Knowledge, Ignorance, and the Nyāsa of Perception

Are the dharmas that have ignorance as their cause the same dharmas that take ignorance as their condition? And so on, as stated at length. Question: why does the treatise here proceed in terms of knowledge and ignorance? Answer: because the composer of the treatise wished it so — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: because these two are the root of defilement and of purity — that is, of all defilement, ignorance is the root; as it is said, whatever various unwholesome dharmas arise or grow, all take ignorance as their root, their accumulation, their kind, and their arising-condition; and of all purity, knowledge is the root — as it is said, whatever various wholesome dharmas arise or grow, none fail to take knowledge as their root, their accumulation, their kind, and their arising-condition. Some say: because these two are both foremost dharmas — that is, the World-Honored One states in the sūtras that these two are foremost dharmas, as it is said: monks, ignorance is foremost, ignorance is the forerunner, and it is by this that various unwholesome dharmas come to arise, and it is by this that one becomes one without shame or remorse; while knowledge is foremost, knowledge is the forerunner, and it is by this that various wholesome dharmas come to arise, and it is by this that one becomes one with shame and remorse. Some say: because these two are, respectively, a proximate obstruction and its antidote — that is, ignorance is the proximate obstruction to knowledge, and knowledge is the proximate antidote to ignorance. Some say: because these two are commonly known to be mutually opposed — that is, ignorance opposes knowledge, and knowledge opposes ignorance. Some say: because both, in their object, are subsumed and not subsumed under the four noble truths alike, both take contaminated and uncontaminated dharmas as their object alike, and both take conditioned and unconditioned dharmas as their object alike, in neither case one subsumed within the other. It is on account of these various reasons that the composer of the treatise proceeds in terms of knowledge and ignorance to compose this treatise.

Now, the classes of dharmas that are, respectively, caused or conditioned by knowledge and ignorance number eleven in kind. Those bound to the desire realm are of four kinds — wholesome, unwholesome, obscured-neutral, and unobscured-neutral. Those bound to the form realm are of three kinds, excluding the unwholesome; the same holds for those bound to the formless realm; and there is also the uncontaminated dharma. Here, for the wholesome dharmas bound to the desire realm, neither knowledge nor ignorance is their cause, but both serve as three conditions — namely, the immediately preceding, the object, and the dominant condition. For the unwholesome dharmas, ignorance serves as their four causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, the homogeneous, and the pervasive cause — and also serves as four conditions; knowledge is not their cause, but serves as two conditions — namely, the object and the dominant condition. For the obscured-neutral dharmas bound to the desire realm, ignorance serves as their four causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, the homogeneous, and the pervasive cause — and also serves as four conditions; knowledge is not their cause, but serves as one condition, the dominant condition. For the unobscured-neutral dharmas of the desire realm, excluding the ripened retribution of ignorance itself, ignorance is not their cause, but serves as three conditions — namely, the immediately preceding, the object, and the dominant condition.

Knowledge is not their cause, but serves as one condition, the dominant condition. As for the ripened retribution of ignorance, ignorance serves as its one cause, the cause of ripened retribution, and serves as three conditions —

namely the causal condition, the immediately preceding condition, and the dominant condition, but not the object-condition, since that ripened retribution occurs in the five sense-consciousnesses. Knowledge is not its cause, but serves as one condition, the dominant condition. For the wholesome dharmas bound to the form realm, neither knowledge nor ignorance is their cause, but both serve as three conditions — namely, the immediately preceding, the object, and the dominant condition. For the obscured-neutral dharmas of the form realm, ignorance serves as their four causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, the homogeneous, and the pervasive cause — and also serves as four conditions; knowledge is not their cause, but serves as two conditions — namely, the object and the dominant condition. For the unobscured-neutral dharmas bound to the form realm, ignorance is not their cause, but serves as three conditions — namely, the immediately preceding, the object, and the dominant condition; knowledge is not their cause, but serves as one condition, the dominant condition. As with the three kinds of the form realm, so too the three kinds of the formless realm. For the uncontaminated dharma, ignorance is not its cause, but serves as two conditions — namely, the object and the dominant condition — excepting the first uncontaminated moment. For the remaining uncontaminated dharmas, knowledge serves as their three causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, and the homogeneous cause — and serves as four conditions, excepting the first knowledge. For the remaining first uncontaminated dharma, knowledge serves as its two causes — namely, the conjoined and the co-existent — or as one cause, namely the co-existent, and serves as two conditions — namely, the causal and the dominant condition. For the first knowledge itself, knowledge is not its cause, but serves as one condition, the dominant condition. This is what is called, in this passage, the abbreviated Vibhāṣā.

Are the dharmas that have ignorance as their cause the same dharmas that take ignorance as their condition? Answer: whatever dharmas have ignorance as their cause also take ignorance as their condition. Here, speaking of the dharmas that have ignorance as their cause in terms of their kind, those dharmas have ignorance as their five causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, the homogeneous, the pervasive, and the ripening cause.

As for those that take ignorance as their condition, these are precisely the dharmas that have ignorance as their cause; speaking of them in terms of their kind, ignorance serves as their four conditions. There are dharmas that take ignorance as their condition without having ignorance as their cause — namely, excepting the ripened retribution of ignorance, the remaining unobscured-neutral formations and wholesome formations; for these dharmas, ignorance serves as three conditions, or two conditions, or one condition, but is not their cause. Are the dharmas that have knowledge as their cause the same dharmas that take knowledge as their condition? Answer: whatever dharmas have knowledge as their cause also take knowledge as their condition. Here, speaking of the dharmas that have knowledge as their cause in terms of their kind, those dharmas have knowledge as their three causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, and the homogeneous cause.

Are the dharmas that have ignorance as their cause the same dharmas that take knowledge as their condition? Answer: whatever dharmas have ignorance as their cause also take knowledge as their condition. Here, speaking of the dharmas that have ignorance as their cause in terms of their kind, those dharmas have ignorance as their five causes, as explained before. As for those that take knowledge as their condition, these are precisely the dharmas that have ignorance as their cause; speaking of them in terms of their kind, knowledge serves as their two conditions — namely, the object and the dominant condition. There are dharmas that take knowledge as their condition without having ignorance as their cause — namely, excepting the ripened retribution of ignorance, the remaining unobscured-neutral formations and wholesome formations; for these dharmas, knowledge serves as four conditions, or three conditions, or two conditions, or one condition, but ignorance is not their cause.

Are the dharmas that have knowledge as their cause the same dharmas that take ignorance as their condition? Answer: whatever dharmas have knowledge as their cause also take ignorance as their condition. Here, speaking of the dharmas that have knowledge as their cause in terms of their kind, those dharmas have knowledge as their three causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, and the homogeneous cause. As for those that take ignorance as their condition, these are precisely the dharmas that have knowledge as their cause; speaking of them in terms of their kind, ignorance serves as their two conditions — namely, the object and the dominant condition. There are dharmas that take ignorance as their condition without having knowledge as their cause — namely, the first knowledge and every contaminated formation; for these dharmas, ignorance serves as four conditions, or three conditions, or two conditions, or one condition, but knowledge is not their cause.

Are the dharmas that have ignorance as their cause thereby unwholesome? Answer: whatever dharmas are unwholesome have ignorance as their cause. Here, speaking of the unwholesome dharmas that have ignorance as their cause in terms of their kind, those dharmas have ignorance as their four causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, the homogeneous, and the pervasive cause. There are dharmas that have ignorance as their cause without being unwholesome — namely, the ripened retribution of ignorance and the obscured-neutral formations. Here, the ripened retribution of ignorance has ignorance as its one cause, the ripening cause; the obscured-neutral formations, speaking of them in terms of their kind, have ignorance as their four causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, the homogeneous, and the pervasive cause — yet these dharmas are not unwholesome, since they are neutral.

Are the dharmas that have knowledge as their cause thereby wholesome? Answer: whatever dharmas have knowledge as their cause are wholesome. Here, speaking of the wholesome dharmas that have knowledge as their cause in terms of their kind, those dharmas have knowledge as their three causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, and the homogeneous cause. There are dharmas that are wholesome without having knowledge as their cause — namely, the first knowledge and wholesome contaminated formations. Here, the first knowledge is itself wholesome yet does not have knowledge as its cause, since there is no prior or co-existent knowledge for it; wholesome contaminated formations likewise do not have knowledge as their cause, since the meaning of causation does not apply to them in this respect.

Is there a dharma that has neither knowledge nor ignorance as its cause, yet is not without a cause at all? Answer: there is — namely, excepting the ripened retribution of ignorance, the remaining unobscured-neutral formations, and the first knowledge together with wholesome contaminated formations. Such dharmas have neither knowledge nor ignorance as their cause, yet are not without a cause. Among these, excepting the ripened retribution of ignorance, the remaining unobscured-neutral formations, speaking of them in terms of their kind, have four causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, the homogeneous, and the ripening cause; the first knowledge has two causes — namely, the conjoined and the co-existent cause; wholesome contaminated formations, speaking of them in terms of their kind, have three causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, and the homogeneous cause. Question: the possession of the uncontaminated that co-exists with the first knowledge likewise has neither knowledge nor ignorance as its cause, yet is not without a cause — why is this not mentioned here? Answer: this passage should be understood as also including the possession of the uncontaminated that co-exists with the first knowledge; that it is not explicitly stated should be understood to have some further significance. Some say: this possession is subsumed under the co-existent cause of the first knowledge, and it is for this reason that it is not separately mentioned. This should not be so said, since possession is not the co-existent cause of the first knowledge; rather, it should be said that it is subsumed within the category of the first knowledge — when the first knowledge is spoken of, its entire cluster should be understood as already spoken of. The meaning of knowledge and ignorance among dharmas is explained at length in the Dependent-Origination Section of the Miscellaneous Aggregation Chapter.

[Views Aggregate, Chapter Eight, Nyāsa of Perception, Part One of Part Three — 見蘊第八中想納息第三之一.] Does a dharma that gives rise to the perception of impermanence entail a dharma conjoined with the perception of impermanence? Having already grasped this chapter-heading and the others like it, together with the explanation of their meaning, one should now analyze them at length. Question: why is this treatise composed? Answer: in order to put a stop to the notion of those who are confused about conjoined dharmas and hold that conjoined dharmas are not real, and to reveal that conjoined dharmas are certainly and truly existent — for this reason the treatise is composed. Does a dharma that gives rise to the perception of impermanence entail a dharma conjoined with the perception of impermanence? Answer: this should be explained through four alternatives. There is a dharma that gives rise to the perception of impermanence without being conjoined with the perception of impermanence — this means that, when the perception of impermanence is necessarily about to cease as another perception is necessarily about to arise in the present, the dharmas conjoined with that other perception are meant. Here it is said that, immediately following the perception of impermanence, the perception of suffering-in-impermanence, up through the perception of cessation — whichever one of these is currently manifest — its conjoined dharmas are, apart from perception itself, the remaining nine dharmas universal to all mental states, the ten dharmas universal to wholesome mental states, and, in the ground possessing both applied and sustained thought,

applied thought and sustained thought; in the ground without applied thought but with only sustained thought, sustained thought and mind. Such dharmas give rise to the perception of impermanence because the perception of impermanence serves as their immediately preceding condition, arising on that basis, yet they are not conjoined with the perception of impermanence, since they are conjoined instead with one or another of the perception of suffering-in-impermanence up through the perception of cessation. There is a dharma conjoined with the perception of impermanence without giving rise to the perception of impermanence — this means that, when another perception is necessarily about to cease as the perception of impermanence is necessarily about to arise in the present, the dharmas conjoined with it are meant.

Here it is said that, immediately following whichever one of the perception of suffering-in-impermanence up through the perception of cessation, the perception of impermanence is currently manifest.

As for its conjoined dharmas, they are, apart from perception itself, the remaining nine dharmas universal to all mental states, and so forth, explained at length as above. Such dharmas are conjoined with the perception of impermanence without giving rise to the perception of impermanence, since one or another of the perception of suffering-in-impermanence up through the perception of cessation serves as their immediately preceding condition, arising on that basis. There is a dharma that both gives rise to and is conjoined with the perception of impermanence — this means that, when the perception of impermanence is necessarily about to cease as the perception of impermanence is necessarily about to arise again in the present, the dharmas conjoined with it are meant. Here it is said that, within the later cluster of the perception of impermanence, the mind and mental factors other than the perception of impermanence itself, explained at length as above — such dharmas give rise to the perception of impermanence, since the perception of impermanence serves as their immediately preceding condition, arising on that basis, and are also conjoined with the perception of impermanence, since they exist within that same cluster. Although the perception of impermanence itself may be said to arise from the perception of impermanence, it is not conjoined with the perception of impermanence, since a thing's own nature is never conjoined with its own nature by the three causes and conditions that define conjunction, as explained before. There is a dharma that neither gives rise to nor is conjoined with the perception of impermanence — this means that, when one perception is necessarily about to cease as another perception is necessarily about to arise in the present, the dharmas conjoined with it are meant. Here it is said that, immediately following whichever one of the perception of suffering-in-impermanence up through the perception of cessation, whichever other one of these is currently manifest, the dharmas conjoined with these various perceptions, explained at length as above — such dharmas do not give rise to the perception of impermanence, since some other perception serves as their immediately preceding condition, arising on that basis, and are also not conjoined with the perception of impermanence, since they are conjoined instead with that other perception. As with the perception of impermanence, so too the perception of suffering-in-impermanence up through the perception of cessation — each should be explained through four alternatives as is appropriate, and thus there come to be ten such sets of four alternatives.

Does a dharma that gives rise to the perception of impermanence entail a dharma that shares the same object as the perception of impermanence? And so on, as stated at length. Question: why is this treatise composed? Answer: in order to put a stop to the notion of those who are confused about the intrinsic nature of an object and hold that the nature of an object is not a real dharma, and to reveal that the nature of an object is certainly and truly existent — for this reason the treatise is composed. Does a dharma that gives rise to the perception of impermanence entail a dharma that shares the same object as the perception of impermanence? Answer: this should be explained through four alternatives. There is a dharma that gives rise to the perception of impermanence without sharing the same object as the perception of impermanence — this means that, when the perception of impermanence is necessarily about to cease as another perception is necessarily about to arise in the present, that other perception has a different object. Here it is said that, immediately following a perception of impermanence taking the aggregate of matter as its object, whichever one of the perception of suffering-in-impermanence or the perception of non-self-in-suffering taking the aggregate of feeling and so forth as its object is currently manifest,

the same is explained for perceptions taking the other aggregates, or the elements and sense-fields, as their object. That dharma arises from the perception of impermanence without sharing the same object as the perception of impermanence, since its object is a different dharma.

There is a dharma that shares the same object as the perception of impermanence without giving rise to the perception of impermanence — this means that, when another perception is necessarily about to cease as the perception of impermanence is necessarily about to arise in the present, this dharma shares that same object. Here it is said that, immediately following whichever one of the perception of suffering-in-impermanence or the perception of non-self-in-suffering taking the aggregate of matter and so forth as its object, a perception of impermanence taking that very same aggregate as its object is currently manifest — the same is explained for the elements and sense-fields. That dharma shares the same object as the perception of impermanence without arising from the perception of impermanence, since one or another of the perception of suffering-in-impermanence or the perception of non-self-in-suffering serves as its immediately preceding condition, arising on that basis. Question: here, of which perception and which perception is it said that they share one and the same object — is it said that the perception of impermanence shares an object with the perception of impermanence, or that the perception of impermanence shares an object with another perception? Whichever is claimed, what fault follows? Both positions carry a fault. If it is said that the perception of impermanence shares an object with the perception of impermanence, how can this passage be reconciled with it — namely, where it says that dharma shares that prior object? If it is said that the perception of impermanence shares an object with another perception, how, again, can this passage be reconciled with it — namely, where it says that dharma does not arise from the perception of impermanence, since there are occasions when that other perception does arise from the perception of impermanence? Answer: here it is said that the perception of impermanence shares an object with the perception of impermanence, and it is for this reason that it is spoken of as sharing the same object as the perception of impermanence. Question: if so, how can this passage be reconciled with it — namely, where it says that dharma shares that object? Some say: this passage should be understood as saying that, when another perception is necessarily about to cease as the perception of impermanence is necessarily about to arise in the present, the dharmas conjoined with it are meant.

This means that the dharma conjoined with the perception of impermanence is conjoined with the perception of impermanence. According to those who explain it this way, three perceptions are subsumed here: the perception of impermanence, followed by another perception arising, followed again by the perception of impermanence arising once more; here, it is said that the later-arisen perception of impermanence shares the same object as the earlier perception of impermanence, and it is for this reason that it is spoken of as sharing the same object as the perception of impermanence. In this way, both passages are well reconciled. Some raise a further question on this point, which now deserves careful consideration: here, of which perception and which perception is it said that they share one and the same object — is it said that the perception of impermanence shares an object with another perception, or that another perception shares an object with the perception of impermanence? What is the difference between these two? If it is said that the perception of impermanence shares an object with another perception, how can this passage be reconciled with it — namely, where it says there is a dharma that shares the same object as the perception of impermanence? For if the perception of impermanence arises immediately following the perception of non-self-in-suffering, that dharma shares the same object as the perception of non-self-in-suffering, not as the perception of impermanence. If it is said that another perception shares an object with the perception of impermanence,

then, since there are occasions when that dharma does in fact arise from the perception of impermanence, one ought not to say that it does not arise from the perception of impermanence. Some say: here it is said that the perception of impermanence shares an object with another perception. Question: if so, how can this passage be reconciled with it — namely, where it says there is a dharma that shares the same object as the perception of impermanence? Answer: this should be explained as follows — when another perception is necessarily about to cease as the perception of impermanence is necessarily about to arise in the present, the dharmas conjoined with that perception are meant; but if so, that dharma ought to arise from the perception of impermanence and also share the same object as the perception of impermanence. According to those who explain it this way, here it should be said that the perception of impermanence shares an object with the perception of impermanence, and therefore three perceptions are altogether subsumed here: the initial perception of impermanence, followed by another perception arising, followed immediately by the perception of impermanence arising once more; here it is said that the later-arisen perception of impermanence shares the same object as the earlier-arisen perception of impermanence. In this way, both faults are avoided. There is a dharma that both gives rise to and shares the same object as the perception of impermanence — this means that, when the perception of impermanence is necessarily about to cease as the perception of impermanence is necessarily about to arise again in the present, this dharma shares that same object. Here it is said that, immediately following a perception of impermanence taking the aggregate of matter and so forth as its object, a perception of impermanence taking that very same aggregate as its object is currently manifest — the same is explained for the elements and sense-fields. That dharma arises from the perception of impermanence and also shares the same object as the perception of impermanence. There is a dharma that neither gives rise to nor shares the same object as the perception of impermanence — this means that, when one perception is necessarily about to cease as another perception is necessarily about to arise in the present, this dharma has yet another, different object. Here it is said that, immediately following whichever one of the perception of suffering-in-impermanence or the perception of non-self-in-suffering taking some other aggregate as its object, whichever one of the perception of suffering-in-impermanence or the perception of non-self-in-suffering taking yet another aggregate as its object is currently manifest — the same is explained for the elements and sense-fields. That dharma does not give rise to the perception of impermanence, since another perception serves as its immediately preceding condition, arising on that basis, and does not share the same object as the perception of impermanence either, since it has yet another perception and another object. As with the perception of impermanence, so too up through the perception of cessation. Question: in what has been explained here, the case of another perception may well be so, but for the perception of foulness and the perception of distaste for food — a past instance takes a past object, a present instance takes a present object, and a future instance, when it arises, takes a future object — how, then, can a third alternative be established for these? Answer: relying on resemblance, it is likewise explained, and no fault follows —

that is, an earlier perception of foulness that takes a skeleton as its object ceases, and a later perception of foulness that again takes a skeleton as its object arises; because the character of their objects is alike, they too are spoken of as sharing one and the same object. The same holds for the perception of distaste for food.

Are dharmas arising from the mind, not other than arising from the mind? And so on, as stated at length. In the earlier Karma Aggregate, it was shown how the desirable and undesirable fruits arise from the mind, together with the distinct stages of that process; here, it is shown how the two kinds of karma, bodily and vocal, arise from the mind, together with the distinct stages of that process. Mind is of two kinds — the initiating and the accompanying. The initiating mind is that which is capable of drawing forth bodily and vocal karma, arising prior to them; the accompanying mind is that which assists bodily and vocal karma, arising together with them.

Here, only the initiating mind is meant, not the accompanying mind. Question: what are the dharmas here spoken of? Some say: they are the restraint of the prātimokṣa. If this is what is meant by saying that the dharmas here are the restraint of the prātimokṣa, then, in saying that these dharmas arise from the mind, it means that they are drawn forth by the power of the mind of prātimokṣa restraint; and in saying that they are not other than arising from the mind, it means that this restraint is never obtained apart from the power of the mind. When the mind arises, does the dharma arise at that very time? Answer: the mind arises first, and the dharma follows after — that is, a mind of this kind first arises, thinking, 'I shall now undertake the restraint of the prātimokṣa,' and only thereafter does the manifest karma of that restraint properly arise. When the mind ceases, does the dharma cease at that very time? Answer: the mind ceases first, and the dharma follows after — that is, that mind first arises and then ceases, and only afterward does the manifest karma of that restraint arise and, in turn, cease. Why is this? Because all conditioned things, swallowed up by impermanence, have no power to remain even briefly once they have arisen, and, moment by moment without interruption, must inevitably perish. When the mind is obtained, is the dharma obtained at that very time? Answer: the mind is obtained first, and the dharma follows after — that is, that wholesome mind is obtained by two conditions: first, the continuity of the wholesome roots, and second, a return from another realm or ground; whereas that restraint is obtained through its manifest karma. When the mind is relinquished, is the dharma relinquished at that very time? Answer: the dharma is relinquished first, and only afterward the mind — that is, that restraint is relinquished by four conditions: first, relinquishing the precepts oneself; second, the arising of both sexual characteristics in one body; third, the severing of the wholesome roots; and fourth, relinquishing one's class of common existence. Some say: it is also relinquished at the moment one commits a root transgression. That mind, however, is relinquished by two conditions: first, the severing of the wholesome roots, and second, passing beyond one's realm or ground. Question: in the case of one who dies in the desire realm and is reborn again in the desire realm, it may indeed be said that the dharma is relinquished first and the mind only afterward; but in the case of one who dies in the desire realm and is reborn in the form or formless realm, or who enters final nirvāṇa, the dharma and the mind are relinquished simultaneously — how, then, can it be said that the dharma is relinquished first and the mind only afterward?

Answer: here, only the case of one who dies in the desire realm and is reborn again in the desire realm is meant — at the moment of his death, since he relinquishes his class of common existence, the restraint of the prātimokṣa is relinquished along with it; yet, although he relinquishes his class of common existence, he does not thereby relinquish the mind. Some say: the case of one who dies in the desire realm and is reborn in the form or formless realm, or who enters final nirvāṇa, is likewise included in what is said here — for, as he is about to die, his bodily strength grows feeble, or he is touched by the suffering of a severed vital point, and thereupon he loses the bodily and vocal restraint he had undertaken; only later, at the moment of death itself, is his mind then relinquished. Question: if so, how can it still be said that a certain monk has died while a monk?

Answer: he still retains his original designation, and so there is no fault — just as a king who has lost his throne is still called a king. Question: how, then, can his robe and bowl and other such possessions be divided among the other monastics? Answer: he himself had, on an earlier occasion, likewise divided such possessions belonging to another; now that he has died, others in turn divide his. Moreover, this is a practice sanctioned and handed down from ancient times. It is heard that, long ago, when a seer died, his fellow practitioners of the holy life delivered his possessions to the king, saying: these are the possessions belonging to a certain seer, who has no heir; we now bring them to the king and beg that they be received. The king had them returned, saying: the possessions used by renunciants are not fit for us laypeople to make use of; from this time forward, whenever a renunciant should die, his fellow practitioners of the holy life should divide his possessions among themselves. It was by this sanction that no fault attaches to the practice.

Assessment: the position explained earlier is the better one. Why is this? Because the touch of suffering is not itself a condition for relinquishing the precepts. What one originally vowed is to be kept up until the very moment of death, not before life has ended; and, apart from the severing of the wholesome roots and the other such conditions, nothing else causes the precepts to be relinquished — rather, it is at the very last moment of death that the mind and the restraint are both lost together, at one and the same time. When the mind receives its ripened retribution, does the dharma receive it at that very time? Answer: sometimes at that very time, and sometimes at another time. 'At that very time' means within the same single moment, the same single continuity, the same single stage, or the same single class of common existence. 'At another time' means in a different moment, a different continuity, a different stage, or a different class of common existence.

This is because the present has these four aspects. Some further say: the dharmas here spoken of are non-restraint. If this is what is meant by saying that the dharmas here are non-restraint, then, in saying that these dharmas arise from the mind, it means that they are drawn forth by the power of the mind of non-restraint; and in saying that they are not other than arising from the mind,

it means that this non-restraint is never obtained apart from the power of the mind. When the mind arises, does the dharma arise at that very time? Answer: the mind arises first, and the dharma follows after —

that is, a mind of this kind first arises, thinking, 'I shall now undertake such-and-such an occupation,' and only thereafter does the manifest karma of that non-restraint properly arise. When the mind ceases, does the dharma cease at that very time? Answer: the mind ceases first, and the dharma follows after — that is, that mind first arises and then ceases, and only afterward does the non-restraint arise and, in turn, cease; the explanation is as before. When the mind is obtained, is the dharma obtained at that very time? Answer: the mind is obtained first, and the dharma follows after — that is, that unwholesome mind is obtained by two conditions: first, regressing from dispassion, and second, a return from another realm or ground; whereas that non-restraint is obtained through its manifest karma. When the mind is relinquished, is the dharma relinquished at that very time? Answer: the dharma is relinquished first, and only afterward the mind — that is, non-restraint is relinquished by four conditions: first, undertaking formal restraint; second, attaining dhyāna; third, the arising of both sexual characteristics in one body; and fourth, relinquishing one's class of common existence. That unwholesome mind, however, is relinquished by one condition — namely, at the moment of becoming dispassionate. When the mind receives its ripened retribution, does the dharma receive it at that very time? Answer: sometimes at that very time, and sometimes at another time, as explained before. Some further say: the dharmas here spoken of are the excellent and evil conduct of body and speech that is neither restraint nor non-restraint. If this is what is meant by saying that the dharmas here are the excellent and evil conduct of body and speech that is neither restraint nor non-restraint, then, in saying that these dharmas arise from the mind,

it means that this excellent or evil conduct of body and speech is drawn forth by the power of the mind; and in saying that they are not other than arising from the mind, it means that this excellent or evil conduct of body and speech is never obtained apart from the power of the mind. When the mind arises, does the dharma arise at that very time? Answer: the mind arises first, and the dharma follows after — that is, a mind of this kind first arises, thinking, 'I shall now do such-and-such an act,' and only thereafter does that manifest karma of body and speech properly arise. When the mind ceases, does the dharma cease at that very time? Answer: the mind ceases first, and the dharma follows after, as explained before. When the mind is obtained, is the dharma obtained at that very time? Answer: the mind is obtained first, and the dharma follows after — that is, that wholesome mind is obtained by two conditions: first, the continuity of the wholesome roots, and second, a return from another realm or ground; that unwholesome mind is likewise obtained by two conditions: first, regressing from dispassion, and second, a return from another realm or ground; whereas that excellent or evil conduct of body and speech is obtained through its manifest karma.

When the mind is relinquished, is the dharma relinquished at that very time? Answer: the dharma is relinquished first, and only afterward the mind — that is, that excellent or evil conduct of body and speech is relinquished by three conditions: first, the cessation of the intention behind it; second, the abandoning of the effort behind it; and third, the exhaustion of its force; that wholesome mind is relinquished by two conditions, and that unwholesome mind by one condition, all as explained before. When the mind receives its ripened retribution, does the dharma receive it at that very time? Answer: sometimes at that very time, and sometimes at another time, as explained before. Is there a dharma that is comprehended and fully known? And so on, as stated at length. Question: why is this treatise composed?

Answer: it is in order to put a stop to other schools and to reveal one's own position. That is, some hold that what is comprehended and fully known is not a real dharma; others further hold that the uncontaminated conditioned is likewise something to be abandoned; others further hold that the unobscured-neutral produced by preliminary effort is likewise something to be cultivated;

and still others hold that nirvāṇa alone is that which is realized. In order to put a stop to these various intentions, and to make clear that what is comprehended and fully known is a real dharma, that what is to be abandoned is exclusively the contaminated, that what is to be cultivated is exclusively the wholesome, and that what is conditioned and realized extends to every wholesome dharma together with the unobscured-neutral produced in dependence on concentration, this treatise is composed. As for what is comprehended: this means that every dharma is comprehended by wholesome wisdom. As for what is fully known: this means that every dharma is fully known by the fully-knowing cognition. As it is said, what is comprehended? — every dharma. What is fully known? — every dharma. As for what is to be abandoned: this means every contaminated dharma, since it is what the path of the antidote is meant to abandon. As it is said, what dharmas are to be abandoned? — every contaminated dharma. As for what is to be cultivated: this means every wholesome conditioned dharma, since it is subject to acquisitional cultivation, habitual cultivation, either one or both together. As it is said, what dharmas are to be cultivated? — every wholesome conditioned dharma. As for what is realized: this means every wholesome dharma together with the unobscured-neutral produced in dependence on concentration, since these are things worth delighting in and seeking to attain. As it is said, what dharmas are realized? — every wholesome dharma, together with the divine eye and divine ear that are unobscured-neutral and produced in dependence on absorption. Is there a dharma that is comprehended and fully known, yet neither to be abandoned, nor to be cultivated, nor realized? Answer: there is — namely, space and cessation not through deliberate discernment. These two dharmas are comprehended, since they are comprehended by wholesome wisdom, and are also fully known, since they are fully known by the fully-knowing cognition; they are not to be abandoned, since they are uncontaminated; they are not to be cultivated, since they are unconditioned; and they are not realized, since they are not things worth delighting in and seeking to attain. Is there a dharma that is comprehended and fully known, neither to be abandoned nor to be cultivated, yet is realized? Answer: there is — namely, cessation through deliberate discernment; this is something realized, since it is a thing worth delighting in and seeking to attain; the rest is as explained before. Is there a dharma that is comprehended and fully known, not to be abandoned, yet is to be cultivated and is realized? Answer: there is — namely, the uncontaminated conditioned dharma; this is to be cultivated, since it is a wholesome conditioned dharma; the rest is as explained before. Is there a dharma that is comprehended and fully known, is to be abandoned, is to be cultivated, and is realized? Answer: there is — namely, wholesome contaminated formations; this is to be abandoned, since it is contaminated; the rest is as explained before. Is there a dharma that is comprehended and fully known, is to be abandoned, is not to be cultivated, yet is realized? Answer: there is — namely, the divine eye and ear produced in dependence on concentration; this is to be abandoned, since it is contaminated, and is not to be cultivated, since it is neutral, yet it is realized, since it is produced in dependence on concentration and sought and attained. Is there a dharma that is comprehended and fully known, is to be abandoned, yet is neither to be cultivated nor realized? Answer: there is —

namely, apart from the divine eye and ear produced in dependence on concentration, the remaining neutral formations and unwholesome dharmas; the meaning is as explained before. Question: the masters of outlying lands say —

that the realized unobscured-neutral dharmas number eight in kind — namely, the divine eye and divine ear produced in dependence on concentration, the two consciousnesses associated with them that are unobscured-neutral, the analytical knowledges of the dharma and of phrasing, the cognition of aspiration, and the mind of transformation. Why, then, is only the divine eye and ear spoken of here, and not these other dharmas? Answer: the passages recited by the masters of outlying lands say it in this way: what dharmas are realized? — every wholesome dharma, together with the unobscured-neutral dharma produced in dependence on absorption. The masters of Kaśmīra ought likewise to have said it this way; that they do not is for a distinct reason. That is, the divine eye- and ear-consciousness produced in dependence on concentration are subsumed within what is spoken of here as the divine eye and ear; once the basis is mentioned, its dependents should be understood as already mentioned. As for the analytical knowledges of the dharma and of phrasing, and the cognition of aspiration, these are entirely wholesome and are also to be cultivated, and are not subsumed under this category — there is no need to press the question. The mind of transformation resembles the workings of a craft, and is not especially something to delight in; it is for this reason not mentioned here, and so it is not followed in what these masters say. Furthermore, whatever is properly sought and attained in dependence on preliminary effort has the character of being dominant, and it is on this basis that it is spoken of here; the divine eye- and ear-consciousness have no distinct preliminary effort of their own —

but are obtained solely on account of the seeking of the divine eye and ear themselves. As for the various minds of transformation, they arise on account of undertaking preliminary effort to seek dispassion, and none of these are dominant in this sense — it is for this reason that they are not spoken of here. Furthermore, the divine eye and ear are attained only after extensively undertaking preliminary effort, and their accomplishment is transient, and so they are rare — for this reason they are spoken of here. That divine eye- and ear-consciousness and the mind of transformation, however, are obtained effortlessly on the occasion of becoming dispassionate or returning from another realm or ground, and once obtained remain accomplished at all times across the three time-periods, and so are not rare — for this reason they are not spoken of. Furthermore, the divine eye and ear are the fruit of cultivation, the fruit of concentration together with its accompanying factors; they are able to manifest only after one has become dispassionate; at every moment their associated consciousness is never empty of function; wherever they arise, they are inevitably present, being of the same class; whoever accomplishes them inevitably exercises their function; they are the basis on which the superknowledges of the divine eye and ear depend; and they are the excellent root of weariness with birth-and-death — for these reasons they are spoken of here, while the other dharmas are not so, and are therefore not spoken of. As for what is here called cessation not through deliberate discernment: this means a cessation that is not a release from bondage, not attained through deliberate discernment, such that the person who attains it is not thereby released from bondage. As for what is called cessation through deliberate discernment: this means a cessation that is a release from bondage, attained through deliberate discernment, such that the person who attains it is thereby released from bondage. These two kinds of cessation are explained at length in the Endearment-and-Reverence Section of the Miscellaneous Aggregation Chapter. Is there a dharma that has no object, yet is the cause and condition of a dharma that has an object, and is itself the object and arises together with a dharma that has no object? And so on, as stated at length. Question: why is this treatise composed? Answer: it is in order to put a stop to other schools and to reveal one's own position. That is, some hold that the characteristics of the conditioned have no real intrinsic nature — as is said by the Dārṣṭāntikas. Why is this? Because they hold that the characteristics of the conditioned are subsumed under the aggregate of formations, among the formations dissociated from mind, and that all dissociated formations are without real substance. Others further hold that the characteristics of the conditioned are themselves unconditioned dharmas — as is said by the Vibhajyavādins. Why is this? Because they say: if the characteristic of the conditioned were itself conditioned, its power would be feeble, and how could it then give rise to another dharma, let alone bring it to cessation? It is precisely because it is unconditioned that it is able to give rise to a dharma and, in turn, bring it to cessation. Others further hold that, among the characteristics of the conditioned, birth, aging, and duration are conditioned, while cessation alone is unconditioned. Why is this? Because they say that it is easy for dharmas to cause birth, aging, and duration, but difficult to cause cessation; if the characteristic of impermanence were itself conditioned, its nature would be feeble, and how could it then bring another dharma to cessation? It is precisely because it is unconditioned that its nature is strong and vigorous, capable of bringing every dharma to cessation. Others further hold that, for a material dharma, the birth, aging, duration, and impermanence of that dharma are themselves nothing other than that very matter, and likewise for the rest. Others further hold that the characteristics of the conditioned are themselves conjoined dharmas.

In order to put a stop to these various divergent positions, and to reveal that the characteristics of the conditioned possess a real, existent nature, are not unconditioned dharmas, and are not simply identical with matter and the rest, but are dissociated formations, this treatise is composed.

Is there a dharma that has no object, yet is the cause and condition of a dharma that has an object, and is itself the object and arises together with a dharma that has no object — a dharma that is existent and has an existent nature, not non-existent and without a non-existent nature —

distinct from matter, distinct from feeling, perception, and consciousness, and distinct from formations dissociated from mind? Answer: there is — namely, the five sense-consciousnesses together with their conjoined dharmas, the unconditioned mind that takes matter as its object, and the mental consciousness together with its conjoined dharmas, along with the birth, aging, duration, and impermanence belonging to the mind-consciousness group. This dharma — that is, the characteristic — itself has no object, since it is a formation dissociated from mind and dissociated formations have no object of their own; yet it is the cause and condition of a dharma that has an object, and is itself the object and arises together with a dharma that has no object, since it takes the six consciousness-groups and their conjoined dharmas spoken of above as its cause, and arises together with them. By this, the position of those who hold that the characteristic of the conditioned is unconditioned is already refuted, since it does not arise from a cause the way an unconditioned dharma never does; this dharma is existent, not non-existent, and possesses a real existent nature, not being a merely nominal dharma; it is not non-existent and does not lack an existent nature. This settles with certainty the meaning stated before. Furthermore, the first two clauses of the fourfold question establish one's own position, while the last two refute the position of others. As for establishing one's own position —

just as those who teach the good doctrine establish the tenets of the good doctrine, and those who teach the bad doctrine establish the tenets of the bad doctrine; just as the Naiyāyikas establish the tenets of the Naiyāyikas, and the Vibhajyavādins establish the tenets of the Vibhajyavādins. As for refuting the position of others — just as those who teach the good doctrine refute the tenets of the bad doctrine, and those who teach the bad doctrine refute the tenets of the good doctrine; just as the Naiyāyikas refute the tenets of the Vibhajyavādins, and the Vibhajyavādins refute the tenets of the Naiyāyikas — so too here: the first two clauses establish one's own position, and the last two refute the position of others. If one refutes others without first establishing one's own position, then this becomes an empty argument, without any foundation to rest on; if one merely establishes one's own position without refuting others, then one's own position is not well established. It is for this reason that one's own position is established first, and the position of others refuted afterward. The meaning intended is that birth, aging, duration, and impermanence have precisely this rationale — by their very nature they are existent, possessing an existent nature, not non-existent, and not lacking an existent nature. By this, the position of those who hold that the characteristic of the conditioned is not truly existent is already refuted. This is distinct from matter, since it is not a material dharma; it is distinct from feeling, perception, and consciousness, since it is not a dharma of feeling, perception, or consciousness.

By this, the position of those who hold that the characteristic of matter and the rest is simply identical with matter and the rest is already refuted. This is distinct from conjoined formations, since it is itself a dissociated dharma. By this, the position of those who hold that the characteristic of the conditioned is a conjoined dharma is already refuted. Should this dharma be said to be the cause and condition of that dharma? Answer: it should indeed be said to be both the cause and the condition.

Here, what is meant by 'this dharma' and what is meant by 'that dharma'? Some say: birth, aging, duration, and impermanence are 'this dharma,' while the six consciousness-groups and their conjoined dharmas that co-exist with them are 'that dharma.' According to those who explain it this way, when this dharma — the characteristic — arises together with that dharma, it should be said to be its cause and condition — as a cause, it is the single cause, namely the co-existent cause; as a condition, it is two conditions, namely the causal and the dominant condition. When this dharma arises prior to a later that dharma, it should likewise be said to be its cause and condition — as a cause, it is three causes, namely the homogeneous, the pervasive, and the ripening cause; as a condition, it is three conditions, excepting the immediately preceding condition. When this dharma arises after an earlier that dharma, it should be said to be its condition but not its cause — as a condition, it is two conditions, namely the object and the dominant condition.

When this dharma is taken altogether in relation to that dharma, it should be said to be both its cause and condition — as a cause, it is four causes, namely the co-existent, the homogeneous, the pervasive, and the ripening cause,

and as a condition, three conditions, excepting the immediately preceding condition. Some further say: the six consciousness-groups and their conjoined dharmas spoken of above are 'this dharma,' while the birth, aging, duration, and impermanence that co-exist with them are 'that dharma.' According to those who explain it this way, when this dharma arises together with that dharma, it should be said to be its cause and condition — as a cause, one cause, namely the co-existent cause; as a condition, two conditions, namely the causal and the dominant condition. When this dharma arises prior to a later that dharma, it should be said to be its cause and condition — as a cause, three causes, namely the homogeneous, the pervasive, and the ripening cause; as a condition, two conditions, namely the causal and the dominant condition. When this dharma arises after an earlier that dharma, it should be said to be its condition but not its cause — as a condition, one condition, namely the dominant condition.

When this dharma is taken altogether in relation to that dharma, it should be said to be both its cause and condition — as a cause, four causes, namely the co-existent, the homogeneous, the pervasive, and the ripening cause,

and as a condition, two conditions, namely the causal and the dominant condition. Some further say: the birth, aging, duration, and impermanence spoken of before are 'this dharma,' while the birth, aging, duration, and impermanence of the same kind arising in a later moment are 'that dharma.' According to those who explain it this way, when this dharma arises together with that dharma, it should be said to be its cause and condition — as a cause, one cause, namely the co-existent cause; as a condition, two conditions, namely the causal and the dominant condition. When this dharma arises prior to a later that dharma, it should be said to be its cause and condition — as a cause, three causes, namely the homogeneous, the pervasive, and the ripening cause; as a condition, two conditions, namely the causal and the dominant condition. When this dharma arises after an earlier that dharma, it should be said to be its condition but not its cause — as a condition, one condition, namely the dominant condition. When this dharma is taken altogether in relation to that dharma, it should be said to be both its cause and condition — as a cause, four causes, namely the co-existent, the homogeneous, the pervasive, and the ripening cause; as a condition, two conditions, namely the causal and the dominant condition. Some further say: the birth, aging, duration, and impermanence spoken of before are 'this dharma,' while this birth in relation to a homogeneous birth, up through this impermanence in relation to a homogeneous impermanence, are 'that dharma.' According to those who explain it this way, when this dharma arises together with that dharma, it should be said to be its cause and condition — as a cause, one cause, namely the co-existent cause; as a condition, two conditions, namely the causal and the dominant condition. When this dharma arises prior to a later that dharma, it should be said to be its cause and condition — as a cause, three causes, namely the homogeneous, the pervasive, and the ripening cause; as a condition, two conditions, namely the causal and the dominant condition. When this dharma arises after an earlier that dharma, it should be said to be its condition but not its cause — as a condition, one condition,

namely the dominant condition. When this dharma is taken altogether in relation to that dharma, it should be said to be both its cause and condition — as a cause, four causes, namely the co-existent, the homogeneous, the pervasive, and the ripening cause; as a condition, two conditions, namely the causal and the dominant condition. Should this dharma be said to be wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral? Answer: in relation to a wholesome dharma, it should be said to be wholesome; in relation to an unwholesome dharma, it should be said to be unwholesome; in relation to a neutral dharma, it should be said to be neutral — since the birth and what is born by it, up through the cessation and what is brought to cessation by it, must necessarily be of the same moral kind. How many latent afflictions underlie and increase in this dharma, and how many fetters bind it? Answer: the latent afflictions taking the contaminated dharmas of the three realms as their object underlie and increase in it, and the nine fetters bind it. Question: why is it not said that the latent afflictions taking uncontaminated dharmas as their object underlie and increase in this dharma? Answer: on account of two conditions —

a latent affliction underlies and increases in a dharma either on account of it being that affliction's object, or on account of it being conjoined with that affliction. A latent affliction taking the uncontaminated as its object has no object here — that is, it cannot take this conditioned characteristic as its object — since its object is precisely what is liberated from bondage; and although a latent affliction may underlie and increase on account of conjunction, there is here no case in which it fails to be conjoined with this very dharma when it does underlie it in this way. Here, speaking generally in terms of kind, it is said that the latent afflictions taking the contaminated dharmas of the three realms as their object underlie and increase in it, and the nine fetters bind it. If one speaks of it distinctly: the desire realm's latent afflictions underlie and increase in the desire realm's instance of this dharma, and so on up through the formless realm's in the formless realm's; all of those to be abandoned by seeing suffering, together with the pervasive ones to be abandoned by seeing origin, underlie and increase in that to be abandoned by seeing suffering; all of those to be abandoned by seeing origin, together with the pervasive ones to be abandoned by seeing suffering, underlie and increase in that to be abandoned by seeing origin; those taking the contaminated as their object that are to be abandoned by seeing cessation, together with the pervasive ones,

underlie and increase in that to be abandoned by seeing cessation; those taking the contaminated as their object that are to be abandoned by seeing the path, together with the pervasive ones, underlie and increase in that to be abandoned by seeing the path; all of those to be abandoned by cultivation, together with the pervasive ones, underlie and increase in that to be abandoned by cultivation; the nine fetters of the desire realm bind that of the desire realm; the six fetters of the form realm bind that of the form realm; the six fetters of the formless realm bind that of the formless realm. Thus, the latent afflictions of the three realms taking the contaminated as their object, and the nine fetters, all underlie and increase in, and bind, this dharma solely on account of it being their object, not on account of conjunction. The characteristics of the conditioned are explained at length in the Matter Section of the Miscellaneous Aggregation Chapter.