Subhūti Cannot Say His Own Name

Question: is wish-knowledge attained through effortful practice, or through the abandonment of afflictions? Answer: some instances are attained through effortful practice, and some through the abandonment of afflictions. Here, some say: for the Buddha it is attained through the abandonment of afflictions, since it is attained at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion; for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas it is attained through effortful practice, and it manifests before the mind through effortful practice.

Some say: both the Buddha and the pratyekabuddha attain it through the abandonment of afflictions, since it is attained at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion, whereas the śrāvaka attains it through effortful practice, and it manifests before the mind through effortful practice. Some say: the Buddha, the pratyekabuddha, and the śrāvaka who has reached the ultimate all attain it through the abandonment of afflictions, since it is attained at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion, while other śrāvakas attain it through effortful practice, and it manifests before the mind through effortful practice. According to this latter view: whatever is certain to be attained is attained through the abandonment of afflictions, since it is attained at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion, and only afterward does it manifest before the mind through subsequently undertaken effortful practice — for the Buddha this requires no effortful practice at all, for the pratyekabuddha a lesser degree of effortful practice, and for the śrāvaka either a middling or a superior degree. Yet there is a further wish-knowledge attained specifically through the effortful practice of the terminal concentration, and it manifests before the mind through that very effortful practice. Question: what is this effortful practice for wish-knowledge? Answer: it takes as its effortful practice every ground together with the terminal concentration — that is, when the practitioner is about to give rise to this wish-knowledge, he first gives rise to a wholesome mind of the desire realm; next, immediately thereafter, he enters the first dhyāna; next he enters the second dhyāna; and so on in succession up to entering the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. From the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception he rises and re-enters the sphere of nothing-whatsoever; and so on in succession back down to entering the first dhyāna. From the first dhyāna he rises and again enters the second dhyāna; and so on in succession up to entering the fourth dhyāna. Having thus cycled through every equipoise of every ground, higher and lower, entering and emerging in turn, until the fourth dhyāna has been rendered utterly pliant and compliant, he then, within the fourth dhyāna itself, proceeds from its lower grade into its middle grade, and from its middle grade into its upper grade — and it is this upper grade that is named the terminal fourth dhyāna. From this, in succession, wish-knowledge is drawn forth. It is for this reason that the Venerable Vasumitra states as follows: "Arhats, for the sake of benefiting others, cycle through the higher and lower grounds, entering and emerging in turn, until the fourth dhyāna has been rendered pliant and compliant; and, once this effortful practice flows on without any obstruction, that is called the completion and fulfillment of the effortful practice, from which wish-knowledge is then drawn forth and manifests before the mind." The Venerable One states: "It is the skillful means of discerning what has ceased without interruption, what has arisen without interruption, and what arises simultaneously; once this effortful practice flows on without any obstruction, that is called the completion and fulfillment of the effortful practice, from which wish-knowledge is then drawn forth and manifests before the mind."

Question: what difference is there between the cognition of recollecting former abodes and wish-knowledge taking the past as its object? Answer: the very names differ — this one is named the cognition of recollecting former abodes, that one is named wish-knowledge taking the past as its object. Furthermore, the cognition of recollecting former abodes knows only the contaminated five aggregates of the prior limit, whereas this wish-knowledge knows both contaminated and uncontaminated aggregates. Furthermore, the cognition of recollecting former abodes knows only the five aggregates of the prior limit bound to the desire and form realms, whereas this wish-knowledge knows aggregates bound to all three realms as well as those unbound. Furthermore, the cognition of recollecting former abodes knows only the general characteristics of the aggregates, whereas this wish-knowledge knows both their particular and their general characteristics. Furthermore, the cognition of recollecting former abodes is possessed by outsiders as well as by adherents of this Dharma, whereas this wish-knowledge is possessed only by adherents of this Dharma. Furthermore, the cognition of recollecting former abodes is possessed by both ordinary worldlings and noble ones, whereas this wish-knowledge is possessed only by noble ones. Furthermore, the cognition of recollecting former abodes is possessed by trainees, non-trainees, and those who are neither alike, whereas this wish-knowledge is possessed only by non-trainees. Furthermore, the cognition of recollecting former abodes is found in the mental continuum of both the one liberated dependent on time and the one liberated regardless of time, whereas this wish-knowledge is found only in the mental continuum of the one liberated regardless of time. Furthermore, the cognition of recollecting former abodes depends on any of the four fundamental dhyānas, whereas this wish-knowledge depends only on the fourth fundamental dhyāna. Furthermore, the cognition of recollecting former abodes may be either previously attained or not yet attained, either previously cultivated or not yet cultivated, either shared with outsiders or not, whereas this wish-knowledge is only ever not yet attained, not yet cultivated, and unshared with outsiders. Furthermore, the cognition of recollecting former abodes, at the very moment it is first drawn forth, is capable only of recollecting in the successive order of birth after birth, and only later, once fully perfected, can it recollect, exactly as one wishes, whether in successive order or by leaping over a hundred or a thousand births at once; whereas this wish-knowledge, both at the very moment it is first drawn forth and once fully perfected, truly knows, exactly as wished, whether in successive order or by leaping over intervening spans. Furthermore, with respect to this wish-knowledge operating only upon the very objects already known by the cognition of recollecting former abodes, it still excels in six respects: first, in resplendence; second, in dominance; third, in subtlety and refinement; fourth, in purity;

fifth, in clarity; and sixth, in swiftness — how much more so, then, with respect to everything else it knows beyond that! This is the difference between the cognition of recollecting former abodes and wish-knowledge taking the past as its object.

Question: what difference is there between the cognition of others' minds and wish-knowledge taking the present as its object? Answer: the very names differ — this one is named the cognition of others' minds, that one is named wish-knowledge taking the present as its object. Furthermore, the cognition of others' minds takes a single thing as its object, whereas this wish-knowledge takes either a single thing or many things as its object.

Furthermore, the cognition of others' minds takes only a particular-characteristic object, whereas this wish-knowledge takes both particular- and general-characteristic objects. Furthermore, the cognition of others' minds takes only another's mental continuum,

whereas this wish-knowledge takes both one's own and another's mental continuum as its object. Furthermore, the cognition of others' minds takes only mind and mental factors as its object, whereas this wish-knowledge takes the five aggregates as its object. Furthermore, the cognition of others' minds depends on any of the four fundamental dhyānas, whereas this wish-knowledge depends only on the fourth fundamental dhyāna. Furthermore, the cognition of others' minds may be possessed by outsiders as well as by adherents of this Dharma, whereas this wish-knowledge is possessed only by adherents of this Dharma. Furthermore, the cognition of others' minds is possessed by both ordinary worldlings and noble ones, whereas this wish-knowledge is possessed only by noble ones. Furthermore, the cognition of others' minds is possessed by trainees, non-trainees, and those who are neither alike, whereas this wish-knowledge is possessed only by non-trainees. Furthermore, the cognition of others' minds is found in the mental continuum of both the one liberated dependent on time and the one liberated regardless of time, whereas this wish-knowledge is found only in the mental continuum of the one liberated regardless of time. Furthermore, the cognition of others' minds may be either previously attained or not yet attained, either previously cultivated or not yet cultivated, either shared with outsiders or not,

whereas this wish-knowledge is only ever not yet attained, not yet cultivated, and unshared with outsiders. Furthermore, the cognition of others' minds may be either contaminated or uncontaminated, whereas this wish-knowledge is only ever contaminated. Furthermore, the cognition of others' minds takes as its object dharmas bound to the desire and form realms as well as those unbound, whereas this wish-knowledge takes as its object dharmas bound to all three realms as well as those unbound. Furthermore, with respect to this wish-knowledge operating only upon the very objects already known by the cognition of others' minds, it still excels in the same six respects already explained — resplendence and the rest — how much more so, then, with respect to everything else it knows beyond that! This is the difference between the cognition of others' minds and wish-knowledge taking the present as its object.

Question: how is wish-knowledge able to know the future? Answer: some say: it infers the future from the past and present — just as a farmer, having sown his seed, infers that a corresponding fruit will surely arise; it is the same in this case. Some say: if this were so, wish-knowledge would then be an inferential cognition, not a directly perceptual one. It should rather be stated as follows: this wish-knowledge knows its effect without needing to observe its cause, and knows its cause without needing to observe its effect — and it is for this reason that this cognition is a directly perceptual cognition, not an inferential one. Question: how does wish-knowledge know the formless realm? Answer: some say: by observing its outflow and its distinguishing modes of activity, just as one who observes a traveler on the road knows where he is bound. Some say: if this were so, wish-knowledge would then be an inferential cognition, not a directly perceptual one. It should rather be stated as follows: this wish-knowledge knows its effect without observing its cause, and knows its cause without observing its effect, and hence this cognition is a directly perceptual cognition, not an inferential one. Yet the śrāvaka and the pratyekabuddha, still possessing the fault of residual habituation, must engage in effortful practice with respect to the object they wish to know before they come to know it; whereas the Tathāgata, whose fault of residual habituation is eternally exhausted, knows the object he wishes to know the very moment he raises his mind to it. Question: how is the World-Honored One's wish-knowledge able to know the distinguishing mental characteristics of every single sentient being? Answer: some say: this question need not even be raised, since this lies within the inconceivable domain of the Buddhas alone. Some say: he has already surveyed and measured them beforehand, and now is simply able to know them. Some say:

by taking hold of a single portion of what is known, he comes to know the distinguishing mental characteristics of sentient beings, and by analogy comes to know the rest — just as, at the time a world-system is destroyed, most sentient beings are reborn in the Ābhāsvara heaven, and there, questioning one another about their former existences, they come afterward to know them by means of the cognition of recollecting former abodes; it is the same with the Buddha. Some say: the Buddha knows because he has thoroughly mastered dependent origination. Some say: the Buddha knows because he has mastery over wish-knowledge. Some say: the Buddha knows because he has thoroughly mastered karma itself. Some say: the Buddha knows because he has thoroughly mastered the outflow of karma. Some say: the Buddha knows because he has thoroughly mastered the distinguishing modes of activity. The Venerable One states: the Buddha, with respect to the mental sphere of sentient beings, simply knows whatever he wishes to know, without needing effortful practice and without the trouble of investigation, since, at the very moment he first attained unsurpassed, perfect, complete awakening, this entire class of cognition was already attained in full. Question: for what reason does one give rise to such wish-knowledge? Answer: in order to benefit others — that is, one first gives rise to wish-knowledge in order to observe the distinguishing dispositions of sentient beings, and afterward performs whatever act of benefit is fitting, just as a skilled physician first observes the distinguishing symptoms of his patient before administering medicine.

Question: should wish-knowledge be said to be wholesome, or neutral? Answer: it may be either wholesome or neutral. Here, some say: wish-knowledge is of only one kind, existing solely within the fourth dhyāna, and is wholesome alone. Some say: wish-knowledge is of two kinds, existing within the fourth dhyāna and within the desire realm, each wholesome alone. Some say: wish-knowledge is of three kinds — wholesome within the fourth dhyāna, and both wholesome and neutral within the desire realm. Some say: wish-knowledge is of five kinds, existing within each of the four dhyānas and within the desire realm, each wholesome alone. Some say: wish-knowledge is of six kinds — wholesome within each of the four dhyānas, and both wholesome and neutral within the desire realm. Some say: wish-knowledge is of seven kinds — wholesome alone within the upper three dhyānas, and both wholesome and neutral within the first dhyāna and within the desire realm. Some say: wish-knowledge is of ten kinds — both wholesome and neutral within each of the four dhyānas and within the desire realm. According to this latter view, it should be understood, as stated before, that six of these are wholesome. Question: if wish-knowledge exists only within the fourth dhyāna and is wholesome alone, why then is it said to be wholesome within the four dhyānas, and both wholesome and neutral within the desire realm? Answer: wish-knowledge does indeed exist only within the fourth dhyāna and is wholesome alone; yet this is spoken of here with an implicit further meaning — namely, that both wish-knowledge itself and the cognition that subsequently expounds, with the same object as its condition, what wish-knowledge has known are both named wish-knowledge. How does this come about? That is, the yogin, relying first on the fourth dhyāna, gives rise to wish-knowledge and comes to know the object to be known; then, taking this same object as his condition, he enters the third dhyāna, and so on in succession, still taking this same object as his condition, down to giving rise to a wholesome mind of the desire realm; and, immediately thereafter, still taking this same object as his condition, he gives rise to either a wholesome or a neutral mind of the desire realm in order to expound the object known. Here, both the fundamental cognition and this subsequently arising cognition are alike called wish-knowledge, and it is for this reason that it is said to be either wholesome or neutral.

What is non-contention practice? — and so on at length. Question: why is this treatise composed? Answer: in order to elucidate the meaning of a sūtra passage — for a sūtra states, "among my disciples, the monk Subhūti is foremost in abiding in non-contention practice." Although it speaks in this way, it does not explain the matter at length.

What is non-contention practice, and what does "non-contention" itself name? Since that sūtra serves as the very foundation this treatise relies upon, what it leaves unexplained ought now to be explained, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. Question: what is non-contention practice? Answer: every arhat has thoroughly mastered the inner time, but this is not necessarily so of the outer time; if he has also thoroughly mastered the outer time, this is named non-contention practice. What is the inner time? It refers to whatever afflictions are present in one's own mental continuum. What is the outer time? It refers to whatever afflictions are present in another's mental continuum. To restrain these afflictions is named thorough mastery. Every arhat has already restrained and severed every affliction present in his own mental continuum, yet whether he has done so for the afflictions present in another's mental continuum is not fixed; if he is also able to restrain these, this is named non-contention practice. Some say: "time" here refers to the three periods — the first part of the day, the middle part of the day, and the latter part of the day; to govern one's afflictions across these three periods is named thorough mastery. Every arhat has already governed and severed the afflictions of his own mental continuum across these three periods, yet whether he has done so for another's mental continuum across these three periods is not fixed; if he is also able to govern these, this is named non-contention practice. Some say: "time" here refers to the six periods — the first, middle, and latter parts of both day and night; to govern one's afflictions across these six periods is named thorough mastery. Every arhat has already governed and severed the afflictions of his own mental continuum across these six periods, yet whether he has done so for another's mental continuum across these six periods is not fixed; if he is also able to govern these, this is named non-contention practice. The Venerable Ghoṣaka states: it is not that non-contention practice is so named because one is free of affliction in one's own mental continuum, but rather that it is so named because one is able to restrain the contentiousness of affliction within another's mental continuum. Why is this? Because "contention" is a term applied with respect to others, not with respect to oneself. Question: why is restraining and governing affliction named thorough mastery? Answer: it is only by means of skillful means and awakened wisdom manifesting before the mind that one becomes able to restrain and govern affliction, whether one's own or another's, and it is for this reason that it is named thorough mastery.

Question: what does "non-contention" itself name? Answer: it names the causing of another's mental continuum to operate free of impure defilement — that is, afflictions are able to moisten, stain, and defile like grime, and one who has attained non-contention is not moistened, stained, or defiled by the grime of affliction within another's mental continuum; this is precisely the meaning of remaining distant from every affliction within another's mental continuum. Some say: this passage should rather be read as "operating without any remainder within another's mental continuum" — that is, one who has attained non-contention,

just as he has eternally severed every affliction in his own mental continuum without remainder, is likewise able to restrain and govern the afflictions in another's mental continuum so that none remain,

— this being precisely the meaning of thoroughly restraining, within another's mental continuum, every affliction that might otherwise be induced to arise there. Some say: this passage should rather be read as "operating without differentiation within another's mental continuum" — that is, one who has attained non-contention, just as he is able to restrain the afflictions within the mental continuum of a friend so that they do not arise, is likewise able to restrain the afflictions within the mental continuum of an enemy or of one neither friend nor enemy so that they do not arise — this being precisely the meaning of restraining every affliction within another's mental continuum equally, without partiality. Question: what difference is there between "thoroughly mastering the outer time" and "operating free of impure defilement"? Answer: "thoroughly mastering the outer time" refers to wisdom operating free of impure defilement — that is, that affliction does not arise.

Furthermore, that arhat practices five kinds of conduct in order to prevent affliction from arising in another's mental continuum. What are the five? First, purifying his own deportment; second, speaking or remaining silent according to the occasion; third, skillfully judging when to go and when to stay; fourth, discerning what should and should not be accepted; and fifth, observing the individual before him. Purifying his deportment: that arhat, while sitting in some place, upon another's approach, observes that person's mind to see through which deportment fetters will fail to arise in him. If he knows that his present deportment would give rise to that fetter, he at once abandons it and adopts some other deportment; if no fetter would arise, he simply remains as he was originally seated — and the same holds for every other deportment. Speaking or remaining silent according to the occasion: that arhat, upon seeing another approach, observes that person's disposition, asking whether he ought to speak with him or remain silent. Having observed this, if he sees that speaking would give rise to that fetter, then, however greatly he might wish to speak, he at once falls silent;

and, if he sees that silence would give rise to that fetter, then, however little he might wish to speak, he at once speaks with him. If, while traveling on a road, he sees two people approaching, he observes which of the two he ought to address first; having observed this, if he sees that speaking with this one would give rise to that fetter in him, he instead speaks with the other one, and likewise the reverse.

If speaking with either would give rise to that fetter, he falls silent toward both alike; and, likewise, if remaining silent toward either would give rise to that fetter, he speaks to both alike. If either speaking or remaining silent alike would give rise to that fetter, he simply avoids the road so as to prevent the fetter from arising. Skillfully judging when to go and when to stay: that arhat, wherever he is dwelling, observes whether he ought to remain there or to leave. If he sees that his remaining would give rise to a fetter in another, even though the place is secure and richly supplied with requisites, conducive to wholesome practice, he nevertheless departs from it; and if he sees that his leaving would give rise to a fetter in another, even though the place is insecure, its provisions scarce, and unconducive to wholesome practice, he nevertheless forces himself to remain there.

Discerning what should and should not be accepted: that arhat, whenever a donor offers requisites, observes that donor's mind to see whether the gift should be accepted or not. Having observed this, if he sees that accepting it would give rise to that fetter, then, even though he is in need of it, he does not accept it; and if he sees that not accepting it would give rise to that fetter, then, even though he has no need of it, he deliberately accepts it anyway. Observing the individual: that arhat, when about to enter a town, village, street, or another's house for the sake of alms, observes the men and women, young and old, within it, lest any of them give rise to affliction on his account. If he knows that none will arise, he then enters to beg for alms; and if he knows that affliction would arise, then, however extreme his hunger, he does not enter — though, since no such circumstance ever actually arises, this discernment is merely precautionary.

Were it ever the case that all sentient beings, upon seeing me, would give rise to affliction, I would at once go to some place devoid of any sentient being and die there by abstaining from food,

never allowing another to give rise to a fetter on my account. By cultivating these five kinds of conduct, that arhat is able to restrain the afflictions in another's mental continuum from ever manifesting before it.

Question: why does an arhat, having already attained liberation, still cultivate this practice, thereby binding himself of his own accord? Answer: that arhat was formerly of bodhisattva lineage, and cannot bear that sentient beings should commit evil and thereby incur suffering; in order to rescue them, he constantly reflects: "since beginningless time, I have bound myself together with sentient beings in mutual entanglement, transmigrating through the five destinies and undergoing every manner of extreme suffering; having now, by good fortune, escaped this, I ought also to rescue others." He further reflects: "since beginningless time, I have taken on bodies as base and defiled as an actor or a prostitute, and hundreds of thousands of beings gave rise to fetters on my account, and it was on this very account that they suffered long through the night of saṃsāra — how much more, then, now that I am free of greed, hatred, and delusion, and serve as a field of merit for the world, would beings who give rise to fetters on my account, without even incurring suffering thereby, still be gravely affected!" Hence he reflects that he ought no longer to create such a causal condition for affliction. It is for this reason that, although the arhat is himself already liberated, he still takes up non-contention practice for the sake of sentient beings.

Question: does he restrain another's particular-characteristic afflictions, or general-characteristic afflictions? Answer: only particular-characteristic afflictions can be restrained, not general-characteristic ones. Why is this? Because general-characteristic afflictions, according to their own respective scope, take as their single, collective object an entire realm, an entire ground, an entire place, or an entire class all at once, or an entire body once obtained, grasping it as self or as belonging to self; or grasping annihilationism or eternalism; or denying it as utterly non-existent; or grasping it as supreme; or grasping it as purifying; or giving rise to mere vacillating doubt;

and ignorance, failing to comprehend all sentient beings, arises constantly and spontaneously in every one of them, and cannot possibly be restrained. It is for this reason that only particular-characteristic afflictions are restrained. Question: what is the intrinsic nature of non-contention practice? Is it concentration, or is it wisdom? And, granting either, what difficulty follows? If it is concentration, how is this passage's own statement to be reconciled, where it says that thorough mastery of the outer time is named non-contention practice, since thorough mastery is itself wisdom? And if it is wisdom, how is another statement to be reconciled, where it says that one should cultivate the tranquil concentration of non-contention? Answer: it should be said that its nature is wisdom. Question: if so, then why does it say that one should cultivate the tranquil concentration of non-contention?

Answer: it ought properly to be said that one should cultivate the tranquil wisdom of non-contention; yet it is said that one should cultivate the tranquil concentration of non-contention because it is meant to display that, since this wisdom occurs together with concentration, it is spoken of as "concentration," even though it is in truth wisdom. This is the intrinsic nature of non-contention. Just as its intrinsic nature is such, so too are its own substance and the like. Its intrinsic nature has now been explained; what is to be explained next follows. Question: why is it named non-contention practice? Answer: because this practice is able to counteract the contentiousness of another's affliction, it is named non-contention practice. Now, "contention" is of three kinds: the contention of affliction, the contention of the aggregates, and the contention of strife. The contention of affliction refers to the hundred and eight afflictions; the contention of the aggregates refers to death; and the contention of strife refers to sentient beings mutually abusing and contradicting one another in speech. It should be understood that what is spoken of here is the contention of affliction, since the purpose is to restrain sentient beings from giving rise to affliction. Some further say: it is because this practice is able to make contention absent, both in oneself and in others, that it is named non-contention practice — this being precisely the meaning of skillfully cultivating the practice of non-self. It is for this reason that the Venerable Subhūti, once, at dusk, came to a vihāra and stood knocking at its door; a monk within asked, "who is it?" The Venerable Subhūti, having long abided in non-contention and thoroughly cultivated the practice of non-self,

remained silent, unable to say, "I am Subhūti," and only after a long while said: "this is a merely conventional designation the world has established, called Subhūti." That venerable one, too, once, traveling on the road, was caught in the rain and took shelter beside the gate of some tīrthika; the tīrthika asked, "what is your name, sir?" The Venerable Subhūti, having long abided in non-contention and thoroughly cultivated the practice of non-self, remained silent, unable to say, "I am Subhūti"; and only after being asked two or three times did he slowly reply: "this is a merely conventional name, Subhūti." It should thus be understood that one who has skillfully cultivated the practice of non-self, and thereby makes contention absent both in himself and in others, is what is called non-contention practice. Some say: it is because yogins, abiding in this practice, are entirely without contention amid what is liked or disliked, fitting or unfitting, agreeable or disagreeable, beneficial or harmful, and among the instruments of pain or pleasure, that it is named non-contention practice.

Furthermore, with respect to which realm non-contention falls within, it falls within the form realm; some say it falls within both the desire and form realms — according to this latter view, the first account is to be preferred. With respect to ground, it exists in the fourth dhyāna; some say it exists across five grounds, namely the four dhyānas and the desire realm — according to this latter view, the first account is to be preferred. With respect to its support, it depends upon a body of the desire realm. With respect to its mode of activity, it is an indistinct mode of activity. With respect to its objective support, it takes the desire realm as its object, and, within the desire realm, it takes only affliction as its object; some say it takes the five aggregates of the desire realm generally as its object — according to this latter view, the first account is to be preferred. With respect to the mindfulness-foundations, it pertains to the dharma-mindfulness-foundation; some say it pertains to all four — according to this latter view, the dharma-mindfulness-foundation account is to be preferred. With respect to what kind of cognition it is, it is conventional cognition. With respect to whether it is conjoined with concentration, it is not conjoined with concentration. With respect to its conjoined faculty, it is conjoined with the equanimity faculty. With respect to time, it falls within the three times, yet takes the future as its object. With respect to whether it is wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral, it is wholesome, taking the unwholesome as its object; some say it takes both the unwholesome and the neutral as its object, but for the most part the unwholesome. With respect to whether it is bound to the three realms or unbound, it is bound to the form realm, yet takes as its object what is bound to the desire realm. With respect to whether it is a trainee's, a non-trainee's, or neither, it is neither a trainee's nor a non-trainee's, taking as its object what is neither a trainee's nor a non-trainee's. With respect to whether it is abandoned by seeing, by cultivation, or not abandoned at all, it is abandoned by cultivation, taking as its object what is abandoned by cultivation; some say it takes as its object what is abandoned by both seeing and cultivation, but for the most part what is abandoned by cultivation. With respect to whether it takes names or meanings as its object, it takes only meanings as its object. With respect to whether it takes its own mental continuum, another's, or neither as its object, it takes only another's mental continuum as its object; some say it takes both its own and another's mental continuum as its object, but for the most part another's. With respect to where it arises, it should be said to arise in the desire realm, not in the form or formless realms; within the desire realm, only in the human destiny, not in other destinies;

within the human destiny, only on the three continents, not on the northern continent; and on all three continents, it is able to arise in both male and female bodies alike. The Venerable Vasudeva states: it is able to arise only in Jambudvīpa, and only in a male body — according to this latter view, the first account is to be preferred. As for what kind of person it arises in: a noble one, not an ordinary worldling; a non-trainee alone, not a trainee; and, among non-trainees, only the one liberated regardless of time, not the one liberated dependent on time. Why is this?

Because only one who has attained mastery in concentration, and whose mental continuum is no longer held in the grip of affliction, is able to give rise to it. Question: do the Buddha, the pratyekabuddha, and the śrāvaka who has reached the ultimate also abide in non-contention? And, granting either answer, what difficulty follows? If they too abide in non-contention, then, since non-contention is able to restrain the affliction of another's mental continuum, why is it that hundreds of thousands of beings still give rise to affliction with them as its object? And if they do not abide in non-contention, how is the sūtra's own statement to be reconciled, where it says that the Venerable Subhūti is foremost in abiding in non-contention — for, if even he, of inferior faculties, is able to abide in non-contention, how could the Buddha, the pratyekabuddha, and others of superior faculties fail to be able to abide in it? Answer: it should be said that the Buddha and the rest also abide in non-contention. Question: if so, then why is it that hundreds of thousands of beings still give rise to affliction with them as its object? Answer: the Buddha and the śrāvaka who has reached the ultimate, both being those who teach the Dharma and convert others, have all attained wish-knowledge, and observe of sentient beings: "am I now able to cause this one to plant wholesome roots without giving rise to affliction toward me?" If he knows it is possible, he goes at once to convert him; if he knows it is not possible to prevent that fetter from arising, yet is still able to cause him to plant wholesome roots,

he reflects: "let that fetter arise, so long as he is thereby caused to plant wholesome roots" — why is this? Because, if he is thereby caused to give rise to even a hair's breadth of excellent wholesomeness, this will certainly be able to crush and destroy a mountain's worth of affliction and evil conduct. And if he knows that neither is possible, he then skillfully avoids that being — a capacity that surpasses Subhūti's own by a hundred thousandfold. Some say: the Buddha and the śrāvaka who has reached the ultimate do not abide in non-contention. Question: why, then, is Subhūti able to abide in non-contention, while the Buddha and others of superior faculties are unable to? Answer: the Venerable Subhūti delighted in, revered, and constantly cultivated non-contention, whereas the Buddha and the rest did not, not because they were incapable of abiding in it, but because they did not give rise to so extremely reverent a regard for non-contention specifically. According to this latter view: the Buddha and the rest also abide in non-contention, but do not abide in it extensively, for the sake of converting sentient beings. Why is this? Because those to be converted are of unequal faculties — some are fitting subjects for consolation, some for reproach, and some for praise, only afterward entering the Dharma; and, although such beings might, at the moment of reproach and the like, give rise to greed, hatred, or conceit, they will nevertheless certainly, by means of this very occasion, plant wholesome roots. It is for this reason that, although the Tathāgata, Śāriputra, and others are able to abide constantly in non-contention practice, they do not abide in it extensively, for the sake of converting sentient beings.

Question: is non-contention attained through effortful practice, or through the abandonment of afflictions? Answer: some instances are attained through effortful practice, and some through the abandonment of afflictions. Here, some say: for the Buddha it is attained through the abandonment of afflictions, since it is attained at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion; for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas it is attained through effortful practice, and it manifests before the mind through effortful practice.

Some say: both the Buddha and the pratyekabuddha attain it through the abandonment of afflictions, since it is attained at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion, whereas the śrāvaka attains it through effortful practice, and it manifests before the mind through effortful practice. Some say: the Buddha, the pratyekabuddha, and the śrāvaka who has reached the ultimate all attain it through the abandonment of afflictions, since it is attained at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion, while other śrāvakas attain it through effortful practice, and it manifests before the mind through effortful practice. According to this latter view: whatever is certain to be attained is attained through the abandonment of afflictions, since it is attained at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion, and only afterward manifests before the mind through effortful practice — for the Buddha this requires no effortful practice at all, for the pratyekabuddha a lesser degree of effortful practice, and for the śrāvaka either a middling or a superior degree.

Yet there is a further non-contention attained specifically through the effortful practice of the terminal concentration, and it manifests before the mind through that very effortful practice. Question: what is this effortful practice for non-contention?

Answer: it takes as its effortful practice every ground together with the terminal concentration, exactly as explained at length in the section on wish-knowledge.

As the sūtra states: "the monk Subhūti, cultivating non-contention practice, realized the Dharma in accordance with the Dharma." Question: non-contention is not itself able to sever affliction — why, then, did the World-Honored One speak in this way? Answer: that venerable one, ever since long ago, delighted in and cultivated non-contention practice, and it was by this very means that, in due succession, he was able to give rise to the noble path, sever every affliction, and become an arhat, whereupon he was able to give rise to non-contention manifesting before the mind. It is with reference to this implicit meaning that this is said — not that non-contention itself is able to sever affliction. How did this come about? It has been heard that the venerable one, long ago, gave rise to his proper aspiration toward non-contention through two conditions: first, through seeing; second, through hearing. Through seeing: that is, he once, in a former age, saw a disciple of a Buddha who, by abiding in non-contention, whenever he came to a town, thoroughfare, or marketplace, guarded and protected sentient beings so that no fetter would arise in them. Through hearing: that is, he once, in a former age, heard likewise of a disciple of a Buddha who abode in non-contention, the rest to be explained as before. Having both seen and heard this, he gave rise to a proper recollection, and, whatever he cultivated — giving, moral discipline, extensive learning, diligent pure conduct — dedicated all of it toward non-contention, vowing: "may I, in the future, become a Buddha's disciple who constantly abides in non-contention, guarding and protecting sentient beings exactly as I have seen and heard." It is by the power of this very vow that, among the Buddha's disciples, he brought about the shared class-nature by which, within the Dharma of the Buddha Śākyamuni, he became the foremost disciple abiding in non-contention, and, precisely on account of non-contention, swiftly realized the fruit of arhatship, since non-contention must necessarily depend upon a non-trainee's own body. It is with reference to this implicit meaning that the sūtra states: "cultivating non-contention practice, he realized the Dharma in accordance with the Dharma." Question: what mode of activity does non-contention perform? Answer: it performs the mode of activity of pacification, since it pacifies the afflictions of others.

As it is said, "among my disciples, Ina, the young scholar, is foremost in intelligence," and so on at length. Question: why is this treatise composed? Answer: in order to elucidate the meaning of a sūtra passage — for in a sūtra the World-Honored One declares five hundred disciples, each foremost in pairs according to his own capacity; and the master of this root treatise now wishes to display the distinctions among such similar pairs, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. Question: why does the World-Honored One declare his disciples foremost in pairs? The Venerable Vasumitra states: the World-Honored One wishes to display that, within a well-taught Dharma, teacher and disciple are worthy and harmonious, without contention, never concealing one another's genuine virtues from each other — unlike outsiders, who, for the sake of fame and profit, harbor jealousy in their hearts, teacher and disciple mutually disparaging one another. Furthermore, the World-Honored One wishes to display that, within a well-taught Dharma, even the disciple possesses genuine virtues worth praising and declaring, how much more so the teacher; whereas, within a poorly taught Dharma, even the teacher possesses no genuine virtue worth declaring, how much less the disciple. Furthermore, he wishes to display that, within a well-taught Dharma, the taint of stinginess is eternally severed, teacher and disciple mutually extolling one another's genuine virtues — unlike outsiders, who, owing to the taint of stinginess, teacher toward disciple and disciple toward teacher alike, do not even wish to hear another praised, how much less to praise themselves. Furthermore, the World-Honored One wishes to display that he has already accomplished all that he himself needed to accomplish, and, having set down the burden of instructing others, now rests at ease of his own accord. Furthermore, he wishes to display that a monk's cultivation of proper effortful practice has somewhere definite to arrive at, and is not aimless or idle. Furthermore, the World-Honored One wishes to cause those who delight in and dwell chiefly upon whatever virtue is praised to give rise to a mind of reverence, their own aspiration thereby fulfilled. Furthermore, the Buddha wishes to encourage newly ordained monks, causing them to give rise to aspiration and diligent cultivation. The Venerable One states: it is on account of two conditions that the World-Honored One declares his disciples' virtues — first, to display his own dwelling in the bliss of the present Dharma; second, out of compassion for sentient beings of later ages. Furthermore, the World-Honored One thereby displays that, among the ninety-six schools of outsiders, his own assembly is supreme. Furthermore, the World-Honored One wishes to display that a Buddha's appearance in the world brings about great benefit — that is, it is only when a Buddha appears in the world that such foremost paired bodhisattva-like figures come to appear, and not during an age without a Buddha. Furthermore, the World-Honored One wishes to cause those who each delight differently among the various distinct kinds of virtue to rejoice, diligently cultivate, abandon every laxity, and swiftly attain realization. Furthermore, the World-Honored One wishes, by means of what his disciples have attained, to confirm that what he himself has taught is true. Furthermore, he wishes to put an end to the slander that, within a well-taught Dharma, no one has actually realized the supramundane Dharma. Furthermore, the World-Honored One wishes to put an end to the disdain of those who, seeing certain monks of haggard appearance, come to look down upon them, by displaying that these very monks all possess surpassing virtues. The masters of the Abhidharma say: it is in accordance with the Dharma of all Buddhas, since, throughout as many world-systems as there are grains of sand in the River Gaṅgā, every Tathāgata, Worthy One, Perfectly and Completely Awakened One who has appeared in the world has declared the virtues of the many foremost pairs among his own assembly of disciples, and the present Buddha does likewise. Furthermore, he wishes to cause those in the world who each delight differently in different virtues to rejoice upon hearing of them, giving rise to a reverent mind toward the Buddha's true Dharma, planting wholesome roots, and obtaining great benefit thereby. Furthermore, it is in order to adorn the assemblies of future Buddhas — that is, once the Buddha has declared his disciples, countless sentient beings, whether seeing or hearing of this, all give rise to rejoicing and set forth a proper aspiration, dedicating whatever they cultivate — giving, moral discipline, extensive learning, right diligence, pure conduct — toward foremost virtue, vowing: "may I, in a future life, within a Buddha's Dharma, be numbered among such noble ones as these" — and this thereby adorns that future Buddha's own assembly of disciples. Furthermore, it is in order to let the disciples thus declared rejoice that their own aspiration has been fulfilled — that is, Ina and the other five hundred monks had, in the distant past, before five hundred Buddhas, whether seeing or hearing those Buddhas declare the virtues of their disciples, rejoiced and set forth the vow: "may whatever giving, moral discipline, extensive learning, right diligence, and pure conduct I possess cause me, in a future life, within a Buddha's true Dharma, to be numbered among such great disciples as these" — and now, this vow having been fulfilled, upon hearing the Buddha's own declaration, they rejoiced and leapt for joy, deeply congratulating themselves; and it is for this reason that it is said,

each and every great assembly of a Tathāgata's disciples attains its own accomplishment only by means of a great vow adorned before five hundred Buddhas in the past. It is on account of such various causal conditions as these that the Buddha declares his disciples foremost in pairs.

Question: as it is said, "among my disciples, Ina, the young scholar, is foremost in intelligence," while "Bāhika and others are foremost in quickness" — what difference is there between these two? Answer: the Venerable Ina excels in a straightforward mind, a mind without crookedness, and a mind of simple sincerity, whereas the Venerable Bāhika and others excel in a soft mind, a pliant mind, and a harmonious mind — and it is on account of these that both alike are named foremost. Here, intelligence is itself quickness, and quickness is itself intelligence; yet, since the Buddha named each of them foremost separately, their distinguishing characteristics must be asked after. As for the Venerable Ina excelling in a straightforward mind, a mind without crookedness, and a mind of simple sincerity —

"straightforward," "without crookedness," and "simple sincerity" differ in name but are one in meaning, each in turn explaining the one before it — or, "straightforward mind" may be taken as the general term, "without crookedness" as a particular term displaying that the mind is without flattery, and "simple sincerity" as a particular term displaying that the mind is without deceit. It is like a keen, intelligent horse that reads its rider's intention well — even should it startle or shy, it causes its rider no harm; the Venerable Ina was just the same, for, by his own intelligence, he read the Buddha's intention well, and, when questioned, answered accordingly and correctly. How did this come about? As the sūtra relates: while still a householder, he was rich in wealth and treasure, of noble and prominent family, and constantly worshipped the sun-deity. When he reached the prime of his youth, he was to take a bride, and broadly invited an assembly of tīrthikas and brahmins to hold a great sacrificial rite at his own house. Now, the Buddha never fails to seize the right moment for converting beings; and so, on the very morning of that day, in order to convert him, he donned his robe, took up his bowl, and bid Ānanda: "you may accompany me into the city to beg for alms." Having so bid him, he entered the city of Śrāvastī and came to stand at the gate of Ina's house. The tīrthika ascetics, seeing him from afar, cried out in rebuke: "today this house holds an auspicious rite — what use is there for this inauspicious creature to come here?" The Buddha, hearing this, told Ānanda: "go and tell those outsiders: the great teacher of the three realms is himself the most auspicious of all — do you not wish to witness an auspicious event? Will not this very Ina, this very day, abandon you all and go forth under me? Use every one of your own arts and see whether you can hinder it." Ānanda, having received the Buddha's instruction, went forth as fearlessly as a lion-king among a herd of deer, into the midst of that assembly of tīrthikas, and proclaimed: "the Tathāgata, who thoroughly comprehends cause and effect, speaks to you in perfect truth, saying: the great teacher of the three realms is himself the most auspicious of all — do you not wish to witness an auspicious event? Will not this very Ina, this very day, abandon you all and go forth under me? Use every one of your own arts and see whether you can hinder it." The tīrthikas, upon hearing this, looked at one another and laughed, saying: "the ascetic Gautama speaks however suits his own fancy — how could it be that, on the very eve of a sacrificial rite, with all our guests, near and far, gathered here in celebration, he should be handed over to that ascetic to go forth? How extraordinary, that an ascetic should tell such a lie!" At that time there was a brahmin named Pañcaśikha, who had once seen that the World-Honored One's predictions never erred, and told the assembly of tīrthikas: "this Ina will surely go forth — do not think otherwise." The tīrthikas all said: "should such a thing indeed occur, we shall surely be able to hinder it," and together, snapping their fingers and clapping their hands, surrounded Ina's own chamber, seven rings deep, and stood watch there.

Before long, the sun rose, and this Ina, having donned new, clean garments, went up to a high pavilion, burned incense, made his vow, and knelt in worship before the sun's own disk. At that time the World-Honored One, knowing the moment for conversion had come, transformed himself into the guise of a brahmin, clad in black deerskin bound about his body with golden cords, holding a golden staff in his hand,

and, appearing to come from the sun's own disk, arrived before Ina, spread out a seat, and sat down. Ina touched his feet in reverent homage. The tīrthikas rejoiced, saying: "this fortunate young man has moved great Brahmā himself to come in person to this ceremony — our work is now done! How splendid — that ascetic's words have proven false!" At that moment the Buddha, in the guise he had conjured, said to Ina: "what is all this commotion about today?" Ina, abashed, bowed his head and replied: "I am, in accordance with worldly custom, about to take a bride." The Buddha asked what the expense was. He replied: "my expense is three hundred thousand pieces of gold." The Buddha further asked how it was to be used. He replied: "one hundred thousand for the bride's own adornments, one hundred thousand to prepare food and drink for the assembly, and one hundred thousand to give as alms to the brahmins." The Buddha said: "as for the hundred thousand you spend on food and drink given to the brahmins, that you might indeed reap a corresponding pleasant fruit thereby is plausible enough — but is the remaining hundred thousand used to purchase your bride?" Being of a straightforward mind, he answered at once: "yes, to purchase her." The Buddha said: "is your bride truly worth so much? Tell me, then — how much is a single hair of hers worth?"

Ina replied: "this is not worth much — were an entertainer or a prostitute to buy it, it would be worth but a single kārṣāpaṇa, or perhaps only half of one." The Buddha further asked how much a single fingernail of hers was worth. Ina replied: "this is worth nothing at all." The Buddha then, one by one, in succession, raised each of the thirty-six impure constituents of her body and asked its worth, and Ina, one by one, answered each in turn: "this, too, is worth nothing at all." Now, Ina had, in a past life, within the Dharma of the Buddha Kāśyapa, spent ten thousand years cultivating the preparatory contemplation on the elements; and, because the Buddha had specifically questioned him about these impure constituents, the wholesome roots he had cultivated in that past life now manifested before him, and he subdued his own craving desire, becoming free of the defilement of the desire realm. The World-Honored One then resumed his original form, and taught Ina the four noble truths; upon hearing them, he at once realized the fruit of non-return. The Buddha then took Ina's hand and rose with him into the sky, speaking a verse, saying:

"Though adorned in the utmost splendor, if one practices the Dharma, calming and taming the breath, devoted to cultivating pure conduct, and relinquishing every worldly entanglement — this indeed is a true renunciant, a pure-willed ascetic monk."

It is by this very exchange that his mind is known to have been simply sincere; for, had it not been so, when the conjured man questioned him, he would instead have answered: "you are a brahmin — what business have you knowing of my taking a bride? It is by the custom of marriage, so how can you call it 'buying'?" Yet, owing to his simple sincerity, he answered truthfully whatever he was asked, and thereby his wholesome roots ripened to maturity and he attained the fruit of non-return. It is for this reason that the World-Honored One praised Ina, the young scholar, as foremost in intelligence.