The Sixty-Two Views

Whoever holds this view — that whatever every person or individual experiences invariably has the transformation of a sovereign lord as its cause — this is a wrong grasping at what is not a cause as if it were a cause, a grasping at precepts and vows, to be abandoned by seeing suffering. That this is a wrong grasping at what is not a cause as if it were a cause, a grasping at precepts and vows, reveals its intrinsic nature; that it is to be abandoned by seeing suffering reveals its antidote, explained at length as before. What gives rise to it? It means that there are ascetics who give rise to this view either through incorrect reasoning, or through attaining concentration, or through evil companions, as should be understood as explained before. Yet dharmas do not arise gradually caused by a sovereign lord — that is, if the various worlds arose caused by the transformation of a sovereign lord, then all of them ought to arise simultaneously, since that cause is always present and there is nothing capable of obstructing it from producing them. If it is said that the sovereign lord must still depend on some further cause before being able to produce them, then it is no longer sovereign, being just like any other cause. If it is said that all dharmas arise from the desire and pleasure of the sovereign lord, and so do not arise all at once — then why do the desire and pleasure of the sovereign lord themselves not arise all at once, since the desire and pleasure that give rise to them are, on their account, always present in the sovereign lord and nothing can obstruct them? If it is said that the sovereign lord must still depend on some further cause before even producing desire and pleasure, then it is no longer sovereign — and, further, this would lead to an infinite regress, since that further cause would itself depend on yet another cause to arise. Further, if the sovereign lord gives rise to all dharmas, then, since the cause is undifferentiated, the dharmas produced ought likewise to be undifferentiated. If it is said that the sovereign lord first produces a single dharma, and thereafter, turning from that dharma, produces many more — then how could that single dharma be capable of producing many dharmas, since it too, like the sovereign lord itself, has but a single substance? Further, the dharmas produced ought likewise to be permanent, since a fruit resembles its cause. Further, the substance of the sovereign lord itself ought to be incapable of producing anything at all, since its substance is permanent, just like empty space.

Whoever holds this view — that whatever every person or individual experiences is entirely without cause and without condition — this is a wrong view that denies causation, to be abandoned by seeing origin. That it is a wrong view that denies causation reveals its intrinsic nature; that it is to be abandoned by seeing origin reveals its antidote, explained at length as before. What gives rise to it? It means that there are ascetics who observe that, in the world, the form of cause and effect is not always alike, and that, when people strive and seek something, it sometimes does not come to fruition, and so they deny that what is experienced has any cause or condition at all. Yet what is experienced is not without cause or condition — for it is directly observed that dharmas arise from causes and conditions, since not all dharmas arise all at once. If there were no cause or condition, everything ought to arise all at once, and every dharma ought to be undifferentiated. Since there is such differentiation, it is on this account that what is experienced is not without cause or condition.

Whoever holds this view — that one causes one's own suffering and pleasure, or that another causes it, or that both oneself and another together cause it — this is a wrong grasping at what is not a cause as if it were a cause, a grasping at precepts and vows, to be abandoned by seeing suffering. Whoever holds this view — that the suffering and pleasure one experiences is caused neither by oneself nor by another, but arises without any cause at all — this is a wrong view that denies causation, to be abandoned by seeing origin. That this is a wrong grasping at what is not a cause as if it were a cause, a grasping at precepts and vows, and that this is a wrong view that denies causation, reveals their intrinsic nature; that they are to be abandoned by seeing suffering and by seeing origin reveals their antidote, explained at length as before. What gives rise to it? It means that the incident of the naked ascetic Kāśyapa is what gives rise to this view. This naked Kāśyapa, when he was formerly a householder, had once been the leader of a merchant caravan, and repeatedly went out to sea to gather treasure. The first time he went out, he met with disaster at sea and, after great hardship, managed to escape; he then reflected: this disaster and hardship is of my own making, because, when I set out to sea, I did not bathe. On his second voyage, he therefore bathed himself before setting out; yet, once at sea, he again met with disaster and, after hardship as before, managed to return, and reflected: this disaster and hardship is caused by another, because, when I set out to sea, I did not offer sacrifice to the gods. On his third voyage, he therefore bathed himself and also offered sacrifice to the gods; yet, upon reaching the sea, he again met with disaster as before, and, though in distress, managed to escape, and reflected: such hardship is caused both by myself and by another — because, when I set out to sea, my bathing and sacrifice were not performed with sufficient earnestness. On his final voyage, he therefore bathed and offered sacrifice with the utmost earnestness before setting out to sea; yet, having set out, he again met with disaster, and, as before, barely managed to return, and reflected: this suffering I have met with is caused neither by myself nor by another, but is simply obtained without any cause at all. On account of this, he came to see the fault of remaining attached to household life, and went forth as a renunciant among the naked ascetics. Later, in Rājagṛha, he met the Buddha and asked him by whom suffering is caused; at that time the World-Honored One tamed him by means of the four modes of explanation. This is explained at length in the Sūtra of the Naked Ascetic Kāśyapa. Thus this incident is what gives rise to this view. As for why every one of the grasping-at-precepts-and-vows views spoken of above are said to be abandoned by seeing suffering: because they arise from the distortion of holding the self to be permanent, and operate within the domain of the fruit; although they are a case of grasping at what is not a cause as if it were a cause, they are nonetheless to be abandoned by seeing suffering. That is, grasping at precepts and vows is altogether of two kinds: first, grasping at what is not a cause as if it were a cause; and second, grasping at what is not the path as if it were the path. Grasping at what is not a cause as if it were a cause is, in turn, of two kinds: first, that which arises from delusion about the self one grasps at as permanent; and second, that which arises from delusion about the ascetic practices one performed in a former life. The former, arising from the distortion of holding the self to be permanent, also operates within the domain of the fruit; following upon these two distortions, it is to be abandoned by seeing suffering, since it operates only within the domain of the fruit thereafter, the characteristic of the fruit being coarse and manifest and easily perceived, and grasping at a cause as if it were a cause not being altogether erroneous —

and because it is deluded about the characteristic of the fruit, it too is to be abandoned by seeing suffering. Grasping at what is not the path as if it were the path is likewise of two kinds: first, grasping at contaminated precepts and the like as the path;

since this arises from delusion about a coarse and manifest characteristic of the fruit, it is thereupon permanently cut off at the moment of seeing the truth of suffering. Second, grasping at the wrong view that denies the truth of the path, and the like, as the path itself. Since this directly opposes the path, and is deluded and attached without distinguishing the characteristics of cause and effect, it is only cut off at the moment of seeing the path. As for the moment of denying the truths of origin and cessation: since one has already dismissed the very dharma-characteristics that are to be abandoned and to be realized, grasping at this denial itself as the path would be of no use, since the path is necessarily established in dependence on the dharmas to be abandoned and to be realized. Further, what one has thereby dismissed is distinct from the path, and there can be no case of grasping it as the path immediately thereafter; if, at some later time, one does grasp it as the path, this grasping of the path necessarily arises only within the domain of the fruit, and is thereupon cut off at the moment of seeing the truth of suffering. It is for this reason that grasping at precepts and vows is not to be abandoned by seeing origin or cessation. As for grasping at mere views: since what it grasps at has no counterpart to depend upon, but simply grasps at something as supreme, and every wrong view can subsequently come to be present in this way, it extends through all four categories. What is spoken of here as grasping at precepts and vows, however, is solely a case of grasping at what is not a cause as if it were a cause, and is therefore to be abandoned by seeing suffering alone.

Whoever holds this view — that the self and the world are permanent, everlasting, firm, abiding, unchanging dharmas, presently and permanently abiding — this is a view of extremism subsumed under eternalism, to be abandoned by seeing suffering. That this view of extremism is subsumed under eternalism reveals its intrinsic nature; that it is to be abandoned by seeing suffering reveals its antidote, explained at length as before. What gives rise to it? It means that there are ascetics who give rise to this view either through incorrect reasoning, or through attaining concentration, or through evil companions, as should be understood as explained before. Yet what they grasp at as the self and the world are neither of them permanent, since a real self and what belongs to a real self are nowhere to be found; it is directly observed that all sentient beings, the world of beings and the world of vessels, and all things undergo change, since they arise from causes and conditions, and whatever has arisen —

will inevitably undergo cessation and destruction; one ought not to grasp at the self and the world as permanent, everlasting, firm, and the rest — every word of which expresses the meaning of permanence. Whoever holds this view — that 'because it is true, and because it abides, the self exists as self' — this view of extremism is subsumed under eternalism, to be abandoned by seeing suffering. 'Because it is true' means because it is a real meaning; 'because it abides' means because it is simply so by nature; 'the self exists as self' means that the self exists eternally. That this view of extremism is subsumed under eternalism reveals its intrinsic nature; that it is to be abandoned by seeing suffering reveals its antidote, explained at length as before. What gives rise to it? It means that there are ascetics who give rise to this view either through incorrect reasoning, and so on, as stated at length. Whoever holds this view — that 'because it is true, and because it abides, the self is without self' — this view of extremism is subsumed under annihilationism, to be abandoned by seeing suffering; 'because it is true, and because it abides' is as explained before; 'the self is without self' means that the self will one day cease to exist. Question: the true Dharma likewise teaches non-self, yet this is not called an evil view — these ascetics also teach non-self; why, then, is theirs called an evil view? Answer: the true Dharma, within the cluster of formations that are empty of self, sees them as empty and without self and so speaks of non-self, and this is therefore not an evil view; these ascetics, within that very cluster of formations empty of self, falsely suppose there to be a self, and merely claim that this self will, in the future, cease to exist — it is for this reason that theirs is an evil view. That this view of extremism is subsumed under annihilationism reveals its intrinsic nature; that it is to be abandoned by seeing suffering reveals its antidote, explained at length as before. What gives rise to it? It means that there are ascetics who give rise to this view either through incorrect reasoning, and so on, as stated at length. Whoever holds this view — that 'the self observes the self; the eye and visible form are precisely the self' — this is the view of a real self, to be abandoned by seeing suffering. 'The self observes the self' means that these ascetics grasp at the self as pervading both internal and external dharmas, and so, when the eye sees visible form, they hold that the self observes the self, since both the eye-faculty and visible form are precisely the self. Whoever holds this view — that 'the self observes non-self; the eye is precisely the self, and visible form is its accoutrement' — this too is the view of a real self, to be abandoned by seeing suffering. 'The self observes non-self' means that these ascetics, since the eye is unshared with others and is an internal dharma, grasp at it as the self, while visible form, being the opposite of this, is merely the self's accoutrement; and so, when the eye sees visible form, they hold that the self observes what is non-self. Whoever holds this view — that 'non-self observes the self; visible form is precisely the self, and the eye is its accoutrement' — this too is the view of a real self, to be abandoned by seeing suffering. 'Non-self observes the self' means that these ascetics, observing directly in the world that the great earth and the various mountains remain unchanged over long ages, hold that this accords with the principle of a self and so grasp at it as the self, while the eye, being the opposite of this, is merely an accoutrement; and so, when the eye sees visible form, they hold that non-self observes the self. Question: why is 'non-self observes non-self' not spoken of? Answer: because no dharma whatsoever truly has a self; if one were to say 'non-self observes non-self,' this would simply be right view, and it is for this reason that it is not spoken of here. Question: if there are ascetics who grasp at the ear, sound, and the like as the self, and nothing else — then, when the eye sees visible form, would their saying 'non-self observes non-self' not itself be right view? Answer: their grasping at the ear, sound, and the like as the self is indeed an evil view; yet, if they say 'non-self observes non-self' with regard to the eye and visible form, this is indeed right view, and it is for this reason that it is not spoken of here. That every one of these is the view of a real self reveals its intrinsic nature; that each is to be abandoned by seeing suffering reveals its antidote, explained at length as before, and the distinctions in what gives rise to them should likewise be understood as explained before.

Whoever holds this view — that 'this is the self, this is the being, the life-force, the born one, the nurtured one, the individual, the mentally-born one, the young man, the doer, the causer of doing, the arisen one, the equally-arisen one, the originator, the equal-originator, the speaker, the perceiver, the experiencer' — that it has never not existed, and will never not exist, that it performs good and evil deeds in this place and that, and undergoes their fruits of ripened retribution in this place and that, relinquishing this set of aggregates and continuing on into another — this is a view of extremism subsumed under eternalism, to be abandoned by seeing suffering. That this view of extremism is subsumed under eternalism reveals its intrinsic nature; that it is to be abandoned by seeing suffering reveals its antidote, explained at length as before, and the distinctions in what gives rise to it should likewise be understood as explained before. Question: what is the difference between the earlier eternalist doctrine spoken of and this one spoken of here? Some say: the earlier one depends on concentration, while this one depends on reasoning. Some say: the earlier one belongs to the teacher, while this one belongs to the disciple. Some say: the earlier one belongs to the preceptor, while this one belongs to the resident pupil. Some say: the earlier one belongs to one held in reverence, while this one belongs to a student. Some say —

the earlier one is both the realizer and the one who states it, while this one is the realizer but not the one who states it. Whoever holds this view — that enjoying the excellent five sense-pleasures constitutes attaining the foremost nirvāṇa in this very life — this is a grasping at an inferior dharma as supreme, a grasping at views, to be abandoned by seeing suffering. Whoever holds this view — that entering and dwelling fully in the first dhyāna, secluded from desires and unwholesome dharmas, accompanied by applied and sustained thought, born of seclusion, with joy and pleasure, constitutes attaining the foremost nirvāṇa in this very life; that entering and dwelling fully in the second dhyāna, with applied and sustained thought stilled, with inner clarity and one-pointedness of mind, without applied or sustained thought, born of concentration, with joy and pleasure, constitutes attaining the foremost nirvāṇa in this very life; that abiding in equanimity apart from joy, with mindfulness and clear comprehension, experiencing pleasure in the body —

that which the noble ones describe as dwelling with equanimity, mindfulness, and pleasure, entering and dwelling fully in the third dhyāna, constitutes attaining the foremost nirvāṇa in this very life; that abandoning pleasure and abandoning pain, joy and sorrow having already vanished, entering and dwelling fully in the fourth dhyāna, neither painful nor pleasant, with equanimity and mindfulness purified, constitutes attaining the foremost nirvāṇa in this very life — this is a grasping at an inferior dharma as supreme, a grasping at views, to be abandoned by seeing suffering. 'Enjoying the excellent five sense-pleasures' means humans and gods of the desire realm — some say it means the gods of the desire realm alone, since their five sense-pleasures are of the most excellent and superior kind. 'Nirvāṇa in this very life' means the nirvāṇa attained within one's present body.

Question: why does this constitute grasping at views? Answer: the five excellent sense-pleasures are tainted, impure, poisonous, and turbid — they are an inferior dharma; these ascetics equate them with the bliss of renunciation and the like, or with the bliss of nirvāṇa, and it is for this reason that it constitutes grasping at views. Question: entering and dwelling fully in the four dhyānas is a superior merit — why, then, is grasping at this as nirvāṇa in this very life also called grasping at views? Answer: mundane dhyāna is tainted, impure, poisonous, and turbid — it too is an inferior dharma; these ascetics equate it with the bliss of freedom from taint and impurity, or with the bliss of nirvāṇa, and it is for this reason that it constitutes grasping at views. Question: there are also ascetics who grasp at the formless attainments as nirvāṇa — why is this not spoken of here? Answer: most of these ascetics grasp at dhyāna as nirvāṇa, and few grasp at the formless attainments; here the treatise speaks in terms of the majority, and so no fault follows. Furthermore, these ascetics grasp at the formless attainments as the ultimate nirvāṇa, whereas what is spoken of here is nirvāṇa in this very life, and it is for this reason that they are not mentioned. Furthermore, the four fundamental dhyānas are subsumed under the path of pleasure, and so these ascetics reckon them as nirvāṇa in this very life, whereas the four formless attainments are subsumed under the path of suffering, and so they do not grasp at them as nirvāṇa in this very life. Furthermore, the formless attainments are subtle, and these ascetics do not penetrate them, fearing deeply that they amount to utter annihilation, and it is for this reason that they are not spoken of as nirvāṇa in this very life — it is on these grounds that the formless is not mentioned here. That this is a grasping at an inferior dharma as supreme reveals its intrinsic nature as grasping at views; that it is to be abandoned by seeing suffering reveals its antidote, explained at length as before. What gives rise to it? It means that there are ascetics who, hearing that nirvāṇa is a supreme and excellent bliss, then hold that whoever attains the bliss of the five grounds of the desire and form realms has thereby already attained nirvāṇa in this very life, and so give rise to this view. Some say: these ascetics attain a mundane concentration and observe the beings within these five grounds experiencing pleasure, and then hold that they have thereby attained nirvāṇa in this very life, and so give rise to this view. Some say: these ascetics give rise to this view on account of association with evil companions. Question: why is this grasping at views to be abandoned by seeing suffering? Answer: because this view operates on the basis of the view of a real self, grasping that there is a real self-substance that experiences the bliss of nirvāṇa. Furthermore, this view operates within the domain of the fruit, grasping at a contaminated fruit as nirvāṇa. Furthermore, this view is deluded about the truth of suffering, taking a dharma of suffering to be pleasure — hence there are the nine kinds of conceit, and so on, as stated at length. Question: why is this treatise composed? Answer: in order to analyze the meaning of the sūtras — that is, the sūtras speak of nine kinds of conceit without analyzing them at length, and it is now, in order to analyze them, that this treatise is composed.

Question: this Nyāsa of Views ought only to analyze views — why, then, does it analyze the kinds of conceit? Answer: it has already been stated that within each and every aggregate, every dharma is spoken of; it is for this reason that within each and every Nyāsa, too, many dharmas are spoken of, and no fault follows. The Venerable Vasumitra explains: this Nyāsa chiefly analyzes the various evil views, but also analyzes what resembles an evil view — among every affliction, there is no affliction other than an evil view itself that nonetheless resembles an evil view, except for conceit.

It is for this reason that conceit too is analyzed here. The Venerable Bhadanta explains: because the various kinds of conceit depend on the view of a real self, being nurtured by that view of a real self, and arise in the present only subsequent to it, and, once one has seen the truths, they no longer arise — it is on this account that this Nyāsa chiefly analyzes views yet also analyzes conceit. The Venerable Buddhadeva explains: because views and conceit alike make it difficult for sentient beings to enter the Buddha's teaching, both are spoken of together.

That is, if sentient beings were without evil views and the various kinds of conceit, they would be able to take refuge in the Tathāgata's true Dharma, cultivate the holy life, escape the suffering of birth-and-death, and attain the bliss of nirvāṇa; but, because of views and conceit, they fail to take refuge in the Tathāgata's true Dharma and lose this supreme benefit. The Venerable Ghoṣa explains:

evil views and the kinds of conceit alike obstruct sentient beings from drawing near to good spiritual friends, hearing the true Dharma, and giving proper attention, and, since the fault of failing to practice in accordance with the Dharma is especially grave, both are spoken of together. As for 'I am superior' — this refers to holding oneself superior with respect to those who are one's equals, which is the excessive conceit arising in dependence on the view of a real self, since holding oneself superior with respect to one's equals is subsumed under excessive conceit. As for 'I am equal' — this refers to holding oneself equal with respect to those who are one's equals, which is the conceit arising in dependence on the view of a real self, since holding oneself equal with respect to one's equals, and being puffed up about it, is subsumed under conceit. As for 'I am inferior' — this refers to holding oneself inferior with respect to those who are superior, which is the humble conceit arising in dependence on the view of a real self, since holding oneself only slightly inferior with respect to those who are far superior is subsumed under humble conceit. As for 'there is one superior to me' — this means holding that another is superior to oneself, which is precisely holding oneself inferior with respect to a superior, the rest as explained before. As for 'there is one equal to me' — this means holding that another is equal to oneself, which is precisely holding oneself equal with respect to an equal, the rest as explained before. As for 'there is one inferior to me' — this means holding that another is inferior to oneself, which is precisely holding oneself superior with respect to an equal, the rest as explained before. As for 'there is none superior to me' — this means holding that no other is superior to oneself, which is precisely holding oneself equal with respect to an equal, the rest as explained before. As for 'there is none equal to me' — this means holding that no other is equal to oneself, which is precisely holding oneself superior with respect to an equal, the rest as explained before. As for 'there is none inferior to me' — this means holding that no other is inferior to oneself, which is precisely holding oneself inferior with respect to a superior, the rest as explained before. These nine kinds of conceit are subsumed under three of the seven kinds of conceit — namely, conceit, excessive conceit, and humble conceit; this is how the root treatise explains it. According to the Prakaraṇapāda, the class of 'I am superior' conceit itself subsumes three kinds of conceit: holding oneself superior with respect to an inferior is simply conceit; holding oneself superior with respect to an equal is excessive conceit; and holding oneself superior with respect to a superior is conceit-upon-excessive-conceit. The remaining eight kinds of conceit should be explained accordingly. All nine of these extend to being abandoned by both seeing and cultivation, yet this is not stated here — some say this is because it is a digression;

some say it is because these are not, in fact, similar to a view.

Whoever holds this view — that the wind does not itself blow, the river does not itself flow, fire does not itself burn, milk does not itself flow forth, conception does not itself occur, the sun and moon do not themselves rise and set, and that defilement and purity abide by their own nature, neither increasing nor decreasing — this is a view of extremism subsumed under eternalism, to be abandoned by seeing suffering. That this view of extremism is subsumed under eternalism reveals its intrinsic nature; that it is to be abandoned by seeing suffering reveals its antidote, explained at length as before. What gives rise to it? The Venerable Vasumitra explains: there are certain ascetics who, through incorrect reasoning, grasp at the existence of a real self, subtle, permanently abiding, and pervading every place, lying hidden and setting all dharmas in motion; and, when they observe the wind or a river blowing or flowing, they hold that this is the doing of the self — for these phenomena could not occur otherwise, just as one who sees a tree stirring knows this to be the doing of the wind, or one who sees the parts of a machine moving knows this to be the doing of a person. The Venerable Bhadanta explains: there are certain ascetics who, through evil reasoning, grasp at the existence of a real self, subtle, permanently abiding, and possessing a superior efficacy that transforms all dharmas; and, when they observe the wind or a river blowing or flowing, they hold that the self causes these to manifest in such a manner — just as, when a tree and the like sway, its shadow, too, is seen to sway, and, when a master of illusion speaks, the illusory body he has conjured speaks as well. Some say: these ascetics attain a mundane concentration and observe sentient beings wandering ceaselessly through the various destinies, and observe the wind and rivers being present or absent, depending on place and time, without any fixed certainty; they then hold that there is a self, subtle, permanently abiding, and possessing a superior efficacy, that causes the wind and rivers and the like to undergo their various transformations, whether being present or absent. Some say: these ascetics, associating with evil companions and following their teaching, give rise to this view.

'Beings grasp that the self acts' — and so on, as stated at length. This briefly explains the meaning of the verses in the sūtras that condemn evil views. As for grasping that the self is able to act and the like: this means grasping that there is a supreme self within the internal body, able to act, able to give rise to, and able to transform all things. As for grasping that another is able to act and the like: this means grasping that there is a supreme self within the external body, able to act, able to give rise to, and able to transform all things. To act means to produce a perpetually existing internal dharma; to give rise to means to produce a perpetually existing external dharma; to transform means to change into an internal or external dharma that is not perpetually existing. Furthermore, to act means to produce the dharmas of one's own body; to give rise to means to produce the dharmas of another's body; to transform means to change into the dharmas of non-sentient things. As for 'each holds his own single view, not the totality': this reveals that these various ascetics each grasp separately at one view, not at the totality of views. As for 'likened to an arrow, because an evil view is able to wound' — this reveals that the aspect of this evil view is fierce and sharp, and its wound reaches far, just like a poisoned arrow. These ascetics, blinded by ignorance, are unable to truly observe and know this fault; they should be made to see that this is an arrow, and so on, as stated at length — this urges them that they should regard an evil view as a true poisoned arrow. As for 'it takes aging, sickness, and death as its forerunners' — just as a poisoned arrow in the world draws forth manifold suffering, so too an evil view draws forth aging, sickness, and various other afflictions upon beings possessed of conceit, and so on, as stated at length — this reveals that those possessed of the seven kinds of conceit, being bound and attached by conceit, are mutually opposed in their views of annihilationism and eternalism, and are unable to cross beyond the boundless expanse of birth-and-death. The seven kinds of conceit are as explained above. 'Attached' means attached in a small degree; 'greatly attached' means attached in a large degree; 'attached everywhere' means attached in every degree — and 'bound' and the rest are likewise so. Question: what is the difference between 'attached' and 'bound'? Answer: the very names differ; furthermore, their meanings also differ — 'attached' means firmly clinging, in the sense of being difficult to wash away; 'bound' means being entangled, in the sense of being difficult to be freed from. Furthermore, 'attached' refers to the binding of conjunction, while 'bound' refers to the binding of the object — that is, the seven kinds of conceit possess both kinds of binding, and so are able to attach and bind those beings. Furthermore, 'attached' means attaching the mind, while 'bound' means binding the body — this is the distinction in meaning between binding and attachment. As for 'mutually opposed in their views of annihilationism and eternalism' — just as householders, bound and attached by craving, are mutually opposed over what they possess, so too renunciants, bound and attached by conceit, are mutually opposed in their views of annihilationism and eternalism. As for 'the boundless expanse of birth-and-death' — the ceaseless wandering through the various destinies and births is the meaning of birth-and-death; such birth-and-death has no discernible prior limit, and so cannot be known, yet, since it has a prior cause, it does have a later limit, since final nirvāṇa marks its final boundary. Furthermore, since the extent of birth-and-death is so vast and far-reaching that one cannot know when liberation will be attained, it is called boundless. 'What is attained and what is yet to be attained are both covered in dust' — and so on, as stated at length. This reveals that these ascetics, with respect to the aggregates, elements, and sense-fields already attained and yet to be attained, are covered by the dust of craving, aversion, and delusion, and so do not truly see the fault in the two extremes of conduct — painful austerity and pleasure-seeking. Because they do not see this, they either sink too deeply or run too swiftly: sinking means being too lax to make any progress, while running means being too hasty to ever reach the goal. The remaining meaning of the verse is explained fully in the treatise itself.

As the sūtra says: whatever śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas there are, each relying on his own conviction, give rise to various disputes, all of which fall into one of five categories. What are the five? First, grasping that the self, after death, possesses perception, and that this alone is true, everything else being foolish falsehood; second, grasping that the self, after death, is without perception; third, grasping that the self, after death, neither has nor lacks perception; fourth, grasping that the self, after death, is utterly extinguished; and fifth, teaching that there is nirvāṇa in this very life. These five are precisely reducible to three, and these three are precisely expandable into those five. That the five are reducible to three: the doctrines of possessing perception, lacking perception, and neither possessing nor lacking perception are precisely this eternalism; the doctrine of utter extinction is precisely this annihilationism; and the doctrine of nirvāṇa in this very life is precisely this grasping at views. That the three are expandable into the five: this eternalism is precisely those doctrines of possessing perception, lacking perception, and neither possessing nor lacking perception; this annihilationism is precisely that doctrine of utter extinction; and this grasping at views is precisely that doctrine of nirvāṇa in this very life.

Further, the Brahmajāla Sūtra teaches that the sixty-two evil view-tenets all have the view of a real self as their root. As for the sixty-two view-tenets: there are eighteen views constructed with reference to the prior limit, and forty-four views constructed with reference to the later limit. The eighteen views constructed with reference to the prior limit are: four doctrines of complete eternalism; four doctrines of partial eternalism; two doctrines of causeless arising; four doctrines concerning finitude and the like; and four doctrines of eel-wriggling equivocation regarding immortality. The forty-four views constructed with reference to the later limit are: sixteen doctrines of possessing perception; eight doctrines of lacking perception; eight doctrines of neither possessing nor lacking perception; seven doctrines of utter extinction; and five doctrines of nirvāṇa in this very life. Here, a constructed view arising with reference to the past is named a view constructed with reference to the prior limit; a constructed view arising with reference to the future is named a view constructed with reference to the later limit. A constructed view arising with reference to the present, however, is not fixed, being named sometimes a view of the prior limit and sometimes a view of the later limit, since the present is later than the future and earlier than the past — or rather, since the present is prior to the future and posterior to the past — or, put differently, since the future is the cause and the past is the fruit. Among the views constructed with reference to the prior limit, as for the four doctrines of complete eternalism: the first is that, by being able to recall one eon of dissolution and formation, or two, or three, up through eighty, one thereupon grasps that the self and the world are both permanent. Question: why do they make this grasping?

Answer: because they reckon it in terms of either transformation or concealment-and-manifestation. As for the doctrine of transformation: they grasp it in this way — milk transforms into curd, a seed transforms into a sprout,

firewood transforms into ash, and so on for every such kind; whatever continues on and exists is simply what has been transformed, since it is not that one dharma ceases and this other dharma arises — every dharma's own nature is permanently abiding. As for the doctrine of concealment and manifestation: they grasp it in this way — the intrinsic nature of dharmas is sometimes concealed, sometimes manifest. They observe that, in this very place, there formerly existed the great earth, continents, Mount Sumeru, the other mountains, the great ocean, the trees, and the rest, of such-and-such a form, appearance, and extent, which then perished, and that, later, in this very place, there again came to exist the great earth and the rest, of that very same form, appearance, and extent; they then reflect: whatever cannot be seen in between is not thereby destroyed in its nature — rather, at the time of the eon of dissolution, its nature merely lies hidden and concealed, and, upon reaching the eon of formation, its nature again becomes manifest. Further, since the seven bodies of a person are permanent, undergo no change, do not touch one another, and cannot have their life-force harmed, they reflect: both the self and what I recall are alike permanent; and, on this basis, they come to hold that the self and the world are both permanently abiding. The second: by being able to recall one birth, or two, or three, up through a hundred thousand births, one thereupon grasps that the self and the world are both permanent, reckoning it in terms of either transformation or concealment-and-manifestation. If they are able to recall the dissolution and formation of the external vessel-world — observing that, in this very place, there formerly existed the great earth, continents, and the rest, of such-and-such a form, appearance, and extent, as explained before, up through their life-force being unharmable — then it goes without saying that they grasp the world as permanent; and, thereupon, they reflect: both the self and what I recall are alike permanent; and, on this basis, they come to hold that the self and the world are both permanently abiding. Question: how does this differ in meaning from the first? Answer: in the former case, although one recalls many eons, one has not yet attained mastery in recalling every successive birth without interruption; in this case, although one recalls fewer births, one has already attained mastery in recalling every successive birth without interruption. The third: by means of the divine eye, one observes the continuity of the aggregates of sentient beings at the moment of death and of birth — that is, one observes that, immediately following the aggregates of the death-existence, the aggregates of the intermediate existence become manifest; one further observes that, immediately following the aggregates of the intermediate existence, the aggregates of the rebirth-existence become manifest; and one further observes that, immediately following the aggregates of the rebirth-existence, the aggregates of the proper-existence become manifest, the aggregates of the proper-existence continuing on, stage by stage, up until the death-existence — just like the flowing of water, or the continuity of a lamp's flame. Because one does not perceive the subtle moment-by-moment arising and ceasing, one then gives rise to a notion of permanence with respect to the aggregates, and thereupon grasps that the self and the world are both permanent, reckoning it in terms of either transformation or concealment-and-manifestation — just as a knife within its sheath, or a snake within its burrow, or a person within a darkened room, enters and emerges, being concealed and manifest in turn; and one thereupon reflects: both the self and what I have seen are alike permanent; and, on this basis, one comes to hold that the self and the world are both permanently abiding. The fourth: by means of reasoning that fails to know truly, one holds that the self and the world are both permanently abiding, reflecting: what exists is eternally existent, and what does not exist is eternally non-existent — what does not exist cannot arise, and what exists cannot cease; one thereby grasps that cause and effect, from beginningless time, have but a single nature, without cessation and without arising, and so this is subsumed under views constructed with reference to the prior limit. If one grasps matter as the self, then, observing that its visible form remains constantly similar, one grasps it as permanent; if one grasps mind and the like as the self, then, since mental dharmas arise without interruption, arise similarly, and arise constantly — being unable to perceive their subtle arising and ceasing, being able to recall past experiences, their prior and later activities resembling one another, and being unimpeded by others — one grasps them as permanent. It is through such vain reasoning as this that one grasps the self and the world as both permanently abiding. These four kinds of views constructed with reference to the prior limit, grasping at complete eternalism, arise on account of four matters — eons, births-and-deaths, and the arising of reasoning.

As for the four doctrines of partial eternalism: the first arises when one, having passed away from the Brahmā-world and been reborn here, attains the superknowledge of recollecting past abodes, and thereupon grasps: we are all created by the Great Brahmā King; Brahmā the creator, abiding there, is permanent, while we, being what he created, are impermanent. The second arises when one hears that Brahmā holds such a view and establishes such a doctrine — that the great elements are impermanent while mind is permanently abiding, or, the reverse of this, that mind is impermanent while the great elements are permanently abiding — and, being one who assents to this, whether abiding in the Brahmā-world or reborn here, or having heard this reasoning transmitted in turn, then grasps: I take the Great Brahmā King as my standard, and therefore the world is partly permanently abiding and partly impermanent.

The third arises when one, having formerly passed away from the Heaven of Play and Forgetfulness and been reborn here, attains the superknowledge of recollecting past abodes, and thereupon grasps: those gods in that heaven who do not indulge excessively in play and lose their mindfulness remain there permanently, whereas we, having formerly passed away from that place on account of excessive play and loss of mindfulness, are impermanent. The fourth arises when one, having formerly passed away from the Heaven of Mental Wrath and been reborn here, attains the superknowledge of recollecting past abodes, and thereupon grasps: those gods in that heaven who do not indulge excessively in mental wrath, glaring at one another with angry eyes, remain there permanently, whereas we, having formerly passed away from that place on account of excessive mutual wrath and angry glaring, are impermanent. Question: where do these various gods dwell? Some say: they dwell on the tiers of Mount Sumeru. Some say: they are the gods of the Heaven of the Thirty-Three. These four kinds of views constructed with reference to the prior limit, grasping at partial eternalism, arise on account of four matters — grasping at the Great Brahmā, the great elements, or mind, and play-and-forgetfulness or wrath.

As for the two doctrines of causeless arising: the first arises when one, having passed away from the heaven of the non-perceiving beings and been reborn here, attains the superknowledge of recollecting past abodes, and, although able to recall the mind that emerged from that non-perceiving state and every stage thereafter, is unable to recall any stage prior to that emerging mind; one then reflects: at that time I originally did not exist, and then arose — and, since all dharmas are like myself, they too must all originally not exist, and then arise. On this basis, one grasps that the self and the world all spontaneously arise without any cause at all. The second arises through vain reasoning and investigation: since one is able to recall, in this present body, every experience one underwent in a former body, if there really were experiences undergone by that former body, one ought likewise to be able to recall them in this present body; since one is unable to recall them, one thereby knows that no such former body exists. One further reflects: if beings were truly born in dependence on something, then that class of being ought necessarily to resemble what it depends on — just as a worm in curds comes to resemble curds, a worm in cow-dung comes to resemble cow-dung, a worm in a green leaf comes to resemble a green leaf, and a child born of father and mother comes to resemble his father and mother — yet it is not that the curds and the like are truly the cause of the worm and the like; and so one knows that every body, and every faculty, cognition, and wisdom, arises entirely without a cause. One further reflects: it is directly observed that peacocks, garuḍas, phoenixes, chickens, and the like, and mountains, rocks, grasses, trees, flowers, fruits, and thorns, and the like, differ in color and shape entirely without being brought about by any cause, but simply exist spontaneously; and so one says: who sharpened all the thorns? Who painted the birds and beasts? Who piled up the mountains and plains? Who carved out the ravines and valleys? Who further engraved the grasses, trees, flowers, and fruits? All of this alike comes about without any cause at all, there being no sovereign lord who fashions the world; on this basis, one grasps that the self and the world arise entirely without cause, existing simply of themselves. These two kinds of views constructed with reference to the prior limit, doctrines of causeless arising, arise on account of two matters — the heaven of non-perception, and vain reasoning.

As for the four doctrines concerning finitude and the like: the first arises when, by means of the divine eye, one sees, below, only as far as the Avīci hell, and, above, only as far as the heaven of the first dhyāna;

one grasps that the self entirely and completely pervades this range, and reflects: if there were any further self or world beyond this, I ought likewise to see it; since I do not see any further than this, I know that there is none. On this basis, one grasps that the self and the world are both finite — this is the sense in which both are held to be limited.

The second arises when, in dependence on a superior dhyāna, one gives rise to a purified divine eye and sees laterally without limit, grasping that the self entirely and completely pervades this range; on this basis, one grasps that the self and the world are both infinite — this is the sense in which both are held to be unlimited. The third arises through both the divine eye and the superknowledge of supernormal locomotion: by the divine eye one sees, below, only as far as the Avīci hell, and, above, only as far as the heaven of the first dhyāna; by the superknowledge of supernormal locomotion one moves one's body laterally without reaching any limit; one thereupon gives rise to a notion of finitude with respect to above and below, and a notion of infinitude with respect to the world laterally, grasping that the self entirely and completely pervades this range; on this basis, one grasps that the self and the world are both finite and infinite — this is the sense in which both are held to be, at once, limited and unlimited. The fourth, neither finite nor infinite, is precisely a rejection of the third position, in favor of this fourth one: one reflects that neither the self nor the world can be definitively said to be finite, nor definitively said to be infinite, and yet both truly exist. Some further say: observing that the world is laterally without limit, one grasps that the self and the world are both not finite; observing that the world is vertically limited, one grasps that the self and the world are both not infinite — though without any fixed certainty, one nonetheless holds that a self truly exists. Others further say: one grasps that the substance of the self can either expand or contract, and so cannot be fixedly described — since, when expanded, it is without limit, one says it is not finite; and since, when contracted, it is limited, one says it is not infinite. Question: since these four doctrines all take the present as their object, how can they be said to be constructed with reference to the prior limit? Answer: because they also anticipate the future, they too bear the name of the prior limit. Others further say: because these four are established through recollecting the eons of formation and dissolution, all of them can be said to be constructed with reference to the prior limit — that is, the first doctrine arises from recollecting a past eon of formation, when the self and the world were vertically limited, and so gives rise to a notion of finitude; the second doctrine arises from recollecting a past eon of formation, when the self and the world were laterally without limit, and so gives rise to a notion of infinitude; the third doctrine arises from recollecting a past eon of formation, when the self and the world were vertically limited and laterally without limit, giving rise to a notion of being both finite and infinite; and the fourth doctrine arises from recollecting a past eon of dissolution, when the self and the world, although their extent — narrow or broad — could not be determined, nonetheless truly existed, giving rise to a notion of being neither finite nor infinite. Some say: grasping at finitude is precisely annihilationism; grasping at infinitude is precisely eternalism; grasping at being both finite and infinite is precisely partial annihilationism and partial eternalism; and grasping at being neither finite nor infinite is precisely the mere arising of the view of a real self. These four kinds of views constructed with reference to the prior limit, doctrines concerning finitude and the like, arise, in accordance with what was explained before, chiefly on account of four matters.

As for the four doctrines of eel-wriggling equivocation regarding immortality: 'immortal' here refers to a certain god — since that god's lifespan is so long, these ascetics grasp it as permanently abiding and immortal. There are certain ascetics who seek to be reborn in that heaven, and, hearing the doctrine of other ascetics, say as follows: if one is able to answer, without confusion, questions concerning that immortal god, one attains rebirth in that heaven; if one is unable to answer, without confusion, questions concerning that immortal god, then there is no possibility of attaining that rebirth. Yet being without confusion is of two kinds —

first, having a definite position with distinctions; and second, having no definite position and no distinctions. Those with true insight have no definite position and no distinctions, since they have nothing to depend upon; those without true insight have a definite position and distinctions, since they have something to depend upon. These ascetics, faced with unconfused questions concerning the immortal god, resort to equivocal, eel-wriggling speech. The first reflects: I do not truly know what is wholesome, what is unwholesome, or the four noble truths; yet there are other śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas who seek true knowledge of such matters — if they should question me on such matters, and I were to answer their question with a definite reply, this would amount to false speech, and, on account of that false speech, I would fail to attain rebirth in that heaven. Fearing false speech, he therefore resorts to equivocal, eel-wriggling speech when faced with unconfused questions concerning the immortal god, saying as follows: I ought not to divulge everything concerning the secret matters of the gods, whether what I myself have realized, or the path of purity. The second reflects: I do not truly know what is wholesome, what is unwholesome, or the four noble truths; yet there are other śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas who seek true knowledge of such matters — if they should question me on such matters, and I were to deny the very meaning of their question, this would amount to a wrong view, and, on account of that wrong view, I would fail to attain rebirth in that heaven. Fearing a wrong view, he therefore resorts to equivocal, eel-wriggling speech when faced with unconfused questions concerning the immortal god — the rest as explained before. The third reflects: I do not truly know what is wholesome, what is unwholesome, or the four noble truths; yet there are other śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas who seek true knowledge of such matters — if they should question me on such matters, and I were not to truthfully confirm their question, they might press me further, and I would then be at a loss, and, on account of that ignorance, I would fail to attain rebirth in that heaven. Fearing this ignorance, he therefore resorts to equivocal, eel-wriggling speech when faced with unconfused questions concerning the immortal god — the rest as explained before. The fourth reflects: my nature is dull and inferior, and I am incapable of contriving equivocal, eel-wriggling words at all. He further reflects: to commit to a fixed position outright is not excellent, since committing outright never accords with the minds of every sentient being alike, and, if I go against the mind of another, I would then fail to attain rebirth in that heaven — therefore I ought to rely on a principle that opposes no one. If someone asks me whether there is a future life, I should turn the question back on him, asking: what is it that you yourself desire? If he says he desires that there is one, I should then confirm his statement, saying: I too allow that there is a future life. In just the same way, whether the question concerns non-existence, both existence and non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence, or whether it is so, or not so, or is different, or is not different, I should in every case turn the question back and, according to whatever the questioner himself desires, confirm it accordingly. He further reflects: my nature is foolish and deluded, and, if I were to openly oppose another, he would then take offense at me. Fearing this foolishness, he therefore resorts to equivocal, eel-wriggling speech when faced with any unconfused questions concerning the immortal god —

resorting to equivocal, eel-wriggling speech. Question: under which view are these four kinds subsumed? Answer: since all four give rise to a notion of immortality with respect to that god, they are all subsumed under eternalism;

reckoning that answering the questions of others in this way serves as the cause of rebirth in that heaven, this is a grasping at precepts and vows. Question: how, then, can these four be said to be constructed with reference to the prior limit? Answer: although these four all operate with respect to a present matter, since they anticipate the future, they too bear the name of the prior limit. Others further say: these four all take as their object a teaching heard previously — that is, these ascetics, having formerly heard the authoritative teaching stated by their own master, hold that it is necessarily by answering the questions of others in this way that one is reborn in the immortal heaven, and that this immortal heaven is necessarily obtained precisely through answering questions in this way; it is for this reason that these four kinds are all subsumed under views constructed with reference to the prior limit. These four kinds of views constructed with reference to the prior limit, the eel-wriggling equivocation regarding immortality, arise on account of the matters of fearing false speech, fearing wrong view, fearing ignorance, and being dull and foolish.