Where Consciousness Comes to Rest
Fascicle 137 completes the elimination-of-form-perception meditation before undertaking a full analysis of the four, seven, and nine abodes of consciousness and sentient beings — why hell, the fourth dhyāna, and the highest formless sphere are excluded from every scheme — and opens an entirely new chapter with an exhaustive causal ledger for grasped and ungrasped great elements and derived form. This page carries Ru-Yi's complete translation.
Translation Method
The Chinese source is Xuánzàng's seventh-century translation of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), preserved in the Taishō canon (T1545, vol. 27) via the CBETA digital edition — public domain text, translated directly from the Chinese. The English wording throughout is Ru-Yi's own, and the reading notes are original, grounded in standard Sarvāstivāda scholarship rather than a specific named commentator's lecture transcript.
Fascicle 137 completes the Full-Vision Nyāsa (具見納息第三之四) and opens the Grasped Nyāsa (執受納息第四之一). Terms established across fascicles 93–136 recur here and are not re-explained at each occurrence.
Classical text is set in the left-hand column below, our English in the right.
1. The Elimination of Form-Perception: Its Own Anatomy
Fascicle 137 opens by finishing what fascicle 136 began: a complete technical anatomy of the elimination-of-form-perception meditation — its self-substance is wisdom, though named after perception since perception's own function predominates within it, exactly as mindfulness-based practices are named for mindfulness though wisdom underlies them too. A dense catalog follows, fixing its realm, ground, object, moral nature, and mode of attainment (preparatory practice, never mere freedom from defilement, so that even one already free of the fourth dhyāna's own defilement cannot manifest it without deliberate effort), before a careful non-equivalence is drawn between lacking the practice and remaining unfree of form's own defilement.
大種蘊第五中具見納息第三之四問此除色想。自體云何。答慧為自體。若爾何故以想為名。由此聚中想用增故。如持息念身等念住。本性生念。宿住隨念。皆慧為體。以念為名。念用增故。彼亦如是已說自體。應釋其名。此以何故名除色想。由此能遣諸積集色令不現前。名除色想。界者色界。
Fifth Aggregate, the Great Elements: the Full-Vision Nyāsa, Chapter Three, Part Four. Question: what is the self-substance of this elimination of form-perception? Answer: wisdom is its self-substance. Question: if so, why is it named using the word "perception"? Because, within this cluster of mental factors, the function of perception predominates — just as with mindfulness of breathing and the body, the other foundations of mindfulness, the innate arising of mindfulness, and recollection of past lives, all of which likewise have wisdom as their self-substance, yet are named using the word "mindfulness" because the function of mindfulness predominates within them — so too here. Having explained its self-substance, we should now explain its name. Why is it called "elimination of form-perception"? Because it is able to dispel every accumulated form so that it no longer manifests — hence it is called "elimination of form-perception." As for its realm: the form realm.
地者第四靜慮。所依者依欲界身。行相者不明了行相。所緣者緣欲界。問此緣欲界何法。答有說。即緣[卄/積]坑等處。有說。即緣彼處空界。如是說者。即緣所除所有諸色。於中有說。唯緣所除自身諸色念住者身念住。智者世俗智。等持者非等持俱。根者捨根相應世者通三世。過去緣過去。現在緣現在。未來可生者。緣未來。
As for its ground: the fourth dhyāna. As for what it depends upon: it depends on a desire-realm body. As for its own aspect: an unclear, indistinct aspect. As for its object: it takes the desire realm as its object. Question: what dharma of the desire realm, specifically, does it take as its object? Answer: some say, it takes as its object precisely such places as burial pits and mounds. Others say: it takes as its object the very empty space of those places. According to this final account: it takes as its object all the very forms that are being eliminated. On this point, some say: it takes as its object only its own body's forms specifically being eliminated. As for the foundation of mindfulness involved: the body as a foundation of mindfulness. As for the kind of knowledge: mundane knowledge. As for absorption: it is not accompanied by equipoise. As for its faculty: associated with the equanimity faculty. As for time: it pertains to all three times — taking the past as object when past, the present as object when present, and, as for the future, taking as object what is yet to arise;
不生者緣三世。善不善無記者。是善緣三種。有說。唯緣無記。三界繫不繫者。是色界繫。緣欲界繫。學無學非學非無學者。是非學非無學。緣非學非無學。見所斷修所斷不斷者。是修所斷。緣修所斷。緣自身他身非身者。有說。唯緣自身。有說。緣自他身。有說。通緣三種。緣名緣義者。唯緣義。加行得離染得者。是加行得。非離染得。已離第四靜慮染者。若不加行求此想時。終不能起令現前故有說。佛離染得。離有頂染時得故。餘加行得。有說。餘亦離染得。而加行現前。佛不加行獨覺下加行。聲聞或中或上。起處者在欲界。非色無色界。在人三洲非北洲。問此誰所起。答有說唯聖者非異生。有說。異生亦起。異生有二種。一內法異生。二外法異生。內法者能起非外法。以外法異生。長夜執我怖畏無我。不樂遣除內所依色故。已說此想自性等門復應顯示有雜無雜。問諸無除色想皆未離色染耶。答諸未離色染皆無除色想。有無除色想非未離色染。謂已離色染而未入彼定。問諸有除色想皆已離色染耶。答諸有除色想皆已離色染。有已離色染非有除色想。謂已離色染而未入彼定。所以者何。前說彼定唯加行得。非離染得故。雖已離第四靜慮染。若不加行求此定時。終不能起令現前故。有說。此定雖離染得。而獨覺等要起加行方令現前。此依現前有無作論故作是說。
— taking as object what will not arise, it pertains to all three times together. As for moral nature: it is wholesome, taking as object the three moral natures. Some say: it takes as object only neutral dharmas. As for the three realms — bound or unbound: it is form-realm-bound, taking the desire realm as its object. As for trainee, non-trainee, or neither: it is neither a trainee nor beyond training, taking as object what is neither a trainee's nor beyond training's own dharmas. As for cut off by seeing, by cultivation, or uncuttable: it is cut off by cultivation, taking as object what is cut off by cultivation. As for taking one's own body, another's body, or no body as object: some say, it takes only its own body as object; others say, it takes both its own and another's body as object; others say, it takes all three kinds indiscriminately as object. As for taking a name or a meaning as object: it takes only the meaning as object. As for whether it is attained through preparatory practice or through freedom from defilement: it is attained through preparatory practice, not through freedom from defilement — for even one who has already become free from the fourth dhyāna's own defilement, if he does not undertake the preparatory practice in seeking this perception, can never bring it into manifestation. Some say: the Buddha alone attains it through freedom from defilement, since he obtains it at the very moment of becoming free from the defilement of the Peak of Existence; all others attain it through preparatory practice. Others say: everyone else, too, attains it through freedom from defilement, yet must still undertake preparatory practice to bring it into actual manifestation — the Buddha alone requires no preparatory practice; a solitary-realized buddha requires only lesser preparatory practice; and a śrāvaka requires either middling or greater preparatory practice. As for where it arises: in the desire realm, not in the form or formless realm, and among the three human continents, not in Uttarakuru. Question: who, precisely, is capable of giving rise to it? Answer: some say, only noble ones, not ordinary beings; others say, ordinary beings, too, can give rise to it — and ordinary beings are of two kinds, inner-dharma and outer-dharma, of which only the inner-dharma kind is capable of giving rise to it, since outer-dharma ordinary beings, through the long night of time, have clung to a self and feared the absence of a self, and hence take no pleasure in dispelling the very form their own inner existence depends upon. Having now explained this perception's own nature and other categories, we should further show whether it is mixed with other things or unmixed with them. Question: does everyone lacking this elimination of form-perception necessarily remain unfree from form's own defilement? Answer: everyone unfree from form's own defilement does indeed lack this perception — yet there is one who lacks this perception without being unfree from form's own defilement, namely, one who has already become free from form's own defilement but has not yet entered this particular absorption. Question: does everyone possessing this elimination of form-perception necessarily have already become free from form's own defilement? Answer: everyone possessing this perception has indeed already become free from form's own defilement — yet there is one who has already become free from form's own defilement without possessing this perception, for the same reason as before, since this absorption is attained only through preparatory practice, never merely through freedom from defilement. Some say: though this absorption can indeed be attained through mere freedom from defilement, a solitary-realized buddha and the rest still require undertaking preparatory practice in order to bring it into actual manifestation — this treatise speaks according to whether it is actually manifest or not, and it is for this reason that this account is given.
That even a fully accomplished practitioner, already free of the fourth dhyāna's own defilement, still cannot manifest this perception without deliberately seeking it out is a quietly important corrective to any assumption that spiritual attainment automatically cascades into every capacity that resembles it: freedom from defilement clears the way, but it does not substitute for the specific, chosen effort a particular practice still requires.
2. Four Scriptures, One Practice: Reconciling Competing Accounts
A rich exercise in textual harmonization follows: the very same phrase, "elimination of form-perception," turns up across four separate scriptural sources — this treatise, the Aggregation Nyāsa, and two verses from the Arthavargīya's own Arthapada — each describing it slightly differently, whether by realm, by which grounds it belongs to, or by which foundation of mindfulness it falls under. Rather than declaring one source authoritative and the others mistaken, the treatise carefully maps out exactly how each account differs from the others, treating the discrepancy itself as worth explaining rather than explaining away.
問除色想言有多處說。謂此處說雜蘊。亦言入無色定除去色想。波羅衍拏亦作是說。
Question: the term "elimination of form-perception" is discussed in many different places — this present passage discusses it, as does the Aggregation Nyāsa, which further says that entering formless absorption eliminates form-perception; the Arthavargīya likewise speaks of it, saying:
諸有除色想 能除一切身於內外法中 無有不見者眾義品中亦作是說。
"Whoever possesses the elimination of form-perception is able to eliminate every bodily attachment; within both inner and outer dharmas alike, there is nothing that remains unseen." The Arthapada likewise speaks of it, saying:
於想有想非即離 亦非無想非除想如是平等除色想 無有染著彼因緣如是諸說義有何異。答此說能遣諸積集色令不現前。名除色想。波羅衍拏眾義品說。斷色界愛名除色想。雜蘊中說。不緣下地流轉諸色名除色想。有說。此除色想在第四靜慮。波羅衍拏眾義品說。除色想者在七地。謂未至中間四靜慮空無邊處近分。雜蘊所說除色想者。亦在七地。謂四無色上三近分。有說。此除色想是身念住。波羅衍拏眾義品說。除色想者是法念住。雜蘊所說除色想者。通四念住。有說此除色想是不共。餘三是共。有說。雜蘊所說是共。餘三不共。是名諸說異義。
"With respect to perception, whether one has perception or is free of it, is neither the point, nor is it the absence of perception, nor the mere elimination of perception — it is this very equanimity that eliminates form-perception, with no attachment remaining, on account of that cause." What difference in meaning is there among these various accounts? Answer: this present passage says that what is able to dispel every accumulated form, so that it no longer manifests, is called "elimination of form-perception." The Arthavargīya's Arthapada says that cutting off craving for the form realm is called "elimination of form-perception." The Aggregation Nyāsa says that not taking as object the forms that flow and turn within the lower grounds is called "elimination of form-perception." Some say: this present passage's own elimination of form-perception belongs specifically to the fourth dhyāna; the Arthavargīya's Arthapada says it belongs to seven grounds — namely, the not-yet-attained stage, the intermediate stage, the four dhyānas, and the access-stage of the sphere of boundless space; and the Aggregation Nyāsa's own account likewise belongs to seven grounds — namely, the four formless attainments together with the access-stages of the upper three. Some say: this present passage's elimination of form-perception is the foundation of mindfulness of the body; the Arthavargīya's Arthapada says it is the foundation of mindfulness of dharmas; and the Aggregation Nyāsa's own account pertains to all four foundations of mindfulness together. Some say: this present passage's elimination of form-perception is not shared with outside paths, while the other three accounts are shared. Others say: the Aggregation Nyāsa's own account is shared, while the other three are not shared. These, then, are the differences in meaning among these various accounts.
Taking four scriptural accounts of the same practice and mapping their precise differences, rather than picking a winner, shows this tradition's own working method at its best: a discrepancy between sources is not a problem to be resolved by force, but an invitation to notice that each source may simply be describing the same reality from a slightly different angle.
3. A New Topic: What Are the 'Abodes of Consciousness'?
The treatise turns to a foundational sūtra topic left unanalyzed in the scriptures themselves: the four, seven, and nine "abodes" into which consciousness and sentient beings are sorted. The four abodes of consciousness — form, feeling, perception, and formations — are defined as whatever contaminated aggregate, conducive to grasping, consciousness comes to rest upon, with a further refinement extending this even to aggregates belonging to no sentient being at all, since consciousness can take even inanimate objects as its own resting object.
四識住七識住。為四攝七。七攝四耶。乃至廣說。問何故作此論。
Do the four abodes of consciousness and the seven abodes of consciousness — does the former subsume the latter, or does the latter subsume the former? And so on, in full. Question: why compose this treatise?
答為欲分別契經義故。謂契經說。四識住七識住九有情居。而不廣分別。亦不明攝。今欲廣解。并顯相攝故。作斯論。四識住者。如契經說。一色隨識住。二受隨識住。三想隨識住。四行隨識住。色隨識住者。謂色有漏隨順於取有情數攝。行隨識住亦爾。受隨識住者。謂受有漏隨順於取想。隨識住亦爾。有餘師說。色隨識住者。
Answer: in order to analyze the meaning of a sūtra passage — for the sūtra speaks of the four abodes of consciousness, the seven abodes of consciousness, and the nine abodes of sentient beings, yet does not analyze them in full, nor clarify how they subsume one another; it is in order to now provide this full explanation that this treatise is composed. As for the four abodes of consciousness: as the sūtra says, first, form as an abode for consciousness to dwell upon; second, feeling; third, perception; fourth, formations. "Form as an abode for consciousness to dwell upon" means contaminated form, conducive to grasping, included among the sentient-being-aggregates; "formations" is likewise so. "Feeling as an abode for consciousness to dwell upon" means contaminated feeling, conducive to grasping; "perception" is likewise so. Other masters say: "form as an abode for consciousness to dwell upon" means —
謂色有漏隨順於取。有情數非有情數攝。行隨識住亦爾。受想隨識住如前說。問有情數蘊。說為識住。此事可爾。非有情數蘊云何名識住。答有多種識住。謂相應識住。俱有識住。所依識住。所緣識住。所行識住。非有情數蘊。是識所緣故名識住。已說自性。應說因緣。何因緣故說名識住。答識於此中住。等住近住故名識住。如馬等所住名馬等住。有說。此中憙所潤識增長廣大故名識住。有說。此中愛所潤識攝受不離故名識住。有說。此中諸有漏識隨順取識生起執著。安住增長故名識住。
— contaminated form, conducive to grasping, included among either the sentient-being-aggregates or the non-sentient-being-aggregates; "formations" is likewise so; "feeling" and "perception" are as already explained. Question: that the sentient-being-aggregates are spoken of as an abode of consciousness — this much makes sense; but how can the non-sentient-being-aggregates also be called an abode of consciousness? Answer: there are, in fact, several kinds of abode of consciousness — namely, through association, through co-existence, as basis, and as object and sphere of activity. The non-sentient-being-aggregates, being objects that consciousness takes, are hence called an abode of consciousness as well. Having explained its own nature, we should now explain its cause — for what cause is it called an abode of consciousness? Answer: consciousness dwells, abides evenly, and rests near within it — hence it is called an abode of consciousness, just as the place a horse and the rest dwell is called a horse-abode and the like. Others say: it is called so because, within it, consciousness moistened by delight grows and expands. Others say: it is called so because, within it, consciousness moistened by craving is grasped and held, never departing. Others say: it is called so because, within it, every kind of contaminated consciousness, conducive to grasping, arises, clings, and settles, growing ever further.
That even a lifeless object can count as an "abode of consciousness," simply by being something consciousness takes as its object, quietly widens the entire framework beyond what its name first suggests: an "abode," on this account, is defined not by what has a mind, but by what a mind can rest upon — a definition broad enough to include the whole of the perceivable world.
4. Why the Undying Never Needs a Home
A cluster of explanations converges on a single question: why are uncontaminated dharmas never counted among the abodes of consciousness? Every answer traces back to the same underlying asymmetry — an abode of consciousness is, by definition, something that sustains, increases, and entrenches existence, feeding a craving- or delight-moistened consciousness that clings and grows within it, while the uncontaminated actively diminishes and undoes existence instead, offering nothing for consciousness to settle into or feed upon.
問何故無漏法不立識住。答諸無漏法無識住相故。復次若法能增益有。能攝受有。能住持有。立為識住。諸無漏法能損減有。能違害有。能破壞有。故非識住。復次若法乃至是身見事。乃至墮苦集諦立為識住。諸無漏法乃至非身見事。乃至不墮苦集諦。故非識住。
Question: why are uncontaminated dharmas not established as an abode of consciousness? Answer: because uncontaminated dharmas possess none of the marks of an abode of consciousness. Further: whatever dharma is capable of increasing existence, of grasping and holding existence, of sustaining and maintaining existence, is established as an abode of consciousness — uncontaminated dharmas, being capable of diminishing existence, of contradicting and harming existence, of destroying existence, are hence not an abode of consciousness. Further: whatever dharma constitutes an object of the view of a real self, and falls under the truth of suffering and its origin, is established as an abode of consciousness — uncontaminated dharmas, not constituting such an object and not falling under those truths, are hence not an abode of consciousness.
有說。若法憙所潤識於中增長廣大立為識住。諸無漏法與此相違故非識住。有說。若法愛所潤識於中攝受不離立為識住。諸無漏法則不如是。故非識住。有說。若法諸有漏識隨順取識於中生起執著。
Others say: whatever dharma is such that, within it, consciousness moistened by delight grows and expands, is established as an abode of consciousness — uncontaminated dharmas, being the opposite of this, are hence not an abode of consciousness. Others say: whatever dharma is such that, within it, consciousness moistened by craving is grasped and held, never departing, is established as an abode of consciousness — uncontaminated dharmas are not so, and hence are not an abode of consciousness. Others say: whatever dharma is such that every kind of contaminated consciousness, conducive to grasping, arises, clings, and settles,
安住增長立為識住。諸無漏法與此相違故非識住。
— growing ever further within it, is established as an abode of consciousness — uncontaminated dharmas, being the opposite of this, are hence not an abode of consciousness.
Defining an "abode" as whatever sustains and entrenches existence has a striking corollary the treatise leaves implicit but unmistakable: liberation itself, being everything an abode is not, could never be described as a home to settle into — it is, by this very definition, the one place consciousness can never actually dwell.
5. Why Consciousness Is Never Its Own Abode
A genuinely elegant puzzle asks why consciousness itself is never counted as its own abode, resolved through the vivid image of a king's own throne: a throne exists for the king's sake, not the other way around, and a road is what a king travels, never something a king could himself become — an abode, likewise, is simply whatever consciousness comes to rest upon, and consciousness, riding and driving every abode the way a king rides a road, can never simultaneously be the road it rides.
問何故識非識住。答為識故立識住。如為王故立王座。如王座王床王路亦爾。如王非路路非王。是王所行故名王路。如是識非住住非識。是識所止故名識住。是故識非識住。有說。若法識所乘御。如象馬船人所乘御。彼法立識住非識。乘御於識故識非識住。復次若法與識俱生俱住俱滅。於識有用立為識住。識於識不爾。有說。識住法爾與識俱在現在。是識所住。非識與識得有此事。問自識他識俱在現在。何不展轉立識住耶。答自識於自識非識住故。於他識亦非無異相故。復次於自識親尚非識住。況於踈遠。有說。若法與識三和合生。互有作用立為識住。非識與識三和合生互有作用。故非識住。
Question: why is consciousness itself not an abode of consciousness? Answer: it is for the sake of consciousness that an abode of consciousness is established, exactly as a throne is established for the sake of a king — just as, likewise, a king's own throne, bed, and road are all established for the king's sake. Just as a king is not himself a road, nor is a road itself a king — a road is simply what a king travels upon, and hence is called a "king's road" — so too, an abode is not itself consciousness, nor is consciousness itself an abode; an abode is simply what consciousness comes to rest upon, and hence is called an "abode of consciousness" — and it is for this reason that consciousness is not itself an abode of consciousness. Others say: whatever dharma is ridden and driven by consciousness, exactly as an elephant, horse, boat, or person is ridden and driven by someone, is what is established as an abode of consciousness, not consciousness itself, since it is consciousness that rides and drives it. Further: whatever dharma arises together with consciousness, abides together with it, and perishes together with it, exercising some function with respect to consciousness, is established as an abode of consciousness — consciousness, with respect to consciousness, does not function in this way. Others say: it is by the very nature of things that an abode of consciousness exists together with consciousness in the present alone, being what consciousness abides upon — consciousness, with respect to consciousness, cannot possibly stand in this same relation. Question: since one's own consciousness and another's consciousness both exist together in the present, why does one not establish an abode of consciousness through their mutual relation as well? Answer: one's own consciousness, with respect to one's own consciousness, is not an abode of consciousness, nor, with respect to another's consciousness, is there any difference in this regard. Further: even with respect to one's own, closely related consciousness, it is not an abode of consciousness — how much less, then, with respect to something so much more distant and unrelated. Others say: whatever dharma arises together with consciousness through the combination of the three factors, each exercising its own function upon the other, is established as an abode of consciousness — consciousness, with respect to consciousness, does not arise through such a threefold combination, and hence is not an abode of consciousness.
The throne-and-road image does more than merely illustrate a grammatical asymmetry between subject and object: it captures something genuinely structural about how this tradition conceives of consciousness itself — always the rider, never the ridden, always doing the resting rather than being rested upon, a directionality built into the very logic of what consciousness is.
6. Each Realm Its Own Consciousness's Own House
The treatise settles a technical principle: each realm and dhyāna-ground's own aggregates are called an abode of consciousness precisely because that same realm's own consciousness dwells there — with a subtle wrinkle for a desire-realm being who manifests an uncontaminated mind belonging to a higher realm, whose resulting aggregates are still called an abode of consciousness even without a same-category consciousness presently resting in them, exactly as an ornamental water-channel, shaped like an elephant or lion's mouth, remains a "water-outlet" even while no water happens to be flowing through it at the moment.
由自分識於中住故。自分諸蘊得識住名。謂欲界蘊。欲界識所住。
— since it is precisely on account of a given category's own consciousness dwelling within it that the aggregates of that same category come to be given the name "abode of consciousness" — that is, the desire realm's own aggregates are what the desire realm's own consciousness dwells upon,
色界蘊色界識所住。無色界蘊。無色界識所住。初靜慮蘊。初靜慮識所住。乃至非想非非想處蘊。非想非非想識所住。問生欲界起色無色界無漏心現在前。現在二蘊是識住不。答應言是識住。問無同分識於中止住。云何名識住。答得識住相故。謂同分識餘緣故不生。非此不能生故亦名識住。如泉池側。置象馬魚師子等口以為注道。水不行時非此為障。水若行者為作所依。雖水不行亦名注道。
the form realm's own aggregates are what the form realm's own consciousness dwells upon, the formless realm's own aggregates are what the formless realm's own consciousness dwells upon; the first dhyāna's own aggregates are what the first dhyāna's own consciousness dwells upon, and so on, up through the aggregates of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception being what the consciousness of that same sphere dwells upon. Question: for one born in the desire realm who gives rise to an uncontaminated mind belonging to the form or formless realm and brings it into manifestation, are the two present aggregates thereby manifest an abode of consciousness, or not? Answer: it should be said that they are indeed an abode of consciousness. Question: if there is no same-category consciousness resting within them, how can they be called an abode of consciousness? Answer: because they possess the mark of an abode of consciousness — that is, though a same-category consciousness fails to arise there on account of some other condition, it is not that this dharma is incapable of giving rise to it, and hence it, too, is still called an abode of consciousness — just as, at the side of a spring or pool, channels are set up in the shape of an elephant, horse, fish, or lion's mouth, to serve as water-outlets: even when water is not presently flowing through them, this is not because they are somehow obstructed, but, should water ever flow, they would serve as its support — and, even while the water is not flowing, they are still called "water-outlets."
The image of a dry ornamental channel, still called a "water-outlet" even with no water presently flowing, elegantly separates a thing's own function from its momentary use: an abode of consciousness, like the channel, is defined by what it is capable of supporting, not merely by what happens to be occupying it at any given instant.
7. The First Two Abodes: Differing Bodies, Differing or Matching Minds
The seven abodes of consciousness now unfold in careful, textured detail, each keyed to a specific realm and defined along two axes — bodily uniformity and perceptual uniformity. The first abode covers humans and desire-realm gods, whose bodies differ in color and shape and whose perceptions differ between pleasure, pain, and neutrality; the second covers the newly-arisen gods of the Brahma-Pariṣadya heaven, whose bodies likewise differ yet who share, at the very moment of their first birth, one single, undifferentiated defiled perception — a uniformity the treatise notes will not last, since their perceptions soon come to differ as well.
彼亦如是。七識住者。如契經說。有色有情身異想異。如人一分天是第一識住有色者。謂彼有情有色可了。有色身。有色界處蘊。有色施設。故名有色。有情者。謂諦義勝義。有情不可得非實有體。
It is the very same here. As for the seven abodes of consciousness: as the sūtra says, there are sentient beings possessing form, with differing bodies and differing perceptions, such as humans and a portion of the gods — this is the first abode of consciousness. "Possessing form" means that those sentient beings possess a form that can be discerned, a form-body, form-realm sense-fields and aggregates, and a form-based designation — hence they are called "possessing form." "Sentient being" refers, in the sense of ultimate truth, to something that cannot actually be apprehended, having no genuinely real substance of its own;
然於界處蘊中。假想施設說為有情。㮈落。意生。儒童。養者。補特伽羅。命者。生者。故名有情。身異者。謂彼有情有種種身。種種顯形狀貌差別故名身異。想異者。謂彼有情。有樂想。苦想。不苦樂想。故名想異。如人一分天者。人則一切人。一分天。謂欲界天。是第一識住者。第一則次第中最初數。識住謂彼所繫色受想行識。釋識住義已如前說。有色有情身異想一。如梵眾天。謂彼初起是第二識住。有色等如前說。想一者。謂彼有情染想無異。如梵眾天者。此顯梵世諸天。謂彼初起者。謂彼初生同起染想。後便想異。是第二識住者。第二准前識住。如前說。有色有情身一想異。
yet, within the aggregates, sense-fields, and elements, it is provisionally conceived and designated, and spoken of as a "sentient being," a "born-one," a "mind-born-one," a "youth," a "nurtured-one," a "person," a "life," or an "arisen-one" — and hence it is called a "sentient being." "Differing bodies" means that these sentient beings possess bodies of many different kinds, differing in their various colors, shapes, and appearances. "Differing perceptions" means that these sentient beings possess the perception of pleasure, the perception of pain, and the perception of neither pleasure nor pain. "Such as humans and a portion of the gods": "humans" here refers to all humans; "a portion of the gods" refers to the gods of the desire realm. "This is the first" means that it is the very first in numerical sequence; "abode of consciousness" refers to the form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness bound up with those beings — the meaning of "abode of consciousness" has already been explained above. There are sentient beings possessing form, with differing bodies yet a single, uniform perception, such as the gods of the Brahma-Pariṣadya heaven at the very moment of their first arising — this is the second abode of consciousness. "Possessing form" and the rest are as already explained. "A single, uniform perception" means that these sentient beings share a single, undifferentiated defiled perception. "Such as the gods of the Brahma-Pariṣadya heaven" refers here to the gods of the Brahma world generally. "At the very moment of their first arising" means that, at the moment of their first birth, they simultaneously give rise to this same shared, defiled perception, though their perceptions later come to differ. "This is the second" corresponds, as before, to the meaning already explained above. There are sentient beings possessing form, with a single, uniform body, yet differing perceptions,
The passing observation that the Brahma-Pariṣadya gods' shared perception at birth "will not last" is a small but telling detail: even a category built to capture a moment of genuine uniformity is careful to flag that uniformity as temporary, refusing to let a snapshot description harden into a permanent claim about beings who are, like everything else in this system, still changing.
8. The Third and Fourth Abodes: One Body, Many Minds — or One of Each
The pattern inverts and then resolves: the third abode covers the second dhyāna's Ābhāsvara gods, uniform in body but differing in perception, oscillating between pleasure and neutrality as they grow weary of the fundamental level's own joy and retreat to the access-level's equanimity, only to grow weary of equanimity in turn and return to joy — compared, memorably, to a wealthy person alternating between worldly and spiritual pleasure, each eventually palling in favor of the other. The fourth abode, the third dhyāna's Śubhakṛtsna gods, achieves at last a genuine double uniformity, one body and one undifferentiated neutral perception alike.
如極光淨天。是第三識住。有色等如前說。身一者。謂彼有情有一類身。一類顯形狀貌無別。想異者。謂彼有情有樂想不苦不樂想。
such as the gods of the Ābhāsvara heaven — this is the third abode of consciousness. "Possessing form" and the rest are as already explained. "A single, uniform body" means that these sentient beings possess a single kind of body, of a single kind of color, shape, and appearance, with no distinction among them. "Differing perceptions" means that these sentient beings possess the perception of pleasure and the perception of neither pleasure nor pain,
由彼諸天厭根本地喜根已。起近分地捨根現前。厭近分地捨根已。
on account of these gods, having grown weary of the fundamental level's own joy-faculty, giving rise instead to and manifesting the access-level's equanimity-faculty; and, having grown weary of the access-level's equanimity-faculty,
起根本地喜根現前。如富貴人。厭欲樂已欣住法樂厭法樂已欣住欲樂。如極光淨天者。此顯第二靜慮諸天。有色有情身一想一。如遍淨天。是第四識住。有色等如前說。想一者。謂彼有情有無覆無記無差別想。如遍淨天者。此顯第三靜慮諸天。無色有情一切色想皆超越故。諸有對想皆隱沒故。於別異想不作意故。入無邊空。空無邊處具足住。如隨空無邊處天。是第五識住。無色有情一切空無邊處皆超越故。入無邊識。識無邊處具足住。如隨識無邊處天。是第六識住。無色有情一切識無邊處皆超越故。入無少所有無所有處具足住。如隨無所有處天。是第七識住。此中諸無色者。謂彼有情無色可了。無有色身。無色界處蘊。無色施設故名無色。有情等如前說。一切空無邊處皆超越等如餘處說。識住者。謂彼所繫受想行識。問何故初靜慮有異身非上地。答以初靜慮立王臣眾有差別故。
they again give rise to and manifest the fundamental level's own joy-faculty — just as a wealthy and eminent person, weary of sensual pleasure, delights instead in dwelling in the pleasure of the Dharma, and, weary of the pleasure of the Dharma, again delights in dwelling in sensual pleasure. "Such as the gods of the Ābhāsvara heaven" refers here to the gods of the second dhyāna generally. There are sentient beings possessing form, with a single, uniform body and a single, uniform perception, such as the gods of the Śubhakṛtsna heaven — this is the fourth abode of consciousness. "Possessing form" and the rest are as already explained. "A single, uniform perception" means that these sentient beings possess a single, undifferentiated, unobscured-neutral perception. "Such as the gods of the Śubhakṛtsna heaven" refers here to the gods of the third dhyāna generally. Formless sentient beings, having entirely transcended every perception of form, every perception of resistance having become entirely hidden, and, no longer attending to any perception of difference at all, enter the sphere of boundless space and dwell fully absorbed within it — such as the gods who follow the sphere of boundless space — this is the fifth abode of consciousness. Formless sentient beings, having entirely transcended the entire sphere of boundless space, enter the sphere of boundless consciousness and dwell fully absorbed within it — this is the sixth abode of consciousness. Formless sentient beings, having entirely transcended the entire sphere of boundless consciousness, enter the sphere of nothing-whatsoever and dwell fully absorbed within it — this is the seventh abode of consciousness. Here, "formless" means that these sentient beings possess no form that can be discerned, no form-body, no form-realm sense-fields or aggregates, and no form-based designation. "Sentient being" and the rest are as already explained. "Abode of consciousness" refers to the feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness bound up with those beings. Question: why does the first dhyāna alone have differing bodies, while the higher grounds do not?
The image of a wealthy person cycling between sensual pleasure and the pleasure of the Dharma, each eventually growing stale in favor of the other, is a wry piece of psychological observation smuggled into a cosmological catalog: even among gods experiencing the second dhyāna's own refined bliss, the treatise recognizes the same restless pattern of satiation and renewed appetite familiar from any ordinary human life.
9. Why the First Dhyāna Alone Has Different-Looking Gods
A pointed question asks why only the first dhyāna's own gods display bodily variety, while every higher ground achieves uniformity — answered through the first dhyāna's own distinctive social structure, its Great Brahmā ruling over a court of Brahma-Purohita ministers and Brahma-Pariṣadya retinue, each rank differing visibly in color, form, dress, and speech exactly as a royal court does, with five further explanations locating the same asymmetry instead in differing grades of feeling, in the presence or absence of discursive thought, manifest karma, the four consciousness-bodies, or the three kinds of feeling.
謂大梵王與諸梵輔及諸梵眾數數集會。於中種種顯形狀貌。衣服語言各有差別。上地不爾。有說。初靜慮受上中下無別異。業異熟故身有異。上地不爾。有說。初靜慮受有尋伺。業異熟故身有異。上地不爾。有說。初靜慮受表無表。業異熟故身有異。上地不爾。有說。初靜慮受四識身相應。業異熟故身有異。上地不爾。有說。初靜慮受三受相應。業異熟故身有異。上地不爾。由如是等種種因緣。初靜慮身異上地身一。又初靜慮。由染污想說為想一。第二靜慮。由善想說為想異。第三靜慮。由無覆無記異熟想說為想一。問何故惡趣。第四靜慮。非想非非想處。皆不立識住耶。答有作是說。彼亦應立在識住中。而不立者。是有餘說。尊者世友作如是說。此是世尊要略而說。然惡趣等攝在此中。謂諸惡趣當知攝在初識住中。第四靜慮攝次三中。非想非非想處攝後三中。所以者何。
Answer: because the first dhyāna alone establishes a distinction between a king and his ministers and retinue — that is, the Great Brahmā King repeatedly gathers together with the Brahma-Purohita and Brahma-Pariṣadya gods, and, among them, their various colors, shapes, appearances, clothing, and speech each differ — the higher grounds are not so. Others say: in the first dhyāna, the ripening-result of karma differs according to whether the feeling experienced is of upper, middle, or lower grade, and hence the body differs — the higher grounds are not so. Others say: in the first dhyāna, the ripening-result of karma differs according to whether the feeling is accompanied by discursive and investigative thought, and hence the body differs — the higher grounds are not so. Others say: in the first dhyāna, the ripening-result of karma differs according to whether the feeling is accompanied by manifest or unmanifest karma, and hence the body differs — the higher grounds are not so. Others say: in the first dhyāna, the ripening-result of karma differs according to whether the feeling is associated with the four kinds of consciousness-body, and hence the body differs — the higher grounds are not so. Others say: in the first dhyāna, the ripening-result of karma differs according to whether the feeling is associated with the three kinds of feeling, and hence the body differs — the higher grounds are not so. It is through causes and conditions such as these that the first dhyāna's own bodies differ, while the higher grounds' bodies are uniform. Further, in the first dhyāna, on account of defiled perception, it is spoken of as having a single, uniform perception; in the second dhyāna, on account of wholesome perception, it is spoken of as having differing perceptions; in the third dhyāna, on account of unobscured-neutral ripening-perception, it is spoken of as having a single, uniform perception. Question: why are the evil destinies, the fourth dhyāna, and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception none of them established as an abode of consciousness? Answer: some say that they, too, ought properly to be established among the abodes of consciousness, and that their not being so established should be understood as a matter left with some further, supplementary account. The Venerable Vasumitra explains it this way: this is simply the World-Honored One's own concise manner of speaking, and the evil destinies and the rest are, in fact, already subsumed within the abodes given — that is, the evil destinies should be understood as subsumed within the first abode of consciousness; the fourth dhyāna is subsumed within the middle three; and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is subsumed within the last three — for why is this?
Explaining bodily diversity through the first dhyāna's own court hierarchy — a Brahmā, his ministers, his retinue, each visibly marked by rank — quietly imports something recognizably social and political into what might otherwise read as a purely metaphysical catalog: even the architecture of the heavens, on this account, echoes the same distinctions of status that structure a royal court on earth.
10. Why Hell, the Fourth Dhyāna, and the Highest Formless Sphere Are Never Called Home
A remarkable cascade of explanations addresses why the evil destinies, the fourth dhyāna, and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception are excluded from the seven abodes of consciousness altogether — competing accounts locate the reason in the absence of craving- or view-grasped consciousness, in the scarcity of specific kinds of cuttable or uncuttable consciousness, in consciousness simply refusing to settle happily in a place of either overwhelming suffering or unstable pleasure, in the active presence of consciousness-destroying attainments like non-perception or cessation, or in the absence of the twin causes — concentration and birth — needed to bring forth a genuinely superior consciousness there at all.
以界同故。有說。若處有二種識多分可得。立為識住。一愛所攝受識。二見所攝受識。惡趣及非想非非想處。愛所攝受識多分不可得。第四靜慮。見所攝受識多分不可得。故非識住。有說。若處有三種識多分可得。立為識住。一見所斷識。二修所斷識。三不斷識。惡趣。非想非非想處。不斷識俱不可得。第四靜慮。見所斷識多分不可得。故非識住。問豈不第四靜慮異生。皆有見所斷識可得耶。答雖有而於彼地非多分可得。五淨居天全無有故。問人欲界天。不斷識亦不可得。應非識住。答可得有二。一自性可得。二所依可得。人欲界天。不斷識雖非自性可得。而所依可得故立識住。
— because they belong to the same realm. Others say: wherever the two kinds of consciousness — consciousness grasped and held by craving, and consciousness grasped and held by views — can, for the most part, both be found, that place is established as an abode of consciousness; in the evil destinies and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, consciousness grasped by craving cannot, for the most part, be found; in the fourth dhyāna, consciousness grasped by views cannot, for the most part, be found — and hence neither is an abode of consciousness. Others say: wherever three kinds of consciousness — consciousness cut off by seeing, consciousness cut off by cultivation, and uncuttable consciousness — can, for the most part, all be found, that place is established as an abode of consciousness; in the evil destinies and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, uncuttable consciousness cannot be found at all; in the fourth dhyāna, consciousness cut off by seeing cannot, for the most part, be found — and hence neither is an abode of consciousness. Question: is it not the case that ordinary beings in the fourth dhyāna can all be found to possess consciousness cut off by seeing? Answer: though this is indeed found, it is not found for the most part within that ground, since the five Pure Abodes entirely lack it. Question: among humans and desire-realm gods, uncuttable consciousness likewise cannot be found — should this, too, then, fail to be an abode of consciousness? Answer: there are two senses of "can be found" — one, found in its own nature; the other, found in its own basis. Among humans and desire-realm gods, though uncuttable consciousness is not found in its own nature, it is found in its own basis, and hence this is still established as an abode of consciousness.
問豈不非想非非想處。不斷識亦所依可得耶。生彼有得阿羅漢故。
Question: is it not the case that, in the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, too, uncuttable consciousness can be found in its own basis, since beings born there are indeed capable of attaining arhatship?
答雖有而非多分。以生彼中暫起聖道。取無學果已。乃至涅槃不現前故。有說。若處有六種識多分可得立為識住。謂見苦所斷識。乃至修所斷識。及不斷識。惡趣。非想非非想處。不斷識俱不可得。
Answer: though this is indeed found, it is not found for the most part, since, for beings born there, the noble path only briefly arises, and, once the fruit beyond training has been attained, it does not manifest again until parinirvāṇa itself. Others say: wherever six kinds of consciousness — consciousness cut off by the seeing of suffering, and so on up through consciousness cut off by cultivation, together with uncuttable consciousness — can, for the most part, all be found, that place is established as an abode of consciousness; in the evil destinies and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, uncuttable consciousness cannot be found at all;
第四靜慮。前四所斷識。多分不可得故非識住。問答分別如前應知。有說。若處識所樂住立為識住。諸惡趣中苦所逼故識不樂住。
in the fourth dhyāna, consciousness cut off by any of the first four kinds of seeing cannot, for the most part, be found — and hence neither is an abode of consciousness. The remaining questions and answers should be understood by analogy, as explained above. Others say: wherever consciousness delights to dwell, that place is established as an abode of consciousness; in the evil destinies, consciousness, oppressed by suffering, does not delight to dwell;
第四靜慮樂。遷動故識不安住。謂諸異生或樂入無色。或樂入無想。或樂令識滅。若諸聖者或樂入無色。或樂入淨居。或樂入無餘。非想非非想處。極寂靜故心微劣故識不樂住。有說。若處無壞識法。而可得者立為識住。諸惡趣中有極苦受。第四靜慮。有無想定。無想異熟非想非非想處。有滅盡定。能壞識法故非識住。有說。若處由二事故。發起殊勝異分諸識。令現在前立為識住。一由定故。二由生故。惡趣。非想非非想處。二事俱無。第四靜慮。雖有定故而無生故。有言。惡趣二事俱無第四靜慮雖有定故而無生故。非想非非想處雖有生故而無定故。由如是等種種因緣。惡趣等非識住。
in the fourth dhyāna, on account of its own pleasure being subject to sudden shifting, consciousness does not rest securely there — that is, ordinary beings there either delight in entering the formless realm, or delight in entering the state of non-perception, or delight in bringing consciousness itself to cessation; while noble ones there either delight in entering the formless realm, or delight in entering the Pure Abodes, or delight in entering final nirvāṇa without remainder. As for the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, being so extremely tranquil, and the mind there so faint and weak, consciousness does not delight to dwell there either. Others say: wherever a dharma capable of destroying consciousness is not to be found, that place is established as an abode of consciousness; in the evil destinies, there is extremely painful feeling; in the fourth dhyāna, there is the attainment of non-perception and the ripening-result of non-perception; in the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, there is the attainment of cessation — each capable of destroying consciousness, and hence none of these is an abode of consciousness. Others say: wherever a place gives rise, through two specific causes, to distinctively superior forms of consciousness and brings them into manifestation, that place is established as an abode of consciousness — the two causes being, first, through concentration, and second, through birth. The evil destinies and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception lack both of these causes entirely; the fourth dhyāna, though it has the cause of concentration, lacks the cause of birth. Others say: the evil destinies lack both causes entirely; the fourth dhyāna, though it has the cause of concentration, lacks the cause of birth; and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, though it has the cause of birth, lacks the cause of concentration. It is through causes and conditions such as these that the evil destinies and the rest are not established as abodes of consciousness.
That so many independent explanations converge on excluding the very same three places — the worst realm, the most unstable heaven, and the most rarefied formless sphere — from counting as anyone's true home suggests something the treatise never states outright: an abode of consciousness, on every account offered, requires a kind of livable middle ground, neither too much suffering nor too little grip, and both extremes of the cosmos alike fail this same basic test of habitability.
11. Solving the First Puzzle: Why Consciousness Joins Its Own List the Second Time
A satisfying resolution closes the loop on an earlier puzzle: why does consciousness exclude itself from the four abodes of consciousness, yet include itself among the seven? The answer distinguishes two entirely different relations — the four abodes require something ridden and driven by consciousness, closely accompanying it, a relation consciousness cannot have with itself; the seven abodes require only a mutual cause-and-effect relationship, sustaining one another in turn, a relation consciousness can indeed have with itself across successive moments.
問何故四識住中識非識住。七識住中識是識住。答由別因故立四識住。由別因故立七識住。謂若有法識所乘御。與識俱行親近和合。
Question: why, among the four abodes of consciousness, is consciousness itself not an abode of consciousness, while, among the seven abodes of consciousness, consciousness itself is an abode of consciousness? Answer: the four abodes of consciousness are established for one reason, and the seven abodes of consciousness for a different reason — that is, whatever dharma is ridden and driven by consciousness, closely accompanying and combining with it,
立四識住。識望於識無如是事故。不立在四識住中。若法與識為因為果。展轉相資立七識住。識望於識有如是事。是故立在七識住中。
is what establishes the four abodes of consciousness — and consciousness, with respect to consciousness, has no such relation, and hence is not established among the four. Whatever dharma serves, in turn, as cause and as effect for consciousness, mutually sustaining one another, is what establishes the seven abodes of consciousness — and consciousness, with respect to consciousness, does have such a relation, and hence is established among the seven.
Resolving this puzzle by distinguishing two entirely different technical senses of "relation to consciousness" — one requiring a rider-and-vehicle structure consciousness cannot have with itself, the other requiring only mutual causal sustenance, which it can — is a clean demonstration of how much apparent contradiction in this literature dissolves once a single ambiguous term is properly disambiguated.
12. The Nine Abodes of Sentient Beings, in Full
A parallel, slightly broader classification now runs through all nine abodes of sentient beings, largely mirroring the seven abodes of consciousness but adding two further categories the earlier scheme excluded: a fifth abode for the Asaṃjñisattva heaven's non-percipient gods, whose own perception has simply ceased entirely, and a ninth abode completing the formless spheres with the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception itself, bringing every possible combination of bodily and perceptual uniformity, present or entirely absent, into a single, exhaustive nine-part scheme.
九有情居者。如契經說。有色有情身異想異。如人一分天。是第一有情居。有色有情身異想一。如梵眾天。是第二有情居。有色有情身一想異。如極光淨天。是第三有情居。有色有情身一想一。如遍淨天。是第四有情居。有色等如前說。有情居者。謂彼所繫色受想行識。又是有情所居。所住。所止。生處。故名有情居。有色有情。無想無別想。如無想有情天。是第五有情居。有色等如前說。
As for the nine abodes of sentient beings: as the sūtra says, there are sentient beings possessing form, with differing bodies and differing perceptions, such as humans and a portion of the gods — this is the first abode of sentient beings. There are sentient beings possessing form, with differing bodies yet a single, uniform perception, such as the gods of the Brahma-Pariṣadya heaven — this is the second abode of sentient beings. There are sentient beings possessing form, with a single, uniform body, yet differing perceptions, such as the gods of the Ābhāsvara heaven — this is the third abode of sentient beings. There are sentient beings possessing form, with a single, uniform body and a single, uniform perception, such as the gods of the Śubhakṛtsna heaven — this is the fourth abode of sentient beings. "Possessing form" and the rest are as already explained. "Abode of sentient beings" refers to the form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness bound up with those beings — and, further, it is where sentient beings dwell, abide, rest, and are born, and hence it is called an "abode of sentient beings." There are sentient beings possessing form, lacking perception, with no differentiation of perception whatsoever, such as the sentient beings of the Asaṃjñisattva heaven — this is the fifth abode of sentient beings. "Possessing form" and the rest are as already explained.
無想者。彼處長時想等滅故。則由此義名無想有情天。無色有情一切色想皆超越。故諸有對想皆隱沒故。於別異想不作意故。入無邊空空無邊處具足住。如隨空無邊處天。是第六有情居。無色有情。
"Lacking perception" means that, in that place, perception and the rest have long since ceased entirely — and it is on this basis that it is called the Asaṃjñisattva heaven, the heaven of non-percipient beings. Formless sentient beings, having entirely transcended every perception of form, every perception of resistance having become entirely hidden, and, no longer attending to any perception of difference at all, enter the sphere of boundless space and dwell fully absorbed within it — this is the sixth abode of sentient beings. Formless sentient beings,
一切空無邊處皆超越故。入無邊識。識無邊處具足住。如隨識無邊處天。是第七有情居。無色有情一切識無邊處皆超越故。入無少所有。無所有處具足住。如隨無所有處天。是第八有情居。無色有情一切無所有處皆超越故。入非想非非想處具足住。如隨非想非非想處天。是第九有情居。無色等如前說。一切無所有處皆超越等如餘處說。
having entirely transcended the entire sphere of boundless space, enter the sphere of boundless consciousness and dwell fully absorbed within it — this is the seventh abode of sentient beings. Formless sentient beings, having entirely transcended the entire sphere of boundless consciousness, enter the sphere of nothing-whatsoever and dwell fully absorbed within it — this is the eighth abode of sentient beings. Formless sentient beings, having entirely transcended the entire sphere of nothing-whatsoever, enter the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception and dwell fully absorbed within it — this is the ninth abode of sentient beings. "Formless" and the rest are as already explained; "having entirely transcended the entire sphere of nothing-whatsoever" and the rest are as explained elsewhere.
Adding exactly the two categories the seven-abodes scheme had excluded — the abode where perception is simply absent, and the abode at the very edge of perception's own coherence — shows the nine-abodes framework completing a project the seven-abodes one had left deliberately unfinished: a fuller accounting of every way a sentient being's own perception can be present, patterned, uniform, or gone altogether.
13. The Border City No One Wants to Call Home
A vivid closing image explains why the evil destinies and the fourth dhyāna's non-Asaṃjñisattva heavens are excluded even from the broader nine abodes of sentient beings: neither place is one beings come to by their own free choice, nor one they wish to remain in once there, exactly like a kingdom's own troubled border city, forever harassed by bandits and hostile neighbors, its wealthy families relocating elsewhere despite a token garrison left to hold the post, and visiting merchants warned bluntly by the garrison itself, "there is nothing here worth relying upon" — a place, everyone agrees, that is "no true city at all."
問何緣惡趣及無想所不攝。廣果天等非有情居。答有作是說。彼亦應立為有情居。而不立者。是有餘說。尊者世友作如是說。此是世尊要略而說。然惡趣等攝在此中。謂諸惡趣當知攝在初有情居。無想所不攝。廣果天等當知攝在第五有情居。所以者何。以地同故。
Question: for what reason are the evil destinies, and the Bṛhatphala heaven and the like — that portion not subsumed under the Asaṃjñisattva heaven — not established as an abode of sentient beings? Answer: some say that they, too, ought properly to be so established, and that their not being so established should be understood as a matter left with some further, supplementary account. The Venerable Vasumitra explains it this way: this is simply the World-Honored One's own concise manner of speaking, and the evil destinies and the rest are, in fact, already subsumed within the abodes given — that is, the evil destinies should be understood as subsumed within the first abode of sentient beings, while the Bṛhatphala heaven and the like, not subsumed under the Asaṃjñisattva heaven, should be understood as subsumed within the fifth abode — for why is this? Because they belong to the same ground.
有說。若處餘樂來居。已居其中。不樂遷動。是處可立為有情居。
Others say: wherever beings, having come there through their own delight in that place, having already come to dwell there, no longer delight to be moved elsewhere, is a place that can be established as an abode of sentient beings —
諸惡趣中二俱不然。但由業力令往令住。若隨意欲剎那不住故不建立。第四靜慮除無想天。餘雖樂來而好遷動。如邊城邑人不樂居。
— in the evil destinies, neither of these two conditions holds true at all, since beings are driven there and made to dwell there solely by the force of their own karma, never by their own free wish, and, moreover, do not remain there even for a single instant by their own choice — and hence it is not established as such. In the fourth dhyāna, aside from the Asaṃjñisattva heaven, beings, though they delight in coming there, are still fond of moving elsewhere — just as people of a border city do not delight in dwelling there,
謂彼異生或樂無色。或樂無想。若諸聖者或樂淨居。或趣涅槃。如國邊城恒為盜賊隣敵侵故。貴族生財樂轉餘處。雖留少分以充鎮守。有諸商人來求資貨。鎮人謂曰。此處多災無以相瞻。商旅咸曰。此非城邑。如是無想所不攝天。惑業所驅恒樂遷動。故不說彼為有情居。
— that is, ordinary beings there either delight in the formless realm, or delight in the state of non-perception; while noble ones there either delight in the Pure Abodes, or aspire toward nirvāṇa — just as, in a kingdom's border city, forever plagued by the incursions of bandits and hostile neighbors, noble families take their wealth and delight in moving elsewhere, though a small garrison remains behind to hold the post, and merchants who come seeking trade are told by the garrison, "This place suffers many calamities — there is nothing here worth relying upon," and the traveling merchants all agree, "This is no true city at all." Just so, the heavens of the fourth dhyāna not subsumed under the Asaṃjñisattva heaven, ever driven by affliction and karma to delight in moving elsewhere, are, for this very reason, never spoken of as an abode of sentient beings.
The border-city image does something genuinely subtle: it locates the disqualifying feature not in any place's own objective danger or discomfort, but in its residents' own settled unwillingness to actually call it home — a city, like an abode of sentient beings, is defined less by what happens within its walls than by whether anyone actually wants to stay.
14. Charting Every Overlap Between Three Different Lists
A meticulous cross-referencing exercise now works out, tetralemma by tetralemma, exactly how the four abodes of consciousness, the seven, and the nine abodes of sentient beings overlap and diverge — precisely which aggregates of which realms belong to one scheme but not another, to both, or to neither, down to the fine distinction between a realm's own form-and-mind aggregates and its mind alone, closing each case with a reason already established earlier in the fascicle.
已分別三種自性。今當說雜無雜相。問四識住七識住。為四攝七。
Having now analyzed these three self-natures, we should next explain their mutual mixing and non-mixing. Question: do the four abodes of consciousness and the seven abodes of consciousness —
七攝四耶。答應作四句。有四非七。謂地獄傍生鬼界。廣果色受想行。及非想非非想處。受想行。有七非四。謂人。欲界天。梵眾。
— does the former subsume the latter, or does the latter subsume the former? Answer: this should be worked out as a tetralemma. There is what belongs to the four but not the seven — namely, the form, feeling, perception, and formations of hell-beings, animals, and ghosts, of the Bṛhatphala heaven, and of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception's own feeling, perception, and formations. There is what belongs to the seven but not the four — namely, the mind of humans, of the desire-realm gods, of the Brahma-Pariṣadya heaven, the Ābhāsvara heaven,
極光淨。遍淨。空無邊處。識無邊處。無所有處心。有亦四亦七。
the Śubhakṛtsna heaven, the sphere of boundless space, the sphere of boundless consciousness, and the sphere of nothing-whatsoever. There is what belongs to both the four and the seven —
謂人。欲界天。梵眾。極光淨。遍淨色受想行。及空無邊處。識無邊處。無所有處受想行。有非四非七。謂地獄傍生鬼界。廣果。非想非非想處心。此中所以如前廣說。問四識住九有情居。為四攝九。九攝四耶。答應作四句。有四非九。謂地獄傍生鬼界。無想天所不攝廣果。色受想行。有九非四。謂人。欲界天梵眾。極光淨。
— namely, the form, feeling, perception, and formations of humans, of the desire-realm gods, of the Brahma-Pariṣadya heaven, the Ābhāsvara heaven, and the Śubhakṛtsna heaven, together with the feeling, perception, and formations of the sphere of boundless space, the sphere of boundless consciousness, and the sphere of nothing-whatsoever. There is what belongs to neither the four nor the seven — namely, the form, feeling, perception, and formations of hell-beings, animals, and ghosts, the Bṛhatphala heaven, and the mind of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. The reasons for this are as already explained above, in full. Question: do the four abodes of consciousness and the nine abodes of sentient beings — does the former subsume the latter, or does the latter subsume the former? Answer: this, too, should be worked out as a tetralemma. There is what belongs to the four but not the nine — namely, the form, feeling, perception, and formations of hell-beings, animals, and ghosts, and of the Bṛhatphala heaven not subsumed under the Asaṃjñisattva heaven. There is what belongs to the nine but not the four — namely, the mind of humans, the desire-realm gods, the Brahma-Pariṣadya heaven,
遍淨。無想天。四無色心。有亦四亦九。謂人。欲界天。梵眾。極光淨。遍淨。無想天。色受想行。及四無色。受想行。有非四非九。謂地獄傍生鬼界。無想天所不攝廣果心。此中所以亦如前說。
the Ābhāsvara heaven, the Śubhakṛtsna heaven, and the Asaṃjñisattva heaven, together with the mind of the four formless spheres. There is what belongs to both the four and the nine — namely, the form, feeling, perception, and formations of humans, the desire-realm gods, the Brahma-Pariṣadya heaven, the Ābhāsvara heaven, the Śubhakṛtsna heaven, and the Asaṃjñisattva heaven, together with the feeling, perception, and formations of the four formless spheres. There is what belongs to neither the four nor the nine — namely, the form, feeling, perception, and formations of hell-beings, animals, and ghosts, and of the Bṛhatphala heaven not subsumed under the Asaṃjñisattva heaven. The reasons for this are, likewise, as already explained above.
Running the full combinatorial comparison across three separate classification schemes at once, rather than simply asserting that they roughly correspond, is this treatise's own insistence on precision over convenience: three frameworks that look, at a glance, like they are describing the same territory turn out, on close inspection, to diverge in exactly specifiable ways, and only the full tetralemma reveals precisely where.
15. Two Places Left Off Every List
The cross-referencing exercise culminates in a clean, surprising result: the nine abodes of sentient beings fully subsume the seven abodes of consciousness, but not the reverse — leaving exactly two places unaccounted for by the narrower scheme, the Asaṃjñisattva heaven and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, both places whose own perceptual life is either absent or so attenuated that consciousness itself has nothing stable to rest upon there.
問七識住九有情居。為七攝九。九攝七耶。答九攝七。非七攝九。
Question: do the seven abodes of consciousness and the nine abodes of sentient beings — does the former subsume the latter, or does the latter subsume the former? Answer: the nine subsume the seven, but the seven do not subsume the nine.
何所不攝。答二處。謂無想天處。及非想非非想處。此中所以亦如前說。
Question: which places, then, does it fail to subsume? Answer: two places — namely, the Asaṃjñisattva heaven, and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. The reasons for this are, likewise, as already explained above.
That precisely the same two places keep falling outside one classification scheme after another throughout this entire fascicle — never randomly, always these same two — suggests they occupy a genuinely singular position in this tradition's own map of existence: not merely difficult to classify, but structurally exceptional in a way every scheme, examined carefully enough, independently confirms.
16. Why the Buddha Insists on Calling Heaven a Mere 'Place'
A closing meditation on language asks why the Buddha specifically calls the Asaṃjñisattva heaven and the Peak of Existence mere "places," rather than granting them the fuller dignity of an "abode" — with every explanation aimed at the same target: certain outside-path teachers mistook these two states, prized for their extraordinary length of life, for genuine, irreversible liberation, and the Buddha's own choice of the plainer word "place" was a deliberate corrective, insisting that both remain restless, impermanent, and, however long-lived, still fully within the wheel of birth-and-death.
問世尊何故。於無想天。及有頂天多說為處。答有諸外道。執此二處以為解脫。佛為遮彼說為生處。有說。外道執此二處為最寂靜。
Question: why does the World-Honored One so often speak of the Asaṃjñisattva heaven and the Peak of Existence specifically as "places"? Answer: because certain outside-path teachers held these two places to be genuine liberation, and the Buddha, in order to refute them, spoke of them instead as mere places of birth. Others say: outside-path teachers held these two places to be the very most tranquil of all —
佛說為處。明是喧動而非寂靜。是界趣生流轉處故。有說。外道執此二處。是真解脫永無退還。故佛說彼是退還處。非真解脫。謂從非想非非想處沒。多生下地。無想天沒必生欲界。有說。彼二天壽量長遠。外道多執為真涅槃。謂無想天於唯異生。生處壽量最遠。
— and the Buddha, in speaking of them merely as "places," made clear that they are in fact restless, not truly tranquil at all, being merely places within which one still circulates through realm, destiny, and rebirth. Others say: outside-path teachers held these two places to be genuine liberation, from which there could never be any falling back — and it is for this reason that the Buddha spoke of them instead as places of falling back, not as genuine liberation at all — that is, one who dies out of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is, for the most part, reborn in a lower ground, and one who dies out of the Asaṃjñisattva heaven is necessarily reborn in the desire realm. Others say: these two heavens have an extraordinarily long lifespan, and outside-path teachers frequently mistake them for true nirvāṇa — the Asaṃjñisattva heaven, among all birthplaces available to ordinary beings alone, has the very longest lifespan;
非想非非想天於一切生處壽量最遠。故佛說彼是無常處。有作是說。九有情居。世尊皆以二名宣說。於其七種作二名說。謂名識住及有情居。於餘二種亦二名說。謂名為處及有情居。有餘師說。佛以識住與有情居展轉相攝。餘不盡者唯有二處。不應異釋。空無邊等亦名處故。有說。生處精勤果中此居後邊故。說名處。謂唯異生生處精勤果。中無想天為後邊。一切生處精勤果中。有頂天為後邊。
while the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, among all birthplaces whatsoever, has the very longest lifespan of all — and it is for this reason that the Buddha spoke of them as impermanent places. Some say: the World-Honored One always speaks of the nine abodes of sentient beings using two designations at once — for the seven of these, he speaks using two names, calling them both an "abode of consciousness" and an "abode of sentient beings"; for the remaining two, he likewise speaks using two names, calling them both a "place" and an "abode of sentient beings." Other masters say: the Buddha, by having the abodes of consciousness and the abodes of sentient beings mutually subsume one another, leaves only these two places unaccounted for by either, and hence they cannot properly be explained any differently — since the sphere of boundless space and the rest, too, are also called "places." Others say: among the results of diligent effort in every birthplace, these two abodes stand at the very furthest limit, and it is for this reason that they are called "places" — that is, among the results of diligent effort in every birthplace available to ordinary beings alone, the Asaṃjñisattva heaven stands at the furthest limit; and among the results of diligent effort in every birthplace whatsoever, the Peak of Existence stands at the furthest limit.
That a single word choice — "place" instead of "abode" — is treated as carrying this much doctrinal weight is a reminder of how precisely this tradition reads its own scripture: nothing in the Buddha's own vocabulary is considered incidental, and even the plainest-seeming noun can be doing quiet, deliberate polemical work against a specific rival claim.
17. A New Chapter: What Grasps and What Is Grasped
An entirely new chapter of the treatise opens — the Grasped Nyāsa — turning to a fresh technical distinction: "grasped" great elements, meaning those presently held by a sentient being's own mind and mental factors, as against "ungrasped" great elements, spanning every element in the past or future, a portion of the present, and everything belonging to insentient matter at any time whatsoever. The treatise is composed, once again, to refute those who deny the reality of causes and conditions across the three times, before laying the technical groundwork for an exhaustive causal ledger to follow.
大種蘊第五中執受納息第四之一有執受大種。與有執受大種。為幾緣。如是等章。及解章義既領會已。應廣分別。問何故作此論。答彼作論者意欲爾故。隨彼意欲而作論。但不違法相便不應責。復次欲止說因緣法。及去來世非實有者。意顯諸因緣去來實有故作斯論。此中有執受大種者。謂現在剎那有情數攝。心心所法所執受大種。無執受大種者。謂過去未來及現在一分有情數攝。并三世一切非情數攝所有大種。是謂此處略毘婆沙。
Fifth Aggregate, the Great Elements: the Grasped Nyāsa, Chapter Four, Part One. Grasped great elements, with respect to grasped great elements, serve as how many conditions? And so on, in such chapter headings. Having now grasped this chapter heading and its explanatory meaning in full, we should next analyze it in full. Question: why compose this treatise? Answer: it is simply the intention of the treatise's own author, that this order be followed — the treatise was composed following his own preference, and, so long as this does not contradict the proper form of the Dharma, this ought not to be demanded as an objection. Further: it is in order to refute those who claim that causal conditions, and the past and future, are not genuinely real, and to show that every cause and condition, in the past and future alike, is indeed genuinely real, that this treatise is composed. Here, "grasped great elements" refers to great elements grasped, in the present moment, by mind and its mental factors belonging to a sentient being; "ungrasped great elements" refers to every great element belonging to the past and future, and to a portion of the present belonging to a sentient being, together with every great element, in all three times, belonging to what is not a sentient being at all. This, then, is what is meant, in brief, by this treatise's own account.
有執受大種。與有執受大種為幾緣。答因。增上。因者一因。謂俱有因。增上者謂不礙生。及唯無障。然有差別。謂一果者。異類相望為因。增上。非一果者。但一增上。有執受大種。與無執受大種。為幾緣。答因。增上。因者一因。謂同類因。增上者如前說。
Grasped great elements, with respect to grasped great elements, serve as how many conditions? Answer: causal and predominant. As for the causal condition: a single cause, namely the co-existent cause. As for the predominant condition: this means not obstructing arising, and being simply without obstruction generally — yet there is a distinction here: for those that share a single ripening-result, they stand as both causal and predominant conditions to one another, viewed reciprocally across different categories; for those that do not share a single ripening-result, they serve merely as a predominant condition. Grasped great elements, with respect to ungrasped great elements, serve as how many conditions? Answer: causal and predominant. As for the causal condition: a single cause, namely the same-class cause. As for the predominant condition: as already explained above —
然有差別。謂有執受大種。與未來有情數大種。為因。增上。與餘無執受大種。但一增上。無執受大種。與無執受大種。為幾緣。答因。增上。因者二因謂俱有。同類。增上者如前說。然有差別。謂過去有情數大種。與過去有情數大種。為因。增上。因者。二因。
— yet there is a distinction here: grasped great elements, with respect to future great elements belonging to a sentient being, serve as both causal and predominant conditions; with respect to every other ungrasped great element, they serve merely as a predominant condition. Ungrasped great elements, with respect to ungrasped great elements, serve as how many conditions? Answer: causal and predominant. As for the causal condition: two causes, namely the co-existent cause and the same-class cause. As for the predominant condition: as already explained above — yet there is a distinction here: past great elements belonging to a sentient being, with respect to past great elements belonging to a sentient being, serve as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, two causes,
Opening a new chapter with the very same defense of the past and future's own reality that has recurred throughout this entire treatise shows how load-bearing that single metaphysical commitment actually is: nearly every technical catalog this text builds, however far removed from the original debate, ultimately rests on the same foundational claim that time itself does not erase what is real.
18. The Exhaustive Ledger for Great Elements — and Where Derived Form Differs
An intricate combinatorial ledger works through every pairing of grasped and ungrasped great elements — sentient or insentient, past, present, or future — specifying precisely which causal and predominant conditions link each pair, down to the fine distinction of exactly which of the six fundamental causes applies in each single case. The same exhaustive treatment then begins again for derived form, immediately surfacing one clean structural difference: grasped derived form, unlike grasped great elements, never serves as a genuine causal condition for other grasped derived form at all, since resistant forms, standing side by side, can never function as a co-existent cause for one another.
謂俱有。同類。增上者如前說。與未來有情數大種。及現在有情數無執受大種為因。增上。因者一因。謂同類因。增上者如前說。與餘無執受大種但一增上。過去非有情數大種。與過去非有情數大種。為因。增上。因者二因。謂俱有。同類。增上者如前說。與未來現在非有情數大種。為因。增上。因者一因。謂同類因。增上者如前說。與過去未來有情數大種。及現在有情數無執受大種。但一增上。未來有情數大種。與未來有情數大種。為因。增上。因者一因。謂俱有因。增上者如前說。與餘無執受大種。但一增上。未來非有情數大種。與未來非有情數大種。為因。增上。因者一因。謂俱有因。增上者如前說。與餘無執受大種但一增上。現在有情數無執受大種。與現在有情數無執受大種。為因。增上。因者一因。謂俱有因。增上者如前說。與未來有情數大種。為因。增上。因者一因。謂同類因。增上者如前說。與餘無執受大種。但一增上。現在非有情數大種。與現在非有情數大種。為因。增上。因者一因。謂俱有因。增上者如前說。與未來非有情數大種。為因。增上。因者一因。謂同類因。增上者如前說。與餘無執受大種。但一增上。無執受大種。與有執受大種。為幾緣。答因增上。因者一因。謂同類因。增上者如前說。然有差別。謂過去有情數大種。與有執受大種。為因。增上。因者一因。謂同類因。增上者如前說。餘無執受大種。與有執受大種。但一增上。已說大種當說所造。所造亦二。
— namely the co-existent cause and the same-class cause, and the predominant condition as already explained. With respect to future great elements belonging to a sentient being, and to present ungrasped great elements belonging to a sentient being, they serve as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause, namely the same-class cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to every other ungrasped great element, they serve merely as a predominant condition. Past great elements not belonging to a sentient being, with respect to past great elements not belonging to a sentient being, serve as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, two causes, namely the co-existent cause and the same-class cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to future and present great elements not belonging to a sentient being, they serve as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause, namely the same-class cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to past and future great elements belonging to a sentient being, and present ungrasped great elements belonging to a sentient being, they serve merely as a predominant condition. Future great elements belonging to a sentient being, with respect to future great elements belonging to a sentient being, serve as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause, namely the co-existent cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to every other ungrasped great element, they serve merely as a predominant condition. Future great elements not belonging to a sentient being, with respect to future great elements not belonging to a sentient being, serve as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause, namely the co-existent cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to every other ungrasped great element, they serve merely as a predominant condition. Present ungrasped great elements belonging to a sentient being, with respect to present ungrasped great elements belonging to a sentient being, serve as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause, namely the co-existent cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to future great elements belonging to a sentient being, they serve as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause, namely the same-class cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to every other ungrasped great element, they serve merely as a predominant condition. Present great elements not belonging to a sentient being, with respect to present great elements not belonging to a sentient being, serve as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause, namely the co-existent cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to future great elements not belonging to a sentient being, they serve as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause, namely the same-class cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to every other ungrasped great element, they serve merely as a predominant condition. Ungrasped great elements, with respect to grasped great elements, serve as how many conditions? Answer: causal and predominant. As for the causal condition: a single cause, namely the same-class cause. As for the predominant condition: as already explained — yet there is a distinction here: past great elements belonging to a sentient being, with respect to grasped great elements, serve as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause, namely the same-class cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to every other ungrasped great element serving as a condition for grasped great elements, only the predominant condition applies. Having now explained the great elements, we should next explain their derived form. Derived form, too, is of two kinds —
謂有執受及無執受。現在剎那有情數攝。心心所法所執受者。是有執受。過去未來及現在一分有情數攝三世一切非情數攝。是無執受。是謂此處略毘婆沙。有執受所造色。與有執受所造色。為幾緣。答一增上。增上義如前說。無因者。有對所造色展轉相望非俱有因故。有執受所造色。與無執受所造色。為幾緣。答因。增上。
— namely, grasped and ungrasped. "Grasped" refers to great elements grasped, in the present moment, by mind and its mental factors belonging to a sentient being; "ungrasped" refers to every great element belonging to the past and future, and to a portion of the present belonging to a sentient being, together with every great element, in all three times, belonging to what is not a sentient being at all. This, then, is what is meant, in brief, by this treatise's own account. Grasped derived form, with respect to grasped derived form, serves as how many conditions? Answer: a single predominant condition — the meaning of "predominant" being as already explained above — and no causal condition, since resistant derived forms, viewed reciprocally against one another, never serve as a co-existent cause for one another. Grasped derived form, with respect to ungrasped derived form, serves as how many conditions? Answer: causal and predominant.
因者二因。謂同類。異熟。增上者如前說。然有差別。謂有執受所造色。與未來有情數所造色。為因。增上。與餘無執受所造色。但一增上。無執受所造色。與無執受所造色。為幾緣。答因。增上。
As for the causal condition: two causes, namely the same-class cause and the ripening cause. As for the predominant condition: as already explained above — yet there is a distinction here: grasped derived form, with respect to future derived form belonging to a sentient being, serves as both causal and predominant conditions; with respect to every other ungrasped derived form, it serves merely as a predominant condition. Ungrasped derived form, with respect to ungrasped derived form, serves as how many conditions? Answer: causal and predominant.
The single clean exception — that resistant, grasped derived forms can never be a co-existent cause for one another, unlike great elements in the very same position — is a small but genuine physical insight buried inside an otherwise formulaic combinatorial exercise: two solid, resistant things sitting beside each other, however intimately connected in space, simply cannot generate one another the way two co-arising qualities of the same underlying substance can.
19. Finishing the Ledger: Derived Form Across Every Combination
The fascicle closes by completing the derived-form ledger with the same exhaustive precision, working through every combination of sentient and insentient, past, present, and future derived form, and specifying, case by case, exactly which of the co-existent, same-class, and ripening causes apply to each — a fitting, characteristically meticulous close to a fascicle that began with a single meditator's own vanishing image of his own body and ends with an entire causal architecture accounting for how physical form itself, held or unheld, is produced and sustained across every possible span of time.
因者三因。謂俱有。同類。異熟因。增上者如前說。然有差別。謂過去有情數所造色。與過去有情數所造色。為因。增上。因者三因。謂俱有。同類。異熟因。增上者如前說。與未來有情數所造色。為因。增上。因者二因。謂同類。異熟。增上者如前說。與現在有情數無執受所造色。為因增上。因者一因。謂同類。
As for the causal condition: three causes, namely the co-existent cause, the same-class cause, and the ripening cause. As for the predominant condition: as already explained above — yet there is a distinction here: past derived form belonging to a sentient being, with respect to past derived form belonging to a sentient being, serves as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, three causes, namely the co-existent cause, the same-class cause, and the ripening cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to future derived form belonging to a sentient being, it serves as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, two causes, namely the same-class cause and the ripening cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to present ungrasped derived form belonging to a sentient being, it serves as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause, namely the same-class cause,
增上者如前說。與餘無執受所造色。但一增上過去非有情數所造色。與過去未來現在非有情數所造色。為因。增上。因者一因。謂同類因。增上者如前說。與餘無執受所造色。但一增上。未來有情數所造色。與未來有情數所造色。為因。增上。因者二因。謂俱有。異熟。增上者如前說。與餘無執受所造色。但一增上。未來非有情數所造色。與一切無執受所造色。但一增上。現在有情數無執受所造色。與現在有情數無執受所造色。為因。增上。因者一因。
and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to every other ungrasped derived form, it serves merely as a predominant condition. Past derived form not belonging to a sentient being, with respect to past, future, and present derived form not belonging to a sentient being, serves as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause, namely the same-class cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to every other ungrasped derived form, it serves merely as a predominant condition. Future derived form belonging to a sentient being, with respect to future derived form belonging to a sentient being, serves as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, two causes, namely the co-existent cause and the ripening cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to every other ungrasped derived form, it serves merely as a predominant condition. Future derived form not belonging to a sentient being, with respect to every ungrasped derived form, serves merely as a predominant condition. Present ungrasped derived form belonging to a sentient being, with respect to present ungrasped derived form belonging to a sentient being, serves as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause,
謂俱有因。增上者如前說。與未來有情數所造色。為因。增上。因者二因。謂同類。異熟。增上者如前說。與餘無執受所造色。但一增上。現在非有情數所造色。與未來非有情數所造色。為因。增上。因者一因。謂同類因。增上者如前說。與餘無執受所造色。但一增上。無執受所造色。與有執受所造色。為幾緣。答因。增上。
— namely the co-existent cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to future derived form belonging to a sentient being, it serves as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, two causes, namely the same-class cause and the ripening cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to every other ungrasped derived form, it serves merely as a predominant condition. Present derived form not belonging to a sentient being, with respect to future derived form not belonging to a sentient being, serves as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, a single cause, namely the same-class cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to every other ungrasped derived form, it serves merely as a predominant condition. Ungrasped derived form, with respect to grasped derived form, serves as how many conditions? Answer: causal and predominant.
因者二因。謂同類。異熟。增上者如前說。然有差別。謂過去有情數所造色。與有執受所造色。為因。增上。因者二因。謂同類。異熟。增上者如前說。餘無執受所造色。與有執受所造色。但一增上。
As for the causal condition: two causes, namely the same-class cause and the ripening cause. As for the predominant condition: as already explained above — yet there is a distinction here: past derived form belonging to a sentient being, with respect to grasped derived form, serves as both causal and predominant conditions; as for the causal condition, two causes, namely the same-class cause and the ripening cause, and the predominant condition as already explained; with respect to every other ungrasped derived form serving as a condition for grasped derived form, only the predominant condition applies.
That this fascicle moves, without any real tonal seam, from a monk watching his own corpse dissolve into nothing to the driest possible combinatorial ledger of causal conditions is itself a quiet statement of this tradition's own worldview: the same metaphysical machinery that explains how a moment of matter causes the next moment of matter is, at bottom, inseparable from the very practice of watching one's own body's impermanence unfold — physics and liberation, in this text, are never actually two different subjects.
Fascicle 137 Complete
This closes fascicle 137 of Ru-Yi's translation, drawn from the treatise's true CBETA boundary. Fascicle 137 completes the Full-Vision Nyāsa's own treatment of the elimination-of-form-perception meditation, reconciling four separate scriptural accounts of the same practice, before undertaking a full analysis of the four abodes of consciousness, the seven abodes of consciousness, and the nine abodes of sentient beings — why hell, the fourth dhyāna, and the highest formless sphere are excluded from every scheme, and why the Buddha deliberately calls two of the longest-lived heavens mere “places” rather than true abodes. The fascicle then opens an entirely new chapter, the Grasped Nyāsa (執受納息第四之一), with an exhaustive causal ledger for grasped and ungrasped great elements and derived form. Fascicle 138 continues within this same nyāsa (執受納息第四之二).