Saṃyutta Nikāya · Discourse 22.153

It Might Not Be Mine

Nocamesiyāsutta — Diṭṭhivagga

Setting
Sāvatthī
Speakers
The Buddha, questioning the mendicants directly
Form
The identical structure as SN 22.150-152, now examining a view about potential future non-existence
Length
Long for this vagga's opening set — the fullest examination given, repeated for both halves of the aggregate list
Northern parallel
The "I might not be, it might not be mine" formula names a specific anxious apprehension about non-existence, distinct from straightforward eternalism or annihilationism
Difficulty
Moderate — the view's precise emotional register (anxious apprehension rather than settled doctrine) rewards careful reading

Why this discourse

Examines a view standing in pointed contrast to SN 22.152's confident eternalism: an anxious apprehension about non-existence — "I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine" — traced to the same grasping-and-insisting conditions and dismantled by the same examination.

Reading guide

A view of anxious uncertainty, not settled doctrine

"I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine" — unlike SN 22.152's confident eternalist assertion, this view has the character of an apprehensive worry: not a claim about what is true, but a distressed contemplation of what might come to pass.

This subjunctive, anxious register recalls SN 22.7's earlier diagnosis of why an aggregate's change causes distress specifically for someone who has identified with it — here given its own dedicated discourse rather than remaining implicit.

The identical conditions, once more

"When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, the view arises" — exactly the same two conditions traced for SN 22.151's bare formula and SN 22.152's confident eternalism, now shown to produce this opposite-feeling anxious view as well.

Why the same root produces such different-feeling views

That confident eternalism (SN 22.152) and anxious apprehension about non-existence (this discourse) trace to the identical grasping-and-insisting mechanism shows that grasping does not commit one to any single emotional orientation — the same underlying attachment can manifest as either confident assertion or fearful uncertainty, depending on circumstance, while the remedy (releasing grasping and insisting) remains identical either way.

The same dismantling examination

"But by not grasping what's impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would the view arise... — No" — the standard three-question sequence, given in full for each aggregate, confirming this anxious view is equally dependent on grasping and equally dissolved by its absence.

Key terms

no cassaṁ no ca me siyā — "I might not be, and it might not be mine" — the anxious formula giving this discourse its title
na bhavissāmi na me bhavissati — "I will not be, and it will not be mine" — the formula's future-tense continuation
upādāya abhinivissa — because of grasping and insisting on — the shared conditions with SN 22.151-152
sassatavāda — eternalist view — SN 22.152's own confident counterpart to this discourse's anxious view
nappajaheyya — would not [arise] — the negative conclusion the examination reaches

The text

The complete discourse: the anxious view stated in full, traced to its conditions, and dismantled by the standard examination given in full for each aggregate. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

§1At Sāvatthī. “Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does the view arise: ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine’?” “Our teachings are rooted in the Buddha. …”

§2“When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, the view arises: ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’ When feeling … perception … choices … consciousness exists, because of grasping consciousness and insisting on consciousness, the view arises: ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine.’

§3What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” “But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?” “Suffering, sir.” “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would the view arise: ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine’?” “No, sir.”

§4“Is feeling … perception … choices … consciousness permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” “But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?” “Suffering, sir.” “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would the view arise: ‘I might not be, and it might not be mine. I will not be, and it will not be mine’?” “No, sir.” “Seeing this … They understand: ‘… there is nothing further for this place.’”

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Self-check quiz

Ten questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 10
What view does this discourse examine?
Correct: A. An anxious apprehension about potential non-existence.
Question 2 of 10
How does this view's emotional register differ from SN 22.152's eternalism?
Correct: A. A distressed contemplation of what might come to pass, not a settled claim about what is true.
Question 3 of 10
What earlier discourse in this book does this anxious register recall?
Correct: A. Given here its own dedicated discourse rather than remaining implicit.
Question 4 of 10
What conditions does this discourse identify as the source of this anxious view?
Correct: A. The same two conditions producing views with very different emotional character.
Question 5 of 10
What does the shared root between confident eternalism and anxious apprehension demonstrate?
Correct: A. Grasping does not commit one to a single emotional orientation, though the remedy remains identical either way.
Question 6 of 10
What examination dismantles this view?
Correct: A. The identical examination used throughout this vagga's opening set, given here in full for each aggregate.
Question 7 of 10
How many aggregates does this examination apply to?
Correct: A. Form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness.
Question 8 of 10
What remedy does this discourse imply for this anxious view, regardless of its different emotional character from eternalism?
Correct: A. The same underlying cause calls for the same underlying release.
Question 9 of 10
Where is this discourse set?
Correct: A. Matching SN 22.150-152's own setting.
Question 10 of 10
What comes next in Diṭṭhivagga after this discourse?
Correct: A. Continuing this vagga's opening set with a more general phenomenon.
Answered 0 of 10 · Correct 0