The Case Concludes, and Manas Begins

Furthermore, the sūtras speak of all sentient beings as sustained by food. Without this consciousness, the very substance of that "consciousness food" could not exist. The sūtras speak of four kinds of food:

First, edible food, characterized by decomposing. This refers to the desire realm's scent, taste, and touch, which serve as food precisely as they decompose; visible form is not included among edible food, since form serves no purpose in the process of decomposing.

Second, contact food, characterized by contact with an object. This refers to contaminated contact, which, the very moment it takes hold of an object, gathers in delight and the like, and so serves as food. Although this contact is associated with all the consciousnesses, its function as food is especially pronounced when it belongs to the six sense-consciousnesses, since their contact grasps its object coarsely and vividly, gathering in joy, pleasure, and beneficial equanimity, and so nourishes especially well.

Third, mental-volition food, characterized by anticipation. This refers to contaminated volition, which arises together with desire, anticipating some agreeable object, and so serves as food. Although this volition is associated with all the consciousnesses, its function as food is especially pronounced when it belongs to the mental consciousness, since the mental consciousness anticipates its object especially strongly.

Fourth, consciousness food, characterized by grasping and holding. This refers to contaminated consciousness which, through the accumulated power of edible, contact, and volitional food, serves as food. Although this consciousness is common to the essential nature of all the consciousnesses, its function as food is especially pronounced in the eighth consciousness, since it alone grasps and holds in a single, continuous kind especially well.

Hence the Abhidharmasamuccaya says these four foods are included within three aggregates, five sense-fields, and eleven elements. These four sustain a sentient being's body and life, keeping them from decaying and breaking off — hence they are called "food."

Edible food is useful only in the desire realm. Contact food and mental-volition food, though pervading all three realms, operate in dependence on consciousness, following whatever consciousness is present or absent. The eye-consciousness and the other evolving consciousnesses are interrupted and keep changing, and so cannot sustain body and life universally and constantly: they are interrupted in mindless meditative absorption, in sleep, in unconsciousness, and in the heaven of no-thought; and even in states where mind is present, they keep changing according to their supporting basis, condition, moral nature, realm, and stage — so, in sustaining body and life, they are neither universal nor constant.

For those who hold there is no eighth consciousness — what, then, serves as food during a mindless state? The sūtra says: "All sentient beings are sustained by food." It cannot be past or future consciousness that serves as food during a mindless state, since these are neither present nor constant, being, like a flower blooming in empty space, without real substance or function. And even granting them some substance or function, if that is not included in the present moment, they would be like empty space, not the kind of thing food can be. Nor can one say that the mind which entered absorption serves as food for the being now in a mindless state, since, once abiding in that mindless state, that prior mind has already ceased — and it is already well established that something past cannot serve as food. Nor can one say that the forces disjoined from mind, such as the attainment of no-thought, themselves serve as that food, since they are not included among the four foods already listed, and disjoined forces have no real substance to begin with. Some hold that even in cessation-attainment and the like, a sixth consciousness remains present, capable of serving as food for that being — this view is unreasonable, and will be refuted at length below.

Furthermore, they ought to explain: when a being born in the upper two realms gives rise to an uncontaminated mind, what then serves as food? An uncontaminated consciousness works to break down contaminated existence, and so cannot serve as food for that being's body and life. Nor can one hold that an uncontaminated consciousness contains contaminated seeds capable of serving as its food, since an uncontaminated consciousness, being like nirvāṇa itself, cannot hold contaminated seeds at all. Nor, again, can one say that in the upper realms body and life simply sustain each other mutually as food, since body and life are not themselves included among the four foods; and in the formless realm there is no body at all, so life would have nothing there to sustain it — and a "shared class of being," as an abstract designation, has no real substance either. By this it can be known with certainty that, distinct from the evolving consciousnesses, there is a ripening consciousness — single in kind, constant, and all-pervading — which grasps and holds body and life, keeping them from decaying and breaking off. It is on this basis that the World-Honored One made the statement: all sentient beings are sustained by food.

"Sentient being" is established only with reference to the grasped aggregates — a Buddha, having nothing contaminated, is not included among sentient beings; wherever it is said that a Buddha, too, is sustained by food, this should be understood as spoken only for the sake of a provisional appearance. Since it is the ripening consciousness, then, that has the pre-eminent nature of food, that consciousness is precisely this eighth consciousness.

Furthermore, the sūtras speak of one abiding in cessation-attainment: physical, verbal, and mental activity have all, without exception, ceased, yet life does not cease, warmth does not depart, the faculties do not decay, and consciousness does not leave the body. Without this consciousness, there could be no consciousness that "does not leave the body" for one abiding in cessation-attainment.

The eye-consciousness and the rest have a coarse, agitated mode of activity; in taking hold of their objects they inevitably give rise to weariness, and, growing averse to this, one seeks a temporary respite, gradually suppressing and eliminating them until they are entirely exhausted — it is with reference to this state that one is said to abide in cessation-attainment. In this absorption, then, these consciousnesses have all ceased entirely. If one does not accept that some subtle, single-kind, constant, all-pervading consciousness remains, grasping and holding life and the rest, on what basis could it possibly be said that "consciousness does not leave the body"?

Should one claim that consciousness merely arises again later, the way a recurring fever is still called "not departed" — then it should not be said that mental activity has ceased at all, since consciousness arising and ceasing would work exactly the same way as perception and the rest, which the sūtra explicitly says has ceased. Life, warmth, and the faculties would, on this same logic, have to work just like consciousness too — which is a grave error. One should, instead, accept that consciousness genuinely does not leave the body, in just the same way that life and warmth do not.

Furthermore, if consciousness were entirely absent in this state, the being would be no different from a tile or a stone, no longer counted among sentient beings at all — how, then, could it be said to be "abiding in cessation-attainment"? And if the ripening consciousness, too, were absent in this state, what would grasp and hold the faculties, life, and warmth? Lacking anything to grasp and hold them, they would all decay and perish, just like a corpse, and life and the rest would then be gone entirely. If that were so, a later consciousness could certainly never arise again — and this "not leaving the body" that is spoken of would then belong to nothing at all, since once the ripening consciousness has abandoned this body, no other body can ever be taken up again apart from consciousness.

Furthermore, if there were no seed-holding consciousness in this state, a later consciousness would have no seeds to draw on — how could it possibly arise? It is already well established that past and future disjoined dharmas have no real substance; and it has already been shown that form and the other such dharmas, apart from consciousness, can neither be perfumed nor hold seeds. In cessation-attainment and the other mindless states, then, just as in states where mind is present, there must certainly be a real consciousness present, complete with faculties, life, and warmth, since the being is still counted among sentient beings. By this line of reasoning, one abiding in cessation-attainment certainly has consciousness, which genuinely does not leave the body.

Should one claim that a sixth consciousness is present in this state, and that this is what "does not leave the body" means — this, too, is unreasonable, since this very absorption is also called "the mindless absorption." If the mere absence of the five sense-consciousnesses were enough to call a state "mindless," then every meditative absorption would have to be called mindless, since the five sense-consciousnesses are absent in all of them. But the mental consciousness, too, is included among the six evolving consciousnesses — so, just like the five sense-consciousnesses, it too is simply absent in cessation-attainment.

Or again: the consciousness present in this state has a mode of activity and cognitive object that cannot be discerned at all, just like life and warmth — and so it cannot be the sixth consciousness. If a consciousness with a discernible mode of activity and object were present in this state, it would have to belong to some other, ordinary state, not to this one — for it is precisely in order to bring a discernible, active consciousness to rest that one enters this absorption in the first place.

Furthermore, if a sixth consciousness were present in this state, would its accompanying mental factors be present, or not? If mental factors were present, the sūtra should not say that, for one abiding in this absorption, mental activity has ceased entirely — nor should this absorption be called "the attainment of the cessation of feeling and perception."

Should one reply: the preliminary practice for this absorption is simply growing weary of feeling and perception specifically, so within this absorption only feeling and perception cease; and since feeling and perception are the two factors that most strongly assist the mind, they alone, among all the mental factors, are singled out as "mental activity" — so what contradiction is there in saying that mental activity has ceased, while other, unnamed mental factors remain?

By that same logic, in the attainment of no-thought, only perception ought to cease, since its preliminary practice is simply growing weary of perception specifically — yet you yourselves do not accept this. And since it is granted that feeling and perception are the two factors that most strongly assist the mind, when these two cease, the mind itself should cease along with them.

One might object: just as physical activity — breathing — can cease while the body itself still remains, why must the mind be held to cease along with the very factors said to be its "activity"? But then, when verbal activity — coarse and subtle discursive thought — ceases, speech itself should likewise not cease, which you do not accept either. The truth is that "activity" stands to its associated dharma in two different ways, universal and non-universal: when a universal activity ceases, its dharma certainly ceases along with it; when a non-universal activity ceases, its dharma may still remain. In-breath and out-breath are non-universal to the body — the body plainly still remains even once the breath has visibly ceased. Coarse and subtle discursive thought, however, is universal to speech — once it ceases, speech is certainly altogether absent. Feeling and perception, likewise, are universal to mind, since they are admitted, like volition, to be among the mental factors present in every mental state whatsoever. When feeling and perception cease, then, the mind certainly ceases along with them — how, then, could one say that the mind remains once they have ceased?

Furthermore, it is granted that volition and the rest are among the mental factors present in every mental state whatsoever — so when feeling and perception cease, these too should cease. And if that is so, then faith and the other wholesome factors would likewise be absent in this state, since it cannot be that a universal factor ceases while some other factor remains — so how could one say that any mental factor at all remains? Yet if it is granted that volition and the rest are not, in fact, absent in this state, then feeling and perception should be present too, being equally factors present in every mental state.

Furthermore, if volition and the rest were present in this absorption, contact, too, should be present, since there is no mental factor whatsoever that does not arise through the power of contact. And if contact is granted to be present, feeling, too, should be present, since contact conditions feeling. And once feeling is granted, perception, too, must arise, since the two are never separated from one another.

One might object: just as feeling conditions craving, yet not every feeling actually gives rise to craving, so too contact conditions feeling, yet not every contact actually gives rise to feeling — by this reasoning, the argument above does not hold. But this defense does not work, since the two cases are not parallel: the Buddha himself specifically singled out only feeling arisen from the contact of ignorance as the condition for craving; he never, anywhere, singled out only some contacts as conditions for feeling. Hence wherever contact is present, feeling must certainly arise, and feeling and perception occur together — this reasoning is settled.

Or else, one should hold that, just as in every other state, feeling and perception do not cease in this state either — but to hold that volition and the rest are present in this state is already to violate the sūtra's own statement that mental activity has ceased entirely, and this could then no longer be called "the attainment of the cessation of feeling and perception" at all.

If, on the other hand, no mental factors were present, then consciousness itself should be absent too, since no other mental consciousness is ever seen apart from its mental factors; since, when a universal factor ceases, its dharma certainly ceases along with it; since feeling and the rest would then not be universal factors after all; and since this consciousness would then not be a genuinely associated dharma at all. To grant this would leave it with nothing to depend on and no condition to rely on, no different from form and the other dharmas that are not mind at all.

Furthermore, the sūtras say: mind and dharma serve as conditions, giving rise to mental consciousness; the three coming together is contact, and together with contact arise feeling, perception, and volition. If a mental consciousness were present in this absorption, then, given the coming together of the three, contact must certainly be present — and once contact is certainly present together with feeling, perception, and volition, how could there be a consciousness present with no mental factors at all?

Should one claim that, at other times, the three coming together have the power to form and give rise to contact and stir up feeling and the rest, but that, since one has grown weary of the mental factors prior to entering this absorption, the three lack that power while in this absorption, so that no contact is formed and no feeling arises — then this absorption ought to be called "the attainment of the cessation of all mental factors," so why does the sūtra speak only of the cessation of feeling and perception specifically?

Should one reply that, at the moment of growing weary, one grows weary specifically of feeling and perception, so that once these two cease, every mental factor ceases along with them, and the absorption is named after that specifically-targeted weariness — then, by that same logic, the mind itself ought to cease here too, since it is equally implicated in what was grown weary of, just like every other mental factor. If not, then how could this be called "the mindless absorption" at all?

Furthermore, what moral nature does the mental consciousness in this state possess? It cannot be defiled or morally neutral, since no such thing occurs within any wholesome absorption; and any other defiled or neutral mind must have mental factors present, so it could not be that one grows weary of something wholesome only to give rise to something defiled instead — one who seeks quiescence certainly does not, in turn, produce agitation.

Should one instead claim it is wholesome — being wholesome, it would have to be associated with the wholesome roots such as non-greed, yet it has already been shown to have no mental factors at all. This mind, then, cannot be either intrinsically wholesome or ultimately wholesome, since that would contradict your own position, lacking as it does the wholesome roots and the rest, and lacking nirvāṇa as its object. Should one claim, instead, that this mind is wholesome by concomitant derivation, drawn forth by the power of the wholesome roots in one's preliminary practice — this, too, does not hold, since it likewise contradicts your own position: no other wholesome mind is ever called wholesome merely by concomitant derivation in this way. A wholesome mind is immediately followed by minds of all three moral qualities — how, then, could a wholesome mind be said to derive its quality merely from what preceded it? A mind is wholesome, rather, precisely through its association with the wholesome mental factors — and if that is so, it must certainly be associated with the wholesome roots, so how could you still maintain that this mind alone has no mental factors at all? Hence, having no mental factors, this consciousness, too, should not exist.

Through this line of examination, it is shown that the eye-consciousness and the other evolving consciousnesses do not, in the state of cessation-attainment, remain "not departed from the body" at all. The consciousness the sūtra means by "not leaving the body," then, is precisely this eighth consciousness — for one does not enter cessation-attainment in order to bring this consciousness itself to rest, since it is this extremely tranquil consciousness that grasps and holds the body throughout. The state of no-thought should be understood in just the same way.

Furthermore, the sūtras say: because the mind is defiled, sentient beings are defiled; because the mind is pure, sentient beings are pure. Without this consciousness, that defiled or pure mind could not exist. Defiled and pure dharmas take mind as their root: they arise because of mind and abide in dependence on mind, since mind alone receives their perfuming and holds their seeds.

Defiled dharmas, broadly speaking, are of three kinds — afflictions, karma, and their results — each a distinct category. Without this consciousness holding the seeds of affliction, then, after passing between realms and stages, and after an interval with no defiled mind at all, the afflictions that later arise would have no cause whatsoever, since no other dharma can hold those seeds, and the past and future have no real substance. If afflictions arose with no cause at all, there could be no fruits of training or of having-finished-training in any of the three vehicles, since afflictions already severed would then simply arise again regardless.

Without this consciousness holding the seeds of karma and its results, then, after passing between realms and stages, and after a period of dissimilar dharmas, the karma and results that later arise would likewise have no cause, since it has already been shown that no other seed or cause can serve this role. If karma and its results arose with no cause at all, then, having entered the nirvāṇa realm without remainder, the karma and results of the three realms would have to arise all over again, since afflictions, too, would then arise with no cause.

Furthermore, the link "formations condition consciousness" could not be established at all, since it has already been shown that the evolving consciousnesses cannot be perfumed. The consciousness that binds one to a new birth in a defiled state is not, in fact, drawn forth by formations; rather, it should properly be said that name-and-form is what formations condition, since the interval of time between a past life's formations and the rebirth-linking moment would otherwise leave no coherent conditioning relationship at all. Since this first point fails, what follows from it fails as well.

Pure dharmas, likewise, are of three kinds — the mundane path, the supramundane path, and the fruit of severance — each a distinct category. Without this consciousness holding the seeds of the mundane and supramundane pure paths, then, after an interval of dissimilar states of mind, the arising of these pure dharmas would have no cause at all, since every alternative cause proposed for this has already been refuted. If these two pure paths arose with no cause, then, having entered the nirvāṇa realm without remainder, these two pure paths would have to arise all over again, since whatever they depend on would likewise arise without cause.

Furthermore, the supramundane path could never even arise for the very first time, since there would be nothing to hold its innate seed beforehand — a contaminated dharma, being of an altogether different category, cannot serve as its cause, and arising with no cause at all cannot explain a specific seed either. Since it could not arise the first time, it could never arise afterward either — and this would mean there could be no fruit of the path in any of the three vehicles at all.

Without this consciousness holding the seeds of affliction, the transformation of one's basis and the fruit of severance could not be established either. Consider: when the path arises, both the manifest afflictions and their seeds are, at that very moment, absent — since a defiled mind and a pure mind cannot arise together, the mind associated with the path does not itself hold those seeds, its very nature being opposed to them, just as nirvāṇa's is; and since the past and future "possession" of a quality has no real substance, and it has already been shown that no other dharma can hold seeds. If, then, there is nothing actually severed, there can be no "severing" either — on what basis, and by what, could the fruit of severance ever be established?

Should one hold that the fruit of severance consists simply in the fact that, through the power of the path, afflictions no longer arise afterward — then the very first moment the path arises would already have to count as the attainment beyond further training, since every affliction thereafter would already have no cause at all, and so could never arise again.

Grant that this consciousness exists, however, and everything holds together perfectly, since it alone can hold the seeds of both defilement and purity.

The lines of reasoning proving this consciousness's existence are, in truth, without limit; fearing to weary the reader with excessive text, I have only sketched their outline here. That this consciousness exists as something distinct is plain from both scripture and reason alike — those of wisdom should place their deep faith and acceptance in it.

Thus far the first transformation has been explained. What, then, is the nature of the second transformation? The verses state:

Next, the second transformation is the consciousness called manas. It turns in dependence on that [first consciousness], takes it as its object, and has deliberation as its nature and characteristic.

Four afflictions constantly accompany it: self-delusion and self-view, together with self-conceit and self-love, and other factors such as contact besides.

It belongs to the covered-yet-neutral moral category, and is bound according to wherever it is born. It is absent in arhats, in cessation-attainment, and on the supramundane path.

The treatise states: having discussed the ripening-transformation consciousness first, we should next explain the nature of the deliberating-transformation consciousness. This consciousness is given the distinct scriptural name manas, since it constantly and closely deliberates in a way that surpasses the other consciousnesses.

How does this name differ from the sixth, the mental consciousness (also called "意識", literally "manas-consciousness")? Here, "manas" is a compound in which the term simply describes the very activity itself — as with the name "storehouse consciousness," where "consciousness" simply is this "storehouse-ing." But "mental consciousness," as a name for the sixth, is a compound naming something in relation to what it depends on — like "eye-consciousness" and the rest, where the consciousness is distinct from the eye, its mere support. Fearing this might cause the two to be confused with one another, the scriptures give the seventh only the bare name "manas."

The name "manas" is also chosen to distinguish this consciousness from "mind" (citta) and "consciousness" (vijñāna) as general terms, since it is inferior to the other consciousnesses both in accumulating seeds and in discriminating objects; or else, the name is meant to show that this consciousness serves as the near, proximate support for that other, sixth "mental consciousness" — hence it is called simply "manas."

"It turns in dependence on that" shows what this consciousness depends on. "That" refers to the very first transformation, the consciousness already discussed — the scriptures teach that this consciousness depends on the storehouse consciousness.

One view holds: manas takes only the seeds of that consciousness as its support, not its manifest, currently-active form — since manas itself is without interruption, it does not need a manifest consciousness to serve as its co-arising support in order to arise.

Another view holds: manas takes both the seeds of that consciousness and its manifest, currently-active form together as its support — for although manas, too, is without interruption, it nevertheless undergoes constant change, and is itself accordingly called an "evolving consciousness"; it must, therefore, rely on a manifest consciousness as its co-arising support in order to arise.

"Turns" means flowing on in continuity, showing that this consciousness constantly relies on that consciousness in order to take hold of its object.

Every mind and mental factor has something it depends on. These supports, broadly speaking, are of three kinds. First, the seed-support: one's own seeds, on which every conditioned dharma relies, since nothing can arise apart from its own causal condition. Second, the co-arising support: the six internal sense-bases, on which every mind and mental factor relies, since none can operate apart from a co-existing sense-faculty. Third, the immediately-preceding-condition support: the mind that has just ceased, on which every mind and mental factor relies, since none can arise apart from a faculty that opens the way and guides it onward.

Only mind and mental factors possess all three of these supports, and so are said, in the fullest sense, to "have a support" — no other dharma does.

Next, the co-arising support. Some hold: the eye-consciousness and the other four sense-consciousnesses take the mental consciousness as their co-arising support, since whenever these arise, that mental consciousness must be present. There is no separate eye-faculty and the rest serving as a co-arising support, since the eye and the other four physical sense-faculties are simply the seeds of their respective consciousnesses.

The Viṃśatikā's verse says: "Consciousness arises from its own seed, and manifests appearing as if it had an object; in order to establish the internal and external sense-fields, the Buddha spoke of these as ten." The meaning of this verse is: in order to establish the twelve sense-fields, the World-Honored One spoke of the seeds of the five sense-consciousnesses as the eye-faculty and the rest, and of the perceived aspect of the five sense-consciousnesses as form and the other objects — hence the eye-faculty and the rest are simply the seeds of the five sense-consciousnesses.

The Ālambanaparīkṣā likewise says: "The form-generating function within consciousness is rightly called the five faculties; this function and the form-object have, since beginningless time, mutually served as each other's cause." The meaning of this verse is: the capacity within the ripening consciousness capable of generating the eye-consciousness and the other form-perceiving consciousnesses is called, by the name "form-function," the five faculties — there is no separate eye and the rest apart from this — since this seed and the form-consciousness are constantly each other's cause, the perfuming consciousness and the seed serving, in turn, as each other's cause.

The seventh and eighth consciousnesses have no separate such support, since they continue on in unbroken succession by their own power alone. The sixth, mental consciousness, does have a separate such support, since it must rely on manas in order to arise.

Another view holds: that account conflicts with both reason and scripture.

If the five physical sense-faculties were simply the seeds of the five sense-consciousnesses, the seeds of the eighteen elements would collapse into confusion — yet each of the eighteen elements has its own distinct seed, as the scriptures state again and again.

Furthermore, the seed of each sense-consciousness gives rise to both a perceived aspect and a perceiving aspect, each distinct — so which of these is meant to be called the "eye-faculty" and the rest? If it is the seed of the perceiving aspect, it should be included in the consciousness aggregate; if it is the seed of the perceived aspect, it should be included among the external sense-fields — either way, this contradicts the scriptures' teaching that the five physical faculties are all included within the form aggregate, as internal sense-fields.

Furthermore, if the five faculties were simply the seeds of the five sense-consciousnesses, the five faculties would have to serve as the causal condition for the five consciousnesses, and could not be said to serve merely as a dominant condition.

Furthermore, if the nose- and tongue-faculties were simply the seeds of their two consciousnesses, then the nose and tongue faculties would have to be bound only to the desire realm — or else these two consciousnesses would have to extend into the form realm as well — and either alternative equally contradicts scripture. The same difficulty arises for the eye-, ear-, and body-faculties as the seeds of their three consciousnesses, spanning two realms and five stages.

Furthermore, since the seeds of the five sense-consciousnesses can be wholesome or unwholesome, the five physical faculties would then have to be more than merely morally neutral. Furthermore, since the seeds of the five sense-consciousnesses are not included among what is "grasped and sustained," the five faculties, too, would then have to lack this quality.

Furthermore, if the five physical faculties were simply the seeds of the five sense-consciousnesses, the seed of the mental consciousness would have to simply be manas, since manas takes the five faculties as its parallel case. Furthermore, the Yogācārabhūmi states that the eye-consciousness and the rest each possess all three kinds of support — yet if the five physical faculties were simply the seeds of the five sense-consciousnesses, there would only be two. Furthermore, the scriptures everywhere teach that the eye-faculty and the rest are both manifest and seed together — to hold that they are only seeds directly contradicts every one of these scriptures.

To evade the difficulties just raised, some who side with that view offer a further, revised defense: the karmic seeds within the ripening consciousness that are capable of drawing forth the five sense-consciousnesses as a dominant condition — these, specifically, are called the five physical faculties, not the seeds that serve as the direct causal condition generating the five sense-consciousnesses; this, they claim, beautifully accords with the two verses, and agrees well with the Yogācārabhūmi.

This, too, is empty talk with no real substance. On this account, the five physical faculties would still have to be more than merely morally neutral; they would still have to be more than merely something "grasped and sustained," included only within the form aggregate, only among the internal sense-fields; the nose- and tongue-faculties would still have to be bound only to the desire realm; the three faculties would still not have to span the five stages; the karma that draws forth the mental consciousness would then have to be manas itself; the eye-faculty and the rest would still not have to be both manifest and seed together; and the eye-faculty and the rest would, on this account, not even properly be physical faculties at all.

Furthermore, if the five sense-consciousnesses were entirely the product of karma, they would have to be exclusively morally neutral throughout — yet wholesome and other varieties of the five sense-consciousnesses plainly are not the product of karma, so on this view there would be no eye-faculty and the rest to serve as their co-arising support at all. This revised defense, then, is no genuine rescue.

Furthermore, the scriptures everywhere teach that the ālayavijñāna transforms into the semblance of the physical sense-faculties, their supporting bases, and the receptacle-world. How, then, can you deny the physical faculties altogether? You yourselves accept that the eye-consciousness and the rest transform into the semblance of form and the other objects — yet you refuse to accept that the eye-faculty and the rest are likewise transformations of the storehouse consciousness. Such confusion runs deeply contrary to both scripture and reason.

As for the verses' calling seed-function the "five faculties" — this was meant only to refute the view that the physical sense-faculties are really, substantially existent apart from consciousness. Since what consciousness transforms into, resembling the eye-faculty and the rest, has the capacity to give rise to the five sense-consciousnesses, it is provisionally named "seed" and "form-function." It does not mean that the physical faculty simply is the karmic seed of consciousness.

Furthermore, the clear mental consciousness that takes hold of the five sense-objects should have the five sense-consciousnesses as its co-arising support, since it must always occur together with them — if it did not depend on the eye-consciousness and the rest, then it should not serve as a support for them either, since mutual dependence requires an equal relationship on both sides.

Furthermore, although the seventh consciousness is itself uninterrupted, it nevertheless undergoes change upon entering the path of seeing and the like — so, like the other evolving consciousnesses, it too should have a co-arising support; otherwise, it could not be included among the "evolving consciousnesses" at all, which would contradict the scriptures' teaching that there are seven evolving consciousnesses. One should, therefore, accept that it does have a co-arising support, namely the currently-manifest eighth consciousness — as the Yogācārabhūmi says: because there is a storehouse consciousness, manas can exist; with manas as its support, the mental consciousness can operate. That treatise means that it is the currently-manifest storehouse consciousness, serving as a support, that allows manas to exist — not its mere seed. Were this not so, it would instead have had to say: because there is a storehouse consciousness, the mental consciousness can operate. By this, that earlier view is shown to conflict with both reason and scripture.

Hence it should be said: each of the first five evolving consciousnesses certainly has two co-arising supports — the five physical faculties, and the simultaneous mental consciousness. The sixth evolving consciousness certainly, constantly has one co-arising support, the seventh consciousness — and, whenever it arises together with the five sense-consciousnesses, it also takes them as a co-arising support. The seventh evolving consciousness certainly has only one co-arising support, the eighth consciousness. Only the eighth consciousness, constantly unchanging, is established by its own power alone, and has no co-arising support at all.

Another view holds: this account still does not exhaust the reasoning. The eighth consciousness, being of the same essential nature as consciousness as the others, why should it not also be granted a co-arising support? Since the seventh and eighth consciousnesses constantly turn together, what fault is there in holding that they serve as each other's mutual support?

If one grants that a manifest consciousness takes a seed as its support, one should equally grant that the seed, in turn, depends on the manifest consciousness — for the consciousness that perfumes the ripening consciousness serves as the support for the seed's arising, growth, and continuance, since the seed cannot arise, grow, or continue apart from it.

Furthermore, in the realm of form, the ripening consciousness is able to grasp and hold the body precisely by operating in dependence on the physical sense-faculties, as the sūtra says: the ālayavijñāna, driven by the winds of karma, universally relies on the sense-faculties, continuing on without interruption; and the Yogācārabhūmi likewise says: because the eye-consciousness and the other five each depend separately on their own faculty, they are unable to grasp and sustain the physical body as a whole. If the ripening consciousness did not universally rely on the physical sense-faculties, it, too, should be unable to grasp and sustain the body, just like the six sense-consciousnesses — or else the reason given here would suffer the fallacy of being inconclusive.

Hence: when the storehouse consciousness is currently manifest, it certainly has one support, the seventh consciousness — and, within a realm possessing form, it also relies on the physical sense-faculties. When the consciousness-seed of the eighth is what is meant, it certainly has one support, the ripening consciousness itself — and, at the initial moment of being perfumed, it also relies on the perfuming consciousness. Everything else remains as stated before.

Another view holds: none of the accounts given above is correct, since they fail to distinguish "support" proper from mere "dependence" in general.

"Dependence" means any dharma whatsoever, subject to arising and ceasing, that relies on causes and conditions in order to arise and continue — anything at all that something else relies on in this general sense is called a "dependence," just as a king and his ministers depend on one another.

But only a dharma that is fixed and determinate, possesses a cognitive object, and serves as the governing factor, causing mind and its mental factors to take hold of their own object, counts as a genuine "support" — namely, the six internal sense-bases. Everything else lacks a cognitive object and lacks this fixed, governing quality, and is therefore merely like the minister, not like the king.

Hence the scriptures speak only of mind and mental factors as "having a support," never form and other such dharmas, since these last have no cognitive object at all. One speaks of mental factors having mind as their support, but never of mind having mental factors as its support, since the mental factors are not the governing party. In certain places, though, "dependence" is loosely spoken of as "support," or "support" as "dependence" — these are simply convenient, informal usages, adapted to context.

By this, then, the eye-consciousness and the other four sense-consciousnesses certainly have four kinds of co-arising support: the five physical faculties, and the sixth, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses — lacking any one of these, they simply cannot operate, since object, discrimination, moral affectedness, and root each require a distinct support. The scriptures speak only of their depending on the five faculties specifically, because this support is not shared with any other consciousness, and because it necessarily shares the very same object, being the nearest, most closely corresponding support.

The sixth, mental consciousness has only two kinds of co-arising support: the seventh and eighth consciousnesses — lacking either, it cannot operate. Although it often takes hold of its object together with, and just as clearly as, the five sense-consciousnesses, this is not always so, and so they do not count as its support. The scriptures speak only of its depending on the seventh, because that is its support for moral affectedness, because it is likewise included among the evolving consciousnesses, and because it is the nearest, most closely corresponding support.

The seventh, manas has only a single co-arising support: the eighth consciousness — without the storehouse consciousness, it certainly cannot operate. As the verse says: "Because there is the ālaya as support, manas turns; relying on this mind and on manas, the remaining evolving consciousnesses can arise."

The ālayavijñāna, likewise, has only a single co-arising support: the seventh consciousness — without that consciousness, it certainly cannot operate. The treatise states that the storehouse consciousness constantly turns together with manas; and it also states that the storehouse consciousness constantly depends on a defiled mind, which is precisely manas. As for the teaching that manas is absent in three states — this refers only to its defiled, covered aspect, just as it is said that the ālaya is absent in four states, without meaning the eighth consciousness itself is absent; the same should be understood here.

Although, in a realm possessing form, the eighth consciousness also relies on the five physical faculties, this is not invariably so, and so they are not counted among its supports. A consciousness-seed, for its part, cannot itself take hold of its own object in a manifest way, so it may be said to have a "dependence" in the general sense, yet has no genuine "support."

The support of the mental factors should be stated in accordance with whichever consciousness they accompany, with the further addition, in each case, of the mind associated with them.

If the matter is stated in this way, it accords beautifully with both reason and scripture.

Next, the guiding support. Some hold: the five sense-consciousnesses, whether considered in their own class or across classes, do not continue in succession from one moment to the next, and must be drawn forth by the sixth, mental consciousness — hence only the mental consciousness serves as their guiding support. The sixth, mental consciousness, being self-continuous, and also drawn forth by the five sense-consciousnesses, takes the prior moment of any of the first six consciousnesses as its guiding support. The seventh and eighth consciousnesses, being self-continuous and never drawn forth by any other consciousness, take only their own prior moment, of their own kind, as their guiding support.

Another view holds: the account just given does not exhaust the reasoning. It is true that, for the first five consciousnesses not yet at the stage of mastery, encountering an ordinary rather than exceptional object, the account given may hold. But at the stage of mastery — as with the buddhas, who have complete mastery over their objects, whose faculties can each perform any other's function, arising spontaneously and decisively, requiring no searching at all — how could their five sense-consciousnesses fail to continue in succession?

Even the ordinary, homogeneously-flowing five sense-consciousnesses, once drawn forth by the force of decisive cognition, of moral affectedness, and of attention, remain focused on their object without a moment's release — how, then, could one refuse to accept that they continue across many successive moments?

Hence the Yogācārabhūmi says: only after a decisive cognition does moral affectedness arise; only after this does the homogeneously-flowing eye-consciousness turn wholesome or unwholesome — yet this does not occur through its own power of discrimination, but rather, for as long as the mental consciousness does not turn to some other object, the eye-consciousness and the mental consciousness, whether wholesome or defiled, continue turning together throughout that entire span — and just as with the eye-consciousness, so it should be understood with the arising of the body-consciousness and the rest.

The clear intent of this passage is to show that, throughout that entire span, the eye-consciousness and the mental consciousness both continue turning together — since, whenever the eye-consciousness is present, the mental consciousness is never absent, this is not a case of the two consciousnesses merely generating each other in succession, one after the other.

If an intensified object is continuously present, overwhelming body and mind so that they cannot let go of it even for a moment, then, at that time, the five sense-consciousnesses must, by reason, continue in succession — as in the scorching hells, or in the heaven of frivolous forgetting.

Hence the Yogācārabhūmi states: whenever any of these six consciousnesses serves as the equal-immediate-antecedent condition for any of these six consciousnesses, it is on this basis that the name "mental faculty" is established. If the five sense-consciousnesses, before and after, invariably had only the mental consciousness as their antecedent, that treatise ought instead to have said: whenever this one consciousness serves as the equal-immediate-antecedent condition for these six consciousnesses. Or else it ought to have said: whenever these six consciousnesses serve as the equal-immediate-antecedent condition for this one consciousness. Since it says neither of these, it can be known that the five sense-consciousnesses do have the capacity to continue in succession.

Whenever the five sense-consciousnesses arise, the mental consciousness is always present too, capable of drawing forth the next moment's mental consciousness — so why should the five sense-consciousnesses need to rely on themselves as their own guiding support?

In states such as dreamless sleep or unconsciousness, the mental consciousness has ceased entirely; when it arises again later, the storehouse consciousness and manas, being themselves constantly continuous, ought equally to serve as its guiding support at that point. If the mental consciousness is instead said to use its own prior, same-kind moment as its guide even then, why should the five sense-consciousnesses not equally be allowed their own prior, same-kind moment as their guide? If this is not accepted for the five senses, then on what grounds is it accepted for the mental consciousness?

When manas, associated with the wisdom of equality, first arises, it must be drawn forth by the sixth, mental consciousness — so this, too, ought to use that mental consciousness as its guiding support. When the purified eighth consciousness, associated with the great mirror wisdom, first arises, it, too, must be drawn forth through the skillful means of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. And the ripening mind, before this transformation, depends on a defiled manas, or else on a wholesome mind associated with compassion and vow. Given this, one must equally accept that the eighth consciousness, too, takes the sixth and seventh as its guiding support. By this, the view stated above does not exhaust the reasoning at all.

One should say, instead: the five sense-consciousnesses may take whichever of the prior six consciousnesses as their guiding support; the sixth, mental consciousness may take its own prior moment, or the seventh or eighth, as its guiding support; the seventh, manas, may take its own prior moment, or the sixth consciousness, as its guiding support; and the appropriating consciousness may take its own prior moment, or the sixth and seventh, as its guiding support. None of this conflicts with reason, for the reasons already given.

Another view holds: this account, too, is unreasonable. The "guiding support" means a dharma possessing a cognitive object, serving as the governing factor, capable of acting as the equal-immediate-antecedent condition — it is called the "guiding support" because it opens the way and guides forward the mind and mental factors that arise after it. This applies only to mind, not to mental factors and the like.

If one thing has no capacity to arise simultaneously with another, it may be said to have a genuine guiding power with respect to that other — but since a single body's eight consciousnesses can indeed all arise together at once, how could a consciousness of one kind serve as the guiding support for a consciousness of another kind? If one grants that it can serve as such a support, one would have to hold that the two cannot arise simultaneously at all — which would be the same, mistaken position held by certain other schools, that different minds cannot occur together.

Furthermore, within a single body, the number of consciousnesses arising together is not fixed — if it were permissible for different-kind consciousnesses to serve as each other's equal-immediate-antecedent condition, then form and the like ought to be permitted the same role, which would contradict the scriptures' teaching that the equal-immediate-antecedent condition belongs only to mind and mental factors.

As for the Mahāyānasaṃgraha's statement that form, too, may have an equal-immediate-antecedent condition — this is a conditional concession, made only for the sake of argument: it provisionally grants the Hīnayāna position that form and mind, in succession, have an equal-immediate-antecedent condition, only in order to then deny that they have a causal condition. Were this not the intended sense, the word "equal" would serve no purpose at all. And if one holds that the word "equal" does not restrict the number but merely indicates a shared kind, this directly contradicts your own position that consciousnesses of different kinds can serve as this condition for one another.

Hence each of the eight consciousnesses takes only its own kind as its guiding support — this accords deeply with both reason and scripture, since dharmas of the very same kind can never arise simultaneously with one another. The support for the mental factors should be stated in accordance with whichever consciousness they accompany.

Although mind and its mental factors, being of different kinds, arise together, they are nevertheless mutually associated, blend as if into a single thing, certainly arise and cease together, and necessarily share the same activity — so that when one opens the way and guides forward, the others do so as well, and thus they can, in turn, serve as each other's equal-immediate-antecedent condition. The various distinct consciousnesses are not like this, and so cannot be treated as an equivalent case. Yet none of the mental factors themselves serve as the guiding support, since they lack the governing quality needed for what they draw forth.

Should one object: if the equal-immediate-antecedent condition for mind and mental factors is invariably restricted to their own kind, then, at the very first moment the seventh and eighth consciousnesses undergo their transformation of basis, the faith and other mental factors newly associated with them would then lack this condition altogether — which would contradict the scriptures' teaching that every mind and mental factor arises from all four conditions.

In states such as dreamless sleep or unconsciousness, although the mental consciousness has ceased, when it arises again later its guiding support is simply its own prior moment of the same kind — and the interrupted five sense-consciousnesses should be understood in just the same way, since no mind of a different kind intervenes in the gap to be called "immediate." Once that prior moment of its own kind has ceased, it has already served as the guiding support for the present consciousness — so why trouble to posit a different kind of consciousness as the guiding support at all?

As for the scriptures' statements that the first six consciousnesses draw forth one another, or that the seventh and eighth arise in dependence on the sixth and seventh — these are all spoken with reference to an especially strong dominant condition, not the equal-immediate-antecedent condition, and so there is no real contradiction. The Yogācārabhūmi's statement — that whenever this consciousness's immediate cessation is followed with certainty by the arising of some consciousness, it is called that consciousness's equal-immediate-antecedent condition, and that when any of these six consciousnesses is the equal-immediate-antecedent condition for any of these six, this is the basis for the designation "mental faculty" — speaks in general terms while meaning something more specific in each case, and so this, too, is not in conflict. Hence, taking only one's own kind as the guiding support accords deeply with both reason and scripture.

Thus far we have explained what this consciousness depends on. What, then, is its object? It is precisely what the verse means by "takes it as its object." "It" refers to the very consciousness just discussed, on which this one depends — the scriptures teach that this consciousness takes the storehouse consciousness as its object.

One view holds: this manas takes both that consciousness's own essence and its associated mental factors as its object. The treatise says that manas is constantly associated with the grasping of self and of what belongs to self — meaning it takes that consciousness's essence and its associated factors as its object, clinging to them, respectively, as "self" and as "what belongs to self." Since mental factors, moreover, are never separate from consciousness, as the very term "Consciousness-Only" implies, this does not conflict with scripture.

Another view holds: that account does not hold up, since nowhere is it said that manas takes contact and the other mental factors as its object. One should say, instead, that manas takes only that consciousness's perceiving aspect and perceived aspect as its object, clinging to them, respectively, as "self" and as "what belongs to self" — since both the perceived and perceiving aspects have consciousness itself as their essence, this does not conflict with the scriptures' teaching.

Another view holds: this account, too, is unreasonable. If manas took the perceived aspect as its object, then, since the five physical faculties and their objects are not themselves part of the consciousness aggregate, manas should, like the five sense-consciousnesses, take external objects as well; it should, like the mental consciousness, take an object shared with others; and a being reborn in the formless realm should then fail to cling to anything as "what belongs to self" at all, since one who is reborn there, having grown weary of form, no longer has the ālaya transforming into form.

One should say, instead, that manas takes only the storehouse consciousness itself and its seeds as its object, clinging to them, respectively, as "self" and as "what belongs to self" — since a seed is simply that consciousness's own functional capacity, not a separately, substantially existing thing, this does not conflict with the scriptures' teaching.

Another view holds: none of the accounts given above is correct. Seeds such as that of form are not themselves part of the consciousness aggregate, and the treatise states that seeds are genuinely, substantially existent — were they merely conceptual constructs, they would be as good as nonexistent, and could not serve as a causal condition at all.

Furthermore, the view of a substantial self accompanying this consciousness arises spontaneously, as a single, unbroken kind, continuing on without interruption — how, then, could it possibly cling separately to two distinct things, a "self" and a "what belongs to self," as if these were two different objects? There is no single mind in which two opposed objects — such as annihilation and permanence — could be separately grasped simultaneously; nor should one say the two graspings occur one after the other, since this clinging has flowed on as a single, undifferentiated whole since beginningless time.

It should be understood, instead, that this manas takes only the storehouse consciousness's perceiving aspect as its object, nothing more — since that perceiving aspect, from beginningless time, has continued as a single, unbroken kind, resembling something permanent and unitary, and constantly serves as the support for all dharmas. This manas clings to it only as an inner self; the mention of "what belongs to self" is simply carried along by force of ordinary speech. Or else, this clinging takes it to be "my self," so that a single act of view-grasping is described in two verbal expressions.

If the matter is stated in this way, it accords well with both reason and scripture, since many passages speak only of a view of self, and the graspings of "self" and of "what belongs to self" never arise together at once.

Before the transformation of basis, manas takes only the storehouse consciousness as its object. Once the transformation has occurred, it takes suchness and all other dharmas as its object as well, since the wisdom of equality realizes the ten kinds of equality, and knows the differing degrees of resolve among sentient beings, manifesting various images of buddhahood accordingly. What is discussed here, though, concerns only the state before this transformation, and so only its taking the storehouse consciousness as object is mentioned. Awakening is unrestricted, delusion is restricted — this is simply how reason has it: the mind free of self and the mind bound to it are, respectively, all-pervading and not all-pervading in their object.

How could this consciousness take as its object the very consciousness it depends on? Just as a later consciousness may take an earlier moment of mind as its object — and if that is already well established, what fault could there be here?

The verse's phrase "has deliberation as its nature and characteristic" shows both this consciousness's essential nature and its mode of activity together: manas has deliberation as its very essential nature, and, precisely because of this, it also uses that same deliberation as its mode of activity. This, in turn, explains the distinct name given to it: it is called "manas" precisely because it constantly and closely deliberates. Before the transformation of basis, it constantly and closely deliberates on the mark of a clung-to self; once the transformation has occurred, it likewise constantly and closely deliberates on the mark of no-self.

How many mental factors are associated with this manas? To begin with, it constantly accompanies four kinds of affliction. Here, the verse's word "accompanies" indicates a relationship of association. That is: from beginningless time until the transformation of basis, this manas spontaneously and constantly takes the storehouse consciousness as its object, and is associated with four root afflictions. What are these four? "Self-delusion, self-view, together with self-conceit and self-love" — these are the four.

Self-delusion is ignorance: being benighted about the mark of self, deluded about the principle of no-self — hence it is called self-delusion. Self-view is self-grasping: falsely conceiving what is not a self to be a self — hence it is called self-view. Self-conceit is arrogance: relying on this clung-to self, it makes the mind swell with pride — hence it is called self-conceit. Self-love is craving for self: growing deeply attached and infatuated with this clung-to self — hence it is called self-love.

The word "together with" shows that self-conceit and self-love occur together with self-view, ruling out the position held by certain other schools that these are not, in fact, mutually associated.

These four constantly arise, disturbing and clouding the inner mind, and causing the outer, evolving consciousnesses to become permanently defiled. It is because of these that sentient beings revolve through birth and death, unable to escape — hence they are called "afflictions."

There are, in general, ten fundamental afflictions — why does this consciousness have only four? Because self-view is present, no other view arises alongside it, since a single mind cannot contain two acts of discriminating wisdom at once. But why must this consciousness necessarily have self-view? The two kinds of view-grasping and wrong view arise only through discrimination, and are eliminated only on the path of seeing — whereas the afflictions accompanying this consciousness are exclusively innate, eliminated only on the path of cultivation. The view of what-belongs-to-self and the extremist view both arise in dependence on self-view — but the view associated with this consciousness does not arise in dependence on them; rather, it constantly, internally clings to the existence of a self, and so must involve self-view specifically.

Because this view is settled through decisive clinging, doubt has no room to arise. Because manas is enamored and attached to self, aversion cannot arise either. Hence the afflictions accompanying this consciousness are only these four.

How can view, conceit, and love — these three — arise together at once? Since their modes of activity do not conflict, what fault could there be in their arising together?

One might object: the Yogācārabhūmi states that craving lowers the mind while conceit raises it up — are these not, then, contradictory? In reply: there is a difference between the discriminated and the innate forms of these afflictions, between an external object and an internal object, and between what is looked down upon and what is relied upon for pride, coarse and subtle — the two passages, understood this way, are not actually in conflict with one another.

Are only these four mental factors associated with manas? No — for the verse also says "and other factors such as contact accompany it."

One view holds: manas has only nine mental factors in all — the four just named, together with five more: contact, attention, feeling, perception, and volition — since manas, like every consciousness, is certainly associated with these universal mental factors. The earlier discussion of contact and the rest concerned their being associated with the ripening consciousness; fearing this might be taken as identical to the present case, since that association, too, is morally neutral, the verse adds the word "other" to show that this case is distinct from that one. The word "and" carries the sense of combination, showing that the four just named and these further five together are constantly associated with manas.

Why, then, does manas lack the remaining mental factors? "Aspiration" is the hope for something not yet attained or joined — but manas spontaneously takes as its object something already attained and joined, with nothing left to hope for, and so it lacks aspiration. "Resolve" is the settled confirmation of something previously uncertain — but manas, from beginningless time, constantly takes as its object something already settled, with nothing left to confirm, and so it lacks resolve. "Recollection" is only the memory of something previously experienced — but manas constantly takes as its object what is presently, currently experienced, with nothing to recall, and so it lacks recollection. "Concentration" is only the fixing of the mind, focused single-pointedly on one object — but manas spontaneously takes a distinct object moment by moment, and so, lacking this single focus, it has no concentration. "Wisdom," in this context, is simply self-view itself, and so is not separately discussed.

The wholesome factors, being pure, do not accompany this consciousness.

The secondary afflictions arise only in dependence on some distinct phase or interval within the primary afflictions' activity. But this consciousness is constantly accompanied by its four afflictions, unbroken and unchanging from one moment to the next, with no distinct phase to speak of — hence this consciousness has no secondary afflictions accompanying it.

"Regret" is remorse over some previously committed deed — but manas spontaneously, constantly takes only its present object, and is not remorseful over any past deed, and so it lacks regret. "Sleep" depends on the body and mind growing heavy and dulled, arising only occasionally through the force of external conditions — but manas, from beginningless time, clings internally in a single unbroken kind, without relying on any external condition, and so sleep is not present in it. "Coarse" and "subtle" discursive thought both operate by turning outward, weighing things over shallowly or deeply, giving rise to coarse or fine expression — but manas operates only by turning inward, clinging to self in a single unbroken kind, and so these do not accompany it.

Another view holds: that interpretation of "other" is unreasonable, since the verse elsewhere specifically classifies this consciousness as "covered." Moreover, this account would leave manas lacking any secondary afflictions to accompany it at all, whereas a primary affliction must always be accompanied by some secondary affliction. Hence the word "other" here indicates the secondary afflictions.

On this point, one view holds: five secondary afflictions are universally associated with every defiled mind. As the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: torpor, restlessness, lack of faith, laziness, and heedlessness are constantly associated together within every category of defilement, for it is simply not possible for a defiled nature to be established apart from a lack of capability and the rest.

Whenever an affliction arises, the mind is thereby rendered defiled — hence, in any defiled state, these five must be present. Whenever an affliction arises, it must do so through a lack of capability, agitation, lack of faith, laziness, and heedlessness. Although restlessness pervades every defiled mind, it is spoken of specifically as an aspect of craving, since it intensifies precisely in states of craving — just as sleep and regret, although they pervade minds of all three moral qualities, are spoken of specifically as an aspect of delusion, since they intensify precisely in states of delusion.

Though other passages speak of six, or of ten, secondary afflictions as pervading every defiled mind, they do so with reference to a different sense of "pervading," not because these actually pervade every defiled mind in the strict sense meant here. Reckoning among the twenty secondary afflictions, six are said to pervade in the sense of extending across both coarse and subtle forms, across both the morally neutral and the unwholesome, and across both those obstructing concentration and those obstructing wisdom, since their character is especially pronounced. Reckoning among twenty-two secondary afflictions, ten are said to pervade in the sense of extending across both coarse and subtle forms among two moral natures. These accounts, then, are not actually in conflict with one another.

Manas, accordingly, has fifteen accompanying mental factors: the nine already named, the five secondary afflictions, and the particular mental factor of wisdom. Although self-view is itself included within the particular mental factor of wisdom, there is a meaningful distinction between them among the fifty-one mental factors, and so the two are listed separately.

Why, then, does manas lack the remaining mental factors? Wrath and the other minor secondary afflictions have a coarse, agitated mode of activity, whereas this consciousness is close and subtle, and so they do not accompany it. Lack of shame and lack of conscience are exclusively unwholesome, whereas this consciousness is morally neutral, and so they are not associated with it. Distraction causes the mind to scatter outward toward external objects, whereas this consciousness constantly, internally clings to a single unbroken object, never scattering outward, and so it is not present. Incorrect knowledge means giving rise to bodily, verbal, and mental conduct that turns outward and violates proper norms, whereas this consciousness clings only inwardly, and so it does not accompany it. That no other mental factors are present follows for the reasons already given.

Another view holds: it should instead be said that six secondary afflictions are universally associated with every defiled mind, since the Yogācārabhūmi says: lack of faith, laziness, heedlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, and false wisdom are all associated with every defiled mind.

Without forgetfulness, distraction, and false wisdom, the mind could not possibly give rise to any affliction at all — for it is only by taking as its object some previously experienced category, giving rise to forgetfulness and a wrongful discrimination, that craving and the other afflictions can arise in the first place. And whenever an affliction arises, the mind must necessarily scatter and wander, since it is precisely distraction toward the object that this consists in.

Torpor and restlessness, however, have mutually opposed modes of activity, and so cannot both arise universally in every defiled mind. The treatise's statement that these five pervade every defiled mind is meant in the sense of extending across coarse and subtle forms, opposed only to what is purely wholesome, being genuine secondary afflictions extending across both moral natures. The statement that ten pervade should be understood in the sense already given.

Manas, on this view, has nineteen accompanying mental factors: the nine already named, the six secondary afflictions, together with recollection, concentration, and wisdom, plus the addition of torpor. Recollection is here listed separately, to be explained in the same way as wisdom above. Concentration, too, is included, since manas is focused, without ever releasing it, on a single, unchanging object of self-clinging. Torpor is added, since the ignorance accompanying this consciousness is especially heavy, leaving the mind torpid. Restlessness is not included, since it is directly opposed to this. That no other mental factors are present should be understood as stated above.

Another view holds, further, that ten secondary afflictions are universally associated with every defiled mind. The Yogācārabhūmi says: heedlessness, restlessness, torpor, lack of faith, laziness, wrongful aspiration, wrongful resolve, wrongful recollection, distraction, and incorrect knowledge — these ten arise with every defiled mind, extending everywhere, bound throughout the three realms.

Without wrongful aspiration and wrongful resolve, the mind could not possibly give rise to any affliction at all, for it is only by wishing to be joined with, or separated from, an experienced object, and confirming its particular character, that craving and the other afflictions can arise. As for those in doubt about some principle, they certainly feel no hesitation regarding form and other such matters — so a mind associated with doubt also has resolve present. As for hesitating over the very object one is taking hold of, that is not the doubt meant as an affliction, as in mistaking a person for a post.

The reason other passages do not describe these last two as universal is that, when taking hold of an object toward which there is no craving, or when a mind is associated with doubt, wrongful aspiration and resolve are not conspicuously evident. Whether the remaining factors are present or absent in each case should be understood as already stated.

Manas, on this view, has twenty-four accompanying mental factors: the nine already named, the ten secondary afflictions, plus the five particular mental factors, to be explained by the same reasoning as before. That no other mental factors are present should be understood as above.

Another view holds: none of the accounts given above exhausts the reasoning. Consider: one who doubts whether another world exists or not — what aspiration or resolve could possibly be present with respect to that? Furthermore, at the moment an affliction arises, if torpor were absent, there would be no fixed lack of capability present; if restlessness were absent, there would be no agitation, and the state would then be no different from a wholesome one, not a defiled state at all. If a defiled mind lacked distraction, it could not properly be said to scatter and wander, and so would not be a defiled mind. And if it lacked forgetfulness and incorrect knowledge, how could any affliction possibly come to manifest at all?

Hence a defiled mind, without exception, invariably arises associated with eight secondary afflictions: torpor, restlessness, lack of faith, laziness, heedlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, and incorrect knowledge. Forgetfulness and incorrect knowledge, insofar as their essential nature consists in recollection and wisdom respectively, do not pervade every defiled mind, since not every defiled mind takes a previously experienced object involving discrimination; but insofar as their essential nature consists in ignorance, they do pervade every arising defiled mind, for the reasons already given.

Manas, accordingly, has eighteen accompanying mental factors: the nine already named, the eight secondary afflictions, and the particular mental factor of wisdom. That no other mental factors are present, and the three treatise passages just discussed, should all be explained as above.

If the matter is stated in this way, it does not conflict with either reason or scripture.