Saṃyutta Nikāya · Discourse 22.151

This Is Mine

Etaṁmamasutta — Diṭṭhivagga

Setting
Sāvatthī
Speakers
The Buddha, questioning the mendicants directly
Form
The identical structure as SN 22.150, now examining the classic self-identification formula
Length
Medium — matching SN 22.150's own length
Northern parallel
The "this is mine, I am this, this is my self" formula recurs throughout this book, most notably in the fourfold self-identification formula at SN 22.7
Difficulty
Approachable — best read directly alongside SN 22.150

Why this discourse

Applies SN 22.150's own structure to this book's single most familiar self-view formula: "this is mine, I am this, this is my self" — tracing exactly where this way of regarding the aggregates comes from (grasping and insisting on them), then dismantling it with the standard three-question examination.

Reading guide

A new condition added: insisting, not only grasping

"When what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does someone regard things like this: 'this is mine, I am this, this is my self'?" — where SN 22.150 named only grasping (upādāya), this discourse adds "insisting on" (abhinivissa), a term already familiar from SN 22.81's discussion of constructions built on the aggregates.

The formula traced to its source

"When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form... someone regards it like this: 'this is mine, I am this, this is my self'" — the discourse locates this familiar three-clause self-view precisely in the combination of an aggregate's existence, grasping it, and insisting on that grasp.

The same dismantling examination

"Is form permanent or impermanent? — Impermanent... But by not grasping what's impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would you regard it like this: 'this is mine, I am this, this is my self'? — No" — the identical three-question structure as SN 22.150, now applied to show this specific self-view formula cannot arise once grasping stops.

Why naming the formula's precise origin matters

Tracing this famous formula back to its exact conditions (existence + grasping + insisting) rather than treating it as a brute fact about how minds work gives practitioners a specific handle on it: since it depends on grasping and insisting, releasing those two conditions is sufficient to prevent the formula's arising, without needing to somehow will the thought itself away directly.

Key terms

etaṁ mama esohamasmi eso me attā — "this is mine, I am this, this is my self" — the classic self-view formula this discourse traces to its origin
upādāya — because of grasping — shared with SN 22.150
abhinivissa — insisting on — the new condition this discourse adds, already seen at SN 22.81
anicca/dukkha — impermanent / suffering — the two qualities the standard examination confirms for each aggregate
nappajaheyya — would not regard [it thus] — the negative conclusion the examination arrives at for each aggregate

The text

The complete discourse: the question, deferential reply, and the standard examination applied to the classic self-view formula. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

§1At Sāvatthī. “Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does someone regard things like this: ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?” “Our teachings are rooted in the Buddha. …”

§2“When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form … When consciousness exists, because of grasping consciousness and insisting on consciousness, someone regards it like this: ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self.’

§3What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” … “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would you regard it like this: ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?” “No, sir.”

§4“Is feeling … perception … choices … consciousness permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” … “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would you regard it like this: ‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?” “No, sir.” “Seeing this … They understand: ‘… there is nothing further for this place.’”

· · ·

Self-check quiz

Ten questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 10
What familiar self-view formula does this discourse examine?
Correct: A. This book's single most familiar self-identification formula.
Question 2 of 10
What new condition does this discourse add to SN 22.150's own "grasping"?
Correct: A. A term already familiar from SN 22.81's discussion of constructions built on the aggregates.
Question 3 of 10
According to this discourse, what does the self-view formula depend on?
Correct: A. Tracing this famous formula to its precise conditions.
Question 4 of 10
What examination does the discourse use to dismantle this formula?
Correct: A. The identical structure as SN 22.150, applied here to a different phenomenon.
Question 5 of 10
Why might naming the formula's precise conditions matter practically?
Correct: A. Releasing grasping and insisting is sufficient, without needing to will the thought away directly.
Question 6 of 10
How does the mendicants' response to the Buddha's opening question compare to SN 22.150's?
Correct: A. The same standard deferential formula as SN 22.150.
Question 7 of 10
How many aggregates does this examination apply to?
Correct: A. Form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness.
Question 8 of 10
Where else in this book has the self-view formula this discourse examines already appeared?
Correct: A. One of the most widely reused technical formulas throughout Khandhavagga.
Question 9 of 10
Where is this discourse set?
Correct: A. Matching SN 22.150's own setting.
Question 10 of 10
What comes next in Diṭṭhivagga after this discourse?
Correct: A. Continuing this vagga's opening set with a new phenomenon under examination.
Answered 0 of 10 · Correct 0