The Nyāsa of Cognition Opens

How many latent afflictions underlie and increase in feeling conjoined with views? And so on, as stated at length. Question: why is this treatise composed? Answer: in order to put a stop to the notion of those who deny the existence of conventional right view, and to reveal that conventional right view truly exists and is underlain and increased by the latent afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation and by the pervasive latent afflictions; and further, in order to block the position of those who hold that there is a latent affliction of doubt to be abandoned by cultivation, and to reveal that the latent affliction of doubt is to be abandoned solely by seeing — for these reasons the treatise is composed. Question: as when, at night, one sees an object and cannot tell whether it is

a stump or a man — is this doubt not something to be abandoned by cultivation? Answer: this is doubt because the matter has not yet been resolved; once resolved, it is thereupon cut off, and does not have the nature of a latent affliction. Question: why does this treatise proceed only in terms of views and doubt? Answer: because the composer of the treatise wished it so — and so on, as stated at length. Furthermore, these two alone, mutually dissociated from each other, both take the four truths as their object, both extend to being pervasive, both take contaminated and uncontaminated dharmas as their object, and both take conditioned and unconditioned dharmas as their object, and in this they are superior to the other afflictions. Craving, aversion, and conceit, although mutually dissociated, are nonetheless unable to take all four truths as their object, are exclusively non-pervasive, take only contaminated dharmas as their object, and take only conditioned dharmas as their object. Ignorance, although it takes the four truths as its object and is also pervasive, extending to conditioned and unconditioned, contaminated and uncontaminated dharmas alike, is nonetheless conjoined with every affliction and is in no case the superior one among them. It is for this reason that the treatise here proceeds only in terms of views and doubt. How many latent afflictions underlie and increase in feeling conjoined with views? Answer: the latent afflictions of the three realms taking the contaminated as their object, and the ignorance conjoined with views that takes the uncontaminated as its object, underlie and increase in it — this is the general statement. If one speaks of it distinctly, feeling conjoined with views is of five distinct kinds — namely, that to be abandoned by seeing suffering, up through that to be abandoned by cultivation. Here, feeling conjoined with views that is to be abandoned by seeing suffering is underlain and increased by all the latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing suffering, together with the pervasive ones to be abandoned by seeing origin; feeling conjoined with views that is to be abandoned by seeing origin is underlain and increased by all the latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing origin, together with the pervasive ones to be abandoned by seeing suffering; feeling conjoined with views that is to be abandoned by seeing cessation is underlain and increased by the ignorance conjoined with views that is to be abandoned by seeing cessation and takes the uncontaminated as its object, together with all the latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing cessation that take the contaminated as their object and the pervasive ones; feeling conjoined with views that is to be abandoned by seeing the path is underlain and increased by the ignorance conjoined with views that is to be abandoned by seeing the path and takes the uncontaminated as its object, together with all the latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing the path that take the contaminated as their object and the pervasive ones; feeling conjoined with views that is to be abandoned by cultivation is underlain and increased by all the latent afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation, together with the pervasive ones. Here, the distinctions in this underlying increase should be explained through four alternatives: there is a latent affliction that underlies and increases in feeling conjoined with views on account of being its object, but not on account of conjunction; there is a latent affliction that underlies and increases in feeling conjoined with views on account of conjunction, but not on account of being its object; there is a latent affliction that underlies and increases in feeling conjoined with views both on account of being its object and on account of conjunction; and there is a latent affliction that underlies and increases in feeling conjoined with views neither on account of being its object nor on account of conjunction. The first alternative refers to, excepting the ignorance conjoined with views that takes the contaminated as its object, the remaining latent afflictions that take the contaminated as their object. The second alternative refers to the ignorance conjoined with views that takes the uncontaminated as its object. The third alternative refers to the ignorance conjoined with views that takes the contaminated as its object. The fourth alternative refers to, excepting the ignorance conjoined with views that takes the uncontaminated as its object, the remaining latent afflictions that take the uncontaminated as their object.

How many latent afflictions underlie and increase in feeling dissociated from views? Answer: excepting the ignorance conjoined with views that takes the uncontaminated as its object, the remaining latent afflictions underlie and increase in it.

This is the general statement. If one speaks of it distinctly, feeling dissociated from views is of five distinct kinds — namely, that to be abandoned by seeing suffering, up through that to be abandoned by cultivation. Here, feeling dissociated from views that is to be abandoned by seeing suffering is underlain and increased by all the latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing suffering, together with the pervasive ones to be abandoned by seeing origin; feeling dissociated from views that is to be abandoned by seeing origin is underlain and increased by all the latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing origin, together with the pervasive ones to be abandoned by seeing suffering; feeling dissociated from views that is to be abandoned by seeing cessation is underlain and increased by, excepting the ignorance conjoined with the wrong view to be abandoned by seeing cessation, the remaining latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing cessation, together with the pervasive ones; feeling dissociated from views that is to be abandoned by seeing the path is underlain and increased by, excepting the ignorance conjoined with the wrong view to be abandoned by seeing the path, the remaining latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing the path, together with the pervasive ones; feeling dissociated from views that is to be abandoned by cultivation is underlain and increased by all the latent afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation, together with the pervasive ones. Here too, the distinctions in this underlying increase should be explained through four alternatives: there is a latent affliction that underlies and increases in feeling dissociated from views on account of being its object, but not on account of conjunction — and so on, worked out through the four alternatives at length. The first alternative refers to the ignorance conjoined with views that takes the contaminated as its object. The second alternative refers to, excepting the ignorance conjoined with views that takes the uncontaminated as its object, the remaining latent afflictions that take the uncontaminated as their object. The third alternative refers to, excepting the ignorance conjoined with views that takes the contaminated as its object, the remaining latent afflictions that take the contaminated as their object. The fourth alternative refers to the ignorance conjoined with views that takes the uncontaminated as its object.

How many latent afflictions underlie and increase in feeling conjoined with doubt? Answer: the latent afflictions of the three realms to be abandoned by seeing that take the contaminated as their object, and the ignorance conjoined with doubt that takes the uncontaminated as its object, underlie and increase in it — this is the general statement. If one speaks of it distinctly, feeling conjoined with doubt is of four distinct kinds — namely, that to be abandoned by seeing suffering, origin, cessation, and the path. Here, that to be abandoned by seeing suffering and that to be abandoned by seeing origin are as explained before. Feeling conjoined with doubt that is to be abandoned by seeing cessation is underlain and increased by the ignorance conjoined with doubt that is to be abandoned by seeing cessation, together with all the latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing cessation that take the contaminated as their object and the pervasive ones; feeling conjoined with doubt that is to be abandoned by seeing the path is underlain and increased by the ignorance conjoined with doubt that is to be abandoned by seeing the path, together with all the latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing the path that take the contaminated as their object and the pervasive ones. Here too, the distinctions in this underlying increase should be explained through four alternatives: there is a latent affliction that underlies and increases in feeling conjoined with doubt on account of being its object, but not on account of conjunction — and so on, worked out through the four alternatives at length. The first alternative refers to, excepting the ignorance conjoined with doubt that takes the contaminated as its object, the remaining latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing that take the contaminated as their object. The second alternative refers to the ignorance conjoined with doubt that takes the uncontaminated as its object.

The third alternative refers to the ignorance conjoined with doubt that takes the contaminated as its object. The fourth alternative refers to, excepting the ignorance conjoined with doubt that takes the uncontaminated as its object, the remaining latent afflictions that take the uncontaminated as their object.

How many latent afflictions underlie and increase in feeling dissociated from doubt? Answer: excepting the ignorance conjoined with doubt that takes the uncontaminated as its object, the remaining latent afflictions underlie and increase in it.

This is the general statement. If one speaks of it distinctly, feeling dissociated from doubt is of five distinct kinds — namely, that to be abandoned by seeing suffering, up through that to be abandoned by cultivation. Here, that to be abandoned by seeing suffering and that to be abandoned by seeing origin are as explained before. Feeling dissociated from doubt that is to be abandoned by seeing cessation is underlain and increased by, excepting the ignorance conjoined with doubt that is to be abandoned by seeing cessation, the remaining latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing cessation, together with the pervasive ones; feeling dissociated from doubt that is to be abandoned by seeing the path is underlain and increased by, excepting the ignorance conjoined with doubt that is to be abandoned by seeing the path, the remaining latent afflictions to be abandoned by seeing the path, together with the pervasive ones; feeling dissociated from doubt that is to be abandoned by cultivation is underlain and increased by all the latent afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation, together with the pervasive ones. Here too, the distinctions in this underlying increase should be explained through four alternatives: there is a latent affliction that underlies and increases in feeling dissociated from doubt on account of being its object, but not on account of conjunction — and so on, worked out through the four alternatives at length. The first alternative refers to the ignorance conjoined with doubt that takes the contaminated as its object. The second alternative refers to, excepting the ignorance conjoined with doubt that takes the uncontaminated as its object, the remaining latent afflictions that take the uncontaminated as their object. The third alternative refers to, excepting the ignorance conjoined with doubt that takes the contaminated as its object, the remaining latent afflictions that take the contaminated as their object. The fourth alternative refers to the ignorance conjoined with doubt that takes the uncontaminated as its object.

How many elements, sense-fields, and aggregates subsume the dharmas of cause, path, and dependent origination? Answer: the eighteen elements, twelve sense-fields, and five aggregates. Here, cause means the six causes — the conjoined cause up through the efficient cause; path means the eightfold noble path — right view up through right concentration; dependent origination means the twelve links of dependent origination — ignorance up through aging-and-death. This cause, path, and dependent origination together subsume every dharma of the elements, sense-fields, and aggregates. Question: this may well be so for cause and dependent origination, but how does the path also subsume them all? Answer: this passage should be explained as follows: cause and dependent origination are subsumed under the eighteen elements, twelve sense-fields, and five aggregates; the path is subsumed under the three elements, two sense-fields, and five aggregates. That the text does not explain it this way should be understood as speaking generally, saying that cause, path, and dependent origination together subsume the elements, sense-fields, and aggregates, not that each subsumes them individually. Some further say: the dharmas of cause, path, and dependent origination are all names for the six causes, since these are all merely distinct designations for cause — just as the Prajñapti-śāstra says that cause, path, road, and the like all share one and the same meaning; it is for this reason that all of them subsume the eighteen elements and the rest. Some say: cause means every conditioned dharma, as the Prakaraṇapāda says: what is the dharma of cause? — every conditioned dharma; by this it fully subsumes the eighteen elements and the rest. Path is itself cause; this cause, in relation to whatever it serves as a path for, and in relation to the fruit it obtains —

by this it likewise subsumes the eighteen elements and the rest. Dependent origination is likewise every conditioned dharma, as the Prakaraṇapāda says: what is the dharma of dependent origination? — every conditioned dharma; by this it likewise subsumes the eighteen elements and the rest. Excepting the dharmas concurrently arisen with eye-contact that are conjoined with perception, feeling, and mind, and the dharmas concurrently arisen with ear-contact that are dissociated from perception, feeling, and mind — how many elements, sense-fields, and aggregates subsume the remaining dharmas? Answer: the eighteen elements, twelve sense-fields, and five aggregates. Concurrent arising is of two kinds — by cause, and by moment. Here, only concurrent arising by moment is meant, since conjunction and dissociation are spoken of. Question: in what is stated here, which conjoined and dissociated dharmas are excepted, and which remaining dharmas are taken as subsumed under the elements, sense-fields, and aggregates? Answer: here, excepted are, within the cluster of eye-contact, the remaining conjoined dharmas other than contact, perception, feeling, and mind, and, within the cluster of ear-contact, birth, aging, duration, and impermanence; the remaining dharmas are taken as subsumed under the elements, sense-fields, and aggregates. Why is this? In what is stated here, whatever dharma is concurrently arisen with eye-contact and conjoined with perception, feeling, and mind, or concurrently arisen with ear-contact and dissociated from perception, feeling, and mind, is what is excepted. Within the cluster of eye-contact, although contact is conjoined with perception, feeling, and mind, it is not itself the intrinsic entity concurrently arisen with eye-contact, since there is no sense of concurrent arising of a thing with its own intrinsic entity. Although perception is concurrently arisen with eye-contact and conjoined with feeling and mind, it is not itself the intrinsic entity conjoined with perception, since there is no sense of conjunction of a thing with its own intrinsic entity — the same holds for feeling and mind. It is for this reason that contact, perception, feeling, and mind within the cluster of eye-contact are none of them excepted; it is the remaining conjoined dharmas, being concurrently arisen with eye-contact and conjoined with perception, feeling, and mind, that are excepted. Within the cluster of ear-contact, contact is not concurrently arisen with ear-contact, nor is it dissociated from perception, feeling, and mind; although perception is concurrently arisen with ear-contact and dissociated from perception itself, it is conjoined with feeling and mind — the same holds for feeling and mind; although the remaining mental factors are concurrently arisen with ear-contact, they are conjoined with perception, feeling, and mind. It is for this reason that mind and mental factors within the cluster of ear-contact are none of them excepted; it is their co-arisen birth, aging, duration, and impermanence, being concurrently arisen with ear-contact and dissociated from perception, feeling, and mind, that are excepted — this is what is called the excepted dharma. What, then, are the remaining dharmas? They are the six groups of contact, the six groups of perception, the six groups of feeling, the six groups of consciousness, and, within the clusters of ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-, and mind-contact, the remaining conjoined formations of the aggregate of formations; excepting, within the cluster of ear-contact, birth, aging, duration, and impermanence, the remaining dissociated formations, and every unconditioned material dharma. Such remaining dharmas are subsumed under the eighteen elements, twelve sense-fields, and five aggregates. And so on up through: excepting the dharmas concurrently arisen with body-contact that are conjoined with perception, feeling, and mind, and the dharmas concurrently arisen with mind-contact that are dissociated from perception, feeling, and mind — how many elements, sense-fields, and aggregates subsume the remaining dharmas? Answer: the eighteen elements, twelve sense-fields, and five aggregates.

Here, the mutual pairing of what is excepted and what is taken, running through each of the six sense-doors in turn, should be explained at length according to the pattern given above. Some further offer a variant explanation of this: excepting the dharmas concurrently arisen with eye-contact that are dissociated from perception, feeling, and mind, and the dharmas concurrently arisen with ear-contact that are conjoined with perception, feeling, and mind, the remaining dharmas are subsumed under the eighteen elements, twelve sense-fields, and five aggregates — and so on up through: excepting the dharmas concurrently arisen with body-contact that are dissociated from perception, feeling, and mind, and the dharmas concurrently arisen with mind-contact that are conjoined with perception, feeling, and mind, the remaining dharmas are subsumed as explained before. Some further offer yet another variant explanation of this: excepting the dharmas concurrently arisen with eye-contact that are conjoined with perception, feeling, and mind, and the dharmas concurrently arisen with ear-contact that are conjoined with perception, feeling, and mind, the remaining dharmas are subsumed as explained before — and so on up through: excepting the dharmas concurrently arisen with body-contact that are conjoined with perception, feeling, and mind, and the dharmas concurrently arisen with mind-contact that are conjoined with perception, feeling, and mind, the remaining dharmas are subsumed as explained before. Some further offer yet another variant explanation of this: excepting the dharmas concurrently arisen with eye-contact that are dissociated from perception, feeling, and mind, and the dharmas concurrently arisen with ear-contact that are dissociated from perception, feeling, and mind, the remaining dharmas are subsumed as explained before — and so on up through: excepting the dharmas concurrently arisen with body-contact that are dissociated from perception, feeling, and mind, and the dharmas concurrently arisen with mind-contact that are dissociated from perception, feeling, and mind, the remaining dharmas are subsumed as explained before.

[Views Aggregate, Chapter Eight, Nyāsa of Cognition, Part One of Part Four — 見蘊第八中智納息第四之一.] Does a thing that can be comprehended entail a thing that can be fully known? Having already grasped this chapter-heading and the others like it, together with the explanation of their meaning, one should now analyze them at length. Question: why is this treatise composed? Answer: in order to put a stop to the position of those who hold that forbearance is itself of the nature of cognition, and to show that forbearance arises together with the very doubt it is meant to abandon and, not yet having reached a settled and repeated determination, cannot be called cognition — for this reason the treatise is composed. A 'thing' (事) is of five kinds: first, a thing of intrinsic nature; second, a thing of binding; third, a thing of the object; fourth, a thing of cause; and fifth, a thing of appropriation. As for a thing of intrinsic nature: as the World-Honored One said, I shall now explain to you the forty-four things of cognition, and the seventy-seven things of cognition — meaning the cognition that takes the links of dependent origination as its object, here spoken of under the term 'thing.' The Venerable Ghoṣa explains it this way: that sūtra speaks of a thing of the object — that is, the links of existence are called a 'thing' because they are the object of cognition; yet that sūtra in fact speaks of cognition as the 'thing,' not the links of existence, since in its later exposition it speaks only of cognition. As for a thing of binding: as explained in an earlier passage — if a thing is bound by the fetter of craving, is that same thing also bound by the fetter of aversion? — that is, the afflictions of the five categories bind the dharmas of the five categories, either on account of being their object or on account of conjunction; those dharmas of the five categories are here spoken of under the term 'thing.' As for a thing of the object: as the Prakaraṇapāda says, every dharma is known by cognition according to its 'thing' — what does 'according to its thing' mean? It means according to what it operates on, according to its sphere, according to its object; the sphere and object on which the various cognitions operate are here spoken of under the term 'thing.' As for a thing of cause: as the Prakaraṇapāda says, a dharma that has a 'thing' and a dharma that has no 'thing' are precisely a dharma that has a cause and a dharma that has no cause; and further, as the World-Honored One says in a verse —

'A monk whose mind is tranquil is able permanently to cut off every thing; birth-and-death is utterly extinguished, and he no longer takes on any existence.' Here, the various causes are spoken of under the term 'thing' — for there is no birth-and-death that does not come from a cause; once the causes are cut off, birth-and-death is thereupon extinguished, and one no longer takes on any existence, but attains final nirvāṇa. As for a thing of appropriation: as the sūtras say, one relinquishes the thing of one's appropriated fields, the thing of one's house, the thing of one's wealth and treasure, and so forth.

And further, as the World-Honored One says in a verse —

'People, in the thing of their fields, wealth, cattle, horses, boys and servants, and in wives, husbands, and every kin and desire, each cling to and delight in his own.' And further, a householder speaks in this way: I have already taken so-and-so's such-and-such a thing; he still owes me such-and-such a thing. All such cases as these are called a thing of appropriation. There are, further, five other kinds of thing: first, a thing of the realm; second, a thing of the sense-field; third, a thing of the aggregate; fourth, a thing of time; and fifth, a thing of the moment. Among these ten kinds of thing, the treatise here proceeds in terms of a thing of intrinsic nature — that is, the intrinsic nature of forbearance, cognition, and the rest is here spoken of under the term 'thing.'

Does a thing that can be comprehended entail a thing that can be fully known? Answer: this should be explained through four alternatives. Here, being comprehensible is spoken of in reference to the full knowing accomplished by uncontaminated cognition of the path, which is said to be able to fully know because it is able truly to know; being fully knowable is spoken of in reference to the full knowing that consists in the uncontaminated path's realized abandonment, which is said to be able permanently to cut off the afflictions. Since these two differ in scope, one exceeding the other in different respects, this should be explained through four alternatives. There is a thing that can be comprehended but is not fully known — this means the cognitions of suffering, origin, cessation, and the path that do not cut off the afflictions, namely, every cognition present in the path of seeing, and, in the path of cultivation and beyond, every cognition of the four truths other than the path that directly cuts off the afflictions. Such cognitions can be comprehended, since they have the nature of true cognition, but are not fully knowable, since they do not cut off the afflictions. There is a thing that is fully knowable but cannot be comprehended — this means the forbearances of suffering, origin, cessation, and the path that do cut off the afflictions, namely, the forbearances in the path of seeing that cut off the afflictions: for one who has not yet become dispassionate with respect to the desire realm, both the forbearance regarding the cognition of the dharma and the forbearance regarding the subsequent cognition; for one who has already become dispassionate with respect to the desire realm, only the forbearance regarding the subsequent cognition. Such forbearances are fully knowable, since they permanently cut off the afflictions, but cannot be comprehended, since they do not have the nature of true cognition. Question: if the forbearances cannot be comprehended, how can this be reconciled with what the Prakaraṇapāda says — namely, where it asks what can be comprehended, and answers, wholesome wisdom; and asks what is comprehended, and answers, every dharma — since forbearance is itself of the nature of wholesome wisdom? Why, then, is it said here that it cannot be comprehended? Answer: this passage should be explained as follows: whatever thing can be comprehended is also a thing that can be fully known, and whatever thing can be fully known is also a thing that can be comprehended; that it is not explained this way is for a distinct reason — namely, that here, being comprehensible is spoken of in reference to the full knowing of cognition, while being fully knowable is spoken of in reference to the full knowing that consists in realized abandonment, and so no objection need be raised. There is a thing that can be both comprehended and fully known — this means the cognitions of suffering, origin, cessation, and the path that do cut off the afflictions, namely, in the path of cultivation, the four cognitions of the path, suffering, and the rest that directly cut off the afflictions; these can be comprehended, since they have the nature of true cognition, and are also fully knowable, since they permanently cut off the afflictions. There is a thing that can be neither comprehended nor fully known — this means the forbearances of suffering, origin, cessation, and the path that do not cut off the afflictions, namely, for one who has already become dispassionate with respect to the desire realm, the four forbearances regarding the dharma in the path of seeing; these cannot be comprehended, since they do not have the nature of true cognition, and are also not fully knowable, since they do not permanently cut off the afflictions — the afflictions they are meant to counter having already been cut off beforehand.

Does a thing that can be turned away from with aversion entail a thing that can be separated from? Answer: this should be explained through four alternatives. Here, aversion means operating with the aspect of aversion toward contaminated dharmas;

separation means being able to separate from the afflictions to be abandoned. Since these two differ in scope, one exceeding the other in different respects, this should be explained through four alternatives. There is a thing that can be turned away from with aversion but cannot be separated from —

this means the forbearances and cognitions of suffering and origin that do not cut off the afflictions, namely, for one who has already become dispassionate with respect to the desire realm and has entered the path of seeing, in the path of seeing, the forbearance regarding the dharma of suffering and origin, together with every cognition of suffering and origin; and, in the path of cultivation and beyond, every cognition of suffering and origin other than the path that directly cuts off the afflictions. Such cognitions can be turned away from with aversion, since they operate toward a thing that is to be turned away from with aversion, but cannot be separated from, since they do not cut off the afflictions. There is a thing that can be separated from but cannot be turned away from with aversion — this means the forbearances and cognitions of cessation and the path that do cut off the afflictions, namely, for one who has not yet become dispassionate, in the path of seeing, the forbearance regarding the dharma of cessation and the path, together with every subsequent cognition of cessation and the path; and, in the path of cultivation, the two cognitions of cessation and the path that directly cut off the afflictions. Such forbearances and cognitions can be separated from, since they are able to cut off the afflictions, but cannot be turned away from with aversion, since they operate toward a thing that is to be delighted in. There is a thing that can both be turned away from with aversion and be separated from — this means the forbearances and cognitions of suffering and origin that do cut off the afflictions, namely, for one who has not yet become dispassionate, in the path of seeing, the forbearance regarding the dharma of suffering and origin, together with every subsequent cognition of suffering and origin; and, in the path of cultivation, the two cognitions of suffering and origin that directly cut off the afflictions. Such forbearances and cognitions can be turned away from with aversion, since they operate toward a thing that is to be turned away from with aversion, and can also be separated from, since they cut off the afflictions.

There is a thing that can neither be turned away from with aversion nor be separated from — this means the forbearances and cognitions of cessation and the path that do not cut off the afflictions, namely, for one who has already become dispassionate,

in the path of seeing, the forbearance regarding the dharma of cessation and the path, together with every cognition of cessation and the path; and, in the path of cultivation and beyond, every cognition of cessation and the path other than the path that directly cuts off the afflictions. Such forbearances and cognitions cannot be turned away from with aversion, since they operate toward a thing that is to be delighted in, and cannot be separated from, since they do not cut off the afflictions. Does a thing that can be turned away from with aversion entail a thing that is cultivated as aversion? Answer: whatever thing can be turned away from with aversion is also cultivated as aversion. Here, cultivation means acquisitional cultivation together with habitual cultivation. In the path of seeing, the forbearances and cognitions of suffering and origin, and, in the path of cultivation and beyond, the cognitions of suffering and origin alone — such forbearances and cognitions operate toward a thing that is to be turned away from with aversion, and are also cultivated as aversion, since the aspect of aversion is cultivated in the present and the future, either singly or both together. There is a thing that is cultivated as aversion but cannot be turned away from with aversion — this means the cognitions of cessation and the path that do cut off the afflictions, namely, in the path of cultivation, when one relinquishes the defilement of the three realms by means of the cognitions of cessation and the path, one cultivates, in the future, the aversion-aspect of the cognitions of suffering and origin, and this is called being cultivated as aversion; since their object, the truths of cessation and the path, is a thing to be delighted in, they are not called able to be turned away from with aversion.

Question: there are occasions when the cognitions of cessation and the path are manifest in the present without cutting off the afflictions, yet still able to be cultivated as aversion — as in the path of cultivation and the path beyond training, at every stage of preliminary effort, liberation, and further progress in relinquishing defilement, when the two cognitions of cessation and the path, and, by means of these two cognitions, the refining of the faculties and the mixed cultivation of dhyāna,

the drawing forth of the superknowledges, the analytical knowledges, and the formless liberations, and the various merits such as the mindfulness-foundations, are undertaken — at all such times, these too are able to be cultivated as aversion, yet cannot be turned away from with aversion; why is this not mentioned here? Answer: it too ought to be mentioned, and that it is not mentioned should be understood to have some further significance. Some say: what is spoken of here is what is fixed — that is, when the cognitions of cessation and the path cut off the afflictions, at the uninterrupted path, they are fixed in being able to cultivate the two cognitions of suffering and origin, since these are, at that time, manifest in the present for the very first time and not previously attained; at other times this is not fixed, being sometimes previously attained and sometimes not — if previously attained, they cannot then be cultivated, and it is for this reason that this case is not mentioned. Some say: what is spoken of here is only the very first stage, not the remaining stages. Some say: what is spoken of here follows what is most salient, stated in brief, and it is for this reason that being cultivated as aversion at the other stages is not mentioned.

Does a thing that can be separated from entail a thing that is cultivated as aversion? Answer: this should be explained through four alternatives. There is a thing that can be separated from but is not cultivated as aversion — this means the forbearances of cessation and the path that do cut off the afflictions, namely, for one who has not yet become dispassionate, in the path of seeing, the forbearance regarding the dharma of cessation and the path, together with every subsequent forbearance of cessation and the path; such forbearances can be separated from, since they cut off the afflictions, but are not cultivated as aversion, since, at that time, only the aspect of delight is cultivated. There is a thing that is cultivated as aversion but cannot be separated from — this means the forbearances and cognitions of suffering and origin that do not cut off the afflictions, namely, for one who has already become dispassionate, in the path of seeing, the forbearance regarding the dharma of suffering and origin, together with every cognition of suffering and origin; and, in the path of cultivation and beyond, every cognition of suffering and origin other than the path that directly cuts off the afflictions. Such forbearances and cognitions are cultivated as aversion, since, at that time, the aspect of aversion is able to be cultivated, but cannot be separated from, since they do not cut off the afflictions. Question: there are occasions when the cognitions of cessation and the path are manifest in the present without cutting off the afflictions, yet are still cultivated as aversion rather than able to be separated from — as in the path of cultivation and the path beyond training, at every stage of preliminary effort, liberation, and further progress in relinquishing defilement, when the two cognitions of cessation and the path, and, by means of these two cognitions, the refining of the faculties, the mixed cultivation of dhyāna, the drawing forth of the superknowledges, the analytical knowledges, and the formless liberations, and the various merits such as the mindfulness-foundations, are undertaken — at all such times, these too are cultivated as aversion rather than able to be separated from; why is this not mentioned here? Answer: it too ought to be mentioned, and that it is not mentioned should be understood to have some further significance. Some say: what is spoken of here is what is fixed — that is, at all these stages, the two cognitions of suffering and origin are fixed, whereas being cultivated as aversion with respect to the two cognitions of cessation and the path is not fixed, since, when previously attained cognitions are manifest in the present, aversion is not then cultivated. There is a thing that can both be separated from and be cultivated as aversion — this means the forbearances and cognitions of suffering and origin, together with the cognitions of cessation and the path, that do cut off the afflictions, namely, for one who has not yet become dispassionate, in the path of seeing, the forbearance regarding the dharma of suffering and origin, together with every subsequent forbearance of suffering and origin; and, in the path of cultivation, the cognitions of suffering, origin, cessation, and the path that directly cut off the afflictions. Such forbearances and cognitions can be separated from, since they cut off the afflictions, and are also cultivated as aversion, since, at that time, the aspect of aversion is able to be cultivated. There is a thing that can neither be separated from nor be cultivated as aversion — this means the forbearances and cognitions of cessation and the path that do not cut off the afflictions, namely, for one who has already become dispassionate, in the path of seeing, the forbearance regarding the dharma of cessation and the path, together with every cognition of cessation and the path; and, in the path of cultivation and beyond, when previously attained cognitions of cessation and the path are manifest in the present. Such forbearances and cognitions cannot be separated from, since they do not cut off the afflictions, and are also not cultivated as aversion, since, at that time, the aspect of aversion is not cultivated. All the distinctions among the various alternatives concerning aversion, separation, and cultivation stated above rest on the distinct stages of the uncontaminated forbearances, subsequent cognitions, and cognitions of the dharma; they do not rest on anything else, following on from the earlier matter of what can be comprehended and fully known, since comprehending and fully knowing pertain solely to the uncontaminated.

Question: as for aversion spoken of above, what is its intrinsic nature — is it non-craving, or is it wisdom? If so, what fault follows? If it is non-craving, how can this passage be reconciled with it — namely, where it says there is a thing that can both be turned away from with aversion and be separated from, meaning the forbearances and cognitions of suffering and origin that cut off the afflictions? And how, again, can what is said in the Miscellaneous Aggregation Chapter be reconciled with it — namely, where it asks, what is habituated aversion that is free of craving, and answers, the non-craving, non-aversion, and non-delusion conjoined with the aversion of one beyond training — since non-craving cannot be said to be conjoined with non-craving, a thing's own nature never being conjoined with its own nature? If it is wisdom, then how can what was said above be reconciled with it — namely, where it asks, what is habituated aversion that is free of craving, and answers, the non-craving, non-aversion, and non-delusion conjoined with the aversion of one beyond training —

since non-delusion is itself wisdom, and wisdom cannot be said to be conjoined with wisdom, for the same reason as before? On this, some say: the intrinsic nature of aversion is non-craving. Question: if so, how can this passage be reconciled with it — namely, where it says there is a thing that can both be turned away from with aversion and be separated from, and so on, as stated at length?

Answer: there, what is spoken of as aversion is the dharma mixed together with aversion, named aversion — that is, non-craving conjoined with forbearance and cognition is spoken of under the name forbearance and cognition. Question: how, then, can what is said in the Miscellaneous Aggregation Chapter be reconciled with it — namely, where it asks, what is habituated aversion that is free of craving, and so on, as stated at length? Answer: that passage should be explained as follows: it means the wholesome roots of non-aversion and non-delusion conjoined with aversion; it ought not to speak of non-craving, and that it does so should be understood as an amplification added by the reciters, carried along by the momentum of the wording. Some say: the intrinsic nature of aversion is wisdom. Question: if so, then how can what is said in the Miscellaneous Aggregation Chapter be reconciled with it — namely, where it asks, what is habituated aversion that is free of craving, and so on, as stated at length? Answer: that passage should be explained as follows: it means non-craving and non-aversion conjoined with aversion; it ought not to speak of non-delusion, and that it does so should be understood as an amplification added by the reciters, carried along by the momentum of the wording. Assessment: it should be said that the intrinsic nature of aversion is distinct — neither non-craving nor wisdom, but a separate mental factor named aversion, conjoined with mind, subsumed within the category of the remaining mental factors. What is spoken of here is uncontaminated aversion.

There is, however, also contaminated aversion — that conjoined with the contemplation of foulness, mindfulness of breathing, the threefold meaning of the mindfulness-foundations, the contemplation of the seven excellent stations, warmth, summit, forbearance, the supreme mundane dharma, the conventional cognition bordering on direct realization in the path of seeing, and, in the path of cultivation and beyond, the dhyānas, immeasurables, formless attainments, liberations, stations of mastery, and totality-devices practiced with the aspects of disease, tumor, and thorn — explained at length, this would exceed the four great oceans, and so it is here stated only in brief. As for what turns away with aversion and what is turned away from with aversion, this should be explained through four alternatives: there is aversion without being turned away from — namely, uncontaminated aversion; there is what is turned away from without being aversion — namely, every contaminated dharma other than contaminated aversion itself; there is what is both aversion and turned away from — namely, conventional aversion; and there is what is neither aversion nor turned away from — namely, every uncontaminated dharma other than uncontaminated aversion itself. Question: if one takes every dharma as one's object and practices the aspect of non-self, should this be said to be an attentiveness with the aspect of delight, or an attentiveness with the aspect of aversion? If so, what fault follows? If it is an attentiveness with the aspect of delight, how can it also operate toward things to be turned away from with aversion? If it is an attentiveness with the aspect of aversion, how can it also operate toward things to be delighted in? Answer: it should be explained as an attentiveness with the aspect of delight. Question: if so, how can it also operate toward things to be turned away from with aversion? Answer: the practitioner engaged in this contemplation delights deeply in contemplating that which is to be delighted in; although his object extends to immeasurable things to be turned away from with aversion, delight nonetheless still arises — just as when a single gold coin is placed atop a heap of copper coins, on account of that gold coin a mind of delight arises toward the whole heap; this is likewise so.

If a dharma serves as the cause of another dharma, is there ever a time when this dharma does not serve as the cause of that dharma? Answer: there is no time when it is not the cause. Question: why is this treatise composed? Answer: in order to put a stop to the notion of those who are confused about causal and conditioning dharmas and hold that the nature of cause and condition is not real, and to reveal that the intrinsic nature of causal and conditioning dharmas is truly real — for this reason the treatise is composed. Some say: the treatise here proceeds in terms of a single cause — namely, the conjoined cause, since, by the conjoined cause, mind and mental factors alike take one and the same object and are never separated from one another, extending across the three time-periods. Some say: the treatise here proceeds in terms of two causes — namely, the conjoined and the co-existent, since these two causes both extend across the three time-periods and are never separated. Some say: the treatise here proceeds in terms of three causes — namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, and the ripening cause, since these three have a superior efficacy with respect to their fruit, extending across the three time-periods. Some say: the treatise here proceeds in terms of four causes —

namely, the conjoined, the co-existent, the ripening, and the efficient cause, since these four causes extend across the three time-periods. Some say: the treatise here proceeds in terms of five causes — namely, excluding the pervasive cause. Some say: the treatise here proceeds in terms of all six causes. Question: if a dharma has not yet reached the stage of having already arisen, it cannot serve as the homogeneous or pervasive cause — only once it has reached the stage of having already arisen is it able to serve as a cause. How, then, can the treatise, proceeding in terms of six causes, say that there is no time when it is not the cause? Answer: this is said with reference to the final stage — that is, once a future dharma reaches the very moment of its arising, it is certain to serve as a cause, and from this point onward there is no time when it is not a cause; it is on this basis that this is said. Question: if so, why is the same not said of the immediately preceding condition — namely, if a dharma serves as the immediately preceding condition for another dharma, is there ever a time when this dharma does not serve as the immediately preceding condition for that dharma? Answer: it is not so said because, at the time when this dharma has not yet reached the stage of having already arisen,

even though the mind and mental factors in question are indeed such as should serve as the immediately preceding condition, it is only once they reach the very moment of their arising that they are certain to serve as that condition. Why, then, is it not said that there is no time when it is not the immediately preceding condition? Answer: this too ought to be said, and that it is not said should be understood as intended to present the meaning through varied wording and varied modes of expression, adorning it so as to make it more easily understood. Furthermore, it is intended to display two gateways, two summaries, two stairways, two reflections, two lights, and two torches, mutually illuminating one another — as here, so there; as there, so here. The remaining meaning is explained at length in the Cognition Section of the Miscellaneous Aggregation Chapter.

If a dharma serves as the immediately preceding condition for another dharma, is there ever a time when this dharma does not serve as the immediately preceding condition for that dharma? Answer: at the time when this dharma has not yet reached the stage of having already arisen, it does not so serve. Question: why is this treatise composed? Answer: in order to put a stop to the notion of those who are confused about the dharma that serves as the immediately preceding condition and hold that its nature is not real, and to reveal that the intrinsic nature of the dharma that serves as the immediately preceding condition is truly real — for this reason the treatise is composed. Question: at the time when this dharma has not yet reached the stage of having already arisen, which dharma is meant — the earlier or the later? Is it that the earlier dharma, before reaching the stage of having already arisen, does not serve as the immediately preceding condition for the later dharma, and only once it has reached that stage does it so serve? Or is it that the later dharma, before reaching the stage of having already arisen, does not serve as the immediately preceding condition for the earlier dharma, and only once it has reached that stage does it so serve? As when the supreme mundane dharma gives rise to the forbearance regarding the cognition of the dharma of suffering — is it that the supreme mundane dharma, before reaching the stage of having already arisen, does not serve as the immediately preceding condition for the forbearance regarding the cognition of the dharma of suffering, and only once it has reached that stage does it so serve? Or is it that the forbearance regarding the cognition of the dharma of suffering, before reaching the stage of having already arisen, does not serve as the immediately preceding condition for the supreme mundane dharma, and only once it has reached that stage does it so serve? If it is that the earlier dharma, before reaching the stage of having already arisen, does not serve as the immediately preceding condition for the later dharma, and only once it has reached that stage does it so serve — this may well hold for a stage possessing mind, but how can it hold for a mindless stage? As when one enters the attainment of no-perception or the attainment of cessation for seven days and nights, or even longer — if the mind that entered that attainment, once it has reached the stage of having already arisen, is to serve as the immediately preceding condition for the mind that emerges from that attainment, then the second moment ought to see the emerging mind arise immediately. Why is this so? Because, if a dharma serves as the immediately preceding condition for another dharma, taking that other dharma as its fruit, there can be absolutely no dharma — whether some sentient being, some medicinal herb, some spell, a buddha, a pratyekabuddha, or an arhat who has reached the ultimate — capable of obstructing it so that, at the second moment, it fails to arise; and if this were so, then these two mindless attainments would never come to an end at all.

If it is that the later dharma, before reaching the stage of having already arisen, does not serve as the immediately preceding condition for the earlier dharma, and only once it has reached that stage does it so serve — is it not then the case that the forbearance regarding the cognition of the dharma of suffering, before reaching the stage of having already arisen, would also serve as the immediately preceding condition for the supreme mundane dharma? On this, some say: it is that the earlier dharma, before reaching the stage of having already arisen, does not serve as the immediately preceding condition for the later dharma, and only once it has reached that stage does it so serve. Question: if so, this may well hold for a stage possessing mind, but how can it hold for a mindless stage? Answer: what is spoken of here is the stage possessing mind, not the other stages. Some say: even explained in terms of a mindless stage, no fault follows — that is, when the mind that enters an attainment is manifest in the present, it at once takes as its fruit every subsequent moment of that attainment together with the emerging mind; it also gives its fruit to the very first moment of that attainment, and gives its fruit to every subsequent moment of that attainment and to the emerging mind as they arise, not taking what it has already taken before. Assessment: this ought not to be so explained.

Why is this? Because there is no such thing as an immediately preceding condition that takes its fruit at one time and gives its fruit at another — if it takes its fruit at this time, then it gives its fruit at this very same time. There are those who explain it thus: it is that the later dharma, before reaching the stage of having already arisen, does not serve as the immediately preceding condition for the earlier dharma, and only once it has reached that stage does it so serve. Question: is it not then the case that the forbearance regarding the cognition of the dharma of suffering, before reaching the stage of having already arisen, would also serve as the immediately preceding condition for the supreme mundane dharma? Answer: at that time, although it does serve as what immediately precedes the supreme mundane dharma, it is not yet the immediately preceding condition; only once it has reached the stage of having already arisen is it called both what immediately precedes and the immediately preceding condition. Just as with the immediately preceding and the immediately preceding condition, so too with the immediately preceding continuity and the continuity itself. The remaining meaning is explained at length in the Cognition Section of the Miscellaneous Aggregation Chapter.