To Whom We Bow, and Why This Treatise Exists

I bow my head to the nature of Consciousness-Only — to the one who is fully pure in it, and to those who are pure in it only in part.

I now explain what they have taught, for the benefit and happiness of all sentient beings.

This treatise is composed now so that those who are confused or mistaken about the two emptinesses may arrive at right understanding. Right understanding arises in order to sever the two obstructions, for the two obstructions arise together with the two attachments — attachment to self and attachment to dharmas. When the two emptinesses are realized, those obstructions are severed accordingly.

The obstructions are severed in order to attain the two supreme fruits: by severing the afflictive obstruction, which perpetuates rebirth, true liberation is realized; by severing the cognitive obstruction, which blocks understanding, great bodhi is attained.

And also, to open the eyes of those who wrongly grasp at self and dharmas and are confused about Consciousness-Only, so that they may penetrate the two emptinesses and know the truth of Consciousness-Only exactly as it is.

There are, further, those who are confused or mistaken about the principle of Consciousness-Only. Some cling to the view that external objects, like consciousness itself, are not unreal. Some cling to the view that inner consciousness, like its objects, does not truly exist either. Some cling to the view that the various consciousnesses differ in function but share a single essence. Some cling to the view that apart from mind there are no separate mental factors.

To turn back these various mistaken attachments, and to bring students to a true understanding of the profound and subtle principle of Consciousness-Only, this treatise is therefore composed.

If there is only consciousness, how is it that the world, and the sacred teachings themselves, speak of a self and of dharmas?

The verse says: Because self and dharmas are only provisionally spoken of, all their various characteristics arise. These depend on what consciousness transforms — and this capacity for transformation is of only three kinds: the ripening consciousness, the deliberating consciousness, and the consciousnesses that discriminate objects.

The treatise says: When the world and the sacred teachings speak of a self and of dharmas, this is only a provisional positing — it is not that either truly, really exists. "Self" means something that rules and possesses; "dharma" means something that holds to a pattern and maintains its own character.

Both of these appear under all sorts of names. The various names for "self" are things like "sentient being," "life-possessor," or, in the language of the path, "stream-enterer," "once-returner." The various names for "dharmas" are things like the categories of substance, quality, and action, or the Buddhist categories of aggregates, sense-fields, and elements. "Arise" means that, depending on the occasion, different such names get applied.

If all these names are only provisional, what are they actually based on? All of them are provisionally set up in dependence on what consciousness transforms. "Consciousness" here means the activity of discriminating and cognizing; the word also covers the mental factors that always accompany it, since they never occur apart from it.

"Transforms" means that the substance of consciousness turns and manifests as two divisions: a perceived aspect and a perceiving aspect, both arising from a deeper, self-witnessing aspect of consciousness. Self and dharmas are named in dependence on these two divisions — apart from them, self and dharmas would have nothing at all to stand on.

Or, put another way: inner consciousness turns and manifests as if it were an outer object. Because of habits built up by endlessly discriminating "self" and "dharmas," whenever the various consciousnesses arise, they transform and appear as self and dharmas. Although these appearances of self and dharmas exist only within consciousness, discrimination makes them show up as if they were something outside it.

Sentient beings, from beginningless time, have taken hold of these appearances and clung to them as a real self and real dharmas — exactly as someone caught in a troubling dream, through the sheer force of the dream, has a mind that produces every kind of outer scene, and, while dreaming, clings to those scenes as real.

The real self and real dharmas imagined by the unenlightened do not exist at all — they are posited only in step with deluded feeling, and so are called provisional. What consciousness transforms into, resembling a self and resembling dharmas, does exist, but it is not the true nature of self or dharmas; because it only resembles them, it too is called provisional.

Because outer objects are posited only in step with deluded feeling, they do not exist the way consciousness does; because inner consciousness necessarily arises from causes and conditions, it is not simply nonexistent the way an outer object is. This blocks both mistaken extremes — overstating what is there, and denying it altogether. Since objects are only provisionally set up in dependence on inner consciousness, they exist conventionally, not ultimately; since consciousness is the real ground that the provisional object depends on, consciousness exists ultimately as well.

How can it be known that there is really no outer object, and that it is only inner consciousness that appears as though it were an outer object? Because a real self and real dharmas cannot be found to exist. How can it be known that a real self cannot be found?

The self that various schools cling to comes, in brief, in three kinds. First, some hold that the substance of self is constant and all-pervading, equal in extent to space itself, since it acts and undergoes suffering or happiness wherever it is. Second, some hold that, although the substance of self is constant, its extent is not fixed, since it expands and contracts with the size of the body. Third, some hold that the substance of self is constant and extremely subtle, like a single atom, since it moves in secret through the body, carrying out its work.

The first view is simply unreasonable. Why? If self is constant and all-pervading, equal in extent to space, it should not undergo suffering or happiness together with any one body; and being constant and all-pervading, it should have no movement at all — so how could it act through a body?

Further: is this self the same for every sentient being, or different for each? If it is the same, then when one being acts, all should act; when one receives a result, all should receive it; when one attains liberation, all should attain it — a great absurdity. If it is different for each, then, since every self equally pervades everywhere, their substances would have to intermingle; and when one acts or receives a result, since it occupies the very place every other self also occupies, that act or result should belong to all of them alike. If one answers that action and result each belong only to their own self, that fails too — action, result, and body are joined equally to every self, so there is no ground to say they belong to this one and not that one; and when one being reaches liberation, all should reach it, since the practice and realization involved are joined to every self alike.

The second view is likewise unreasonable. Why? If the substance of self is permanent, it should not expand and contract with the body; but if it does expand and contract, like air in a bellows, then it is not permanent after all. And if self can be divided up along with the body, how can it still be claimed to be a single unity? What is said here amounts to nothing more than children's play.

The third view is likewise unreasonable. Why? If self is as minute as a single atom, how could it move an entire large body throughout? If one answers that, though small, it races through the body so fast — like a whirling firebrand that seems to trace a whole ring of fire — that it appears to move everywhere at once, then the self so described is neither a single unity nor permanent, since whatever comes and goes in this way cannot be both permanent and one.

There are, further, three more kinds of self that are clung to: self as identical with the five aggregates; self as separate from the aggregates; and self as neither identical with nor separate from the aggregates.

The first is simply unreasonable: such a self would have to be, like the aggregates themselves, impermanent and plural, not one enduring unity. The physical elements within the body are certainly not the real self, since, like physical things outside the body, they have material resistance. Mind and mental factors are also not the real self, since they do not endure in unbroken continuity but depend on many conditions. The remaining formations are likewise not the real self, since, like space, they have no faculty of awareness.

The second is likewise unreasonable: such a self would have to be, like space, incapable of acting or of experiencing anything.

The third is likewise unreasonable: granted that it is established in dependence on the aggregates while being neither identical with nor separate from them, it would then be like a pot — which is also established in dependence on its parts while being neither identical with nor separate from them — and a pot is not a real self either.

And since it cannot even be said whether such a self is conditioned or unconditioned, it likewise cannot be said whether it is self or not-self. Therefore the real self clung to in all these ways is not established.

Furthermore: does the real self that is clung to possess thought, or not? If it possesses thought, it must be impermanent, since thought is not present at all times. If it does not possess thought, it would be like space — incapable of performing action or experiencing a result. Either way, the self that is clung to cannot be established.

Furthermore: does the real self that is clung to have function, or not? If it has function, then, like the hands and feet, it must be impermanent. If it has no function, then, like the horns of a rabbit, it cannot be a real self. Either way, the self that is clung to is not established.

Furthermore: is the real self that is clung to the object taken by the view of self, or not? If it is not, then how could you claim to know a real self exists at all? If it is, then that view of self would have to count as accurate perception rather than a distorted view, since it would be knowing something exactly as it is. But if so, why do the very scriptures trusted by those who cling to a self all condemn the view of self and praise the teaching of no-self — saying that freedom from the view of self can realize nirvāṇa, while attachment to it sinks one in birth-and-death? How could a mistaken view realize nirvāṇa, while a correct view instead sinks one in birth-and-death?

Moreover, no view of self ever actually takes a real self as its object, for the simple reason that it has an object at all — like any other mental state that takes an object. And whatever the view of self does take as its object is certainly not a real self, for the simple reason that it is something taken as an object — like anything else so taken. The view of self, then, does not take a real self as its object; it only takes hold of the aggregates that inner consciousness itself has manifested, and, following its own deluded feeling, constructs them in various ways.

Attachment to self, in brief, is of two kinds: innate, and discriminated. Innate self-attachment, through deluded habituation from beginningless time, arises constantly together with the body by its own inner causal power; it does not depend on any mistaken teaching or mistaken discrimination but operates spontaneously — hence it is called innate.

This too is of two kinds. One is continuous and unbroken: located in the seventh consciousness, which takes the eighth consciousness as its object, it generates its own mental image and clings to it as a real self. The other occurs with interruption: located in the sixth consciousness, which takes the appearance of the five grasped aggregates as transformed by consciousness — as a whole or individually — it generates its own mental image and clings to it as a real self. Because these two are subtle, they are hard to sever; only later, on the path of cultivation, through repeated practice of contemplating the emptiness of a higher kind of arising, can they finally be eliminated.

Discriminated self-attachment, by contrast, is brought about by the power of present external conditions; it does not arise together with the body, but requires a mistaken teaching and mistaken discrimination before it can arise — hence it is called discriminated. It exists only in the sixth, cognizing consciousness.

This too is of two kinds: one takes the characteristics of the aggregates as described by a mistaken teaching, generates its own mental image, and constructs it as a real self; the other takes the characteristics of a self as described by a mistaken teaching, generates its own mental image, and constructs it as a real self. Because these two are coarse, they are easy to sever; at the very moment of first entering the path of seeing, by contemplating the true suchness of the emptiness of self in all dharmas, they are eliminated at once.

In every kind of self-attachment just described, an object among the aggregates outside one's own mind may or may not be present — but an object among the aggregates within one's own mind is always present. Every kind of self-attachment, then, takes the impermanent appearance of the five grasped aggregates as its object, and mistakenly clings to it as self. The appearance of the aggregates, since it arises from conditions, exists the way an illusion exists; the self mistakenly clung to, since it is arbitrarily constructed, definitely does not exist at all. As the scripture says: "Monks, you should know that whatever view of self exists among the ascetics and brahmins of this world, all of it takes the five grasped aggregates as its object."

If there is really no self, how could there be such things as memory, recognition, recitation, habit, gratitude, and resentment? — Since the self you cling to is held to be constant and unchanging, whatever comes later should be exactly as what came before, so these changing things should not exist at all; or whatever came before should be exactly as what comes later, so these things should never have failed to exist even earlier. For, on your view, its substance is no different between before and after.

If you answer that it is only the self's function, not its substance, that changes over time, that does not hold up either: function is never apart from substance, so the function should be constant too; and substance is never apart from function, so the substance should not be constant either.

It is, rather, that every sentient being has its own root consciousness, continuing on as a single stream, maintaining seeds, and serving as a mutual cause together with all dharmas — and it is through the power of this habituation that memory, recognition, and the rest are possible. The challenge you raise, then, is a fault in your own position, not in ours.

If there is no real self, who creates karma, and who receives its result? — The self you cling to, being changeless, is just like space: how could it possibly create karma or receive a result? And if it does change, then it must be impermanent. It is, rather, that the mind and mental factors of sentient beings, through the power of causes and conditions, continue on without interruption, and in this way create karma and receive its result — which is in no way inconsistent with reason.

If there is really no self, who revolves through the realms of birth-and-death, and who grows weary of suffering and seeks nirvāṇa? — The self you cling to, being free of arising and ceasing, could hardly be said to revolve through birth-and-death at all; being constant, like space, and untroubled by suffering, why would it ever need to grow weary and seek nirvāṇa? What you say only ever undercuts your own position. It is, rather, that sentient beings, through the continuity of body and mind, revolve through the realms of birth-and-death by the power of afflictions and karma, and, growing weary of suffering, seek nirvāṇa.

From all this, it can be known for certain that there is no real self. There are only the various consciousnesses which, from beginningless time, cease and arise in succession, continuing on as cause and effect; and, through deluded habituation, they give rise to an appearance resembling a self, which the unenlightened mistakenly cling to as self.

How can it be known that no dharmas really exist apart from consciousness? Because the external dharmas clung to by non-Buddhist schools, and by other Buddhist schools, do not, on examination, hold up. How, then, do the positions of the non-Buddhist schools fail to hold up?

Consider first the Sāṃkhya school. They hold that the self (puruṣa) is pure consciousness, which experiences twenty-three principles — "the great" (mahat) and so on — composed out of three factors: sattva, rajas, and tamas. They hold that these principles, being formed by the combination of the three factors, are real, not merely provisional, and are directly perceived as such.

This is unreasonable. Why? Since these principles are formed out of many factors, they should — like an army, or a forest, each made of many separate things — be merely provisional, not real. How, then, can they be said to be directly perceived as single, real things?

Further: if "the great" were truly real, it should be, like the three original factors themselves, not something composed of three parts. And if sattva and the other two just are "the great," then, like "the great," they too should be composed of three parts and subject to change rather than constant — the same problem simply recurs.

Further: since each of the three original factors has many capacities, and capacity and substance are one and the same on your view, each should also have many substances. And since the substance of the three factors pervades everywhere, when one changes in one place, the others should change there too, since their substances are not distinct.

You grant that these three factors are distinct in both substance and characteristic — so how could combining them produce a single characteristic? It should not be that, once combined, they suddenly become a single characteristic, when their substance is no different from what it was before combining. And if you say the three are distinct in substance but identical in characteristic, that contradicts your own tenet that substance and characteristic are one and the same: substance should then be, like the characteristic, obscurely a single thing, or the characteristic should be, like the substance, evidently threefold. Either way, you cannot say the three combine into one.

Further: the three factors are particulars, and "the great" is their universal; and since universal and particular are, on your view, identical, "the great" should be neither simply one nor simply three. When the three change, if they do not combine into a single characteristic, things should remain as they were before changing — so how do we plainly observe a single, continuous form? But if they do combine into a single characteristic, they should lose their original distinct characteristics, and their very substance should be lost along with them.

Nor can you say each of the three has two aspects — a universal aspect and a particular aspect — for since universal and particular are identical on your view, the universal aspect too should be threefold, and then how could it appear as one? And if you say each of the three substances already has all three aspects, mixed together and hard to tell apart, and that this is why they appear as one — then, given that three aspects are genuinely present, how could they appear as one? And for that matter, how would you even know the three factors are distinct in the first place?

If each of the three already possesses all three aspects, then each one alone should be able to produce color and the rest — what would it still be missing, that it should need to wait for the three to combine? And each substance should likewise be threefold, since substance and aspect are identical on your view. Moreover, since every principle of "the great" and so on is alike composed of the same three factors, then compared with one another they should show no difference at all — and the distinctions between cause and effect, between sense-objects and their measures, between the elements, and between the sense-faculties could none of them be established.

If that were so, then a single sense-faculty should apprehend every object, or a single object should be apprehended by every sense-faculty — and the world's plain distinctions between the sentient and the insentient, the pure and the impure, and everything else, along with direct perception and inference themselves, should all collapse into no difference. This is a very great fault. The real dharmas the Sāṃkhya school clings to, then, are not established; they are merely constructed out of deluded feeling and supposed to exist.

The Vaiśeṣika school holds that its categories — substance and the rest — mostly possess real existence, and are directly perceived as such. This is unreasonable. Why? Consider, among these categories, whatever is held to be permanent. If it is capable of producing an effect, it must be impermanent, since it then has a causal function — like the effect it produces. If it produces no effect, it can have no real nature apart from consciousness — like the horns of a rabbit.

Consider, among what is impermanent, whatever has material resistance. It must then have spatial parts, and so must be divisible — like an army, or a forest — and so has no real, independent existence. If it lacks material resistance, then, like mind and mental factors, it can have no real nature apart from these.

Furthermore: on their own view, earth, water, fire, and wind — classified as substances — should have no material resistance, since substance and quality are held to be different categories, yet earth and the rest are perceived by the body's sense of touch, just as hardness, wetness, heat, and motion are. And by the same token, hardness, wetness, heat, and the rest — classified as qualities — should not lack material resistance either, since they too are perceived by the body's sense of touch, just as earth, water, fire, and wind are. Earth, water, and fire, moreover, are all seen by the eye together with their color — the same challenge applies here as well. From this it can be known that there is no real "earth," "water," "fire," or "wind" existing separately from "hardness," "wetness," and the rest; nor does the eye ever actually see a real earth, water, or fire apart from its qualities.

Furthermore: within their category of substance, whatever has material resistance and is nonetheless held to be permanent must, simply because it has material resistance, be impermanent — like a coarse lump of earth. And among all their categories, whatever is grasped by a physical sense faculty but is said to lack material resistance ought instead to have material resistance, since it is granted to be grasped by a physical sense faculty — just as earth, water, fire, and wind are.

Furthermore: whatever is not included among substance, quality, and the rest should have no separate real nature apart from consciousness, precisely because it is not so included — like the son of a barren woman. And whatever is not included under "the existent" should likewise have no separate real nature apart from consciousness, precisely because it is not so included — like a sky-flower.

Their category of "Existence" itself, then: if it is granted to be not nonexistent, it should have no nature separate from substance, quality, and the rest — just as substance and quality themselves need no further "existence" standing behind them. But if it is separate from substance and the rest, it should fail to be Existence at all, precisely because it is admitted to differ from them — like an absolute nonexistent, which is likewise different from them and equally fails to confer existence. Just as "what exists is not nonexistent" without needing some separate thing called "Existence" to make it so, how could substance and the rest need a separate "Existence" of their own? And if, apart from what exists, there must be a separate "Existence," then, apart from what does not exist, there ought equally to be a separate "Non-existence" — but no one holds that. So why hold this? Therefore their "Existence" is nothing but a mistaken construction.

The same dilemma recurs one level down. They also hold that "substance-ness," "quality-ness," and "action-ness" — the specific natures that make something count as a substance, a quality, or an action — are different from substance, quality, and action themselves. This too is unreasonable: on their own logic, being different from substance disqualifies something from being substance-ness, exactly as quality and action, being different from substance, are correctly excluded from being substance-ness — so substance-ness, being just as different from substance, should equally fail to be substance-ness. And, running the same test the other way, substance and the rest should then fail to be included under substance-ness at all, since they are equally different from it.

The identical cross-examination applies again between, say, the specific nature "earth-ness" and the substance earth itself, and so on for every category — by now the pattern should be clear. Substance-ness needs no further "substance-ness-ness" standing behind it any more than substance itself needed a separate "Existence"; and if a separate substance-ness were required for substance to be substance, then a separate "non-substance-ness" should equally be required for what is not substance — which no one holds. Therefore the categories of universality and particularity that generate claims like this are merely provisional constructions.

Furthermore: their category of "inherence" — the special relation that is supposed to bind a substance to its own qualities — is certainly not really existent, since it is not included among Existence, substance, and the rest, any more than an absolute nonexistent is. They themselves grant that substance and the other categories are directly perceived, and yet, examined by reason, even these turn out not to be really existent — how much less, then, could inherence, which they themselves admit is not even directly perceived? And even if one insists that inherence is directly perceived after all, it fails for exactly the same reasons already given.

In fact, none of these — substance and the rest — are ever directly perceived as possessing a real essence apart from consciousness, since they are, by their own admission, merely objects known to the mind — like the proverbial hair of a tortoise. The cognition that takes substance as its object is not a direct perception of some real essence of "substance" existing apart from consciousness, because it arises only through a provisional coming-together of conditions — exactly like the cognition that takes quality as its object. And so on, up through the cognition that takes inherence as its object: it too is not a direct perception of some real essence of "inherence" apart from consciousness, since it likewise arises only through a provisional coming-together of conditions — exactly like the cognition that takes substance as its object.

Therefore the categories of the Vaiśeṣika school — substance and all the rest — are, in the end, nothing more than constructions set up in accordance with deluded feeling.

Some hold that there is a single great sovereign god (Maheśvara), whose substance is real, all-pervading, and eternal, and who generates all dharmas. This is unreasonable. Why? Whatever is capable of generating something cannot be eternal; whatever is not eternal cannot be all-pervading; and whatever is not all-pervading cannot be truly real in the way claimed.

If this god's substance really is eternal and all-pervading, possessing every capacity, then it should generate all dharmas everywhere and at all times, all at once. If it can generate things only when it depends on some desire or condition, this contradicts the claim that it is a single, sufficient cause. And if the desire and the conditions must themselves also arise all at once — since, on this view, the cause is eternally present — the same problem simply recurs.

Others hold that there is a single Brahmā, or time, or space, or a primordial origin, or nature, or the void, or a cosmic self, which is eternal, really existent, possesses every capacity, and generates all dharmas — every one of these is refuted in exactly the same way.

Some hold, more specifically, that the sound of the Vedic scriptures is eternal, and can serve as a definitive means of valid knowledge, expressing and explaining all things; others hold that all sound whatsoever is eternal, and only becomes manifest — and so able to express meaning — when the right conditions bring it out. Both are unreasonable. Why? Consider the sound of the Vedic scriptures first: since it is granted to be able to express meaning, it cannot be eternal, any more than any other sound can. And the substance of sound in general likewise cannot be eternal, since, like a pot or a piece of cloth, it depends on many conditions to come into being.

Some non-Buddhist schools hold that atoms of earth, water, fire, and wind are real and eternal, and capable of generating gross, visible matter; the gross matter so generated does not exceed the measure of its causes, and, though impermanent itself, has a substance that is really existent. This too is unreasonable. Why? If the atoms they posit have spatial parts, then, like a line of marching ants, their substance cannot be truly single and real. If they have no spatial parts, then, like mind and mental factors, they should be incapable of clustering together to produce gross matter as an effect. And since they clearly are capable of producing an effect, then — being, like what they produce, subject to a causal process — how can atoms still be called eternal?

Furthermore: if the effect produced does not exceed the measure of its cause, it should be, like the atom itself, not describable as "gross" at all — and then this resulting matter should not be graspable by the eye or the other physical sense faculties, which contradicts their own position. If they answer that the resulting matter, through a combination of measure and quality, is not truly gross but only appears gross, and so is graspable by the senses — then, since the resulting matter is of the same measure as its cause, it should, like the atom, lack any such combination; or else the atom itself should equally possess it, since, on their view, it occupies the very same place as the gross matter it produces.

If they answer that the resulting matter is spread across all its causal atoms, and, since the causes are not a single thing, it may still be called "gross" — then the substance of the resulting matter should likewise not be a single thing, since the causes it resides in occupy separate places; and in that case it still fails to be gross, and so still cannot be grasped by the senses. If they answer that it becomes gross simply by being composed of many parts — then the many atomic causes, once combined, should already be gross enough to serve as a sense-object by themselves; what further need is there for a separate "result"? And being composed of many parts, the result should not be really existent after all — which contradicts what they claimed at the start.

Furthermore: since both the resulting matter and its causal atoms have material resistance, they should not occupy the same place, any more than two atoms can. If they answer that the substance of the result and of the cause interpenetrate each other, as sand takes in water, or a drug dissolves into molten copper — but who would really grant that the very substance of sand or copper takes in water or a drug, rather than the water merely filling the gaps between grains? Either the result must be separate from its cause, or a transformation of it — and either way, it cannot be both one with the cause and eternal.

Finally: if the substance of the resulting gross matter is a single unity, then grasping one part of it should mean grasping the whole, since the part and the whole would then be one and the same. To deny this contradicts their own logic; to grant it contradicts plain fact. Whichever way they turn, then, their position cannot be established — it is nothing but a mistaken construction, following mere feeling.

Although non-Buddhist schools come in many varieties, what they hold about the relation between a particular existent and its universal "Existence" reduces to only four positions.

First: some hold that a particular existent and "Existence" are definitely identical in substance — the Sāṃkhya school, among others. This is unreasonable. Why? If every dharma simply were identical with "Existence," then all dharmas, being alike identical with it, should show no difference in substance from one another — which contradicts Sāṃkhya's own claim that the three guṇas and the self differ in substance, and also contradicts what the world plainly observes: that things differ from one another. Furthermore, if form were identical with "form-ness," form itself should show no difference between, say, blue and yellow.

Second: some hold that a particular existent and "Existence" are definitely different in substance — the Vaiśeṣika school, among others. This is unreasonable. Why? If this were so, no dharma would actually possess Existence at all, so that, like something already vanished into nonexistence, its substance could never be found — which contradicts their own claim that the substance of substance and the rest is not nonexistent, and also contradicts what the world plainly observes: that things do exist. Furthermore, if form were different from "form-ness," form should be, like sound, something the eye cannot perceive.

Third: some hold that a particular existent and "Existence" are both identical and different. This is unreasonable. Why? The "identical" half faces every fault just given against identity, and the "different" half faces every fault just given against difference. Moreover, since being identical and being different are mutually contradictory, their substances would have to be distinct — so a single thing being, in one substance, both identical and different at once cannot be established. And if they retreat to saying not every dharma need share a single substance in this way, then "identical" and "different" become merely provisional labels, not real — so treating them as real is, either way, untenable.

Fourth: some hold that a particular existent and "Existence" are neither identical nor different — the Ājīvika school, among others. This is unreasonable. Why? "Neither identical nor different" faces the same difficulty as "both identical and different," since it too presupposes a definite relation between identity and difference. And does the phrase "neither identical nor different" function as a denial, or as an assertion? If purely an assertion, it should not be phrased as a double negation; if purely a denial, then nothing is actually being claimed; if both denial and assertion at once, the two sides contradict each other; if neither assertion nor denial, it collapses into empty chatter. Moreover, "neither identical nor different" contradicts what the world plainly knows — that any two things are either identical or different — and it also contradicts their own school's insistence that form and the other existents are definitely, really existent. This claim, then, is nothing but an evasive dodge meant to escape every fault already raised — the wise should not be misled into accepting it.

How is it that the form and other dharmas which other Buddhist schools hold to really exist apart from consciousness are not, in fact, real? Because what they hold to be real — form, the forces disjoined from mind, and the unconditioned dharmas — do not hold up on examination. The form they posit is, broadly, of two kinds: resistant form, composed of atoms, and non-resistant form, not composed of atoms.

Resistant form is certainly not really existent, because the atoms supposed to compose it are not really existent either. If atoms have material resistance, they should, like a pot, be merely provisional, not real — since a pot, too, is a composite. If they lack material resistance, they should be, like non-material things, incapable of combining into a pot or a piece of cloth.

Furthermore: if atoms have spatial parts, they must be divisible, and so cannot be really existent. If they have no spatial parts, then, like non-material things, how could they combine to catch light and cast shadow? The moment the sun rises and shines on a pillar, light appears on the east side and shadow on the west; since the side that catches light and the side that casts shadow are not the same, the atoms they posit must have spatial parts. Furthermore: when one sees or touches a wall, one apprehends only this side, not that other part. Since a combined object just is its atoms, those atoms must have spatial parts.

Furthermore: wherever an atom is located, it must have an upper side, a lower side, and the four directions distinguished — otherwise there would be no way for atoms to combine and cluster together at all; lacking such distinctions, they would simply merge into and interpenetrate one another, and could never form anything gross. For this reason, atoms must have spatial parts. And since resistant form is held to just be these atoms, if the atoms had no spatial parts, there would be no obstruction between them at all — but then they would not really be "resistant" in the first place.

Therefore, the atoms you posit must have spatial parts; and having spatial parts, they must be divisible, and so cannot be really existent. Resistant form, then, is not established as really existent.

But don't the five sense-consciousnesses need some real form as their basis and object? — It is not that there is no form at all; it is that this form is a transformation of consciousness. That is: when consciousness arises, through the power of its own inner causes and conditions, it transforms and manifests an appearance resembling the eye-faculty, resembling color, and so on — and it is this very appearance that serves as their basis and object.

The eye-faculty and the other sense-faculties, however, are never directly perceived; their existence is only inferred from their capacity to give rise to consciousness. They are, in other words, a capacity, not something built from outside materials. Since resistant form existing externally has already been shown not to hold up, it should be understood that what is called the "eye-faculty" and so on is only what inner consciousness itself transforms and manifests, capable of giving rise to eye-consciousness and the rest — and it is this that serves as the basis from which eye-consciousness and the rest arise.

Since eye-consciousness and the rest have, on examination, no external object-condition, it must be granted that what consciousness itself transforms serves as this object-condition: whatever gives rise to an appearance resembling itself within consciousness is what should be recognized as its object-condition. It cannot simply mean "whatever gives rise to it" in any sense — otherwise even a general causal condition would have to count as this consciousness's object-condition, which is absurd.

When eye-consciousness and the other four take color and the rest as their object, they take only the combined appearance, because only this resembles the object; that combined appearance has no real, independent essence apart from the individual atoms. Once the combination is analyzed apart into individual atoms, the consciousness bearing that resembling appearance no longer arises at all — so, since the combined appearance is not really existent, it cannot be the true object of the five sense-consciousnesses, any more than a double-vision "second moon" could give rise to real sense-consciousness of a second moon.

Nor can atoms, even combined, individually serve as the object taken by the five sense-consciousnesses, since no image of a single atom ever appears within that consciousness. Nor do atoms possess some further real "combined appearance," since this appearance is absent when they are not combined. And since these atoms have exactly the same substance and characteristics whether combined or not, then — just as in the uncombined state — the atoms of color and the rest are not the true object of the five sense-consciousnesses even when combined.

Some hold that while an individual atom is not the sense-object when uncombined, in the combined state the atoms mutually support one another and a gross appearance arises which becomes the object — and that this appearance is really existent. This does not hold up: the combined state has exactly the same substance and characteristics as the uncombined state, so nothing new and really existent has actually appeared. If the atoms composing a pot and a bowl were equal in kind and number, the consciousness perceiving each should be indistinguishable — which is absurd. And in combining, each atom would have to give up its minute, round characteristic to form the gross whole — but then a consciousness bearing a gross appearance cannot really be taking a subtle-appearance object at all; otherwise, one consciousness could just as well take any object for any other, and a single consciousness would end up able to perceive everything at once.

Even granting that atoms exist, this leads to such absurdities — how much more so if, apart from consciousness, there are no real atoms at all! From this it can be known for certain that it is only the appearance resembling color and the rest, transformed by consciousness itself, that serves as the object-condition: seeing arises in dependence on this appearance, and bears its very characteristics.

When consciousness transforms, it manifests, all at once, a single appearance of whatever size it is; it does not separately transform into many individual atoms that then combine into one thing. For the sake of those who cling to gross matter as having a real, substantial body, the Buddha spoke of atoms in order to lead them to analyze that solidity away — not to claim that form is actually, really made of atoms.

Practitioners of meditation, using the power of analytical reflection, progressively break down the appearance of gross matter, further and further, until it can be broken down no further, and provisionally call this an "atom." Although such an atom still, strictly speaking, has spatial parts, it can no longer actually be divided in practice; divide it once more and it seems to dissolve into empty space, no longer describable as form at all. Hence it is said that the atom is the edge of form — the point where analysis of matter runs out, not a real thing found at the bottom of it.

From this it should be understood that all resistant form is a manifestation of consciousness's own transformation, not something composed of atoms. Non-resistant form belongs to the same category, and so is likewise not really existent — or else, being non-resistant, it must, like mind and mental factors, certainly not be real form at all. Resistant form, which clearly displays the characteristics of form, has, on careful examination, no existence apart from consciousness — how much less, then, could non-resistant form, which does not even display the characteristics of form, be called a real, substantial dharma?

But aren't expressed form and unexpressed form really existent? — They are not. Why? Consider bodily expression first: if it is really existent, what is its nature? If one says it is shape, it cannot be really existent, since shape can be analyzed into parts, and no atom of "length" or the like can ever actually be found. If one says it is motion, that too is not really existent: the moment a conditioned thing arises, it ceases — there is no enduring thing that "moves." The ceasing of a conditioned dharma depends on no further cause; for if ceasing depended on a cause, it would not really be ceasing at all.

If one says bodily expression is a kind of form that is neither color nor shape, generated by mind, capable of moving the hand and so on — this too is unreasonable. If it is itself a kind of motion, the fault already given applies again. If it is instead the cause of motion, it should just be the physical force of wind — but wind has no expressive power, and should not be called "expression." Moreover, the sense of touch, through which such a force would be felt, should not carry moral weight the way expression is supposed to — unlike color, sound, or taste, touch is not the kind of thing that is wholesome or unwholesome in itself. Bodily expression, then, is certainly not really existent.

Rather, it is mind that serves as the cause: it makes the appearance of the hand and so on, as transformed by consciousness, arise and cease in unbroken succession, shifting from place to place, so that it seems as though there were real movement. Because this expresses what is in the mind, it is provisionally called "bodily expression."

Verbal expression likewise has no really existent nature as sound: a single instant of sound cannot express meaning, and sound continuing across many moments cannot be really existent either, since that would just be resistant external form — already refuted above. Rather, it is because of mind that consciousness transforms into an appearance resembling sound, arising and ceasing in unbroken succession, so that it seems as though there were real expression; calling this "verbal expression" is, understood this way, in no way inconsistent with reason.

If expressed form is not really existent, how could unexpressed form be real? Yet, based on the limits set by wholesome or unwholesome intention and vow, "unexpressed form" can be provisionally established, and this too is not inconsistent with reason. It is established either based on the stage where the seeds of a strong wholesome or unwholesome bodily or verbal intention have increased and grown, or based on the stage, within meditative concentration, where the active manifestation of an unwholesome bodily or verbal intention has been suppressed. Either way, it exists only provisionally.

The World-Honored One teaches, in the sūtras, that there are three kinds of karma — doesn't denying bodily and verbal karma contradict scripture? — We do not deny that they exist; we only say that they are not physical form. The volition capable of moving the body is called bodily karma; the volition capable of producing speech is called verbal karma. The two kinds of volition — deliberating and deciding — being associated with mind and constituting its activity, are called mental karma.

The volition that gives rise to bodily and verbal action, insofar as it actually accomplishes something, is called karma; and, since it is the path that deliberating and deciding volition travels, and since it universally produces the ripened results of suffering or happiness, it is also called a "path." The first seven paths of karma, then, likewise have volition as their true nature; bodily and verbal expression, being brought about by volition, are only provisionally called "karma" — and, since volition is what travels this path, it is called a "path of karma."

From all this, it should be understood that there really is no external form at all — there is only inner consciousness, transforming and manifesting an appearance resembling form.

The forces disjoined from mind are likewise not really existent. Why? "Possession" and "non-possession," and the rest, cannot be apprehended as having their own substance and characteristics the way form, mind, and the mental factors can; nor can they be apprehended as having some function distinct from form, mind, and the mental factors. From this it can be known that they are certainly not really existent — they are merely provisionally established, based on the condition of form and the rest.

They certainly have no real substance or function apart from form, mind, and the mental factors, since, if they did, they would have to be counted among the aggregates just as form, mind, and the mental factors are — and they are not. Or else: since they are included among neither mind, mental factors, form, nor the unconditioned, they are, like an absolute nonexistent, certainly not really existent. Or else: since they are included among none of the other real dharmas, they have, like other merely provisional dharmas, no really existent substance at all.

How, then, do they claim to know that "possession" and "non-possession" have real substance and function apart from form, mind, and the rest? Because scripture says so — as when it is said, "such a person possesses wholesome or unwholesome qualities," or "the noble ones possess the ten qualities of one beyond training"; or when it is said, "the unenlightened do not possess the noble dharmas," "arhats do not possess the afflictions." But scripture never says that this "possessing" has real substance and function apart from form, mind, and the rest — cited as proof, then, it proves nothing.

Scripture also says a wheel-turning king "possesses" the seven treasures — does this mean he really possesses another person's body, or some insentient object? If you answer that this only means he has mastery over the treasures, and "possession" is spoken of provisionally in that sense — then why not allow the very same for wholesome and unwholesome qualities, rather than insisting on a real "possession" there? And if you say the seven treasures exist in the present and so can be provisionally said to be possessed — how, then, would you know that the wholesome and unwholesome qualities supposedly "possessed" exist apart from the present moment at all? Nothing exists, in reason, apart from what is presently real — wholesome seeds and the like must always be present.

Furthermore, what special function would "possession" actually have with respect to a dharma? If you say it causes a dharma to arise, then it should also cause unconditioned dharmas to arise — and every insentient thing should then never arise at all, and whatever has not yet been possessed, or has already been lost, should then never arise again. If arising is said to depend jointly on possession together with some other cause, then positing possession alongside that cause is pointless. And if a person possesses the "possession" of wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral dharmas all at once, then all three should manifest at the very same instant — but if their actual manifestation still waits on other conditions, then possession itself turns out to do no real work.

If you say that "possession," with respect to a dharma, simply means that dharma is not lost — so that a person "possesses" it in that sense — then whatever dharmas can be so possessed are never apart from that person to begin with, and cannot be really found apart from them at all. "Possession" is, either way, useless. And since possession does not really exist, non-possession does not exist either.

Rather, based on the condition under which a sentient being can be said to accomplish various dharmas, three kinds of "accomplishment" are provisionally established: accomplishment by way of seeds, accomplishment by way of mastery, and accomplishment by way of manifest activity. "Non-accomplishment" is provisionally established as their reverse. Though such cases are numerous, at the stage where the seeds to be severed by the path of seeing have not yet been permanently destroyed, "non-possession" is provisionally established under the name "the nature of an ordinary, unenlightened being" — since, at that stage, the noble dharmas have not yet been accomplished.

How, further, is it known that there is a real "sameness of kind" distinct from form, mind, and the rest? Because scripture says so — as when scripture speaks of "the sameness of kind among the gods," "the sameness of kind among humans," and so on. But scripture never says that this "sameness of kind" has real substance apart from form, mind, and the rest — cited as proof, it proves nothing.

If you say it must really exist because it produces a shared cognition and shared way of speaking about members of one kind, then grass and trees too — which are also spoken of and recognized in shared kinds — should have a "sameness of kind." And if a shared cognition of sameness requires an underlying "sameness of kind," then that sameness of kind itself, being likewise recognized as shared across many individuals, should need some further "sameness of kind" behind it — but no one holds that, so why hold it here? If you say it is real because it causes shared activity and shared desire among members of a kind — that fails too: past habituation alone is enough to explain shared activity and shared desire, with no need to posit anything further. Rather, based on the resemblance of body and mind among sentient beings, and the particular conditions that distinguish one from another, "sameness of kind" is provisionally established.

How, further, is it known that there is a real "life faculty" distinct from form, mind, and the rest? Because scripture says so — as when scripture says: "Life, warmth, and consciousness, these three — the life faculty should be understood as what is called life." But scripture never says that "life" has real substance apart from form, mind, and the rest — cited as proof, it proves nothing.

Moreover, since it has already been shown that form is not apart from consciousness, there can be no separate life faculty apart from consciousness either. And if the life faculty were really different from consciousness, it should, like feeling and the other mental factors, not really be a life faculty in its own right.

If so, why does scripture speak of three separate things? — They are distinguished as three only to bring out different aspects of meaning, just as a single effort is spoken of as "the four right exertions." In the state without conscious activity, should life and warmth then be absent — yet doesn't scripture say consciousness never leaves the living body? Given this, how could that state even be called "without mind"? — It is the evolving consciousnesses that cease there, not the ālayavijñāna; the reasons for this will be explained at length later. This consciousness alone is sufficient to serve as the basis of whatever realm, destiny, and birth one is in — being all-pervading, constant, and continuous, itself a ripened karmic result — so there is no need to posit, on top of it, some separately real "life faculty." Rather, based on the seed that directly gives rise to this consciousness, whose distinct capacity, shaped by karma, fixes how long a life will last, the "life faculty" is provisionally established.

How, further, is it known that the two mindless attainments and the ripened result of no-thought have a real nature distinct from form, mind, and the rest? — They argue: without a real nature, these could not block mind and mental factors from manifesting. But by the same logic, if the mindless state requires some separate real dharma, distinct from form, mind, and the rest, to block mind — call it the "mindless attainment" — then the formless state should equally require some separate real dharma to obstruct form, and no one holds that. Why, then, hold it here?

Besides, why should blocking mind require a real, substantial dharma at all? A dike or an embankment blocks water perfectly well, and it is nothing more than an ordinary, provisional arrangement of earth.

What actually happens is this: when cultivating meditative concentration, in its preparatory stage, one grows weary of coarse, agitated mind and mental factors, and forms a resolute aspiration to block them. This makes mind and mental factors grow gradually subtler and fainter, and, at the point of extremely faint mental activity, this perfumes the ripening consciousness, forming an intensified seed of aversion to agitation. Because of this, the seeds of coarse mental activity are weakened and suppressed, so that such activity temporarily does not manifest — and it is on this basis that the two attainments are provisionally established. Since the seed involved is wholesome, the attainment itself is also called wholesome.

Before entering the attainment of no-thought, one seeks the result of no-thought as a future rebirth; the seed formed through this perfuming then draws forth that ripened state. Based on the condition, within that state, where coarse conceptualization does not operate, "no-thought" is provisionally established as its name; and since it is established on the basis of a ripened karmic result, it takes the name "ripened." All three of these, then — the two attainments and their ripened result — are, like everything else examined in this fascicle, not really existent.