Three Roots of Good and Evil

Do the three kinds of bad conduct gather in the three unwholesome roots, or do the three unwholesome roots gather in the three kinds of bad conduct? Such chapters as these, together with their own explanatory meaning — having already comprehended them, they ought now to be fully explained in turn. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is in order to distinguish the meaning of the scripture — that is, as the scripture states:

there exist three kinds of bad conduct and three unwholesome roots. Although the scripture makes this same statement, it does not broadly discuss it, nor has it stated that the three kinds of bad conduct gather in the three unwholesome roots, or that the three unwholesome roots gather in the three kinds of bad conduct. The scripture is this treatise's own root, and whatever it has not yet stated ought now to be stated,

and it is thereby that this treatise is composed.

The three kinds of bad conduct are: bodily bad conduct, verbal bad conduct, and mental bad conduct. What, precisely, are bodily bad conduct, and the rest? Exactly as the Bhagavān states: what is bodily bad conduct? It refers to cutting off life, taking what is not given, and sexual misconduct. What is verbal bad conduct? It refers to false speech, divisive speech, harsh speech, and idle chatter. What is mental bad conduct? It refers to covetousness, malice, and wrong view.

It should be understood that, here, the Bhagavān speaks solely of the bad conduct gathered within the root path of karma, not the bad conduct gathered within the preparatory action and the subsequent action of the path of karma. This *Jñānaprasthāna* speaks broadly of every unwholesome bodily karma whatsoever, whether gathered within a path of karma or not gathered within a path of karma —

all of this, in every case, is named bodily bad conduct. It speaks broadly of every unwholesome verbal karma whatsoever, whether gathered within a path of karma or not gathered within a path of karma — all of this, in every case, is named verbal bad conduct. It speaks broadly of every unwholesome mental karma whatsoever, whether gathered within a path of karma or not gathered within a path of karma — all of this, in every case, is named mental bad conduct.

Exactly as this treatise gathers in the various kinds of bad conduct, the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, too, speaks in just the same way — that same treatise states: what is bodily bad conduct?

It refers to cutting off life, taking what is not given, and sexual misconduct — this same statement accords with the scripture. It further states: further, cutting off life, taking what is not given, and conduct that is not pure — in this way, it further gathers in what was not gathered before, namely, the very conduct of desire that arises with respect to one's own wife. It further states: there is a further unwholesome bodily karma — in this way, it further gathers in whatever belongs to the preparatory action and the subsequent action of the path of karma. It further states: there is, further, whatever bodily karma is drawn forth by improper reasoning. One asks: what, precisely, is bodily karma drawn forth by improper reasoning — is this gathering in what was not gathered before? The answer: what was stated before speaks of inherent nature; what is stated now speaks of what gives rise to it. By whom is this given rise to? Namely, by improper attention. There are, further, those who say: this refers to every defiled-and-neutral bodily karma, and a portion of the undefiled-and-neutral bodily karma. Every defiled-and-neutral bodily karma refers to what is given rise to by the flattery and craving, and the like, belonging to the ground of the first dhyāna. A portion of the undefiled-and-neutral bodily karma refers to the fact that one ought to go and come, walk and stand, sit and lie down, cut and sew, in such-and-such a way, yet one does not go and come, walk and stand, up through, cut and sew, in this same way — such bodily karma as this, performing what ought not to be performed, being improper, is gathered within the category drawn forth by improper reasoning, and it is thereby named bodily bad conduct. Were it stated in this way, bodily bad conduct would then pervade the unwholesome and the neutral, the desire realm and the form realm; yet bad conduct is solely unwholesome, solely belonging to the desire realm, and it is thereby that the position stated first is the good one. That same treatise, further, states: what is verbal bad conduct? It refers to false speech, divisive speech, and harsh speech,

and idle chatter — this same statement accords with the scripture. It further states: there is a further unwholesome verbal karma — in this way, it further gathers in whatever belongs to the preparatory action and the subsequent action of the path of karma. It further states: there is, further, whatever verbal karma is drawn forth by improper reasoning. One asks: what, precisely, is verbal karma drawn forth by improper reasoning — is this gathering in what was not gathered before? The answer: what was stated before speaks of inherent nature; what is stated now speaks of what gives rise to it. By whom is this given rise to? Namely, by improper attention. There are, further, those who say: this refers to every defiled-and-neutral verbal karma, and a portion of the undefiled-and-neutral verbal karma.

Every defiled-and-neutral verbal karma refers to what is given rise to by the flattery and craving, and the like, belonging to the ground of the first dhyāna. A portion of the undefiled-and-neutral verbal karma refers to the fact that one ought to speak a single word, two words, many words, a word for a man, a word for a woman, a word for neither man nor woman, or a word for what has gone, is coming, or is now — yet one does not speak in this way, up through, a word for what has gone, is coming, or is now — such verbal karma as this, speaking what ought not to be spoken, being improper, is gathered within the category drawn forth by improper reasoning, and it is thereby named verbal bad conduct. Were it stated in this way, verbal bad conduct would then pervade the unwholesome and the neutral, the desire realm and the form realm; yet bad conduct is solely unwholesome, solely belonging to the desire realm, and it is thereby that the position stated first is the good one. That same treatise, further, states: what is mental bad conduct? It refers to covetousness, malice, and wrong view — this same statement accords with the scripture. It further states: there is a further unwholesome mental karma — in this way, it further gathers in the various unwholesome forms of volition. It further states: there is, further, whatever mental karma is drawn forth by improper reasoning. One asks: what, precisely, is mental karma drawn forth by improper reasoning —

is this gathering in what was not gathered before? The answer: what was stated before speaks of inherent nature; what is stated now speaks of what gives rise to it. By whom is this given rise to? Namely, by improper attention. There are, further, those who say: this refers to every defiled-and-neutral mental karma, and a portion of the undefiled-and-neutral mental karma, named mental karma drawn forth by improper reasoning. Every defiled-and-neutral mental karma drawn forth by improper reasoning refers to the mental karma associated with the desire realm's own view of self and extreme view, and every mental karma associated with the various afflictions of the form and formless realms. A portion of the undefiled-and-neutral mental karma drawn forth by improper reasoning refers to the various mental karma that arises exactly as already stated for the undefiled-and-neutral bodily karma and verbal karma drawn forth by improper reasoning. Were it stated in this way, mental bad conduct would then pervade the unwholesome and the neutral, and, further, pervade all three realms; yet bad conduct is solely unwholesome, solely belonging to the desire realm.

It is thereby that the position stated first is the good one.

Exactly as the *Jñānaprasthāna* and the *Saṅgītiparyāya* gather in bodily bad conduct and verbal bad conduct, so, too, does what is stated within the *Prajñaptiśāstra*, excepting solely mental bad conduct, which it gathers in separately, since that same treatise states: one asks, do the three kinds of bodily bad conduct gather in every kind of bodily bad conduct, or does every kind of bodily bad conduct gather in the three kinds of bodily bad conduct? The answer: every kind gathers in the three; the three do not gather in every kind. What is not gathered in? Namely, whatever is not cutting off life, striking a sentient being with a hand, a staff, and the like, and whatever is not sexual misconduct, engaging in impure conduct with respect to what ought to be engaged with, giving rise to various acts of heedlessness such as drinking wine, and, through lack of proper knowledge and loss of mindfulness, making use of food and drink, and the like, and being incapable of avoiding those who violate the precepts — such bodily karma as these, given rise to, is not gathered within the three. One asks: those who violate the precepts are measureless — how could one possibly avoid them all? Even were one to abandon this one, one would again draw near that one. The answer: wherever one may be, there they are — to wish to be entirely free of them is genuinely difficult; being capable of not following their own defiled conduct is what constitutes genuine avoidance. It is therefore said: though the body may be far off, if one follows their own habitual conduct, this is named drawing near; though the body may be close by, if one does not follow their own habitual conduct, this is named being far removed. One asks: do the four kinds of verbal bad conduct gather in every kind of verbal bad conduct, or does every kind of verbal bad conduct gather in the four kinds of verbal bad conduct? The answer: every kind gathers in the four; the four do not gather in every kind. What is not gathered in? Namely, exactly as there is one who, dwelling alone in an empty, secluded place, speaks in this way: there is no giving, no affection, no offering — such verbal bad conduct as this, since the various sentient beings of the world do not come to understand it, is not gathered within the four. One asks: do the three kinds of mental bad conduct gather in every kind of mental bad conduct, or does every kind of mental bad conduct gather in the three kinds of mental bad conduct? The answer: every kind gathers in the three; the three do not gather in every kind. What is not gathered in? Namely, sensation, notion, formations, and consciousness that co-arise with covetousness, malice, and wrong view — these are not gathered within the three. Within that same treatise, mental bad conduct gathers in the very own-nature of four aggregates — in this way, the own-nature of the five aggregates is posited for the various kinds of bad conduct.

One asks: for what reason do this *Jñānaprasthāna* and the *Saṅgītiparyāya* differ from the Buddha's own scripture and the *Prajñaptiśāstra* in how they gather in the various kinds of bad conduct? The answer: it is by reliance upon two kinds of approach that the various kinds of bad conduct are spoken of — the first is by reliance upon worldly convention; the second is by reliance upon supreme meaning. That is, the Buddha's own scripture and the *Prajñaptiśāstra* speak of the various kinds of bad conduct by reliance upon the approach of worldly convention; this *Jñānaprasthāna* and the *Saṅgītiparyāya* speak of the various kinds of bad conduct by reliance upon the approach of supreme meaning.

Exactly as the distinction is made by reliance upon worldly convention and supreme meaning, so, too, should it be understood by reliance upon what is of provisional meaning and what is of definitive meaning, what carries a separate intention and what carries no separate intention, what has a separate cause and condition and what has no separate cause and condition, and the direct realization of the truth of worldly convention and the direct realization of the truth of supreme meaning, and the like. There are, further, those who say:

it is by virtue of three conditions that what is gathered in differs — namely, by virtue of inherent nature, by virtue of admixture, and by virtue of what the world finds censurable. This *Jñānaprasthāna* and the *Saṅgītiparyāya* speak of their own inherent nature; the *Prajñaptiśāstra* speaks of their admixture — that is, even a dharma that is not, itself, the inherent nature of bad conduct, if admixed together with bad conduct, likewise earns its name. The scripture speaks of what the world finds censurable, since the various worldly people, for the greater part, give rise to censure with respect to the root path of karma, not with respect to the preparatory action and the subsequent action of the path of karma. It is by virtue of this same condition that the various kinds of bad conduct are gathered differently across the scripture and the treatises. This, then, is what is termed the own-nature of bad conduct.

Having already stated their own-nature, what they are so named for ought now to be stated. One asks: for what reason are they named bad conduct? What, precisely, is the meaning of "bad conduct"? The answer: it is because they are to be loathed and censured that they are named "bad"; it is because they traverse and rely upon their own domain that they are named "conduct." As for being named "bad" because they are to be loathed and censured: exactly as it is said, a bad wife and children, bad clothing and food, a bad person, a bad place, bad comings and goings, and the like. As for being named "conduct" because they traverse and rely upon their own domain: that is, cutting off life, harsh speech, and malice traverse the domain of sentient beings; taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, and covetousness traverse the domain of requisites; false speech, divisive speech, and idle chatter traverse the domain of names; wrong view traverses the domain of name-and-form. There are, further, those who say: it is because they bring forth the fruit of suffering sensation that they are named "bad"; it is because they move swiftly and adroitly that they are named "conduct." One asks: sunk and drowning in every kind of evil, how could this be called adroit? The answer: whoever performs bad conduct possesses such a skillful device that, although he performs bad conduct, he causes the world not to know of its evil, and it is thereby named adroit. There are, further, those who say: it is because one draws near to evil people that one becomes capable of drawing forth an evil destiny, and it is thereby named bad conduct. There are, further, those who say: it is by virtue of three conditions that it is named bad conduct — namely, being what is reflected upon by evil reflection, being what is spoken by evil speech, and being what is done by evil doing. Being what is reflected upon by evil reflection refers to mental bad conduct; being what is spoken by evil speech refers to verbal bad conduct; being what is done by evil doing refers to bodily bad conduct. There are, further, those who say: it is by virtue of three conditions that it is named bad conduct — namely, the meaning of evil doing, being what is to be loathed and censured, and decisively being capable of bringing forth an unloved fruit. As for the meaning of evil doing: performing the various evils of body, speech, and mind is thereby named bad conduct. As for being what is to be loathed and censured: performing bad conduct, violating the moral precepts, one becomes constantly loathed and censured by the various gods, the great teachers, and those wise ones who share the very same holy conduct. As for decisively being capable of bringing forth an unloved fruit: whatever bad conduct there is, of body, speech, or mind, there exists no place, no occasion whatsoever, on which it could bring forth a beloved fruit; there exists a place, an occasion, on which it brings forth an unloved fruit. The *Saṅgītiparyāya*, too, speaks in just the same way: for what cause and condition is it named bad conduct? It refers to the fact that it is capable of bringing forth an unloved, undelightful, displeasing, disagreeable fruit — this displays the naturally-flowing fruit. It further states that it is capable of bringing forth an unloved, undelightful, displeasing, disagreeable ripening — this displays the ripened fruit.

The three unwholesome roots are: craving, aversion, and delusion. One asks: what, precisely, is the own-nature of these three? The answer: the unwholesome root of craving is fivefold — namely, the craving bound to the desire realm and abandoned by the five categories. The unwholesome root of aversion is fivefold — namely, the aversion abandoned by the five categories. The unwholesome root of delusion is fivefold — namely, the whole of what is gathered within the desire realm and abandoned by seeing accumulation, cessation, and the path, and by cultivation, together with a portion of what is abandoned by seeing suffering. Now, ignorance abandoned by seeing suffering is of ten kinds; here, excluding what is associated with the view of self and the extreme view, the remainder of ignorance is taken, and it is thereby said to be a portion. These fifteen dharmas are solely unwholesome, and, pervasively giving rise to unwholesome dharmas, are named unwholesome roots, it should be understood. These three, in every case, are associated with the six bodies of consciousness.

This, then, is named the own-nature of the three unwholesome roots. Having already stated their own-nature, what they are so named for ought now to be stated. One asks: for what reason are they named unwholesome roots? What, precisely, is the meaning of "unwholesome root"? The answer: the meaning of being capable of giving rise to the unwholesome, the meaning of being capable of nourishing the unwholesome, of being capable of augmenting the unwholesome, of being capable of extending the unwholesome, of being capable of benefiting the unwholesome, of being capable of sustaining the unwholesome, of being capable of causing unwholesome dharmas broadly to spread and circulate — this is the meaning of unwholesome root. The Venerable Vasumitra speaks as follows: the meaning of being the cause of the various unwholesome dharmas is the meaning of unwholesome root; the meaning of being the seed of the various unwholesome dharmas, of arising together with the unwholesome, of being capable of serving as the turning cause that draws forth the unwholesome, of being the following cause that gives rise to the unwholesome, of gathering in and benefiting every unwholesome dharma — this is the meaning of unwholesome root. The Great Virtuous One speaks as follows: relying upon this same matter, one is pervasively capable of giving rise to and increasing the various unwholesome dharmas, being capable of serving as the turning cause, and the following cause, gathering in and benefiting the unwholesome, and it is thereby named unwholesome root.

One asks: if the meaning of being the cause of the unwholesome is the meaning of unwholesome root, then a previously arisen unwholesome set of five aggregates serves as the cause for every subsequently arisen and not-yet-arisen unwholesome set of five aggregates; a previously arisen ten unwholesome paths of karma serve as the cause for every subsequently arisen and not-yet-arisen ten unwholesome paths of karma; a previously arisen unwholesome category co-arising with the thirty-four latent afflictions serves as the cause for every subsequently arisen and not-yet-arisen unwholesome

category co-arising with the thirty-four latent afflictions, as is fitting — in this way, every unwholesome dharma whatsoever ought then to be named an unwholesome root. What, then, is the special, uncommon cause and condition by virtue of which the Bhagavān establishes solely these three as the unwholesome roots? The answer: this is the Bhagavān's own statement with something further left unsaid — the great teacher, observing the mental conduct and aspiration of the sentient beings he was converting, spoke in brief summary. The Venerable Pārśva says: it is solely the Bhagavān who ultimately and fully comprehends the very nature and characteristic of every dharma, and likewise knows their own function — this is not known by any other. Whatever dharma possesses the characteristic of an unwholesome root, he thereupon establishes it; whatever lacks it, he does not establish it. The Venerable Ghoṣa, too, speaks as follows: the great teacher knows that these three unwholesome roots possess such a function, are so forceful, and are so intimately near, being capable of serving as the cause for every unwholesome dharma — apart from these unwholesome roots, no other unwholesome dharma possesses any such matter. There are, further, those who say: these three kinds are capable of giving rise to every unwholesome dharma, difficult to cut off, difficult to extinguish, difficult to transcend, difficult to cross over, and it is thereby that they alone are established as the unwholesome roots. There are, further, those who say: these three kinds possess many faults, giving rise to a great abundance of sorrow and affliction in every present and future dharma, and it is thereby that they alone are established as the unwholesome roots. There are, further, those who say:

these three kinds constitute the very greatest obstruction to emerging from the desire realm, exactly as a mighty jailer guards the gate of a prison, and it is thereby that they alone are established as the unwholesome roots. There are, further, those who say: these three kinds are, among the unwholesome, the very most supreme, the very foremost, going before and leading the way, exactly as the mightiest army's own general leads every soldier — it is by virtue of this same unwholesome root's own dominant force that every unwholesome dharma is caused to spread and increase,

and it is thereby that they alone are established as the unwholesome roots. There are, further, those who say: these three kinds serve as the proximate counteracting enemy and obstruction to the three wholesome roots, and it is thereby that they alone are established as the unwholesome roots. There are, further, those who say: these three kinds are capable, with respect to every unwholesome dharma,

of serving as its cause, its root, its eye, its accumulation, and its condition, giving rise to every unwholesome dharma, obstructing every dharma of virtue,

being the very most supreme among unwholesome dharmas, and it is thereby that they alone are established as the unwholesome roots. There are, further, those who say: these three kinds pervasively gather in every unwholesome dharma whatsoever — that is, every unwholesome dharma is, in every case, either of the category of craving, of the category of aversion, or of the category of delusion — and it is thereby that they alone are established as the unwholesome roots. Further, these three kinds possess five qualities in full, which no other dharma possesses — namely, they pervade the five categories, are pervasively present within the six consciousnesses, are of the very nature of a latent affliction, are capable of giving rise to coarse bodily and verbal karma, and constitute a firm, strong preparatory effort that cuts off the wholesome roots — and it is thereby that they alone are established as the unwholesome roots. As for pervading the five categories: this excludes the five views and doubt. As for being pervasively present within the six consciousnesses: this excludes the various forms of pride. As for being of the very nature of a latent affliction: this excludes the various entanglements and stains, and the like.

As for being capable of giving rise to coarse bodily and verbal karma, and constituting a firm, strong preparatory effort that cuts off the wholesome roots: this displays the meaning of "root." Further, these same five qualities exclude every dharma from establishing the meaning of "root" — that is, an undefiled dharma is pervasively present within the six consciousnesses, but possesses none of the remaining four qualities; the defiled form aggregate wholly lacks all five qualities; the defiled feeling and notion aggregates, and the defiled formations aggregate associated with the various afflictions, apart from the entanglements and stains, although these pervade the five categories and are pervasively present within the six consciousnesses, are nonetheless not of the very nature of a latent affliction; although they are capable of giving rise to coarse bodily and verbal karma, they do not constitute a firm, strong preparatory effort that cuts off the wholesome roots. The various defiled formations dissociated from mind, although pervading the five categories, possess none of the remaining four qualities. Within the defiled consciousness aggregate, the five consciousnesses — eye-consciousness, and the rest — possess wholly none of the five qualities; mental consciousness, though it pervades the five categories, and is likewise capable of giving rise to coarse bodily and verbal karma, nonetheless possesses none of the remaining three qualities. Among the ten afflictions, the five views and doubt possess the nature of a latent affliction, but possess none of the remaining four qualities. Pride pervades the five categories, is of the nature of a latent affliction, and is capable of giving rise to coarse bodily and verbal karma, but possesses neither of the remaining two qualities. Among the ten entanglements, torpor, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of conscience, though they pervade the five categories and are pervasively present within the six consciousnesses, are nonetheless not of the nature of a latent affliction; though they give rise to coarse bodily and verbal karma, they do not constitute a firm, strong preparatory effort that cuts off the wholesome roots. Sleep alone, though it pervades the five categories, possesses none of the remaining four qualities. The remaining five entanglements, though they give rise to coarse bodily and verbal karma, possess none of the remaining four qualities. The six afflictive stains, though they, too, are at times capable of giving rise to coarse bodily and verbal karma, possess none of the remaining four qualities —

solely craving, aversion, and delusion possess these five qualities in full, unlike every other dharma, and it is thereby that they alone are established as the unwholesome roots. Further, these three kinds, for the greater part, follow and increase along with the three sensations, and it is thereby that they alone are established as the unwholesome roots. Further, these three kinds, for the most part, manifest in the present among sentient beings of the desire realm, and are capable of giving rise to the ten unwholesome paths of karma, generating the ten evil destinies, and it is thereby that they alone are established as the unwholesome roots.

These three kinds, pervading the five categories, together with the six consciousnesses, arise together with the various unwholesome categories and serve as their root. Here, the category associated with craving, by virtue of two roots, is named as possessing a root — namely, craving, and the ignorance associated with it. The category associated with aversion, too, by virtue of two roots, is named as possessing a root —

namely, aversion, and the ignorance associated with it. Every remaining unwholesome mental category, apart from these, is named as possessing a root by virtue of a single root — namely, ignorance.

One asks: the Bhagavān, in various places, speaks of "root" differently — that is, in one place, he speaks of the view of self and the extreme view as root; in another place, he speaks of the Bhagavān himself as root; in another place, he speaks of the wish to act as root; in another place, he speaks of diligence as root; in another place, he speaks of inherent nature as root — what meaning do these various statements carry? The answer: the view of self and the extreme view, since they are capable of giving rise to the sixty-two views, are spoken of as root. The Bhagavān, since he is capable of speaking of defilement and purification, bondage and liberation, birth-and-death and nirvāṇa, giving rise to the correct teaching of the dharma, is spoken of as root. The wish to act, since it is capable of drawing forth every wholesome dharma, is spoken of as root. Diligence, since it gathers in and protects every wholesome dharma one cultivates, causing it not to scatter and be lost, is spoken of as root. Inherent nature, since it is capable of sustaining its own substance without loss, is spoken of as root — exactly as the unconditioned, too, being capable of sustaining its own substance, is spoken of as root,

this, too, is without any fault. There are, further, those who say: it is by virtue of serving as a cause of the same kind, sustaining a naturally-flowing fruit, or being sustained by the very nature of a cause of the same kind, that a conditioned dharma's own inherent nature is named root. There are, further, those who say: it is by virtue of the force of the associated and co-existent causes sustaining it that a conditioned dharma's own inherent nature is named root. A name is capable of manifesting a dharma's own inherent nature, and it is thereby, too, that it is spoken of as the root of inherent nature. This craving, aversion, and delusion are capable of giving rise to and extending the various unwholesome dharmas, and it is thereby that they are spoken of as roots. The three unwholesome roots are set forth at length exactly as within the preceding Fetters Aggregate.

Having already stated the own-nature of the three kinds of bad conduct and the three unwholesome roots, it is now fitting to display the characteristic of their admixture and non-admixture. Do the three kinds of bad conduct and the three unwholesome roots, taken together, gather the former within the latter, or the latter within the former? The answer: a tetralemma ought to be cast. There is bad conduct that is not an unwholesome root — namely, bodily and verbal bad conduct, wrong view, and unwholesome volition — since these possess solely the characteristic of bad conduct, not the characteristic of an unwholesome root. There is an unwholesome root that is not bad conduct —

namely, the unwholesome root of delusion — since this possesses solely the characteristic of an unwholesome root, not the characteristic of bad conduct. There is what is both bad conduct and an unwholesome root —

namely, the unwholesome roots of craving and aversion — since these possess both characteristics at once. There is what is neither bad conduct nor an unwholesome root — namely, what remains, excluding what precedes. "Characteristic" here refers to what a name displays; excluding what the preceding three clauses display, whatever remains constitutes the fourth clause. That is, within the form aggregate, excluding unwholesome form, whatever remains of the form aggregate is taken; within the formations aggregate, excluding the three unwholesome roots, unwholesome wrong view, and unwholesome volition, whatever remains of the associated and dissociated formations aggregate is taken, together with the three aggregates in their entirety, and the unconditioned dharmas — all of this, in every case, constitutes the fourth clause, and it is thereby said, "whatever remains, excluding what precedes." Further, within the unwholesome category co-arising with craving associated with eye-consciousness, there may be bad conduct that is not an unwholesome root, and a tetralemma ought to be cast. There is bad conduct that is not an unwholesome root — namely, unwholesome volition. There is an unwholesome root that is not bad conduct — namely, the unwholesome root of delusion. There is what is both bad conduct and an unwholesome root — namely, the unwholesome root of craving. There is what is neither bad conduct nor an unwholesome root — namely, whatever remains, excluding what precedes. Exactly as the tetralemma is cast for eye-consciousness, so, too, up through mental consciousness, should it be understood. Exactly as the six tetralemmas are cast for the unwholesome category co-arising with craving, so, too, should it be for the category co-arising with aversion. Within the unwholesome category co-arising with wrong view, since it is solely of the mental ground, a single tetralemma alone is cast. There is bad conduct that is not an unwholesome root — namely, wrong view and unwholesome volition. There is an unwholesome root that is not bad conduct —

namely, the unwholesome root of delusion. There is nothing that is both bad conduct and an unwholesome root. There is what is neither bad conduct nor an unwholesome root — namely, whatever remains, excluding what precedes. Within the unwholesome category co-arising with the exclusively mental form of ignorance, too, since it is solely of the mental ground, a single tetralemma alone is cast. There is bad conduct that is not an unwholesome root — namely, unwholesome volition. There is an unwholesome root that is not bad conduct — namely, the unwholesome root of delusion. There is nothing that is both bad conduct and an unwholesome root. There is what is neither bad conduct nor an unwholesome root — namely, whatever remains, excluding what precedes.

Do the three kinds of good conduct and the three wholesome roots, taken together, gather the former within the latter, or the latter within the former? And so on, stated at length. One asks: for what reason is this treatise composed? The answer: it is in order to distinguish the meaning of the scripture — that is, as the scripture states: there exist three kinds of good conduct and three wholesome roots. Although the scripture makes this same statement, it does not broadly discuss it, set forth at length exactly as before. The three kinds of good conduct are: bodily good conduct, verbal good conduct, and mental good conduct. What, precisely, are bodily good conduct, and the rest? Exactly as the Bhagavān states: what is bodily good conduct? It refers to abstaining from cutting off life, abstaining from taking what is not given, and abstaining from sexual misconduct. What is verbal good conduct? It refers to abstaining from false speech, abstaining from divisive speech, abstaining from harsh speech,

and abstaining from idle chatter. What is mental good conduct? It refers to non-craving, non-aversion, and right view. It should be understood that, here, the Bhagavān speaks solely of the good conduct gathered within the root path of karma, not the good conduct gathered within the preparatory action and the subsequent action of the path of karma.

This *Jñānaprasthāna* speaks broadly of every wholesome bodily karma whatsoever, whether gathered within a path of karma or not gathered within a path of karma — all of this, in every case, is named bodily good conduct. It speaks broadly of every wholesome verbal karma whatsoever, whether gathered within a path of karma or not gathered within a path of karma — all of this, in every case, is named verbal good conduct. It speaks broadly of every wholesome mental karma, and the like, whether gathered within a path of karma or not gathered within a path of karma — all of this, in every case, is named mental good conduct. Exactly as this treatise gathers in the various kinds of good conduct, the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, too, speaks in just the same way —

that same treatise states: what is bodily good conduct? It refers to abstaining from cutting off life, abstaining from taking what is not given, and abstaining from sexual misconduct — this same statement accords with the scripture. It further states: further, abstaining from cutting off life, abstaining from taking what is not given, abstaining from impure conduct — in this way, it further gathers in what was not gathered before, namely, abstaining from the very conduct of desire that arises with respect to one's own wife. It further states: there is a further wholesome bodily karma — in this way, it further gathers in whatever belongs to the preparatory action and the subsequent action of the path of karma. It further states: there is, further, whatever bodily karma is drawn forth by proper reasoning. One asks: what, precisely, is bodily karma drawn forth by proper reasoning — is this gathering in what was not gathered before? The answer: what was stated before speaks of inherent nature; what is stated now speaks of what gives rise to it. By whom is this given rise to? Namely, by proper attention. There are, further, those who say: this refers to a portion of the undefiled-and-neutral bodily karma — namely, one ought to go and come, walk and stand, sit and lie down, cut and sew, in such-and-such a way, and one does, in every case, go and come, up through, cut and sew, exactly as one ought — such bodily karma as this, performing what ought to be performed, being in accordance with proper reasoning, is gathered within the category drawn forth by proper reasoning, and it is thereby named bodily good conduct. Were it stated in this way, bodily good conduct would then pervade the wholesome and the neutral; yet good conduct is solely wholesome, and it is thereby that the position stated first is the good one. That same treatise, further, states: what is verbal good conduct? It refers to abstaining from false speech, abstaining from divisive speech, abstaining from harsh speech, and abstaining from idle chatter — this same statement accords with the scripture. It further states: there is a further wholesome verbal karma — in this way, it further gathers in whatever belongs to the preparatory action and the subsequent action of the path of karma. It further states: there is, further, whatever verbal karma is drawn forth by proper reasoning. One asks: what, precisely, is verbal karma drawn forth by proper reasoning — is this gathering in what was not gathered before? The answer: what was stated before speaks of inherent nature; what is stated now speaks of what gives rise to it. By whom is this given rise to? Namely, by proper attention. There are, further, those who say: this refers to a portion of the undefiled-and-neutral verbal karma — namely, one ought to speak a single word, two words, many words, a word for a man, a word for a woman, a word for neither man nor woman, or a word for what has gone, is coming, or is now — and one does, in every case, speak in this way, up through, a word for what has gone, is coming, or is now — such verbal karma as this, speaking what ought to be spoken, being in accordance with proper reasoning, is gathered within the category drawn forth by proper reasoning, and it is thereby named verbal good conduct. Were it stated in this way, verbal good conduct would then pervade the wholesome and the neutral; yet good conduct is solely wholesome, and it is thereby that the position stated first is the good one. That same treatise, further, states: what is mental good conduct? It refers to non-craving, non-aversion, and right view — this same statement accords with the scripture. It further states: there is a further wholesome mental karma — in this way, it further gathers in every kind of wholesome volition. It further states: there is, further, whatever mental karma is drawn forth by proper reasoning. One asks: what, precisely, is mental karma drawn forth by proper reasoning — is this gathering in what was not gathered before? The answer: what was stated before speaks of inherent nature; what is stated now speaks of what gives rise to it. By whom is this given rise to? Namely, by proper attention. There are, further, those who say: this refers to a portion of the undefiled-and-neutral mental karma, named mental karma drawn forth by proper reasoning — that is, the various mental karma that arises exactly as already stated for the undefiled-and-neutral bodily karma and verbal karma drawn forth by proper reasoning. Were it stated in this way, mental good conduct would then pervade the wholesome and the neutral; yet good conduct is solely wholesome, and it is thereby that the position stated first is the good one.

Exactly as the *Jñānaprasthāna* and the *Saṅgītiparyāya* gather in bodily good conduct and verbal good conduct, so, too, does what is stated within the *Prajñaptiśāstra*, excepting solely mental good conduct, which it gathers in separately, since that same treatise states:

does the three kinds of bodily good conduct gather in every kind of bodily good conduct, or does every kind of bodily good conduct gather in the three kinds of bodily good conduct? The answer: every kind gathers in the three; the three do not gather in every kind. What is not gathered in? Namely, abstaining from what was already stated — striking a sentient being with a hand, a staff, and the like, and every impure conduct with respect to what ought to be engaged with, and every act of heedlessness such as drinking wine — while yet abiding in proper knowledge and mindfulness in making use of food and drink, and the like, and, further, being capable of properly avoiding those who violate the precepts — such bodily karma as these, given rise to, is not gathered within the three; the remaining question and answer should be understood as before. One asks: do the four kinds of verbal good conduct gather in every kind of verbal good conduct, or does every kind of verbal good conduct gather in the four kinds of verbal good conduct? The answer: every kind gathers in the four; the four do not gather in every kind. What is not gathered in? Namely, exactly as there is one who, dwelling alone in an empty, secluded place, speaks in this way: there is giving, there is affection, there is offering — such verbal good conduct as this, since the various sentient beings of the world do not come to understand it, is not gathered within the four. One asks: do the three kinds of mental good conduct gather in every kind of mental good conduct, or does every kind of mental good conduct gather in the three kinds of mental good conduct? The answer: every kind gathers in the three; the three do not gather in every kind. What is not gathered in? Namely, sensation, notion, formations, and consciousness that co-arise with non-craving, non-aversion, and right view — these are not gathered within the three. Within that same treatise, mental good conduct gathers in the very own-nature of four aggregates — in this way, the own-nature of the five aggregates is posited for the various kinds of good conduct.

One asks: for what reason do this *Jñānaprasthāna* and the *Saṅgītiparyāya* differ from the scripture and the *Prajñaptiśāstra* in how they gather in the various kinds of good conduct? The answer: it is by reliance upon two kinds of approach that the various kinds of good conduct are spoken of — the first is by reliance upon worldly convention; the second is by reliance upon supreme meaning. That is, the scripture and the *Prajñaptiśāstra* speak of the various kinds of good conduct by reliance upon the approach of worldly convention; this *Jñānaprasthāna* and the *Saṅgītiparyāya* speak of the various kinds of good conduct by reliance upon the approach of supreme meaning. Exactly as the distinction is made by reliance upon worldly convention and supreme meaning, so, too, should it be understood by reliance upon what is of provisional meaning and what is of definitive meaning, and the rest, set forth at length exactly as before. There are, further, those who say: it is by virtue of three conditions that what is gathered in differs — namely, by virtue of inherent nature, by virtue of admixture, and by virtue of what the world finds worthy of praise. This *Jñānaprasthāna* and the *Saṅgītiparyāya* speak of their own inherent nature; the *Prajñaptiśāstra* speaks of their admixture — that is, even a dharma that is not, itself, the inherent nature of good conduct, if admixed together with good conduct, likewise earns its name. The scripture speaks of what the world finds worthy of praise, since every worldly being, for the greater part, gives rise to praise with respect to the root path of karma, not with respect to the preparatory action and the subsequent action of the path of karma. It is by virtue of this same condition that the various kinds of good conduct are gathered differently across the scripture and the treatises. This, then, is what is termed the own-nature of good conduct. Having already stated their own-nature, what they are so named for ought now to be stated. One asks: for what reason are they named good conduct? What, precisely, is the meaning of "good conduct"? The answer: it is because they are worthy of praise that they are named "good"; it is because they traverse and rely upon their own domain that they are named "conduct." As for being named "good" because they are worthy of praise: exactly as it is said, a good wife and children, good clothing and food, a good person, a good place, good comings and goings, and the like. As for being named "conduct" because they traverse and rely upon the very domain relied upon: that is, it refers precisely to the domain relied upon by the three preceding kinds of bad conduct, giving rise to the three kinds of good conduct in a manner contrary to it. There are, further, those who say: it is because they bring forth the fruit of pleasant sensation that they are named "good"; it is because they move swiftly and adroitly that they are named "conduct." One asks: with respect to good conduct, how could this be called adroit? The answer: whoever performs good conduct possesses such a skillful device that, though he does not seek after worldly fame, in order to urge others toward good conduct, he causes whatever good conduct he himself cultivates to be known by others, and it is thereby named adroit. There are, further, those who say: it is because one draws near to good people that one becomes capable of drawing forth a good destiny, and it is thereby named good conduct. There are, further, those who say: it is by virtue of three conditions that it is named good conduct — namely, being what is reflected upon by good reflection, being what is spoken by good speech, and being what is done by good doing. Being what is reflected upon by good reflection refers to mental good conduct; being what is spoken by good speech refers to verbal good conduct; being what is done by good doing refers to bodily good conduct. There are, further, those who say: it is by virtue of three conditions that it is named good conduct — namely, the meaning of good doing, being worthy of praise,

and decisively being capable of bringing forth a beloved fruit. As for the meaning of good doing: performing the various good deeds of body, speech, and mind is thereby named good conduct. As for being worthy of praise: performing wholesome conduct, guarding the moral precepts, one becomes constantly praised by the various gods, the great teachers, and those wise ones who share the very same holy conduct.

As for decisively being capable of bringing forth a beloved fruit: whatever good conduct there is, of body, speech, or mind, there exists no place, no occasion whatsoever, on which it could bring forth an unloved fruit and ripening; there exists a place, an occasion, on which it brings forth a beloved fruit and ripening. The *Saṅgītiparyāya*, too, speaks in just the same way: for what cause and condition is it named good conduct? It refers to the fact that it is capable of bringing forth a beloved, delightful, pleasing, agreeable, greatly joyful fruit — this displays the naturally-flowing fruit. It further states that it is capable of bringing forth a beloved, delightful, pleasing, agreeable, joyful ripening — this displays the ripened fruit.

The three wholesome roots are: non-craving, non-aversion, and non-delusion. What, precisely, is the wholesome root of non-craving? It refers to a mental concomitant, associated with mind, that is the counteraction of craving — this is named the very nature of the wholesome root of non-craving. What, precisely, is the wholesome root of non-aversion? It refers to a mental concomitant, associated with mind, that is the counteraction of aversion — this is named the very nature of the wholesome root of non-aversion. What, precisely, is the wholesome root of non-delusion? It refers to a mental concomitant, associated with mind, that is the counteraction of delusion — this is named the very nature of the wholesome root of non-delusion. These three wholesome roots, within a single mind, may be attained in full.

The three unwholesome roots cannot, within a single mind, be attained in full. Further, the three wholesome roots are fully capable of guarding and defending every wholesome mind, pervading the six bodies of consciousness, both contaminated and undefiled; the three unwholesome roots are incapable of fully guarding and defending every unwholesome mind. Further, the three wholesome roots pervasively associate with the wholesome mind; the three unwholesome roots do not pervasively associate with the unwholesome mind. Further, the three wholesome roots are capable of pervasively giving rise to every wholesome mind; the three unwholesome roots are incapable of giving rise to every unwholesome mind. Such matters as following-and-turning and not-following-and-turning, and the rest, ought all to be set forth at length. This, then, is named the own-nature of the three wholesome roots.

Having already stated their own-nature, what they are so named for ought now to be stated. One asks: for what reason are they named wholesome roots? What, precisely, is the meaning of "wholesome root"? The answer: the meaning of being capable of giving rise to the wholesome is the meaning of wholesome root; the meaning of being capable of nourishing the wholesome, of being capable of augmenting the wholesome, of being capable of extending the wholesome, of being capable of benefiting the wholesome, of being capable of sustaining the wholesome, of being capable of causing wholesome dharmas broadly to spread and circulate — this is the meaning of wholesome root. The Venerable Vasumitra speaks as follows: the meaning of being the cause of wholesome dharmas is the meaning of wholesome root; the meaning of being the seed of wholesome dharmas, of arising together with the wholesome, of being capable of serving as the turning cause that draws forth the wholesome, of being the following cause that gives rise to the wholesome, of gathering in and benefiting every wholesome dharma — this is the meaning of wholesome root. The Great Virtuous One speaks as follows: relying upon this same matter, one is pervasively capable of giving rise to and increasing every wholesome dharma, being capable of serving as the turning cause, and the following cause, gathering in and benefiting the wholesome, and it is thereby named wholesome root.

One asks: if the meaning of being the cause of wholesome dharmas is the meaning of wholesome root, then a previously arisen wholesome set of five aggregates serves as the cause for every subsequently arisen and not-yet-arisen wholesome set of five aggregates; a previously arisen ten wholesome paths of karma serve as the cause for every subsequently arisen and not-yet-arisen ten wholesome paths of karma; the previously arisen thirty-seven factors of enlightenment serve as the cause for every subsequently arisen and not-yet-arisen thirty-seven factors of enlightenment — in this way, every wholesome dharma whatsoever ought then to be named a wholesome root. What, then, is the special, uncommon cause and condition by virtue of which these three are established as the wholesome roots? The answer: this is the Bhagavān's own statement with something further left unsaid — the great teacher, observing the mental conduct and aspiration of the sentient beings he was converting, spoke in brief summary. The Venerable Pārśva says:

it is solely the Bhagavān who ultimately and fully comprehends the very nature and characteristic of every dharma, and likewise knows their own function — this is not known by any other. Whatever dharma possesses the characteristic of a wholesome root, he thereupon establishes it; whatever lacks it, he does not establish it. The Venerable Ghoṣa, too, speaks as follows: the great teacher knows that these three wholesome roots possess such a function, are so forceful, and are so intimately near, being capable of serving as the cause for every wholesome dharma — no other wholesome dharma possesses any such matter. There are, further, those who say: these three wholesome roots are, among wholesome dharmas, the very most supreme, and, by virtue of this supremacy, are established as the wholesome roots. There are, further, those who say: these three wholesome roots are, among wholesome dharmas, the very most supreme, the very foremost, going before and leading the way, exactly as the mightiest army's own general leads every soldier — it is by virtue of this same wholesome root's own dominant force that every wholesome dharma is caused to spread and increase, and it is thereby established as the wholesome roots.

There are, further, those who say: these three wholesome roots are capable, with respect to every wholesome dharma, of serving as its cause, its root, its eye, and its accumulation, giving rise to every wholesome dharma, obstructing every unwholesome dharma, being the very most supreme among wholesome dharmas, and it is thereby established as the root. There are, further, those who say: it is because the three wholesome roots are capable of pervasively giving rise to the ten wholesome paths of karma, generating the ten wholesome destinies, that they are established as the root. It is by virtue of such various causes and conditions as these that, within the entire gathering of wholesome dharmas, solely these three are established as the wholesome roots. Having already stated the own-nature of the three kinds of good conduct and the three wholesome roots, it is now fitting to display the characteristic of their admixture and non-admixture. Do the three kinds of good conduct and the three wholesome roots, taken together, gather the former within the latter, or the latter within the former? The answer: a tetralemma ought to be cast. There is good conduct that is not a wholesome root — namely, bodily and verbal good conduct, and wholesome volition — since these possess solely the characteristic of good conduct, not the characteristic of a wholesome root. There is a wholesome root that is not good conduct — namely, the wholesome root of non-delusion not gathered within right view — since this possesses solely the characteristic of a wholesome root,

not the characteristic of good conduct. There is what is both good conduct and a wholesome root — namely, non-craving, non-aversion, and right view — since these possess both characteristics at once. There is what is neither good conduct nor a wholesome root — namely, whatever remains, excluding what precedes. "Characteristic" here refers to what a name displays; excluding what the preceding three clauses display, whatever remains constitutes the fourth clause.

That is, within the form aggregate, excluding wholesome form, whatever remains of the form aggregate is taken; within the formations aggregate, excluding the three wholesome roots and every wholesome volition, whatever remains of the associated and dissociated formations aggregate is taken, together with the three aggregates in their entirety, and the unconditioned dharmas — all of this, in every case, constitutes the fourth clause, and it is thereby said, "whatever remains, excluding what precedes." Further, within the wholesome category co-arising with eye-consciousness, there may be good conduct that is not a wholesome root, and a tetralemma ought to be cast. There is good conduct that is not a wholesome root — namely, wholesome volition. There is a wholesome root that is not good conduct — namely, the wholesome root of non-delusion. There is what is both good conduct and a wholesome root — namely, non-craving and non-aversion. There is what is neither good conduct nor a wholesome root — namely, whatever remains, excluding what precedes. Exactly as this is stated for the category co-arising with eye-consciousness, so, too, up through the category co-arising with body-consciousness, should it be understood. Within the category co-arising with right view, there may be good conduct that is not a wholesome root, and a tetralemma ought to be cast. There is good conduct that is not a wholesome root — namely, wholesome volition. There is a wholesome root that is not good conduct — there is none such. There is what is both good conduct and a wholesome root — namely, non-craving, non-aversion, and right view. There is what is neither good conduct nor a wholesome root — namely, whatever remains, excluding what precedes. Within the category co-arising with the knowledge of exhaustion and of non-arising, there may be good conduct that is not a wholesome root, and a tetralemma ought to be cast. There is good conduct that is not a wholesome root — namely, wholesome volition. There is a wholesome root that is not good conduct — namely, the wholesome root of non-delusion. There is what is both good conduct and a wholesome root — namely, non-craving and non-aversion. There is what is neither good conduct nor a wholesome root — namely, whatever remains, excluding what precedes.