The Middle Way

[Views Aggregate, Chapter Eight, Nyāsa of Views, Part Three of Part Five — 見蘊第八中見納息第五之三.] As for the sixteen doctrines of possessing perception among the views constructed with reference to the later limit: the first four kinds are established on the basis of three views. As it is said, one kind of individual gives rise to this view and establishes this doctrine: the life-force is identical with the body. Another kind of individual gives rise to this view and establishes this doctrine: the life-force is distinct from the body. Yet another kind of individual gives rise to this view and establishes this doctrine: this is, altogether, the self — pervading everywhere, without duality, without differentiation, without deficiency. On the basis of the first view is established the first doctrine: the self, possessing form, possesses perception after death. That is, these ascetics grasp at matter as the self, and grasp at the remaining four aggregates as belonging to the self; the self they grasp at has matter as its intrinsic nature,

and it is hence named possessing form. Grasping at the characteristics of dharmas is called perception; this self, possessing form, possesses that perception, and it is hence named possessing perception. Since they grasp at the four aggregates as belonging to the self, they reflect: this self, possessing form, possesses perception after death. This holds throughout the desire realm and a portion of the form realm, excepting the heaven of non-perception; for those who allow that even the formless realm possesses form, this also holds in the first three formless spheres — since it possesses perception, it does not hold in the final one. On the basis of the second view is established the second doctrine: the self, without form, possesses perception after death. That is, these ascetics grasp at the formless as the self, and grasp at matter, or the remaining four aggregates, as belonging to the self — that is, if they exclude perception, they grasp at the remaining three aggregates, whether collectively or individually, as the self, and thereupon grasp at the aggregates of perception and matter as belonging to the self; if they grasp at the aggregate of perception as the self, they thereupon grasp at the remaining aggregates as belonging to the self. The self they grasp at has the formless as its intrinsic nature, and it is hence named without form. Grasping at the characteristics of dharmas is called perception; this formless self either has perception as its intrinsic nature, or has the function of perception and so is named possessing perception, or possesses that perception and so is named possessing perception. Since they grasp at the aggregate of perception as belonging to the self, they reflect: this formless self possesses perception after death. This holds from the desire realm up through the sphere of nothingness, excepting the heaven of non-perception. On the basis of the third view is established the third doctrine: the self, both possessing form and formless, possesses perception after death. That is, these ascetics — such as the truth-speaking ascetics and the like — grasp at both matter and the formless as the self, giving rise to a single notion of self with respect to the five aggregates altogether, since, upon separately analyzing each of the aggregates individually, no real self is to be found — just as, upon separately analyzing sweet, sour, salty, pungent, and bland, no single, real, unified flavor is to be found. Having given rise to a single notion with respect to the aggregates, they then altogether grasp at it as the self; the self they grasp at has both matter and the formless as its intrinsic nature, and it is hence named both possessing form and formless. Grasping at the characteristics of dharmas is

called perception; this self, both possessing form and formless, either has perception as its intrinsic nature, or has the function of perception and so is named possessing perception, or possesses that perception and so is named possessing perception. Since they grasp at the aggregates of their own body as the self, and grasp at the aggregates of another's body as belonging to the self — there are further ascetics who, having seen the fault in the view of the self as possessing form, then rely instead on the formless self, and, having seen the fault in the view of the formless self, then rely once again on the self as possessing form; these ascetics, not having cut off their view of a self, though they grasp at a self, are not fixed in their position, saying that the self they grasp at is solely one possessing form, or solely formless — and yet they reflect that this self, both possessing form and formless, possesses perception after death, holding throughout the desire realm entirely and accordingly, and so on, as stated at length. The fourth doctrine — the self, neither possessing form nor formless, possesses perception after death — is precisely a rejection of the third position, with no separate view to depend on: they reflect that, although the self truly exists, it cannot be definitively said to be both possessing form and formless, since holding the real self to be definitively both possessing form and formless carries a fault in either respect, and so they say: this self, neither possessing form nor formless, possesses perception after death — the rest as explained before. All four of these kinds can arise either through reasoning or through meditative attainment. As for the doctrine that the finite self possesses perception after death: if one grasps at matter as the self, the self one grasps at has a limited extent — either within the mind, blazing with light the size of a finger-joint, or within the body, matching the body's own shape, radiant within and without — as it is said, my self's form is dignified, blazing with light, and supremely pure; how could the Venerable Gautama teach non-self? If one grasps at what is non-material as the self, the self one grasps at likewise has a limited extent, since the basis and object of a non-material dharma have a limited extent, and so it too is called finite. This is grasped through reasoning; if this grasping arises through meditative attainment, one must not yet have attained the totality-device concentration. Both of these kinds alike reflect: my self is certainly finite and possesses perception after death — this holds throughout the desire realm and a portion of the form realm, excepting the heaven of non-perception; for those who allow that even the formless realm possesses form, this also holds in the first three formless spheres. As for the doctrine that the infinite self possesses perception after death: if one grasps at matter as the self, the self one grasps at pervades every place — as the Veda says, there is a self, a person, whose extent is vast, whose limit is difficult to fathom, whose light and color are like the sun, whom those in darkness, though standing before it, are unable to see; one must know this self before one can cross beyond birth, aging, sickness, and death, there being no other principle of crossing beyond apart from this. And, as it is further said, the earth is precisely the self, and the self is precisely the earth, its extent without limit. If one grasps at the formless as the self, one reflects: just as, without touching fire, one can never be burned, and, without touching a blade, one can never be cut, and, without touching water, one can never be moistened, so too, whatever does not touch the self can never take on an infinite extent. This is grasped through reasoning; if this grasping arises through meditative attainment, one must already have attained the totality-device concentration. Both of these kinds alike reflect:

my self is certainly infinite and possesses perception after death — this holds throughout the desire realm entirely, and accordingly, and so on, as stated at length. As for the doctrine that the self, both finite and infinite, possesses perception after death: if one grasps at matter as the self, the self one grasps at, following the body it depends on, either contracts or expands, its extent not fixed; one reflects: if the body has a fixed measure, the self is finite; if the body has no fixed measure, the self is infinite. If one grasps at the formless as the self, one reflects: if it follows a basis and object that has a fixed measure, the self is finite; if it follows a basis and object that has no fixed measure, the self is infinite. Both of these kinds alike reflect: my self, both finite and infinite, possesses perception after death.

This holds throughout the desire realm entirely, and accordingly, and so on, as stated at length. As for the doctrine that the self, neither finite nor infinite, possesses perception after death: this is precisely a rejection of the third position, in favor of this fourth one — the three modes of explanation are to be understood as before. All four of these kinds can arise either through reasoning or through meditative attainment.

On the basis of distinctions in perception and feeling, they further say: the self has a single perception; the self has various perceptions; the self has a slight perception; the self has an immeasurable perception; the self has only pleasure; the self has only pain; the self has both pain and pleasure; the self has neither pain nor pleasure, and possesses perception after death. Here, 'the self has a single perception' means the self as it exists in the first three formless spheres, since its various perceptions operate through a single mode, and so it is named a single perception. 'The self has various perceptions' means —

the self as it exists in the desire and form realms, excepting the heaven of non-perception, since its various perceptions operate through six or four modes and take various objects as their sphere, and so it is named various perceptions. For those relying on reasoning, the self likewise admits of this distinction: one who possesses a single kind of skilled knowledge is named as having a single perception, while one who possesses various kinds of skilled knowledge is named as having various perceptions. 'The self has a slight perception' means grasping at a slight amount of matter as the self, or grasping at a slight amount of the formless as the self. If one grasps at a slight amount of matter as the self, the self one grasps at has a narrow, small extent, such as the size of a finger-joint, and one grasps at the perception belonging to that self as slight, since it depends on a small body and takes a small sphere as its object, and is hence called a slight perception; the self, combined with that perception, is named as having a slight perception. This holds throughout the desire realm and a portion of the form realm, excepting the heaven of non-perception; for those who allow that even the formless realm possesses form, this also holds in the first three formless spheres. If one grasps at a slight amount of the formless as the self, one either grasps at feeling as the self and perception as belonging to the self — this perception, depending on a small body and taking a small sphere as its object, is called a slight perception, and the self, combined with that perception, is named as having a slight perception — or one grasps at formations as the self, or grasps at consciousness as the self, explained at length in the same way. If one grasps at perception itself as the self, that perception, depending on a small body and taking a small sphere as its object, is called a slight perception, and, since one grasps at this slight perception as the very nature of the self, or as having the function of perception, one is named as having a slight perception. This holds from the desire realm up through the sphere of nothingness, excepting the heaven of non-perception.

'The self has an immeasurable perception' means grasping at immeasurable matter as the self, or grasping at the immeasurable formless as the self. If one grasps at immeasurable matter as the self, the self one grasps at pervades every place, and one grasps at the perception belonging to that self as immeasurable, since it depends on an immeasurable body and takes an immeasurable sphere as its object, and is hence called an immeasurable perception; the self, combined with that perception, is named as having an immeasurable perception. This holds throughout the desire realm and a portion of the form realm, excepting the heaven of non-perception;

for those who allow that even the formless realm possesses form, this also holds in the first three formless spheres. If one grasps at the immeasurable formless as the self, one either grasps at feeling as the self and perception as belonging to the self — this perception, depending on an immeasurable body and taking an immeasurable sphere as its object, is called an immeasurable perception, and the self, combined with that perception, is named as having an immeasurable perception — or one grasps at formations as the self, or grasps at consciousness as the self, explained at length in the same way. If one grasps at perception itself as the self, that perception, depending on an immeasurable body and taking an immeasurable sphere as its object, is called an immeasurable perception, and, since one grasps at this immeasurable perception as the very nature of the self, or as having the function of perception, one is named as having an immeasurable perception. This holds from the desire realm up through the sphere of nothingness, excepting the heaven of non-perception. All four of these kinds can arise either through reasoning or through meditative attainment. 'The self has only pleasure' means the self as it exists in the first three dhyānas — those who have attained concentration, by means of the divine eye, observe that the first three dhyānas constantly experience pleasure, and, having later passed away from that state and been reborn here, then reflect: my self has only pleasure. Those who rely on reasoning observe that beings are, at every time, joined with the requisites of pleasure, and then reflect: my self has only pleasure — and this holds likewise for the other world as for this one. 'The self has only pain' means the self as it exists in the hells — those who have attained concentration, by means of the divine eye, observe that beings in the hells constantly experience pain, and, having later passed away from that state and been reborn here, then reflect: my self has only pain. Those who rely on reasoning observe that beings are, at every time, joined with the requisites of pain, and then reflect: my self has only pain — and this holds likewise for the other world as for this one. 'The self has both pain and pleasure' means the self as it exists among animals, hungry ghosts, humans, and the gods of the desire realm — those who have attained concentration, by means of the divine eye, observe that those beings experience a mixture of pain and pleasure, and, having later passed away from that state and been reborn here, then reflect: my self has both pain and pleasure. Those who rely on reasoning observe that beings are, at times, joined with the requisites of pain, and, at other times, joined with the requisites of pleasure, and then reflect: my self has both pain and pleasure — and this holds likewise for the other world as for this one. 'The self has neither pain nor pleasure' means the self as it exists in the fourth dhyāna up through the sphere of nothingness — those who have attained concentration know that those beings have neither pain nor pleasure, and, having later passed away from that state and been reborn here, then reflect: my self has neither pain nor pleasure. Those who rely on reasoning reflect: my own self is permanent, operating without clarity; although it may be conjoined temporarily with pain or pleasure, these are but guests, and my self does not truly possess them. These sixteen kinds constitute the doctrines of possessing perception among the views constructed with reference to the later limit, arising, as explained above, on account of sixteen matters. Eight doctrines of lacking perception: that is, four concerning form and the rest, and four concerning finitude and the rest. As for the four concerning form and the rest: the first is grasping that the self, possessing form, lacks perception after death — that is, these ascetics grasp at matter as the self, having attained the concentration of non-perception, and observe others attaining that concentration and being reborn in the heaven of the non-perceiving beings; they then reflect: my self, possessing form, will lack perception after death, since, upon being reborn in the heaven of the non-perceiving beings, perception will not arise. Those who rely on reasoning grasp at matter as the self, and, observing cases of epileptic seizure, deep sleep, or fainting, where one is afflicted by painful feeling and seems entirely without perception, then reflect: although my self possesses form, it lacks perception, and this holds likewise for the other world as for this one. The second is grasping that the self, formless, lacks perception after death — that is, these ascetics grasp at the life-faculty as the self, having attained the concentration of non-perception, and observe others attaining that concentration and being reborn in the heaven of the non-perceiving beings; they then reflect: my self, formless, will lack perception after death, since, upon being reborn in the heaven of the non-perceiving beings, perception will not arise. Those who rely on reasoning grasp at the life-faculty as the self, and, observing cases of epileptic seizure, deep sleep, or fainting, where one is afflicted by painful feeling and seems entirely without perception, then reflect: my self, formless, likewise lacks perception, and this holds likewise for the other world as for this one. Those who rely on reasoning may also, excluding perception, grasp at the remaining three aggregates as the self, and can likewise grasp that the self, formless, lacks perception after death.

The third is grasping that the self, both possessing form and formless, lacks perception after death — that is, these ascetics grasp at matter and the life-faculty as the self, giving rise to a single notion of self with respect to these two, since, upon separately analyzing each of these two individually, no real self is to be found — just as, upon separately analyzing sweet and the rest, no single, unified flavor is to be found. Having grasped at these two as a single self, they attain the concentration of non-perception, and observe others attaining that concentration and being reborn in the heaven of the non-perceiving beings; they then reflect: my self, both possessing form and formless, will lack perception after death, since, upon being reborn in the heaven of the non-perceiving beings,

perception will not arise. Those who rely on reasoning grasp at matter and the life-faculty as the self, and, observing cases of epileptic seizure, deep sleep, or fainting, where one is afflicted by painful feeling and seems entirely without perception, then reflect: my self, both possessing form and formless, is entirely without perception, and this holds likewise for the other world as for this one. Those who rely on reasoning may also, excluding perception, grasp at the remaining four aggregates as the self, and can likewise grasp that the self, both possessing form and formless, lacks perception after death.

The fourth is grasping that the self, neither possessing form nor formless, lacks perception after death — this is precisely a rejection of the third position, in favor of this fourth one; the three modes of explanation are to be understood as before. As for the four concerning finitude and the rest: the first is grasping that the finite self lacks perception after death — that is, if one grasps at matter as the self, the self one grasps at has a narrow, small extent, such as the size of a finger-joint; if one grasps at the formless as the self, one grasps at the life-faculty as the self, pervading throughout the body and matching its shape. Having grasped in this way, one attains the concentration of non-perception, and observes others attaining that concentration and being reborn in the heaven of the non-perceiving beings; one then reflects: my finite self will lack perception after death, since, upon being reborn in the heaven of the non-perceiving beings, perception will not arise. Those who rely on reasoning likewise grasp at that as the self, observing cases of epileptic seizure, and accordingly, as explained at length before. The second is grasping that the infinite self lacks perception after death — that is, if one grasps at matter as the self, the self one grasps at pervades every place; if one grasps at the formless as the self, one grasps at the life-faculty as the self, likewise pervading every place. Having grasped in this way, one attains the concentration of non-perception, and observes others attaining that concentration and being reborn in the heaven of the non-perceiving beings; one then reflects: my infinite self will lack perception after death, since, upon being reborn in the heaven of the non-perceiving beings, perception will not arise.

Those who rely on reasoning likewise grasp at that as the self, observing cases of epileptic seizure, and accordingly, as explained at length before. The third is grasping that the self, both finite and infinite, lacks perception after death — that is, if one grasps at matter as the self, the self one grasps at either contracts or expands; if one grasps at the formless as the self, one grasps at the life-faculty as the self, likewise contracting or expanding along with the body's own form. Having grasped in this way, one attains the concentration of non-perception, and observes others attaining that concentration and being reborn in the heaven of the non-perceiving beings; one then reflects: my self, both finite and infinite, will lack perception after death,

since, upon being reborn in the heaven of the non-perceiving beings, perception will not arise. Those who rely on reasoning likewise grasp at that as the self, and accordingly, as explained at length before. The fourth is grasping that the self, neither finite nor infinite, lacks perception after death — this is precisely a rejection of the third position, in favor of this fourth one; the three modes of explanation are to be understood as before. These eight kinds constitute the doctrines of lacking perception among the views constructed with reference to the later limit, arising, as explained above, on account of eight matters.

Eight doctrines of neither possessing nor lacking perception: that is, four concerning form and the rest, and four concerning finitude and the rest. As for the four concerning form and the rest: the first is grasping that the self, possessing form, neither possesses nor lacks perception after death — that is, those who rely on reasoning grasp at matter as the self, observing that the perception of certain beings is unclear,

and then reflect: my self, possessing form, neither possesses nor lacks perception, and this holds likewise for the other world as for this one. This grasping cannot arise from that attainment itself — why is this? Because only one who has already become dispassionate with respect to the sphere of nothingness can grasp at the aggregates of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as the self; since these ascetics are without that formless attainment, this grasping has no basis in principle. Speaking in a distinct sense, this grasping can also arise from having attained that concentration — that is, one born in the desire or form realm who has become dispassionate with respect to the sphere of nothingness grasps at the aggregates of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as the self; the self one grasps at, though not itself material, is combined with matter and hence named a self possessing form — just as one is said to have a topknot, though the person's own substance is not the topknot itself; although such a person does not grasp at matter as belonging to the self, the self one grasps at has not yet been separated from its material body, and, right up until death, continues to accompany that body, and it is hence said that the self possesses form. Because the perception belonging to the concentration of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception that one has entered is unclear, one grasps that one's self is presently neither possessing nor lacking perception, and will be so after death as well. For those who allow that even the formless realm possesses form, they likewise allow that one may grasp that the self of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is in fact possessed of form, yet neither possesses nor lacks perception. The second is grasping that the self, formless, neither possesses nor lacks perception after death — that is, those who have attained that concentration grasp at the formless aggregates of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as the self, or as belonging to the self; the self they grasp at has the formless as its intrinsic nature, or, having something formless, is hence named a formless self. Because the perception belonging to the concentration of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception that one has entered is unclear, one grasps that one's self is presently neither possessing nor lacking perception, and will be so after death as well. Those who rely on reasoning grasp at the formless as the self, and, observing that the perception of certain beings is unclear, then reflect:

my self, formless, neither possesses nor lacks perception, and this holds likewise for the other world as for this one. The third is grasping that the self, both possessing form and formless, neither possesses nor lacks perception after death — that is, those who rely on reasoning grasp at both matter and the formless as the self, observing that the perception of certain beings is unclear, and then reflect: my self, both possessing form and formless, neither possesses nor lacks perception, and this holds likewise for the other world as for this one. This grasping cannot arise from that attainment itself — why is this? Because only one who has already become dispassionate with respect to the sphere of nothingness can grasp at the aggregates of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as the self; since these ascetics are without that formless attainment, this grasping has no basis in principle. Speaking in a distinct sense, this grasping can also arise from having attained that concentration — that is, one born in the desire or form realm who has become dispassionate with respect to the sphere of nothingness grasps at the aggregates of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as the self; the self one grasps at, though not itself material, is combined with matter and hence named a self possessing form — just as one is said to have a topknot, though the person's own substance is not the topknot itself; although such a person does not grasp at matter as belonging to the self, the self one grasps at has not yet been separated from its material body, and, right up until death, continues to accompany that body, and it is hence said that the self also possesses form;

and, since one also grasps at the formless as the self, it is said that the self is also formless. Because the perception belonging to the concentration of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception that one has entered is unclear,

one grasps that one's self is presently neither possessing nor lacking perception, and will be so after death as well. For those who allow that even the formless realm possesses form, they likewise allow that one may grasp that the self of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is in fact both possessed of form and formless, yet neither possesses nor lacks perception. The fourth is grasping that the self, neither possessing form nor formless, neither possesses nor lacks perception after death — this is precisely a rejection of the third position, in favor of this fourth one; the three modes of explanation are to be understood as before.

As for the four concerning finitude and the rest: the first is grasping that the finite self neither possesses nor lacks perception after death; the second is grasping that the infinite self neither possesses nor lacks perception after death; the third is grasping that the self, both finite and infinite, neither possesses nor lacks perception after death; and the fourth is grasping that the self, neither finite nor infinite, neither possesses nor lacks perception after death. All of these grasp at the formless as the self, and this grasping can arise for anyone who has already attained the concentration of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Further, all of these may grasp at the four formless aggregates of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as the self or as belonging to the self: the first, because that concentration's duration is brief, taking each single aggregate individually as its object, grasps that the self is finite; the second, because that concentration's duration is long, taking all four aggregates collectively as its object, grasps that the self is infinite; the third, because that concentration's duration is sometimes brief and sometimes long, taking either each single aggregate or all four aggregates collectively as its object, grasps that the self is both finite and infinite — this is precisely a rejection of the third position, in favor of the fourth; the three modes of explanation are to be understood as before. In all these cases, because the perception belonging to the concentration of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception that one has entered is unclear, one grasps that one's self is presently neither possessing nor lacking perception, and will be so after death as well. Those who rely on reasoning, and those who allow that even the formless realm possesses form, grasp at both matter and the formless as the self, accordingly, as explained at length before. These eight kinds constitute the doctrines of neither possessing nor lacking perception among the views constructed with reference to the later limit, arising, as explained above, on account of eight matters. Question: why, within the doctrines of lacking perception and of neither possessing nor lacking perception, is it not said that the self has a single perception, and so on through the eight, as before? Answer: if this were also said, then all of these would have to be named doctrines of possessing perception, since one who possesses perception and feeling is not, in fact, lacking perception and the rest. It is because all these doctrines of possessing perception and the rest speak of what occurs after death that they are all subsumed under views constructed with reference to the later limit.

As for the seven doctrines of utter extinction: the first reflects — this self, possessing form, has as its intrinsic nature the coarse four great elements and what they compose, and, after death, is utterly extinguished and altogether ceases to exist; this, precisely, is what is meant by the self's true extinction. This ascetic observes that this present life begins with the taking of conception and ends with death, and then reflects: at the moment of conception, I originally did not exist, and then came to exist; and, upon reaching the state of death, having existed, I revert to non-existence — this is named a genuine extinction. The second reflects —

this self, as a god of the desire realm, is, after death, utterly extinguished and altogether ceases to exist; this, precisely, is what is meant by the self's true extinction. This ascetic reflects: since I was not born through a birth-canal, I originally did not exist, and then came to exist; and, having existed, I revert to non-existence — like a comet and the like, this is named a genuine extinction. The third reflects — this self, as a god of the form realm, is, after death, utterly extinguished and altogether ceases to exist; this, precisely, is what is meant by the self's true extinction. This ascetic reflects: since I was not born through a birth-canal, I originally did not exist, and then came to exist through the power of meditative attainment; and, having existed, I revert to non-existence — this is named a genuine extinction. Some further say: these three annihilationist views all arise with reference to beings who have already become dispassionate with respect to the first dhyāna. These holders of annihilationism,

although having already attained concentration, are not yet able to become dispassionate with respect to the first dhyāna, and the divine eye they generate is able to see only the lower grounds; since the beings of the first three cases have, upon dying, all been reborn in a higher ground, the intermediate-existence and rebirth-existence bodies they undergo are not within their range of perception, and they then reflect: those who have attained dhyāna, upon dying, are utterly extinguished in every case. The fourth reflects — this self, as a god of the sphere of infinite space, is, after death, utterly extinguished and altogether ceases to exist;

this, precisely, is what is meant by the self's true extinction. The fifth reflects — this self, as a god of the sphere of infinite consciousness, is, after death, utterly extinguished and altogether ceases to exist; this, precisely, is what is meant by the self's true extinction. The sixth reflects — this self, as a god of the sphere of nothingness, is, after death, utterly extinguished and altogether ceases to exist; this, precisely, is what is meant by the self's true extinction. The seventh reflects — this self, as a god of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, is, after death, utterly extinguished and altogether ceases to exist; this, precisely, is what is meant by the self's true extinction. Among these, the latter four include those who grasp at the sphere of infinite space as the summit of birth-and-death, up through those who grasp at the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as the summit of birth-and-death. If one grasps at the sphere of infinite space as the summit of birth-and-death, one grasps that non-existence after death in the sphere of infinite space is named a genuine extinction — and so on, up through, if one grasps at the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as the summit of birth-and-death,

one grasps that non-existence after death in the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is named a genuine extinction. These seven kinds constitute the doctrines of utter extinction among the views constructed with reference to the later limit, arising, as explained above, on account of seven matters. Because all seven of these kinds speak of what occurs after death, they are subsumed under views constructed with reference to the later limit.

As for the five doctrines of nirvāṇa in this very life: these ascetics hold that, if in the present one's self experiences ease and happiness, this is named attaining nirvāṇa; if one's self has suffering, this is not, at that time, named attaining nirvāṇa, since it lacks ease. The first reflects: this self is pure, liberated, and free from every calamity, meaning that, presently enjoying the pleasure of the excellent five sense-objects, this is, at that time, named attaining nirvāṇa in this very life. The second, able to perceive the fault in sensual desire, reflects: the pleasure born of sensual desire is attended by manifold suffering and much enmity and harm, whereas the pleasure born of meditative concentration is subtle, tranquil, unattended by manifold suffering, and free from every enmity; and further reflects: this self is pure, liberated, and free from every calamity, meaning that, presently abiding in the first dhyāna, this is, at that time, named attaining nirvāṇa in this very life. The third, able to perceive the fault attending both sensual desire and applied and sustained thought, reflects:

this self is pure, liberated, and free from every calamity, meaning that, presently abiding in the second dhyāna, this is, at that time, named attaining nirvāṇa in this very life. The fourth, able to perceive the fault attending sensual desire, applied and sustained thought, and joy, reflects: this self is pure, liberated, and free from every calamity, meaning that, presently abiding in the third dhyāna, this is, at that time, named attaining nirvāṇa in this very life. The fifth, able to perceive the fault attending sensual desire, applied and sustained thought, joy, and in-and-out breathing, reflects: this self is pure, liberated, and free from every calamity, meaning that, presently abiding in the fourth dhyāna, this is, at that time, named attaining nirvāṇa in this very life. Question: how can these five doctrines of nirvāṇa in this very life be subsumed under views constructed with reference to the later limit? Answer: although these five take the present as their object, since they anticipate the past, they too bear the name of the later limit, and it is for this reason that they are said to be constructed with reference to the later limit. Others further say: since these five grasp that the self, presently having pleasure, will also have pleasure afterward, they are subsumed under views constructed with reference to the later limit. Question: if so, why are they called doctrines of nirvāṇa in this very life? Answer: present pleasure comes first, and one then grasps at a later pleasure — since the present comes first, its name is used to designate the doctrine. These five kinds constitute the doctrines of nirvāṇa constructed with reference to the later limit, arising, as explained above, on account of five matters. As the sūtra says: monks, you should know that the various views relied upon by the śramaṇas, brāhmaṇas, and others in the world all fall into two views — namely, the view of existence, and the view of non-existence. This should now be analyzed: how do all these views fall into these two views? Answer: this expression 'fall into' does not mean that their own substance is subsumed within these two, but only reveals that they fall within the categories of these two views. Why is this? The view of existence is precisely eternalism, and the view of non-existence is precisely annihilationism; every evil view-tenet, however numerous its kinds, falls without exception into one of these two categories. As at the very start of this chapter, where Pūraṇa taught that there is no giving, and so forth — these five kinds of wrong view fall into the category of annihilationism, since they grasp at non-existence; some say they fall into both categories, since they also grasp at a permanent self while denying causation. Next, the teaching that a living being with a life-force, once dead, is utterly broken apart and ceases to exist, and so forth, is subsumed under annihilationism, and so falls into the category of annihilationism — some say that this body of a person made of the four great elements, up through the wise praising receiving, falls into both categories. Next, the teaching of no cause and no condition, and so forth, is the view of Maskarin; the teaching of acting and causing others to act, and so forth, is the view of Sañjayin — both of these fall into the category of annihilationism, since they grasp at non-existence; some say they fall into both categories, since they also grasp at a permanent self while denying causation. Next, the teaching of these seven bodies of a person, and so forth, is subsumed under eternalism, and so falls into the category of eternalism. Next, the teaching that there are one billion, four hundred million, and so forth, is the view of the disheveled ascetics clad in coarse garments. Next, the teaching that whatever every person experiences invariably has past deeds as its cause, and so forth, is the view of the Nirgrantha disciples — both of these fall into both categories, since they also grasp at a self that is afterward utterly extinguished. Next, the teaching that whatever every person experiences is entirely without cause and without condition, and so forth, is the view of Kakuda Kātyāyana; it falls into the category of annihilationism, since it grasps at non-existence — some say it falls into both categories, since it also grasps at a permanent self while denying causation. Next, the teaching that one causes one's own suffering and pleasure, and so forth, falls into both categories, since it also grasps at a self that is afterward utterly extinguished. Next, the teaching that the suffering and pleasure one experiences is not self-caused, and so forth, falls into the category of annihilationism, since it grasps at non-existence — some say it falls into both categories, since it also grasps at a permanent self while denying causation. Next, the teaching that the self and the world are permanent, and so forth, is subsumed under eternalism, and so falls into the category of eternalism. Next, the teaching that 'because it is true, and because it abides, the self exists as self,' and so forth, is subsumed under eternalism, and so falls into the category of eternalism. Next, the teaching that 'because it is true, and because it abides, the self is without self,' and so forth, is subsumed under annihilationism, and so falls into the category of annihilationism. Next, the teaching that the self observes the self, and so forth, falls into the category of eternalism. Next, the teaching of enjoying the excellent five sense-pleasures, and so forth, falls into the category of eternalism, since it grasps that a permanent self attains nirvāṇa — some say it falls into both categories, since it also grasps at a self that is afterward utterly extinguished. Next, the teaching that the wind does not itself blow, and so forth, is subsumed under eternalism, and so falls into the category of eternalism. Next, the teaching that beings grasp that the self acts, and so forth, falls into both categories of view, since it also grasps at a self that is afterward utterly extinguished. Lastly, the teaching that enjoying pure, excellent, and delightful sense-pleasures carries no fault, and so forth, falls into the category of eternalism, since it grasps that a permanent self enjoys superior sense-pleasures — some say it falls into both categories, since it also grasps at a self that is afterward utterly extinguished. The sūtras teach the view that the self possesses perception, the view that the self lacks perception, the view that the self neither possesses nor lacks perception, the view of utter extinction, and the view of nirvāṇa in this very life — these five fall into the two categories of view, the first three falling into the category of eternalism and the fourth into the category of annihilationism;

as for the fifth, some say it falls into the category of eternalism, and some say it falls into both categories. As for the sixty-two views taught in the Brahmajāla Sūtra —

these too are altogether subsumed within these two categories of view. That is, among the views constructed with reference to the prior limit: the four doctrines of complete eternalism fall into the category of eternalism; the four doctrines of partial eternalism — some say they fall into the category of eternalism, and some say they fall into both categories, since they grasp at both the permanent and the impermanent; the two doctrines of causeless arising fall into the category of annihilationism — some say they fall into both categories, since they also grasp at a permanent self while denying causation; the four doctrines concerning finitude and the rest, and the four doctrines of eel-wriggling equivocation regarding immortality, fall into the category of eternalism — some say they fall into both categories, since they grasp at a permanent self that is nonetheless afterward extinguished. Among the views constructed with reference to the later limit: the doctrines of possessing perception, lacking perception, and neither possessing nor lacking perception are all subsumed under eternalism, and so fall into the category of eternalism; the seven doctrines of utter extinction are subsumed under annihilationism, and so fall into the category of annihilationism; the five doctrines of nirvāṇa in this very life fall into the category of eternalism, since they grasp that a permanent self attains nirvāṇa — some say they fall into both categories, since they grasp that a self, presently attaining nirvāṇa, is afterward extinguished. The Kātyāyana Sūtra teaches that the world has two views — first, the view of existence, and second, the view of non-existence — subsumed, in turn, under the categories of eternalism and annihilationism. The Lion's Roar Sūtra teaches:

every view relies on two views — namely, the view of existence, and the view of non-existence. Those who rely on the view of existence become attached to that view and despise the view of non-existence; those who rely on the view of non-existence become attached to that view and despise the view of existence. These two, in turn, are also subsumed under the categories of eternalism and annihilationism. As the sūtra says: eternalist ascetics grasp either at transformation, or at concealment-and-manifestation, or at the notion that the mental element permanently comes and goes, and the like — all such views are subsumed under eternalism, and so fall into the category of eternalism. As the sūtra says: there are ascetics who grasp that the life-force is identical with the body, that the life-force is distinct from the body, that the life-force is not identical with the body, and that the life-force is not distinct from the body. Question: why do these ascetics grasp that the life-force is identical with the body? The Venerable Vasumitra explains: because they observe that, in the world, when the body is born, one speaks of a being being born, and, when the body perishes, one speaks of a being dying. Furthermore, they observe that, in the world, one speaks of there being a life-force with respect to a body possessing material faculties, and of there being no life-force with respect to a body without material faculties. Furthermore, they observe that, in the world, one gives rise to notions of male and female with respect to the distinct characteristics of the body. Furthermore, they observe that, in the world, one speaks of the strong and the weak with respect to the strength or weakness of the body. Furthermore, they observe that, in the world, one speaks of the tall and short and the like with respect to the differing length, coarseness, fineness, fatness, thinness, whiteness, or blackness of bodily form. Furthermore, they observe that, in the world, when one part of the body is injured, the entire body experiences the discomfort of that suffering. Furthermore, they observe that, in the world, when one feels sorrow or joy, tears flow, the hair stands on end, and the complexion brightens or darkens accordingly. Furthermore, they observe that, in the world, one always gives rise to the notion and name 'self' with respect to the body. Other masters say: they observe that, in the world, when the tail of a house lizard or the like is severed, each severed part is still able to move on its own. The Venerable Bhadanta explains: they observe that, in the world, one speaks of a being's bodily form, a being's voice, a being's beauty or ugliness, a being's deportment, and a being's activity, all with respect to a body possessing material faculties. It is on account of such various causes and conditions as these that these ascetics say that the life-force is identical with the body. Question: why do these ascetics grasp that the life-force is distinct from the body? The Venerable Vasumitra explains: these ascetics grasp at matter as the body,

and grasp at mind and mental factors as the life-force. The continuity of matter and of mind differ from one another: they perceive that the material body undergoes transformation from before to after, yet do not perceive the distinct characteristics of mind and the rest from before to after — and it is on this basis that they give rise to this view. Furthermore, they observe that the body is coarse while mind and mental factors are subtle; the life-force, being subtle, must therefore be distinct from the body. Furthermore, they observe that deportment follows the turning of intention and desire, and so grasp at intention and desire as the life-force, deportment being merely the changing manifestation of the body. Furthermore, they observe that a corpse's bodily appearance shows no difference from before, and then reflect: the life-force, having departed from the body, is what is named death, and it is therefore distinct from the body. Furthermore, they observe that the material body and the stages of mind and mental factors each undergo distinct transformation from before to after; they grasp at mind and the rest as precisely the life-force, and it is therefore distinct from the body. Furthermore, they observe that the material body has many parts, while the life-force is single, and it is therefore distinct from the body. Furthermore, these ascetics observe that one relinquishes the body of the prior existence and takes on the body of the intermediate existence, and again relinquishes the body of the intermediate existence and takes on the body of the present existence; in this way, though the bodies successively differ from one another, the life-force remains single, and it is therefore distinct from the body. Other masters say: they observe that, during sleep, the body is still capable of movement, and so know that there is, within it, a distinct life-force. Furthermore, they observe that, during a dream, the body remains in its original place while the life-force wanders to other regions, and so know that there is a life-force distinct from the body. Others further say: they observe that, in dependence on meditative concentration, one is able to recall the past and know the future across many distinct bodies, and then reflect: though the bodies are many, the life-force is single, and so know that it is distinct in each case. Furthermore, they observe that, in the world, the body itself does not move on its own —

yet is able to recall the past and know the future, and so know that there is a life-force distinct from the body. Some say: they observe that, in the world, one recalls one's own former deeds and past experiences even while the body remains motionless, and so know that there is a life-force distinct from the body. Others further say: they observe that the body's form differs from one stage to the next, yet the skilled knowledge and the like that follows along remains unchanged, and so know that there is a life-force distinct from the body. The Venerable Bhadanta explains: they observe that both those without mastery and those with mastery over their bodies alike have bodies that move, and so know that the body is set in motion by the life-force.

Question: why do these ascetics grasp that the life-force is not identical with the body? The Venerable Vasumitra explains: they observe that, in the world, the body has many differing parts, while the life-force is not so differentiated, and so it is not identical with the body. Furthermore, they observe that, in the world, the body changes in accordance with conditions, while the life-force does not, and so it is not identical with the body. Furthermore, they observe that, in the world, the body undergoes such changes as increase, decrease, gain, and loss, while the life-force does not, and so it is not identical with the body. The Venerable Bhadanta explains: they observe that, in the world, a single body possesses various differing characteristics, while the life-force does not, and so it is not identical with the body. Question: why do these ascetics grasp that the life-force is not distinct from the body? The Venerable Vasumitra explains: they observe that no distinct, real thing called the life-force can be found apart from the body,

and so they grasp that the life-force is not distinct from the body — the rest is as explained above under 'identical with the body.' The Venerable Bhadanta explains: they observe that, in the world, one gives rise to self-love with respect to one's own body, and not with respect to any other dharma, and so they grasp that the life-force is not distinct from the body — the rest is as explained above under 'identical with the body.'

Yet these foolish ordinary people, not properly understanding the moment-by-moment continuity of matter and mind, speak of the life-force as being identical with the body, or distinct from it, and so on. If they say it is identical with the body, or not distinct from it, this falls into the category of annihilationism; if they say it is distinct from the body, or not identical with it, this falls into the category of eternalism. Thus, the various evil view-tenets of these ascetics, without exception, all fall into the categories of annihilationism and eternalism. It is in order to counter these that every Tathāgata, Arhat, and Fully and Perfectly Awakened One proclaims the middle way — namely, that matter, mind, and the rest are neither annihilated nor permanent.

Question: how, then, should one know that there is no annihilation after death? The Venerable Vasumitra explains as follows: we observe that, at the present time, the mind proceeds through many successive moments — because of the ceasing of each earlier moment, each later moment arises; the later mind necessarily arises in dependence on the earlier mind, and the earlier mind, possessing force, necessarily draws forth the later mind, ceasing to do so only upon encountering the condition of utter aversion. On this basis, the mind that first takes rebirth in this present life is certain to have an earlier mind as its cause, drawing it forth; and, at the moment approaching death, in the absence of the condition of utter aversion, the mind at the very moment of death is certainly able to draw forth a later mind. Since the prior body was able to draw forth the arising of this present body, why should this present body not draw forth a later body? On this basis, one should know that there is no annihilation after death. Furthermore, we observe that the present sense-cognition, once it has arisen in dependence on its faculty, is in turn able to serve as the cause drawing forth mental cognition; and so one knows that the very first mental cognition within the womb must arise, drawn forth, on account of a past sense-cognition. Since the prior life was able to draw forth the arising of this present life, why should this present life not draw forth a later life? On this basis, one should know that there is no annihilation after death. The Venerable Bhadanta explains: it is not that one mind operates apart from another mind; we also observe matter arising in dependence on mind, and further observe mind arising in dependence on matter — it is on account of the afflictions that matter and mind arise, and on this basis one should know that there is no annihilation after death. Furthermore, it is directly observed that a prior moment's body, possessing an affliction, is necessarily able to draw forth the mind and body of a later moment; and, knowing that one who possesses an affliction at the moment of death is certainly able to draw forth the arising of a later mind and body, on this basis one should know that there is no annihilation after death. Question: why, then, are matter, mind, and the rest

not permanent? Answer: they undergo change without ceasing to change — how, then, could they be permanently abiding? Question: how, then, can one know that this change does not come merely from concealment and manifestation, and that one must instead grasp that their very substance undergoes arising and ceasing? The Venerable Vasumitra explains: if this change came merely from concealment and manifestation, then the stages of dwelling in the womb, infancy, childhood, youth, middle age, and old age ought all to arise at once — yet they arise gradually, in succession; and so one knows that the substance of this change undergoes arising and ceasing, and does not come merely from concealment and manifestation. Furthermore, if this change came merely from concealment and manifestation, then the stages of dwelling in the womb, infancy, childhood, youth, middle age, and old age ought to have gaps between them — yet there are no such gaps; and so one knows that the substance of this change undergoes arising and ceasing, and does not come merely from concealment and manifestation. The Venerable Bhadanta explains: it is directly observed, in the world, that when a multitude of conditions combine, various dharmas arise, and, when those conditions disperse, those dharmas thereupon perish — this distinction could not exist for something merely concealed or manifest; and so one knows that this change does not come from concealment and manifestation, but only from the very substance itself undergoing arising and ceasing. Furthermore, when a dharma undergoes change, its earlier and later characteristics differ, and so its substance, too, ought to differ, since characteristic and substance are one and the same; if a dharma were permanently abiding, then, although it might have distinct stages of concealment and manifestation, its characteristic would show no difference — and so one knows that the substance of this change undergoes arising and ceasing. The full meaning and purport of the Verse Nyāsa are easily understood from the text itself, and so are not further explained here.

Upon completing his translation of this treatise, the Tripiṭaka Master Xuánzàng spoke two verses, saying:

'Four hundred years after the Buddha's final nirvāṇa, King Kaniṣka of Jambudvīpa convened five hundred worthy sages, who, in Kaśmīra, expounded the Tripiṭaka. Among these, the Abhidharma-vibhāṣā — having now obtained its complete text — has today had its translation finished. May this work bring benefit to every sentient being, that they may swiftly realize perfect quiescence and the sublime awakening.'