Saṃyutta Nikāya · Discourse 22.152

This Is My Self

Somattāsutta — Diṭṭhivagga

Setting
Sāvatthī
Speakers
The Buddha, questioning the mendicants directly
Form
The identical structure as SN 22.150-151, now examining a specific eternalist view
Length
Medium — the fullest single view-statement given in this vagga's opening set
Northern parallel
The "self and cosmos are one, permanent after death" formula names a classic eternalist (sassatavāda) position debated across the wider Canon
Difficulty
Moderate — the specific philosophical position under examination is more elaborate than SN 22.151's bare formula

Why this discourse

Moves from the bare self-view formula of SN 22.151 to a fully articulated philosophical position — a classic eternalist claim that self and cosmos are identical and will remain permanent after death — and traces this elaborate view to the identical simple conditions already used for the simpler formula.

Reading guide

A fuller, more elaborate view than SN 22.151's own

"The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After death I will be that, permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable" — a specific metaphysical claim (self = cosmos) joined to a specific eschatological claim (permanence surviving death), considerably more developed than SN 22.151's compact three-clause formula.

The same source, regardless of the view's complexity

"When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, the view arises" — identical conditions (an aggregate's existence, grasping it, insisting on that grasp) as SN 22.151, showing that a philosophically elaborate eternalist doctrine and a bare instinctive self-view formula share the exact same root.

An implicit point about doctrinal sophistication

That an articulated metaphysical system (self=cosmos, surviving eternally) traces to the same simple grasping-and-insisting mechanism as an unreflective, everyday self-view suggests sophistication of expression does not correspond to a different underlying cause — elaborate philosophy and casual assumption are, at root, the same phenomenon dressed differently.

The identical examination, applied once more

"But by not grasping what's impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would the view arise... — No" — the standard three-question sequence dismantles this fuller view exactly as it dismantled SN 22.151's simpler one, confirming the examination's power does not depend on how elaborate the view under scrutiny happens to be.

Key terms

sassata — eternal, permanent — the core claim of the view this discourse examines, naming a classic eternalist position
so loko so attā — "the self and the cosmos are one and the same" — the specific metaphysical claim this view makes
upādāya abhinivissa — because of grasping and insisting on — the identical conditions shared with SN 22.151
avipariṇāmadhamma — not subject to change — one of the qualities this eternalist view claims for the self, directly denied by the examination
nappajaheyya — would not [regard it thus] — the negative conclusion, showing the view cannot survive the examination

The text

The complete discourse: the elaborate eternalist view stated in full, traced to its conditions, and dismantled by the standard examination. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

§1At Sāvatthī. “Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does the view arise: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After death I will be that, permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable’?” “Our teachings are rooted in the Buddha. …”

§2“When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, the view arises: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After death I will be that, permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.’ When feeling … perception … choices … consciousness exists, because of grasping consciousness and insisting on consciousness, the view arises: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After death I will be that, permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable.’

§3What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” “But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?” “Suffering, sir.” “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would the view arise: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After death I will be that, permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable’?” “No, sir.”

§4“Is feeling … perception … choices … consciousness permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” “But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?” “Suffering, sir.” “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would the view arise: ‘The self and the cosmos are one and the same. After death I will be that, permanent, everlasting, eternal, and imperishable’?” “No, sir.” “Seeing this … They understand: ‘… there is nothing further for this place.’”

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Self-check quiz

Ten questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 10
What specific philosophical position does this discourse examine?
Correct: A. A classic articulated eternalist (sassatavāda) position.
Question 2 of 10
How does this view compare in complexity to SN 22.151's own formula?
Correct: A. A specific metaphysical claim (self=cosmos) joined to a claim about surviving death.
Question 3 of 10
What conditions does this discourse identify as the source of this elaborate view?
Correct: A. The same simple mechanism producing both the elaborate view and the bare formula.
Question 4 of 10
What implicit point does tracing a sophisticated doctrine to the same root as a casual self-view make?
Correct: A. Elaborate philosophy and casual assumption are, at root, the same phenomenon dressed differently.
Question 5 of 10
What examination does the discourse use to dismantle this view?
Correct: A. The identical examination used throughout this vagga's opening set.
Question 6 of 10
What does the examination's success against this more elaborate view confirm?
Correct: A. The same three questions dismantle both the simple formula and this fuller doctrine.
Question 7 of 10
How many aggregates does this examination apply to?
Correct: A. Form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness.
Question 8 of 10
What quality does the view claim for the self, directly contradicted by the examination's findings?
Correct: A. Directly denied once each aggregate is shown to be impermanent.
Question 9 of 10
Where is this discourse set?
Correct: A. Matching SN 22.150-151's own setting.
Question 10 of 10
What comes next in Diṭṭhivagga after this discourse?
Correct: A. Continuing this vagga's opening set with the next phenomenon under examination.
Answered 0 of 10 · Correct 0