The Cakya Hunters and the Pearl-Swallowing Goose

Is there karma unwholesome and conducive to painful feeling whose ripening has not yet ripened, and so on in full? Question: why compose this treatise? Answer: in order to put a stop to another school's position and to make clear our own doctrine. That is, some say there is no intermediate existence at all; some further say that, although there is intermediate existence, none who are born in an unhappy destiny pass through it; some further say that, although those born in an unhappy destiny do pass through intermediate existence, none who are born in hell do so; some further say that, although those born in hell do pass through intermediate existence, none who have previously committed an ānantarya deed do so; some further say that, although those who have previously committed an ānantarya deed do pass through intermediate existence,

— they do not experience the ripening of the ānantarya deed within that intermediate existence; some further say that, although one does experience the ripening of the ānantarya deed while abiding in intermediate existence, one experiences only the ripening of the four aggregates, not the aggregate of form. In order to refute these various mistaken attachments and to show that intermediate existence exists in every place of birth throughout the realm possessing form, without exception, and that within it one experiences the ripening of the aggregate of form as well, this treatise is composed for this reason.

Is there karma unwholesome and conducive to painful feeling whose ripening has not yet ripened, yet which is not incapable of giving rise to a defiled mind at the very first moment its ripening-fruit is received? Answer: there is — as with ānantarya karma that has been created and increased, whose ripening-fruit first arises within the intermediate existence leading to hell. Question: what is the difference between "creating" and "increasing"? Some say: there is no difference. Some say: the difference is merely nominal — this is called creating, that is called increasing. Some say: the meaning itself also differs. That is, one may fall into an unhappy destiny through a single evil deed, or one may fall through the full complement of three; if one falls into an unhappy destiny through a single evil deed, then at the time of its preparatory action it is called only creating, not increasing, while once it reaches completion it is called both creating and increasing; if one falls through the full complement of three, then while creating only one or two of them it is called only creating, not increasing, while once all three are fully created it is called both creating and increasing — and just as with the three evil conducts, so too with the three good conducts, the difference being that one is thereby born in a fortunate destiny instead. Further, one may fall into hell through a single ānantarya deed, or through the full complement of five; if through a single one, then at the stage of its preparatory action it is called only creating, not increasing, while once it reaches completion it is called both creating and increasing; if through the full complement of five, then while creating only one up through four of them it is called only creating, not increasing, while once all five are fully created it is called both creating and increasing. Further, one may fall into an unhappy destiny through a single unwholesome path of karma, or through the full complement of ten; if through a single one, then at the stage of its preparatory action it is called only creating, not increasing, while once it reaches completion it is called both creating and increasing; if through the full complement of ten, then while creating only one up through nine of them it is called only creating, not increasing, while once all ten are fully created it is called both creating and increasing — and just as with the ten unwholesome paths of karma, so too with the ten wholesome paths of karma, the difference being that one is thereby born in a fortunate destiny instead. Further, one may bring about a single class-nature through many good conducts, as with the bodhisattva's own final class-nature, brought about by three thousand two hundred meritorious deeds; while creating from one up through three thousand one hundred ninety-nine of these merits, it is called only creating, not increasing, while once all three thousand two hundred are fully created, it is called both creating and increasing. Further, there is karma deliberately created, and karma not deliberately created; if deliberately created, it is called both creating and increasing; if not deliberately created, it is called only creating, not increasing — and it is likewise said for what is created through careful deliberation versus created impulsively. Further, there is karma whose ripening is conducive to one of the three fixed times, and karma whose ripening is indeterminate; that conducive to one of the three fixed times is called both creating and increasing, while that whose ripening is indeterminate is called only creating, not increasing — and it is likewise said for karma whose ripening is fixed versus whose ripening is indeterminate.

Further, there is karma whose ripening is conducive to a specifically fixed experience, and karma whose ripening is not conducive to any specifically fixed experience; the former is called both creating and increasing, the latter only creating, not increasing. Further, there is karma whose timing is fixed and whose ripening is also fixed, and karma whose ripening alone is fixed while its timing is not; that in which both are fixed is called both creating and increasing, while that in which only one is fixed is called only creating, not increasing. Further, there is unwholesome karma conducive to an unhappy destiny, and unwholesome karma conducive to a fortunate destiny; the former is called both creating and increasing, the latter only creating, not increasing — and wholesome karma is spoken of in the reverse way. Further, there is unwholesome karma accompanied by an unwholesome companion, and unwholesome karma accompanied by a wholesome companion; the former is called both creating and increasing, the latter only creating, not increasing — and wholesome karma is spoken of in the reverse way. Further, there is unwholesome karma that arises within a continuum bearing no view of action and wrong view, confused about cause and effect, and unwholesome karma that arises within a continuum bearing a view of action and right view, not confused about cause and effect; the former is called both creating and increasing, the latter only creating, not increasing — and wholesome karma is spoken of in the reverse way. Further, there is unwholesome karma that damages both moral discipline and right view, and unwholesome karma that damages moral discipline but not right view; the former is called both creating and increasing, the latter only creating, not increasing — and wholesome karma is spoken of in the reverse way. Further, there is unwholesome karma whose preparatory action and intention are both corrupted, and unwholesome karma whose preparatory action alone is corrupted while the intention is not; the former is called both creating and increasing, the latter only creating, not increasing. In just this way, there is karma noticed at all three of its stages, and karma not noticed at any of the three; karma done without any subsequent regret, and karma done with subsequent regret; karma done and afterward called to mind, and karma done and not afterward called to mind; karma repeatedly recollected, and karma not repeatedly recollected —

— all likewise spoken of in the same pattern. Further, if karma is able to both take hold of a fruit and actually deliver that fruit, it is called both creating and increasing; if karma takes hold of a fruit yet is unable to deliver it, it is called only creating, not increasing. The Venerable Vasumitra explains: if the karma one performs is dedicated with intention, revealed with intention, and praised and proclaimed before one's own kind, this is called both creating and increasing; if the karma one performs is otherwise, it is called only creating, not increasing. Some say: if the karma one performs is complete in every respect and finished in every respect, like a stūpa built and adorned to full completion, this is called both creating and increasing; if the karma one performs is otherwise, it is called only creating, not increasing. The Great Virtuous One says: if the karma one performs comes together with its full complement of conditions such that it will certainly bring about its fruit, this is called both creating and increasing; if the karma one performs is otherwise, it is called only creating, not increasing. There are countless approaches such as these — these are the distinctions between creating and increasing.

There are five kinds of ānantarya deeds: first, killing one's mother; second, killing one's father; third, killing an arhat; fourth, causing a schism in the harmonious saṅgha; fifth, with malicious intent, drawing a buddha's blood. Question: what is the own-nature of these five ānantarya deeds? Answer: their own-nature is bodily and verbal karma — the first three and the last are of the nature of bodily karma, while the fourth alone is of the nature of verbal karma. Hence these five are included within three realms, three sense-fields, and one aggregate: the three realms are the form realm, sound realm, and dharma realm; the three sense-fields are the form field, sound field, and dharma field; the one aggregate is the aggregate of form. This is the own-nature of the ānantarya deeds. Having explained their own-nature, we should now explain the reason for it. Question: why are they called ānantarya, "without interval"? Answer: they are so named for two reasons: first, to exclude the present life and later lives; second, to exclude other destinies. As to excluding the present life and later lives: these five ripen only in the very next life, never ripening in the present life nor in some later life beyond, and hence are named "without interval." As to excluding other destinies: these five are definitely experienced in hell, never intermixed with any other destiny, and hence are named "without interval." They are established for two reasons: first, betraying the kindness of one's own nurturing; second, destroying a field of merit. As to betraying the kindness of nurturing: this refers to killing one's mother or father. As to destroying a field of merit: this refers to the remaining three. The crime of an ānantarya deed is obtained through two conditions:

— first, undertaking the preparatory action; second, the result reaching completion. If one undertakes the preparatory action but the result does not reach completion, one does not obtain the ānantarya crime; if the result reaches completion without one having undertaken the preparatory action, one likewise does not obtain the ānantarya crime. As to undertaking the preparatory action without the result reaching completion: this is as when a certain person, wishing to kill his own mother, is found out by her, and she hides herself within a stack of grain, while another woman happens to be in the mother's own sleeping place; that person, arriving, believes this woman to be his own mother and kills her with a knife, and, having killed her, then goes to wipe the blade clean upon the stack of grain, at which the blade touches his mother's body, and she thereby loses her life — at the time the preparatory action was undertaken, the result had not yet reached completion, and by the time the result reached completion, the preparatory action was already over; hence this does not constitute the crime of an ānantarya deed.

As to the result reaching completion without the preparatory action having been undertaken: this is as when a certain person, supporting his parents as they pass along a dangerous road, and fearing bandits might come, urges and presses them onward, whereupon his parents stumble and thereby lose their lives; although the result reaches completion, it was not arisen from any preparatory action — hence it is necessary that both the preparatory action be undertaken and the result reach completion before an ānantarya deed is constituted. Question: is there a case where both the preparatory action is undertaken and the result reaches completion, yet the ānantarya crime is still not obtained? Answer: there is — namely, when the killer dies at the same moment as the one killed, since there is then no subsequent class-nature in which that crime could be established. If an elder brother orders his younger brother to go himself and kill their mother, both the younger brother, in accordance with his elder brother's instruction, and the elder brother himself obtain the ānantarya crime; if the younger brother instead orders another to do it, or does it jointly with another, only the younger brother obtains the ānantarya crime. If an elder brother orders his younger brother to have another kill their mother, both the younger brother, in accordance with his elder brother's instruction, and the elder brother obtain the ānantarya crime; if the younger brother kills her himself, or does it jointly with another, only the younger brother obtains the ānantarya crime.

If an elder brother orders his younger brother to kill their mother jointly with another, both the younger brother, in accordance with his elder brother's instruction, and the elder brother obtain the ānantarya crime; if the younger brother kills her himself, or merely has another do it, only the younger brother obtains the ānantarya crime. If an elder brother orders his younger brother to kill their mother when she arrives, both the younger brother, in accordance with his elder brother's instruction, and the elder brother obtain the ānantarya crime; if he instead kills her only once she has already left, only the younger brother obtains the ānantarya crime. Just as with an elder brother ordering a younger, so too it is with a brother ordering a sister, or ordering an elder brother, or ordering an elder sister; just as with ordering the killing upon arrival or upon departure, so too it is with standing, sitting, or lying down; and just as with killing one's mother, so too with killing one's father, killing an arhat, and drawing a buddha's blood — the distinctions concerning sending an agent should be understood accordingly for each. If a non-human kills its non-human parent, the ānantarya crime is not obtained; the cases of a non-human killing a human, or a human killing a non-human, should be understood in the same way — only when a human being kills a human parent is the ānantarya crime obtained. Question: if a paṇḍaka, hermaphrodite, or one without sexual organs kills a parent, is the ānantarya crime obtained? Answer: it is not, for why is this? It is such a being's very nature to have feeble resolve and strength, incapable of serving as a vessel for either restraint or non-restraint. The Venerable Vasumitra explains: paṇḍakas and the like, in killing a parent, do not obtain the ānantarya crime, for why is this? They have no love or reverence toward their parents that was previously present and is now destroyed by the deed. Further, they have no superior sense of shame and dread of blame toward their parents that was previously present and is now destroyed by the deed. The Great Virtuous One says: paṇḍakas and the like, their afflictions being so excessive, are necessarily consigned to an unhappy destiny, and being so consigned, they incur no ānantarya crime. Question: if an animal kills its parent, is the ānantarya crime obtained? Answer: it is not,

— for why is this? It is such a being's very nature to have feeble resolve and strength, incapable of serving as a vessel for either restraint or non-restraint. The Venerable Vasumitra explains: animals, in killing a parent, do not obtain the ānantarya crime, for why is this? They have no love or reverence toward their parents that was previously present and is now destroyed by the deed. Further, they have no superior sense of shame and dread of blame toward their parents that was previously present and is now destroyed by the deed. The Great Virtuous One says: as for animals killing their parents, some obtain the ānantarya crime and some do not — namely, those of superior intelligence obtain it, while those not so intelligent do not. It has been heard that there was once an intelligent dragon-horse, whose pedigree a certain man, in his greed, caused to be mated with the horse's own mother; the horse, afterward realizing what had happened, castrated itself and died of grief. Question: as when, with a single preparatory action, one kills one's mother and another woman at the same time — the unmanifest karma involved has already been explained before; but as for the manifest karma, with respect to whom is it obtained? Answer: it is obtained with respect to the mother, for why is this? Because the ānantarya crime is the more weighty with respect to her. The Venerable Ghoṣa explains: manifest karma is composed of atomic particles, and the particles involved in killing the mother and in killing the other are distinct from one another, and hence the manifest crime is obtained with respect to both persons. Question: as when a woman conceives an embryo which, at the kalala stage, is then removed and placed within the body of another woman, and the child later born asks who counts as his mother — killing which of the two incurs the ānantarya crime? Answer: the former is the birth mother, the latter the nursing mother; only killing the birth mother incurs the ānantarya crime, since the embryo at the kalala stage depends upon the one who first conceived it — though in the ordinary conduct of life one should still consult and care for the nursing mother.

If one kills a non-mother while taking her for one's mother, or kills one's mother while taking her for a non-mother, in neither case is the ānantarya crime obtained; it is only when one kills one's mother while recognizing her as one's mother that the ānantarya crime is obtained — and the same should be understood for one's father and the others. Is there a case where killing a woman who is neither one's mother nor an arhat still incurs the ānantarya crime? Answer: there is — namely, killing a father who has changed sex to become female. Is there a case where killing a man who is neither one's father nor an arhat still incurs the ānantarya crime? Answer: there is — namely, killing a mother who has changed sex to become male. Question: if one's mother is an arhat, or one's father is an arhat, and one kills that single person, does one obtain only one ānantarya crime, or two? If it is said that only one is obtained, then how can betraying the kindness of nurturing and destroying a field of merit both be counted as one — and how then is the scriptural statement to be reconciled, where the Buddha says to Kokālika, "You have now obtained two ānantarya crimes — killing your father, and killing an arhat"? If it is said that two are obtained,

— then how can killing a single life produce two crimes? Answer: one should say that only one crime is obtained, since betraying the kindness of nurturing and destroying a field of merit both operate with respect to the very same single body. The sūtra ought properly to have said, "You have obtained the ānantarya crime through two conditions — killing your father, and killing an arhat" — and as for why it instead says "two crimes," this is in order to rebuke him with the weight of two crimes. Other masters say: although the crime's own substance is single, the suffering it brings about is doubled, and it is for this reason that "two" is spoken of.

Question: just as killing an arhat incurs the ānantarya crime, does killing a trainee likewise incur this crime? Answer: it does not, for why is this? As explained before, an ānantarya deed is obtained through two conditions — first, betraying the kindness of nurturing; second, destroying a field of merit. Killing a trainee does not constitute destroying a field of merit, since a trainee possesses both merit and fault, both good conduct and evil conduct, both wholesome roots and unwholesome roots. Question: if one kills someone who has fallen from the fruit of arhatship, does this incur the ānantarya crime? Answer: it does not, since such a person has thereby become a trainee once again, as explained before. Question: but at the very last moment before his life is cut off, he necessarily abides once more as an adept — why then does this not incur the ānantarya crime? Answer: because no malicious intent was directed at the adept's own body — that is, the murderous intent and preparatory action were directed only at the person's body while it was a trainee's, never at it as an adept's, and since the cause of an ānantarya deed is thus absent, the ānantarya crime is not obtained.

The Vinaya says: in the Sāla forest there was a great many bhikṣus who were killed by a band of robbers, their robes and belongings plundered; the local officials seized the robbers and sent them before the king, who ordered the law to be applied. Among them was one robber who fled to Jetavana and sought to go forth; at that time the community of bhikṣus, without carefully investigating, let him go forth and receive the full precepts. Later, when the executioner led the remaining robbers to the charnel ground to have them cut to pieces, the bhikṣus, hearing of it and wishing to know the loathsome nature of worldly things, all went together to watch, and the one newly gone forth was among them. Seeing the condemned men's limbs and joints hacked apart, each piece scattered in a different place, this newly ordained one was suddenly overcome with terror, fainted, and fell to the ground, and it was a long while before he revived. The assembly asked him why, and he answered, "The dead are my own former companions — I did this very deed together with them just yesterday. Had I not gone forth, I too would have met with this same suffering." Hearing this, the bhikṣus said to one another, "How should this evil man now be dealt with?" and went to report the matter to the Buddha. The Buddha said, "This man killed a company of bhikṣus and has obtained the ānantarya crime — he is not fit to go forth. If he has already gone forth, the community should expel him and not dwell together with him, for why is this? One who has committed an ānantarya deed can never cause any wholesome dharma to grow within my true Dharma and Vinaya." Question: since he did not know that one of them was an arhat, why does he obtain the ānantarya crime? Answer: it is not through knowing that the crime is obtained, but through destroying a field of merit that the crime is obtained — for, among that company of bhikṣus, he gave rise to an indiscriminate intention to kill them all alike, and it was by this most evil state of mind that he killed even an arhat among them, and hence he obtains the ānantarya crime.

Question: if one first commits another ānantarya deed and only afterward causes a schism in the saṅgha, and is then born in hell, which fruit does one experience first? If one first experiences the fruit of the other ānantarya deed, then the fruit of causing the schism would become a matter of some later ripening; but if one first experiences the fruit of causing the schism, then the fruit of the other ānantarya deed would become a matter of some later ripening.

Answer: if one first commits another ānantarya deed, one is thereafter unable to cause a schism in the saṅgha; but if one first causes a schism, one is thereafter still able to commit another ānantarya deed, and whatever one commits afterward is entirely swept up by the predominant power of the schism-crime, jointly bringing about the very same Avīci-hell fruit — the same holds, according to this pattern, for other evil conduct ripening in the very next life alongside an ānantarya deed. Moreover, if one first causes a schism and afterward commits another ānantarya deed, whatever one commits afterward is again entirely swept up by the predominant power of the schism-crime, jointly bringing about Avīci, up to and including the full experience of a single eon's lifespan-fruit, with no further increase of lifespan added — the length or shortness of lifespan for other evil conduct ripening in the very next life alongside an ānantarya deed is likewise to be understood according to this pattern. Question: if, on account of causing a schism, one is born in Avīci hell, and the universe is destroyed before one's lifespan there is exhausted, does one then die prematurely? If one dies prematurely, then how can the lifespan brought about by such an extremely grave karma be cut short partway? But if one does not die prematurely, then how does one not become an obstacle to the universe's own destruction — for the sūtra says that as long as even a single being remains in any place, that place does not yet come to destruction? Answer: if the lifespan is fixed, there is no premature death for such a being. Question: if so, then how does this not become an obstacle to the universe's destruction? Answer: such a being, by the power of that karma, is transferred to undergo this fate within the hell of some other universe — just as, within a royal capital, when a general amnesty is about to be granted, the gravest prisoners are first transferred to a distant prison, and only afterward is the amnesty released; it is just the same here. Some say: when this universe is about to be destroyed, if there are beings who have committed an ānantarya deed, it is simply the nature of things that, upon their death, they are no longer reborn in this universe at all, but are necessarily reborn within the hell of some other universe to undergo the fruit of that karma. Some say: when a universe is about to be destroyed, no being whatsoever commits such an extremely evil karma at that time.

Question: has anyone ever committed the full complement of all five ānantarya deeds? Some say: no one has, for why is this? This karma is so extremely grave that no vessel could possibly withstand and contain it in full. Other masters say: there has indeed been one who committed the full complement of five — as in the time of Kāśyapa Buddha, there was a bhikṣu named Puṣpottara, the son of Yaśottara, who committed the full complement of all five ānantarya deeds together with cutting off his own wholesome roots. Question: what is the difference between falling into hell through a single ānantarya deed and falling through the full complement of up to five? Answer: one who falls into hell through a single ānantarya deed has a body that is narrow and small, with fewer instruments of suffering, and the pain experienced is not of the most extreme intensity; but one who falls into hell through the full complement of up to five has a body that is vast and broad, with instruments of suffering multiplied, and the pain experienced is of the utmost, most extreme intensity.

Question: among the five ānantarya deeds, which is the heaviest? Answer: causing a schism in the harmonious saṅgha is heaviest, since it destroys the Dharma-body; next is drawing a buddha's blood; next is killing an arhat; next is killing one's mother; and last is killing one's father — since a mother's kindness in nurturing outweighs a father's, and the power of a field of merit exceeds that of a field of kindness. Question: the World-Honored One's own body of adept dharmas is what is properly called "the Buddha," and this cannot actually be harmed — so how can arousing malice and drawing blood incur the ānantarya crime? The Venerable Vasumitra explains: it is because one gives rise to a malicious intent wishing to destroy the very dharmas capable of accomplishing great awakening —

— that, although what is actually harmed is the born body, one still obtains the ānantarya crime with respect to it. Further, the adept dharmas that constitute the buddhas operate in dependence upon the born body, and if one destroys that which is depended upon, one should know that what depends upon it is likewise destroyed — just as, when a jar is broken, the milk within it is lost as well — and this is why the ānantarya crime is obtained. Question: given that arousing malice and drawing a buddha's blood incurs the ānantarya crime, is there a case of arousing malice without drawing blood that still incurs this same ānantarya crime? Answer: there is, and hence a tetralemma should be constructed. There is arousing malice and drawing a buddha's blood that does not incur the ānantarya crime — namely, arousing merely the intent to strike, from which blood happens to be drawn.

There is arousing malice without drawing blood that still incurs the ānantarya crime — namely, arousing the intent to kill, up to merely causing blood to shift position internally without emerging. There is arousing malice and drawing a buddha's blood that also incurs the ānantarya crime — namely, arousing the intent to kill and thereby drawing blood. And there is arousing malice without drawing blood that does not incur the ānantarya crime — namely, arousing merely the intent to strike, up to merely causing blood to shift position internally without emerging. Question: does a buddha's body have scars, blemishes, or the like? Answer: it does not, for why is this? Every tathāgata's major and minor marks are perfectly complete, his body hair and skin wondrously smooth and even, and hence there is no such thing as a scar or blemish upon it. Question: what karma brings about this fruit? Answer: it is that the Tathāgata, in ages past, throughout the three incalculable eons of cultivating the bodhisattva practices,

— whenever he saw any being whose body was maimed or incomplete, gave rise to deep compassion and skillfully worked to save and heal it, insisting that it be made whole; and whenever he saw an image of a buddha, a bodhisattva, or a noble monk, or a shrine, stūpa, or monastery that had fallen into disrepair or ruin, skillfully worked to restore it, insisting that it be returned to its original state — it is through this very karma that he now obtains such adorning major and minor marks, free of any scar or blemish.

Is there a case where one who has deliberately taken life, without ever afterward undertaking a vow of abstention, nonetheless obtains protection over every being whatsoever? Answer: there is — as when one, in the very midst of undertaking the preparatory action for killing, comes to realize the true nature of dharmas. This shows that it is not through undertaking the various precepts, but simply through entering the state of certainty as to what is right, that one obtains the restraint of non-doing, which is called protection. What is the matter here? The Cakya sūtra is the root source of this treatise. Long ago there was a member of the Śākya clan named Cakya, who had once been an ancestor of the World-Honored One's own household staff, and who, on account of some matter, fled and took up residence in the Himalayan region, where he raised sons and daughters, each numbering in the dozens. His family connections grew strong and his household splendid, and although his granaries overflowed, he made his living by hunting. Once, when all the young, vigorous men of the family had gone out on a hunt, the Blessed One, wishing to go to the heavenly palace to repay his mother's kindness by spending the rains retreat there and teaching the Dharma, first surveyed the world with his buddha-eye, lest there be any being he himself ought to go and personally deliver, for whom the failure to see the Buddha would mean losing the very moment of benefit. He thereupon saw Cakya and his household, whose wholesome roots had already ripened and whose time to see the truths had arrived. At that time the World-Honored One, in order to deliver them, vanished from where he was dwelling and appeared before their gate. The old father, seeing him from afar, knew at once that this was the Buddha, and joyfully went out to greet him, bowing in reverence, and said, "Noble son, what day is this, that you should descend to my house? Well-Gone One, Dharma-king, what day is this, that you should turn your regard upon me?" He then had the place swept and a clean seat arranged and adorned,

burned incense and scattered flowers, and invited the Buddha, the World-Honored One, to enter the house and take his seat. The old father then, together with the women of the household, bowed their heads at the Buddha's feet, and with palms joined in reverence, took whatever meat, dried or fresh and properly prepared, the household possessed, seasoned and flavored, and offered it to the World-Honored One. The World-Honored One then said, "No, no — the buddhas, the tathāgatas, do not eat flesh or blood." The old father and the women, upon hearing this command, withdrew in shame and sat down to one side,

— whereupon, some say, the Buddha simply passed that day without eating at all; others say he took food from the northern continent to sustain himself at midday. The Buddha then, in accordance with their receptivity, expounded the essentials of the Dharma, and the whole household, young and old alike, together realized freedom from birth, attained the fruit of stream-entry, and gave rise to the pure Dharma-eye, gazing up at the World-Honored One with deep-hearted joy. The Buddha, attending to the receptivity of the others, expounded the Dharma once more. Meanwhile, the young men, having caught and captured birds and deer, indulging freely in killing, set further snares and traps, and, carrying their meat, returned home; but when they reached the place where the women always came out to greet them, they were, on this day alone, strangely met by no one, and all thought to themselves that something unusual must have happened. Climbing to a height to look, they saw from afar, within the household, a being of extraordinary form, radiant with majestic splendor as if a tower of molten gold, with their father and the women gathered reverently around him, front and back — and, seeing this, they were filled with fury, saying to one another, "It must be on account of this one that we were not greeted!" Their rage growing intense, they did not even pause to set down their burdens, but seized their knives and advanced directly, intending to kill the Buddha. Their father cried out to them, "Stop, stop! This is the noble son, the Well-Gone One, the Dharma-king, come to deliver us — you should each rejoice in this fortune, and not give rise to any evil intent." Upon hearing this, the sons were all filled with remorse and shame, cast down their knives, set down their burdens, bowed their heads and begged forgiveness, and, with palms joined in reverence, sat down to one side. The Buddha, in accordance with their receptivity, expounded the essentials of the Dharma, and, hearing it, the sons too realized freedom from birth, attained the fruit of stream-entry, and gave rise to the pure Dharma-eye, gazing up at the World-Honored One with deep-hearted joy. Meanwhile, throughout the countless insects and deer of that forest and wilderness, though many struck the snares and traps and were killed or wounded, by the power of the noble path, the unmanifest karma of the path of killing was prevented from arising in the sons at all. Question: for killing what kind of being, at the stage of the preparatory action, can one still enter the noble path? Some say: only for killing animals and the like, not for killing a human. Some say: it extends to killing a human as well, excepting only the case where the preparatory action for an ānantarya deed has already been undertaken. This is why it is said: as when one, in the very midst of undertaking the preparatory action for killing, comes to realize the true nature of dharmas — if one thereby obtains protection over every being whatsoever, does one also thereby receive abstention with respect to every being? Answer: a tetralemma should be constructed. There is obtaining protection over every being without receiving abstention — as when one, without having undertaken the precepts, realizes the true nature of dharmas; this shows that one who has not received the prātimokṣa restraint is called one who has not undertaken the precepts. There is receiving abstention over every being without obtaining protection — as when one, having undertaken the precepts, still violates that abstention; this shows that, although one has received the prātimokṣa restraint, through improper attention

— and afflictions such as greed, one is unable to actually abstain from what one has vowed to protect. There is both obtaining protection over every being and receiving abstention — as when one, having undertaken the precepts, does not violate that abstention; this shows that one who has received the prātimokṣa restraint is further able to give proper attention and careful reflection, and would never deliberately violate it even for the sake of one's own life. As it has been heard: long ago there was a mendicant bhikṣu who, going on his alms-round from house to house in turn, came to the home of a jeweler,

just as that craftsman was drilling pearls for the king. Seeing the bhikṣu approach, he was pleased and took his own bowl to go inside and fetch him food. At that moment, the bhikṣu's robe, being red, caught the light of the sun and cast a red glow that reflected onto the precious pearls, making them appear the very same red color, and a goose nearby, mistaking one for a piece of flesh, thereupon swallowed it. The bhikṣu saw this happen but could not stop it in time.

The jeweler returned with the bowl filled with food, gave it to the bhikṣu, and, exchanging thanks, saw him off. Afterward, the man noticed one pearl was missing, and secretly suspected that the bhikṣu had stolen it and carried it off; he at once ran after him, seized him, and dragged him back, rebuking him, "Ascetic, you are a son of the Śākyas — how can you be so without shame as to steal a pearl belonging to my king?" The bhikṣu answered, "I have done no such thing." The man thought to himself, "If I do not treat him harshly, I shall never recover the pearl,"

and thereupon beat and tortured him until blood flowed from every wound. The very goose that had swallowed the pearl then came and licked at the blood, and the man, in his fury, struck it with his staff, killing it on the spot. The bhikṣu then asked to see whether the goose was alive or dead. The man snapped at him, "Let us settle the matter of the pearl — what has the goose to do with it?" But the bhikṣu insisted, and the man at last looked and reported that it was dead. The bhikṣu then told him, "The goose swallowed your pearl." The man did not believe him, still suspecting this to be a mere pretext,

but the bhikṣu said, "I truly saw it swallow the pearl." The man thereupon took his knife and cut open the goose's belly, and there within its stomach found the lost pearl. Overcome with shame, grief, and joy all at once, he bowed and thanked the bhikṣu, saying, "Venerable one, why did you not show me sooner, and spare me this foolish blindness? I have tortured your own body and committed this evil deed, and shall suffer for it through the long night of saṃsāra with no end in sight." The bhikṣu told him, "I have undertaken the precepts of restraint — I would sooner give up my own body and life than harm even the egg of an ant. Had I told you sooner, you would certainly have killed the goose to recover it — and how could failing to protect a living being ever be called upholding the precepts?" A person of this kind is called one who obtains protection over beings and also receives abstention. There is what is neither obtaining protection over every being nor receiving abstention — namely, whatever falls outside the categories just named. "The categories just named" are as explained in full above — that is, apart from persons who possess all three restraints and gods who possess two restraints, taking the remainder of humans and gods, and the whole of the other destinies, all of this together constitutes the fourth case, and hence it is said, "whatever falls outside the categories just named." There are four kinds of restraint called protection: first, prātimokṣa restraint; second, dhyāna restraint; third, undefiled restraint; fourth, cutting-off restraint. Prātimokṣa restraint is desire-realm moral discipline; dhyāna restraint is form-realm moral discipline; undefiled restraint is undefiled moral discipline;

— and cutting-off restraint takes a small portion from within each of the two restraints, dhyāna and undefiled: within the nine uninterrupted paths that free one from the defilements of the desire realm, the worldly accompanying precept is included within two restraints, namely dhyāna restraint and cutting-off restraint; the undefiled accompanying precept is likewise included within two restraints, namely undefiled restraint and cutting-off restraint. Question: why is it only this portion that is called cutting-off restraint? Answer: because it alone is capable of serving as the antidote that cuts off both precept-breaking itself and the afflictions that give rise to precept-breaking, for why is this? Within the first eight of the nine uninterrupted paths, the two accompanying precepts serve as the antidote that cuts off only the afflictions that give rise to precept-breaking; but within the ninth uninterrupted path, the two accompanying precepts serve as the antidote that cuts off both precept-breaking itself and the afflictions that give rise to it. Hence a tetralemma should be constructed comparing dhyāna and undefiled restraint against cutting-off restraint. As to dhyāna restraint compared against cutting-off restraint: there is what is dhyāna restraint but not cutting-off restraint — namely, apart from the worldly accompanying precept within the nine uninterrupted paths that free one from the defilements of the desire realm, all other worldly accompanying precepts. There is what is cutting-off restraint but not dhyāna restraint — namely, the undefiled accompanying precept within the nine uninterrupted paths that free one from the defilements of the desire realm. There is what is both dhyāna restraint and cutting-off restraint — namely, the worldly accompanying precept within the nine uninterrupted paths that free one from the defilements of the desire realm. And there is what is neither dhyāna restraint nor cutting-off restraint — namely, apart from the undefiled accompanying precept within the nine uninterrupted paths that free one from the defilements of the desire realm, all other undefiled accompanying precepts. As to undefiled restraint compared against cutting-off restraint: there is what is undefiled restraint but not cutting-off restraint — namely, apart from the undefiled accompanying precept within the nine uninterrupted paths that free one from the defilements of the desire realm, all other undefiled accompanying precepts. There is what is cutting-off restraint

— but not undefiled restraint — namely, the worldly accompanying precept within the nine uninterrupted paths that free one from the defilements of the desire realm. There is what is both undefiled restraint

— and cutting-off restraint — namely, the undefiled accompanying precept within the nine uninterrupted paths that free one from the defilements of the desire realm. And there is what is neither undefiled restraint nor cutting-off restraint — namely, apart from the worldly accompanying precept within the nine uninterrupted paths that free one from the defilements of the desire realm, all other worldly accompanying precepts.

Question: of these four restraints, who possesses how many? Answer: some possess only one — namely, any one of the remaining three restraints apart from cutting-off restraint, though no one possesses cutting-off restraint alone. Some possess two — namely, either prātimokṣa and dhyāna restraint, or dhyāna and undefiled restraint, or dhyāna and cutting-off restraint, though no one possesses undefiled and cutting-off restraint alone together. Some possess three — namely, either prātimokṣa, dhyāna, and undefiled restraint, or prātimokṣa, dhyāna, and cutting-off restraint, or dhyāna, undefiled, and cutting-off restraint, though no one possesses prātimokṣa, undefiled, and cutting-off restraint together without dhyāna restraint. And some possess the full complement of all four. Here, one who possesses only prātimokṣa restraint is an ordinary being born in the desire realm who has undertaken the precepts but has not yet attained a wholesome mind of the form realm. One who possesses only dhyāna restraint is an ordinary being born in the desire realm who has not undertaken the precepts, who has attained a wholesome mind of the form realm yet is still fully bound by the fetters, or who is born in the second, third, or fourth dhyāna. One who possesses only undefiled restraint is a noble one born in the formless realm. One who possesses both prātimokṣa and dhyāna restraint is an ordinary being born in the desire realm who has undertaken the precepts and attained a wholesome mind of the form realm yet is still fully bound by the fetters. One who possesses both dhyāna and undefiled restraint is a noble one born in the desire realm who has not undertaken the precepts and has not yet become free of the desire realm's defilements, or who is born in the second, third, or fourth dhyāna. One who possesses both dhyāna and cutting-off restraint is an ordinary being born in the desire realm who has not undertaken the precepts and has become free of the desire realm's defilements to any of the nine grades, or who is born in the first dhyāna. One who possesses prātimokṣa, dhyāna, and undefiled restraint is a noble one born in the desire realm who has undertaken the precepts and has not yet become free of the desire realm's defilements. One who possesses prātimokṣa, dhyāna, and cutting-off restraint is an ordinary being born in the desire realm who has undertaken the precepts and has become free of the desire realm's defilements to any of the nine grades. One who possesses dhyāna, undefiled, and cutting-off restraint is a noble one born in the desire realm who has not undertaken the precepts and has become free of the desire realm's defilements to any of the nine grades, or who is born in the first dhyāna. And one who possesses the full complement of all four is a noble one born in the desire realm who has undertaken the precepts and has become free of the desire realm's defilements to any of the nine grades.

Question: of these four restraints, how many follow the mind, and how many do not follow the mind? Answer: three follow the mind, and one does not follow the mind — namely, prātimokṣa restraint. Question: why does prātimokṣa restraint not follow the mind? Answer: prātimokṣa restraint is coarse and heavy, while

— the mind-following restraints are subtle and light. Some say: prātimokṣa restraint can be damaged and overcome by evil moral conduct, while the mind-following restraints cannot be damaged and overcome by evil moral conduct. Some say: prātimokṣa restraint can be damaged and overcome by evil intention and malicious intention, while the mind-following restraints cannot be damaged and overcome by these. Some say: prātimokṣa restraint operates with a sluggish, dull efficacy,

— not matching the mind, while the mind-following restraints operate with a swift, sharp efficacy that matches the mind. Some say: prātimokṣa restraint depends upon manifest karma, while the mind-following restraints depend upon unmanifest karma. Some say: prātimokṣa restraint is the fruit of manifest karma, while the mind-following restraints are the fruit of unmanifest karma. Some say: prātimokṣa restraint depends upon manifest karma and is the fruit of manifest karma, while the mind-following restraints depend upon mind and are the fruit of mind.

Some say: prātimokṣa restraint is obtained by depending upon the harmonious assembly of the monastic community, while the mind-following restraints are obtained solely by depending upon the Dharma.

Some say: prātimokṣa restraint is obtained by depending upon another, while the mind-following restraints are obtained by depending upon oneself. Some say: prātimokṣa restraint does not arise, abide, and cease as one with the mind, while the mind-following restraints do arise, abide, and cease as one with the mind. Some say: prātimokṣa restraint does not share a single fruit, a single outflow, and a single ripening with the mind, while the mind-following restraints do share a single fruit, a single outflow, and a single ripening with the mind. Some say: prātimokṣa restraint does not arise together with the mind, while the mind-following restraints do arise together with the mind. Some say: it stands to reason that a mind-following dharma should be exactly this way — if the mind is wholesome, it too is wholesome, and likewise if unwholesome or neutral. But prātimokṣa restraint is wholesome alone, and if it followed the mind, then, when a wholesome mind arises, it could indeed follow along —

— but when an unwholesome or neutral mind arises, it would then have to be cut off. Some say: it stands to reason that a mind-following dharma should be exactly this way — if the mind is of the desire realm, it too is of the desire realm, and likewise if it is of the form or formless realm or unbound. But prātimokṣa restraint is of the desire realm alone, and if it followed the mind, then, when a mind of the desire realm arises, it could indeed follow along, but when a mind of the form or formless realm or an unbound mind arises, it would then have to be cut off. Some say: it stands to reason that a mind-following dharma should be exactly this way — if the mind is that of a trainee, it too is that of a trainee, and likewise if it is that of an adept or of one who is neither trainee nor adept. But prātimokṣa restraint

— is that of one who is neither trainee nor adept alone, and if it followed the mind, then, when a mind of one neither trainee nor adept arises, it could indeed follow along, but when the mind of a trainee or an adept arises, it would then have to be cut off. Some say: it stands to reason that a mind-following dharma should be exactly this way — if the mind is abandoned by seeing, it too is abandoned by seeing, and likewise if abandoned by cultivation or not to be abandoned. But prātimokṣa restraint is abandoned by cultivation alone, and if it followed the mind, then, when a mind abandoned by cultivation arises, it could indeed follow along, but when a mind abandoned by seeing, or a mind not to be abandoned, arises, it would then have to be cut off. Some say: if prātimokṣa restraint followed the mind, it ought to be cultivated in the future and possessed in the future, yet prātimokṣa restraint has no future cultivation and no future possession. Some say: if this prātimokṣa restraint followed the mind, it ought to be impossible to speak of one's seniority or juniority in the precepts, counted from the time one has abided in them. Some say: if this restraint followed the mind, it ought to be impossible to speak of the fixed hierarchy among the grades of precepts. Some say: if this prātimokṣa restraint followed the mind, it ought not to be given up through the four or five conditions — the four conditions being, first, giving up one's training; second, a change of sex; third, cutting off one's wholesome roots; fourth, giving up one's class-nature; and the five conditions being these same four, together with the ending of the night before the ordination-day cutoff. Some say: if this prātimokṣa restraint followed the mind, then one would have to obtain it at the very moment one descends from a higher realm and is reborn in the desire realm, and if so, there would then be no threefold distinction at all among abiding in restraint, abiding in non-restraint, and abiding in neither. Some say: if prātimokṣa restraint followed the mind, it could exist only when mind is present and would have to be cut off when mind is absent — and it is precisely in order to avoid all these various faults that prātimokṣa restraint does not follow the mind. Question: for one abiding in prātimokṣa restraint, when he transgresses a precept, does he give up his restraint or not? The foreign masters say: he gives up his restraint and obtains a state that is neither restraint nor non-restraint; and when he confesses openly, with a mind free of concealment, and properly repents and removes the fault, he then gives up this state of neither restraint nor non-restraint and regains restraint. If one holds this account, it is indeed well reconciled — confessing openly and repenting does restore one to abiding in restraint, and the formal act of repentance and removal is not without effect. Other masters say: when he transgresses a precept, he gives up his restraint and obtains a state that is neither restraint nor non-restraint; and when he confesses openly, with a mind free of concealment, and properly repents and removes the fault, he then gives up this state of neither restraint nor non-restraint, yet still does not thereby regain restraint. Question: but then how is the statement that confessing openly and repenting restores one to abiding in restraint to be reconciled — is proper repentance and removal of fault then without effect after all? Answer: abiding in a wholesome intention is what is called abiding in restraint, and at that moment one has given up one's evil intention

and given rise to a wholesome intention, and hence it is not without effect — yet in actual fact, at this stage, one does not truly regain restraint. Some further say: when he transgresses a precept,

— his present restraint is cut off, and he obtains a state that is neither restraint nor non-restraint, yet he still possesses his past restraint; and when he confesses openly with a mind free of concealment and so forth, it is as in the second account above. Some say: when he transgresses a precept, it is cut off for the very first moment, and afterward continues once more. The treatise-masters of Kashmir say: when he transgresses a precept, he does not give up his restraint at all, yet he obtains a state that is neither restraint nor non-restraint,

— and hence, at that time, he is called both one abiding in neither restraint nor non-restraint, and also one abiding in restraint. When he confesses openly with a mind free of concealment and properly repents and removes the fault, he then gives up the state of neither restraint nor non-restraint, and is called simply one abiding in restraint — just as a wealthy man, when he owes another a debt, is called both a debtor and a wealthy man, but once he has repaid the debt, he is called simply a wealthy man. If one holds this account, it is indeed well reconciled — confessing openly and repenting does restore one to abiding in restraint, and the formal act of repentance and removal is not without effect. Question: how is wholesome moral discipline able to overcome unwholesome moral discipline? Answer: because it is accompanied by the mind of vowed acceptance, even a beginningless habituation to every kind of unwholesome moral discipline can be swept away the instant wholesome discipline is undertaken —

— just as, in a room where darkness has accumulated for a long time, the very instant a bright lamp arrives, the darkness is at once dispelled; or just as, when one has long grown accustomed to the notion of blandness, the very instant one tastes salt, that notion is at once dispelled. It is just the same with wholesome moral discipline overcoming the unwholesome, and one should understand that the path overcoming the afflictions works in exactly the same way.