Contact, Attention, and What the Ālaya Feels

With how many mental factors does this consciousness associate? It constantly associates with contact, attention, feeling, perception, and volition. From beginningless time, until it is finally transformed, the ālayavijñāna constantly associates with these five mental factors in every state, since they are the universally-operating mental factors.

"Contact" means the distinctive change arising from the coming-together of three things — faculty, object, and consciousness — mutually according with one another; its nature is to bring mind and mental factors into contact with an object, and its function is to serve as the basis for feeling, perception, volition, and the rest. Contact arises in dependence on this coming-together, and in turn unites them — hence it is said to belong to them. At the very moment the three come together, a capacity favorable to generating further mental factors is already present — this is its "transformation." Contact arises resembling this coming-together — hence it is called "distinctive."

Since it is specifically the faculty's own transformation that draws contact into being, and this outweighs the consciousness and object in explanatory importance here, some treatises speak only of the faculty's transformation. Uniting all of mind and mental factors, bringing them together onto their object, is contact's essential nature — and since it already favors the arising of further mental factors, serving as their basis is its function.

The Sūtra on Arising and Ceasing says the aggregates of feeling, perception, and formations are all conditioned by contact — which is why consciousness, contact, feeling, and the rest are said to arise from the coming-together of two, three, or four factors, depending on the case. The Yogācārabhūmi names contact as the basis specifically for feeling, perception, and volition because volition is the foremost member of the formations-aggregate, and naming it stands in for the rest. Other texts name it specifically as the basis for feeling because contact's production of feeling is especially immediate and forceful: the pleasant-or-otherwise character contact grasps and the favorable-or-harmful character feeling grasps are extremely close to one another.

Contact's own nature, however, is real, not merely provisional: it counts as a genuine mental factor among the standard enumerations, it is included among the nutriments, and it can serve as a condition — just like feeling and the other genuine mental factors. It is not simply identical with the bare coming-together of the three that gives rise to it.

"Attention" has, as its nature, the capacity to rouse the mind; its function is to draw the mind toward its object. This rousing draws out the very seed that ought to give rise to mind, directing it toward its object — hence the name. Though it also rouses the mental factors, since mind is the principal, it is simply said to "draw the mind."

Some say attention means turning the mind toward a different object, or holding the mind steady on a single object — but neither account is correct: were that its meaning, it could not operate universally across every state of mind, and it would be indistinguishable from concentration, which specifically means holding the mind steady on one object.

"Feeling" has, as its nature, the receiving of an object's character as favorable, unfavorable, or neither; its function is to give rise to craving, since it can produce the desire for union, for separation, or for neither.

Some say feeling is of two kinds: "object-feeling," which receives the object itself, and "own-nature feeling," which receives the accompanying contact — and that only the latter is feeling's true character, since object-feeling shares its character with other mental factors. This is unreasonable: feeling certainly does not take the contact arising alongside it as its object. If feeling is said to "receive contact" merely because it arises resembling and following from contact, then every effect resembling its cause would have to count as feeling. And if this "own-nature feeling" is really just contact's effect, it should be called "feeling caused by contact," not "feeling's own nature" at all.

If one answers that feeling "receives" contact-produced feeling the way a king "consumes" the cities of his realm — meaning governs, not literally eats — this too fails, since it contradicts their own claim that feeling does not cognize itself. And if "own-nature feeling" simply means "not departing from one's own nature," then every dharma whatsoever would qualify, since everything equally doesn't depart from its own nature. What is said here is fit only to placate small children. Object-feeling, in truth, shares its character with nothing else: receiving an object's favorable-or-otherwise character, definitely as one's own, is uniquely feeling's own affair.

"Perception" has, as its nature, the grasping of an image with respect to an object; its function is to establish various verbal designations — only once an object's boundary-marks are established can such designations follow. "Volition" has, as its nature, causing the mind to act; its function is to drive the mind toward wholesome activity and the like — grasping an object's correct causal character and driving one's own mind to act accordingly.

Since these five are among the universally-operating factors, they certainly associate with the storehouse consciousness; their universal character will be explained more fully later. Though contact and the rest differ from the ripening consciousness in specific perceiving-activity, they share its time and basis, and match it in object and in number — hence they are said to "associate" with it.

This consciousness's perceiving-activity is extremely unclear and indistinct; it cannot discriminate an object as favorable or unfavorable. Being subtle, uniform, and continuous, it therefore associates only with neutral feeling. Furthermore, the feeling associated with it is only ever true ripening, following the power of karma that projected it long ago — it does not depend on present conditions, operating purely through the force of past wholesome or unwholesome karma, and so is only ever neutral. Painful and pleasant feelings are "ripened arisings" rather than true ripening in this strict sense, since they depend on present conditions — and so are not associated with this consciousness.

Furthermore, it is precisely because this consciousness is constant and never felt to change that sentient beings constantly cling to it as an inner self; were it associated with painful or pleasant feeling, it would then be felt to change — and how, then, could it still be clung to as self? Hence it associates only with neutral feeling.

If so, how can this consciousness also be the ripened result of unwholesome karma? — Since wholesome karma is already granted to bring about neutral feeling, the same should hold for unwholesome karma too: neutral feeling conflicts with neither the painful nor the pleasant class, just as a morally neutral dharma in general can be brought about by either wholesome or unwholesome karma.

Why does this consciousness not associate with the five "particular" mental factors? Because each one contradicts its nature. Desire operates by hoping for something longed for — but this consciousness operates spontaneously, hoping for nothing. Resolve operates by firmly holding a settled matter — but this consciousness is too dim to hold anything firmly. Mindfulness operates only by clearly remembering something previously practiced — but this consciousness is too weak to remember clearly. Concentration fixes the mind on a single object — but this consciousness operates spontaneously, taking a different object moment by moment. Wisdom operates only by discerning merit from fault — but this consciousness is too faint to discern anything at all. For these reasons, it does not associate with the particular mental factors.

Since this consciousness is purely of a ripening nature, it likewise does not associate with wholesome or defiled factors. As for regret and the other three factors classed only as "indeterminate" — being subject to interruption, they certainly cannot be of a true ripening nature either.

Dharmas are of four kinds: wholesome, unwholesome, obstructed-indeterminate, and unobstructed-indeterminate. Which does the ālayavijñāna belong to? This consciousness is purely unobstructed-indeterminate, since it is of a ripening nature. If the ripening consciousness were wholesome or defiled, the whole cycle of transmigration and its cessation could never be established. Moreover, this consciousness serves as the basis for both wholesome and defiled activity; were it itself one or the other, it could not — since wholesome and defiled contradict each other — serve as the basis for both. And since this consciousness has the very nature of what can be perfumed, if it were already wholesome or defiled, it would, like something intensely fragrant or foul, be incapable of taking on any further impression — and without that capacity, the causes and effects of both defilement and purification could never be established at all. Hence this consciousness is purely unobstructed-indeterminate.

"Obstructed" means that a defiled dharma obstructs the noble path, and also clouds the mind, rendering it impure — since this consciousness is not defiled, it is called "unobstructed." "Determinate" means having a wholesome or unwholesome quality, producing a desirable or undesirable result, with a distinctive nature specific enough to be designated one way or the other — since this consciousness is neither wholesome nor unwholesome, it is called "indeterminate."

"Contact and the rest are likewise so" means: just as the ālayavijñāna is purely unobstructed-indeterminate, so too are contact, attention, feeling, perception, and volition — since factors that associate together must necessarily share the same moral nature.

A further view holds: contact and the rest, just like the ālaya, are also "ripening" and "possessing all seeds," and so on down to "unobstructed-indeterminate," since the phrase "likewise so" makes no distinction and so should apply across the board. This is unreasonable. Why? Contact and the rest depend on consciousness and are not self-sufficient, just as craving, faith, and the other mental factors cannot themselves be perfumed — so how could they, like consciousness itself, be capable of holding seeds?

Furthermore, if contact and the rest could also be perfumed, a single sentient being would end up with six separate seed-holding substances. If so, which one would any given result actually arise from? It cannot arise from all six at once, since we never observe many seeds jointly producing a single sprout.

If it arises from only one, the other five seeds would be entirely useless. Nor can they produce their results in sequence, since all six are perfumed simultaneously with equal force; nor can all six results arise at once, since that would absurdly mean six eye-consciousnesses arising together within a single instant for one being.

Who, though, ever claimed that contact and the rest can themselves be perfumed and hold seeds? If not, then how can they, like consciousness, be called "possessing all seeds"? — Because contact and the other four have an appearance resembling seeds in this looser sense, sharing the same object as consciousness; even though formless, they must still have some object, and so a direct condition of objective support must certainly be present for them as well. This seed-resembling appearance, however, does not actually serve as a genuine cause producing manifest consciousness, just as the eye-faculty-resembling appearance within contact is not itself a real basis for consciousness, and just as an image resembling fire has no actual power to burn.

This attempted rescue does not hold up: any seed-resembling character among the objects of contact and the rest should only be compared to consciousness's own object later, in the specific context of "grasping-and-holding" — not appealed to here. The earlier phrase "possessing all seeds," then, definitely refers specifically to the capacity to be perfumed and to hold seeds — otherwise the root verse would contain a pointless repetition.

Furthermore, the claim that "likewise so" makes no distinction and so must apply across the board proves nothing: taken that far, contact and the other four would also have to be capable of discerning cognition, and would have to associate with further instances of contact and the rest — an absurd, endless regress. "Likewise so," then, means only what is appropriate in each respective case — not that literally everything applies without exception.

Is the ālayavijñāna impermanent, or permanent? Neither impermanent nor permanent, since it "constantly flows." "Constant" means this consciousness, from beginningless time, continues as a single, unbroken kind, never interrupted — it is the very basis on which the realms, destinies, and modes of birth are established, and its stable nature holds seeds without letting them be lost. "Flows" means this consciousness, from beginningless time, arises and ceases moment by moment, changing from one instant to the next — its cause ceasing exactly as its result arises, never remaining a single unchanging thing — and so it can be perfumed by the evolving consciousnesses to form new seeds. "Constant" rules out interruption; "flows" shows it is not permanent — it is exactly like a rushing torrent, cause and effect simply operating according to their own nature.

Just as the water of a rushing torrent is neither interrupted nor permanent, and yet, continuing over a long span, carries things along and can drown them — so too this consciousness, continuing in arising and ceasing from beginningless time, is neither permanent nor interrupted, and carries sentient beings along, keeping them from escaping saṃsāra. And just as a torrent, though struck by wind, raises waves on its surface without its flow ever breaking — so too this consciousness, though it encounters countless conditions and gives rise to the eye-consciousness and the rest, nevertheless continues constantly, without interruption. And just as a torrent carries fish, grass, and other things along on and beneath its surface, never releasing them from the current — so too this consciousness moves constantly together with its own inner habitual tendencies and outer factors like contact.

The point of this teaching and its simile is to show that this consciousness's beginningless causal process is neither interrupted nor permanent. This consciousness's nature, from beginningless time, has its result arise and its cause cease in every single instant. Because the result arises, it is not interrupted; because the cause ceases, it is not permanent. Being neither interrupted nor permanent is exactly the principle of dependent origination — hence it is said that this consciousness constantly flows, like a torrent.

An objection: given that the past and future are not really, substantially existent, "not permanent" is understandable — but how can it also be "not interrupted"? How could mere interruption ever amount to the correct principle of dependent origination? And on the other hand: if the past and future WERE really, substantially existent, "not interrupted" would be understandable — but then how could it be "not permanent"? Permanence, too, would fail to be the correct principle of dependent origination.

Does merely pointing out a fault in another's position thereby establish one's own? — Without refuting what is mistaken, it is hard to make clear what is correct. At the very moment a prior cause ceases, the subsequent result arises at once — just as the two ends of a scale rise and fall at exactly the same time. Cause and effect continue on in just this way, like a flowing stream. What need is there to posit a substantially real past and future in order to establish "not interrupted"?

Turning the challenge back: at the very moment a cause presently exists, its later result has not yet arisen — so of what, exactly, is it "the cause" at that point? At the moment a result presently exists, its prior cause has already ceased — so of what is it "the result"? If there is no genuine relation of cause and effect at all on your view, how can you claim to have escaped either eternalism or nihilism yourself?

And if the result already existed at the very time the cause existed, then, since the result would already inherently exist, what need would it have to wait for a prior cause at all? If the very notion of "cause" collapses this way, how could "effect" still stand? With neither genuine cause nor genuine effect, how have you escaped eternalism or nihilism either? On our own account, cause and effect are established simply in terms of a dharma's functional activity — so this whole challenge never even touches our position.

Some other schools say: although there is no substantially real past or future, cause and effect can still genuinely continue. Even an extremely swift present dharma still has an earlier and a later moment — arising and ceasing. At the moment of arising, it repays its cause; at the moment of ceasing, it draws forth its effect. Though there are two moments, the substance is one and the same: the prior cause is ceasing exactly as the later effect is arising — their characteristics differ, but both exist at that shared instant. Causation understood this way is not merely provisional, yet it avoids both eternalism and nihilism, and faces none of the difficulties raised earlier — what wise person would abandon this account for another?

This is empty talk, with no real substance behind it. How could a single instant contain two separate moments? Arising and ceasing contradict each other — how could both belong to the very same present? If ceasing belongs to the present, arising should then belong to the future. "Existing" is what defines arising — if that counts as present, then ceasing, defined by "not existing," should count as past, not present. And if ceasing is not simply nonexistence, arising should not simply be existence either; and if arising genuinely exists in the present, ceasing should then be simply absent from it — being mutually contradictory this way, how could the two share one substance?

We never observe this kind of thing happening even with pleasure and pain and the like. If arising and ceasing were truly one and the same, there should not really be two separate moments; if they are genuinely different, how can their substance be called the same? The claim that arising-moment and ceasing-moment are both simultaneously present, sharing one substance, simply cannot be sustained. The Sautrāntikas' account of causal continuity likewise cannot be sustained, since they do not accept an ālayavijñāna capable of holding seeds in the first place. From all this, one should believe in the Mahāyāna's account of dependent-origination causal continuity.

This consciousness constantly flows, like a torrent, from beginningless time — so at what stage is it finally, ultimately relinquished? Only at the stage of the arhat. That is: when a noble one has completely exhausted the afflictive obstruction, they are called an arhat, and at that point, since this consciousness is forever free of coarse, heavy affliction, it is said to be "relinquished."

The term "arhat" here encompasses the fruit of no-further-learning across all three vehicles alike, since all have permanently slain the thief of affliction, are worthy of the world's finest offerings, and will never again undergo ordinary birth-and-death.

How is this known? The Yogācārabhūmi's "Chapter of Investigation" says that arhats, pratyekabuddhas, and tathāgatas alike do not possess the ālaya. The Abhidharmasamuccaya further says that when bodhisattvas attain awakening, they simultaneously sever both the afflictive and the cognitive obstructions, thereby becoming both arhats and tathāgatas at once.

If so, bodhisattvas whose afflictive seeds have not yet been permanently severed — and who are therefore not yet arhats — should still possess the ālayavijñāna. Why, then, does that same chapter say even "non-retreating" bodhisattvas do not possess it? — That passage speaks of practitioners of the two lesser vehicles who, having already reached the fruit of no-further-learning, turn their aspiration toward great awakening: since they will certainly never again lapse into the afflictive obstruction, and are now heading toward awakening, they are simply renamed "non-retreating bodhisattvas" at that point — they are already included within "arhat" as just defined, so the passage does not actually conflict with this account.

A further view holds: it is only bodhisattvas at the Immovable Ground — the eighth — and above who truly count as "non-retreating," since from that point on no affliction ever manifests again; they proceed spontaneously within the swift stream of the Dharma; they can give rise to every kind of practice within a single practice; and they advance moment by moment without cease. Though such a bodhisattva has not yet completely severed the afflictive seeds within the ripening consciousness, the self-view and self-love that take this consciousness as their object no longer cling to and store it as an inner self — so the name "ālaya" is permanently relinquished here, and such a bodhisattva is also called an "arhat" in this sense.

Another view holds: it is already bodhisattvas at the First Ground and above, since they have already realized the principle revealed by the two emptinesses, attained the two kinds of superior wisdom, and severed the two discriminated obstructions; they can give rise to every practice within a single practice; and though they may still give rise to afflictions for the sake of benefiting beings, those afflictions produce no real fault — these too are called "non-retreating." Though such a bodhisattva has not yet fully severed innate affliction, the discriminated self-view and self-love that take this consciousness as their object no longer cling to and store it as self — so the name "ālaya" is likewise relinquished here too, and such a bodhisattva is also called an "arhat." Hence the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: though bodhisattvas across the ten grounds have not yet permanently severed every affliction, these afflictions, like poison suppressed by a spell or medicine, produce no fault — so, throughout these grounds, such bodhisattvas are, like an arhat who has already severed affliction, likewise called "arhat."

This position is unreasonable. Prior to the Seventh Ground, bodhisattvas still have innate self-view and self-love, which cling to and store this consciousness as an inner self — how, then, could they already have relinquished the name "ālaya"? And if merely no longer clinging to it via the discriminated forms of self-view and self-love were enough to count as "relinquishing," then stream-enterers and others still in training — who have likewise already severed the discriminated views — should equally have already relinquished the name "ālaya." But granting that directly contradicts what every treatise says.

One might object: the afflictions arising in bodhisattvas above the first ground all occur through correct knowledge and so produce no fault — stream-enterers have no such quality, so how can they be compared? — But although the afflictions arising within these bodhisattvas' six active consciousnesses do occur through correct knowledge and produce no fault, their seventh consciousness, in its contaminated state, still spontaneously and actively clings to and stores this eighth consciousness as a self — so how is this genuinely any different from the case of stream-enterers? From this it can be known that the first-ground view is unreasonable.

In fact, it is only the arhat — having completely, finally exhausted the coarse, heavy afflictions within this consciousness — who no longer clings to and stores the ālayavijñāna as an inner self. It is this that permanently loses the name "ālaya," and this is what "relinquished" means — not that the entire eighth consciousness itself is discarded. Otherwise, an arhat would have no consciousness left at all to hold seeds, and would, at that very moment, simply enter final nirvāṇa without remainder — which plainly does not happen.

Although every sentient being, without exception, possesses this eighth consciousness, various names are given to it depending on the particular aspect being emphasized. It is sometimes called "mind" (心), since it accumulates the seeds deposited by countless dharmas' perfuming. It is sometimes called "ādāna" (阿陀那, the appropriator), since it grasps and holds the seeds and the physical sense-faculties, keeping them from decaying. It is sometimes called "the basis of the knowable" (所知依), since it supports every defiled and pure knowable dharma. It is sometimes called "the seed-consciousness" (種子識), since it universally holds the seeds of both mundane and supramundane dharmas. These four names apply across every stage, without exception, from ordinary beings up through Buddhas.

It is sometimes called "ālaya" (storehouse), since it takes in and stores every defiled dharma without letting it be lost, and since self-view and self-love cling to it and store it as an inner self. This name applies only to ordinary beings and those still in training — not to those beyond training or non-retreating bodhisattvas — since it specifically carries the sense of storing defilement as a clung-to self.

It is sometimes called "the ripening consciousness," since it draws forth the ripened results of wholesome and unwholesome karma that lead to birth-and-death. This name applies only to ordinary beings, the two lesser vehicles, and bodhisattvas — not to the stage of a Tathāgata, since only up to that point does it still carry morally indeterminate ripened dharmas.

It is sometimes called "the stainless consciousness" (無垢識), since it supports the most utterly pure, uncontaminated dharmas. This name exists only at the stage of a Tathāgata: bodhisattvas, the two lesser vehicles, and ordinary beings still hold contaminated seeds capable of receiving further perfuming, and have not yet attained a wholesome, pure eighth consciousness.

As scripture says, in verse: "The Tathāgata's stainless consciousness is the pure, uncontaminated realm, liberated from every obstruction, associated with the wisdom of the great perfect mirror." The name "ālaya" is singled out for special mention because its associated fault is the most serious, and because it is the very first of these names to be relinquished. "The ripening consciousness" is relinquished when a bodhisattva is about to attain awakening, or when śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas enter final nirvāṇa. "The stainless consciousness," however, is never relinquished at any point, since there is no end to benefiting and bringing joy to sentient beings. "Mind" and the other universally-applying names should each simply be used as appropriate to the aspect of meaning under discussion.

In general, the eighth consciousness has two states. The first is the contaminated state, included within the morally indeterminate nature — it associates only with the five factors, contact and the rest, and takes only the previously described objects of grasping-and-holding and the receptacle-world.

The second is the uncontaminated state, included purely within the wholesome nature. It associates with twenty-one mental factors: the five universal factors, the five particular factors, and the eleven wholesome factors — since, at this stage, it constantly associates with every kind of mental factor.

It associates with the five particular factors because: it constantly delights in the wisdom that realizes its object, which is desire; it constantly holds firmly to what it observes, which is resolve; it constantly, clearly remembers what it has previously experienced, which is mindfulness; the World-Honored One never has an unconcentrated mind, which is concentration; and it constantly discerns and judges with respect to all dharmas, which is wisdom. It associates with the eleven wholesome factors because utterly pure faith and the rest constantly accompany it, being entirely free of defilement and agitation.

Even at this stage, it associates only with neutral feeling, since it operates spontaneously, constantly, and evenly at all times. It takes all dharmas whatsoever as its object, since the mirror-like wisdom associated with it at this stage universally takes all dharmas as its object.

How can it be known that this eighth consciousness has a distinct substance of its own, apart from the eye-consciousness and the rest? Because scripture and correct reasoning serve as the standards of proof. The Mahāyānābhidharma-sūtra says: "The beginningless element is the equal support of all dharmas; because of this there are the various destinies, and the attainment of nirvāṇa." This eighth consciousness's own nature is extremely subtle, and so it is revealed through its function rather than described directly. The first half of the verse shows its function as cause and condition; the second half shows its function as the support sustaining both transmigration and its cessation.

"Element" carries the sense of "cause": it is the seed-consciousness, which, continuing on from beginningless time, directly gives rise to all dharmas — hence it is called "cause." "Support" carries the sense of "condition": it is the consciousness that grasps and holds, which, from beginningless time, serves equally as the support for all dharmas — hence it is called "condition." That is: because it holds all seeds, and serves as the basis for manifest dharmas, it both transforms into them and serves as their support. "Transforms into them" means it transforms into the receptacle-world and the body-with-faculties; "serves as their support" means it serves as the basis for the evolving consciousnesses.

Because it grasps and holds the five physical sense-faculties, the eye-consciousness and the other four operate in dependence on it; and because it also supports manas, the sixth, cognizing consciousness operates in dependence on it too, since manas and the cognizing consciousness are both evolving consciousnesses. Just as the eye-consciousness and the rest depend on their co-existing physical faculty, the eighth consciousness — itself of the nature of consciousness — should likewise serve as a co-existing support for the seventh consciousness. This, then, is its function as cause and as condition.

"Because of this there are" means: because this consciousness exists. "The various destinies" means the wholesome and unwholesome destinies of rebirth. That is: because this eighth consciousness exists, it holds all the dharmas favoring transmigration, causing sentient beings to transmigrate through birth-and-death. Though affliction, karma, and birth are all part of transmigration, "destiny" specifically names the result, emphasized here as most significant — or else the term covers both the destination and the path to it, so that even a destiny's requisites can be called by its name.

Affliction, karma, and birth all depend on this consciousness — this is its function as the support sustaining transmigration. "And the attainment of nirvāṇa" means: because this consciousness exists, the attainment of nirvāṇa is possible. Because this eighth consciousness exists, it holds all the dharmas favoring cessation, enabling practitioners to attain nirvāṇa. This may refer specifically to the path that attains nirvāṇa, since nirvāṇa itself does not depend on this consciousness for its own existence; or specifically to the nirvāṇa attained, since that is precisely what practitioners seek; or to both together, since both fall under the category of cessation.

"Nirvāṇa" names the cessation realized; "attainment" names the path that realizes it — through the path capable of severing, the afflictions to be severed are severed, and at their final, complete exhaustion, nirvāṇa is realized. The severing subject, the severed object, and the realization all depend on this consciousness — its function as the support sustaining cessation.

The verse's first line shows this consciousness's own nature exists constantly from beginningless time; the remaining three lines show it supports, both generally and specifically, the two categories of defiled and pure dharmas. The defiled dharmas are the truths of suffering and its origin — the destination of rebirth together with karma and affliction; the pure dharmas are the truths of cessation and the path — the nirvāṇa realized together with the path that realizes it. Both categories depend on this consciousness; depending instead on the evolving consciousnesses does not hold up on examination.

That same scripture further says: "Because it takes in and stores all dharmas, this consciousness holding all seeds is called ālaya — to the superior ones, I reveal this." Because this root consciousness possesses all seeds, it can take in and store all defiled dharmas — and on this basis the name "ālaya" is established. This is unlike, say, the Sāṃkhya notion of a primordial nature transforming into "the great" and so on, since here seed and result are not one and the same substance, and what depends and what is depended-upon both arise and cease together. Because it mutually takes in and stores defiled dharmas, and because sentient beings cling to and store it as self, this consciousness is called "ālaya."

Bodhisattvas who have already entered the path of seeing, attaining genuine direct realization, are called "the superior ones" — capable of truly understanding the ālayavijñāna, and so the World-Honored One reveals this teaching specifically to them. Or else, all bodhisattvas are called "the superior ones": even before the path of seeing, though unable yet to truly understand the ālayavijñāna, they are capable of faith and understanding, and seek to transform its basis — so the teaching is given to them too. None of the evolving consciousnesses carry this kind of meaning.

The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra likewise says: "The ādāna-consciousness is extremely profound and subtle; all its seeds flow like a torrent. I do not reveal this to the ordinary and the foolish, fearing they would discriminate and cling to it as a self." Because it grasps and holds the seeds of all dharmas, grasps and sustains the physical faculties and their bases, and grasps and takes up the continuity of rebirth-linking, this consciousness is called "ādāna" — the appropriator.

Beings incapable of realization cannot fathom its depths — hence "extremely profound." Those disposed only toward quiescence cannot penetrate it — hence "extremely subtle." It is the genuine seed of all dharmas; struck by conditions, it gives rise to the waves of the evolving consciousnesses, constantly, without interruption, just like a torrent. "Ordinary" means those incapable of realization; "foolish" means those disposed toward quiescence alone. Fearing they would seize on this teaching with discriminating attachment, fall into the lower destinies, and obstruct the arising of the noble path, the World-Honored One did not reveal it to them. Only the eighth consciousness matches this description.

The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra likewise says: "Just as the ocean, meeting the condition of wind, gives rise to all sorts of waves, their activity manifesting without ever being interrupted — so too the ocean of the storehouse consciousness: struck by the wind of objects and the rest, it constantly gives rise to the waves of the other consciousnesses, their activity manifesting continuously." The eye-consciousness and the rest have nothing resembling a great ocean, constantly and continuously giving rise to waves of consciousness on their own — so it can be known that there is a distinct eighth consciousness, apart from them, that does.

Countless Mahāyāna sūtras of this kind each separately teach that this eighth consciousness exists. Every Mahāyāna sūtra accords with the teaching of no-self and goes against the notion of a transmigrating person; turns away from transmigration and toward its cessation; praises the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha and criticizes non-Buddhist schools; sets forth teachings like the aggregates and refutes notions like a primordial nature. Those who delight in the Mahāyāna grant that it reveals undistorted truth; being included among the sūtras, it counts as valid scriptural authority, exactly as the Ekottarikāgama and similar texts are accepted as authoritative.

Furthermore, the noble Maitreya, using seven kinds of reasoning, proves that the Mahāyāna sūtras are genuinely the Buddha's own words.

First: not predicted in advance. If the Mahāyāna sūtras were composed by others after the Buddha's passing, in order to destroy the true Dharma, why did the World-Honored One never predict and warn of this, the way he foretold other fearsome events to come?

Second: arising together from the start. The Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna teachings have circulated together since the very beginning — how, then, could one claim the Mahāyāna alone is not the Buddha's word?

Third: not within anyone else's domain. What the Mahāyāna teaches is vast and profound, beyond the speculative reach of non-Buddhist schools; it is never found in their own scriptures, and even if taught to them, they would not accept it. It cannot, then, be anything other than the Buddha's word.

Fourth: the point is settled either way. Even if one insists the Mahāyāna was spoken by some other Buddha, not the present one — the claim that it is spoken by a Buddha is already established regardless.

Fifth: the argument from existence or nonexistence. If the Mahāyāna exists, its teachings should be believed to be the Buddha's own, since nothing apart from the Mahāyāna itself could ever establish this. And if the Mahāyāna did not exist, the śrāvaka teaching should not exist either, since apart from the Mahāyāna there is no way for anyone to attain buddhahood, and so no one could ever have appeared to teach the śrāvaka vehicle in the first place. Since the śrāvaka vehicle plainly is the Buddha's word, denying the same of the Mahāyāna makes no sense.

Sixth: it serves as a genuine antidote. Those who diligently practice by relying on the Mahāyāna sūtras all bring forth non-discriminating wisdom, capable of genuinely counteracting every affliction — this alone is reason to believe it is the Buddha's teaching.

Seventh: its meaning differs from its literal wording. The Mahāyāna's intent is extremely profound, impossible to grasp by simply following the letter of the text — and it is exactly this difficulty that leads some to slander it as not the Buddha's word, when the opposite is true. As the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra summarizes: "Not predicted in advance, arising together, not within others' domain, already settled, existence or nonexistence, serving as an antidote, and meaning differing from the letter."

The scriptures of other schools, too, implicitly speak of the ālayavijñāna as having a distinct nature of its own. The Mahāsāṃghika's Āgama implicitly calls it "the root consciousness," since it is the basis for the eye-consciousness and the rest — just as a tree's root is the basis for its trunk; the eye-consciousness and the other five have no capacity to serve as anyone's "root" in this way. The Sthavira school's scripture and the Vibhajyavādins both implicitly call it "the consciousness of the constituent factor of existence": "existence" meaning the three realms of existence, and "constituent factor" carrying the sense of "cause" — only this consciousness, being constant and all-pervading, can serve as the cause of the three realms. The Mahīśāsaka school calls it "the aggregate that exhausts birth-and-death," since, apart from the eighth consciousness, no other aggregate-dharma continues without interruption all the way to the exhaustion of birth-and-death — form is interrupted in the formless realm, other mental factors cease in the heaven of no-thought, and the forces disjoined from mind have already been shown to have no separate substance apart from form and mind.

The Sarvāstivāda's own Ekottarikāgama likewise implicitly calls it "ālaya" — speaking of "craved ālaya," "delighted-in ālaya," "rejoiced-in ālaya," and "cherished ālaya." Since the ālayavijñāna is the general and specific object of craving across past, present, and future, these four names are given. Sentient beings cling to it as their true inner self, and, for as long as this is not severed, constantly generate love and attachment toward it — hence the ālayavijñāna is the true object of such attachment.

It should not, instead, be held that the other five grasped aggregates are this true object. Consider beings born into a realm of unmixed suffering: they generate no love or attachment toward these five aggregates at all — they constantly feel aversion toward them instead, thinking, "When will I be free of this life, this particular existence, this suffering body and mind, so that I may freely experience happiness?"

The five sense-desires, too, are not this true object: those free of desire no longer crave the five wondrous sense-objects, and yet still love "self." Pleasant feeling, too, is not this object: those free of attachment to the third meditative absorption grow weary of pleasant feeling, and yet still love "self." The view of a substantial body is likewise not this object: trainees who already have faith in no-self no longer crave through that view, and yet still love an inner self. The active consciousnesses, too, are not this object: those who seek the cessation of mind grow weary of them, and yet still love "self." The physical body, too, is not this object: those free of attachment to form grow weary of the body, and yet still love "self." And the forces disjoined from mind, having no separate substance apart from form and mind, are not it either.

Whenever ordinary beings and trainees give rise to self-love, they may or may not feel love toward these other aggregates — but toward this consciousness, self-love certainly, invariably arises. This alone, then, is the true object of such attachment. And so, when that scripture speaks of "ālaya," it can only be referring to this ālayavijñāna.

The scriptural case has now been made; the argument turns next to reason itself. The sūtra states that it is because the seeds of all defiled and pure dharmas gather and arise there that this consciousness is called "mind" — and without this consciousness, that seed-holding mind could not exist.

The evolving consciousnesses are interrupted in states such as cessation-attainment; they shift readily from one kind to another depending on their sense-faculty, object, attention, and moral quality; and they are as unstable as a flash of lightning. None of this allows them to be perfumed or to hold seeds, so they cannot be the mind in which the seeds of defilement and purity gather and arise. This consciousness, by contrast, is single in kind and continues without a single interruption — stable and receptive to perfuming the way sesame is — and so it exactly answers to what the sūtra calls "mind."

To deny that there is a mind capable of holding seeds violates not only scripture but reason itself. Consider: when defiled or pure dharmas arise, if there were nothing for them to perfume, they could not perfume anything into a seed — and their arising would then accomplish nothing at all. And if defiled and pure dharmas arose with no seed serving as their cause, that would be no different from the non-Buddhist view that things simply arise on their own, uncaused.

Form, and the forces disjoined from mind, are not themselves of the nature of mind — like sound or light, they cannot, by their very nature, be perfumed by the inner dharmas of defilement and purity. How, then, could they hold seeds? And apart from consciousness they have no real nature of their own to speak of — how, then, could they be held to be the support in which inner seeds reside?

The mental factors that accompany the evolving consciousnesses are, like those consciousnesses themselves, interrupted, shifting readily from one state to the next, not self-governing, and not themselves of the nature of mind — so they too cannot hold seeds, nor can they be perfumed. By reason, then, the mind that holds seeds must be something else altogether.

Some hold: the six consciousnesses, from beginningless time, have depended on sense-faculty and object across ever-changing successive moments — yet their "kind" remains one and the same throughout, and it is this shared kind that is perfumed and that holds the seeds. Since this alone accounts for every cause-and-effect relationship among defiled and pure dharmas, why insist on a distinct eighth consciousness at all?

This claim has no substance. Why? If this "kind" is held to be something real, that is no different from the non-Buddhist view of a persisting real universal; if it is admitted to be merely a conceptual construct, it has no genuine efficacy, and could not possibly hold real inner seeds.

Furthermore, of what moral nature is this "kind" of consciousness supposed to consist? If it is wholesome or unwholesome, it should not be able to be perfumed at all, since it would then be karmically determinate, like the unconditioned dharma of cessation-through-discernment, which is fixed and unchanging. If it is morally neutral, then at the very moments when the mind is actually wholesome or unwholesome, no neutral mind is present, and this "kind" would then be broken off — for an activity that is wholesome or unwholesome at a given moment cannot, at that same moment, also be neutral in kind: a distinct kind must always match a distinct activity in its very nature.

Furthermore, in mindless states this "kind" is certainly altogether absent — and since it is thus interrupted, its nature is not stable. How, then, could it hold seeds or receive perfuming? Furthermore, an arhat's mind and an ordinary being's mind share the very same "kind" of consciousness — so the arhat's mind should then be perfumed by both defilements and uncontaminated dharmas alike, which you yourselves would admit to be a fault. Furthermore, the eye-faculty and the rest share their "kind" with the eye-consciousness and the rest, in terms of both faculty and dharma — so they too should perfume one another, which you do not accept either. One should not, then, hold that a mere "kind" of consciousness is what receives perfuming.

Furthermore, the six sense-consciousnesses — whether considered as particular events or as a shared kind — never exist together in two successive moments: an earlier moment and a later moment are separated like this, and things separated in this way cannot perfume one another, since perfuming and what is perfumed must occur at exactly the same time. Should one instead hold that all six consciousnesses arise together, simultaneously, the same reasoning just given still applies: on that view too, they are simply not what is being perfumed, and so they still have no capacity to hold seeds.

Others hold that form and mind, each within its own uninterrupted kind, serve as the seed of their own later moment, so that a cause-and-effect relationship is thereby established — meaning that everything argued above fails to prove its point. But this view, too, is unreasonable, since it involves no genuine perfuming at all: given that their own kind is never actually perfumed, how could an earlier moment possibly be held to be the seed of a later one? Furthermore, whatever is interrupted should not arise again — yet an arhat beyond further training would then have no subsequent aggregates, since it is precisely the form and mind at the moment of death that would be serving as the seed of what comes after. Nor should one hold that form and mind mutually generate each other as seeds in turn, since neither the evolving consciousnesses nor form can be perfumed at all, as already shown above.

Some hold: dharmas of all three times — past, present, and future — genuinely exist; cause draws forth effect across all three without exception, so what need is there to posit a consciousness that holds seeds? As for the sūtra's calling mind the "seed," that is only because mind's power in giving rise to defiled and pure dharmas happens to be especially strong.

This view, too, is unreasonable. The past and the future are neither permanent nor presently existing — they are, like a flower blooming in empty space, not truly, substantially existent at all. And having no actual function, they cannot be held to serve as a cause-and-condition. Without a consciousness capable of holding the seeds of defilement and purity, no cause-and-effect relationship at all could ever be established.

Some hold that the Mahāyāna teaching which dissolves all characteristics into emptiness represents the ultimate truth, and — relying on what only resembles valid inference — deny the existence of this consciousness, and indeed of all dharmas whatsoever. This directly contradicts the very scriptures already cited above. To hold that wisdom, severance of affliction, realization, cultivation, and the cause-and-effect of defilement and purity are all unreal is to fall into a grave wrong view — even the non-Buddhist schools that disparage the cause-and-effect of defilement and purity do not go so far as to claim it entirely nonexistent; they merely hold it to be not ultimately real.

If all dharmas whatsoever were unreal, bodhisattvas would have no reason to diligently accumulate the provisions for awakening in order to abandon birth-and-death. What person of any wisdom, in order to defeat a phantom enemy, would go recruit the son of a barren woman to serve as their army?

One should, therefore, believe there is a mind capable of holding seeds, on the basis of which the cause-and-effect of defilement and purity is established. That mind is precisely this eighth consciousness.

Furthermore, the sūtras speak of a "ripening mind," drawn forth by wholesome and unwholesome karma — and without this consciousness, that ripening mind could not exist. The eye-consciousness and the rest are interrupted, and are not, at every single moment, the result of karma — like a flash of lightning, they cannot be the ripening mind. True ripening should never, once broken off, resume again — yet the eye-consciousness and the rest plainly do resume, and the life-faculty and its like show no such interruption at all. The eye-consciousness and the other four, insofar as they are drawn forth by karma, are like sound and the rest: since they are not continuous, they are merely "arisings born of ripening," not true ripening itself.

One must, therefore, accept that there is a true ripening mind, which repays life-projecting karma, pervading the whole body without interruption, and transforming into the body and its receptacle-world to serve as the basis for sentient beings — for body and world, apart from mind, could not, by reason, exist at all. The forces disjoined from mind have no real substance of their own, and the evolving consciousnesses are not constantly present — so if this mind did not exist, what would transform into the body and its world? And on what would a sentient being's constant existence depend?

Furthermore, whether within meditative absorption or outside it, in moments of deliberate reflection or without any reflection at all, there logically must be numerous bodily sensations continually arising. Without this, the body could not, at some later time, feel at ease, nor, at another time, feel fatigued and worn — if a true ripening mind were not constantly present, how could such bodily sensation occur in any of these states at all?

This is not to say that a Buddha, whenever some other wholesome mind arises, must likewise give rise to a true ripening mind: whoever it is granted that a ripening mind arises for, at that moment, is by definition an ordinary sentient being, not a Buddha. Hence a true ripening mind is constantly present — and that mind is precisely this eighth consciousness.

Furthermore, the sūtras speak of sentient beings transmigrating through the five destinies and the four modes of birth. Without this consciousness, the very substance of that destiny and birth-mode could not exist. Only a dharma that is genuinely real, constant, universal, and unmixed can be established as the true substance of a destiny or birth-mode. Dharmas that are not themselves ripening get mixed up across destinies and birth-modes, since a being abiding in one destiny can still give rise to dharmas belonging to another.

The ripened forms, and whatever among the five sense-consciousnesses is drawn forth by karma, do not pervade every destiny and birth-mode, since the formless realm has none of these at all. The innately-acquired wholesome states, and whatever among the mental consciousness's states is drawn forth by karma, though they do pervade every destiny and birth-mode and arise without being mixed across destinies, are nevertheless not constantly present. The forces disjoined from mind have no real substance of their own. None of these, then, can be established as the true substance of a destiny or birth-mode.

Only the ripening mind and its accompanying mental factors are genuinely real, constant, universal, and unmixed — and so only these are the true substance of a destiny or birth-mode. If this mind did not exist, a being born in the formless realm who gives rise to a wholesome state would, at that moment, no longer belong to any destiny or birth-mode at all. And if one instead allowed "destiny and birth-mode" to encompass every contaminated dharma, to avoid that problem, then a being born in the formless realm who gives rise to an uncontaminated mind should likewise fail to belong to any destiny or birth-mode — which violates reason just the same. To avoid both this fault and the one before it, only a ripening dharma can be the true substance of a destiny or birth-mode.

Hence the Tathāgata is not included within any destiny or birth-mode at all, since a Buddha has no morally-neutral ripening dharma; nor is he included within the three realms, since he has nothing contaminated — the World-Honored One has already abandoned the truths of suffering and its origin, and the seeds of all conceptual proliferation have been permanently severed.

Since the true substance of a destiny and a birth-mode is only the ripening mind and its mental factors, and since that mind and its factors cannot, by reason, exist apart from the eighth consciousness, it can be known that this eighth consciousness exists as something distinct.

Furthermore, the sūtras speak of the physical body, with its faculties, as something "grasped and sustained." Without this consciousness, that capacity to grasp and sustain could not exist. The five physical sense-faculties, and the physical basis they depend on, are grasped and sustained only in the present moment, and this must depend on a mind capable of such grasping and sustaining — namely the ripening mind alone: drawn forth by prior karma, neither wholesome nor defiled, single in kind, all-pervading, and continuous, it grasps and sustains the physical body and its faculties. The eye-consciousness and the other evolving consciousnesses carry no such capacity.

This statement means only to show that the eye-consciousness and the other evolving consciousnesses all lack the capacity to grasp and sustain, in a single, all-pervading, continuous way, one's own physical body and faculties — it does not mean to claim that only the ripening mind can ever grasp and sustain anything whatsoever, lest it follow that a Buddha's physical body has no one grasping and sustaining it at all. Rather, this is said because it is only the ripening mind that grasps and sustains a contaminated physical body.

The evolving consciousnesses arise only in dependence on present conditions, like sound or wind. Wholesome and defiled states are, moreover, not themselves drawn forth by karma, like the unconditioned dharma of cessation not brought about through discernment. Nor can "arisings born of ripening" do this, since they are not themselves true ripening, do not pervade universally as a basis, and are not continuous — like a flash of lightning, none of these can grasp and sustain a contaminated physical body.

Whenever this treatise speaks of "mind" or "consciousness," it means to include the mental factors as well, since they are invariably associated together — just as the term "Consciousness-Only" itself does. Nor can the physical sense-faculties themselves, or the forces disjoined from mind, grasp and sustain the physical body and its faculties, since they have no cognitive object at all, like empty space. There must, then, be some other mind capable of grasping and sustaining — and that mind is precisely this eighth consciousness.

Furthermore, the sūtras speak of life, warmth, and consciousness as three things mutually dependent on and sustaining one another, thereby continuing to abide. Without this consciousness, there would be no consciousness capable of sustaining life and warmth over a long duration. The evolving consciousnesses are interrupted and keep changing kind, like sound or wind — they have no constant, sustaining function, and so cannot be established as the consciousness that sustains life and warmth. Only the ripening consciousness is uninterrupted and unchanging in kind, just like life and warmth themselves, possessing a constant, sustaining function — and so it alone can be established as the consciousness that sustains life and warmth.

One might object: the sūtra speaks of the three dharmas as mutually dependent, and life and warmth are indeed of a single, continuous kind — yet if consciousness alone were not so, how could this square with reason?

But although the sūtra speaks of the three dharmas as mutually dependent, it is nevertheless accepted that warmth alone does not pervade all three realms — so why not equally accept that consciousness alone may be interrupted and change kind? This poses no real difficulty for the position argued above. Wherever all three dharmas are present, continuing without interruption, they can sustain one another constantly; where this is not the case, there is simply no constant, sustaining function present. The reasoning given above already established, on this basis, that "consciousness" in the phrase "the three dharmas" does not refer to the evolving consciousnesses — how, then, could citing warmth's own failure to pervade every realm undermine that same reasoning? The position stated above, then, stands firmly established.

Furthermore, among these three dharmas, life and warmth are both exclusively contaminated — so one might suppose this consciousness, paralleling life and warmth, must likewise definitely be contaminated. Yet when a being is born in the formless realm and gives rise to an uncontaminated mind, what consciousness, at that very moment, sustains its life? By this it can be known that there exists a ripening consciousness — single in kind, constant, all-pervading, capable of sustaining life and warmth regardless of whether the surface mind of the moment is contaminated or not — and that consciousness is precisely this eighth consciousness.

Furthermore, the sūtras speak of sentient beings, at the moment of taking rebirth and at the moment of death, as necessarily abiding in a scattered mind, never in a mindless meditative absorption. Without this consciousness, there could be no mind present at those moments of birth and death. At these moments, body and mind are utterly dulled and clouded — like deep, dreamless sleep, or a state of total unconsciousness — and the clear, discerning evolving consciousnesses certainly do not manifest.

Moreover, in this state, the six evolving consciousnesses' mode of activity and cognitive object cannot be discerned at all — and, exactly as in any genuinely mindless state, they simply are not operating. Whenever the six evolving consciousnesses truly are operating, their mode of activity and object can always be discerned, as at every other time.

The true ripening consciousness, being extremely subtle, has a mode of activity and cognitive object that can never be discerned at all — it is the result of life-projecting karma, continuing throughout a single lifetime, constantly without any change. That it is scattered, possesses a mind, and is called "the mind of birth and death" is therefore in no way contrary to reason.

Some hold: the five sense-consciousnesses are certainly absent at this moment. The mental consciousness takes hold of its object either through the five senses, through instruction from another, or through meditative absorption as its cause — but at the moment of taking rebirth, none of these causes can be found; therefore the mental consciousness, too, is absent at the moment of taking rebirth.

But if this were so, then a being born in the formless realm would, from then on, never again give rise to mental consciousness at all — since a meditative mind must be induced by a prior scattered mental consciousness, and in that realm the five sense-consciousnesses and instruction from another are both certainly absent, leaving no way whatsoever for the scattered mind that induces absorption to arise.

Should one claim it arises spontaneously later on, through the sheer power of habituation — then why would it not likewise manifest at the very moment of that being's first rebirth there? And for that matter, at the initial moment of rebirth in the desire realm or the form realm, habituated mental consciousness ought equally to manifest at once. If one answers that it fails to manifest at first simply because of the mind's dullness in that moment — that is exactly the same cause already given above for why mental consciousness is absent at birth and death generally, so what need was there to propose a separate explanation at all?

Certain other schools hold that, at the moments of birth and death, there exists a distinct, especially subtle kind of mental consciousness, whose mode of activity and cognitive object cannot be discerned at all. It should be recognized that this is precisely the eighth consciousness — since the mental consciousness generally agreed upon by every school is simply not like this.

Furthermore, the sūtras speak of consciousness as the condition for name-and-form, and name-and-form as the condition for consciousness — these two dharmas depending on each other in turn, just like a bundle of reeds, occurring together at the same time. Without this consciousness, the very substance of that "consciousness" spoken of there could not exist.

The sūtra itself explains this: "name" refers to the four formless aggregates, and "form" refers to the kalala and the like. These two abide in mutual dependence on consciousness, just like two bundles of reeds leaning on each other — constantly serving as each other's condition, always occurring together at the same time, never separating from one another.

The eye-consciousness and the other evolving consciousnesses are already included within "name." If this consciousness did not exist, then what could the sūtra's word "consciousness" possibly be referring to?

Nor can one say that the aggregate of consciousness, within "name," refers to the body of five sense-consciousnesses, with "consciousness" in the pairing referring to the sixth — since at the stage of the kalala, the five sense-consciousnesses do not yet exist at all. Furthermore, the evolving consciousnesses are interrupted and keep changing, and so have no capacity to constantly grasp and hold name-and-form — how, then, could they be said to serve constantly as name-and-form's condition? The "consciousness" spoken of in that sūtra, therefore, points to the eighth consciousness.