The Dirty Sandal That Would Not Come Clean

As for the Venerable Bāhika and the others excelling in a soft mind, a pliant mind, and a harmonious mind — the word "others" here includes the Venerable Phalguna and the Venerable Cīravāsika. Here, "soft mind," "pliant mind," and "harmonious mind" differ in name but are one in meaning, each in turn explaining the one before it —

— or, "soft mind" may be taken as the general term, "pliant mind" as a particular term displaying that the mind is without arrogance, and "harmonious mind" as a particular term displaying that the mind is without conceit. How is it known that Bāhika and the others indeed possessed a soft mind and the rest? It has been heard that these three, upon hearing that a Buddha had appeared in the world, inquired and learned that the Buddha was in the city of Śrāvastī, and the three together set out from Rājagṛha toward Śrāvastī. The World-Honored One, knowing that their wholesome roots would ripen only through the very experience of traveling back and forth in this way, took a different road and went from Śrāvastī to Rājagṛha. Bāhika and the others, arriving at Śrāvastī, heard that the Buddha had already gone to Rājagṛha, and at once turned back together toward Rājagṛha. Arriving there, they heard that he had already gone to Campā, and again turned together toward the country of Campā.

Arriving there, they made inquiries and heard that the Buddha had already gone to Vārāṇasī, and the three together went on to that country as well. Arriving there, they learned that he had already gone to the city of Kapilavastu, and together proceeded there as well, only to learn that he had already gone to the city of Vaiśālī. In this way the World-Honored One circled through six great cities, six times over, and Bāhika and the others likewise pursued the Buddha, journeying back and forth through those same six cities six times. When the Buddha knew that these men's faculties had ripened, he arrived at Śrāvastī and met with them there. Just as the Buddha was entering the city, they were leaving it, and, suddenly beholding the Buddha from afar, their joy became unbearable — before even their feet had touched the ground again, they attained the fruit of stream-entry, and, not long afterward, became arhats. Yet had these three not possessed a soft, pliant, and harmonious mind, they surely would instead have simply settled in a single city to await the Buddha there — how else could they have pursued him through all six great cities, circling six times over, without a single thought of weariness ever arising, until the very moment they beheld the Buddha they realized the noble fruit? It is for this reason that the Buddha praised them, saying: "Bāhika and the others are foremost in quickness."

Question: as it is said, "among my disciples, Cūḷapanthaka excels in turning inward upon mind, while Mahāpanthaka excels in turning inward upon perception" — what difference is there between these two? Answer: the Venerable Cūḷapanthaka chiefly dwells in the mindfulness-foundation that contemplates mind by way of mind, whereas the Venerable Mahāpanthaka chiefly dwells in the mindfulness-foundation that contemplates dharmas by way of dharmas. Question: why does the Venerable Cūḷapanthaka chiefly dwell in the mindfulness-foundation of mind, while the Venerable Mahāpanthaka chiefly dwells in the mindfulness-foundation of dharmas? Answer: because their own respective dispositions differ. Furthermore, the Venerable Cūḷapanthaka is one whose conduct is dominated by craving, and it was by the force of mind that he underwent so much suffering through beginningless saṃsāra; now that he has become a non-trainee, he constantly reproaches mind itself, and it is for this reason that he chiefly dwells in the contemplation of the mindfulness-foundation of mind. The Venerable Mahāpanthaka is one whose conduct is dominated by views, and it was by the force of perception that he underwent so much suffering through beginningless saṃsāra; now that he has become a non-trainee, he constantly reproaches perception itself, and it is for this reason that he chiefly dwells in the contemplation of the mindfulness-foundation of dharmas. Question: for what reason were these two venerable ones given these particular names? Answer: it has been heard that, once, in Śrāvastī, there was a brahmin's wife who repeatedly bore sons, each of whom died shortly after birth. Before long, this wife bore yet another son, and at once sent someone to abandon him on the great road, but, after a long time, he still had not died, and so he was given the name "Great Road." That wife, at a later time, bore yet another son, and likewise at once sent someone to abandon him on the small road; and he, too, after a long time, still had not died, and so he was given the name "Small Road." The Venerable Mahāpanthaka, of sharp faculties and conduct dominated by views, upon reaching manhood, took refuge in the Buddha and went forth, and, through diligent cultivation, became an arhat.

The Venerable Cūḷapanthaka, however, was of conduct dominated by craving and of dull faculties, delighting in remaining a householder, clinging fondly to his family, amassing great wealth and property, and holding high rank in lavish extravagance; his clan flourished and he enjoyed every sensual pleasure — yet all of this, in the end, declined. As a verse says:

"Wealth once accumulated must in the end be exhausted; rank once attained must in the end decline; union once formed must in the end be sundered; life once sustained must in the end come to death." Thereupon, not long afterward, Cūḷapanthaka's parents both died, his wealth and treasure were scattered and lost, his lofty rank was relinquished, his family and kin were estranged, and his own appearance grew haggard and wasted. His elder brother Mahāpanthaka, seeing this and taking pity on him, brought him to go forth and receive the full precepts, and taught him a verse composed by the Buddha, having him practice reciting it —

"Let body, speech, and mind do no evil of any kind found in the world; be free of desire, mindful, and clearly comprehending, and undergo no meaningless suffering." Yet Cūḷapanthaka was so extremely dull-witted that, undertaking this verse, he labored painstakingly to memorize it throughout the four months of the rains, while even cowherds and shepherds on the road, merely overhearing it, learned to recite it fluently — and still he had not mastered it, even after those four months had passed. At that time, monks were gathering from every quarter to pay their respects to the World-Honored One, and each morning newly ordained monks would go to their preceptor or teacher to receive instruction, ask about points of meaning, or clear up whatever they had forgotten. Cūḷapanthaka, at that time, imitating the others, likewise set out and was just leaving his room when his brother asked him: "where are you going?" He replied: "I am going to my preceptor and teacher to receive instruction, ask about points of meaning, and clear up what I have forgotten." His brother said to him: "I myself am your preceptor — where else would you go?" — for that Cūḷapanthaka was one who, having entered the path, truly deserved to be reproached and expelled. Mahāpanthaka then seized him by the neck, dragged him out of the room, and rebuked him, saying: "you fool!

"for four months I have taught you a single verse, which even cowherds and shepherds have learned to recite fluently, and you still have not mastered it — and now you say you wish to go elsewhere to receive instruction and clear up what you have forgotten?" Having been thus reproached and expelled by his brother, Cūḷapanthaka went to the Jetavana grove and stood there weeping. The Buddha, at that time, entering the Jetavana grove from outside, saw him and asked: "poor Cūḷapanthaka, why are you weeping?" He recounted the whole matter to the World-Honored One in full. The Buddha then said to him: "are you able to follow me in clearing up what you have forgotten?" He replied that he was able to. At that time the World-Honored One, by his own supernormal power, removed whatever obstruction had prevented him from reciting that verse, and taught it to him afresh; and he at once recited it with mastery, surpassing even the effort he had expended over the previous four months. The Buddha then separately taught him a verse on removing dust and grime, and told him: "whatever monks come in today from outside, you may wipe off all the dust and grime from their leather sandals." Cūḷapanthaka respectfully assented and carried this out exactly as instructed. Toward evening there came a monk whose leather sandals were extremely caked with dust and grime;

Cūḷapanthaka wiped it, and one sandal became perfectly clean, while the other, however hard he wiped, would not come clean, and he then reflected: "if even the dust and grime of an outer object, which stains it only briefly, cannot be made clean, how much less can the inner grime of greed, hatred, and delusion, which has stained the mind through the long night of saṃsāra, ever be made clean?" Just as he gave rise to this reflection, the contemplation of impurity and mindfulness of breathing manifested before him, and, in due succession, he at once attained the fruit of arhatship. Question: for what reason was Cūḷapanthaka so extremely dull-witted? Answer: the Venerable Cūḷapanthaka, in a past life within the Dharma of the Buddha Kāśyapa, had fully upheld that Buddha's own Tripiṭaka, yet, his mind covered over by the taint of stinginess with the Dharma, he never once taught others its wording, explained its meaning, or cleared up their difficulties; and it was on account of that very karma that he now obtains such an extremely dull-witted result. Some say: that venerable one had once, in the city of Vārāṇasī, worked as a pig-butcher, and, having bound five hundred pigs and loaded them onto a boat to ferry them across to the far shore, found, upon disembarking, that all the pigs had already suffocated to death; and it is by the force of that karma that he is so dull-witted. Some say: that venerable one, in some other past life, had once sealed shut the mouth of a badger's den, preventing it from escaping, so that it died trapped within; and it is on account of that karma that he is so dull-witted. As the World-Honored One states: "monks, you should know — I see no single dharma that turns so swiftly as does mind."

Why is this? Because the swift turning of mind is difficult to illustrate by any simile — and it is for this reason that you should train yourselves to thoroughly know mind, and to thoroughly know the turning of mind. Question: is this swift turning of mind spoken of with respect to time, or with respect to its objective support? And, granting either, what difficulty follows? If with respect to time, then every conditioned dharma alike turns swiftly with respect to time; and if with respect to its objective support, then every mind and mental factor alike turns swiftly with respect to its objective support — why, then, is mind alone spoken of? Answer: the swift turning of mind is spoken of both with respect to time and with respect to its objective support, yet with reference to its own continuum, not to a single momentary instant. Were the swift turning of mind spoken of with reference to a single moment, then it would follow that mind turns swiftly with respect to only a portion of time and not swiftly with respect to the rest, and that it does not turn swiftly with respect to its objective support at all — since it is said that, for whatever dharma serves as an object, that same dharma is at every moment its object without exception. It is for this reason that the swift turning of mind is spoken of only with reference to its own continuum — that is, within a single body, mind is sometimes wholesome, sometimes unwholesome, sometimes neutral; sometimes it depends on the eye, and so on up to sometimes depending only on the mental faculty; sometimes it takes form as its object, and so on up to sometimes taking dharmas as its object — shifting and changing within each and every one of these categories in turn. Question: mental factors, too, possess this same swift turning — why, then, is mind alone spoken of? Answer: mental factors, too, ought properly to be mentioned, and the fact that they are not should be understood as an incomplete statement on the Buddha's part, a mere abbreviated statement made in accordance with the occasion. Some say: mind is mentioned here in a way that also subsumes mental factors, since they belong to the same aggregate grouping. Some say: what is spoken of here is simply the most eminent member of a group, just as one says "the king has come," meaning the king together with his retinue. Some say: mental factors depend upon mind, and it is on account of mind that they are named "mental" [factors]; and, since mind is like the great earth, mental factors are named as belonging to that great earth, and so, when mind is spoken of, mental factors are thereby spoken of as well. Some say: the uninterrupted path of the realization of the superknowledge of the cognition of others' minds takes only mind as its object, and it is for this reason that mind alone is specifically mentioned. Some say: the very word "mind" here speaks collectively of the whole of mind and mental factors together, since both alike possess the sense of "accumulation." Some say: mind is mentioned alone because it serves as the forerunner, as a verse states, "mind is the forerunner of all dharmas," and so on. Some say: mind is named "the far-traveler," as a verse states, "mind travels far, travels alone," and so on. Some say: mind is named "the sovereign," as a verse states, "the sixth, the dominant sovereign," and so on. Furthermore, mind is named "that which is relied upon," as a sūtra states that the five faculties each operate within their own separate sphere and object, while the mental faculty makes use of the sphere and object of all five faculties together, since they all rely upon it. Furthermore, mind is named "the lord of the city," as a sūtra states — "the lord of the city" referring precisely to the appropriating consciousness — and it is on account of this very meaning that mind alone is spoken of. Some further say: it is mind that is able to give rise to both wholesome and unwholesome moral discipline, and it is for this reason that mind alone is specifically mentioned, as a sūtra states that both wholesome and unwholesome moral discipline arise dependent on mind. Some say: a treacherous mind gives rise to rebirth in an evil destiny, and a level, even mind gives rise to rebirth in a wholesome destiny, and it is for this reason that mind alone is spoken of, as a sūtra states — the son of Devadatta, the parrot, the young scholar — because they gave rise to an evil mind toward the Buddha, their bodies, at the breaking up of life,

— fell into hell as swiftly as a tossed cowrie-shell falls to the ground; and, in another case, someone who gave rise to a wholesome mind toward the Buddha was, at the breaking up of life, reborn in heaven just as swiftly as a tossed cowrie-shell falls to the ground. Some say: mind is an inner dharma, pervading every place, and is able to have an objective support, and it is for this reason that it is specifically mentioned — "an inner dharma," because it is subsumed under the inner sense-fields; "pervading every place," because it is present without exception from the depths of the Avīci hell below up to the peak of existence above; and "able to have an objective support," because it is able to take every dharma as its object. Some say: mind is in constant continuity, whereas mental factors are not so; furthermore, mind is without increase or decrease, whereas mental factors are not so.

Some say: when mind turns with such-and-such a support, objective support, and mode of activity, the mental factors follow along with its turning, just as, wherever a male fish swims, the female fish all follow along — and it is for this reason that mind alone is specifically mentioned. Some say: if mind is untamed, unguarded, unprotected, undefended, and uncultivated, and so remains unpliant, it thereby decays, and the mental factors likewise decay; if mind is tamed, guarded, protected, defended, and cultivated, and so becomes pliant, it does not decay, and the mental factors likewise do not decay. Furthermore, if mind is not restrained from scattering out toward the five sense-objects, the mental factors likewise are not restrained; if mind, through restraint, does not scatter out toward the five sense-objects, the mental factors likewise do not scatter out — just as, with a water-filtering tube, opening the top lets it leak, while closing the top stops it — and it is for this reason that mind alone, and not the mental factors, is spoken of.

Question: elsewhere the Buddha says that mind is like a monkey — why, then, does he here say that the swift turning of mind is difficult to illustrate by any simile? Answer: it is not that just anyone, with just any capacity, at just any time, or with just any degree of wisdom, is able to construct that simile, and it is for this reason that it is called "difficult" — not that no simile at all exists. "Not just anyone," because it is not any ordinary worldling, relying merely on hearsay, discursive thought, or inferior concentration, who is able to construct it; only the Buddha, the pratyekabuddha, and the noble disciples, who thoroughly know the particular and general characteristics of every mind, are able to construct it. "Not just any capacity," because it cannot be constructed without mental application and effortful practice; it can only be constructed by means of mental application and effortful practice. "Not just any time," because —

it cannot be constructed during an age without a Buddha; only once the sun of a Buddha has risen in the world can it be constructed. "Not just any degree of wisdom," because it cannot be constructed by coarse, shallow wisdom; only by a deep and subtle awakened wisdom can it be constructed. Some say: only one who thoroughly knows mind's own arising, abiding, and passing away, its increase and its diminishment, its skillful means, its temporal phases, its mode of operation, and its own drawing-forth is able to construct that simile, and it is for this reason that it is called difficult. Some say: who is able to construct that simile? The Buddha. Who is capable of knowing how to construct that simile? The Buddha as well — yet these two capacities are not present together in anyone else, and it is for this reason that it is called difficult. Some say: who is able to construct that simile? One who thoroughly knows the moment-by-moment, uninterrupted arising and passing away of mind. Who is capable of knowing how to construct that simile? One who thoroughly knows the moment-by-moment, uninterrupted arising and passing away of mind — yet these two capacities are not present together in anyone else, and it is for this reason that it is called difficult. Some say: a simile may be either an exact equivalence or a mere resemblance — an exact equivalence would be to say "mind is like mind"; a mere resemblance would be to say "mind is like feeling" and the like — and both of these are already subsumed within "the swiftness of mind" itself, since, as stated before, the very word "mind" here collectively subsumes the whole of mind and mental factors together; beyond this, there exists no further exact equivalence or resemblance, and it is for this reason that it is called difficult. Some say: were there some other dharma that grasped its object with a force and function just like mind's own, it could serve as a simile for it — yet no such dharma exists, and it is for this reason that it is called difficult.

Although a sūtra states that mind is like a monkey, yet, within the span of that monkey letting go of one branch to grasp another, mind itself has already turned through a hundred thousand objects — and it is for this reason that it is called difficult to construct. Some say: although the World-Honored One says it is difficult to construct, this is because there is no one able to verify and confirm it, not because no simile at all exists — that is, the Buddha's own power is able to conjure a tree in a single instant to serve as a simile for mind, yet, since there is no one who could recognize it as such, it is called difficult. Question: could the Venerable Śāriputra himself not know it? Answer: some say: he does not know it, because it is so extremely swift. Some say: he is able to know it, but simply does not apply his mind to knowing it, since there is no use in doing so. The Venerable Pārśva states: when the World-Honored One says that mind is like a monkey, this is precisely a case of illustrating mind by means of mind itself, since the monkey's own leaping about, light and restless, is entirely the doing of mind. Question: what difference is there between "thoroughly knowing mind" and "thoroughly knowing the turning of mind"? Answer: some say: there is no difference — thoroughly knowing mind is precisely thoroughly knowing the turning of mind. Some say: there is indeed a difference — that is, the very names differ, one being named "thoroughly knowing mind," the other "thoroughly knowing the turning of mind." Furthermore, observing mind's own intrinsic nature is named thoroughly knowing mind, while observing mind's own mode of activity is named thoroughly knowing the turning of mind. Furthermore, observing the distinctions in mind's own nature is named thoroughly knowing mind, while observing the distinctions in the objects mind operates upon is named thoroughly knowing the turning of mind. Furthermore, observing mind's own particular characteristic is named thoroughly knowing mind, while observing its general characteristic is named thoroughly knowing the turning of mind. Some say: the contemplation of the mindfulness-foundation of mind is named thoroughly knowing mind, while the contemplation of the mindfulness-foundation of dharmas is named thoroughly knowing the turning of mind. Furthermore, observing only consciousness-as-nutriment, the consciousness-aggregate, the mental sense-field, and the seven mental elements is named thoroughly knowing mind, while observing, all together, the four nutriments, the five aggregates, the twelve sense-fields, and the eighteen elements is named thoroughly knowing the turning of mind. Some say: observing mind is named thoroughly knowing mind, while observing mental factors is named thoroughly knowing the turning of mind. Some say: observing consciousness is named thoroughly knowing mind, while observing the stations of consciousness is named thoroughly knowing the turning of mind. The Venerable Pārśva states: observing a mind possessed of craving is named thoroughly knowing mind, while observing the turning of a mind possessed of craving into a mind free of craving is named thoroughly knowing the turning of mind — and, just as with craving and freedom from craving, so too should it be understood with hatred and freedom from hatred, and delusion and freedom from delusion; and likewise with scattered and concise, inferior and superior, agitated and unagitated, untranquil and tranquil, unconcentrated and concentrated, uncultivated and cultivated, unliberated and liberated, defiled and undefiled, contaminated and uncontaminated, and bound and unbound, whether fettered or unfettered.

As it is said, "among my disciples, Śāriputra possesses great wisdom and eloquence, while Mahākoṣṭhila has attained the unimpeded understandings" — what difference is there between these two? Answer: the Venerable Śāriputra chiefly dwells in the unimpeded understanding of meaning, whereas the Venerable Mahākoṣṭhila chiefly dwells in all four unimpeded understandings, and it is for this reason that the World-Honored One declares each of them foremost in his own respect. Question: if so, is the Venerable Mahākoṣṭhila then superior to Śāriputra? Answer: Śāriputra is the superior of the two, since he is able to dwell freely and at will in all four, yet chooses to set the other three aside and dwell in only one. Question: why does Śāriputra chiefly dwell in the understanding of meaning alone, while Mahākoṣṭhila chiefly dwells in all four? Answer: the Venerable Śāriputra has grown weary of and turned away from mere verbal expression, cherishing meaning alone, whereas the Venerable Mahākoṣṭhila cherishes both meaning and verbal expression equally. Some say:

the Venerable Śāriputra has attained mastery over all four unimpeded understandings, and simply chooses, as he pleases, to dwell in the single unimpeded understanding of meaning, since at all times he seeks meaning alone; whereas the Venerable Mahākoṣṭhila has not yet attained mastery over any of the four unimpeded understandings, and yet the World-Honored One still declares that he has attained the unimpeded understandings, since

he reflects: "let me not, in entering, abiding in, and rising from these four unimpeded understandings, forget or misstate anything with respect to what has been declared of me" — and it is for this reason that he circulates through and chiefly dwells in all four in turn. It is like two monks who both recite the four Āgamas: one has mastered them fluently, while the other still finds them difficult; the one who is fluent may, as he pleases, recite whichever single one he wishes, while the one who finds them difficult must circulate through and go over all of them in turn — it is the same in this case. Hence these two venerable ones dwell in their respective understandings in different ways. Question: what is the intrinsic nature of the four unimpeded understandings? Answer: their intrinsic nature is wisdom. How is this known to be so? As the Prakaraṇapāda states: what is the unimpeded understanding of dharma? It is the cognition that never regresses with respect to names, phrases, and syllables. What is the unimpeded understanding of meaning? It is the cognition that never regresses with respect to ultimate meaning.

What is the unimpeded understanding of language? It is the cognition that never regresses with respect to verbal expression. What is the unimpeded understanding of eloquence? It is the cognition that never regresses with respect to unobstructed, cogent explanation, and with respect to mastery in concentration and wisdom. From this it is known that wisdom constitutes their intrinsic nature, since cognition is itself wisdom. This, then, is the intrinsic nature of the unimpeded understandings — that is, their own substance, their own nature, their own characteristic, and their own inherent nature. Their intrinsic nature has now been explained; what is to be explained next follows. Question: why are they named "unimpeded understandings"? Answer: penetrating one's object of knowledge without any obstruction is named unimpeded understanding — that is, the unimpeded understanding of dharma applies to names, phrases, and syllables; the unimpeded understanding of meaning applies to nirvāṇa, the ultimate meaning; the unimpeded understanding of language applies to every regional dialect and expression; and the unimpeded understanding of eloquence

applies, with an ever-unregressing cognition, to proper exposition and to the path itself, understanding both without any obstruction. Some say: to know one's object of knowledge through direct perception is named unimpeded understanding, just as, in the world, one says of some directly witnessed matter, "I understand and know this without any obstruction." Some say: this ought rather to be named "the profound and hidden understanding,"

since it understands the profound and hidden points of the Abhidharma. Some say: this ought rather to be named "the fitting understanding," since it understands whatever object it takes exactly as is fitting to that object. With respect to realm: the unimpeded understandings of dharma and of language fall within the desire and form realms; the unimpeded understandings of meaning and of eloquence fall within all three realms as well as beyond any realm.

With respect to ground: the unimpeded understanding of dharma — some say it exists across two grounds, the desire realm and the first dhyāna; some say across five grounds, the desire realm and the four dhyānas; some say across seven grounds, the desire realm, the stage of proximate access, the intermediate dhyāna, and the four dhyānas. The unimpeded understandings of meaning and of eloquence, in their contaminated form, exist across eleven grounds — the desire realm, the stage of proximate access, the intermediate dhyāna, the four dhyānas, and the four formless attainments; in their uncontaminated form, they exist across nine grounds — the stage of proximate access, the intermediate dhyāna, the four dhyānas, and three of the formless attainments. The unimpeded understanding of language exists across two grounds, the desire realm and the first dhyāna. With respect to support: all four unimpeded understandings alike depend upon a body of the desire realm. With respect to mode of activity: the unimpeded understandings of dharma and of language have an indistinct mode of activity. As for the unimpeded understanding of meaning: those who hold that nirvāṇa alone is the ultimate meaning say it operates through the four modes of activity pertaining to cessation, together with the indistinct mode of activity; those who hold that every dharma is the ultimate meaning say it operates through the sixteen modes of activity, together with the indistinct mode of activity. As for the unimpeded understanding of eloquence: some say it operates through twelve modes of activity together with the indistinct mode of activity; some say it operates through the four modes of activity pertaining to the path, together with the indistinct mode of activity. With respect to objective support: the unimpeded understanding of dharma takes names, phrases, and syllables as its object; the unimpeded understanding of meaning, according to some, takes only the truth of cessation as its object, and, according to others, takes every dharma as its object; the unimpeded understanding of language takes verbal expression as its object; the unimpeded understanding of eloquence takes the path and its exposition as its object. With respect to the mindfulness-foundations: the unimpeded understanding of dharma pertains to the dharma-mindfulness-foundation; the unimpeded understanding of meaning, according to some, pertains only to the dharma-mindfulness-foundation, and, according to others, is complete with all four; the unimpeded understanding of language pertains to the body-mindfulness-foundation; the unimpeded understanding of eloquence pertains to all four mindfulness-foundations. With respect to what kind of cognition it is: the unimpeded understandings of dharma and of language are conventional cognition. As for the unimpeded understanding of meaning: those who hold that nirvāṇa alone is the ultimate meaning —

— some say it comprises six kinds of cognition, namely cognition of the Dharma, subsequent cognition, conventional cognition, cognition of cessation, cognition of exhaustion, and cognition of non-arising; some say it comprises four kinds, excluding the cognition of exhaustion and of non-arising, since the unimpeded understandings are of the nature of view. As for those who hold that every dharma is the ultimate meaning: some say it comprises ten kinds of cognition; and, as for the unimpeded understanding of eloquence: some say it comprises eight kinds, excluding the cognition of exhaustion and of non-arising; some say it comprises nine kinds, excluding the cognition of cessation;

some say it comprises seven kinds, further excluding the cognition of exhaustion and of non-arising; some say it comprises six kinds, namely cognition of the Dharma, subsequent cognition, conventional cognition, cognition of the path, cognition of exhaustion, and cognition of non-arising; some say it comprises four kinds, further excluding the cognition of exhaustion and of non-arising. With respect to whether it is conjoined with concentration: the unimpeded understandings of dharma and of language are not conjoined with concentration. As for the unimpeded understanding of meaning: some hold it is conjoined only with the signless concentration as well as with non-concentration; some hold it is conjoined with all three concentrations as well as with non-concentration. As for the unimpeded understanding of eloquence: some say it is conjoined with the concentrations of emptiness and wishlessness as well as with non-concentration; some say it is conjoined only with the concentration of the path and of wishlessness as well as with non-concentration. With respect to its conjoined faculty: taken generally, it is conjoined with all three faculties — joy, equanimity, and the rest; yet, within the desire realm, it is conjoined with the joy and equanimity faculties; within the first two dhyānas, it is conjoined with the joy faculty; within the third dhyāna, it is conjoined with the pleasure faculty;

and within every other ground, it is conjoined only with the equanimity faculty. With respect to time: all four fall within the three times. The unimpeded understandings of dharma and of eloquence take all three times as their object;

the unimpeded understanding of language, with respect to the past, takes the past as its object, with respect to the present, takes the present as its object, and, with respect to the future, takes the future as its object if it is yet to arise, or all three times if it has already arisen; some say the unimpeded understanding of dharma is the same as that of language in this respect; some say that the three unimpeded understandings of dharma, language, and eloquence take the past as their object with respect to both the past and the present, and take all three times as their object with respect to the future. As for the unimpeded understanding of meaning: some hold it takes only what is beyond time as its object; some hold it takes both the three times and what is beyond time as its object. With respect to whether it is wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral: all four are wholesome; yet the unimpeded understanding of dharma takes the neutral as its object. As for the unimpeded understanding of meaning: some hold it takes only the wholesome as its object; some hold it takes all three as its object. The unimpeded understandings of language and of eloquence take all three as their object. With respect to whether it is bound to the desire realm and the rest: the unimpeded understandings of dharma and of language are bound to the desire and form realms. The unimpeded understandings of meaning and of eloquence are bound to all three realms as well as unbound. As for the unimpeded understanding of dharma: those who hold that the formless realm, too, possesses names, phrases, and syllables say it takes as its object what is bound to all three realms; those who hold that the formless realm has no names, phrases, or syllables say it takes as its object what is bound to the desire and form realms alone. As for the unimpeded understanding of meaning: some hold it takes only what is unbound as its object; some hold it takes as its object what is bound to all three realms as well as what is unbound. The unimpeded understanding of language takes as its object what is bound to the desire and form realms; as for the unimpeded understanding of eloquence, some say it takes as its object what is bound to all three realms as well as what is unbound, and some say it takes as its object what is bound to the desire and form realms as well as what is unbound. With respect to whether it is a trainee's, a non-trainee's, or neither: the unimpeded understandings of dharma and of language are neither a trainee's nor a non-trainee's, and take as their object what is likewise neither. The unimpeded understandings of meaning and of eloquence are a non-trainee's, and also neither a trainee's nor a non-trainee's. As for the unimpeded understanding of meaning:

some hold it takes only what is neither a trainee's nor a non-trainee's as its object; some hold it takes all three as its object. The unimpeded understanding of eloquence takes all three as its object. With respect to whether it is abandoned by seeing, by cultivation, or not abandoned at all: the unimpeded understandings of dharma and of language are abandoned by cultivation, and likewise take as their object what is abandoned by cultivation. As for the unimpeded understandings of meaning and of eloquence: in their contaminated form, they are abandoned by cultivation; in their uncontaminated form, they are not abandoned at all. As for the unimpeded understanding of meaning: some hold it takes only what is not abandoned as its object; some hold it takes all three as its object. The unimpeded understanding of eloquence takes as its object both what is abandoned by cultivation and what is not abandoned. With respect to whether it takes names or meanings as its object: the unimpeded understanding of dharma takes only names as its object. As for the unimpeded understanding of meaning: some hold it takes only meanings as its object; some hold it takes both names and meanings as its object equally. The unimpeded understandings of language and of eloquence take only meanings as their object. With respect to whether it takes its own mental continuum, another's, or neither as its object: the three unimpeded understandings of dharma, language, and eloquence take both one's own and another's mental continuum as their object; some hold they take only one's own mental continuum as their object. As for the unimpeded understanding of meaning: some hold it takes only what is not a mental continuum as its object; some hold it takes all three as its object. With respect to whether it is attained through effortful practice or through the abandonment of afflictions: it is attained through both. Here, some say: for the Buddha it is attained through the abandonment of afflictions, since it is attained at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion; for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas it is attained through effortful practice, and it manifests before the mind through effortful practice. Some say: the Buddha and the pratyekabuddha both attain it through the abandonment of afflictions, since it is attained at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion, while the śrāvaka attains it through effortful practice, and it manifests before the mind through effortful practice. Some say: the Buddha, the pratyekabuddha, and the śrāvaka who has reached the ultimate all attain it through the abandonment of afflictions, since it is attained at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion, while other śrāvakas attain it through effortful practice, and it manifests before the mind through effortful practice. According to this latter view: whatever is certain to be attained is attained through the abandonment of afflictions, since it is attained at the moment of the knowledge of exhaustion, and only afterward manifests before the mind through effortful practice — for the Buddha this requires no effortful practice at all, for the pratyekabuddha a lesser degree of effortful practice, and for the śrāvaka either a middling or a superior degree. Yet there is a further unimpeded understanding attained specifically through effortful practice, and it manifests before the mind through that very effortful practice. Question: what is the effortful practice for the four unimpeded understandings? Answer: some say: the unimpeded understanding of dharma takes the cultivation of grammatical treatises as its effortful practice; the unimpeded understanding of meaning takes the cultivation of the Buddha's own teaching as its effortful practice; the unimpeded understanding of language takes the cultivation of treatises on phonetics as its effortful practice; and the unimpeded understanding of eloquence takes the cultivation of treatises on logic as its effortful practice,

since, without skill in each of these four domains, one certainly cannot give rise to the unimpeded understandings. Some say: the unimpeded understandings of dharma and of language take the cultivation of non-Buddhist treatises as their effortful practice, while the unimpeded understandings of meaning and of eloquence take the cultivation of Buddhist treatises as their effortful practice. According to this latter view, all four unimpeded understandings alike take the cultivation of the Buddha's own teaching as their effortful practice — that is, with respect to a single verse: learning how its name ought properly to be pronounced is the effortful practice for the unimpeded understanding of dharma; learning how its meaning ought properly to be understood is the effortful practice for the unimpeded understanding of meaning; learning how its verbal expression ought properly to be construed is the effortful practice for the unimpeded understanding of language; and learning how it ought properly to be expounded without obstruction is the effortful practice for the unimpeded understanding of eloquence — and it is for this reason that all four unimpeded understandings alike take the cultivation of the Buddha's own teaching as their effortful practice. Question: by means of what is this unimpeded understanding drawn forth?

Answer: it is drawn forth by means of the concentration and wisdom of the terminal fourth dhyāna. The Venerable Pārśva states: it is drawn forth by means of the superknowledge-wisdom of any of the four dhyānas.

Question: where can this unimpeded understanding arise? Answer: only in the desire realm; within the desire realm, only in the human destiny, upon the three continents; and it is able to arise in both female and male bodies. The Venerable Vasudeva states: it is able to arise only in Jambudvīpa, and only in a male body — according to this latter view, the first account is to be preferred, since men and women on all three continents alike are able to prolong or relinquish their own life-formations at will. Question: what kind of person is able to give rise to the unimpeded understandings? Answer: a noble one, not an ordinary worldling; a non-trainee, not a trainee; and the one liberated regardless of time, not the one liberated dependent on time. Why is this? Because only one whose mental continuum is no longer held in the grip of affliction, and who has attained mastery in concentration, is able to give rise to them. One liberated by conviction possesses neither of these two qualities; one who has arrived through insight, though he has attained mastery in concentration, still has his mental continuum held in the grip of affliction; and the one liberated dependent on time, though his mental continuum is no longer held in the grip of affliction, has not yet attained mastery in concentration — only the one liberated regardless of time possesses both qualities together, and it is for this reason that he alone is able to give rise to them. Question: in what order do the four unimpeded understandings arise? Do they arise exactly in the order in which they are spoken of, or not? Answer: some say: they arise exactly in the order spoken of — since the sūtra first speaks of the unimpeded understanding of meaning, it arises first, and so on down to speaking last of the unimpeded understanding of eloquence, which therefore arises last. That is, the yogin, in order to know meaning, first gives rise to the unimpeded understanding of meaning; although he has already come to know the meaning, he has not yet properly arranged the names and the rest that express it, and so next gives rise to the unimpeded understanding of dharma; although he has already properly arranged the names and the rest, he is not yet able to construe them in proper verbal expression, and so next gives rise to the unimpeded understanding of language; and although he is already able to construe them in proper verbal expression, he is not yet able to expound them without obstruction and in accordance with reason, and so lastly gives rise to the unimpeded understanding of eloquence. Some say: they arise exactly in the order spoken of — since the Abhidharma first speaks of the unimpeded understanding of dharma, it arises first, and so on down to speaking last of the unimpeded understanding of eloquence, which therefore arises last. That is, the yogin, in order to know the proper sequential arrangement of names and the rest, first gives rise to the unimpeded understanding of dharma; although he already knows their proper sequential arrangement, he does not yet understand the meaning they express, and so next gives rise to the unimpeded understanding of meaning — the latter two arising as already explained. Some say:

they do not arise exactly in the order spoken of — rather, the understanding of language arises first, then that of dharma, then that of meaning, and last that of eloquence. Why is this? Because that practitioner must first thoroughly comprehend conventional verbal expression, next know the names and the rest that this verbal expression depends upon, and next know the meaning and import that these names and the rest depend upon; and only once he knows all three of these is he able to expound them without obstruction and in accordance with reason — and it is for this reason that language is able to draw forth dharma, dharma is able to draw forth meaning, and meaning is able to draw forth eloquence. Question: are the four unimpeded understandings attained one at a time, or not? Answer: if one is attained, all four are necessarily attained together at that same time, just as the four noble lineages are attained all at the same time, each then manifesting before the mind in whatever order one desires. Question: does the pratyekabuddha, and the śrāvaka who has reached the ultimate, attain the unimpeded understandings? If they do attain them — since "unimpeded understanding" is named for a never-regressing cognition, whatever it knows ought to admit of no error — why, then, did the Venerable Mahāmaudgalyāyana predict that someone would be reborn male when in fact she was later reborn female, predict that the heavens would rain when in fact they did not, and predict that the army of Rājagṛha would be victorious when it was in fact later defeated by the army of Vaiśālī? And why is it that the pratyekabuddha is unable to teach the Dharma? How, then, is the verse's own statement to be reconciled —

— "only the Buddha is called a non-trainee; whoever has attained the unimpeded understandings has reached the far shore of merit and virtue, forever free of every error" — and, if they do not attain them, why does the sūtra state, "among my disciples, Mahākauṣṭhila has attained the unimpeded understandings," when that venerable one was of inferior faculties, while the Buddha still declares Mahāmaudgalyāyana, of superior faculties, not to have attained them? Answer: it should be said that the pratyekabuddha, and the śrāvaka who has reached the ultimate, do indeed attain the unimpeded understandings as well. Question: since "unimpeded understanding" is named for a never-regressing cognition, why did the Venerable Mahāmaudgalyāyana's own predictions contain error? Answer: his cognition never regressed with respect to whatever object fell within his own proper scope of observation; it is only with respect to some other, unobserved scope that no fault should be found —

as, in that prediction, the person was indeed first male and only afterward transformed into female; and the heavens, too, did indeed rain, but the asura king Rāhu caught the rain up and diverted it into the great ocean; and, when the two kingdoms were about to go to war, the guardian yakṣas of the two lands first fought one another, and the yakṣas of Rājagṛha were at first victorious but afterward defeated, and the people of that kingdom fared likewise — it was not that they were not victorious at first. That venerable one, in these very predictions concerning gender and the rest, simply observed the earlier state of affairs and did not observe what followed —

had he observed what followed as well, his predictions, too, would have contained no error. Question: if the pratyekabuddha, too, attains the unimpeded understandings, why is he unable to teach the Dharma to others?

Answer: because he delights in tranquility and loves solitude, fears clamor and disdains crowds, sees the virtue of seclusion and the fault of noisy confusion, and his mind turns away from any following — how, then, could he teach the Dharma? Some say: every pratyekabuddha is one whose practice is of the śamatha type alone; only a vipaśyanā-type practice is capable of teaching the Dharma. Some say: no pratyekabuddha delights in arranging names and the rest into speech. Some say: he carefully considers that, were he to teach the Dharma, whoever would thereby be able to enter the fixed nature of the noble ones, attain the fruits, become free of defilement, and exhaust the contaminants, he would indeed teach — yet, since this cannot come about, he thinks, "why should I waste my effort in vain?" and hence does not teach. Some say: every pratyekabuddha, having carefully surveyed and measured the world, finds only two kinds of beings capable of being converted — those converted by a Buddha, and those converted by a śrāvaka — there being no beings at all capable of being converted by a pratyekabuddha, and hence he does not teach the Dharma. Some say: teaching the Dharma arises from two conditions — first, being drawn forth by one's own power; second, following another's instruction — and the pratyekabuddha has neither this power nor a teacher's instruction to follow. Furthermore, one condition is being drawn forth by fearlessness, the other by following another's instruction — and the pratyekabuddha has neither this fearlessness nor a teacher's instruction to follow. Furthermore, one condition is being drawn forth by great compassion, the other by following another's instruction — and the pratyekabuddha has neither this great compassion nor a teacher's instruction to follow — and it is for these reasons that he is unable to teach the Dharma. Question: teaching the Dharma is in fact fully grounded in every quality of Buddhahood — why, then, is only power, fearlessness, and great compassion mentioned here, and not the rest? Answer: power is able to establish one's own thesis, fearlessness is able to overturn another's thesis, and great compassion is able to give rise to the very wish to teach the Dharma in the first place, without depending on anything further — and it is for this reason that only these three are mentioned. Some say: that pratyekabuddha reflects as follows: those able to teach the Dharma are the Dharma-king and the Dharma-king's own sons; I am neither the Dharma-king nor his son — how, then, could I teach the Dharma? — and hence he does not teach. Some say: that pratyekabuddha reflects: I have, from of old, never studied or trained in the affairs of teaching the Dharma — and hence he does not teach. Some say:

only one who is self-awakened and skilled in the three proper methods of taming beings is able to teach the Dharma — the pratyekabuddha is not so. Some say: only one who is self-awakened and possessed of omniscience and knowledge of every mode is able to teach the Dharma — the pratyekabuddha is not so. Some say: the very purpose of teaching the true Dharma is always to break through the view of self, and, in an age when a pratyekabuddha appears in the world, sentient beings' own attachment to self is so firm and unyielding that it is difficult to break through, and hence he does not teach the Dharma. Some say: for one who is self-awakened, at the very moment he teaches the Dharma, his mind must necessarily orient itself toward nirvāṇa; yet, should the pratyekabuddha give rise to a mind oriented toward nirvāṇa, in the very next moment he would enter the utmost bliss of the liberation of cessation — whereas the Tathāgata is not so, for, although he too delights in liberation, he is sustained by great compassion and great equanimity, and is thereby able to abide long in the world and continue teaching.

Some say: only one who is self-awakened and has accomplished the dharma of never forgetting is able to teach the Dharma. The pratyekabuddha, while dwelling in a secluded forest, is indeed able to use the unimpeded understandings to arrange the aggregates, elements, sense-fields, and the rest into names, phrases, and syllables; yet, once he enters a village to beg for alms, what he had previously arranged may sometimes be forgotten, and he then reflects: "since I have not attained the dharma of never forgetting, what use would there be in teaching?" — and hence does not teach. Some say: it is simply the nature of the pratyekabuddha's own lineage to be such that, although he has attained the unimpeded understandings, he does not delight in teaching the Dharma; when he wishes to bring about benefit, he displays only supernormal powers, or else simply confers the eight precepts of a single day and night upon others. Question: if the śrāvaka and the pratyekabuddha, too, attain the unimpeded understandings, how is the verse's own statement to be reconciled? Answer: it is spoken with reference to the fact that only the Buddha attains them in their ultimate, complete, and supreme form of mastery, free of any error whatsoever — it is not meant that the two vehicles fail to accomplish them at all.

Were it not so, the two vehicles ought likewise not to attain the state of non-training at all, since the verse states that only the Buddha is a non-trainee. Other masters say: the śrāvaka and the pratyekabuddha, one and all, do not attain the four unimpeded understandings. Question: why, then, does the sūtra say, "among my disciples, Mahākauṣṭhila has attained the unimpeded understandings," when his own faculties were not superior, while the Buddha still declares that the pratyekabuddha and the śrāvaka who has reached the ultimate, of superior faculties, do not attain them at all — why say that they, one and all, do not attain them? Answer: what is spoken of as his attainment is merely a wholesome root resembling the unimpeded understandings, not the genuine article — since that venerable one, throughout the long night of saṃsāra, delighted in and diligently cultivated this particular Dharma, the Buddha, in accordance with his own wish, declared that he had attained it; whereas others, although they too attained this same resembling wholesome root, are not said to have attained it, since they did not delight in and diligently cultivate it to so extreme a degree. Question: why is it that the two vehicles, one and all, do not attain the unimpeded understandings? Answer: "unimpeded understanding" is named for a never-regressing cognition, yet the cognition of the śrāvaka and of the pratyekabuddha does regress with respect to various objects, since their own predictions and pronouncements do contain error, and hence they are not unimpeded understandings. According to this latter view, the first account is to be preferred, since the cognition of the śrāvaka and of the pratyekabuddha never regresses with respect to their own proper scope of objects.

Here, wish-knowledge subsumes wish-knowledge itself, terminal cognition, non-contention cognition, and the unimpeded understanding of meaning among the four unimpeded understandings; it should be understood that the unimpeded understanding of meaning is subsumed in just the same way as wish-knowledge itself. Terminal cognition does not subsume the unimpeded understanding of language; in every other respect it is as explained for wish-knowledge. Non-contention cognition subsumes non-contention cognition itself, wish-knowledge, and terminal cognition, but does not subsume the unimpeded understanding of meaning nor the three unimpeded understandings of dharma, language, and eloquence; it should be understood that the three unimpeded understandings of dharma, language, and eloquence are subsumed in just the same way as non-contention cognition.

According to what is respectively fitting, each of these seven is said to subsume itself, excepting non-contention cognition and the unimpeded understanding of language, and none of them subsumes terminal cognition. All seven of these are alike attained by means of the terminal concentration, since they are all drawn forth by the power of that terminal concentration. The intrinsic substance of the terminal dhyāna is of six kinds, that is, all seven minus the unimpeded understanding of language, since it is the very uppermost grade of the fourth dhyāna alone that is named "terminal." Other masters say: the uppermost grade of each of the four dhyānas alike is named "terminal," and hence, on their account, the terminal dhyāna comprises seven distinct kinds, subsumed among the seven cognitions with a corresponding set of distinctions, to be understood in accordance with what has already been explained above; yet it remains the case that only the terminal grade of the fourth dhyāna, and no other, is capable of drawing forth these cognitions.