Why Only the Buddha Is Called Buddha

Sixth Aggregate, the Faculties: the Faculty Nyāsa, Chapter One, Part Two. Question: what is the faculty of what is already known? Answer: one who has already seen the truths, has already directly realized them — this refers to the wisdom and wisdom-faculty belonging to any trainee, together with whatever other faculties accompany it; one who is resolved-through-faith, attained-through-vision, or a bodily witness, with respect to the four noble truths already directly realized, directly realizing them once more — this is called the faculty of what is already known. Here, "having already seen the four noble truths" is why one is called "having already seen the truths"; "having already directly realized them" is why one is called "having already directly realized"; "the wisdom and wisdom-faculty belonging to any trainee" refers to the wisdom-faculty itself, together with whatever other faculties accompany it; "with respect to the four noble truths already directly realized, directly realizing them once more" refers to the remaining eight faculties — altogether, these nine faculties together are called the faculty of what is already known. Question: those beyond training, too, directly realize the four noble truths once more, as when one turns from the retrogressible type to the reflective type, and so on, up through turning from the aspiring type to the unshakable type — why, then, does the passage speak only of the trainee's own repeated direct realization, and not that of the one beyond training? Answer: it ought properly to have mentioned the one beyond training as well, and its failure to do so should be understood as a matter left with some further, supplementary account. Others say: this passage cites the first case in order to reveal the latter —

that is, in speaking of the trainee's own repeated direct realization, it should be understood that the one beyond training's own repeated direct realization has already been implicitly stated as well — exactly as citing the beginning reveals the completion, or citing the preparatory stage reveals the final result; it should be understood accordingly here too. Others say: this speaks of repeated direct realization specifically where one cuts off an affliction never before cut off, or attains a fruit of the ascetic life never before attained; the one beyond training, at that point, is neither cutting off an affliction never before cut off, nor attaining a fruit never before attained, and hence is not mentioned. Others say: this speaks of repeated direct realization specifically where one attains a freedom-from-bondage never before attained, having cut off a bondage never before cut off; the one beyond training, at that point, though attaining a freedom-from-bondage never before attained, is not cutting off any bondage never before cut off, and hence is not mentioned — and, just as with cutting off bondage and attaining freedom from it, so too should this be understood for removing faults and cultivating virtues, abandoning the inferior for the superior and excellent, departing from the meaningless for the meaningful, and exhausting the suffering of thirsting craving for the coolness of ease free from heat. Others say: this speaks of repeated direct realization specifically where one abandons an ignorance never before abandoned, having attained a knowledge never before attained; the one beyond training, at that point, though attaining a knowledge never before attained, is not abandoning any ignorance never before abandoned, and hence is not mentioned — it should be understood that this speaks specifically of defiled ignorance. It is through causes and conditions such as these, of many kinds, that the trainee is spoken of as repeatedly directly realizing, and not the one beyond training.

Question: what is the faculty of complete knowledge? Answer: an arhat whose outflows are exhausted, the wisdom and wisdom-faculty belonging to any one beyond training, together with whatever other faculties accompany it; one liberated through wisdom or liberated in both respects, capable of attaining present, visible ease — this is what is meant. Here, "an arhat whose outflows are exhausted, the wisdom and wisdom-faculty belonging to any one beyond training" refers to the wisdom-faculty itself, together with whatever other faculties accompany it; "one liberated through wisdom or liberated in both respects, capable of attaining present, visible ease" refers to the remaining eight faculties — altogether, these nine faculties together are called the faculty of complete knowledge. Question: the trainee, too, attains present, visible ease — why, then, does the passage speak only of the one beyond training? Answer: it ought properly to have mentioned the trainee as well, and its failure to do so should be understood as a matter left with some further, supplementary account. Others say: this passage cites the final case in order to reveal the initial one — that is, in speaking of the one beyond training's own attainment of present, visible ease, it should be understood that the trainee's own attainment of present, visible ease has already been implicitly stated as well —

exactly as citing the completion reveals the beginning, or citing the final result reveals the preparatory stage; it should be understood accordingly here too. Further, this passage speaks of what is superior in name and meaning — for, speaking in terms of dharma, the dharma belonging to the one beyond training is superior; speaking in terms of the individual, the individual beyond training is superior. Others say: this passage speaks of one who has attained a tranquil ease untroubled by the heat of affliction — the trainee, though attaining a tranquil ease, is nonetheless still troubled by the heat of affliction, and hence is not mentioned. Further, this passage speaks of one who experiences a tranquil ease that is self-sovereign and vast — the trainee, having still further tasks yet to accomplish, though experiencing a tranquil ease, is neither self-sovereign in it nor experiences it as vast, exactly as a king who has not yet eliminated every hostile enemy, though experiencing royal pleasure, is neither self-sovereign in it nor experiences it as vast — it is the very same here, and hence the trainee is not mentioned. Others say: this passage speaks of one whose own afflictive intention has already been stilled, one who has already fully realized the mark of a sage — the trainee is not so, and hence is not mentioned. Others say: this passage speaks of one who possesses a present-life abiding-in-ease, without any further abiding-in-ease belonging to a future life — the trainee possesses an abiding-in-ease belonging to both this life and the next, and hence is not mentioned. It is through causes and conditions such as these, of many kinds, that abiding-in-ease is spoken of for the one beyond training, and not for the trainee.

Question: is there such a thing as an arhat possessing the three knowledges? If there is, why does this present passage not mention it? And if there is not, how is the sūtra's own freely-cited statement to be reconciled — as it is said: the Venerable Śāriputra, reverently pressing his palms together, said to the Buddha, "World-Honored One, of these five hundred bhikṣus, how many possess the three knowledges, how many are liberated in both respects, and how many are liberated through wisdom alone?" On this point, one further question arises within the discussion itself: did the Venerable Śāriputra himself already know the answer to this? If he knew, why did he ask? And if he did not know, how could he be called a disciple who has reached the far shore of perfection? It should be said that the Venerable One did indeed know — but, if so, why did he ask? There are indeed cases of asking despite already knowing, as the Vinaya itself says: at that time, the World-Honored One, though already knowing, still deliberately asked — and hence one ought not to refuse his question on the grounds that he already knew the answer. Others say: the Venerable One wished to benefit others — that is, though Śāriputra himself already understood this matter clearly, he knew that others within the assembly did not, yet, lacking the fearless confidence to do so themselves, could not ask the Buddha directly; Śāriputra, having no such hesitation, asked on their behalf, in order to benefit them. Others say: the Venerable One wished to reveal a distinction hidden within an apparent uniformity — that is, the Buddha had taught the Dharma to these five hundred bhikṣus exactly as fitting, and, upon hearing it, every one of them had attained the fruit of arhatship, permanently cutting off any further existence, each one genuinely fulfilling the Buddha's own heart's intention —

since to genuinely, truthfully fulfill the Buddha's own heart's intention means precisely to attain the fruit of arhatship and permanently cut off further existence. The Venerable Śāriputra reflected: though these bhikṣus have all alike attained the fruit of arhatship, permanently cutting off further existence, it is not yet known which of them had, from the very outset, diligently undertaken the preparatory practice, and which had not — and, wishing to reveal this hidden distinction within their apparent uniformity, he raised this question. Others say: the World-Honored One had earlier taught the Dharma to these five hundred bhikṣus, causing them all equally to abide in the very same fruit — the Venerable Śāriputra, wishing to reveal that the paths by which they had reached it nonetheless differed, therefore raised this question. Others say: the World-Honored One had earlier taught the Dharma to these five hundred bhikṣus, causing them to abide in an equal, unconditioned liberation — the Venerable Śāriputra, wishing to reveal that their own conditioned liberation was not, on that account, without genuine difference, therefore raised this question. Others say: the Venerable One wished to reveal and bring to light a buried treasure of virtue, that the world might come to know of it in common — exactly as a treasure buried in the earth, covered over by soil, remains unseen by the people of the world, until, once excavated and revealed, it can finally be seen, giving rise to a sense of wonder — just so, this treasure-store of virtue, covered over by the mere soil of modest self-effacement, remained unknown to a world unaware of it, until, brought to light through Śāriputra's own revealing question, it became something the world came to know of in common, giving rise to a sense of wonder. Others say: the Venerable One wished to arouse in the donors an ever-increasing intention — for there were donors who, throughout the four months of the rains retreat, supplied the monastic community with robes and other necessities, and who might have wondered to themselves whether the field into which they had sown their offerings was truly a fine and fertile one; wishing to let them come to a settled, definite knowledge that they had indeed planted their own merit in a truly excellent field, and thereby rejoice all the more that their own effort had not been in vain, the Venerable One therefore raised this very question. Others say: the Venerable One wished to demonstrate the proper etiquette and protocol between teacher and disciple — that is, it is proper, according to the Dharma, for a disciple to question his teacher, and proper, according to the Dharma, for a teacher to instruct his disciple. Others say: the Venerable One wished to demonstrate his own tireless, insatiable pursuit of the Dharma, free of any trace of laziness or complacency, so that others might follow his own example, and it was for this reason that he asked. Others say: the Venerable One wished to prevent people of the world, upon acquiring some small measure of knowledge, from growing proud and self-satisfied, and thereby ceasing to inquire further of others — for the Venerable One himself reflected: "the wisdom of the people of this world does not amount to even a sixteenth part of my own, and yet I myself still ask of others — how much more, then, should you, who know and see so much less, refrain from asking?" Others say: the Venerable One wished to demonstrate his own freedom from the taint of stinginess with regard to the Dharma — for one who is stingy with the Dharma takes no joy even when another asks a question, let alone would he himself ever ask one. Others say: the Venerable One wished to put a stop to the slander of the heretics — for the heretics constantly slandered the Buddha, saying that the ascetic Gautama secretly instructs Upatiṣya and Kolita by night, and has them teach it publicly by day; but, were Śāriputra himself to press his palms together in reverence and pose this very question before the entire great assembly, such slander would at once be put to rest. Others say: the Venerable One wished to demonstrate that whatever excellent teaching any of the World-Honored One's own disciples might offer must still receive the Buddha's own seal of approval — exactly as, in matters of state, whatever official document or decree, however well composed, requires the king's own royal seal upon it,

for, lacking the king's own seal, no one will accept it, and, when carried to a checkpoint or border-crossing, it will everywhere meet with obstruction; but, bearing the king's own seal, it is everywhere trusted and acted upon, meeting with no obstruction wherever it goes — just so, whatever excellent teaching is offered by any of the Buddha's own disciples, lacking the Buddha's own seal of approval, others will not accept it, and, even after the Tathāgata's own final passing, the fourfold assembly, too, will not receive it with due reverence; but, once sealed and approved by the Buddha himself, it is heard and followed accordingly, and the fourfold assembly, even after the Dharma's own eventual passing, will continue to hold it in reverence. It was for causes and conditions such as these that the Venerable Śāriputra raised this very question. But, if there is no such thing as an arhat possessing the three knowledges, how is that sūtra's own statement to be reconciled? Answer: it should be said that there is indeed such a thing as an arhat possessing the three knowledges. Question: if so, that sūtra's own statement is easily reconciled — but why, then, does this present passage not mention it? Answer: this passage ought properly to have said: "together with whatever other faculties accompany it; one liberated through wisdom, liberated in both respects, or possessing the three knowledges, is capable of attaining present, visible ease" — and its failure to say this should be understood as a matter left with some further, supplementary account. Further, this has, in fact, already been implicitly stated earlier — for an arhat possessing the three knowledges is necessarily either liberated through wisdom or liberated in both respects; in speaking of one liberated through wisdom, it is already implicitly understood that one liberated through wisdom possessing the three knowledges has been spoken of as well; and, in speaking of one liberated in both respects, it is already implicitly understood that one liberated in both respects possessing the three knowledges has been spoken of as well — and hence this is not separately stated. There were, in ages past, two treatise-masters on this very question — one named Timira, the other named Ghoṣavarman. The Venerable Timira exclusively praised wisdom; the Venerable Ghoṣavarman exclusively praised the attainment of cessation. Timira held this view: wisdom is superior, not the attainment of cessation, since wisdom possesses an object, while the attainment of cessation possesses none.

Ghoṣavarman held this view: the attainment of cessation is superior, not wisdom, since the attainment of cessation belongs only to noble ones, while wisdom is common even to ordinary beings. Those who praised wisdom argued thus: whoever possesses the three knowledges yet lacks the eight liberations is called simply "one possessing the three knowledges"; whoever possesses the three knowledges and also possesses the eight liberations is likewise still called "one possessing the three knowledges"; whoever possesses the eight liberations yet lacks the three knowledges is called "liberated in both respects"; and whoever possesses only one or two of the three knowledges is called "liberated through wisdom" — for why is this? Because wisdom is superior to the attainment of cessation. Those who praised the attainment of cessation argued thus: whoever possesses the eight liberations yet lacks the three knowledges is called simply "liberated in both respects"; whoever possesses the eight liberations and also possesses the three knowledges is likewise still called "liberated in both respects"; whoever possesses the three knowledges yet lacks the eight liberations is called "one possessing the three knowledges"; and whoever possesses only one or two of the three knowledges is called "liberated through wisdom" — for why is this? Because the attainment of cessation is superior to wisdom. Both of these two accounts, however, expend their own effort entirely in vain, benefiting neither the letter nor the meaning of the matter. In truth, among those who possess the three knowledges, some have attained the attainment of cessation, and some have not — those who have attained it are called "liberated in both respects, possessing the three knowledges"; those who have not are called "liberated through wisdom, possessing the three knowledges."

We should now once more explain, one by one, the specific reason behind each of the three uncontaminated faculties' own individual name. Question: why is it called the faculty of what is yet unknown but about to be known? Answer: not yet already known, yet now knowing; not yet already directly realized, yet now directly realizing; cutting off ignorance — hence it is called the faculty of what is yet unknown but about to be known. Question: if this is so, then, once suffering-dharma-patient-acceptance has arisen, direct realization of suffering with respect to the five aggregates of the desire realm has already been attained; and, once suffering-dharma-knowledge then arises, direct realization of that very same suffering is attained once more —

so that this would then be a case of already having directly realized, yet directly realizing once more — why, then, is this still called the faculty of what is yet unknown but about to be known, rather than the faculty of what is already known? Answer: suffering-dharma-patient-acceptance, with respect to suffering among the five aggregates of the desire realm, is called "direct realization," but not "already directly realized"; only once suffering-dharma-knowledge has arisen is it properly called "already directly realized." Yet, since this is a case of directly realizing what has not yet already been directly realized, it is not called the faculty of what is already known. Others say: suffering-dharma-patient-acceptance, though called "direct realization" with respect to suffering among the five aggregates of the desire realm, is not called "knowing," since it is not itself of the nature of knowledge; only once suffering-dharma-knowledge arises is it properly called "knowing." At that point, though called "already directly realized," this is a case of directly realizing without yet having already known and now knowing, and hence it is not called the faculty of what is already known. Further, this passage composes its treatise specifically with reference to knowledge's own direct realization, not that of patient acceptance, and hence this, too, is not called "already having directly realized, and directly realizing once more" — how, then, could it be called the faculty of what is already known? Others say: immediately following suffering-dharma-knowledge, a further path arises that has not yet already been directly realized; this knowledge, with respect to what has not yet already been directly realized, remains covered and obstructed, still bound below by what lies above it, and, on account of this overriding power, is not yet self-sovereign — and it is for this reason that suffering-dharma-knowledge is not called the faculty of what is already known. The remaining patient-acceptances and knowledges should be understood in exactly the same way.

Question: why is it called the faculty of what is already known? Answer: already known, and now knowing; already directly realized, and now directly realizing; cutting off ignorance — hence it is called the faculty of what is already known. Question: if this is so, then, once path-class patient-acceptance has arisen, with the exception of its own self-nature and its associated and co-existent dharmas, direct realization is attained with respect to every remaining class of the path-knowledge type; and it is only afterward, once path-class knowledge itself arises, that direct realization is attained with respect to the self-nature and associated and co-existent dharmas of that very patient-acceptance itself — at that point, with respect to that patient-acceptance's own self-nature and the rest, not yet already having been directly realized, is directly realized — why, then, is this called the faculty of what is already known, rather than the faculty of what is yet unknown but about to be known? Answer: the foreign masters say that all sixteen mind-moments alike belong to the path of seeing. Question: we are not asking about that here, but only about why the fifteenth mind-moment specifically is treated as the path of seeing — why is this? The Venerable Saṃghavasu explains it this way: at the very moment path-class patient-acceptance manifests in the present, it is capable of cultivating countless future moments of path-class patient-acceptance, and what is thus cultivated has already attained direct realization with respect to the very present patient-acceptance and the rest — and hence no fault follows. This, however, is unreasonable, since a future path possesses no actual function. It should instead be answered this way: it is spoken of as "already directly realized" from the standpoint of the greater majority — that is, what has already been directly realized is immeasurable and boundless, while what has not yet already been directly realized is but a small remainder; what has already been directly realized, and is now directly realized once more, is like the great earth itself, while what has not yet already been directly realized, yet is now directly realized, is like but a single clod of that earth — the same comparison holding as with a single speck of dust against Mount Sumeru, a single drop against the great ocean, or the resting-place of a single mosquito against the whole of open space. It is on account of this greater majority, then, that it is called the faculty of what is already known. Question: at the sixteenth mind-moment, ought this not to be spoken of exactly as with the [first] seven kinds of knowledge — why, then, does the passage speak of it uniquely as the faculty of what is already known, rather than as "not yet already known, yet now knowing"? Answer: this, too, is spoken of from the standpoint of the greater majority — that is, though the very first moment does indeed resemble those seven kinds of knowledge, every subsequent moment differs from it, and, speaking from the standpoint of the greater majority, all are alike called the faculty of what is already known, since they share a single, uniform nature. Others say: after this point, there is no longer anything not yet already known, since the path is no longer covered over and obstructed, no longer bound below by what lies above it,

and hence is necessarily self-sovereign — and it is on this account that it is spoken of as "already known," exactly as one already departed is called "gone" — it is the very same here.

Question: why is it called the faculty of complete knowledge? Answer: already knowing, and now knowing; already directly realized, and now directly realizing; not cutting off ignorance, since it has already previously been cut off — hence it is called the faculty of complete knowledge. Question: if this is so, then, since all three vehicles' own ones beyond training alike possess complete knowledge, why does the World-Honored One alone bear the name "Buddha"? Answer: because he alone is capable of initial awakening, capable of pervasive awakening, and capable of distinguishing awakening — the śrāvaka and the solitary-realized buddha are incapable of initial awakening, incapable of pervasive awakening, and incapable of distinguishing awakening, and hence are not called "Buddha." Others say: whoever, with respect to every object of cognition, awakens to it by his own power, awakens to it pervasively,

and awakens to it without the slightest error or confusion, is called "Buddha." The solitary-realized buddha, though capable of awakening by his own power, lacks the remaining two qualities; the śrāvaka lacks all three — and hence neither is called "Buddha." Others say: whoever, with respect to every condition whatsoever, is capable of natural, spontaneous awakening, awakening in every possible mode, is called "Buddha." The solitary-realized buddha, though possessing natural, spontaneous awakening, lacks awakening in every possible mode; the śrāvaka lacks both — and hence neither is called "Buddha." Others say: whoever possesses wisdom capable of pervasively and clearly awakening to the very relation between the perceiver and the perceived, the aspect and the object, faculty and its own proper meaning, and the object possessed and the object itself, within every possible object of cognition, is called "Buddha" — the two vehicles are not so. Others say: whoever, having once heard the Dharma, never again abandons it, is called "Buddha" — the two vehicles are not so. Others say: whoever, within his own continuum, has permanently subdued every trace of unreasonable habitual propensity, is called "Buddha" — the two vehicles are not so. Others say: whoever is capable of reaching the very bottom, the ultimate source, of the profound river of dependent origination, is called "Buddha" — the two vehicles are not so. Hence the sūtra offers the simile of three animals crossing a river — the rabbit, the horse, and the elephant: the rabbit merely floats upon the surface of the water as it crosses; the horse sometimes treads the riverbed and sometimes floats as it crosses; the mighty elephant, at every moment, treads the very bottom of the river as it crosses — the śrāvaka, the solitary-realized buddha, and the Tathāgata, in crossing the river of dependent origination, are likewise so, each in turn. Others say: whoever has cut off both kinds of ignorance — the defiled and the undefiled — is called "Buddha"; the śrāvaka and solitary-realized buddha are capable of cutting off only the defiled kind, not the undefiled, and hence are not called "Buddha." Others say: whoever has cut off both kinds of doubt — the underlying tendency and its manifest instance — is called "Buddha"; the śrāvaka and solitary-realized buddha, though cutting off the underlying tendency, do not cut off its manifest instance, and hence are not called "Buddha." Others say: whoever, at the very moment of the knowledge of exhaustion, has both obstructions cut off at once, mind thereby liberated — namely, the afflictive obstruction and the obstruction to liberation — is called "Buddha"; the śrāvaka and solitary-realized buddha either become free of the afflictive obstruction first and the obstruction to liberation afterward, or become free of the obstruction to liberation first and the afflictive obstruction afterward, but never both at once, and hence are not called "Buddha." Others say: whoever possesses both kinds of perfection at once — the basis and what is based upon it — is called "Buddha." As for other sentient beings: some possess a perfect basis without a perfect basis-holder, as with a wheel-turning king; some possess a perfect basis-holder without a perfect basis, as with the śrāvaka and solitary-realized buddha. Only the Buddha possesses both at once, and hence alone bears the name "Buddha" — exactly as basis and basis-holder, vessel and what a vessel holds, place and what illuminates a place, should be understood to correspond in just the same way. Others say: whoever possesses three perfections at once — of physical form, of lineage, and of eloquence — is called "Buddha"; the two vehicles are not so. Others say: whoever possesses three further perfections at once — the fulfillment of every vow, and being freely open to any question — is called "Buddha"; the two vehicles are not so. Others say: whoever possesses the three kinds of non-guardedness and the three foundations of unshared mindfulness is called "Buddha"; the two vehicles are not so. Others say: whoever speaks without any duplicity, whose eloquence never runs dry, and whose every prediction is never mistaken, is called "Buddha"; the two vehicles are not so. Others say: whoever possesses four kinds of knowledge at once — knowledge of cause, knowledge of time, knowledge of characteristics, and knowledge of exposition — is called "Buddha"; the two vehicles are not so. Others say: whoever possesses a further four kinds of knowledge — unattached knowledge, unobstructed knowledge, unmistaken knowledge, and unregressing knowledge — is called "Buddha"; the two vehicles are not so. Others say: whoever possesses awakening to every kind of cause, every kind of result, every kind of continuity, and every kind of antidote, is called "Buddha"; the two vehicles are not so. Others say: whoever cannot be tainted by any of the eight worldly conditions, whose own perfection of virtue none can ever equal, and who is capable of rescuing every being from every peril and calamity whatsoever, is called "Buddha"; the two vehicles are not so. Others say:

whoever possesses the eighteen unshared buddha-dharmas, the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the great compassion, and the three foundations of unshared mindfulness, is called "Buddha"; the two vehicles are not so. Others say: whoever possesses a profound, subtle, pervasive, and equal great compassion is called "Buddha" — "profound" because accumulated across three incalculable eons; "subtle" because awakened to the three kinds of suffering; "pervasive" because taking the three realms as its object; "equal" because turning without any difference toward friend and foe alike. It is through causes and conditions such as these, of many kinds, that, among the three kinds of complete knowledge, only one alone is called "Buddha."

Question: why does the World-Honored One, among the dharmas of the form aggregate, establish only the eye sense-field and the rest as faculties, and not the form sense-field and the rest? Answer: because the form sense-field and the rest lack the mark of a faculty. Others say: whatever is subsumed under an internal sense-field is established as a faculty; whatever is subsumed under an external sense-field is not. Others say: whatever also serves as a basis is established as a faculty; whatever serves only as an object is not — the same holding for whatever possesses an object as against what is merely an object. Others say: whatever is exclusively subsumed under sentient beings is established as a faculty; whatever is indeterminate in this respect is not. Others say: whatever is exclusively grasped is established as a faculty; whatever is neither exclusively so, nor determinately one or the other, is not. Others say: whatever is exclusively subsumed under a single continuum is established as a faculty; whatever is indeterminate in this respect is not. Others say: whatever is used and experienced exclusively by its own continuum is established as a faculty; whatever is indeterminate in this respect is not. Others say: whatever is uncommon, belonging exclusively to oneself, is established as a faculty; whatever is common, shared with others, is not.

Question: why, within the feeling aggregate, does the World-Honored One establish two faculties each for painful and pleasant feeling, yet only a single faculty for neither-pleasant-nor-painful feeling?

Answer: neither-pleasant-nor-painful feeling, too, ought properly to have been established as two, and its not being so should be understood as a matter left with some further, supplementary account. Further, the Buddha wished to adorn the meaning with a variety of wording and a variety of expressions, so as to make it easier to understand. Further, he wished to display two gateways and two summaries, and so on, explained fully elsewhere. Further, pleasant and painful feeling admit of the sharp and the dull, the restless and the settled; whatever is sharp, restless, and unsettled is established as the joy- or displeasure-faculty; whatever is dull, calm, and settled is established as the pleasure- or pain-faculty; neither-pleasant-nor-painful feeling is exclusively of the dull, calm, and settled kind, and hence is established, together, as a single faculty. Further, pleasant and painful feeling each undergo a distinct mode of turning, and hence are each divided into two — that is, the pleasure-faculty turns in one way, the joy-faculty in another; the pain-faculty turns in one way, the displeasure-faculty in another; neither-pleasant-nor-painful feeling undergoes no such distinct turning, and hence is established, together, as a single faculty. Further, painful and pleasant feeling mutually oppose one another,

and are each, accordingly, divided into two — that is, painful and pleasant oppose one another, and displeasure and joy oppose one another; neither-pleasant-nor-painful feeling has no such opposition, and hence is spoken of as only a single kind. Question: why is the perception aggregate not established as a faculty? Answer: dharmas that are not faculties are numerous — why ask specifically about perception alone? Question: form and formations, in part, are established as faculties, and feeling and consciousness are entirely established as faculties, but perception alone is not — it is for this specific reason that the question is asked. Answer: because perception lacks the mark of a faculty. Further, a faculty operates by its own power, while perception operates only through another — exactly as a hired laborer acts only when instructed, and does not act when left uninstructed. Perception's own turning toward an object is likewise so —

that is, it is only once feeling, volition, and consciousness have apprehended, constructed, and discerned the object that perception then grasps its own mark. Further, a faculty is self-sovereign, not covered over by another, while perception is covered over by wisdom, and hence is not called a faculty — that is, a wholesome perception is covered over by wholesome wisdom, exactly as one who grasps things well in wholesome matters is called, in the world, an "intelligent person"; a neutral perception is covered over by neutral wisdom, exactly as one who grasps things well in worldly affairs is called a "skillful person"; a defiled perception is covered over by inverted wisdom, exactly as it is said that one gives rise to the inverted perception of permanence with respect to what is impermanent, up through giving rise to the inverted perception of a self with respect to what is not a self. The Venerable Vasumitra explains it this way: why is perception not established as a faculty? Answer: the sense of predominance is the meaning of "faculty" — perception's own predominance is too slight, and hence it is not established as a faculty. Question: perception, too, possesses a certain predominance, as it is said, every conditioned dharma exercises mutual predominance over one another, and every unconditioned dharma is predominant with respect to the conditioned. Answer: I say it is slight, not that it is entirely absent. Further, it is said: a faculty is capable of harming affliction; perception is incapable of harming affliction. Question: perception, too, is capable of harming affliction, as it is said, bhikṣus, whoever practices, cultivates, and repeatedly cultivates the perception of impermanence is thereby able to remove every craving belonging to the desire, form, and formless realms alike. Answer: this speaks of wisdom under the name "perception." The Great Virtuous One explains it this way: a faculty carries the sense of sovereignty, not following after another; perception, however, always follows after whatever other mind and mental factors have already discerned the object, before it is then able to grasp its own mark, and hence is not established as a faculty. The Venerable Saṃghaloka explains it this way: a faculty carries the sense of being solid and substantial; perception's own function is floating and empty — hence a merely provisional, hollow conception is called "perception," and the world, too, speaks of an unreal, groundless understanding as one's own mere "perception." The Venerable Ghoṣavarman explains it this way: a faculty is firmly settled and difficult to shake; perception's own function shifts and changes according to its conditions, unsettled, exactly like a reflected image or a shimmering mirage — and hence it is not established as a faculty. Question: why are the afflictions not established as faculties? Answer: they lack the mark of a faculty. Other masters say: predominance is the very sense of "faculty," and the afflictions are base and inferior. Question: the afflictions are capable of causing every existence to continue on, of destroying every wholesome quality, of causing beings to sink into birth-and-death, of keeping them far from nirvāṇa, and of being exceedingly difficult to tame and subdue — how, then, could they be called base and inferior? Answer: it is because the afflictions are contemptible and despicable, rejected by the wise, that they are called base and inferior — it is not that they lack power that they are so called, exactly as an executioner or an outcaste, though indeed possessing real power, are still called base and inferior, since they are held in contempt by those of noble standing. Question: if so, then defiled feeling, too, ought not to be established as a faculty. Answer: feeling, with respect to the defiled class of dharmas, possesses a genuinely predominant function, and hence is established as a faculty — the afflictions are not so, since it is in dependence upon feeling itself that the afflictions actually arise. Question: if so, then perception, too, ought to be established as a faculty, since it likewise gives rise to affliction. Answer: though perception, too, is capable of giving rise to affliction, it does not surpass feeling in this respect, and it is for this same reason that it is likewise not spoken of among the limbs of dependent origination. Others say: feeling, though it inclines toward the defiled class of dharmas, also intermingles freely with wholesome dharmas as well; the afflictions incline only toward the defiled class of dharmas, and never incline toward the wholesome — and hence they are not established as faculties, exactly as the warden of a prison, though himself of low station, still associates freely with the noble and eminent, unlike the mere prison gatekeeper, who, though fierce and harsh enough to inflict suffering upon others, remains so utterly contemptible and detestable that the noble and eminent keep their distance from him entirely. The Venerable Saṃghavasu explains it this way: whatever dharma can be found present within both a defiled and an undefiled body is established as a faculty; the afflictions can be found only within a defiled body, and hence are not established as faculties. If this were so, however, then neither the displeasure-faculty nor the faculty of complete knowledge ought to be established as faculties either, since the displeasure-faculty can be found only within a defiled body, and the faculty of complete knowledge only within an undefiled one. Others say: a faculty carries the sense of sovereignty; the afflictions are not sovereign, being merely a kind of mental factor. If this were so, however, then feeling and the rest, too, ought not to be established as faculties, being likewise mental factors — and it is on this basis that the account given earlier is the better one.

Question: why is it that feeling, whether wholesome, defiled, or neutral, is in every case established as a faculty, while wisdom, mindfulness, and concentration are established as faculties only in their wholesome form, never in their defiled or neutral form? Answer: feeling possesses a genuinely predominant function with respect to the defiling class of dharmas — wholesome, defiled, and neutral feeling all alike possess this power, and hence, inclining as they do toward the defiling class, all three are established as faculties. Wisdom, mindfulness, and concentration possess a genuinely predominant function with respect to the purifying class of dharmas specifically — only their wholesome form inclines toward the purifying class, and hence only the wholesome kind of wisdom, mindfulness, and concentration is established as a faculty. Other masters say: feeling possesses a genuinely predominant function across all three moral natures at once, and hence, whether wholesome, defiled, or neutral, all three are established as faculties; wisdom, mindfulness, and concentration possess a genuinely predominant function only with respect to the purifying class, and hence only their wholesome form is established as a faculty — for why is this? It is by the very power of feeling that sentient beings turn toward wholesome, defiled, and neutral matters alike,

since feeling's own superiority with respect to the purifying class is why it is spoken of among the awakening-factors and the dhyāna-factors, its own superiority with respect to the defiling class is why it is spoken of among the twelve limbs of dependent origination, and its own superiority with respect to neither of these two classes is why, through feeling, various neutral undertakings are carried out — wisdom and the rest are not so. It should accordingly be understood that the mind-faculty, too, is superior across all three moral natures at once, and hence, whether wholesome, defiled, or neutral, is in every case established as a faculty — for why is this superior across all three? Because dharmas of all three moral natures alike depend upon mind itself. Question: why are attention, resolved understanding, contact, and desire not established as faculties? Answer: they lack the mark of a faculty — that is, though attention is capable of directing the mind toward whatever object it aims at, it does not possess a superior function at every moment alike, and hence is not established as a faculty. Question: does it not possess a superior function with respect to the purifying class as well? For every meditator, at the very outset of cultivating concentration, invariably relies upon the power of attention. Answer: at the very outset of cultivating concentration, causing the mind to turn toward its object, attention does indeed possess a temporary power — but, once the mind has come to rest upon its object, it no longer possesses any superior function, and hence is not established as a faculty. Resolved understanding, though capable of causing the mind to affirm and settle with certainty upon its object, possesses no distinctively superior function with respect to growth and expansion, and hence is not established as a faculty. Question: does resolved understanding not possess a superior function among wholesome dharmas as well, since it is established among the five aggregates of precepts and the rest, and among the ten limbs of the one beyond training? Answer: at the very stage of freedom from defilement, the mark of that very freedom becomes manifest, and it is this that is established as the aggregate of liberation and the path-factor of correct liberation — apart from this, there is no further, distinctively superior function of growth and expansion — and, lacking the mark of a faculty, it is not established as a faculty. Contact, though it causes the mind to come into contact with its object, giving rise to feeling in accordance with it, possesses no distinctively superior function with respect to defilement or purification, and hence is not established as a faculty.

Question: is not the very giving-rise of feeling itself a superior function? Answer: feeling possesses a genuinely superior capacity with respect to both defilement and purification, and hence can be established as a faculty; contact merely gives rise to feeling, possessing no directly superior function of its own with respect to either defilement or purification. Further, contact is capable only of inclining toward the defiling class, never the purifying class, and hence is not established as a faculty, since faculties are, for the most part, established specifically for their inclination toward the purifying class. It is for this very same reason, too, that desire is not established as a faculty, since it, too, possesses no superior function with respect to the purifying class. Question: the sūtra says that desire is the very root of all dharmas, and that every defiled and purified dharma alike arises from it — how, then, could it possess no superior function with respect to the purifying class? Answer: though it is true that, without desire, defiled and purified dharmas alike could not arise, and the sūtra speaks of it as the very root of all dharmas, once these dharmas have already arisen, desire itself no longer possesses any further superior function; further, it inclines predominantly toward craving, and hence is not established as a faculty, since it inclines toward what is base and inferior, not toward what is truly predominant. Question: volition is capable of causing the mind to construct both wholesome and unwholesome actions, is established as mental karma, is capable of giving rise to bodily and verbal action, is capable of bringing about birth-and-death, and possesses a superior function surpassing every other dharma — why, then, is it not established as a faculty? Answer: it inclines only toward the defiling class, never the purifying class, and hence is not established as a faculty. Others say: every karmic action arises from affliction, and affliction itself is contemptible and base, not genuinely predominant — and hence karma, too, ought to be understood in just the same way, exactly as the sons and daughters born of a base and contemptible person are themselves shunned and rejected by all, no one willing to marry into their family — every karmic action should be understood in just the same way, and hence possesses no genuine sense of "faculty" at all.

Question: why is it that, among the wholesome mental factors, only two are established as faculties, while all the rest are not? Answer: because the rest all alike lack the mark of a faculty — that is, faith is capable of serving as the very root of every wholesome quality, there being no wholesome quality whatsoever that comes to be apart from faith; diligence is capable of universally spurring on and drawing forth every wholesome quality, there being no wholesome quality whatsoever that comes to be apart from diligence — and it is for this reason that these two dharmas alone carry a superior meaning sufficient to be established as faculties; the rest are not so. Question: shame and moral dread, both subsumed under wholesome self-nature, are spoken of as the two "white dharmas" — why, then, are they not established as faculties? Answer: these two are capable of counteracting only what is pervasively unwholesome, being themselves exclusively of the black, wholly unwholesome class in their own opposing self-nature, and are hence spoken of as "white" and as "wholesome by their own nature" — but, with respect to the growth and expansion of wholesome dharmas generally, they possess no distinctively superior capacity of their own, and hence lack the sense of a faculty. Question: non-craving and non-hatred are called wholesome roots — why, then, are they not established as faculties in this context? Answer: the criterion by which those two are established as "roots" differs from the criterion at work here — that is, what they counteract is associated with all six kinds of consciousness, pervades every kind of what is cut off, is of the nature of an underlying tendency, is capable of giving rise to coarse bodily and verbal evil karma, and serves as the immediate preparatory cause for cutting off wholesome roots entirely — possessing these five characteristics together, they are established as unwholesome roots; non-craving and the other two are capable of counteracting precisely this, and of giving rise to every scattered wholesome action, and are hence called wholesome roots. Here, however, faith and the rest are established as faculties with respect to their broad capacity for growing and expanding every wholesome quality,

relying predominantly on their conduciveness to supramundane wholesome qualities — and it is for this reason that non-craving and the rest are not faculties in this specific sense. Question: why are tranquility, non-harming, non-heedlessness, and equanimity not established as faculties? Answer: they lack the mark of a faculty — that is, what these four counteract are, respectively, four secondary afflictions: three of these are found exclusively within a defiled mind; the fourth serves as a companion to evil, discursive thought, disturbing and harming the bodhisattva, obstructing his attainment of awakening — and it is for this reason that, among wholesome dharmas, these four are established as their respective antidotes; yet, with respect to the growth and expansion of the purifying class of dharmas generally, they accomplish no distinctively superior function, and hence are not established as faculties. Question: since every wholesome quality depends upon non-heedlessness in order to arise, how can it be said that its own accomplishment is not superior? Answer: this merely removes heedlessness, and it is in consequence of this removal that wholesome qualities are able to arise in dependence upon faith and the rest — it does not itself, directly and intimately, possess the power of generating and growing them. Question: why are delight and aversion not established as faculties? Answer: within the scattered state, their own function is indeed superior, but, within the state of settled concentration, their function is no longer clearly evident — and a genuine faculty must be superior specifically within both states at once, becoming, moreover, all the more clear and pronounced specifically within the state of concentration. Question: if so, why is faith established as a faculty? Answer: the function of purifying clarity pervades every state alike, not merely the scattered one, and it is for this reason that it is established as a faculty. Question: why are remorse, drowsiness, sleep, and discursive and investigative thought not established as faculties? Answer: they lack the mark of a faculty — that is, the first two occur only within the scattered mind, while the latter two do not pervade every realm and ground alike, and, further, none of them possesses any superior capacity for generating wholesome qualities, and hence none of them is spoken of as possessing the sense of a faculty. Question: if so, then painful feeling and the other three feelings, too, ought not to be established as faculties, since they, too, fail to pervade every realm and ground. Answer: taken as a whole, feeling pervades every stage alike, and, according to its various kinds, is uniformly called a faculty — moreover, feeling universally possesses the predominant capacity for generation and growth that these others lack. Question: discursive thought, too, is established as a limb within concentration and within the path — is this not likewise a case of growth and superiority? Answer: this reflects concentration and wisdom's own internal, mutually supporting and sustaining structure specifically, not a general function of growing toward the purifying class of dharmas broadly, and hence it is not itself established as a faculty.

Question: why, among the formations dissociated from mind, is only the life-faculty established as a faculty? Answer: because the life-faculty alone possesses the mark of a faculty — that is, it belongs exclusively to sentient beings, is exclusively of the nature of a ripening-result, and is capable of comprehensively sustaining and maintaining — and it is for these reasons alone that it is established as a faculty; none of the rest is so. For why is this? The four conditioned characteristics possess none of these three senses at all; the ripening-result of non-perception lacks the sense of comprehensive sustaining; class-nature is not exclusively of the ripening-result kind, since it, too, is common to the outflow-continuing kind as well; the two mindless attainments, names, phrases, and syllable-clusters, and acquisition and non-acquisition, all lack the latter two senses — and hence none of these is established as a faculty.

Question: if the sense of the supreme is the meaning of "faculty," then, since nirvāṇa is supreme among all dharmas whatsoever, why is it not established as a faculty? Answer: nirvāṇa is itself the very place where every faculty is extinguished and dissolved — and a place where something is extinguished and dissolved is never itself given the name of what has been extinguished there, exactly as the broken remains of a vase and the like are no longer called by the name "vase" and the like. Others say: whatever dharma traverses the world, takes up its own result, gives rise to a result in turn, possesses genuine function, and cognizes an object, can be established as a faculty — nirvāṇa is not so. Others say: whatever dharma arises and perishes, possesses a cause and a result, and bears a conditioned characteristic, can be established as a faculty — nirvāṇa is not so. Others say: a faculty belongs to what arises through the combination of cause and condition together — nirvāṇa is not so. Others say: whatever dharma is born by birth, aged by aging, and destroyed by destruction, can be established as a faculty — nirvāṇa is not so. Others say: a faculty falls within the aggregates, falls within time, and is followed everywhere by every manner of suffering — nirvāṇa is not so. Others say: a faculty possesses an anterior-and-posterior aspect, and an upper-middling-and-lower aspect — nirvāṇa is not so. Others say: the sense of the supreme, as the meaning of "faculty," refers specifically to what is supreme among conditioned dharmas while yet possessing genuine function; nirvāṇa, though supreme among all dharmas whatsoever, possesses no function at all, and hence is not established as a faculty. Space and analytical non-cessation likewise lack the sense of a faculty, and should be understood accordingly, by the very same reasoning.