Saṃyutta Nikāya · Discourse 22.154

Wrong View

Micchādiṭṭhisutta — Diṭṭhivagga

Setting
Sāvatthī
Speakers
The Buddha, questioning the mendicants directly
Form
The identical structure as SN 22.150-153, now examining wrong view generally rather than a specific formula
Length
Short — compressed, following the established pattern
Northern parallel
Micchādiṭṭhi, "wrong view," is the Canon's standard general term, the first factor of the noble eightfold path's own negation
Difficulty
Approachable — best read as a generalizing move after three specific-view discourses

Why this discourse

Having examined three specific views in turn (the bare self-formula, confident eternalism, anxious apprehension about non-existence), this discourse steps back to ask about wrong view (micchādiṭṭhi) as a general category — the same conditions, the same examination, now applied to the class rather than to any one member of it.

Reading guide

From specific formulas to the general category

"When what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does wrong view arise?" — where SN 22.151-153 each asked about one specific articulated view, this discourse asks about micchādiṭṭhi as such, the category any of those three specific views (and countless others) would fall under.

The same conditions, now shown to be fully general

"When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, wrong view arises" — the identical grasping-and-insisting mechanism, now stated to produce wrong view generally rather than any single named instance of it.

This generalization retroactively confirms what the preceding three discourses already implied: SN 22.151-153 were not treating three unrelated causal stories, but three particular cases of the single general mechanism this discourse now names directly.

A more compressed presentation

Unlike SN 22.150-153's fuller treatments, this discourse's examination is given with more of the aggregate-by-aggregate elaboration elided — by the fourth discourse in this vagga's opening set, the underlying pattern is established firmly enough that less needs to be spelled out.

Setting up two more general terms

This same move — from specific formula to general category — will repeat twice more: SN 22.155 will ask about sakkāyadiṭṭhi ("substantialist view," already a major technical term throughout this book), and SN 22.156 about attānudiṭṭhi ("theory of self"), two more general labels for the same underlying phenomenon this discourse's "wrong view" already names most broadly.

Key terms

micchādiṭṭhi — wrong view — the general category this discourse examines, giving it its title
sammādiṭṭhi — right view — the noble eightfold path's own first factor, the implicit opposite of this discourse's subject
upādāya abhinivissa — because of grasping and insisting on — the shared conditions traced across this entire opening set
sakkāyadiṭṭhi — substantialist view — the more specific technical term SN 22.155 will examine next
attānudiṭṭhi — theory of self — the term SN 22.156 will examine after that

The text

The complete discourse: the general question about wrong view, traced to its conditions and dismantled by the standard examination. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

§1At Sāvatthī. “Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does wrong view arise?” “Our teachings are rooted in the Buddha. …”

§2“When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, wrong view arises. When feeling … perception … choices … consciousness exists, because of grasping consciousness and insisting on consciousness, wrong view arises.

§3What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” … “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would wrong view arise?” “No, sir.”

§4“Is feeling … perception … choices … consciousness permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” “But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?” “Suffering, sir.” “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would wrong view arise?” “No, sir.” “Seeing this … They understand: ‘… there is nothing further for this place.’”

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Self-check quiz

Ten questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 10
What does this discourse examine, compared to SN 22.151-153's specific formulas?
Correct: A. A generalizing move after three discourses on specific articulated views.
Question 2 of 10
What does this discourse's generalization retroactively confirm about SN 22.151-153?
Correct: A. The same grasping-and-insisting mechanism underlying all of them.
Question 3 of 10
What conditions does this discourse identify as producing wrong view?
Correct: A. The same conditions traced throughout this vagga's opening set.
Question 4 of 10
How does this discourse's presentation compare to SN 22.150-153's?
Correct: A. By the fourth discourse in the set, the established pattern needs less spelling out.
Question 5 of 10
What two more general terms will the following discourses examine?
Correct: A. SN 22.155 and SN 22.156, two more labels for the same underlying phenomenon.
Question 6 of 10
What is sammādiṭṭhi, the implicit opposite of this discourse's subject?
Correct: A. The positive counterpart implicitly contrasted with this discourse's own subject.
Question 7 of 10
How many aggregates does this examination apply to?
Correct: A. Form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness.
Question 8 of 10
What examination dismantles wrong view according to this discourse?
Correct: A. The identical examination used throughout this vagga's opening set.
Question 9 of 10
Where is this discourse set?
Correct: A. Matching SN 22.150-153's own setting.
Question 10 of 10
What comes next in Diṭṭhivagga after this discourse?
Correct: A. Continuing the generalizing move with a more specific technical term.
Answered 0 of 10 · Correct 0