An unnamed mendicant, questioning the Buddha; the Buddha replying
Form
The identical structure as SN 35.165, with substantialist view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) and suffering (dukkha) substituted
Length
~1 minute to read
Northern parallel
A rough counterpart may exist in the Chinese Saṃyukta-āgama (T99), though this reading guide does not assert a specific matching sutra number
Difficulty
★☆☆☆☆ — the cluster's second discourse, substituting two terms at once
Why this discourse
This discourse restates SN 35.165's own structure with two substitutions: “substantialist view” (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) in place of “wrong view,” and “suffering” in place of “impermanent” as the cognitive act that dissolves it. Sakkāyadiṭṭhi is this project's own most frequently recurring technical term, already central to Book III's Diṭṭhivagga (where SN 22.155 traced its arising through the identical “grasping and insisting” formula) and referenced throughout that book's opening chapters.
Reading guide
Two substitutions, not one
Where SN 35.166's companion SN 35.165 asked about wrong view abandoned by knowing impermanence, this discourse asks about substantialist view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) abandoned by knowing suffering (dukkhato) — both the view named and the characterization used to dissolve it change together.
This book's own most central recurring term
Sakkāyadiṭṭhi ("substantialist view," sometimes rendered "identity view") is a term this project has already met repeatedly in Book III, most explicitly at SN 22.155, which called it "this book's own most central recurring technical term." This discourse gives the same term its own treatment in Book IV's own six-field scheme.
A pairing this project has already confirmed
This discourse's own pairing of dukkha with sakkāyadiṭṭhi's abandonment is not arbitrary: SN 22.155 traced substantialist view's arising to grasping and insisting on the aggregates as a source of suffering, the same underlying diagnosis this discourse's own abandoning formula addresses from the opposite direction.
Key terms
sakkāyadiṭṭhi — substantialist view — this discourse's own subject, this project's own most frequently recurring technical term
dukkhato jānato passato — knowing and seeing as suffering — the specific cognitive act this discourse names as sufficient for substantialist view's abandonment
micchādiṭṭhi — wrong view — SN 35.165's own more general term, of which sakkāyadiṭṭhi is one specific technical instance, as SN 22.154 already established
attānudiṭṭhi — theory of self — the term SN 35.167 will examine next
cakkhu, rūpā, cakkhuviññāṇaṁ, cakkhusamphasso — the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact — the fourfold expansion, unchanged from SN 35.165
The text
The complete discourse: the mendicant's question (elided in the source, identical to SN 35.165's own), then the Buddha's reply, run for the eye and by the source's own elision implicitly for the remaining five sense fields. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).
§1Then a mendicant went up to the Buddha … and said to him: “Sir, how does one know and see so that substantialist view is given up?” “Mendicant, knowing and seeing the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact as suffering, substantialist view is given up. … And also knowing and seeing the pleasant, painful, or neutral feeling that arises dependent on mind contact as suffering, substantialist view is given up. This is how to know and see so that substantialist view is given up.”
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Self-check quiz
5 questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.
Question 1 of 5
What two substitutions distinguish this discourse from SN 35.165?
Correct: A. Both the view examined and the characterization used to dissolve it change together.
Question 2 of 5
How has this project already characterized sakkāyadiṭṭhi, before this discourse's own treatment?
Correct: A. SN 22.155 called it "this book's own most central recurring technical term."
Question 3 of 5
What cognitive act does this discourse name as sufficient for substantialist view's abandonment?
Correct: A. Dukkhato jānato passato — the discourse's own distinct characterization.
Question 4 of 5
How does sakkāyadiṭṭhi relate to micchādiṭṭhi, as SN 22.154 already established?
Correct: A. Established in Book III and unchanged here.
Question 5 of 5
What discourse follows this one, completing the three-term sequence?
Correct: A. Attānudiṭṭhi, theory of self, is the third and final term.
