When Manas Finally Falls Silent

With what feeling is this defiled manas associated? One view holds: it is accompanied only by joyful feeling, since it constantly, internally clings to a self, giving rise to joy and love. Another view holds: this is not so — for accepting joyful feeling all the way up to the peak of existence would contradict the scriptures' own statement.

One should say, instead: this manas is associated with four kinds of feeling. Born into the lower destinies, it is associated with sorrowful feeling, since it takes as its object the result drawn forth by unwholesome karma. Born as a human, in the desire-realm heavens, or in the first and second meditative absorptions, it is associated with joyful feeling, since it takes as its object the result of wholesome karma belonging to a realm possessing joy. In the third meditative absorption, it is associated with pleasurable feeling, since it takes as its object the result of wholesome karma belonging to a realm possessing pleasure. From the fourth meditative absorption up to the peak of existence, it is associated with equanimous feeling, since it takes as its object only the result of wholesome karma belonging to a realm of equanimity.

Another view holds: that account, too, is unreasonable. This manas, from beginningless time, spontaneously operates as a single, unchanging kind, taking hold of an internally clung-to self, forever without alteration — and so it cannot be associated with a feeling that itself varies and changes. Moreover, wherever this manas differs in meaning from the storehouse consciousness discussed earlier, the treatise states this difference explicitly. If manas were associated with all four feelings, this too would have been stated explicitly. Since it is not stated explicitly, manas must certainly be the same as the ālaya in this respect. Hence manas is associated only with equanimous feeling.

Before the transformation of basis, manas is associated with the mental factors already described. Once the transformation has occurred, only twenty-one mental factors arise together with it — the five universal factors, the five particular factors, and the eleven wholesome factors — just as with the eighth consciousness. Once the transformation has occurred, manas is accompanied only by equanimous feeling, since it operates spontaneously, constantly turning toward its object with perfect evenness.

To what moral category does manas, together with its mental factors, belong? It belongs to the covered-yet-neutral category, and nothing else. The four afflictions and the rest associated with this manas are defiled dharmas — obstructing the noble path and concealing one's own mind, they are called "covered"; being neither wholesome nor unwholesome, they are called "neutral." Just as the afflictions of the upper two realms, held in check by the power of meditative concentration, are classified as neutral — this manas, too, together with its defiled dharmas, is classified as neutral, since its support is subtle and it operates spontaneously. Once the transformation of basis has occurred, it is exclusively wholesome in nature.

To which realm is manas, together with its mental factors, bound? It is bound to whatever realm a being is born into. That is: when born in the desire realm, the manifest manas and its associated mental factors are bound to the desire realm; and the same should be understood all the way up to the peak of existence — since manas spontaneously, constantly takes as its object the storehouse consciousness of its own realm specifically, clinging to it as an inner self, never that of another realm.

Whenever the ripening storehouse consciousness of a given realm is currently manifest, the being is said to be "born in that realm"; the defiled manas, taking that consciousness as its object and clinging to it as self, is thereby bound to that realm, and so is said to be "bound to that realm." Or else, it is bound by the afflictions of that particular realm, and is thus said to be "bound to that realm" in this sense. Once the transformation of basis has occurred, it is no longer bound in this way at all.

This defiled manas has continued since beginningless time — at what stage is it permanently severed, or merely temporarily suppressed? The verse says: "It is absent in arhats, in cessation-attainment, and on the supramundane path." "Arhat" here refers broadly to the fruit of having-finished-training in any of the three vehicles — at this stage, both the seed and the manifest activity of this defiled manas are permanently severed and extinguished, and so it is said to be absent. In the stages of cessation-attainment and the supramundane path, still within training, it is only temporarily suppressed and extinguished, and so it, too, is said to be absent there.

This defiled manas, from beginningless time, operates subtly, as a single unbroken kind, spontaneously — no contaminated path can suppress or extinguish it; only the noble paths of the three vehicles have the capacity to suppress and extinguish it, since genuine understanding of no-self directly opposes self-grasping. When the subsequently-attained uncontaminated wisdom that flows from this understanding manifests, it too opposes this manas, since both the genuine understanding of no-self and what is subsequently attained from it are equally uncontaminated — hence together they are called "the supramundane path."

Cessation-attainment, being itself an outflow of the noble path, is extremely tranquil, and so this manas is absent there as well. Yet since its seed has not been permanently severed, once cessation-attainment or the noble path is exited, this manas manifests again, right up until it is finally, permanently extinguished.

The afflictions associated with this defiled mind, being entirely innate, are not eliminated on the path of seeing; being genuinely defiled, they are certainly not beyond elimination altogether. Being extremely subtle, their seeds are severed all at once, together with the very subtlest afflictions of the peak of existence, their power being equal — when the vajra-like concentration manifests, it severs these seeds all at once, and one becomes an arhat; hence, at the stage beyond further training, they never arise again.

Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas beyond further training who turn toward the Mahāyāna — from their initial arousal of intention up until they have not yet attained buddhahood — though genuinely bodhisattvas, are also called "arhats," since the meaning applies equally to them; hence this is not separately discussed here.

On this point, one view holds: manas is associated only with the afflictive obstruction. The scriptures everywhere say that it is absent in the three stages just discussed; they also say that it is constantly associated with the four afflictions; and they say that it serves as the basis for the defilement of the other consciousnesses.

Another view holds: that account conflicts with both scripture and reason, since the scriptures state that manas exists even on the supramundane path. An undefiled mental consciousness, just as when it is defiled, must certainly have some innate, exclusive support of its own.

The treatise states: the storehouse consciousness always, certainly turns together with at least one other consciousness, namely manas; when the mental consciousness arises, then two turn together, namely the mental consciousness and manas; if any one of the five sense-consciousnesses arises, then three turn together; and if, at some time, all five sense-consciousnesses arise at once, then seven turn together.

But if, while abiding in cessation-attainment, the seventh consciousness were absent, then, at that time, the storehouse consciousness would have to turn together with no consciousness at all, and it would then no longer be certain that it constantly turns together with at least one. And while abiding on the noble path, if the seventh were absent, then, at that time, the storehouse consciousness would turn together with only itself alone — so how, then, could it be said that, whenever the mental consciousness arises, the storehouse consciousness certainly turns together with two?

The Prakaraṇāryavācā-śāstra says: manas is constantly associated either with the four afflictions, or else with their opposite, its activity being either one of self-important pride, or one of perfect equanimity. From this it can be known that this manas extends to both a defiled and an undefiled state.

If, on the strength of the treatise's saying that an arhat has no defiled manas, one concludes that the seventh consciousness is thereby entirely absent — then, by the same reasoning, since the treatise also says that an arhat abandons the ālaya, one would have to conclude the eighth consciousness is thereby entirely absent too. Since that conclusion is not accepted, why should this one be?

Furthermore, various treatises say: by transforming the seventh consciousness, one attains the wisdom of equality. Like every other wisdom, this wisdom certainly has a support, a purified consciousness with which it is associated. If this consciousness did not exist, that wisdom could not exist either, since a supported thing cannot exist apart from its support. Nor can one say that this wisdom instead depends on the sixth, evolving consciousness, since it is accepted that this wisdom operates constantly in a buddha, exactly like the mirror wisdom.

Furthermore, if the seventh consciousness were absent at the stage beyond further training, the eighth consciousness would then have no co-arising support at all. Yet it must certainly have such a support, being of the same essential nature as consciousness as the others.

Furthermore, just as one who has not yet realized the selflessness of the person has self-grasping constantly operating, so too one who has not yet realized the selflessness of dharmas should have dharma-grasping constantly operating — if this consciousness did not exist, on what consciousness would that grasping depend? It cannot depend on the eighth, since the eighth lacks the discriminating wisdom needed for such grasping. By this, one should believe that, on the noble path of the two vehicles, in cessation-attainment, and at the stage beyond further training, this consciousness continues to operate constantly, since these practitioners have not yet realized the selflessness of dharmas.

Furthermore, various treatises use the parallel case of the five sense-consciousnesses to prove that the seventh exists, serving as the sixth's support. If, when the noble path arises, or at the stage beyond further training, there were no seventh consciousness to serve as the sixth's support, then both the thesis and the reason offered in that proof would fail together — or else one would have to say the five sense-consciousnesses, too, sometimes lack a support. Since the five always have a support, the sixth, too, should always have one.

Hence there certainly exists an undefiled manas, constantly manifesting in these three stages. When it is said to be "absent" there, this refers only to the defiled manas; just as it is said that the ālaya is absent in four states without meaning the eighth consciousness itself is absent, so too should this be understood here.

This manas, broadly speaking, has three distinct kinds: first, associated with the view of a personal self; second, associated with the view of dharmas as self; third, associated with the wisdom of equality.

The first extends through the entire continuity of ordinary beings, through śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas still in training, and through the contaminated mental states of a certain class of bodhisattvas before the eighth ground — taking the ālayavijñāna as its object, it gives rise to the view of a personal self.

The second extends through the entire continuity of ordinary beings, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, and through every bodhisattva's states in which the fruit of the wisdom realizing the emptiness of dharmas is not currently manifest — taking the ripening consciousness as its object, it gives rise to the view of dharmas as self.

The third extends through the entire continuity of every tathāgata, and through the states, on the bodhisattva's path of seeing and path of cultivation, in which the fruit of the wisdom realizing the emptiness of dharmas is currently manifest — taking the undefiled ripening consciousness as its object, it gives rise to the wisdom of equality.

Whenever the view of a personal self arises, the view of dharmas as self must also be manifest at that very time, since self-grasping necessarily arises in dependence on dharma-grasping — just as, mistaking a post for something in the dark at night, one then takes it to be a person. Although the view of self and the view of dharmas as self differ in their function, they are not mutually opposed, and both rely on a single act of discriminating wisdom — just as the eye-consciousness and the rest, though a single essence, can perform multiple functions, such as discerning blue and other colors, without contradiction; this, too, should be understood in the same way.

When the noble path or cessation-attainment is currently manifest for a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha still in training; for a bodhisattva of sudden awakening, on the path of cultivation; or for a gradually-awakening trainee, when the fruit of the wisdom realizing the emptiness of the person is currently manifest — in all these cases, only dharma-grasping arises, since self-grasping has already been suppressed.

For a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha beyond further training, and for this gradually-awakening bodhisattva when the fruit of the wisdom realizing the emptiness of dharmas is not currently manifest — here, too, only dharma-grasping arises, since self-grasping has already been permanently severed.

From the eighth ground onward, every bodhisattva's self-grasping never operates at all — either already permanently severed, or permanently suppressed. When the fruit of the wisdom realizing the emptiness of dharmas is not currently manifest, dharma-grasping still arises, and there is no contradiction in this. As the sūtra says: from the eighth ground onward, no afflictions manifest at all any longer — only the cognitive obstruction, together with what it depends on, remains. This cognitive obstruction here refers to its manifest activity, not its seed — were this not so, the afflictions, too, would have to remain present.

Manas together with dharma-grasping, although not called "defiled" with respect to śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, is nevertheless called "defiled" with respect to bodhisattvas, since it obstructs their wisdom — and for this reason it, too, is called "covered-yet-neutral." With respect to śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, it is called "uncovered," since it does not obstruct their wisdom in this way. It is included among what is "born of ripening," since it is constantly generated from the ripening consciousness — called "born of ripening" rather than "the fruit of ripening," since this name applies broadly, in the way that whatever is not otherwise included is classified under "dominant condition."

How should it be known that this seventh consciousness has a distinct essence of its own, apart from the eye-consciousness and the rest? Scripture and reason together serve as the standard of proof.

The Bhagavān states, again and again throughout the scriptures, that mind, manas, and consciousness carry three distinct meanings: what accumulates and gives rise is called "mind"; what deliberates is called "manas"; what discerns is called "consciousness." These are the three distinct meanings. Although all three meanings apply, in some measure, to all eight consciousnesses, each is displayed most prominently in a particular one: the eighth is called "mind," since it accumulates the seeds of every dharma and gives rise to every dharma; the seventh is called "manas," since it takes the storehouse consciousness as its object, constantly and closely deliberating, taking it to be a self; and the remaining six are called "consciousness," since, operating on their own six distinct objects, coarsely, in motion, and with interruption, they discern and cognize.

As the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra's verse says: "The storehouse consciousness is called mind; that which has deliberation as its nature is called manas; what is capable of discerning the characteristics of all objects is called consciousness."

Furthermore, the Mahāyāna sūtras, again and again, specifically speak of a seventh consciousness — hence it exists as something distinct. That the Mahāyāna sūtras are a valid standard of authoritative scripture has already been argued at length above, and so is not established again here.

The Vimokṣa Sūtra, too, specifically speaks of this seventh consciousness. As its verse says: "Defiled manas constantly arises and ceases together with its afflictions; once liberated from these afflictions, it neither existed before nor will exist afterward."

That sūtra itself explains the meaning of this verse: there is a defiled manas which, from beginningless time, constantly arises and ceases together with four afflictions — self-view, self-love, together with self-conceit and self-delusion. Once the path that counteracts these arises and the afflictions are severed, this manas is thereby liberated from them. At that point, the afflictions associated with this manas are not only presently nonexistent, but have no past or future existence either, since past and future have no real nature of their own.

Teachings of this kind are found across every school's canon; fearing to weary the reader with excessive citation, they are not further elaborated here.

The scriptural case has now been made; the argument turns next to reason. The sūtras speak of an exclusive ignorance, subtle and constantly operating, concealing true reality — without this consciousness, that ignorance could not exist. Ordinary beings, at every stage without exception, constantly give rise to this ignorance, deluded about the true principle, concealing the meaning of true reality, and obstructing the eye of noble wisdom. As the verse says: "When the mind of true meaning is about to arise, it is constantly capable of obstructing it; occurring together across every stage, this is called exclusive ignorance."

Hence the sūtra says: ordinary beings dwell constantly in a long night, blinded by ignorance, their minds bound in a stupor, never once awakening. If there were some moment, at the stage of an ordinary being, when this ignorance failed to arise, this would contradict the sūtra's meaning — for it makes no sense that, throughout the entire stage of being an ordinary being, this deluding ignorance should sometimes operate and sometimes not. If this ignorance depended on the six consciousnesses alone, none of this could be established, since it would then have to be intermittent, whereas it is constantly defiling. Once one accepts that manas exists, this difficulty disappears.

Defiled manas is constantly associated with four afflictions — so why is the ignorance among them specifically called "exclusive," rather than the others?

One view holds: since the self-view, self-conceit, and self-love accompanying it are not themselves fundamental afflictions in the way ignorance uniquely is, what fault is there in calling only ignorance "exclusive"?

Another view holds: that account conflicts with both reason and scripture, since these three are never listed among the purely secondary afflictions, and are instead classified among the six, or the ten, primary afflictions. Passage after passage states that defiled manas is constantly associated with all four afflictions together. It should be said, instead: among these four, ignorance is the governing one — although the other three arise together with it, ignorance alone is called "exclusive," since, from beginningless time, it constantly, internally befuddles and deludes, never once examined or reflected upon, its delusive power being especially pronounced. Self-view and the rest, accompanying it, are properly called merely "associated" — but could they not, when acting as the governing factor themselves, equally be called "exclusive"? There would be no fault, either, in granting this, in the same way as with ignorance.

Another view holds: this ignorance is called "exclusive" in the sense of "the exclusive qualities of a buddha" — meaning it belongs to this consciousness alone, and no other.

If that were so, however, then the afflictions associated with other consciousnesses, being absent from this consciousness, should equally be called "exclusive" to those other consciousnesses. Rather, the name "exclusive" is established with reference to a distinctive, pre-eminent quality, not simply because something happens to be absent elsewhere — it is not the case that anything absent from one thing but present in another automatically deserves the name "exclusive." That is: the ignorance associated with the seventh consciousness, operating constantly from beginningless time, obstructing the wisdom of true meaning — this distinctive function is found nowhere else, present only in this consciousness, and so it alone is called "exclusive."

Given this, the other three afflictions accompanying it should equally be called "exclusive" — yet ignorance, being the governing factor, alone receives this name. Or else, one may grant that the other three, too, are called "exclusive"; it is simply that, in contrast to other, ordinary forms of "delusion," the text speaks specifically of ignorance.

"Exclusive ignorance," broadly speaking, is of two kinds: first, "constantly-operating exclusive ignorance," absent from every other consciousness; second, "independently-operating exclusive ignorance," which this consciousness does not itself have. Hence the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of two kinds of ignorance: ignorance accompanied by craving and the like is called "associated ignorance"; ignorance not accompanied by craving and the like is called "independently-operating ignorance." The governing, independently-operating kind is eliminated only on the path of seeing, as the sūtra says: "Noble ones still in training, once their exclusive ignorance has been permanently severed, create no new karma." The non-governing, independently-operating kind is eliminated on the path of cultivation as well, since wrath and the other such afflictions are eliminated on both the path of seeing and the path of cultivation. The constantly-operating exclusive ignorance is absent from every other school's account; the independently-operating exclusive ignorance is accepted both by this school and by others.

Furthermore, the sūtras say: the eye and form serve as conditions, giving rise to the eye-consciousness; and so on, up to: mind and dharma serve as conditions, giving rise to the mental consciousness. Without this consciousness, that "mind" mentioned as a condition could not exist.

Just as the five sense-consciousnesses each certainly have their own dominant, exclusive co-arising support — namely, the eye and the other faculties — so too the mental consciousness, being itself included among the six consciousnesses, should by the same reasoning be granted just such a support. If this consciousness did not exist, what could that support possibly be?

One cannot say that form itself is this support, since mind is not form. Nor could the mental consciousness, without such a support, ever have the two kinds of discrimination — recollective and inferential. Nor can one say that the five sense-consciousnesses, too, lack a genuine co-arising support of their own, merely happening to occur alongside their faculties by coincidence, the way a sprout happens to occur alongside its shadow — for consciousness and its faculty, being necessarily bound to the same object, must certainly occur together at the very same time, just like mind and its mental factors.

By this line of reasoning, it is well established that the mental consciousness, exactly like the eye-consciousness and the rest, must certainly have its own exclusive support — one which gives this consciousness its very name, "mental," and its own sense-field. This support cannot be the equal-immediate-antecedent condition, since it must instead be a dominant-condition support belonging clearly to one of the six established consciousnesses.

Furthermore, the sūtras say: what deliberates is called "manas." Without this consciousness, that manas could not exist.

Consider: whenever the mental consciousness is currently present, the equal-immediate-antecedent mind — its own preceding moment — has already ceased, and no longer exists; and since past and future have, by reason, no real existence at all, that deliberating function could certainly not be established this way. Given this, how could this be called "manas" at all?

Should one say this is merely a figure of speech — this, too, does not hold up: without any genuine deliberation actually occurring, on what basis could even a figurative usage be established? Should one say that, when it was present, deliberation did occur, and it is on that basis that it is now called "manas" — but at that earlier moment it was properly called "consciousness," not "manas" — so how could it be called "manas" now?

Hence it is known that there exists a distinct seventh consciousness, manas, which constantly and closely deliberates, and is properly named "manas" in its own right — it is only in a merely figurative sense that the already-ceased mental consciousness could ever be provisionally called "manas."

Furthermore, the sūtras say: without defiled manas, there would be no distinguishing the attainment of no-thought from cessation-attainment. Consider: both of these attainments equally extinguish the six consciousnesses and their mental factors — in essence and in number, there is no difference between them. If there were no defiled manas, present in one of these attainments and absent in the other, how could these two be distinguished at all?

Should one say the difference lies instead in their preliminary practice, the realm and stage they belong to, their basis, and so on — this, too, does not hold up, since the very cause of these differences depends on the presence or absence of manas: if manas did not exist, none of these differentiating causes could exist either.

Hence there certainly must exist this distinct manas.

Furthermore, the sūtras say: sentient beings in the heaven of no-thought have both mind and mental factors entirely extinguished for the entire span of that life. Without this consciousness, that being should have no defilement at all.

Consider: throughout that entire long span, the six evolving consciousnesses are absent — and if this manas did not exist either, self-grasping would then be entirely absent as well. Yet nowhere else does a being still fully bound by the fetters go an entire lifetime with absolutely no self-grasping whatsoever. If that being genuinely had no self-grasping, it would be no different from nirvāṇa itself — and the sages and worthies would then have no reason to unanimously condemn and disparage rebirth there.

Should one object that self-grasping is present at the very beginning and the very end of that life — this presents no such fault. But if it were genuinely absent throughout that long middle span, this fault would indeed arise. Should one instead say that self-grasping existed in the past and will exist again in the future — this presents no such fault only if manas exists continuously; but since the past and future are not themselves presently, constantly existent, this fault would arise on that account as well. Without anything actually "obtained," there could be no "obtaining" of it either — and the disjoined dharma that some propose to fill this gap has already been refuted above. Without the storehouse consciousness available to receive it, there could be no perfuming for this either — and it has already been argued at length that no other dharma can be genuinely perfumed.

Hence there certainly must exist a distinct, defiled manas, constantly giving rise to self-grasping even in the heaven of no-thought — and it is precisely because of this that the sages and worthies unanimously condemn and disparage rebirth there.

Furthermore, the sūtras say: ordinary beings, even in a wholesome or morally neutral state of mind, constantly carry self-grasping with them. Without this consciousness, that self-grasping could not exist.

Consider: an ordinary being, whatever the moral quality of the mind — wholesome, defiled, or neutral — although outwardly performing various actions, constantly, internally clings to a self. Because of this self-grasping, whatever acts of giving and the like arise within the six consciousnesses can never be free of the mark of self.

Hence the Yogācārabhūmi says: defiled manas serves as the other consciousness's support; as long as it has not been extinguished, that consciousness remains bound by characteristics, and cannot be liberated. Once manas is extinguished, this bondage by characteristics is released. "Bondage by characteristics" means being unable to fully penetrate the character of one's object, taking it as substantially real, like a magician's illusion. It is because the perceiving aspect is thus constrained by the perceived aspect that one is not free — hence it is called "bondage by characteristics." With this meaning in view, there is a verse that says: "This defiled manas is what the other consciousness depends on; as long as this manas has not been extinguished, the consciousness's bondage can never be released."

Furthermore: in wholesome or uncovered-neutral states of mind, if self-grasping were absent, these states should not be contaminated at all — since, within one's own mental continuity, the afflictions belonging to the six consciousnesses do not arise together at the same time as these wholesome states. Nor is it reasonable that some past-or-future bondage could be the cause, since past and future have no real existence. Nor is it the case that these states become contaminated through some other being's affliction, lest, by the same token, one should become uncontaminated through some other being's liberation.

Nor can one say that there is some separate latent tendency, itself a disjoined dharma, arising alongside the present mental continuity, which is what makes these wholesome states contaminated — such a thing has already been well established not to really exist. Nor can one say that these wholesome states arise from contaminated seeds, and are thereby rendered contaminated — for such seeds would have no cause to have become contaminated in the first place. Nor is it the case that these states become contaminated merely by having contaminated seeds — otherwise, even a trainee's uncontaminated mind would have to count as contaminated too.

Although the afflictions do draw forth acts of giving and the like, they do not arise at the very same time as these acts, and so cannot be the direct cause of their contamination, since the very term "contaminated" implies actually occurring together with contamination. And morally neutral karma, not itself drawn forth by any affliction at all — how, then, could that be rendered contaminated either?

Rather: whatever is contaminated becomes so because it arises and ceases together with, and mutually reinforces, the afflictions currently manifest within that very same being — it is this that establishes contamination. Through this, contaminated seeds are formed by perfuming, and when these later manifest, the sense of "contaminated" is thereby established. This is how it works for ordinary beings, and likewise for those still in training. Even an adept beyond further training's contaminated states, although not occurring together with any affliction, nevertheless arise from contaminated seeds formed earlier — and so are properly called contaminated, without any contradiction in reason.

It is because manas constantly gives rise to self-grasping that wholesome states and the rest come to count as contaminated at all. If this manas did not exist, that could certainly not be the case — hence it is known that this seventh consciousness exists as something distinct.

The lines of reasoning proving this consciousness's existence are very many; following the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, I have given only a brief account of six kinds here — those with wisdom should accept and study them accordingly. As for the sūtras that speak of only six consciousnesses, it should be understood that these follow a provisional, conventional mode of exposition, or else speak of six with reference to the six sense-faculties they depend on — in reality, and by kind, there are eight distinct consciousnesses.

Thus far the second transformation has been explained. What, then, is the nature of the third transformation? The verse states: "Next, the third transformation has, in its distinctions, six kinds; discerning objects is its nature and characteristic; it is wholesome, unwholesome, or neither."

The treatise states: having discussed the deliberating-transformation consciousness, we should next explain the nature of the object-discerning-transformation consciousness. This consciousness, broadly speaking, has six distinct kinds, differing according to the six sense-faculties and their objects.

They are named "eye-consciousness" up through "mental consciousness," named after their respective faculties, since this naming satisfies five conditions: dependence, activation, belonging, assistance, and resemblance to the faculty. Although all six consciousnesses depend, in some sense, on mind to operate, the name "mental consciousness" is given specifically with reference to what is exclusive to it — just as the naming of the five sense-consciousnesses involves no such confusion. Or else, the sixth is named "mental consciousness" simply because it depends on mind alone — the naming of a consciousness follows its own logic, and "mind" and "manas" are not parallel cases here.

Or else, they are named "form-consciousness" up through "dharma-consciousness," named after their respective objects, since this accords with the very meaning of "consciousness" — discerning any of the six objects is what "consciousness" means. Form-consciousness and the other four discern only form and their own respective objects; dharma-consciousness alone is capable of discerning all dharmas generally, or else is capable of discerning dharmas specifically, and for this reason it alone receives the name "dharma-consciousness" — hence naming the six consciousnesses this way, too, involves no confusion.

This naming of the six consciousnesses by their objects applies to the stage before mastery over the five physical sense-faculties has been attained; once mastery is attained, the faculties can each perform one another's function, so that a single faculty can give rise to a consciousness that takes hold of every kind of object — in that case, one may still name the consciousness after its faculty without any confusion arising. The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra's statement that a tathāgata's five faculties each operate on all five kinds of object is spoken with reference only to their coarse, most conspicuous, matching objects. The Buddhabhūmi Sūtra's statement that the wisdom of accomplished activity discerns the differences among sentient beings' mental conduct, manifesting the three kinds of transformative activity and giving the four kinds of prediction, would be impossible without this all-pervading capacity to take any object at all.

The support and object of the six evolving consciousnesses, however, are coarse and already well established, and so are not further discussed here — their support has already been explained above where it fit naturally; their object will now be discussed, as is fitting here.

Next, the phrase "discerning objects is its nature and characteristic" shows both these six consciousnesses' essential nature and their mode of activity together: consciousness has discerning objects as its very essential nature, and, precisely because of this, it also uses that same discerning as its mode of activity. This, in turn, explains the name given to it: it is called "consciousness" precisely because it is capable of discerning and discriminating objects.

As the sūtra says: what is the eye-consciousness? It is that which, depending on the eye-faculty, discerns forms; and so on, up to: what is the mental consciousness? It is that which, depending on the mental faculty, discerns all dharmas. That sūtra speaks here only of the exclusive support, and, before the transformation of basis, of what the perceiving aspect discerns; the remaining supports and what else is discerned have already been explained above.

To what moral category do these six evolving consciousnesses belong? They belong to the wholesome, the unwholesome, and the neither category. "Neither" means morally neutral — being neither wholesome nor unwholesome, it is called "neither." Whatever is beneficial both in this life and in lives to come is called "wholesome"; the pleasant results of birth as a human or a god, though beneficial in this life, are not beneficial in lives to come, and so are not called "wholesome." Whatever is harmful both in this life and in lives to come is called "unwholesome"; the painful results of birth in the lower destinies, though harmful in this life, are not harmful in lives to come, and so are not unwholesome either. Whatever cannot be determined as either wholesome or unwholesome, beneficial or harmful, is called "morally neutral."

These six evolving consciousnesses, when associated with faith and the other ten wholesome factors, belong to the wholesome category; when associated with lack of shame and the other nine unwholesome factors, they belong to the unwholesome category; when associated with neither, they belong to the morally neutral category.

One view holds: within the six consciousnesses, the three moral qualities cannot occur together at the same time, since these consciousnesses, all operating through the outward-facing sense-doors, are mutually opposed to one another. The five sense-consciousnesses must always be guided by the mental consciousness, arising together with it and sharing the same object, in order to become wholesome or defiled. If one allowed the five sense-consciousnesses to occur with all three moral qualities simultaneously, the mental consciousness, at that same moment, would have to span all three qualities at once — which would violate reason. Hence they certainly cannot occur together.

As for the Yogācārabhūmi's statement that the storehouse consciousness, at a single time, is associated with the evolving consciousnesses in all three moral qualities occurring together — this refers to many successive moments. It is like speaking of "a single mind" without meaning a single moment of arising and ceasing; there is no real contradiction here.

Another view holds: within the six consciousnesses, the three moral qualities can indeed occur together. The initial, unreflective moment and the subsequent, homogeneously-flowing moments of the eye-consciousness and the other four can arise together, whether in greater or lesser number, at the same time. And although the five sense-consciousnesses certainly arise together with the mental consciousness, their moral quality need not be identical to the mental consciousness's own. The difficulty raised above, then, is here simply beside the point.

Hence the Yogācārabhūmi says: if one encounters the condition of a sound and thereby rises from meditative absorption, the mental consciousness associated with that absorption continues to turn together with the newly arising ear-consciousness — it is not the case that only the mental consciousness associated with the absorption could ever apprehend that sound. Were this not so, one would not even register that sound at all, and so would have no reason to rise from absorption in the first place. Nor does one rise from absorption the very instant the sound is apprehended — only after registering the sound does one rise later, should some further interest arise.

While still in absorption, the ear-consciousness's initial, unreflective hearing of the sound should, by reason, be neither wholesome nor unwholesome — for, prior to the transformation of basis, an initial, unreflective falling-into-an-object is always morally neutral. By this, it is genuinely proven that the mental consciousness arising together with the five sense-consciousnesses is not necessarily identical in moral quality to them.

Wherever it is said that the mental consciousness arising together with the five sense-consciousnesses also takes the same five objects as its object, it is never said that they share the same moral quality as well. The Abhidharmasamuccaya's statement that the five sense-consciousnesses are absent in the state of meditative equipoise refers only to what holds for the most part. If, among the five sense-consciousnesses, all three moral qualities occur together, the mental consciousness follows whichever one it is preferentially attending to, matching that one's quality; where there is no preferential attention, it is simply morally neutral. Hence, within the six evolving consciousnesses, the three moral qualities can indeed occur together.

At the stage of complete mastery, these consciousnesses belong exclusively to the wholesome category — a buddha's form, mind, and the rest are all included within the truth of the path, since the seeds of all conceptual proliferation have already been permanently extinguished.

With how many mental factors are the six consciousnesses associated? The verse states: "These mental factors — universal, particular, wholesome, afflictive, secondary-afflictive, and indeterminate — are all associated with the three feelings."

The treatise states: these six evolving consciousnesses are, in general, associated with mental factors of six categories — the universal factors and the rest. They constantly arise in dependence on mind, are associated with mind, and belong to mind — hence they are called "mental factors," just as something belonging to me is called "mine."

Mind, with respect to its object, grasps only its overall character; the mental factors, with respect to that same object, also grasp its particular characteristics, assisting and completing mind's work — this is how they earn the name "mental factors." It is like a master painter and an assistant: the master sketches the outline, the assistant fills in the colors.

Hence the Yogācārabhūmi says: consciousness is capable of discerning the overall character of a thing; attention discerns whatever aspect of it consciousness has not yet discerned — this refers to the particular characteristics that the various mental factors grasp. Contact discerns the aspect of an object being agreeable or otherwise; feeling discerns the aspect of being received and appropriated; perception discerns the aspect that serves as the basis for verbal designation; volition discerns the aspect of being a proper cause for action and the like. Hence attention and the rest are called mental factors. This passage also shows that mental factors grasp the overall character of an object as well.

Other passages further say: aspiration, too, discerns the aspect of an object being desirable; resolve, too, discerns the aspect of an object being settled and certain; recollection, too, discerns the aspect of an object being habitually familiar; concentration and wisdom, too, discern the aspect of an object's merits and faults, and so forth. It is through this that wholesome or defiled states arise with respect to an object. Every mental factor, then, grasps a particular characteristic of its object, in addition to whatever overall character mind itself grasps.

Although the mental factors, in name and meaning, involve no ambiguity, they nevertheless fall into six distinct categories, differing in kind: the universal factors number five; the particular factors likewise number five; the wholesome factors number eleven; the afflictions number six; the secondary afflictions number twenty; and the indeterminate factors number four. These six categories together total fifty-one.

They are classified this way because: the universal factors can certainly be found in every single mind whatsoever; the particular factors arise only in dependence on their own specific, distinct objects; the wholesome factors can arise only within a wholesome mind; the afflictions are, by nature, included among the fundamental afflictions; the secondary afflictions are, by nature, mere outflows of the afflictions; and the indeterminate factors are indeterminate with respect to being wholesome, defiled, or otherwise.

The Yogācārabhūmi, however, combines these six into five categories, since the afflictions and the secondary afflictions are both, alike, defiled. It further distinguishes these five categories by means of the "four alls": occurring in every moral nature, every stage, every time, and always co-occurring together as a group. Among the five, the universal factors possess all four of these qualities. The particular factors possess only the first two — occurring across every moral nature and every stage. The wholesome factors possess only one — occurring across every stage. The defiled factors possess none of the four. The indeterminate factors possess only one — occurring across every moral nature. By this, the five categories are distinguished in kind.

These six evolving consciousnesses are readily changeable and not fixed, and so are all capable of being associated with any of the three feelings, since all of them register an object's aspect as agreeable, disagreeable, or neither. Registering an agreeable aspect of an object, gladdening body and mind, is called pleasant feeling; registering a disagreeable aspect, oppressing body and mind, is called painful feeling; registering a neutral aspect, neither oppressing nor gladdening body or mind, is called neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.

These three feelings may each be divided in two: associated with the five sense-consciousnesses, they are called bodily feeling, since they depend specifically on the body; associated with the mental consciousness, they are called mental feeling, since they depend only on mind. Furthermore, all three extend to both contaminated and uncontaminated states, since painful feeling, too, can arise even from an uncontaminated cause.

Or each may be divided in three: eliminated on the path of seeing, eliminated on the path of cultivation, or belonging to neither. Or again: belonging to one in training, one beyond training, or neither, making three.

Or, taken together, they may be divided into four: wholesome, unwholesome, covered-neutral, and uncovered-neutral feeling.

Another view holds: each of the three feelings can indeed be divided into these four, since spontaneous craving and delusion arising together with the five sense-consciousnesses, and the spontaneous afflictions in realms of unmixed suffering that give rise to no karmic action, are morally neutral. Each of these can be associated with the painful faculty. The Yogācārabhūmi says: whenever any affliction arises spontaneously, it can manifest in association with any of the three feelings — if it extends to every kind of consciousness, it is associated with every corresponding faculty; if it does not extend to every kind of consciousness, it is associated only with the faculties belonging to the mental sphere. The Abhidharmasamuccaya says: spontaneous afflictions bound to the desire realm that give rise to bad conduct are unwholesome; all the rest are covered-neutral. Hence it is known that each of the three feelings can indeed be divided into these four.

Or, taken together, they may be divided into five: painful, pleasurable, sorrowful, joyful, and equanimous. Among the three basic feelings, painful and pleasurable are each split into two because the character of oppressing or gladdening body versus mind differs in each case; because one lacks discrimination while the other involves discrimination; and because one is especially intense while the other is comparatively mild. Neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is not split into two, because its character of neither oppressing nor gladdening does not differ between body and mind; because it involves no discrimination either way; and because it operates with perfect evenness throughout.

Every gladdening feeling, when associated with the five sense-consciousnesses, is always called "pleasure." When associated with the mental consciousness: in the desire realm, or in the preliminary stages of the first and second meditative absorptions, it is called "joy," since it only gladdens the mind. In the fundamental stages of the first and second meditative absorptions, it is called both "pleasure" and "joy," since it gladdens both body and mind. In the preliminary and fundamental stages of the third meditative absorption, it is called only "pleasure," since it is especially tranquil and profound, involving no discrimination.

Every oppressive feeling, when associated with the five sense-consciousnesses, is always called "pain." As for that associated with the mental consciousness: one view holds it is called only "sorrow," since it oppresses the mind. The scriptures everywhere say that a distressing feeling belonging to the mental sphere is called the sorrow-faculty. The Yogācārabhūmi says: sentient beings born in the hells, immediately upon their ripening, have a further arising born of ripening, with pain and sorrow continuing on together. It also says: in the hells, coarse and subtle discursive thought occur together with sorrow, and the same holds for a portion of the hungry-ghost and animal realms. Hence it is known that even the especially intense distressing feeling belonging to the mental sphere is still called "sorrow" — how much more so the milder cases?

Another view holds: it extends to both names. Among humans and gods, it is always called "sorrow," since it is never especially intense there. In the animal and hungry-ghost realms, it is called both "sorrow" and "pain," since these realms have both mixed and unmixed forms of suffering, differing in intensity. In the hell realms, it is called only "pain," since suffering there is unmixed and especially intense, involving no discrimination at all.

The Yogācārabhūmi says: whenever any affliction arises spontaneously, it can manifest in association with any of the three feelings, as explained at length above. It also says: the innate view of a substantial self is exclusively morally neutral, and the same should be understood of the extremist view associated with it — the painful feeling accompanying these views is not included under the sorrow-faculty, since the treatise states that the sorrow-faculty is never morally neutral.

Furthermore, the Yogācārabhūmi says: among beings in the hells, the remaining three faculties certainly never manifest. The same holds for the hungry-ghost and animal realms of unmixed suffering. These "remaining three" must be the pleasure-, joy-, and sorrow-faculties, since it must instead be the equanimity-faculty that manifests for them.

Might one not object: does this not mean even a merely occasional equanimity-faculty could never manifest there either? How, then, could that passage be understood as referring only to an occasional feeling? In reply: one should not, on this basis, say instead that the mental faculty is certainly always present there, since the six occasional consciousnesses are sometimes absent as well. Nor should that treatise be understood as referring only to an occasional feeling in one case but to a general, constant faculty in the other — there being no principled reason for such a distinction.

Furthermore, if that treatise's statement is understood as referring only to an occasional feeling, how could it also say that hell-beings certainly possess all eight faculties? Should one hold that, since the five sense-consciousnesses there are not continuous, the sorrow-faculty must specifically be counted as this eighth, constantly-present faculty — then what of the moments of death, rebirth, and unconsciousness? Would the sorrow-faculty be present even then? Those who hold that the pain-faculty is this eighth faculty face the same refutation.

Should one hold, instead, that a single bodily form serves as this eighth faculty — this, too, is unreasonable, since such a form is not fixed: beings drawn there by unwholesome karma may well be entirely without such a form. Since it is by unwholesome karma that the gateways of their five faculties are made to constantly experience suffering, the eye and the other faculties are certainly established there — but what use would a single, fixed bodily form serve them? It could hardly be the case that beings in the uninterrupted, greatest hell have any occasion to seek out sexual activity.

By this, then, the eighth faculty must certainly be the equanimity-faculty, since the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are themselves associated only with equanimous feeling.

Just as, in the realm of utmost bliss, mental gladness is called "pleasure," with no separate "joy"-faculty present there, so too, in the place of utmost suffering, mental oppression is called "pain," with no separate "sorrow"-faculty present there. Hence the phrase "the remaining three" must, in general, refer to the sorrow-, joy-, and pleasure-faculties.

Where other passages speak of hell-beings as having a homogeneously-flowing pleasure, this should be understood as spoken with reference to a merely provisional, conventional mode of exposition — or else, taken generally, as meaning only that these mixed-suffering realms lack a truly ripened pleasure, and so are called realms of unmixed suffering relative to that lack. As for the scriptures that call the distressing mental feeling of the hells the sorrow-faculty, this should be understood as speaking of what holds for the most part, or again as a merely provisional exposition — there is no real contradiction here.

The Yogācārabhūmi's statement that sentient beings born in the hells, immediately upon their ripening, have a further arising born of ripening, with pain and sorrow continuing on together; and its further statement that, in the hells, coarse and subtle discursive thought occur together with sorrow, and the same for a portion of the hungry-ghost and animal realms — these, too, should be understood as merely provisional exposition.

Furthermore, that pain-faculty, when it occurs together with the mental consciousness, belongs to a kind resembling sorrow, and is provisionally called "sorrow" on that basis; or else, since that pain-faculty harms both body and mind, though properly included under the pain-faculty, it is also called "sorrow" — just as the joy of the preliminary stage, though properly included under the joy-faculty, benefits both body and mind, and so is also called "pleasure." The Prakaraṇāryavācā-śāstra and other treatises fully elaborate this point. Yet the stage just prior to the first absorption certainly has no pleasure-faculty at all, since it is said to possess only eleven of the twenty-two faculties.

By this, it should be understood that the distressing mental feeling in realms of utterly unmixed suffering is likewise included under the pain-faculty. These scriptural teachings involve many distinct approaches; fearing to weary the reader with excessive text, they are not further elaborated here.

One view holds: within the six consciousnesses, the three feelings cannot occur together at the same time, since these consciousnesses, all operating through the outward-facing sense-doors, are mutually opposed to one another. The mental consciousness arising together with the five sense-consciousnesses shares the same object with them — so if the five sense-consciousnesses had all three feelings occurring together, the mental consciousness, too, would have to span all three at once, which would violate reason. Hence they certainly cannot occur together.

As for the Yogācārabhūmi's statement that the storehouse consciousness, at a single time, is associated with the evolving consciousnesses in all three feelings occurring together — this refers to many successive moments. It is like speaking of "a single mind" without meaning a single moment of arising and ceasing; there is no real contradiction here.

Another view holds: within the six consciousnesses, the three feelings can indeed occur together, since agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral objects can all be registered together at once. The mental consciousness need not always share the same feeling as the five sense-consciousnesses: with respect to whichever object it is preferentially attending to, it gives rise to that one feeling; where there is no preferential attention, it simply gives rise to equanimous feeling. By this, within the six consciousnesses, the three feelings can indeed occur together.

At the stage of complete mastery, only pleasure, joy, and equanimity remain, since buddhas have already eliminated sorrow and pain entirely.

Having briefly outlined the six categories of mental factors above, we should now explain their distinct characteristics at length. What, then, is the nature of the first two categories? The verse states: "The first, universal factors, are contact and the rest; next, the particular factors are aspiration, resolve, recollection, concentration, and wisdom — their objects each differ."

The treatise states: among the six categories, the first, the universal mental factors, are contact and the other four, already explained at length above. How should this universality be known? Scripture and reason together serve as the standard of proof.

As for scripture: the sūtras say that the eye and form serve as conditions, giving rise to the eye-consciousness; the coming together of the three is contact, and together with contact arise feeling, perception, and volition, and so on at length. By this, contact and the other three are shown to be universal.

Furthermore, the sūtras say: only when the faculty is unimpaired, the object is present, and attention has properly arisen, can consciousness be generated. Other sūtras further say: wherever there is attention, there discernment occurs; wherever there is discernment, there attention occurs. Hence these two are constantly, mutually joined, and so on at length — by this, attention, too, is shown to be universal. Genuine proof from scripture of this kind is not confined to a single passage.

As for reason: whenever consciousness arises, the three must certainly come together, and this certainly produces contact — and contact, in turn, must be present wherever they exist together, for otherwise mind and its mental factors would have no way of jointly making contact with a single common object.

Attention draws the mind forward, directing it toward its own object — without this, mind could not exist at all. Feeling is capable of receiving and appropriating an agreeable, disagreeable, or neutral object, causing the mind and the rest to give rise, correspondingly, to a joyful, distressed, or equanimous aspect — whenever mind arises, this is never entirely absent. Perception is capable of establishing the definite boundaries of its own object — were this absent whenever mind arises, mind could not grasp the bounded character of its object at all. Volition causes the mind to take hold of the correct causal aspect of its object, and to perform wholesome and other such acts — in no state where mind arises is this ever entirely absent, and so volition, too, must always be present.

By this it is proven that contact and the other four dharmas are certainly present wherever mind arises, and are therefore universal. That the remaining factors are not universal will be explained in what follows.

Next, the particular factors: aspiration through wisdom, whose objects for the most part differ from one another — hence they are discussed second among the six categories, right after the universal factors.

What is aspiration? Its nature is hoping for a desired object; its function is serving as the basis for diligent effort.

One view holds: "a desired object" means an agreeable one, since one hopes to see, hear, and so on with respect to agreeable things. But might one not object: with respect to a disagreeable thing, one hopes not to encounter it, and wishes to be separated from it — is this not also aspiration? In reply: this is simply seeking the agreeable state of not-encountering or being-separated itself, not the disagreeable thing as such. Hence, with respect to a genuinely disagreeable or neutral object, there is never any aspiration at all — and even with respect to an agreeable thing, if there is no hoping involved, no aspiration arises either.

Another view holds: "a desired object" means whatever object is being sought, since one hopes to be joined with, or separated from, both agreeable and disagreeable things alike. With respect to a genuinely neutral object, there is never any aspiration at all — and even with respect to an agreeable or disagreeable thing, if there is no seeking involved, no aspiration arises either.

Another view holds: "a desired object" means whatever object one wishes to examine, since one hopes to examine any object whatsoever that one wishes to examine. If one does not wish to examine something, but simply, spontaneously takes it as an object under the sheer force of the causal condition, there is no aspiration involved at all. By this line of reasoning, aspiration is not a universal factor.

Some hold: it is only through the power of hoping for an object that mind and its mental factors are able to take hold of any object at all, and this is why the sūtra says "aspiration is the root of all dharmas."

This claim does not hold. Mind and the rest take hold of their object through attention, not aspiration — the scriptures everywhere say that the presence of attention is what generates consciousness; nowhere is it ever said that aspiration generates mind or its mental factors. Just as it is said that craving is the root of all dharmas — does this mean mind and its mental factors are all generated by craving? The statement that aspiration is "the root of all dharmas" means only that it is the root of whatever activity and undertaking aspiration itself gives rise to. Or else, it refers specifically to wholesome aspiration, which is capable of arousing correct effort — since it helps bring about every wholesome deed, the treatise accordingly states that "diligent effort" is its function.

What is resolve? Its nature is confirming a settled object; its function is being unable to be diverted by anything else. That is: through the force of a teaching, a piece of reasoning, or direct evidence — whether correct or mistaken — one settles and confirms the object one has taken hold of, and, because of this, no other condition can divert one from it. Hence, with respect to an object still in doubt, resolve is altogether absent; nor is resolve present in a mind that has not settled and confirmed anything. By this, resolve is not a universal factor.

Some hold: whenever mind and the rest take hold of their own object, since nothing obstructs them in doing so, resolve is always present. This does not hold up. Why? Whatever is capable of not obstructing is simply every dharma in general; whatever is not obstructed is simply mind and the rest. What actually brings about this vigorous activity is the faculty and attention — and if resolve, too, were said to bring this about, it would then itself have to depend on yet another factor to explain its own vigorous arising, and this would lead to an infinite regress.

What is recollection? Its nature is causing the mind to clearly remember a previously familiar object without forgetting it; its function is serving as the basis for concentration. That is: it repeatedly holds in mind a previously experienced object, preventing it from being forgotten, and is thereby capable of giving rise to concentration. With respect to an object never before experienced, in either its particular or general character, no recollection ever arises at all — and even with respect to something previously experienced, if it cannot be clearly remembered, recollection likewise does not arise. Hence recollection, too, is certainly not a universal factor.

Some hold: whenever mind arises, recollection must always accompany it, since it is capable of serving as the cause of remembering at some later time. This does not hold up — otherwise, whenever delusion or faith arises later, one would have to say these were already present earlier too, which no one holds. The power of the earlier mind and its mental factors, or of perception, is already sufficient to serve as the cause of later remembering, without needing to posit recollection at every single moment.

What is concentration? Its nature is causing the mind to focus single-pointedly on an object under examination without becoming scattered; its function is serving as the basis for wisdom. That is: when examining an object as meritorious, faulty, or neither, concentration causes the mind to focus single-pointedly without scattering, and, on this basis, decisive, discriminating wisdom then arises.

The phrase "the mind focuses" means that wherever the mind wishes to remain fixed, it is then able to remain so fixed — it does not mean fixed on only a single, unchanging object. Were this not so, then on the path of seeing, where the truths are examined one after another in succession, each with a distinct object, there could be no genuine concentration at all. Wherever the mind is not bound and focused single-pointedly on an object, no concentration arises — hence it is not a universal factor.

Some hold: even in such moments, concentration is still present, only in an especially subtle, hidden form. In reply: one ought to speak plainly and honestly here. Should one claim that concentration is universal because it is what causes mind and the rest to unite harmoniously and turn together toward a single object — this, too, is unreasonable, since that is properly the function of contact. Should one claim it is universal because it prevents the mind from shifting its object even for a single instant — this, too, is unreasonable, since a single moment of mind has, in itself, no capacity to shift its object to begin with. Should one claim it is universal because it is what allows mind to take hold of its object at all — this, too, is unreasonable, since it is attention, not concentration, that causes mind to take hold of its object.

Some hold: concentration's very essence is simply mind itself, since the sūtra calls it "the training of mind," and describes it as "one-pointedness of mind." This is no genuine proof: the sūtra speaks this way because concentration gathers and unifies the mind upon a single object, causing that one-pointedness — not because concentration simply is mind. It is included, rather, among the faculties, powers, factors of awakening, and factors of the path, just as recollection and wisdom are — none of which are simply identical with mind itself.

What is wisdom? Its nature is discriminating among an object under examination; its function is severing doubt. That is: when examining an object as meritorious, faulty, or neither, it is through wisdom's careful investigation that a settled conclusion is reached. With respect to an object not under examination, in a benighted, unreflective mind, there is no discrimination at all — hence wisdom, too, is not a universal factor.

Some hold: even in such moments, wisdom, too, is present, only in an especially subtle, hidden form. In reply: how could one so beloved of the gods possibly know this? Because the Abhidharma texts classify it among the "universal-ground factors"? But the various schools' Abhidharma texts contradict one another at every turn — how, then, can you insist on treating any one of them as a definitive standard? Only contact and the other four are called universal in the sūtras themselves. That some texts call ten factors universal is not found in the sūtras, and should not be stubbornly insisted upon. Aspiration and the other four particular factors, then, being distinct from contact and the rest, are certainly not universal, just as faith, craving, and the like are not.

One view holds: these five necessarily support one another — whenever any one of them arises, the remaining four must also be present.

Another view holds: this is not fixed. The Yogācārabhūmi states that, among the four "alls," these five lack the last two. It further states that these five arise with respect to four kinds of object, and their respective objects and the corresponding subjective acts need not always occur together.

It should be said, instead: these five may sometimes arise only one at a time — with respect to a desired object, only aspiration arises; with respect to a settled object, only resolve arises; with respect to a familiar object, only recollection arises; with respect to an object under examination, only single-pointed concentration arises.

Consider a benighted sort of person: in order to still a scattered mind, though focused single-pointedly on an object, incapable of any real discrimination — it is commonly known that such a person has concentration but no wisdom. At the preliminary stage of their practice, they may have had a little learning and reflection, and so concentration is said to take an object under examination in a merely nominal sense; or else this is simply said with reference to what holds for the most part. As with the beings of the "heaven of frivolous forgetting," who focus single-pointedly on one object while giving rise to craving, aversion, and the like — possessing concentration but no wisdom — cases of this kind are, in truth, quite numerous. Or again, with respect to an object under examination, only discrimination may arise, without single-pointed focus, the mind instead scattering and roaming as it investigates.

They may sometimes arise two at a time: with respect to an object that is both desired and settled, aspiration and resolve arise together; or with respect to an object that is both desired and familiar, aspiration and recollection arise together — and so on, up through an object that is under examination, where concentration and wisdom arise together, giving twelve such combinations in all.

They may sometimes arise three at a time: with respect to an object that is desired, settled, and familiar, aspiration, resolve, and recollection arise together — and so on, up through an object that is familiar and under examination, where recollection, concentration, and wisdom arise together, giving thirteen such combinations in all.

They may sometimes arise four at a time: with respect to an object that is desired, settled, familiar, and under examination, the first four factors arise together — and so on, up through an object that is settled, familiar, and under examination, where the last four arise together, giving five combinations of four in all.

They may sometimes arise all five at a time: with respect to an object that is desired, settled, familiar, and under examination all at once, all five arise together.

In this way, taken across these four kinds of object, aspiration and the rest give, in total — counting singly and in every combination — thirty-one distinct cases.

There are also states of mind in which none of the five arises at all — as when the object is none of these four kinds, as in an initial, unreflective moment of falling into an object, or as when accompanying the storehouse consciousness; cases of this kind, too, are not confined to just one instance.

One view holds: for the five sense-consciousnesses, none of these five is ever present at all — since they take hold only of an object already directly obtained, they have no aspiration; since they are incapable of settled confirmation, they have no resolve; since they constantly take hold only of ever-new objects, they have no recollection; since their very nature is scattered and unstable, they have no concentration; since they are incapable of inferential reasoning, they have no wisdom.

Another view holds: the five sense-consciousnesses can indeed possess these five, though in a diminished form: although they lack any strong, deliberate hope with respect to their object, they still have a faint measure of delighting in it. Although they lack any strong, deliberate confirmation of their object, they still have a faint measure of settling on it. Although they lack any clear memory of a previously familiar object as such, they still have a faint measure of recognizing it as belonging to a familiar kind. Although they do not deliberately fix their attention on a single object, they still have a faint measure of focus — the scriptures rule out only full meditative equipoise when describing their nature as scattered and unstable, not this weaker sense of concentration. Although they cannot engage in inferential reasoning about their object, they still have a faint measure of discrimination — and it is on this basis that the scriptures speak of the clairvoyant and clairaudient powers as belonging to the very nature of the eye- and ear-consciousnesses themselves. The remaining three sense-consciousnesses, by the same reasoning, can likewise possess wisdom without contradiction.

At the stage before mastery, these five may sometimes be absent; once mastery is attained, these five are certainly always present. A buddha delights in examining every object, so aspiration never diminishes; a buddha's confirming resolve regarding its object is constant and never diminishes; a buddha's recollection of what has been experienced never diminishes; furthermore, a buddha's five sense-consciousnesses take the three times as their object, a tathāgata's mind is never without concentration, and all five sense-consciousnesses are, in a buddha, endowed with the wisdom of accomplished activity.

With which feelings are these five particular factors associated? One view holds: aspiration is associated with three feelings, excluding sorrow and pain, since these two are never themselves a desired object. The remaining four are associated with four feelings, excluding only pain, since resolve and the rest are absent from the five sense-consciousnesses.

Another view holds: all five are associated with all five feelings. The treatise states that the sorrow-faculty, longing and grieving for the unsurpassed dharma, seeks to realize it. In realms of unmixed suffering, beings hope for liberation, and the mental consciousness there has the pain-faculty present, as already explained above. The treatise states that craving is associated with both sorrow and pain — and this craving is always accompanied by aspiration. Since the pain-faculty is thus already established as associated with the mental consciousness, what fault could there be in resolve and the other three also occurring together with pain? And since the five sense-consciousnesses, too, have been shown to possess a faint measure of confirming resolve and the rest, by the reasoning already given — by this, aspiration and the rest are shown to be associated with all five feelings.

These five, moreover, should be further analyzed according to moral nature, realm, and stage of training, and other such categories, as reason dictates — this should be considered accordingly.