Fascicle 118 · 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論卷第一百一十八 · Complete

Is the Buddha's Voice a Ripening?

Fascicle 118 stages a formal debate over whether the Buddha's own voice is a karmic ripening, refutes backward-flowing causation, works through an extended matrix of how body, speech, and mind ripen together and apart, and opens the Killing-of-Life Nyāsa with a precise anatomy of what killing actually is. This page carries Ru-Yi's complete translation.

Translator: Ru-Yi Meditation Center Status: fascicle 118 complete, 12 sections Source: Taishō T1545, vol. 27, fascicle 118 Topic: 業蘊第四 → 邪語納息 concludes, 害生納息 begins (the Karma Aggregate; Wrong-Speech Nyāsa concludes, Killing-of-Life Nyāsa opens)

Translation Method

The Chinese source is Xuánzàng's seventh-century translation of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), preserved in the Taishō canon (T1545, vol. 27) via the CBETA digital edition — public domain text, translated directly from the Chinese. The English wording throughout is Ru-Yi's own, and the reading notes are original, grounded in standard Sarvāstivāda scholarship rather than a specific named commentator's lecture transcript.

Fascicle 118 completes the Wrong-Speech Nyāsa (邪語納息第二之三) and opens the Killing-of-Life Nyāsa (害生納息第三之一), moving from a debate over the Buddha's own voice and an extended karmic-ripening matrix into a precise philosophical anatomy of killing itself. Terms established across fascicles 93–117 recur here and are not re-explained at each occurrence.

Classical text is set in the left-hand column below, our English in the right.

1. Is the Buddha's Own Voice a Karmic Ripening? A Formal Debate

Fascicle 118 opens with a genuine cross-school dispute: the Vātsīputrīyas and Vibhajyavādins, citing a scriptural passage on why the bodhisattva obtained a Brahmā-voice, hold that sound itself can be a ripening-fruit of karma. The Vaibhāṣika "correct-principle theorist" is drawn into a formal debate exchange — complete with the opponent's own attempt to declare him defeated by self-contradiction — before resolving the tension: the bodhisattva's past karma produced the subtle physical basis (the Tathāgata's throat) from which wondrous speech can arise, but the sound itself, arising fresh from present causes, is never the ripening.

Chinese Source

諸法由業得。彼法當言是善不善無記耶。乃至廣說。問何故作此論。答為止他宗顯己義故。謂犢子部。分別論者。欲令音聲是異熟果。問彼由何量作如是說。答由聖言故。如施設論說。何緣菩薩感得梵音大士夫相。菩薩昔餘生中。離麁惡語此業究竟得梵音聲。由此說故彼便計聲是異熟果。為遮此意顯一切聲非異熟果故作斯論。

Ru-Yi Translation

Dharmas obtained through karma — should these be said to be wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral? And so on in full. Question: why compose this treatise? Answer: in order to put a stop to another school's position and to make clear our own doctrine. That is, the Vātsīputrīyas and the Vibhajyavādins wish to hold that sound is itself a ripening-fruit. Question: on what authority do they make this claim? Answer: on the authority of a scriptural statement — as the Prajñaptiśāstra says: for what reason does the bodhisattva obtain the mark of the great being's own Brahmā-voice? Because the bodhisattva, in his former lives, abstained from harsh and evil speech, and this karma, upon reaching completion, obtained the Brahmā-voice. On the basis of this statement, they reckon that sound is itself a ripening-fruit. In order to refute this notion and to show that no sound whatsoever is a ripening-fruit, this treatise is composed.

諸法由業得。彼法當言是善不善無記耶。答依異熟果諸法由業得彼法是無記。問何故作是說。答或有諸法雖由業得而非無記。如諸律儀不律儀等。為簡彼法故作是說。依異熟果諸法由業得彼法是無記此中犢子部分別論者。問應理論者言。定作是說依異熟果諸法由業得彼法是無記耶。此是審定他宗之言。若不審定他所立宗。便難他者則無有能與他作過。亦是徵難他所不說故審定言。汝今忍可定作是說。依異熟果諸法由業得。彼法是無記耶。應理論者答言如是。

Dharmas obtained through karma — should these be said to be wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral? Answer: dharmas obtained through karma, with respect to the ripening-fruit, are neutral. Question: why is it said in this way? Answer: because there are dharmas that, although obtained through karma, are not neutral — such as the various restraints and non-restraints — and it is in order to set these apart that it is said in this way: dharmas obtained through karma, with respect to the ripening-fruit, are neutral. Here, a Vātsīputrīya or Vibhajyavādin questions the correct-principle theorist, saying: do you indeed hold, definitively, that dharmas obtained through karma, with respect to the ripening-fruit, are neutral? This is a statement made to first pin down the opponent's own position, for if one does not first pin down what position the opponent actually holds, one cannot then fault him for anything, and it is also a way of pressing him on what he has not yet stated — hence this pinning-down statement: do you now accept and definitively hold that dharmas obtained through karma, with respect to the ripening-fruit, are neutral? The correct-principle theorist answers: yes, this is so.

彼復問言為何所欲。如來善心說語。妙音美音和雅音悅意音。此語是善耶。應理論者答言如是。彼便難言。聽我說汝負處失處違自言處。若作是說。依異熟果諸法由業得彼法是無記。則不應言如來善心說諸妙音美音和雅音悅意音此語是善。作是說者不應道理。若作是說如來善心說諸妙音美音和雅音悅意音。此語是善則不應言依異熟果諸法由業得彼法是無記。而作是說不應道理。應理論者釋彼難言。應作是說。菩薩昔餘生中。造作增長感異熟果大宗葉業。由是因緣展轉出生如來咽喉微妙大種。從此能生妙語音聲而聲非異熟。

He then further asks: and what do you further hold — is the speech that the Tathāgata utters with a wholesome mind, wondrous in sound, beautiful in sound, gentle and elegant in sound, delightful in sound, wholesome speech? The correct-principle theorist answers: yes, this is so. He then presses the objection, saying: hear now, let me point out your defeat, your loss, and your self-contradiction. If you hold that dharmas obtained through karma, with respect to the ripening-fruit, are neutral, then you ought not to say that the speech the Tathāgata utters with a wholesome mind — wondrous, beautiful, gentle and elegant, delightful in sound — is wholesome speech; to say so is unreasonable. But if you hold that the speech the Tathāgata utters with a wholesome mind — wondrous, beautiful, gentle and elegant, delightful in sound — is wholesome speech, then you ought not to say that dharmas obtained through karma, with respect to the ripening-fruit, are neutral; and to say so is likewise unreasonable. The correct-principle theorist resolves this objection, saying: one should rather explain it thus — the bodhisattva, in his former lives, created and increased the great foundational karma that brings about a ripening-fruit, and it was through this cause and condition that, by successive transmission, the Tathāgata's own subtle great elements of the throat came to be produced, from which this wondrous speech-sound can then arise — while the sound itself is not the ripening.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The opponent's rhetorical move — "let me point out your defeat, your loss, your self-contradiction" — preserves a genuine piece of ancient Indian debate procedure within the treatise itself: before a rebuttal proper, the challenger first pins down exactly which two of the opponent's own commitments supposedly cannot both be true, a formal discipline that keeps a philosophical dispute from sliding into simple assertion and counter-assertion.

2. Nine Reasons Sound Is Never a Ripening-Fruit, and Two Causes Behind a Bodhisattva's Vow

Nine independent arguments converge on the same conclusion: sound belongs too many causal removes from its originating karma; it follows the speaker's will in a way no true ripening ever could; it generates further sound rather than another ripening; it is produced by present exertion, not solely prior karma; it can be wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral, while ripening is neutral alone; and, most tellingly, one can observe cases where beings in fortunate circumstances utter unpleasant sounds and vice versa — a plain empirical counter-example to the ripening theory. The section closes with the two causes, seeing and hearing, that move a bodhisattva to vow for the Brahmā-voice, illustrated by the simile of admiring another's magnificent hall and music and resolving to earn the very same for oneself.

Chinese Source

問若一切聲非異熟果。施設論說當云何通。答依展轉因作如是說。

Ru-Yi Translation

Question: if no sound whatsoever is a ripening-fruit, how is the statement of the Prajñaptiśāstra to be reconciled? Answer: it is stated with reference to a successive, indirect cause,

然一切聲非異熟果。問何故諸聲非異熟果。或有說者。聲屬第三傳。謂最初業生諸大種。大種生聲。聲屬第三故非異熟果。復有說者。聲屬第五傳。謂初業生異熟大種。異熟大種生長養大種。長養大種生等流大種。從此等流大種生聲。聲屬第五故非異熟果。復有說者。聲隨欲轉非異熟法可隨欲轉。復有說者。聲復生聲非從異熟復生異熟。有說。聲是現在加行所發。異熟果是先業所起。復有說者。離初靜慮染時語表便斷。若是異熟者應離三界染時方斷。復有說者。聲有三種。謂善不善無記。異熟果唯無記。有說。若聲是異熟者生可愛趣。應一切時出如意聲。生非可愛趣。應一切時出不如意聲。現見有時與此相違。是故聲非異熟。復有說者。聲有間斷異熟色無間斷。是故聲非異熟。然諸菩薩由二因緣。發願求佛大士夫相微妙梵音。一由曾見。二由曾聞。由曾見者。謂彼菩薩。曾見諸佛處大集會。為諸有情以梵音聲。宣說正法摧伏異論。微妙深遠具丈夫相。由曾聞者。謂彼菩薩。具聞如來以梵音聲。宣說正法乃至具丈夫相。爾時菩薩見聞歡喜深心愛樂。則便誓受順彼正因。我諸禁戒梵行精進。皆當迴向願於未來。得住如是大士行類。由此意樂復以種種上妙香花供具音樂。供養諸佛獨覺聲聞制多形像。承事供養父母師長同梵行者。修如是等殊勝福時。一一迴求此梵聲相。又勤淨除二種業道。謂麁惡語。及雜穢語。由勤淨除麁惡語故。得大士相微妙梵音。由此梵音摧伏一切外道他論。由勤淨除雜穢語故。

— and no sound whatsoever is a ripening-fruit. Question: why is no sound a ripening-fruit? Some say: sound belongs to the third transmission — that is, the initial karma first produces the great elements, and the great elements produce sound; since sound belongs to the third remove, it is not a ripening-fruit. Some further say: sound belongs to the fifth transmission — that is, the initial karma produces the ripening great elements, the ripening great elements produce the nutriment-sustained great elements, the nutriment-sustained great elements produce the outflow-consistent great elements, and it is from these outflow-consistent great elements that sound is produced; since sound belongs to the fifth remove, it is not a ripening-fruit. Some further say: sound follows the will and can be altered at will, while no ripening dharma can be altered at will. Some further say: sound gives rise to further sound, whereas a ripening never again gives rise to another ripening. Some say: sound is brought forth by present exertion, while a ripening-fruit arises from prior karma. Some further say: manifest verbal karma ceases upon becoming detached from the defilement of the first dhyāna alone, whereas, if it were a ripening, it ought to cease only upon becoming detached from the defilement of all three realms. Some further say: sound is of three kinds — wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral — while a ripening-fruit is neutral alone. Some say: if sound were itself a ripening, then one born in an agreeable destiny ought at all times to utter agreeable sounds, and one born in a disagreeable destiny ought at all times to utter disagreeable sounds — yet one plainly observes cases contrary to this, and hence sound is not a ripening. Some further say: sound has gaps and interruptions, while ripened form has none — hence sound is not a ripening. Now, bodhisattvas, through two causes and conditions, vow to seek the great being's mark of the buddha's own subtle Brahmā-voice: first, through having once seen it; second, through having once heard it. Through having once seen it: this means that the bodhisattva once saw, at a great assembly presided over by a buddha, that buddha proclaiming the true Dharma to beings with a Brahmā-voice, subduing rival doctrines, subtle and profound, possessed of the mark of the great being. Through having once heard it: this means that the bodhisattva once fully heard the Tathāgata proclaiming the true Dharma with a Brahmā-voice, and so on up to being possessed of the mark of the great being. At that time, the bodhisattva, having seen and heard this, rejoiced and, with a deeply loving and delighted mind, vowed to undertake the proper causes according with it — that all his own precepts, pure conduct, and diligent effort should be dedicated, with the wish that in the future he should come to abide in the very same class of great being's conduct. Moved by this very intention, he further makes offerings of various superb incense, flowers, offerings, and music to the images of buddhas, pratyekabuddhas, śrāvakas, and stūpas, and reverently serves and provides for his parents, teachers, and fellow practitioners of pure conduct — and, whenever cultivating such superior merit, he dedicates each act toward seeking this very mark of the Brahmā-voice. He further diligently purifies himself of two paths of karma — harsh speech, and idle chatter. Through diligently purifying himself of harsh speech, he obtains the great being's mark of the subtle Brahmā-voice, by which this Brahmā-voice subdues every rival doctrine of the outside paths. Through diligently purifying himself of idle chatter,

感得言詞威肅清亮。由此言詞映奪一切世俗異論。譬如有人見他處在華妙堂閣。陳列五樂歡娛自恣。聞他拊奏五樂音聲。作是思惟。

— he obtains speech that is dignified, solemn, clear, and resonant, by which this speech outshines and overwhelms every worldly rival doctrine. It is like a certain person who sees another dwelling in a magnificent hall, arrayed with the five kinds of music, reveling freely in pleasure, and who, hearing the sound of another's music being played, thinks to himself:

我於何時當得如是處妙堂閣。陳列五樂歡娛自適。既思惟已勤加功力。積集財寶如其所願皆能辦之。菩薩亦爾由見及聞。發願求佛梵音聲相諸業。過去乃至廣說。問何故作此論。答諸有不顧去來愚三世者。欲令過去未來是無。唯說現在無為是有。為遮彼執顯過去未來是實有法故作斯論。復次所以作此論者。為欲遮止外道所說故。

— "When shall I too come to dwell in such a magnificent hall, arrayed with the five kinds of music, reveling freely in delight?" And having so reflected, he diligently exerts his own effort, accumulating wealth, until he is able to accomplish everything just as he had wished. The bodhisattva is just the same: through having seen and heard, he vows to seek the karma that brings about the buddha's own mark of the Brahmā-voice-sound. Are past dharmas, and so on in full — Question: why compose this treatise? Answer: because there are those who, disregarding past and future and being ignorant of the three times, wish to hold that the past and the future do not exist, and say that only the present and the unconditioned exist. In order to refute this attachment and to show that the past and future are dharmas that really exist, this treatise is composed. Further, the reason this treatise is composed is in order to put a stop to what a certain outside path teaches —

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The nine-fold refutation's most quietly devastating argument is the empirical one — that agreeable destinies do not reliably produce agreeable voices, nor disagreeable destinies disagreeable ones — since it refuses to settle the matter by definition or authority alone, instead appealing to what anyone can simply observe about how voices actually vary; a philosophical debate over what counts as karmic ripening is, in the end, answered by checking against ordinary experience.

3. Why Causation Runs Only Forward: Refuting a Backward-Flowing Time

A different opponent's theory is dismantled: that later dharmas cause earlier ones, as a spring's later-arriving water is said to press the earlier water into flowing forth. The treatise shows this reverses every accepted chain of dependent origination, both internal (ignorance conditioning formations, not the other way around) and external (seed producing sprout, not sprout producing seed), and would produce absurdities that strike at the heart of the entire moral cosmos — receiving a karmic fruit before ever committing the deed, falling into hell before committing the crime, attaining buddhahood before ever practicing the path. A dense technical matrix then works out exactly how a karma's own temporal location (past, present, or future) constrains where its fruit can fall, cross-referenced against three different technical senses of "present" (momentary, phase-based, and class-nature-based), before opening a new fourfold combinatorial inquiry into how bodily, verbal, and mental karma variously combine to produce agreeable and disagreeable ripening.

Chinese Source

彼說言一切諸法後為前因。猶如泉水後逼於前令涌令注。如是後水為前水因。諸法亦爾由後念法所推逼故。令從未來起入現在。復從現在滅入過去。是故未來為現在因。現為過因。為遮彼執明一切法。前為後因非後前因。若說後法為前因者。便違內外諸法緣起。

Ru-Yi Translation

— that school holds that every dharma has what comes later as the cause of what comes earlier, just as, in a spring, the later water presses upon the earlier water, causing it to well up and flow forth, so that the later water is the cause of the earlier water; and that dharmas are just the same, in that it is precisely because they are pressed and driven forward by the dharma of a later moment that they arise out of the future and enter the present, and then, from the present, cease and pass into the past — hence the future is the cause of the present, and the present is the cause of the past. In order to refute this attachment and to make clear that every dharma has what comes earlier as the cause of what comes later, never what comes later as the cause of what comes earlier — for if one holds that a later dharma is the cause of an earlier one, this directly contradicts the dependent origination of every dharma, both internal and external —

違內法緣起者。謂應行緣無明。乃至老死緣生。因於子息而有父母。眼識為緣生於眼色。乃至意識為緣生於意法。從頞部曇生羯邏藍。乃至從老生於中年。違外法緣起者。謂應芽為種因。乃至果為花因如是等若爾則有大過。謂未作應得。應先受善惡異熟。後造善惡業。先墮無間獄。後造五逆罪。先受輪王位。後造輪王業。先證阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。然後修菩薩行。若未作而得。亦應已作而失。如此則無繫縛出離。勿有此過。是故諸法前為後因。非後前因。由是因緣故作斯論。諸業過去彼果過去耶。答彼果或過去。或未來。或現在果。謂異熟果由已滅等差別故。成三種諸業未來彼果未來耶。答如是。以非果先因在後故。諸業現在彼果現在耶。答彼果或現在。或未來。所釋如前。此中有說。依剎那現在作論。依此所說諸業過去。彼果隨在何世。而彼業皆有四種。謂順現法受。乃至順不定受。諸業未來諸業現在。隨所有果彼業亦四。而不應言諸業現在彼果現在。非此剎那造業。即此剎那受異熟果故。或有說者。此中依分位現在而作論。依此所說諸業過去彼果過去。未來現在。諸業未來諸業現在彼果未來。皆如前說。諸業現在彼果現在者。彼業有二。謂順現法受。順不定受。復有說者。此中依一眾同分現在作論。依此所說諸業過去。彼果或過去者如前說。或未來者彼業有二。謂順後次受。及順不定受。或現在者彼業有三。除順現法受。諸業未來亦如前說。諸業現在彼果或現在者。彼業有二。謂順現法受。及順不定受。或未來者彼業有三。除順現法受。問頗有順現法受業。因在過去果在未來耶。答有。謂依剎那分位現在。不依一眾同分現在而說。復有說者。亦依一眾同分現在而說。謂如有人。造作增長順現法受業已。未獲與果率爾命終。爾時即名因在過去果在未來。頗有順現法受業。因在過去果在現在。或因在現在果在未來耶。若依一眾同分現在為問。應答言無。尊者妙音說有。謂如前說。頗有如身業感異熟果。語業意業不爾耶。乃至廣說。今於此中方便顯示三業所感愛非愛果。後見蘊中方便顯示分位差別。此中所問先答黑品。後答白品。是名此處略毘婆沙。頗有如身業感異熟果。語業意業不爾耶。答有。如身不護語護。彼於爾時有善心或無記心。謂於今時起不善身表業。由此發起無表業隨轉。及於今時或先時起善語表業。由此發起無表業隨轉。即於爾時善心現起或無記心。此中身業感非愛異熟。語業感愛異熟。意業若善心起感愛異熟。若無記心起。不感愛非愛異熟。又如身護語不護。彼於爾時有不善心或無記心。謂於今時起善身表業。由此發起無表業隨轉。及於今時或由先時起不善語表業。由此發起無表業隨轉。即於爾時不善心現起或無記心。此中身業感愛異熟。語業感非愛異熟。意業若不善心起。感非愛異熟。若無記心起。不感愛非愛異熟。是名如身業感異熟果。語業意業不爾。

As for contradicting the dependent origination of internal dharmas: this means that formations are conditioned by ignorance, and so on up through birth being conditioned by aging-and-death; that it is on account of the child that there come to be parents; that eye-consciousness, taken as condition, gives rise to eye and form, and so on up through mental consciousness, taken as condition, giving rise to mind and mental objects; and that the kalala embryonic stage arises from the arbuda stage, and so on up through the middle years arising from old age. As for contradicting the dependent origination of external dharmas: this means that the sprout would be the cause of the seed, and so on up through the fruit being the cause of the flower. If this were so, there would follow a great fault — that one would obtain a result before ever performing the deed, that one would first experience the ripening of good or evil before creating the good or evil karma, that one would first fall into Avīci hell before committing the five ānantarya deeds, that one would first receive the position of a wheel-turning king before creating the karma of a wheel-turning king, that one would first realize unsurpassed, perfect, complete awakening and only afterward cultivate the bodhisattva practices. And if one could obtain a result without having yet performed the deed, one should equally be able to lose a result after having already performed it — and in that case there would be no bondage and no liberation from it at all. To avoid such a fault, it is held that every dharma has what comes earlier as the cause of what comes later, never what comes later as the cause of what comes earlier — and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. If karma is past, is its fruit past? Answer: its fruit may be past, future, or present — for the ripening-fruit, owing to the distinctions of whether it has already ceased and so forth, comes in three kinds. If karma is future, is its fruit future? Answer: yes, this is so, since a fruit can never precede its own cause. If karma is present, is its fruit present? Answer: its fruit may be present or future, explained as before. Here some say: this discussion is conducted with reference to the momentary present. According to this account, for past karma, its fruit, whatever time it falls in, has all four kinds of karma — that ripening in the present life, and so on up through that whose ripening is indeterminate; and for future karma and present karma, whatever fruit they have, their karma is likewise of these same four kinds — though one ought not to say that for present karma the fruit is present, since it is not the case that karma created in this very moment is experienced as ripening in this very same moment. Some further say: this discussion is conducted with reference to the present understood as a phase. According to this account, for past karma the fruit is past, future, or present; for future karma and present karma the fruit is future, all explained as before; and as for present karma whose fruit is present, such karma is of two kinds — that ripening in the present life, and that whose ripening is indeterminate. Some further say: this discussion is conducted with reference to the present understood as a single class-nature. According to this account, for past karma: if the fruit is past, it is as explained before; if the fruit is future, such karma is of two kinds — that ripening in a later life, and that whose ripening is indeterminate; if the fruit is present, such karma is of three kinds, excepting that ripening in the present life. For future karma, it is likewise as explained before. For present karma: if the fruit is present, such karma is of two kinds — that ripening in the present life, and that whose ripening is indeterminate; if the fruit is future, such karma is of three kinds, excepting that ripening in the present life. Question: is there karma ripening in the present life whose cause lies in the past and whose fruit lies in the future? Answer: there is, when speaking with reference to the momentary or phase-based present, but not when speaking with reference to the present understood as a single class-nature. Some further say: it can also be spoken of with reference to the present understood as a single class-nature — as when a certain person, having created and increased karma ripening in the present life, suddenly dies before yet receiving its fruit; at that time it is indeed to be called a case where the cause lies in the past and the fruit in the future. Is there karma ripening in the present life whose cause lies in the past and whose fruit lies in the present, or whose cause lies in the present and whose fruit lies in the future? If the question is posed with reference to the present understood as a single class-nature, the answer should be that there is no such case; the Venerable Ghoṣa says there is, as explained before. Is there a case where it is bodily karma alone that brings about a ripening-fruit, while verbal and mental karma do not? And so on in full. Here we now conveniently show the agreeable and disagreeable fruits brought about by the three karmas, just as the later Aggregate of Views conveniently shows the distinctions among their phases. Of the questions posed here, the dark category is answered first, and the pale category afterward — this is called the brief exposition of the Vibhāṣā at this point. Is there a case where it is bodily karma alone that brings about a ripening-fruit, while verbal and mental karma do not? Answer: there is — as when the body is unguarded and speech is guarded: at that time one has either a wholesome mind or a neutral mind, in that one gives rise, in the present, to unwholesome manifest bodily karma, which in turn gives rise to accompanying unmanifest karma, while also, either now or previously, giving rise to wholesome manifest verbal karma, which in turn gives rise to accompanying unmanifest karma, with a wholesome or neutral mind manifesting at that very time. Here, the bodily karma brings about a disagreeable ripening, the verbal karma brings about an agreeable ripening, and the mental karma, if arisen with a wholesome mind, brings about an agreeable ripening, or, if arisen with a neutral mind, brings about neither an agreeable nor a disagreeable ripening. Again, as when the body is guarded and speech is unguarded: at that time one has either an unwholesome mind or a neutral mind, in that one gives rise, in the present, to wholesome manifest bodily karma, which in turn gives rise to accompanying unmanifest karma, while also, either now or previously, giving rise to unwholesome manifest verbal karma, which in turn gives rise to accompanying unmanifest karma, with an unwholesome or neutral mind manifesting at that very time. Here, the bodily karma brings about an agreeable ripening, the verbal karma brings about a disagreeable ripening, and the mental karma, if arisen with an unwholesome mind, brings about a disagreeable ripening, or, if arisen with a neutral mind, brings about neither an agreeable nor a disagreeable ripening. This is what is meant by bodily karma alone bringing about a ripening-fruit, while verbal and mental karma do not.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The absurd-consequences argument here does something philosophically forceful: it shows that reversing the direction of causation is not merely counterintuitive but actually incoherent with the entire moral architecture the tradition depends on — if fruit could precede its own cause, there could be no meaningful bondage and no meaningful liberation from it, since one could simply already possess whatever a future action was going to earn, making the very practice of the path pointless before it even began.

4. The Body-Speech-Mind Ripening Matrix Begins

A precise combinatorial exercise opens: given that one's body and speech can each independently be "guarded" (acting wholesomely) or "unguarded" (acting unwholesomely) at any given moment, while the mind present at that same moment may be wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral, the treatise works out exactly which of body, speech, and mind bring about an agreeable or disagreeable ripening in each combination — beginning with the case where bodily karma alone ripens while verbal and mental karma do not, and its mirror image where verbal karma alone ripens.

Chinese Source

頗有如語業感異熟果。身業意業不爾耶。答有。如身護語不護。彼於爾時有善心或無記心。謂於今時或由先時起善身表業。由此發起無表業隨轉。及於今時起不善語表業。由此發起無表業隨轉。即於爾時善心現起或無記心。此中身業感愛異熟。語業感非愛異熟。意業若善心起。感愛異熟。若無記心起。不感愛非愛異熟。如身不護語護。彼於爾時起不善心或無記心。謂於今時或由先時起不善身表業。由此發起無表業隨轉。及於今時起善語表業。由此發起無表業隨轉。即於爾時起不善心或無記心。此中身業感非愛異熟。語業感愛異熟。意業若不善心起。感非愛異熟。若無記心起。不感愛非愛異熟。是名如語業感異熟果。身業意業不爾。

Ru-Yi Translation

Is there a case where it is verbal karma alone that brings about a ripening-fruit, while bodily and mental karma do not? Answer: there is — as when the body is guarded and speech is unguarded: at that time one has either a wholesome mind or a neutral mind, in that one gives rise, either now or previously, to wholesome manifest bodily karma, which in turn gives rise to accompanying unmanifest karma, while also giving rise, in the present, to unwholesome manifest verbal karma, which in turn gives rise to accompanying unmanifest karma, with a wholesome or neutral mind manifesting at that very time. Here, the bodily karma brings about an agreeable ripening, the verbal karma brings about a disagreeable ripening, and the mental karma, if arisen with a wholesome mind, brings about an agreeable ripening, or, if arisen with a neutral mind, brings about neither an agreeable nor a disagreeable ripening. As when the body is unguarded and speech is guarded: at that time one gives rise to either an unwholesome mind or a neutral mind, in that one gives rise, either now or previously, to unwholesome manifest bodily karma, which in turn gives rise to accompanying unmanifest karma, while also giving rise, in the present, to wholesome manifest verbal karma, which in turn gives rise to accompanying unmanifest karma, with an unwholesome or neutral mind arising at that very time. Here, the bodily karma brings about a disagreeable ripening, the verbal karma brings about an agreeable ripening, and the mental karma, if arisen with an unwholesome mind, brings about a disagreeable ripening, or, if arisen with a neutral mind, brings about neither an agreeable nor a disagreeable ripening. This is what is meant by verbal karma alone bringing about a ripening-fruit, while bodily and mental karma do not.

諸有欲令有缺減律儀不律儀者。依彼意趣此諸句中。身護語不護。

For those who wish to hold that restraint and non-restraint can be incomplete, according to their own intent, within these various formulations, the case of the body being guarded while speech is unguarded,

語護身不護。皆得依三種說。謂若住律儀。若住不律儀。若住非律儀非不律儀。諸有欲令無缺減律儀不律儀者。依彼意趣。此等唯依住非律儀非不律儀者說非餘。

and of speech being guarded while the body is unguarded, may each be spoken of with reference to any of the three states — abiding in restraint, abiding in non-restraint, or abiding in neither restraint nor non-restraint. For those who wish to hold that restraint and non-restraint cannot be incomplete, according to their own intent, these cases are spoken of solely with reference to one abiding in neither restraint nor non-restraint, and not otherwise.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The matrix's insistence that body, speech, and mind can each independently ripen toward agreeable or disagreeable fruits — even within the very same person at the very same moment — is a striking refusal to let one channel of action "contaminate" or override the others: a single person can be simultaneously guarded in speech and unguarded in body, harvesting a pleasant verbal fruit and an unpleasant bodily fruit from what is, from the outside, one continuous stretch of behavior.

5. Completing the Matrix: Every Remaining Combination

The exercise runs through every remaining combination — mental karma ripening alone; bodily and verbal karma ripening together while mental karma does not; bodily and mental together without verbal; verbal and mental together without bodily; and finally all three ripening together, either uniformly agreeable or uniformly disagreeable — each mapped onto whether the practitioner counts as one abiding in restraint, non-restraint, or neither, with a careful footnote on how two different theories of "incomplete" restraint handle these same formulations.

Chinese Source

頗有如意業感異熟果身業語業不爾耶。答有。如身護語護。彼於爾時有不善心此相違說亦爾。此相違等如前准釋此中若意業感非愛異熟身語業便感愛異熟。若意業感愛異熟。身語業便感非愛異熟。是名如意業感異熟果。身業語業不爾。

Ru-Yi Translation

Is there a case where it is mental karma alone that brings about a ripening-fruit, while bodily and verbal karma do not? Answer: there is — as when the body is guarded and speech is guarded, and one has an unwholesome mind at that time; and the reverse case is likewise explained accordingly, following the pattern given before. Here, if the mental karma brings about a disagreeable ripening, the bodily and verbal karma bring about an agreeable ripening; if the mental karma brings about an agreeable ripening, the bodily and verbal karma bring about a disagreeable ripening. This is what is meant by mental karma alone bringing about a ripening-fruit, while bodily and verbal karma do not.

頗有如身業語業感異熟果意業不爾耶。答有。如身不護語不護。彼於爾時有善心或無記心。此相違說亦爾。如前准釋。此中若身語業感非愛異熟。意業便感愛異熟。或都不感。若身語業感愛異熟。意業便感非愛異熟。或都不感。是名如身業語業感異熟果。意業不爾。

Is there a case where it is bodily and verbal karma that bring about a ripening-fruit, while mental karma does not? Answer: there is — as when the body is unguarded and speech is unguarded, and one has a wholesome or neutral mind at that time; and the reverse case is likewise explained accordingly, following the pattern given before. Here, if the bodily and verbal karma bring about a disagreeable ripening, the mental karma brings about an agreeable ripening, or brings about no ripening at all; if the bodily and verbal karma bring about an agreeable ripening, the mental karma brings about a disagreeable ripening, or brings about no ripening at all. This is what is meant by bodily and verbal karma bringing about a ripening-fruit, while mental karma does not.

諸有欲令有缺減律儀不律儀者。及有欲令無缺減律儀不律儀者。依彼意趣此諸句中。身護語護。身不護語不護。皆得依三種說。謂若住律儀若住不律儀。若住非律儀非不律儀。頗有如身業意業感異熟果語業不爾耶。答有。如身不護語護。彼於爾時有不善心此相違說亦爾。如前准釋。

For those who wish to hold that restraint and non-restraint can be incomplete, and for those who wish to hold that they cannot be incomplete, according to their own intent, within these various formulations, the cases of the body being guarded and speech being guarded, and of the body being unguarded and speech being unguarded, may each be spoken of with reference to any of the three states — abiding in restraint, abiding in non-restraint, or abiding in neither restraint nor non-restraint. Is there a case where it is bodily and mental karma that bring about a ripening-fruit, while verbal karma does not? Answer: there is — as when the body is unguarded and speech is guarded, and one has an unwholesome mind at that time; and the reverse case is likewise explained accordingly, following the pattern given before.

頗有如語業意業感異熟果身業不爾耶。答有。如身護語不護。彼於爾時有不善心此相違說亦爾。如前准釋。頗有如身業語業感異熟果。意業亦爾耶。答有。如身不護語不護。彼於爾時有不善心此相違說亦爾。如前准釋。此中或三業皆感非愛異熟。或三業皆感愛異熟。是名如身業語業感異熟果。意業亦爾。

Is there a case where it is verbal and mental karma that bring about a ripening-fruit, while bodily karma does not? Answer: there is — as when the body is guarded and speech is unguarded, and one has an unwholesome mind at that time; and the reverse case is likewise explained accordingly, following the pattern given before. Is there a case where bodily and verbal karma bring about a ripening-fruit, and mental karma does likewise? Answer: there is — as when the body is unguarded and speech is unguarded, and one has an unwholesome mind at that time; and the reverse case is likewise explained accordingly, following the pattern given before. Here, either all three karmas bring about a disagreeable ripening, or all three karmas bring about an agreeable ripening. This is what is meant by bodily and verbal karma bringing about a ripening-fruit, and mental karma doing likewise.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

That every logically possible combination of the three karmas' ripening receives its own worked example, down to the case where a single wholly negative episode is analyzed as producing three metaphysically distinct disagreeable fruits, shows this section functioning less as doctrine to be believed than as a trained capacity to be built: the payoff is not any single conclusion but the exercised ability to track body, speech, and mind as three separate ledgers running in parallel, never collapsed into one undifferentiated moral balance.

6. Karma-Less Ripening: The Attainments and a Debate Over Acquisition

A striking exception to the whole body-speech-mind framework surfaces: ripening can occur through factors entirely dissociated from mind, with no bodily, verbal, or mental karma involved at all — namely the meditative attainments of non-perception and cessation, and the peculiar dharma called "acquisition" (prāpti). A genuine dispute follows over whether acquisition can itself bring about class-nature (that is, which kind of being one is reborn as), with the Venerable Saṃghavasu proposing the vivid image of countless minor acquisitions accumulating to produce the dull, degraded class-nature of an earthworm, a lizard, or an elephant — a claim the Venerable Ghoṣa firmly rejects on the technical ground that separate acquisitions, lacking any shared common fruit, could never combine their force no matter how many accumulated.

Chinese Source

頗有非身業語業意業感異熟果。而感異熟果耶。答有。謂心不相應行感異熟果。色心心所法心不相應行此復云何。謂無想定滅盡定。

Ru-Yi Translation

Is there a case where it is none of bodily, verbal, or mental karma that brings about a ripening-fruit, yet a ripening-fruit still occurs? Answer: there is — namely, factors dissociated from mind bringing about a ripening-fruit. What are these factors dissociated from mind, distinct from form and from mental and mind-associated dharmas? They are the attainment of non-perception and the attainment of cessation,

得及彼生老住無常。

— together with acquisition, and their arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence.

問無想定感何異熟。或有說者。無想定感無想及色異熟。命根眾同分。是彼有心靜慮。異熟所餘諸蘊是俱異熟。復有說者。無想定感無想及色異熟。命根是彼有心靜慮。異熟所餘諸蘊是俱異熟。復有說者。無想定感無想異熟。所餘諸蘊是俱異熟。問若爾命根便非是業所感異熟。品類足說當云何通。如說一法是業異熟非業。所謂命根。答一切命根是異熟果。諸異熟果多由業感故作是說。然此不無非業感者。復有說者。若有心時亦感無心諸蘊異熟。若無心時亦感有心諸蘊異熟。問若爾應有心因感無心果。應無心因感有心果。答此亦無過。如有色因感無色果。或無色因感有色果。業果差別不違正理此亦如是。評曰應作是說。無想異熟唯無想定感。一切命根及眾同分。眼等色根皆業所感。餘蘊俱感。問滅盡定感何異熟。答感非想非非想處四蘊異熟。問得感何異熟。答感色心心所法心不相應行。問得能感眾同分不。或有說者。不感。所以者何。眾同分者是業所感。此得非業故不能感。諸說得不能感眾同分者。彼說諸得感色異熟者。能感四處。謂色香味觸。亦感心心所法異熟者。謂樂受苦受不苦不樂受。及相應法。感心不相應行異熟者。謂得生住老無常。尊者僧伽伐蘇說曰。得亦能感眾同分果。謂眾多得積集能感一眾同分。所得依身愚鈍羸劣。不明不利。猶如蚯蚓蚖蛇象等。彼眾同分是得所感。諸說得亦能感眾同分者。彼說此得感色異熟者。謂九處除聲處。感心心所法異熟者。謂樂受苦受不苦不樂受。及相應法。感心不相應行異熟者。謂命根眾同分得生住老無常。彼不應作是說。所以者何。得得相望不同一果。假使積集數過俱胝復何所益。若同一果可有是事。是故如前所說者好。尊者妙音作如是說。

Question: what ripening does the attainment of non-perception bring about? Some say: the attainment of non-perception brings about non-perception and the ripening of form; the life faculty and the class-nature are the ripening of that state's own possession-of-mind dhyāna; the remaining aggregates are a co-arisen ripening. Some further say: the attainment of non-perception brings about non-perception and the ripening of form; the life faculty is the ripening of that state's own possession-of-mind dhyāna; the remaining aggregates are a co-arisen ripening. Some further say: the attainment of non-perception brings about only the ripening of non-perception itself; the remaining aggregates are a co-arisen ripening. Question: if so, then the life faculty would not be a ripening brought about by karma at all — how then is the statement in the Prakaraṇapāda to be reconciled, which says there is a dharma that is a ripening of karma yet is not itself karma, namely the life faculty? Answer: every life faculty is indeed a ripening-fruit, and since ripening-fruits are for the most part brought about by karma, it is spoken of in this way — yet this does not exclude the possibility of some that are not brought about by karma. Some further say: when one possesses mind, one's karma also brings about the ripening of the aggregates of a mindless state; when one is without mind, one's karma also brings about the ripening of the aggregates of a state possessing mind. Question: if so, then a cause possessing mind would bring about a mindless fruit, and a cause without mind would bring about a fruit possessing mind. Answer: this too involves no fault, just as a cause possessing form can bring about a formless fruit, or a formless cause can bring about a fruit possessing form — differences between karma and its fruit are not contrary to sound principle, and it is just the same here. The verdict: one should say that the ripening of non-perception is brought about by the attainment of non-perception alone; every life faculty and class-nature, and the eye and other form faculties, are all brought about by karma; the remaining aggregates are a co-arisen ripening. Question: what ripening does the attainment of cessation bring about? Answer: it brings about the ripening of the four aggregates of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Question: what ripening does acquisition bring about? Answer: it brings about form, mind, mind-associated dharmas, and factors dissociated from mind. Question: can acquisition bring about the ripening of class-nature? Some say: it cannot, for why is this? Class-nature is brought about by karma, and since this acquisition is not karma, it cannot bring it about. Those who hold that acquisition cannot bring about class-nature hold that this acquisition, when it brings about the ripening of form, can bring about four sense-fields — namely form, smell, taste, and touch; when it brings about the ripening of mind and mind-associated dharmas, this means pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, together with their associated dharmas; when it brings about the ripening of factors dissociated from mind, this means arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence. The Venerable Saṃghavasu says: acquisition too can bring about a class-nature fruit — that is, a great many acquisitions, accumulated together, can bring about a single class-nature, one whose dependent body is dull, feeble, unclear, and unsharp — like an earthworm, a lizard, or an elephant — and that class-nature is what is brought about by acquisition. Those who hold that acquisition too can bring about class-nature hold that this acquisition, when it brings about the ripening of form, means the nine sense-fields excepting the sound field; when it brings about the ripening of mind and mind-associated dharmas, this means pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, together with their associated dharmas; when it brings about the ripening of factors dissociated from mind, this means the life faculty, class-nature, acquisition, arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence. This account, however, should not be made, for why is this? One acquisition, set against another acquisition, does not share a single common fruit with it — so even were they accumulated in a number exceeding a koṭi, what benefit would that be? Only if they shared a single common fruit could such a thing be possible. Hence the account given before is the better one. The Venerable Ghoṣa explains it thus:

Reading note — Ru-Yi

Ghoṣa's rebuttal of Saṃghavasu's earthworm-and-elephant theory turns on a small but rigorous principle worth noticing: mere accumulation of quantity, however vast, cannot manufacture a causal power that individual instances never possessed to begin with — a billion acquisitions that share no common fruit remain a billion separate non-events, never coalescing into the single, different kind of event their sheer number might seem to promise.

7. Simultaneous Fruits Across Time, and the Kashmiri Monk's Test

An intricate combinatorial survey shows how the three temporally distinct kinds of karma (present-life, next-life, later-life) can ripen simultaneously across the five aggregates — form ripening now, feeling next life, dissociated factors later, and every permutation between — before turning to karma classified by realm, where a seemingly absurd question (can karma of all three realms ripen at the very same moment?) receives a memorable resolution through the story of a Kashmiri monk who refused communal duty by claiming the title of "treatise-master," only to be exposed as a fraud by an arhat's single deliberately impossible test-question, which he answered wrong by taking it at face value rather than recognizing its deeper, technical sense.

Chinese Source

得不能感眾同分果。餘業感得眾同分時。於其眼處乃至意處。得亦能感相狀異熟。即彼諸法生住老無常此中亦攝依附彼法。不自在故。頗有順現法受等三業。非前非後受異熟果耶。答有。乃至廣說。此中非前者。遮過去。非後者遮未來。受異熟果者。謂三業同於一剎那頃受異熟果。依此立問。是以答言有。謂順現法受業色者。此業能感四處異熟。謂色香味觸。順次生受業心心所法者。此業能感樂受苦受不苦不樂受。及彼相應異熟。順後次受業心不相應行者。此業能感四類異熟。謂命根眾同分得生住老無常。又順現法受業心不相應行者。此業能感二類異熟。謂得生住老無常。順次生受業色者。此業能感九處異熟。除聲處。順後次受業心心所法者。

Ru-Yi Translation

— acquisition cannot bring about a class-nature fruit; but when other karma brings about a class-nature and its corresponding acquisition, then, with respect to the eye sense-field up through the mind sense-field, acquisition too can bring about the ripening of their outward characteristics — that is, the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of those very dharmas, which is also included here, since these depend upon and are attached to those dharmas and have no independent standing of their own. Is there a case, among the three karmas ripening in the present life and the rest, whose ripening-fruit is neither earlier nor later? Answer: there is, and so on in full. Here, "not earlier" excludes the past, and "not later" excludes the future; "receiving the ripening-fruit" means that the three karmas receive their ripening-fruit at one and the same moment — it is with reference to this that the question is posed, and hence the answer is that there is such a case. That is: as to karma ripening in the present life whose fruit is form, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of four sense-fields, namely form, smell, taste, and touch; as to karma ripening in the very next life whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, together with their associated dharmas; as to karma ripening in some later life whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind, this karma is able to bring about four kinds of ripening — namely the life faculty, class-nature, acquisition, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence. Again, as to karma ripening in the present life whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind, this karma is able to bring about two kinds of ripening — namely acquisition, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence; as to karma ripening in the very next life whose fruit is form, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of nine sense-fields, excepting the sound field; as to karma ripening in some later life whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas,

此業能感樂受苦受不苦不樂受。及彼相應異熟。又順現法受業心心所法者。此業能感樂受苦受不苦不樂受。及彼相應異熟。順次生受業心不相應行者。此業能感四類異熟。謂命根眾同分得生住老無常。順後次受業色者。此業能感九處異熟。謂除聲處。頗有順樂受等三業。非前非後。受異熟果耶。答有。謂順樂受業色者。此業能感人天九處異熟。謂除聲處。能感惡趣四處異熟。謂色香味觸。順苦受業心心所法者。此業能感苦受。及彼相應異熟。順不苦不樂受業心不相應行者。此業能感人天四類異熟。謂命根眾同分得生住老無常。能感惡趣二類異熟。謂得生住老無常。又順樂受業心不相應行者。此業能感人天四類異熟。謂命根眾同分得生住老無常。能感惡趣二類異熟。謂得生住老無常。順苦受業色者。此業能感惡趣九處異熟。謂除聲處。能感人天四處異熟。謂色香味觸。順不苦不樂受業心心所法者。此業能感不苦不樂受。及彼相應異熟。又順樂受業心心所法者。此業能感樂受及彼相應異熟。順苦受業心不相應行者。此業能感惡趣四類異熟。謂命根眾同分得生住老無常。能感人天二類異熟。謂得生住老無常。順不苦不樂受業色者。此業能感人天九處異熟。謂除聲處。能感惡趣四處異熟。謂色香味觸。

— this karma is able to bring about the ripening of pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, together with their associated dharmas. Again, as to karma ripening in the present life whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, together with their associated dharmas; as to karma ripening in the very next life whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind, this karma is able to bring about four kinds of ripening, namely the life faculty, class-nature, acquisition, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence; as to karma ripening in some later life whose fruit is form, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of nine sense-fields, excepting the sound field. Is there a case, among the three karmas conducive to pleasant feeling and the rest, whose ripening-fruit is neither earlier nor later? Answer: there is. That is: as to karma conducive to pleasant feeling whose fruit is form, this karma is able to bring about, among humans and gods, the ripening of nine sense-fields, excepting the sound field, and, among the unhappy destinies, the ripening of four sense-fields, namely form, smell, taste, and touch; as to karma conducive to painful feeling whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of painful feeling together with its associated dharmas; as to karma conducive to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind, this karma is able to bring about, among humans and gods, four kinds of ripening, namely the life faculty, class-nature, acquisition, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence, and, among the unhappy destinies, two kinds of ripening, namely acquisition, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence. Again, as to karma conducive to pleasant feeling whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind, this karma is able to bring about, among humans and gods, four kinds of ripening, namely the life faculty, class-nature, acquisition, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence, and, among the unhappy destinies, two kinds of ripening, namely acquisition, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence; as to karma conducive to painful feeling whose fruit is form, this karma is able to bring about, among the unhappy destinies, the ripening of nine sense-fields, excepting the sound field, and, among humans and gods, the ripening of four sense-fields, namely form, smell, taste, and touch; as to karma conducive to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling together with its associated dharmas. Again, as to karma conducive to pleasant feeling whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of pleasant feeling together with its associated dharmas; as to karma conducive to painful feeling whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind, this karma is able to bring about, among the unhappy destinies, four kinds of ripening, namely the life faculty, class-nature, acquisition, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence, and, among humans and gods, two kinds of ripening, namely acquisition, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence; as to karma conducive to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling whose fruit is form, this karma is able to bring about, among humans and gods, the ripening of nine sense-fields, excepting the sound field, and, among the unhappy destinies, the ripening of four sense-fields, namely form, smell, taste, and touch.

頗有三界業。非前非後受異熟果耶。答有。乃至廣說。此中道理應答言無。以異熟果界地斷故。而言有者。有何理耶。有說。此中以問非理。是故隨彼作非理答。何故須作非理問耶。欲試驗他故為此問。曾聞迦濕彌羅國有一論師。至北印度闇林僧伽藍。知眾事者差為僧使。彼不受言我是論師應免斯事。其知事者往白眾首阿羅漢言。迦濕彌羅國有一苾芻。至此僧伽藍次當僧使彼不受言我是論師應免斯事。阿羅漢言汝應往問。頗有三界業。非前非後受異熟果耶。知僧事者便往問之。彼得此問答言無有。知僧事者還往眾首阿羅漢所白言。已問彼答言無。阿羅漢言。定是論師應免僧事。故今於此還述彼問。欲有試驗故亦復作非理而答。復有說者。依增上果為此問答亦不違理。以三界業容有一時受此果故謂欲界繫業色者。

Is there a case, among the karma of the three realms, whose ripening-fruit is neither earlier nor later? Answer: there is, and so on in full. Here, by strict reasoning, the answer ought to be that there is no such case, since the ripening-fruit is cut off by realm and ground — so on what principle can it be said that there is? Some say: the question posed here is itself an improper one, and hence an improper answer is given to match it. Why should such an improper question be posed at all? It is posed precisely in order to test another. It has been heard that there was once, in Kashmir, a certain treatise-master who traveled to a monastery in the dark forest of northern India, where the one in charge of communal affairs assigned him to serve as an attendant for the community; he refused, saying, "I am a treatise-master and ought to be exempted from such duty." The one in charge of communal affairs went and reported this to the arhat presiding over the assembly, saying, "There is a bhikṣu from Kashmir who has come to this monastery, and it is now his turn to serve as attendant for the community, but he refuses, saying he is a treatise-master and ought to be exempted from such duty." The arhat said, "You should go and ask him this: is there a case, among the karma of the three realms, whose ripening-fruit is neither earlier nor later?" The one in charge of communal affairs then went and asked him this, and upon receiving the question, he answered that there was no such case. The one in charge of communal affairs then returned to the arhat presiding over the assembly and reported, "I have asked him, and he answered that there is no such case." The arhat said, "He is certainly no treatise-master, and should not be exempted from communal duty." It is for this reason that this question is here recounted once more — it was posed precisely as a test, and hence an improper answer is likewise given in return. Some further say: if this question is posed with reference to the predominant-condition fruit, then the question and answer are not contrary to reason either, since the karma of the three realms may indeed bring about this kind of fruit all at the same time. That is: as to desire-realm-bound karma whose fruit is form,

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The Kashmiri monk's story is a small, sharp piece of institutional satire embedded in the middle of dense scholastic combinatorics: a self-proclaimed expert's actual expertise is verified not by asking him to recite what he knows, but by posing a single question sophisticated enough that only genuine mastery — not mere confidence or credentials — can answer it correctly, and his failure exposes the gap between claiming a title and possessing what the title is supposed to certify.

8. Completing the Survey: Realms, Morality, and the Path

The simultaneous-ripening survey concludes by working through karma of the three realms via the predominant-condition fruit (illustrated by donors who, hearing merely that a monk has attained dhyāna or a formless absorption, are moved to give offerings that ripen for the monk across every realm at once), then through wholesome-versus-unwholesome karma, and finally through karma abandoned by seeing versus by cultivation — before the fascicle explicitly defers further technical detail on cause and fruit to the earlier Aggregate of Miscellaneous Topics, where it says the matter has already been explained in full.

Chinese Source

此業亦感欲界繫九處異熟。謂除聲處。色界繫業心心所法者。謂婆羅門長者居士諸淨信者。聞有苾芻證得靜慮。便施種種衣服飲食諸資身具。彼受施已發生樂受及相應法。無色界繫業心不相應行者謂婆羅門長者居士諸淨信者。聞有苾芻得無色定。便施種種衣服飲食諸資身具。彼受施已命根不斷。又欲界繫業心不相應行者。此業亦感欲界四類異熟。謂命根眾同分得生住老無常。色界繫業色者。謂婆羅門長者居士諸淨信者。聞有苾芻證得靜慮。便施種種衣服飲食諸資身具。彼受施已長養諸根增益大種。無色界繫業心心所法者。

Ru-Yi Translation

— this karma also brings about, within the desire realm, the ripening of nine sense-fields, excepting the sound field. As to form-realm-bound karma whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas: this means that brahmins, householders, and devout laypersons, hearing that a certain bhikṣu has realized dhyāna, thereupon offer him various robes, food and drink, and other requisites of life, and he, having received these offerings, gives rise to pleasant feeling and its associated dharmas. As to formless-realm-bound karma whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind: this means that brahmins, householders, and devout laypersons, hearing that a certain bhikṣu has attained a formless absorption, thereupon offer him various robes, food and drink, and other requisites of life, and he, having received these offerings, has his life faculty sustained without interruption. Again, as to desire-realm-bound karma whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind: this karma also brings about, within the desire realm, four kinds of ripening, namely the life faculty, class-nature, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence. As to form-realm-bound karma whose fruit is form: this means that brahmins, householders, and devout laypersons, hearing that a certain bhikṣu has realized dhyāna, thereupon offer him various robes, food and drink, and other requisites of life, and he, having received these offerings, nourishes his faculties and increases his great elements. As to formless-realm-bound karma whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas:

謂婆羅門長者居士諸淨信者。聞有苾芻證無色定。便施種種衣服飲食諸資身具。彼受施已發生樂受及相應法。又欲界繫業心心所法者。此業亦感樂受苦受不苦不樂受。及彼相應法。色界繫業心不相應行者。謂婆羅門長者居士諸淨信者。聞有苾芻證得靜慮。便施種種衣服飲食諸資身具。彼受施已命根不斷。無色界繫業色者。謂婆羅門長者居士諸淨信者。聞有苾芻證無色定。便施種種衣服飲食諸資身具。彼受施已長養諸根增益大種。由此道理今於此中。依增上果作此問答亦不違理。以增上果一切界地無隔斷故。頗有善不善業。非前非後受異熟果耶。答有。乃至廣說。謂善業色者。此業能感人天九處異熟。謂除聲處。能感惡趣四處異熟。謂色香味觸。不善業心心所法者。此業能感苦受及彼相應異熟。心不相應行者。此業能感惡趣四類異熟。謂命根眾同分得生住老無常。能感人天二類異熟。謂得生住老無常。又善業心心所法者。此業能感樂受不苦不樂受。及彼相應異熟。心不相應行者。此業能感人天四類異熟。謂命根眾同分得生住老無常。能感惡趣二類異熟。謂得生住老無常。

— this means that brahmins, householders, and devout laypersons, hearing that a certain bhikṣu has attained a formless absorption, thereupon offer him various robes, food and drink, and other requisites of life, and he, having received these offerings, gives rise to pleasant feeling and its associated dharmas. Again, as to desire-realm-bound karma whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas: this karma also brings about pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, together with their associated dharmas. As to form-realm-bound karma whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind: this means that brahmins, householders, and devout laypersons, hearing that a certain bhikṣu has realized dhyāna, thereupon offer him various robes, food and drink, and other requisites of life, and he, having received these offerings, has his life faculty sustained without interruption. As to formless-realm-bound karma whose fruit is form: this means that brahmins, householders, and devout laypersons, hearing that a certain bhikṣu has attained a formless absorption, thereupon offer him various robes, food and drink, and other requisites of life, and he, having received these offerings, nourishes his faculties and increases his great elements. By this reasoning, then, if this question here is posed with reference to the predominant-condition fruit, the question and answer are not contrary to reason, since the predominant-condition fruit is never cut off by any realm or ground whatsoever. Is there a case, among wholesome and unwholesome karma, whose ripening-fruit is neither earlier nor later? Answer: there is, and so on in full. That is: as to wholesome karma whose fruit is form, this karma is able to bring about, among humans and gods, the ripening of nine sense-fields, excepting the sound field, and, among the unhappy destinies, the ripening of four sense-fields, namely form, smell, taste, and touch; as to unwholesome karma whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of painful feeling together with its associated dharmas; as to that whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind, this karma is able to bring about, among the unhappy destinies, four kinds of ripening, namely the life faculty, class-nature, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence, and, among humans and gods, two kinds of ripening, namely arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence. Again, as to wholesome karma whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of pleasant feeling and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, together with their associated dharmas; as to that whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind, this karma is able to bring about, among humans and gods, four kinds of ripening, namely the life faculty, class-nature, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence, and, among the unhappy destinies, two kinds of ripening, namely arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence.

不善業色者。此業能感惡趣九處異熟。謂除聲處。能感人天四處異熟。謂色香味觸。頗有見修所斷業。非前非後受異熟果耶。答有。

As to unwholesome karma whose fruit is form, this karma is able to bring about, among the unhappy destinies, the ripening of nine sense-fields, excepting the sound field, and, among humans and gods, the ripening of four sense-fields, namely form, smell, taste, and touch. Is there a case, among karma abandoned by seeing and abandoned by cultivation, whose ripening-fruit is neither earlier nor later? Answer: there is,

乃至廣說。謂見所斷業色者。此業能感惡趣九處異熟。謂除聲處。

and so on in full. That is: as to karma abandoned by seeing whose fruit is form, this karma is able to bring about, among the unhappy destinies, the ripening of nine sense-fields, excepting the sound field, and

能感人天四處異熟。謂色香味觸。修所斷業。心心所法。心不相應行者。此業有二種。謂善不善。善業心心所法者。此業能感樂受不苦不樂受。及彼相應異熟。心不相應行者。此業能感人天四類異熟。謂命根眾同分得生住老無常。能感惡趣二類異熟。謂得生住老無常。不善業心心所法者。此業能感苦受及彼相應異熟。心不相應行者。此業能感惡趣四類異熟。謂命根眾同分得生住老無常。能感人天二類異熟。謂得生住老無常。又見所斷業心心所法者。此業能感苦受及彼相應異熟。心不相應行者。此業能感惡趣四類異熟。謂命根眾同分得生住老無常。能感人天二類異熟。謂得生住老無常。

is able to bring about, among humans and gods, the ripening of four sense-fields, namely form, smell, taste, and touch. As to karma abandoned by cultivation whose fruit is mind, mind-associated dharmas, or a factor dissociated from mind: this karma is of two kinds, wholesome and unwholesome. As to the wholesome karma whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of pleasant feeling and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, together with their associated dharmas; as to that whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind, this karma is able to bring about, among humans and gods, four kinds of ripening, namely the life faculty, class-nature, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence, and, among the unhappy destinies, two kinds of ripening, namely arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence. As to the unwholesome karma whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of painful feeling together with its associated dharmas; as to that whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind, this karma is able to bring about, among the unhappy destinies, four kinds of ripening, namely the life faculty, class-nature, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence, and, among humans and gods, two kinds of ripening, namely arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence. Again, as to karma abandoned by seeing whose fruit is mind and mind-associated dharmas, this karma is able to bring about the ripening of painful feeling together with its associated dharmas; as to that whose fruit is a factor dissociated from mind, this karma is able to bring about, among the unhappy destinies, four kinds of ripening, namely the life faculty, class-nature, and arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence, and, among humans and gods, two kinds of ripening, namely arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence.

修所斷業色者。此業有二種。謂善不善。善業色者。此業能感人天九處異熟。謂除聲處。能感惡趣四處異熟。謂色香味觸。不善業色者。此業能感惡趣九處異熟。謂除聲處。能感人天四處異熟。謂色香味觸。異熟因果如雜蘊智納息中已廣說。

As to karma abandoned by cultivation whose fruit is form: this karma is of two kinds, wholesome and unwholesome. As to the wholesome karma whose fruit is form, this karma is able to bring about, among humans and gods, the ripening of nine sense-fields, excepting the sound field, and, among the unhappy destinies, the ripening of four sense-fields, namely form, smell, taste, and touch. As to the unwholesome karma whose fruit is form, this karma is able to bring about, among the unhappy destinies, the ripening of nine sense-fields, excepting the sound field, and, among humans and gods, the ripening of four sense-fields, namely form, smell, taste, and touch. The cause and fruit of ripening have already been explained in full in the Nyāsa on Knowledge within the Aggregate of Miscellaneous Topics.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The donors' story — that mere news of a monk's meditative attainment, without any direct contact, is enough to move brahmins and householders to give offerings whose karmic fruit then ripens for the monk across all three realms simultaneously — quietly relocates the entire discussion from abstract combinatorics back into ordinary devotional life: the vast technical apparatus being built here exists ultimately to make sense of something as simple and human as being moved to generosity by hearing good news about someone else's spiritual progress.

9. A New Nyāsa Begins: The Four Combinations of Killing and Its Preparation

A new chapter opens — the Killing-of-Life Nyāsa — with a precise fourfold matrix distinguishing the act of killing from its preparatory action: a victim already dead while the attacker's murderous exertion continues unabated (as when a mortally wounded man dies before the assailant's blows stop landing); a victim still alive though the attacker, believing the deed done, has already ceased; a clean case where death and the cessation of effort coincide exactly; and an ongoing attack where neither death nor cessation has yet occurred — each illustrated across direct assault, sending an agent, and the use of poison or spells.

Chinese Source

業蘊第四中害生納息第三之一頗有已害生殺生未滅耶。如是等章及解章義既領會已。次應廣釋。

Ru-Yi Translation

Fourth Aggregate, Karma: the Killing-of-Life Nyāsa, Chapter Three, Part One. Is there a case where a killing of life has already occurred, yet the act of killing is not yet extinguished? Having now grasped this chapter heading and its explanatory meaning in full, we should next explain it in full.

此中有非殺生以殺生聲說。有非加行以加行聲說。謂殺生加行亦名殺生。殺生後起亦名加行。是謂此處略毘婆沙。頗有已害生殺生未滅耶。答有。如已斷他命彼加行未息。謂如有人為害他命。以刀杖等加害。加行未息而彼命已斷。遣使呪藥廣說亦爾。頗有未害生殺生已滅耶。答有。如未斷他命。彼加行已息。謂如有人為害他命。

Here there is what is not itself killing yet is spoken of with the term "killing," and there is what is not itself preparatory action yet is spoken of with the term "preparatory action" — that is, the preparatory action for killing is also called "killing," and what arises after the killing is also called "preparatory action." This is called the brief exposition of the Vibhāṣā at this point. Is there a case where a killing of life has already occurred, yet the act of killing is not yet extinguished? Answer: there is — as when another's life has already been cut off, yet the preparatory action toward it has not yet ceased: this means that a certain person, intending to take another's life, attacks him with a knife, a staff, or the like, and although the preparatory action has not yet ceased, that person's life has already been cut off; the same holds in full for sending an agent, or using poison or spells. Is there a case where a killing of life has not yet occurred, yet the act of killing has already been extinguished? Answer: there is — as when another's life has not yet been cut off, yet the preparatory action toward it has already ceased: this means that a certain person, intending to take another's life,

以刀杖等加害。其命未斷彼謂已斷。不復加害。遣使呪藥廣說亦爾。頗有已害生殺生已滅耶。答有。如已斷他命彼加行已息。謂如有人為害他命。以刀杖等加害。即命斷時加行亦息。遣使呪藥廣說亦爾。頗有未害生殺生未滅耶。答有。如未斷他命。彼加行未息。

— attacks him with a knife, a staff, or the like, and although that person's life has not yet been cut off, the attacker believes it has already been cut off and ceases the attack; the same holds in full for sending an agent, or using poison or spells. Is there a case where a killing of life has already occurred, and the act of killing has already been extinguished? Answer: there is — as when another's life has already been cut off, and the preparatory action toward it has already ceased: this means that a certain person, intending to take another's life, attacks him with a knife, a staff, or the like, and, at the very moment his life is cut off, the preparatory action likewise ceases; the same holds in full for sending an agent, or using poison or spells. Is there a case where a killing of life has not yet occurred, and the act of killing is not yet extinguished? Answer: there is — as when another's life has not yet been cut off, and the preparatory action toward it has not yet ceased:

謂如有人為害他命。以刀杖等加害。其命未斷彼加行亦未息。遣使呪藥廣說亦爾。

this means that a certain person, intending to take another's life, attacks him with a knife, a staff, or the like, and that person's life has not yet been cut off, while the preparatory action toward it has likewise not yet ceased; the same holds in full for sending an agent, or using poison or spells.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This fourfold matrix performs a genuinely useful piece of moral clarification by refusing to collapse "killing" into a single all-or-nothing event: the treatise insists that the physical fact of death and the psychological fact of murderous intent's continuation are two independently trackable variables, which is precisely why a person can be, in this analysis, technically still "killing" someone already dead, or have already stopped "killing" someone who, in fact, still lives.

10. A Definite Hell Despite an Unfinished Killing, and Why There Can Be a Sin of Killing at All

A vivid set of scenarios shows that even an interrupted ānantarya deed can guarantee hell as its fruit — a would-be matricide seized by authorities mid-attempt, a mother who kills her attacking son in self-defense, a mother's own guardian deity striking the son down while she survives, or a son overcome by remorse partway through who then takes his own life instead, still falling to hell exactly as if he had completed the act. This sets up the section's deepest question: since ultimately there is no real "being," only aggregates, elements, and sense-fields, how can there be a genuine sin of killing at all? Three masters offer converging answers — Vasumitra's parallel to the notion of a self persisting despite no self existing; another's appeal to what the aggregates make possible to believe (permanence, pleasure, purity); and the Great Virtuous One's account of the threefold awareness ("I shall kill," "I am killing," "I have killed") that these very aggregates give rise to — closing with the rule that the sin requires both a preparatory action and the result's actual completion, never one alone.

Chinese Source

頗有未害生殺生未滅。此業異熟定生地獄耶。答有。如作無間業加行時命終。其事云何。謂如有人欲害其母適起加行。或為官司所獲。或母有力反害其子。或母福德天神為殺子墮地獄而母猶存。或起加行致母必死。而便中悔自害其命亦生地獄。如害母如是造餘無間應知亦爾。問唯法無眾生云何而有殺罪。尊者世友說曰。如雖無眾生。而有眾生想。如是雖無眾生。而有殺罪。復次此蘊界處。能起我想。有情想。命者。生者。養者。補特伽羅想。是故若斷壞彼得殺生罪。復次蘊界處。能起我想常樂淨想。是以若斷壞之。彼得殺生罪。大德說言。此蘊界處。是有執受起三時覺。謂我當殺正殺已殺。是故若斷壞彼得殺生罪。然眾生是世俗有殺生罪。是勝義有此殺生罪。由二緣得。一起加行。二果究竟。若起加行果不究竟。

Ru-Yi Translation

Is there a case where a killing of life has not yet occurred and the act of killing is not yet extinguished, yet this karma's ripening definitely leads to rebirth in hell? Answer: there is — as when one dies at the very moment of undertaking the preparatory action for an ānantarya deed. How does this happen? It is as when a certain person, wishing to kill his own mother, has just begun the preparatory action, when he is seized by the authorities, or when his mother, being strong, instead kills her son in self-defense, or when, through his mother's own merit, a guardian deity causes the son who would kill her to fall into hell while the mother herself survives, or when, having undertaken the preparatory action such that his mother's death is certain, he then feels remorse partway through and takes his own life, likewise falling into hell. Just as with the killing of a mother, so too should it be understood for the committing of any of the other ānantarya deeds. Question: since there is only dharma and no real being, how can there be any sin of killing at all? The Venerable Vasumitra explains: just as, although there is no real being, there is still the notion of a being, so too, although there is no real being, there is still the sin of killing. Further: these aggregates, elements, and sense-fields are able to give rise to the notion of a self, a sentient being, a life-possessor, one who is born, one who is nourished, and a person — and hence, if one destroys and breaks them, one obtains the sin of killing. Further: the aggregates, elements, and sense-fields are able to give rise to the notion of permanence, pleasure, and purity — and hence, if one destroys and breaks them, one obtains the sin of killing. The Great Virtuous One says: these aggregates, elements, and sense-fields are objects of appropriation that give rise to a threefold awareness — "I shall kill," "I am now killing," "I have killed" — and hence, if one destroys and breaks them, one obtains the sin of killing. Thus the being is a conventional existent, yet the sin of killing exists; it is an ultimate existent that this sin of killing is obtained through, by two conditions — first, undertaking the preparatory action; second, the result reaching completion. If one undertakes the preparatory action but the result does not reach completion,

或果究竟不起加行。皆不得殺罪。若起加行果亦究竟方得殺罪。問頗有亦起加行果亦究竟。而不得殺罪耶。答有。如能殺所殺俱時捨命。或能殺者前死。問殺何蘊名殺生。過去耶。未來耶。現在耶。

— or the result reaches completion without one having undertaken the preparatory action, in neither case is the sin of killing obtained; only when the preparatory action is undertaken and the result also reaches completion is the sin of killing obtained. Question: is there a case where the preparatory action is undertaken and the result also reaches completion, yet the sin of killing is still not obtained? Answer: there is — as when the killer and the one killed both give up their lives at the same moment, or when the killer himself dies first. Question: killing which aggregate is called "killing a living being" — the past, the future, or the present aggregate?

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The Great Virtuous One's threefold awareness — "I shall kill," "I am killing," "I have killed" — locates the sin of killing not in some metaphysical fact about a nonexistent self being destroyed, but in the structure of intention and self-narration that accompanies the act from beginning to end: killing turns out to be a sin not because there is a self to violate, but because the killer's own mind constructs and inhabits exactly the kind of continuous, self-referential story that only a real agent could tell — which is, in the end, precisely what makes the act his own.

11. Which Aggregate, In Which Time, Is Actually Killed?

A genuinely difficult metaphysical puzzle follows: since the past has already ceased, the future has not yet arrived, and the present does not abide, which aggregate, at which time, is actually the object of killing? The resolution locates the true object in the future — one "kills" by obstructing the very causes and conditions that would otherwise bring a future continuum's aggregates into being — with a further debate over whether the fast-vanishing present aggregate counts too, since cutting short its potency before it would naturally cease still prevents what follows from continuing, exactly as a jar's breaking spills the milk inside it even though the milk itself was never directly struck. Related debates follow on whether only form (touchable by weapons) or all five aggregates can be "killed," and whether killing two victims with a single effort produces one act of manifest karma or two.

Chinese Source

過去已滅。未來未至。現在不住。悉無殺義云何名殺生耶。答殺未來蘊。非過去現在。問未來未至云何可殺。答彼住現在遮未來世諸蘊和合說名為殺。由遮他蘊和合生緣故得殺罪。有說殺現在未來蘊但非過去。問未來可爾現在不住設彼不殺亦自然滅。云何殺耶。答斷彼勢用說名為殺。所以者何。先現在蘊雖不住而滅。然不能令後蘊不續。今現在蘊不住而滅。則能令其後蘊不續故。於現蘊亦得殺罪。問諸蘊中何蘊可殺。於彼得殺罪。有說色蘊。所以者何。唯色可為刀杖等所觸故。有說五蘊。

Ru-Yi Translation

The past has already ceased, the future has not yet arrived, and the present does not abide — none of them, it seems, admit of the sense of "killing" at all, so how can it be called killing a living being? Answer: it is the future aggregate that is killed, not the past or the present. Question: since the future has not yet arrived, how can it be killed? Answer: one who abides in the present and obstructs the coming-together of the aggregates of a future life is said to "kill" — since it is by obstructing the coming-together of the causes and conditions for another's aggregates to arise that one obtains the sin of killing. Some say that it is the present and the future aggregate that are killed, but not the past. Question: granting the future, the present does not abide — even without being killed, it would cease of its own accord regardless — so how can it be called killing? Answer: cutting short its potency and function is called killing, for why is this? Although the present aggregate of a moment ago does not abide and ceases regardless, it is nonetheless incapable, on its own, of preventing the aggregate that follows it from continuing; but when the present aggregate is now cut short before it would otherwise cease, this is indeed capable of preventing the aggregate that follows it from continuing — and hence the sin of killing is obtained with respect to the present aggregate as well. Question: among all the aggregates, which aggregate can be killed, such that the sin of killing is obtained with respect to it? Some say: the aggregate of form, for why is this? Only form can be touched by a knife, a staff, and the like. Some say: all five aggregates,

問四蘊無觸云何可殺。答彼依色轉色蘊壞時。彼便不轉故亦名殺。

— Question: the four formless aggregates cannot be touched, so how can they be killed? Answer: they operate in dependence upon form, and when the aggregate of form is destroyed, they thereupon cease to operate, and hence this too is called killing,

如缾破時乳等亦失。又彼都於五蘊起惡心。而殺故於彼得殺罪。問為殺無記。於彼得罪為三種耶。有說。無記。所以者何。唯無覆無記。可為刀杖等所觸故。有說三種。問善染污法無觸云何可殺。答善染污法依無記轉。無記壞時彼便不轉故亦名殺。餘廣說如前。問如以一加行俱時殺母及餘女人。彼於母得殺生及無間無表罪。於餘女人唯得殺生無表罪。而此表業為但得一為得二耶。有作是說。但得一表。所以者何。以一加行俱時而殺無差別故。尊者妙音說曰。

— just as, when a jar is broken, the milk within it is likewise lost. Moreover, the killer's own malicious intent is directed at all five aggregates together, and it is by killing that he obtains the sin of killing with respect to them. Question: is what is killed neutral, or is it that the sin obtained is of three kinds? Some say: it is neutral, for why is this? Only unobscured-neutral form can be touched by a knife, a staff, and the like. Some say: it is of three kinds. Question: wholesome and defiled dharmas cannot be touched, so how can they be killed? Answer: wholesome and defiled dharmas operate in dependence upon the neutral, and when the neutral is destroyed, they thereupon cease to operate, and hence this too is called killing — the rest explained in full as before. Question: as when, with a single preparatory action, one kills both one's mother and another woman at the same time — with respect to the mother, one obtains the unmanifest karma of both killing and an ānantarya deed, while with respect to the other woman, one obtains only the unmanifest karma of killing — but as for this manifest karma, is only one obtained, or two? Some say: only one manifest action is obtained, for why is this? Because it is a single preparatory action that kills them both at the same time, without any distinction. The Venerable Ghoṣa explains:

彼得二表。所以者何。此身表業極微所成。害母及餘極微各異。如無表得二表亦應爾。問如以一加行殺多眾生。隨爾所眾生得爾所無表罪。而此表業為但得一為得多耶。有說得一。所以者何。以一加行俱時而殺無差別故。尊者妙音說曰。彼得多表。廣說如前。

— he obtains two manifest actions, for why is this? This bodily manifest karma is composed of atomic particles, and the particles involved in killing the mother and in killing the other are distinct from one another — just as two unmanifest karmas are obtained, two manifest actions should likewise be obtained. Question: as when, with a single preparatory action, one kills many beings, one obtains as many instances of unmanifest killing karma as there are beings — but as for this manifest karma, is only one obtained, or many? Some say: only one is obtained, for why is this? Because it is a single preparatory action that kills them all at the same time, without any distinction. The Venerable Ghoṣa explains: he obtains many manifest actions, explained in full as before.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The broken-jar simile for how formless aggregates can be "killed" despite being untouchable is an elegant piece of indirect causation: it shows that destroying what something depends upon is a perfectly genuine way of destroying that thing itself, even without ever touching it directly — the milk was never struck, yet it is undeniably lost, and the four formless aggregates are undeniably ended, precisely because both depend for their continuation on a physical vessel that has just been shattered.

12. Near-Misses and Edge Cases: Doomed Lifespans, Mutual Slaying, Coercion, and Silent Crimes

A closing sequence of precisely calibrated edge cases tests the killing-sin's exact boundaries: attacking someone whose lifespan was ending anyway incurs no sin only if the attack shortens nothing at all, even a single moment's difference being sufficient for full culpability; attacking someone fatally and then dying oneself before their actual death incurs no sin, since one's own continuum ends before the guilt can be established in it; two combatants who kill each other simultaneously likewise incur no sin, for the identical reason; acting under a king's compulsion still typically incurs the sin unless one was genuinely willing to sacrifice one's own life rather than comply; and the section closes with three memorable cases of crime committed without the expected medium — ordering a killing by speech alone, committing false speech through a bodily gesture alone, and, most strikingly, committing both sins at once through nothing but a sage's own resentful thought and the customary silent gesture of declaring one's purity during the poṣadha confession rite.

Chinese Source

問殺壽應盡者得殺罪不。答若此剎那壽應盡。即爾時加害者不得殺罪。若由加害乃至令彼一剎那壽住不生。法皆得殺罪。況多剎那。

Ru-Yi Translation

Question: if one kills someone whose lifespan was due to end anyway, does one obtain the sin of killing? Answer: if that very moment was the moment that lifespan was due to end regardless, then the one who inflicted the attack at that very moment does not obtain the sin of killing; but if, through the attack, even a single moment's continuation of life that would otherwise have arisen is prevented from arising, one obtains the sin of killing in every such case, how much more so for many moments.

問殺斷末摩者。得殺罪不。答若此剎那正應捨命。即爾時加害者不得殺罪。若由加害乃至令彼一剎那命住不生。法皆得殺罪。況多剎那。

Question: if one kills by severing a vital point, does one obtain the sin of killing? Answer: if that very moment was precisely the moment that life was due to be given up regardless, then the one who inflicted the attack at that very moment does not obtain the sin of killing; but if, through the attack, even a single moment's continuation of life that would otherwise have arisen is prevented from arising, one obtains the sin of killing in every such case, how much more so for many moments.

問若有害他令定當死。便自害命得殺罪不。答不得。所以者何。以彼果未究竟。便自失命無後眾同分。可成就彼罪故。問若戰鬪時互相加害。俱時死者各得殺罪不。答不得。所以者何。以二皆悉果未究竟。便俱失命無後眾同分。可成就彼罪故。問若為王等逼令行殺。得殺罪不。有說不得。所以者何。他力所制非彼意樂故。如是說者。亦得殺罪。除自要心寧捨己命終不害他。如是則無罪。問若依先王所制法。令刑罰有過得殺罪不。答得王及法司。若遣他殺得殺生無表罪。彼所遣人。及若自殺俱得殺生表無表罪。若眾多有情謀害一命。彼起加行親斷命者。得殺生攝表無表罪。餘同謀及作聲援者。但得殺生無表。若彼多人等設加行斷彼一命。當知皆得表無表罪。頗有非身作。而得殺生罪耶。答有。謂語遣殺。頗有不發語而得虛誑語罪耶。答有。謂身表。頗有非身作不發語而得二罪耶。

Question: if one attacks another such that his death is certain, but then takes one's own life before he dies, does one obtain the sin of killing? Answer: one does not, for why is this? Because the result has not yet reached completion, and, having already lost one's own life, there is no subsequent class-nature in which that sin could be established. Question: if two combatants in battle attack one another and both die at the same moment, does each obtain the sin of killing? Answer: neither obtains it, for why is this? Because for both, the result has not yet reached completion, and, both having already lost their lives, there is no subsequent class-nature in which that sin could be established for either. Question: if one is compelled by a king or the like to carry out an execution, does one obtain the sin of killing? Some say: one does not, for why is this? Because one is constrained by another's power, not acting from one's own wish. According to this account, one does still obtain the sin of killing, unless one had resolved firmly in one's own mind that one would sooner give up one's own life than harm another — only in that case is there no fault. Question: if, acting in accordance with a law established by a former king, one metes out a punishment that turns out excessive, does one obtain the sin of killing? Answer: both the king and the officiating judge obtain it. If one sends another to carry out a killing, one obtains the unmanifest karma of killing; the person sent, and likewise anyone who kills by his own hand, obtains both the manifest and unmanifest karma of killing. If a great many beings conspire to take a single life, whoever undertakes the preparatory action and personally cuts off that life obtains the manifest and unmanifest karma comprised in killing, while the other co-conspirators and those who merely cheer him on obtain only the unmanifest karma of killing; but if these many persons each individually undertake preparatory action sufficient to cut off that one life, one should know that all of them obtain both the manifest and unmanifest karma. Is there a case where one obtains the sin of killing without the body having acted at all? Answer: there is — as when one orders another, by speech alone, to carry out a killing. Is there a case where one obtains the sin of false speech without ever uttering a word? Answer: there is — namely, through a bodily gesture. Is there a case where one obtains both sins at once, without the body having acted and without uttering a word?

答有。謂仙人意憤。及布灑他時默然表淨。

Answer: there is — as with a sage's own resentful state of mind, and as with the silent gesture of declaring one's own purity at the time of the poṣadha rite.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The rule that dying before one's victim erases the killing-sin entirely — not because the malicious intent or the fatal blow were any less real, but purely because there is no longer a continuum left in which the guilt could be established — is a strikingly mechanical piece of karmic bookkeeping: it treats culpability not as an immediate moral fact settled at the moment of the deed, but as something that must be properly registered in a subsequent existence to exist at all, meaning that dying first is, in this precise technical sense, indistinguishable from never having sinned.

Fascicle 118 Complete

This closes fascicle 118 of Ru-Yi's translation, drawn from the treatise's true CBETA boundary. Fascicle 118 completed the Wrong-Speech Nyāsa (邪語納息第二之三): a formal debate over whether the Buddha's own voice is a karmic ripening, nine reasons sound never is, a refutation of backward-flowing causation, an extended combinatorial matrix of how body, speech, and mind ripen together and apart, karma-less ripening through the meditative attainments, and the Kashmiri monk's test. Fascicle 118 then opened the Killing-of-Life Nyāsa (害生納息第三之一): the four combinations of killing and its preparatory action, why there can be a sin of killing despite no real self to kill, which aggregate in which time is truly killed, and a closing sequence of precisely calibrated edge cases from doomed lifespans to silent crimes. Fascicle 119 continues within this same nyāsa.