomplished at the time of the dharma-cognition of accumulation; the knowledge of cessation is first accomplished at the time of the dharma-cognition of cessation; the knowledge of the path is first accomplished, beginning with dharma-cognition. Dharma-cognition, subsequent cognition, the knowledge of suffering, of accumulation, of cessation, and of the path, from their very first attainment onward, up until one has not yet entered complete nirvāṇa, are constantly accomplished; worldly knowledge, from an unknowable original limit, up until one has not yet entered complete nirvāṇa, is constantly accomplished; the knowledge of others' minds, once one has already become free of the desire realm's own defilement, and has not yet been reborn within the formless realm, and has not yet entered complete nirvāṇa, is constantly accomplished. This, then, is what is termed, in this place, the brief Vibhāṣā.

Does whoever cultivates dharma-cognition also cultivate subsequent cognition, and so on, stated at length. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is in order to put a stop to what other schools maintain, and to display the correct principle — that is, there are those who say that wholesome, defiled, and neutral dharmas all possess the meaning of cultivation; in order to put a stop to this same holding, and to display that solely wholesome, conditioned dharmas possess the capacity for cultivation. How is this known to be so? Exactly as the scripture states: wholesome, conditioned dharmas ought to be cultivated, not any other kind. For what reason is this so? If a dharma is capable of yielding a beloved fruit, and one diligently and vigorously cultivates it, causing it gradually to increase and grow, it is thereby named cultivation; solely wholesome, conditioned dharmas are capable of attaining a beloved fruit — namely, attaining the beloved, ripened, dominant fruit of the world, and likewise attaining the fruit of freedom from bondage that transcends the world. The various persons possessing knowledge diligently and vigorously cultivate them, proceeding from the lower, through the middling, to the upper grade, causing themselves swiftly to attain the sought-after, beloved fruit; defiled and neutral dharmas, and the unconditioned wholesome, are without any such function, and are thereby not named cultivation. There are, further, those who deny that there exists any meaning of future cultivation — holding that the past and the future are both without any genuine substance whatsoever.

In order to put a stop to this same holding, and to display that the past and the future are decisively and genuinely real, and that the present is capable of cultivating future wholesome dharmas — that is, a present, supremely wholesome dharma, serving as cause, draws forth the attainment of every future wholesome dharma; it is by virtue of attaining that same dharma that it is spoken of as being cultivated by it. Were there no capacity to cultivate future wholesome dharmas, then there would be no such matter as attaining a fruit and the like — that is, at the time of attaining a fruit and the like, the present possesses solely a single kind of knowledge, yet eight kinds of knowledge are cultivated for the future; the present possesses solely a single aspect, yet sixteen aspects are cultivated for the future; the present possesses solely a single moment, yet measureless moments are cultivated for the future.

The present, either, possesses solely contaminated mind and mental concomitants, yet contaminated and undefiled mind and mental concomitants are cultivated for the future; or the present possesses solely undefiled mind and mental concomitants, yet undefiled and contaminated mind and mental concomitants are cultivated for the future — every such matter as these would then fail to be established.

Further, at the very time the various buddhas attain the great awakening, the present possesses solely the virtue of the knowledge of exhaustion — were there no meaning of future cultivation of the wholesome,

it would then follow that the various buddhas would be without all-knowledge — let there be no such grave fault as this. It must, therefore, be admitted that future wholesome dharmas are cultivated. It is in order to put a stop to these various divergent holdings, and to display the correct principle, that this treatise is composed. Cultivation is of four kinds, exactly as stated at length before; this same discussion relies solely upon two kinds of cultivation — namely, attainment-cultivation and habituation-cultivation.