Saṃyutta Nikāya · Discourse 35.165

Giving Up Wrong View

Micchādiṭṭhipahānasutta — Nandikkhayavagga

Setting
Not restated in this discourse
Speakers
An unnamed mendicant, questioning the Buddha; the Buddha replying
Form
A single question, then an answer run across all six sense fields with their four companions each
Length
~1 minute to read
Northern parallel
A rough counterpart may exist in the Chinese Saṃyukta-āgama (T99), though this reading guide does not assert a specific matching sutra number
Difficulty
★★☆☆☆ — opens the vagga's final cluster, best read beside its own Book III counterpart

Why this discourse

This discourse opens a three-discourse cluster on giving up views — wrong view here, substantialist view at SN 35.166, theory of self at SN 35.167 — the identical three-term sequence (micchādiṭṭhi, sakkāyadiṭṭhi, attānudiṭṭhi) already published in Book III at SN 22.154-156. But the formula runs in the opposite direction: SN 22.154 asked what conditions wrong view's arising (“grasping and insisting on what does wrong view arise?”), while this discourse asks how it is given up (“knowing and seeing what is wrong view given up?”) — arising and abandoning, the same three technical terms examined from both ends.

Reading guide

A question about abandoning, not arising

“How does one know and see so that wrong view is given up?” opens this discourse — a question about release, distinct from SN 22.154's own question about what conditions the view's arising in the first place.

The identical three technical terms, reversed direction

SN 22.154-156 traced micchādiṭṭhi, sakkāyadiṭṭhi, and attānudiṭṭhi to their arising, through “grasping and insisting” on each of the five aggregates in turn. This discourse and its own two companions (SN 35.166-167) take the same three terms and ask the reverse question: what dissolves them. Both directions converge on the same diagnosis — the aggregates there, the sense fields here — are what grasping and insisting (or their absence) turns on.

Knowing and seeing X as impermanent

The answer: knowing and seeing the eye, sights, eye consciousness, eye contact, and eye-born feeling — and by extension all six sense fields with their own four companions — as impermanent, wrong view is given up. No further elaboration is offered; the diagnosis is compressed into a single cognitive act repeated across all six fields.

Key terms

micchādiṭṭhi — wrong view — the general category this discourse examines, giving it its title, identical to SN 22.154's own subject
jānato passato pahīyati — “knowing and seeing... is given up” — this discourse's own abandoning formula, the reverse of SN 22.154's arising formula
aniccato jānato passato — knowing and seeing as impermanent — the specific cognitive act this discourse names as sufficient for wrong view's abandonment
gahetvā abhinivissa (SN 22.154's own arising formula) — “grasping and insisting on” — the condition SN 22.154 names for wrong view's arising, the mirror image of this discourse's own abandoning formula
cakkhu, rūpā, cakkhuviññāṇaṁ, cakkhusamphasso — the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact — the fourfold expansion run for each of the six sense fields

The text

The complete discourse: the mendicant's question, then the Buddha's reply, run for the eye and (by the source's own elision) implicitly for the remaining five sense fields. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

§1Then a mendicant went up to the Buddha … and said to him: “Sir, how does one know and see so that wrong view is given up?”

§2“Mendicant, knowing and seeing the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact as impermanent, wrong view is given up. … And also knowing and seeing the pleasant, painful, or neutral feeling that arises dependent on mind contact as impermanent, wrong view is given up. This is how to know and see so that wrong view is given up.”

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Self-check quiz

5 questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 5
What question opens this discourse?
Correct: A. A question about abandonment, not about arising.
Question 2 of 5
How does this discourse's own formula relate to SN 22.154's, already published in Book III?
Correct: A. SN 22.154 asked what conditions wrong view's arising; this discourse asks how it is given up.
Question 3 of 5
What cognitive act does this discourse name as sufficient for wrong view's abandonment?
Correct: A. Aniccato jānato passato — knowing and seeing as impermanent, run across all six sense fields.
Question 4 of 5
What condition does SN 22.154 name for wrong view's arising, the mirror image of this discourse's own formula?
Correct: A. The two discourses converge on the same substrate — aggregates there, sense fields here.
Question 5 of 5
What two discourses follow this one, continuing the same three-term sequence?
Correct: A. Sakkāyadiṭṭhi and attānudiṭṭhi complete the three-term sequence SN 22.155-156 already ran for the aggregates.
Answered 0 of 5 · Correct 0