Are Conditions Even Real?
Fascicle 131 closes the merit-in-giving narrative with the householder Ugra's equanimous giving and the equal merit of Sujātā's milk-porridge and Cunda's final meal, then opens the Condition Nyāsa, refuting the Dṛṣṭāntikas' denial that causal conditions are real and building an exhaustive catalog of causal relations across the great elements, derived form, mind, and the twenty-two faculties. This page carries Ru-Yi's complete translation.
Translation Method
The Chinese source is Xuánzàng's seventh-century translation of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), preserved in the Taishō canon (T1545, vol. 27) via the CBETA digital edition — public domain text, translated directly from the Chinese. The English wording throughout is Ru-Yi's own, and the reading notes are original, grounded in standard Sarvāstivāda scholarship rather than a specific named commentator's lecture transcript.
Fascicle 131 closes the Great-Elements-and-Derivatives Nyāsa (大造納息第一之五) and opens the Condition Nyāsa (緣納息第二之一). Terms established across fascicles 93–130 recur here and are not re-explained at each occurrence.
Classical text is set in the left-hand column below, our English in the right.
1. Who Was the Deva in the Sky? And Two Kinds of 'Approaching Stream-Entry'
Fascicle 131 opens by completing the merit-in-giving arc from the previous fascicle: the householder Ugra tells the Buddha that a deity once whispered to him, while he served food, exactly which recipient held which fruit of the path — yet he gave with an equal heart throughout regardless. Competing theories identify the deity as a Māra obstructing his virtue, a deceptive ghost, a deity he regularly worshipped, or a deceased relative reborn as a god. A careful distinction then separates two senses of "approaching stream-entry" — the merely conventional stage even a deity could perceive, and the ultimate stage occurring within the swift, imperceptible path of seeing itself, illustrated by the Buddha's own rebuke of the monk Bāhiya's hesitation.
大種蘊第五中大造納息第一之五如契經說。鄔揭羅長者白佛言。世尊。我於一時自手執杓施僧飲食時。有天神空中語我。長者當知。此阿羅漢果。此阿羅漢向此不還果。此不還向。此一來果。此一來向。此預流果。此預流向。此持此犯。我於爾時雖聞彼語。自省無有不平等心。於僧眾中等心而施。問彼天神者為是誰耶。復何因緣來語長者。答有作是說。是魔眾天欲為長者善品留難。有說。是鬼以虛誑言惑亂長者。有餘師說。彼是長者常所祭天故來空中。示導長者福田差別。有餘復言。
Fifth Aggregate, the Great Elements: the Great-Elements-and-Derivatives Nyāsa, Chapter One, Part Five. As the sūtra says: the householder Ugra told the Buddha, "World-Honored One, once, while I myself, ladle in hand, was giving food and drink to the community, a deity in the sky spoke to me, saying, 'Householder, you should know — this one has the fruit of arhatship; this one approaches arhatship; this one has the fruit of non-returning; this one approaches non-returning; this one has the fruit of once-returning; this one approaches once-returning; this one has the fruit of stream-entry; this one approaches stream-entry; this one keeps the precepts purely; this one violates them.' Though I heard these words at that time, I examined myself and found no partiality in my own mind, and gave to the assembly of monks with an equal heart throughout." Question: who was this deity, and for what reason did it come to speak to the householder? Some say: it was a deity of Māra's own host, wishing to create an obstacle to the householder's own wholesome practice. Others say: it was a ghost, seeking to confuse the householder with false words. Other masters say: it was a deity the householder regularly made offerings to, who came into the sky to show him the distinctions among the various fields of merit. Others, further, say:
彼是長者過去親屬生在天中。以誠實言汲引長者。問若是長者過去親屬於預流向云何能知。見道迅速非其境故。答預流向有二種。一者世俗。二者勝義。得順決擇分名為世俗。已入見道名為勝義。住世俗向是彼天境。若勝義向舍利子等。尚不盡知況彼天等。彼天所示但是世俗。能受長者所施食故。亦有餘經說勝義向。如世尊告婆拕梨言。若有苾芻是俱解脫。我設告彼汝來以身於此濘渠為我作彴。婆拕梨聽於意云何。彼聞我命為拒逆不。將登躡時為退避不正踐蹈時為轉側不。婆拕梨曰不也。世尊復告婆拕梨。置俱解脫。若有苾芻是慧解脫。我設告彼乃至廣說。復置慧解脫說於身證。復置身證說於見至。復置見至說信勝解置信勝解說隨法行。置隨法行說隨信行。佛問彼答一一如前。有說。此經亦說世俗預流果向。以見道中不能聽受佛語義故。評曰此中說勝義向於理為善。以說隨信隨法行故。問住見道時無能聽受。佛說義者無異心故。如何世尊以言告彼。答世尊依彼志樂而說。無如是事為分別故。假在見道有異分心。能受如來此言義者。必捨見道作所勅事。佛意呵責婆拕梨言。
— this was a deity who had been the householder's own relative in a past life, reborn among the gods, come to guide the householder with truthful words. Question: if this was the householder's own past relative, how could it know one approaching stream-entry, given that the path of seeing occurs too swiftly to be its object? Answer: "approaching stream-entry" is of two kinds — the conventional, and the ultimate. Attaining the wholesome roots conducive to liberation is called the conventional; already having entered the path of seeing is called the ultimate. It is the conventional approacher who falls within that deity's own range; even the ultimate approacher is not fully known even by Śāriputra and others like him, let alone by that deity — what the deity indicated was only the conventional kind, since such a one is still capable of receiving the householder's own offered food. There is, however, another sūtra passage that does speak of the ultimate approacher — as when the World-Honored One told Bāhiya, "Were there a bhikṣu doubly liberated, and were I to tell him, 'Come, use your own body to serve as a footbridge for me across this muddy channel' — Bāhiya, listen, what do you think? Upon hearing my command, would he refuse? When about to step upon him, would he draw back? When actually being trodden upon, would he flinch?" Bāhiya answered, "He would not." The World-Honored One then told Bāhiya, "Set aside the doubly liberated — were there a bhikṣu liberated through wisdom alone, were I to tell him," and so on in full; "set aside the wisdom-liberated, and speak of the body-witness; set aside the body-witness, and speak of the view-attainer; set aside the view-attainer, and speak of one resolved through faith; set aside one resolved through faith, and speak of one following the Dharma; set aside one following the Dharma, and speak of one following faith" — the Buddha asking, and Bāhiya answering, each in turn just as before. Some say: this sūtra, too, speaks only of the conventional approacher to the fruit of stream-entry, since one in the very midst of the path of seeing is incapable of hearing and receiving the Buddha's own spoken meaning. The verdict: it is better to say this passage speaks of the ultimate approacher, since it speaks of one following faith and one following the Dharma specifically. Question: while abiding in the path of seeing, one is incapable of receiving anything, the Buddha's own spoken meaning included, since one's mind admits of no other object at that time — how, then, could the World-Honored One address him with such words? Answer: the World-Honored One spoke according to that person's own aspiration, there being no actual instance of this occurring, spoken only for the sake of analysis — for, were one within the path of seeing to have a differently-directed mind capable of receiving the Tathāgata's own spoken meaning, he would necessarily have already left the path of seeing to carry out what was commanded. The Buddha's own intent was to rebuke Bāhiya, saying,
The rebuke of Bāhiya works by a striking rhetorical device: rather than describing what a true path-of-seeing practitioner's obedience would look like, the Buddha instead asks Bāhiya to imagine himself commanded to serve as a literal human footbridge, and to judge for himself whether such a person would flinch — turning an abstract question about spiritual attainment into a vivid, almost uncomfortable thought experiment about total, unhesitating submission.
2. Why Ugra Gave with an Equal Heart, Regardless What the Deva Revealed
A rich cascade of reasons is offered for why the householder maintained equanimity in giving despite the deity's revelations: the whole assembly was gathered by his own single summons and so deserved equal treatment; all recipients equally have their hunger relieved; his intent was only to benefit others, never himself; partiality risks breeding attachment or aversion that would undermine his own purity as a donor; he followed the Buddha's own teaching on the five faults of favoring a single recipient; he expected no personal reward since any fruit would ripen only in a realm he hoped to leave; he revered renunciants for relinquishing what he himself, though advanced in practice, still could not; he valued the shared outward form all monastics present to the world regardless of inner virtue; he felt gratitude toward the Dharma as a whole; and he wished to demonstrate that his own settled wisdom could not be swayed by a deity's revelation.
住見道中尚從我命。況汝遠離一切功德。而於我所生違逆心。是故此中說勝義向問長者何故雖聞天語。猶於僧中平等心施。有說。僧眾皆是長者一揵椎聲所召集故。彼作是念。此皆是我一揵椎聲之所召集。無宜於此不等心施。有說。僧眾受此飲食皆除飢渴無差別故。彼作是念。我施飲食為除飢渴。如阿羅漢受我施已飢渴得除。
— "even one abiding in the path of seeing would still obey my command — how much more should you, so far removed from every virtue, give rise to a mind of resistance against me?" — and it is for this reason that this passage speaks of the ultimate approacher. Question: why did the householder, though he heard the deity's words, still give with an equal heart throughout the assembly? Some say: the entire assembly had been gathered by this single sound of his own gong, and he reflected, "All of these were gathered here by this one sound of my own gong — it would not be fitting to give unequally among them." Others say: the assembly, receiving this food and drink, alike have their hunger and thirst removed, without distinction, and he reflected, "I give food and drink in order to remove hunger and thirst — just as an arhat, receiving my offering, has his hunger and thirst removed,
具縛異生受我飲食亦復如是。無宜於此不等心施。有說。長者施僧飲食本意但欲饒益他故。彼作是念。我施飲食為饒益他不欲自利。
— so too does a fully-fettered ordinary being, receiving my offering, have his removed in just the same way — it would not be fitting to give unequally among them." Others say: the householder's original intent in giving food and drink to the community was solely to benefit others, and he reflected, "I give food and drink in order to benefit others, not to benefit myself —
如阿羅漢受我飲食所得饒益。毀戒亦然。是故我今應等心施有說。
— just as an arhat, receiving my food and drink, obtains benefit from it, so too does one who has violated the precepts — and hence I should now give with an equal heart." Others say:
長者避愛恚故彼作是念。若施不等僧或於我起愛恚心。由此當招不如意果。我即於彼便作怨讎。何得名為真淨施主。有說。長者隨佛教故彼作是念。如來常說若有於一補特伽羅偏心敬養有五過失。若有一失尚不應為何況於五。有說。長者不望報故。彼作是念。施果異熟唯欲界受。我若命終當生色界。施果於我便為無益。設當有益尚不希求況復無益。故我但應平等心施。有說。長者敬出家故彼作是念。我離欲染得不還果。猶於居家眷屬珍財不能棄捨。諸出家者雖有具縛。而於居家眷屬財產能棄能捨能不積集。受佛禁戒盡壽修行。純一圓滿清淨梵行。設有失念毀犯戒者。深生慚恥常希清淨。
— the householder gave with an equal heart in order to avoid attachment and aversion, reflecting, "Should I give unequally, some among the community might give rise to attachment or aversion toward me on that account, bringing about an undesired result, and I would thereby become their own enemy — how, then, could I be called a truly pure donor?" Others say: the householder followed the Buddha's own teaching, reflecting, "The Tathāgata has always taught that showing partial devotion and reverence toward a single person carries five faults — and if even one fault ought not to be risked, how much less all five?" Others say: the householder gave without hoping for reward, reflecting, "The ripening-fruit of giving is experienced only within the desire realm — and, should I die and be reborn in the form realm, the fruit of my giving would then bring me no benefit at all; and, even were there benefit, I should not seek it for its own sake, let alone when there is none — and hence I should simply give with an equal heart." Others say: the householder revered renunciants, reflecting, "Though I have become free of the desire realm's defilement and attained the fruit of non-returning, I am still unable to give up my own household relations and possessions — yet renunciants, though they may still be fully fettered, are capable of giving up, relinquishing, and refraining from accumulating household relations and property, undertaking the Buddha's own precepts and practicing them for their entire lives, in pure, complete, undefiled conduct; and, should any of them, through a lapse of mindfulness, violate a precept, they still feel deep shame over it, and constantly aspire to purity —
若在居家不能如是。故我於此應等心施。有說。長者重儀相。故彼作是念。諸出家人剃髮染衣。儀相同佛持戒破戒。俱令世間瞻覩生福。為作福田故我於中應等心施。有說。長者荷佛恩故彼作是念。
— whereas, remaining a householder, I myself am incapable of this — and hence I should give with an equal heart toward them all." Others say: the householder valued the outward form of renunciation, reflecting, "Renunciants, with shaved heads and dyed robes, share an outward form resembling the Buddha's own — and, whether precept-keeping or precept-violating, this same outward form alike causes the world, upon seeing it, to generate merit, serving as a field of merit for all — and hence I should give with an equal heart among them." Others say: the householder felt gratitude for the Buddha's own kindness, reflecting,
我依佛法獲得忍智。金剛杵劍摧破二十身見山峯。斷截無邊惡趣根本。作有邊際定趣涅槃。於四諦中慧眼清淨。盡下分結出欲淤泥。
— "Relying on the Buddha's own Dharma, I have obtained forbearance and wisdom, and, with the vajra club and sword, have shattered the twenty peaks of the mountain of self-view, severed the boundless root of the evil destinies, set a definite limit on my own future existence and set out toward nirvāṇa, purified my wisdom-eye with respect to the four truths, exhausted the lower-portion fetters, and emerged from the mire of desire —
故我不應於佛弟子。心不平等而行惠施。有說。長者顯自所得覺慧堅牢不可轉故。彼作是念。我慧堅牢豈隨天言輕有轉變。故於僧眾施心平等。顯己如是故來白佛。
— and hence I ought not to give with a partial mind toward the Buddha's own disciples." Others say: the householder wished to show that his own attained wisdom was so firm and unshakable that it could not be swayed, reflecting, "My wisdom is firm and steadfast — how could it be lightly overturned by a mere deity's words?" — and it was in order to display this steadfastness in his own giving toward the community that he came to tell the Buddha of this matter.
The sheer number of independently sufficient reasons offered — ten or more, none contradicting the others — for a single, simple act of equanimous giving suggests the treatise finds something genuinely overdetermined and admirable in Ugra's response: rather than settling on the one true motive, it treats his equanimity as robust enough to survive being explained a dozen different ways, each account illuminating a different facet of what made his gift exemplary.
3. Two Gifts, One Fruit: Sujātā's Milk-Porridge and Cunda's Final Meal
A related sūtra passage teaches that two specific acts of giving food yield exactly equal, undifferentiated merit: the milk-porridge Sujātā and her sister offered the bodhisattva just before his awakening, and Cunda's final meal offered to the Buddha just before his parinirvāṇa — despite the first recipient still harboring greed, hatred, and delusion, and the second having already exhausted them entirely. The resolution locates the equalizing factor differently in each case: the sisters' own exalted intention compensated for an as-yet-unawakened field, while the supreme excellence of the field itself — the Buddha on the verge of final nirvāṇa — compensated for Cunda's own grief-stricken, less exalted state of mind.
如契經中佛告慶喜。施食有二果無差別。一者菩薩受彼食已。證得無上正等菩提。二者如來受彼食已。入於無餘大涅槃界。問初受食者有貪瞋癡。後受食者貪瞋癡盡。何緣施果無差別耶。答由思及田有偏勝故。佛依偏勝說果無差。謂初難陀難陀跋羅姊妹二人。聞說菩薩受十六轉甘味乳糜。必當得成無上等覺。歡喜踊躍發殊勝思。
As the sūtra says: the Buddha told Ānanda that two acts of giving food yield equal, undifferentiated fruit — first, when the bodhisattva, having received that food, went on to realize unsurpassed, perfect awakening; and second, when the Tathāgata, having received that food, entered the great realm of nirvāṇa without remainder. Question: the first recipient still had greed, hatred, and delusion, while the second recipient had already exhausted them — why, then, is the resulting fruit of giving undifferentiated? Answer: it is on account of the excellence of either the donor's intention or the field, whichever predominates in each case — the Buddha speaks of the undifferentiated fruit with reference to whichever of these two predominates. As to the first: the two sisters, Nandā and Nandabalā, having heard that the bodhisattva, upon receiving sixteen portions of sweet milk-porridge, would certainly attain unsurpassed, perfect awakening, were filled with joy and gave rise to an especially exalted intention,
持上乳糜奉施菩薩。菩薩食已即於是夜。降伏魔軍成等正覺。女聞倍喜更起勝思。彼所施田雖非殊勝。由思勝故能招勝果。准陀於佛將涅槃時。見佛身形少如衰變。又聞不久必入涅槃。戀慕不堪其心擾亂。殊勝思願不能現前。然由勝田能招勝果。佛依此故說無差別。有作是說。欲遮准陀變悔心故。如彼經說。佛告阿難。若彼准陀工巧之子。或他所引或自尋思。於施食中而生變悔。於難得事便為不得。難得事者所謂諸佛將涅槃時最後供養。彼若生變悔者。汝便應以六處而勸喻之。謂施食因緣能招長壽。色力樂譽富貴臣僚。
— and offered the milk-porridge to the bodhisattva. The bodhisattva, having eaten it, that very night subdued Māra's army and achieved perfect awakening — and, upon hearing this, the sisters rejoiced all the more, giving rise to an even more exalted intention. Though the field they gave to was not, at that moment, itself supreme, it was on account of their exalted intention that they obtained a supreme fruit. As to the second: Cunda, at the time the Buddha was about to enter nirvāṇa, saw the Buddha's own body showing slight signs of decline, and, hearing that he would soon enter nirvāṇa, was so overcome with longing and grief that his mind became disturbed, unable to summon an equally exalted intention — yet it was on account of the supreme field itself that he obtained a supreme fruit. It is with reference to this that the Buddha speaks of the undifferentiated fruit. Some say: this was spoken in order to forestall any regret arising in Cunda's own mind — as that sūtra says, the Buddha told Ānanda, "Should this Cunda, the craftsman's son, whether prompted by another or reflecting on his own, come to feel regret over his own act of giving food, thinking that he had failed to make the most of a rare and precious opportunity" — such a rare opportunity being the final offering made just before a buddha's own entry into nirvāṇa — "then, should he feel such regret, you should console him with six considerations: that the causes and conditions of giving food are capable of bringing about long life, beauty, strength, happiness, renown, wealth, and eminent office —
Locating the source of equal merit in different places for each gift — donor intention in one case, recipient excellence in the other — quietly resolves what looks like a troubling asymmetry: rather than requiring both factors to be equally present in every meritorious gift, the treatise treats intention and field as two independent paths to the same result, either one alone sufficient to reach the ultimate ceiling of merit when the other happens to fall short.
4. A Cascade of Equivalences: Crossing the Same River Twice, By Two Different Roads
An extraordinary list of paired metaphors explains, from every possible angle, why the two gifts are equal: at the first reception he attained the Dharma, at the second he made use of it; at the first he crossed the river of affliction, at the second the river of birth-and-death; at the first he dried up affliction's ocean, at the second birth-and-death's ocean — and so on through uprooting each one's tree, breaking each one's mountain, transcending each one's floods, yokes, clingings, bonds, and hindrances, and finally defeating, at the first reception, the Māras of affliction and of the sovereign gods, and, at the second, the Māras of the aggregates and of death itself.
我從世尊親聞是事。施食有二果無差別。一者菩薩受彼食已。證得無上正等菩提。二者如來受彼食已。入於無餘大涅槃界。復應告彼准陀。當知於施食中。若生變悔汝於如是難得事中便為不得。如失菩薩將成佛。時奉施乳糜。所生勝福慎莫變悔。由此故言二果無別。有說。二時俱能資益離染身故。謂食於消化時能作食事。佛於後夜成正覺時。彼食消化如成正覺。涅槃亦爾。故說二施果無差別。有說。初受食已證得佛法。後受食已受用佛法。得修習修說亦如是。有說。初受食已便入一切靜慮解脫等持等至。後受食已亦入一切靜慮解脫等持等至。有說。初受食已渡煩惱河。後受食已渡生死河。有說。初受食已涸煩惱海。後受食已涸生死海。如是拔煩惱樹。拔生死樹。破煩惱山。破生死山。越煩惱依。越生死依。說亦如是。有說。初受食已棄捨集諦。後受食已棄捨苦諦。有說。初受食已證入道諦。後受食已證入滅諦。有說。初受食已捨集入道。後受食已捨苦入滅。有說。初受食已超越諸漏。後受食已超順漏法。
— and that I myself have personally heard this from the World-Honored One: two acts of giving food yield equal, undifferentiated fruit — first, when the bodhisattva, having received that food, went on to realize unsurpassed, perfect awakening; and second, when the Tathāgata, having received that food, entered the great realm of nirvāṇa without remainder. You should further tell Cunda that, should he feel regret over his own act of giving food, he would thereby fail to make the most of just such a rare and precious opportunity — like the milk-porridge offered to the bodhisattva just before he became a buddha, this excellent merit he has generated should never be regretted, for this very reason it is said that the two fruits are undifferentiated." Others say: both moments alike sustain a body about to become free of defilement, since eating accomplishes the function of nutriment precisely at the moment of digestion — and, just as the Buddha achieved perfect awakening in the latter part of that night, that food's own digestion coincided with his awakening; and it was likewise so with his nirvāṇa — and hence the two acts of giving food are said to yield undifferentiated fruit. Others say: at the first reception of food, he attained the Buddha's own Dharma; at the second, he made use of that same Dharma — this is spoken of in the same way as attainment and cultivation. Others say: at the first reception, he entered every dhyāna, liberation, concentration, and attainment; at the second, he likewise entered every dhyāna, liberation, concentration, and attainment. Others say: at the first reception, he crossed the river of affliction; at the second, he crossed the river of birth-and-death. Others say: at the first reception, he dried up the ocean of affliction; at the second, he dried up the ocean of birth-and-death — and it is spoken of in this same way for uprooting the tree of affliction and the tree of birth-and-death, for breaking the mountain of affliction and the mountain of birth-and-death, and for transcending the basis of affliction and the basis of birth-and-death. Others say: at the first reception, he abandoned the truth of origin; at the second, he abandoned the truth of suffering. Others say: at the first reception, he realized and entered the truth of the path; at the second, he realized and entered the truth of cessation. Others say: at the first reception, he abandoned origin and entered the path; at the second, he abandoned suffering and entered cessation. Others say: at the first reception, he transcended every contaminant; at the second, he transcended every dharma conducive to the contaminants.
有說。初受食已超四暴流。後受食已超順流法。如流順流說超差別如是。扼順扼取。順取身繫順身繫。諸蓋順諸蓋說超亦爾。有說。
Others say: at the first reception, he transcended the four floods; at the second, he transcended the dharmas conducive to those floods — and this same pattern of "transcending the thing itself" and "transcending what is conducive to it" is spoken of likewise for the yokes and what is conducive to the yokes, for the clingings and what is conducive to the clingings, for the bodily bonds and what is conducive to the bodily bonds, and for the hindrances and what is conducive to the hindrances. Others say:
初受食已摧破二魔。謂煩惱魔。自在天魔。後受食已亦破二魔謂蘊魔死魔。有說。初受食已入有餘大涅槃界。後受食已入無餘大涅槃界。佛依如是種種因緣。說二種施果無。差別。
— at the first reception, he defeated two Māras — the Māra of affliction, and the sovereign-deva Māra; at the second reception, he likewise defeated two further Māras — the Māra of the aggregates, and the Māra of death. Others say: at the first reception, he entered the great realm of nirvāṇa with remainder; at the second, he entered the great realm of nirvāṇa without remainder. It is on the basis of such various causal accounts as these that the Buddha teaches that the two acts of giving food yield equal, undifferentiated fruit.
The relentless doubling of nearly every image in this cascade — one river becomes two, one ocean becomes two, one mountain becomes two — performs, in its very repetitive structure, the exact claim it is making: that the bodhisattva's awakening and the Buddha's final nirvāṇa are not two different achievements needing separate justification, but the very same accomplishment reached twice, described in parallel vocabulary because it is, at bottom, one single victory completed in two stages.
5. A New Chapter Opens: Are Conditions Even Real? Refuting the Analogists
An entirely new topic begins: the Condition Nyāsa, composed specifically to refute the Dṛṣṭāntika masters, who held that "condition" itself has no real, independent existence — citing the sūtra's own claim that a single, uniform ignorance produces volitional formations of endlessly varied character as proof that causal relations are merely conventional labels. The treatise's refutation is sweeping: if conditions weren't real, nothing conditioned would be real either; dependent origination's own profundity, surpassing the four great oceans, would collapse into shallow triviality; the three distinct paths to buddhahood, pratyekabuddhahood, and śrāvakahood would make no sense; and no teacher could ever genuinely improve a disciple's wisdom from lower to higher, since nothing real would exist to drive that growth.
大種蘊第五中緣納息第二之一大種與大種為幾緣。如是等章。及解章義。既領會已。當廣分別。
Fifth Aggregate, the Great Elements: the Condition Nyāsa, Chapter Two, Part One. With how many conditions do the great elements relate to the great elements? And so on, in such chapter headings. Having now grasped this chapter heading and its explanatory meaning in full, we should next analyze it in full.
問何故作此論。答欲止譬喻者所說故。彼說緣性非實有法。問彼何故作是說。答依契經故。如契經說。無明緣行。行相有異無明一相。如何一相無明為緣生異相行。而緣是實。尊者亦說。緣是諸師假立名號。體非實有。亦為遮止如是所說顯示諸緣體是實有。若諸緣性非實有者。則一切法皆非實有。以因緣攝一切有為法。等無間緣攝過去現在。除阿羅漢最後心聚。餘心心所法。所緣緣增上緣攝一切法故。又若緣性非實有者。應不施設諸法甚深。謂不依因緣觀察則諸法性麁淺易知。若以因緣而觀察者。則甚深義過四大海。唯佛能知非餘所測。又若緣性非實有者。應不施設有三菩提。謂以上智觀因緣故得佛菩提。以中智觀得獨覺菩提。以下智觀得聲聞菩提。又因緣性非實有者。應不施設有三品慧。謂下品慧應常下品。
Question: why compose this treatise? Answer: in order to refute the position of the Dṛṣṭāntikas, who hold that the essential nature of condition is not truly, really existent. Question: why do they say this? Answer: on the basis of the sūtra, for the sūtra says: ignorance conditions volitional formations — yet the resulting formations show varied characteristics, while ignorance itself has a single, uniform characteristic; how, then, could a single, uniform ignorance, serving as condition, give rise to formations of varied characteristics, were condition truly real? A certain venerable master likewise says that "condition" is merely a name arbitrarily established by various treatise-masters, its essential nature not truly real. It is in order to refute this position, and to show that the essential nature of every condition is truly, really existent, that this treatise is composed. For, were the essential nature of condition not truly real, then no dharma whatsoever would be truly real, since causal-condition subsumes every conditioned dharma, immediately-preceding-condition subsumes past and present mind and mental factors other than an arhat's own final mind-aggregate, and object-condition and predominant-condition subsume every dharma without exception. Moreover, were the essential nature of condition not truly real, the profundity of the various dharmas could not be established at all — for, without contemplating dharmas through causes and conditions, their own nature would appear coarse, shallow, and easy to know; but, contemplated through causes and conditions, their meaning proves more profound than the four great oceans, knowable to a buddha alone, beyond the fathoming of any other. Moreover, were the essential nature of condition not truly real, the three kinds of awakening could not be established at all — for it is through contemplating causes and conditions with superior wisdom that one attains a buddha's own awakening, with middling wisdom that one attains a pratyekabuddha's awakening, and with inferior wisdom that one attains a śrāvaka's awakening. And, were the essential nature of cause and condition not truly real, the three grades of wisdom could not be established at all — for inferior wisdom would then remain permanently inferior,
中應恒中。上應恒上。無實緣力令增減故。若爾便無師徒教習。又師徒性應無改轉。尊者妙音亦作是說。若緣非實師不應令弟子覺慧轉。下作中。轉中作上。無修習緣令增長故。師徒教誨應不得成。
— middling wisdom permanently middling, and superior wisdom permanently superior, there being no real force of condition capable of causing increase or decrease — and, were this so, there could be no such thing as a teacher instructing a disciple, and the very natures of teacher and disciple could never change at all. The Venerable Ghoṣa likewise says: were condition not truly real, a teacher could never cause a disciple's own understanding and wisdom to change, turning inferior into middling and middling into superior, there being no condition of cultivation capable of bringing about such growth — and hence the teaching relationship between teacher and disciple could never be accomplished at all,
師應常師弟子亦爾。由如是等所說理故。知緣自性決定實有。問若緣實有當云何通譬喻論師所引經義。答無明雖一作用有多。多用為緣生異相行。以有為法隨託眾緣。有無量門作用別故。譬如一士而有五能。而不相違彼亦如是。有說。為顯諸有為法自性羸劣。不能自起必藉他緣。無實作用無有自在故作斯論。此中自性謂法自體。
— the teacher remaining permanently a teacher, and the disciple likewise. It is on the basis of reasoning such as this that condition's own essential nature is known to be determinately, truly real. Question: if condition is truly real, how is the sūtra passage cited by the Dṛṣṭāntika masters to be reconciled? Answer: though ignorance is single, its own function is manifold — this manifold function, serving as condition, gives rise to formations of varied characteristics, since a conditioned dharma, depending on the many conditions it relies upon, admits of countless distinct functional aspects — just as a single person may possess five distinct skills without any contradiction, so too it is here. Others say: this treatise is composed in order to show that every conditioned dharma's own essential nature is inherently feeble, incapable of arising by itself, necessarily relying on other conditions, possessing no real autonomous action and no genuine self-mastery. Here, "essential nature" refers to a dharma's own intrinsic substance,
或云此顯所生諸法自性羸劣。以羸劣故有藉四緣。或三或二方得生起。尚無有法藉一緣生況無所藉。如羸病者。必假若四若三若二。
— or, alternatively, this shows that the essential nature of the produced dharmas is itself feeble — being feeble, they depend on four conditions, or three, or two, before they can arise at all; there is no dharma that arises relying on only a single condition, let alone none at all — just as one who is gravely ill must depend on four, three, or two supports,
所倚任緣而得起轉。尚無假一況全不假。或云此顯能生因緣自性羸劣。以羸劣故或四或三或二相資方能生法。如羸劣者。或四或三或二相假能辦一事。如契經說。色是無常色之因緣亦無常性。無常所起色云何常。由諸有為性羸劣故不能自起。謂彼無力可能自生。由不自生故藉他起。要假緣力方得生故。由藉他緣故無作用。謂法無欲作是念言。我應作誰誰令我作。無作用故則無自在。謂我勿起我勿滅中。諸有為法不自在故。有說。為遣諸緣起愚故作斯論。緣起愚者。謂彼聞說無明緣行。乃至生緣老死。便謂唯此是緣起法今欲決定顯示從緣所生。內外諸法皆是緣起。由此等緣故作斯論。
— in order to move and function at all, there being no dharma that relies on even a single support alone, let alone none whatsoever. Or, alternatively, this shows that the very essential nature of the generative causes and conditions themselves is feeble — being feeble, it is only through four, three, or two conditions combining together that a dharma can be produced at all, just as several feeble people, whether four, three, or two, combining their efforts, are capable of accomplishing a single task. As the sūtra says: form is impermanent, and form's own causes and conditions are likewise impermanent by nature — how, then, could form, arisen from what is impermanent, itself be permanent? It is because every conditioned dharma's own nature is feeble that it is incapable of arising by itself, having no power capable of self-generation — and, since it cannot generate itself, it must rely on something else to arise, requiring the power of conditions before it can arise at all. And, since it relies on something else, it possesses no genuine action of its own — that is, no dharma ever intends, or thinks, "I ought to act upon this, and let this act upon me" — and, lacking action, it likewise possesses no genuine self-mastery, since, with respect to "let me not arise" or "let me not cease," no conditioned dharma has any autonomous power at all. Others say: this treatise is composed in order to dispel the specific delusion concerning dependent origination — that is, delusion arising from hearing that ignorance conditions formations, and so on, up through birth conditioning old age and death, and thereupon supposing that this alone constitutes the whole of dependent origination — whereas it is now, in order to establish with certainty that every internal and external dharma without exception arises dependent on conditions, that this treatise is composed.
The refutation's most elegant move resolves the original objection — one uniform ignorance producing many different effects — not by denying the premise but by relocating where the diversity comes from: ignorance's own function remains single, but that single function combines with an endless variety of surrounding conditions, exactly as one skilled person can perform five entirely different tasks without their own underlying competence ever needing to divide into five different competencies.
6. The Great Elements' Own Causal Web, Traced Down to Left Eye and Right
The systematic catalog of conditions begins with the great elements' relationship to themselves — co-existent and same-class causal-condition, plus predominant-condition — broken down with astonishing granularity through eleven sense-field varieties, then left versus right (even distinguishing the elements underlying the left eye from those underlying the right), then nourishment-grown versus ripening-born, then wholesome versus unwholesome karmic origin, then divine versus human, then desire-realm versus form-realm, down through all four dhyānas and the three evil destinies — before turning to how the elements relate to derived form, and derived form to itself and back to the elements, through the treatise's own established five-cause and three-cause frameworks.
大種與大種為幾緣。答。因。增上。因者二因。謂俱有。同類。俱生互相望為俱有因。前生與後生為同類因。增上者謂不礙生。及唯無障。此依種類總相而說。然四大種有十一種。謂眼處所依。乃至法處所依。眼處所依與眼處所依為因。增上與餘所依但一增上。乃至法處所依與法處所依為因。增上與餘所依但一增上。眼處所依大種復有二種。謂左與右左與左所依為因。增上與右所依但一增上。
With how many conditions do the great elements relate to the great elements? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of two kinds — co-existent cause and same-class cause. Elements arising together, mutually compared, serve as co-existent cause for one another; elements arising earlier and later serve as same-class cause for one another. As to predominant-condition: this means not obstructing arising, or merely being without any hindrance. This is stated with reference to their general category as a whole. Yet the four great elements themselves come in eleven varieties, namely, that which serves as the basis of the eye sense-field, and so on, up through that which serves as the basis of the dharma sense-field. The elements basing the eye sense-field serve as causal-condition for the elements basing the eye sense-field, and as mere predominant-condition for the elements basing any other sense-field; and so on likewise, up through the elements basing the dharma sense-field serving as causal-condition for the elements basing the dharma sense-field, and as mere predominant-condition for the elements basing any other sense-field. The great elements basing the eye sense-field themselves further divide into two — the left and the right — with the elements basing the left serving as causal-condition for the elements basing the left, and as mere predominant-condition for the elements basing the right;
右與右所依為因。增上與左所依但一增。上左眼所依大種復有二種。謂所長養及異熟生。長養與長養為因。增上與異熟生但一增上。異熟與異熟為因。增上與所長養但一增上。異熟大種復有二種。謂善業異熟及不善業異熟。善業異熟與善業異熟為因。增上與不善業異熟但一增上。不善業說亦爾。善業異熟大種復有二種。謂天及人。天與天為因。增上與人但一增上。人說亦爾。天大種復有二種。謂欲界及色界。欲界與欲界為因。增上與色界但一增上。色界說亦爾。色界大種復有四種。謂初靜慮乃至第四靜慮。初靜慮與初靜慮為因。增上與餘靜慮但一增上。乃至第四靜慮說亦爾。不善業異熟大種復有三種。謂地獄傍生餓鬼。地獄與地獄為因。增上與餘二但一增上。傍生餓鬼說亦爾。如說異熟。長養亦爾。如說左右亦爾。如說眼處所依大種。乃至法處所依大種亦爾。此中異者。謂五外處有自他身。情非情等差別應思。問同趣同地處所差別。展轉相望為有因不。答有說。無因。此不應理。應有大種是剎那故。謂五淨居所有大種。無始生死曾未起故。諸所造色十一種等准前大種廣說應知。大種與所造色為幾緣。答因。增上。因者五因。謂生因。依因。立因。持因。養因。增上者謂不礙生。及唯無障。有說。大種與所造觸為同類因。此不應理。大種所造觸非同類故。所造色與所造色為幾緣。答因。增上。因者三因。謂俱有。同類。異熟。增上者謂不礙生。及唯無障。此總相說。差別說者准前大種如理應思。所造色與大種為幾緣。答因。增上。因者一因。謂異熟因。增上者。謂不礙生。及唯無障。有說。造觸與諸大種為同類因。此不應理。造觸大種非同類故。
— and likewise the elements basing the right serve as causal-condition for the elements basing the right, and as mere predominant-condition for the elements basing the left. The elements basing the left eye further divide into two — nourishment-grown and ripening-born — with nourishment-grown serving as causal-condition for nourishment-grown, and as mere predominant-condition for ripening-born; and ripening-born serving as causal-condition for ripening-born, and as mere predominant-condition for nourishment-grown. Ripening-born elements themselves further divide into two — the ripening of wholesome karma and the ripening of unwholesome karma — with wholesome-karma-ripening serving as causal-condition for wholesome-karma-ripening, and as mere predominant-condition for unwholesome-karma-ripening; and likewise for unwholesome-karma-ripening in reverse. Wholesome-karma-ripening elements themselves further divide into two — those of gods and those of humans — with divine elements serving as causal-condition for divine elements, and as mere predominant-condition for human elements; and likewise for human elements in reverse. Divine elements themselves further divide into two — those of the desire realm and those of the form realm — with desire-realm elements serving as causal-condition for desire-realm elements, and as mere predominant-condition for form-realm elements; and likewise for form-realm elements in reverse. Form-realm elements themselves further divide into four — the first dhyāna up through the fourth — with first-dhyāna elements serving as causal-condition for first-dhyāna elements, and as mere predominant-condition for the elements of the other dhyānas; and likewise up through the fourth dhyāna. Unwholesome-karma-ripening elements themselves further divide into three — hell, the animal realm, and the ghost realm — with hell-elements serving as causal-condition for hell-elements, and as mere predominant-condition for the other two; and likewise for the animal and ghost realms. As explained for ripening-born, so too for nourishment-grown; as explained for left and right, so too throughout; as explained for the elements basing the eye sense-field, so too up through the elements basing the dharma sense-field — the sole difference being that, for the five external sense-fields, one must further consider the distinction between one's own body and another's, and between sentient and insentient, according to what is fitting. Question: within the very same destiny and ground, mutually compared across different places, is there causal-condition or not? Answer: some say there is not — but this cannot be right, since there must be great elements that are, for that continuum, entirely novel — namely, the great elements belonging to the Five Pure Abodes, never before arisen in that continuum's own beginningless round of birth-and-death. Derived form, in its own eleven varieties, should be understood in full according to this same pattern as the great elements above. With how many conditions do the great elements relate to derived form? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of five kinds — the generative, dependent, establishing, sustaining, and nourishing causes. As to predominant-condition: this means not obstructing arising, or merely being without any hindrance. Some say the great elements serve as same-class cause for derived touch — but this cannot be right, since the great elements and derived touch are not of the same class. With how many conditions does derived form relate to derived form? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of three kinds — co-existent, same-class, and ripening cause. As to predominant-condition: this means not obstructing arising, or merely being without any hindrance. This is stated with reference to the general category as a whole; stated with distinctions, one should reflect according to the pattern already given for the great elements above. With how many conditions does derived form relate to the great elements? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of one kind only — ripening-cause. As to predominant-condition: this means not obstructing arising, or merely being without any hindrance. Some say derived touch serves as same-class cause for the great elements — but this cannot be right, since derived touch and the great elements are not of the same class.
That the treatise distinguishes the causal relationship between the elements underlying one's left eye and those underlying one's right — treating even this as a genuine, analyzable causal boundary — reveals just how far this taxonomy is willing to push granularity: no distinction, however seemingly trivial or symmetrical, is assumed identical to its mirror image without being separately verified.
7. How the Elements Become an Object of Mind, and Mind's Own Fivefold Cause
The catalog turns to how the great elements relate to mind and mental factors — solely as an object taken by body- and mental-consciousness, the former grasping only the particular own-characteristic, the latter grasping both the particular and the shared characteristic — before mapping mind and mental factors' own relationship to themselves through all four conditions at once: a full five kinds of cause, immediately-preceding-condition, object-condition, and predominant-condition.
大種與心心所法為幾緣。答所緣。增上。所緣者。謂與身識彼相應法。及與意識彼相應法為所緣。身識及相應法。取自相。意識及相應法。取自相共相。增上者如前說。心心所法與心心所法為幾緣。
With how many conditions do the great elements relate to mind and mental factors? Answer: object-condition, and predominant-condition. As to object-condition: this means serving as the object for body-consciousness and its associated factors, and for mental-consciousness and its associated factors — body-consciousness and its associated factors take only the particular own-characteristic as their object, while mental-consciousness and its associated factors take both the particular own-characteristic and the shared characteristic. As to predominant-condition: as explained before. With how many conditions do mind and mental factors relate to mind and mental factors?
答因。等無間。所緣。增上。因者五因。謂相應。俱有。同類。遍行。異熟。等無間者。謂心心所法等無間。心心所法現在前。所緣者。謂心心所法。與心心所法為所緣。增上者如前說。心心所法與大種為幾緣。答因。增上。因者。一因。謂異熟因。增上者如前說。大種與眼處為幾緣。答因。增上。因者五因。謂生等五。增上者如前說。眼處與眼處為幾緣。答因增上。因者一因。謂同類因。
Answer: causal-condition, immediately-preceding-condition, object-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of five kinds — associated, co-existent, same-class, universally-pervasive, and ripening cause. As to immediately-preceding-condition: this means that, immediately following mind and mental factors, further mind and mental factors presently manifest. As to object-condition: this means mind and mental factors serving as the object for further mind and mental factors. As to predominant-condition: as explained before. With how many conditions do mind and mental factors relate to the great elements? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of one kind only — ripening-cause. As to predominant-condition: as explained before. With how many conditions do the great elements relate to the eye sense-field? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of five kinds — the generative and the other four. As to predominant-condition: as explained before. With how many conditions does the eye sense-field relate to the eye sense-field? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of one kind only — same-class cause.
The precise distinction between body-consciousness taking only a "particular" characteristic and mental-consciousness taking both particular and shared characteristics quietly explains something intuitive about the difference between raw sensation and conceptual thought: the body can feel this specific touch, but only the mind can recognize it as an instance of touch in general — sensation and categorization turn out to be structurally distinct cognitive acts, not merely different degrees of the same one.
8. Color, Sound, and Touch: Three Asymmetric Relationships to the Elements
The same exhaustive four-condition analysis extends across each remaining physical sense-field, revealing genuine asymmetries: color shares two kinds of causal-condition with itself (same-class and ripening, since visible form is itself a karmic ripening-fruit), while sound shares only one (same-class alone, since sound is manifest karma itself rather than its resultant fruit), and touch, uniquely, shares a full seven kinds with both the elements and itself, since touch alone stands in a genuine co-existent relationship with the very elements it is derived from.
增上者如前說。眼處與大種為幾緣。答一增上。增上義如前說。如眼處。耳鼻舌身香味處亦爾。大種與色處為幾緣。答因。增上。因者五因。謂生等五。增上者如前說。色處與色處為幾緣。答因。增上。因者二因。謂同類。異熟。增上者如前說。色處與大種為幾緣。答因。增上。因者一因。謂異熟因。增上者如前說。如色處。
As to predominant-condition: as explained before. With how many conditions does the eye sense-field relate to the great elements? Answer: predominant-condition alone, its meaning as explained before. As with the eye sense-field, so too the ear, nose, tongue, and body sense-fields, and the smell and taste sense-fields. With how many conditions do the great elements relate to the form sense-field? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of five kinds — the generative and the other four. As to predominant-condition: as explained before. With how many conditions does the form sense-field relate to the form sense-field? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of two kinds — same-class and ripening cause. As to predominant-condition: as explained before. With how many conditions does the form sense-field relate to the great elements? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of one kind only — ripening-cause. As to predominant-condition: as explained before. As with the form sense-field,
聲觸處亦爾。總說雖然而義有異。謂大種與聲處為因。增上。因者。五因。謂生等五。增上者如前說。聲處與聲處為因。增上。因者一因。謂同類因。增上者如前說。聲處與大種為因。增上。因者一因。謂異熟因。增上者如前說。大種與觸處為因。增上。因者七因。謂生等五。及俱有。同類增上者如前說。觸處與觸處為因。增上。因者七因。謂生等五。及俱有。同類。增上者如前說。觸處與大種為因。增上。因者二因。謂俱有。同類。增上者如前說。大種與意處為幾緣。答所緣。增上。所緣者謂與身識意識為所緣。身識取自相。意識取自相共相。身識取時若一若多廣如前說。意處與意處為幾緣。答因。等無間。所緣。增上。因者三因。謂同類。遍行。異熟。等無間者。謂意處等無間。意處現在前。所緣者。謂意處與意處為所緣。增上者如前說。此依種類總相而說。然意處有六種。謂眼識。乃至意識。此中眼識與眼識為因。等無間。增上。非所緣。因者二因。謂同類。異熟。等無間者謂眼識等無間。眼識現在前。增上者如前說。非所緣者以眼識唯緣色。眼識非色故。如眼識與眼識。眼識與耳鼻舌身識亦爾。眼識與意識為因等無間。所緣。增上。因者。二因。謂同類。異熟等無間者。謂眼識等無間。
— so too are the sound and touch sense-fields alike, though speaking generally, their specific details differ. That is: the great elements relate to the sound sense-field as causal-condition and predominant-condition, causal-condition being of five kinds — the generative and the other four — and predominant-condition as explained before. The sound sense-field relates to the sound sense-field as causal-condition and predominant-condition, causal-condition being of one kind only — same-class cause — and predominant-condition as explained before. The sound sense-field relates to the great elements as causal-condition and predominant-condition, causal-condition being of one kind only — ripening-cause — and predominant-condition as explained before. The great elements relate to the touch sense-field as causal-condition and predominant-condition, causal-condition being of seven kinds — the generative and the other four, together with co-existent and same-class cause — and predominant-condition as explained before. The touch sense-field relates to the touch sense-field as causal-condition and predominant-condition, causal-condition likewise being of these same seven kinds, and predominant-condition as explained before. The touch sense-field relates to the great elements as causal-condition and predominant-condition, causal-condition being of two kinds — co-existent and same-class cause — and predominant-condition as explained before. With how many conditions do the great elements relate to the mind sense-field? Answer: object-condition, and predominant-condition. As to object-condition: this means serving as object for body-consciousness and mental-consciousness — body-consciousness takes only the particular own-characteristic, while mental-consciousness takes both the particular own-characteristic and the shared characteristic; and, as to whether body-consciousness takes its object singly or in multiplicity, this is explained in full as before. With how many conditions does the mind sense-field relate to the mind sense-field? Answer: causal-condition, immediately-preceding-condition, object-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of three kinds — same-class, universally-pervasive, and ripening cause. As to immediately-preceding-condition: this means that, immediately following the mind sense-field, the mind sense-field presently manifests. As to object-condition: this means the mind sense-field serving as object for the mind sense-field. As to predominant-condition: as explained before. This is stated with reference to the general category as a whole; yet the mind sense-field itself comes in six varieties, namely eye-consciousness, and so on, up through mental-consciousness. Here, eye-consciousness relates to eye-consciousness as causal-condition, immediately-preceding-condition, and predominant-condition, but not as object-condition — causal-condition being of two kinds, same-class and ripening cause; immediately-preceding-condition meaning that, immediately following eye-consciousness, eye-consciousness presently manifests; and predominant-condition as explained before; not object-condition, since eye-consciousness takes only form as its object, and eye-consciousness itself is not form. As with eye-consciousness's relation to eye-consciousness, so too its relation to ear-, nose-, tongue-, and body-consciousness. Eye-consciousness relates to mental-consciousness as causal-condition, immediately-preceding-condition, object-condition, and predominant-condition — causal-condition being of two kinds, same-class and ripening cause; immediately-preceding-condition meaning that, immediately following eye-consciousness,
That touch alone, among the derived sense-fields, shares a co-existent causal relationship with the great elements it derives from is a precise technical payoff of an idea established many fascicles earlier: touch is partly constituted by the elements' own defining qualities of solidity, moisture, heat, and motion, and this special intimacy is what earns it two additional causal relationships color and sound, more clearly separated from their own material basis, simply do not qualify for.
9. Can the Five Senses Speak Directly to Each Other? And the Dharma-Field's Complete Web
A genuine scholarly dispute breaks out over whether the five sense-consciousnesses can ever arise in direct, immediate succession with one another, without an intervening moment of mental-consciousness: meditation specialists say no, every sense-consciousness must pass through mental-consciousness first, while the Abhidharma masters insist they can succeed one another directly, citing the Faculties Aggregation's own explicit teaching about the pain faculty as proof. The catalog then closes out the dharma-sense-field's own full, symmetric web of all four conditions with itself and with the great elements.
意識現在前。所緣者。謂眼識與意識為所緣。增上者如前說。如眼識對六識。耳鼻舌身識對六亦爾意識與意識為因。等無間。所緣。
— mental-consciousness presently manifests; object-condition meaning that eye-consciousness serves as object for mental-consciousness; and predominant-condition as explained before. As eye-consciousness relates to each of the six consciousnesses, so too do ear-, nose-, tongue-, and body-consciousness each relate to all six. Mental-consciousness relates to mental-consciousness as causal-condition, immediately-preceding-condition, object-condition,
增上。因者三因。謂同類。遍行。異熟。等無間者。謂意識等無間。意識現在前。所緣者。謂意識與意識為所緣。增上者如前說。
— and predominant-condition — causal-condition being of three kinds, same-class, universally-pervasive, and ripening cause; immediately-preceding-condition meaning that, immediately following mental-consciousness, mental-consciousness presently manifests; object-condition meaning mental-consciousness serving as object for mental-consciousness; and predominant-condition as explained before.
意識與眼識為因。等無間增上。非所緣。因者三因。即同類。遍行。異熟。等無間者。謂意識等無間眼識現在前增上者如前說。非所緣者。以眼識唯緣色。意識非色故。如意識對眼識。意識對餘識亦爾。問眼等五識展轉無間現在前不。答諸瑜伽師說。眼等五識展轉無間不現在前。皆從意識無間生故。阿毘達磨諸論師言。眼等五識展轉皆得無間而起。若不爾者違根蘊說。如彼說。苦根與苦根為因。等無間。增上。非所緣。意處與大種為幾緣。答因。增上。因者一因。謂異熟因。增上者如前說。大種與法處為幾緣。答因。所緣。增上。因者七因。謂生等五。及俱有。同類。所緣者。謂與身識相應法。及意識相應法。為所緣。增上者如前說。法處與法處為幾緣。答因。等無間。所緣。增上。因者五因。即相應等五。等無間者。謂法處等無間。法處現在前。所緣者。謂法處與法處為所緣。增上者如前說。法處與大種為幾緣。答因。增上。因者三因。
Mental-consciousness relates to eye-consciousness as causal-condition, immediately-preceding-condition, and predominant-condition, but not as object-condition — causal-condition being of these same three kinds, same-class, universally-pervasive, and ripening cause; immediately-preceding-condition meaning that, immediately following mental-consciousness, eye-consciousness presently manifests; and predominant-condition as explained before; not object-condition, since eye-consciousness takes only form as its object, and mental-consciousness is not form. As mental-consciousness relates to eye-consciousness, so too does it relate to each of the other consciousnesses. Question: can the five sense-consciousnesses — eye and the rest — arise in direct, immediate succession with one another? Answer: the various masters of meditative practice say that the five sense-consciousnesses cannot arise in direct, immediate succession with one another, since each of them arises only immediately following mental-consciousness. The various Abhidharma treatise-masters say that the five sense-consciousnesses can indeed arise in direct, immediate succession with one another, since otherwise this would contradict the Faculties Aggregation's own teaching, which says that the pain faculty relates to the pain faculty as causal-condition, immediately-preceding-condition, and predominant-condition, but not as object-condition. With how many conditions does the mind sense-field relate to the great elements? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of one kind only — ripening-cause. As to predominant-condition: as explained before. With how many conditions do the great elements relate to the dharma sense-field? Answer: causal-condition, object-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of seven kinds — the generative and the other four, together with co-existent and same-class cause. As to object-condition: this means serving as object for the mental factors associated with body-consciousness and mental-consciousness. As to predominant-condition: as explained before. With how many conditions does the dharma sense-field relate to the dharma sense-field? Answer: causal-condition, immediately-preceding-condition, object-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of five kinds — associated cause and the other four. As to immediately-preceding-condition: this means that, immediately following the dharma sense-field, the dharma sense-field presently manifests. As to object-condition: this means the dharma sense-field serving as object for the dharma sense-field. As to predominant-condition: as explained before. With how many conditions does the dharma sense-field relate to the great elements? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition. As to causal-condition: this is of three kinds —
謂俱有。同類。異熟。增上者如前說。
— co-existent, same-class, and ripening cause. As to predominant-condition: as explained before.
The dispute over whether sense-consciousnesses can talk directly to one another, bypassing mental-consciousness entirely, is really a dispute about how tightly integrated ordinary perception actually is: one side pictures the mind as a mandatory hub every sensory impression must pass through before another can arise, while the other pictures a looser, more distributed system where the senses can, on occasion, hand off to each other without central mediation.
10. Twenty-Two Faculties, and Why the Analysis Runs Shorter for Them
The same catalog extends across the twenty-two faculties — sense-organs, life, mind, the feeling-faculties, the five spiritual faculties, and the three uncontaminated path-faculties, the last relating to the elements specifically through the wisdom-factors that directly contemplate them as an object. A closing methodological puzzle asks why the sense-field comparisons yield three questions each while the faculty comparisons yield only two, resolved most convincingly by noting that the faculties are already subsumed within the sense-fields, making a separate third comparison for them strictly redundant.
大種與眼根為幾緣。答因。增上。因者五因。謂生等五。增上者如前說。眼根與大種為幾緣。答一增上。增上義如前說。如眼根。耳鼻舌身男女根亦爾。大種與命根為幾緣。答一增上。增上義如前說。命根與大種為幾緣。答一增上。增上義如前說。大種與意根為幾緣。答所緣。增上。所緣增上義皆如前說。意根與大種為幾緣。
With how many conditions do the great elements relate to the eye faculty? Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition — causal-condition being of five kinds, the generative and the other four; predominant-condition as explained before. With how many conditions does the eye faculty relate to the great elements? Answer: predominant-condition alone, its meaning as explained before. As with the eye faculty, so too the ear, nose, tongue, body, and the male and female faculties. With how many conditions do the great elements relate to the life faculty? Answer: predominant-condition alone, its meaning as explained before. With how many conditions does the life faculty relate to the great elements? Answer: predominant-condition alone, its meaning as explained before. With how many conditions do the great elements relate to the mind faculty? Answer: object-condition, and predominant-condition, both meanings as explained before. With how many conditions does the mind faculty relate to the great elements?
答因增上。因者一因。謂異熟因。增上者如前說。如意根。樂苦喜憂捨信精進念定慧根亦爾。大種與未知當知根為幾緣。答所緣。增上。所緣者。謂諸大種與苦忍苦智。集忍集智。及相應根為所緣。
Answer: causal-condition, and predominant-condition — causal-condition being of one kind only, ripening-cause; predominant-condition as explained before. As with the mind faculty, so too the faculties of pleasure, pain, joy, displeasure, equanimity, faith, effort, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom. With how many conditions do the great elements relate to the faculty of "I shall come to know"? Answer: object-condition, and predominant-condition. As to object-condition: this means the great elements serving as object for the forbearance and wisdom regarding suffering, the forbearance and wisdom regarding its origin, and their associated faculties.
增上者如前說。未知當知根與大種為幾緣。答一增上。增上義如前說。如未知當知根。已知根具知根亦爾。問大種對處問答有三。何故對根問答唯二。答彼造論者意欲爾故。謂所造論隨彼意欲而造論。但令不違法相。不應責其所以。有說。此是有餘之說。有說。
As to predominant-condition: as explained before. With how many conditions does the faculty of "I shall come to know" relate to the great elements? Answer: predominant-condition alone, its meaning as explained before. As with the faculty of "I shall come to know," so too the faculties of "I already know" and "I have fully known." Question: for the great elements paired with the sense-fields, the questions and answers number three, so why, for the great elements paired with the faculties, do the questions and answers number only two? Answer: it is simply the intention of the treatise's own author — the treatise was composed following his own preference, and, so long as this does not contradict the proper form of the Dharma, this ought not to be demanded as an objection. Others say: this is a matter left with a further, supplementary account. Others say:
此中現種種文種種說。莊嚴於義令易解故。有說。此中現二門二略乃至廣說。有說。諸根即處所攝。若說處當知已說根。是以不問。
— it is in order to adorn the meaning with a variety of wording and a variety of expression, making it easier to understand. Others say: this passage displays a graduated sequence, from broad to brief — first four questions, then three, then two — since, once the fuller account has been given earlier, the later portion may be inferred accordingly, the wording gradually abbreviated to avoid excessive repetition. Others say: this passage displays two mutually illuminating gateways and summaries, and so on in full. Others say: the faculties are already subsumed within the sense-fields — once the sense-fields have been explained, the faculties are thereby already explained as well, and hence this third question is not asked for them.
The observation that faculties are already fully subsumed within sense-fields, making an entire third round of questions genuinely redundant rather than merely omitted for brevity, is a small but satisfying piece of structural housekeeping: the treatise's own taxonomy is shown to be internally consistent enough that a shortcut in one place can be justified by appeal to a containment relationship established elsewhere, rather than simply asserted as stylistic economy.
11. An Old Debate Resurfaces: Does Form Have Same-Class Cause?
A brief cross-reference revisits a dispute already settled at length in an earlier fascicle: the Western masters and the Dṛṣṭāntikas deny that form has same-class cause with respect to other form, while the Abhidharma masters affirm it does — the treatise simply pointing back to its own prior, exhaustive treatment rather than repeating the argument here.
有說。此中廣略漸次。謂初四問次三後二。由前廣說後可准知。為去繁文漸略而說。問色法於色法有同類因耶。答西方諸師。譬喻尊者說。色於色無同類因。對法諸師說。色於色有同類因。如前雜蘊同類因中已廣分別。
Question: does form have same-class cause with respect to other form? Answer: the masters of the West, and the Venerable Dṛṣṭāntika, say that form has no same-class cause with respect to other form; the Abhidharma masters say that form does have same-class cause with respect to other form — this has already been analyzed in full within the earlier Miscellaneous Aggregate's own treatment of same-class cause.
Rather than re-litigating a settled dispute in full, the treatise trusts its own earlier work enough to simply cite it — a small but telling sign that this massive, sprawling text is meant to be read as a single, internally cross-referenced whole, its later fascicles building on and pointing back to arguments its own earlier fascicles have already carried the full weight of.
12. Why the Four Elements Are Never Called 'Conjoined'
A subtle puzzle asks why the four great elements, though arising, persisting, and ceasing together as one unit exactly as mind and its mental factors do, are never called "conjoined" the way mind and mental factors are. The key distinction: the elements can increase or decrease relative to one another, while mind and its factors cannot, since within a single mind-moment there is always exactly one instance of each mental factor, admitting no relative quantitative variation the way accumulated atoms of one element can outnumber another.
何故四大種一生一住一滅而不相應。心心所法一生一住一滅說名相應。答如四大種或減或增。心心所法則不如是。此中生者。謂生所生。住者謂住所住。及異所異。滅者謂滅所滅。問諸有為法各有生住滅。何故乃言一生一住一滅。答有因緣故說各有生住滅。謂各別有諸相相故非一相。有因緣故說一生一住一滅。謂皆不離一剎那時等。於一時生住滅故。問四大種體有增減不。設爾何失二俱有過。
Why is it that the four great elements, though arising, persisting, and ceasing together as a single unit, are not called "conjoined," while mind and mental factors, likewise arising, persisting, and ceasing together as a single unit, are called "conjoined"? Answer: the four great elements may increase or decrease relative to one another, whereas mind and mental factors do not admit of this. Here, "arising" means the arising-characteristic giving rise to what arises; "persisting" means the persisting-characteristic sustaining what persists, together with the changing-characteristic that alters it; "ceasing" means the ceasing-characteristic bringing about what ceases. Question: every conditioned dharma has its own individual arising, persisting, and ceasing — why, then, is it said that they undergo "a single arising, a single persisting, a single ceasing"? Answer: there is a reason for saying each has its own individual arising, persisting, and ceasing — namely, that each severally possesses its own distinct characteristics, and hence these are not a single characteristic; and there is a reason for saying they undergo a single arising, persisting, and ceasing together — namely, that they never depart from occupying one and the same instant, arising, persisting, and ceasing all within that same single moment. Question: do the great elements' own substance genuinely increase or decrease? Either way, what fault would follow? Both possibilities show difficulty:
若有增減寧不相離。所以者何。若堅物中地極微多。水火風少。地微隨與水等量雜餘則相離。乃至動物說亦如是。若無增減水石等物。不應得成堅軟等異。答應言大種體有增減。問若爾云何名不相離。答雖有增減而不相離。以展轉相資同作所作故。如堅物中雖地微多水火風少。然離水等地微不能作所作事。乃至動物說亦如是。
— if their substance does increase or decrease, how could they remain inseparable, for why is this? For, in a solid object, if earth-atoms far outnumber water, fire, and wind, then, should earth-atoms be reduced to the same quantity as water and the rest, the excess would then have to be separated off — and likewise for a moving object; yet, if there were no increase or decrease at all, water, stone, and the like ought never to show any distinction of hard or soft. Answer: it should be said that the great elements' own substance does genuinely increase and decrease. Question: if so, how can they still be called inseparable? Answer: though they increase and decrease, they remain inseparable, since they continue mutually to support one another and jointly accomplish their shared task — just as, in a solid object, though earth-atoms far outnumber water, fire, and wind, earth-atoms apart from water and the rest are nevertheless incapable of accomplishing their own function — and likewise for a moving object,
如多村邑共營一事。雖有人數多少不同。而互相須不可相離。問心心所體亦有增減。如何乃言則不如是。謂心所法於三界。三性。有漏。無漏。諸心聚中有多有少。答由事等故不名增減。若一心中有二想一受等可名增減。然一心中一想一受等故異大種。有說。大種體無增減。問石等云何堅軟等異。答大種勢力有增微故。如堅物中四大極微。體數雖等而其勢力地極微增。乃至動物說亦如是。如一兩鹽和一兩麨置於舌上。鹽生識猛麨生識微。此亦如是。水酢均和生舌識喻。針鋒鳥翮生身識喻。廣說亦爾。問心心所法亦用有增微。如指鬘利根。蛇奴根鈍。如何言不如是耶。答如四大種勢力麁顯。增微易了是以說之。心心所法則不如是。由此大種不說相應。
— just as many villages, cooperating on a single shared task, though differing in the number of people involved, remain mutually dependent and inseparable. Question: mind and mental factors, too, admit of increase and decrease in their own substance — why, then, is it said that they do not? For instance, mental factors, across the three realms, the three moral natures, and the contaminated and uncontaminated, occur in greater or lesser number within a given mental aggregate. Answer: it is on account of the equal number of instances that this is not called increase or decrease — were there, within a single moment of mind, two instances of perception but only one of feeling, this could indeed be called increase or decrease; but, within a single moment of mind, there is only ever one instance of perception, one of feeling, and so on, and hence this differs from the great elements. Others say: the great elements' own substance never increases or decreases at all. Question: how, then, do stone and the like show a distinction of hard or soft? Answer: it is on account of the great elements' own functional strength increasing or diminishing — that is, though, in a solid object, the atoms of the four great elements may be equal in substance and number, earth's own functional strength there is increased, and so on likewise for a moving object — just as, when a small measure of salt is mixed with a small measure of flour and placed upon the tongue, the sensation produced by the salt is vivid while that produced by the flour is faint, so too it is here; just as water mixed evenly with vinegar illustrates a produced tongue-sensation, and the point of a needle against a bird's feather illustrates a produced body-sensation, explained in full likewise. Question: mind and mental factors, too, differ in the strength of their function — as with a sharp faculty like Aṅgulimāla's, or a dull one like a serpent's — why, then, is it said that this does not hold for them? Answer: because the great elements' own functional strength is coarse and evident, its increase or diminishment easy to discern, and hence it is spoken of in this way — mind and mental factors are not like this, and it is on this account that the great elements are not called "conjoined."
又心心所法皆有所緣。四大種無所緣。非無所緣法可說相應。所以者何。心心所法。有所依。有行相。有發悟故。必有所緣。有所緣故恒相應不相離。四大種與此相違。故無所緣無所緣故。雖不相離而不相應。不相離有二種。一大種不相離共造一色故。二心心所法不相離共緣一境故。五蘊雖復同在一身。無此二事非不相離。是故大種不說相應。
Moreover, mind and mental factors always have an object, whereas the four great elements have no object at all — and a dharma lacking an object can never properly be called "conjoined," for why is this? Mind and mental factors have a basis, a mode of apprehension, and a capacity for awakening awareness, and hence necessarily have an object — and, having an object, they are constantly conjoined and never separate. The great elements are the opposite of this, having no object at all — and, lacking an object, though inseparable, they are not called conjoined. "Inseparable" is of two kinds — first, the great elements are inseparable in that they jointly produce a single instance of form; second, mind and mental factors are inseparable in that they jointly take a single object. Though the five aggregates alike occupy a single body, without these two specific relations, this alone does not make them inseparable in the relevant sense — and it is for this reason that the great elements are not called "conjoined."
Locating the crucial difference in whether relative quantity can vary — the elements can, mind and its factors cannot — turns what might seem like an arbitrary terminological distinction into a genuine structural fact about two different kinds of togetherness: material elements combine like ingredients in variable proportion, while a single moment of mental experience combines like a fixed, non-negotiable ensemble, each part occurring exactly once.
13. Proving the Four Are Never Separated: A Function-by-Function Demonstration
A rigorous demonstration proves the four elements' permanent inseparability by showing that even within a mass dominated by one element, the other three remain functionally indispensable: within a solid mass, water is still needed to melt metal and hold the mass together, fire to spark and ripen it, wind to move and grow it; the same fourfold demonstration is then run in full for liquid, warm, and moving masses, each time showing that removing any one of the supposedly "absent" three elements would make some observed function impossible.
問云何得知此四大種恒不相離。答自相作業一切聚中皆可得故。謂堅聚中地界自相現可得故有義極成。於此聚中若無水界。金銀錫等應不可銷。又水若無彼應分散。若無火界石等相擊火不應生。又火若無無能成熟彼應腐敗。若無風界應無動搖。又若無風應無增長。
Question: how is it known that the four great elements are always inseparable from one another? Answer: because each element's own characteristic and function can be found within every kind of aggregate mass. That is, within a solid mass, earth's own characteristic is directly evident, and this point is beyond dispute; yet, within this same mass, were there no water-element, gold, silver, tin, and the like could never be melted down at all, and, without water, the mass would simply scatter apart; were there no fire-element, striking stones together would produce no fire at all, and, without fire, nothing could ripen to maturity but would simply rot and decay; were there no wind-element, there would be no motion at all, and, without wind, there would be no growth at all.
於濕聚中水界自相現可得故有義極成。於此聚中若無地界至嚴寒位應不成氷。又地若無船等應沒。若無火界應無煖時。又火若無彼應腐敗。若無風界應不動搖。又風若無應無增長。於煖聚中火界自相現可得故有義極成。於此聚中若無地界燈燭等焰應不可迴。又地若無不應持物。若無水界應不生流。又水若無焰不應聚。若無風界應不動搖。又若無風應無增長。於動聚中風界自相現可得故有義極成。於此聚中若無地界觸牆等障應不折迴。又地若無應不持物。若無水界應無冷風。又水若無彼應分散。若無火界應無煖風。又火若無彼應腐敗。問此四大種其相各異展轉相違。云何一時不相離起。
Within a liquid mass, water's own characteristic is directly evident, and this point is beyond dispute; yet, within this same mass, were there no earth-element, ice could never form even in the depths of severe cold, and, without earth, boats and the like ought to sink; were there no fire-element, there would be no warm season at all, and, without fire, the mass would simply rot and decay; were there no wind-element, there would be no motion at all, and, without wind, there would be no growth at all. Within a warm mass, fire's own characteristic is directly evident, and this point is beyond dispute; yet, within this same mass, were there no earth-element, a lamp's or torch's own flame could never be guided or redirected at all, and, without earth, nothing could be held or supported; were there no water-element, no flowing fuel could ever gather at all, and, without water, the flame could never properly coalesce; were there no wind-element, there would be no motion at all, and, without wind, there would be no growth at all. Within a moving mass, wind's own characteristic is directly evident, and this point is beyond dispute; yet, within this same mass, were there no earth-element, an obstruction such as a wall could never turn the wind's own motion back at all, and, without earth, nothing could be held or supported; were there no water-element, there would be no cool breeze at all, and, without water, the mass would simply scatter apart; were there no fire-element, there would be no warm breeze at all, and, without fire, it would simply rot and decay. Question: these four great elements each bear mutually different, seemingly contrary characteristics — how, then, can they arise together, at one and the same time, remaining forever inseparable?
Running the identical fourfold proof four separate times — once for each dominant element — rather than stating the general principle once and trusting the reader to generalize, reflects a deep methodological commitment: a claim this important, that the four elements can never be separated under any circumstance, is not allowed to rest on a single demonstrated case extended by analogy, but must be independently verified in every one of the four possible dominant configurations.
14. Different, But Not Opposed: Vasumitra's Final Distinction
The fascicle closes on an elegant philosophical resolution from the Venerable Vasumitra: having different characteristics and being genuinely mutually contrary are two entirely separate matters, not one implying the other. Dharmas that differ in characteristic yet are not contrary — like the four elements themselves, or the various colors and derived sense-qualities — can arise together in permanent, inseparable unity; but dharmas that are also genuinely contrary — firewood and fire, hail and a ripening crop, the eclipse-demon Rāhu and the full moon, medicine and disease, light and darkness — can never coexist at the same time in the same place.
尊者世友作如是說言。異相相違因緣各別。非諸相異皆必相違。諸不相違而相異者。容俱時起互不相離。如四大種及香味觸青黃色等。諸有異相而互相違。必無一時不相離起。如薪與火。雹與稼穡。邏呼月輪。藥病明闇。
The Venerable Vasumitra explains it this way: having different characteristics and being mutually contrary are two entirely separate causal matters, and not every pair of dharmas differing in characteristic is thereby necessarily mutually contrary as well. There are dharmas which, though differing in characteristic, are not mutually contrary, and such dharmas may indeed arise together at one and the same time, remaining forever inseparable — as with the four great elements themselves, together with smell, taste, touch, and the colors blue, yellow, and the rest. But there are also dharmas which, differing in characteristic, are also genuinely mutually contrary — and such dharmas can never, at one and the same time, arise together remaining inseparable — as with firewood and fire, hail and a ripening crop, Rāhu and the full disk of the moon, medicine and disease, and light and darkness.
Vasumitra's distinction does real philosophical work beyond this immediate puzzle: by denying that mere difference automatically implies exclusion, it opens conceptual space for exactly the kind of stable, permanent diversity-in-unity the four great elements themselves exhibit — showing that apparent tension between distinctness and coexistence was never a logical necessity to begin with, only a habit of thought the treatise here explicitly corrects.
Fascicle 131 Complete
This closes fascicle 131 of Ru-Yi's translation, drawn from the treatise's true CBETA boundary. Fascicle 131 completes the merit-in-giving narrative with the householder Ugra's equanimous giving and the equal merit of Sujātā's milk-porridge and Cunda's final meal, then opens the Condition Nyāsa (緣納息第二之一), refuting the Dṛṣṭāntikas' denial that conditions are real and constructing an exhaustive catalog of causal relations among the great elements, derived form, mind, the sense-fields, and the twenty-two faculties — closing with Vasumitra's elegant distinction between mere difference and genuine contrariety. Fascicle 132 continues within this same nyāsa.