Wholesome Factors, Afflictions, and Their Kin

The universal and particular categories have now been explained. What is the nature of the wholesome category? The verse states: "The wholesome factors are: faith, sense of shame, sense of embarrassment, the three wholesome roots beginning with non-greed, diligence, pliancy, heedfulness, equanimity, and non-harming."

The treatise states: whatever accompanies only a wholesome mind is called a wholesome mental factor. Faith, shame, and the rest number, definitively, eleven.

What is faith? Its nature is deep acceptance, delight, and aspiration with respect to what is real, what possesses virtue, and what has capability, taking the mind's own clarity as its essence; its function is counteracting lack of faith and delighting in what is wholesome.

Faith, broadly speaking, is of three distinct kinds: first, faith in what is real — deeply accepting the true facts and principles of all dharmas; second, faith in what possesses virtue — deeply believing in and delighting in the genuine, pure virtues of the Three Jewels; third, faith in what has capability — deeply believing that every mundane and supramundane wholesome quality has the power to be attained and accomplished, giving rise to aspiration accordingly. It is through this that lack of faith is counteracted, and one comes to delight in realizing and cultivating both mundane and supramundane wholesome qualities. Acceptance here refers to resolve, which is faith's cause; delight and aspiration refer to aspiration itself, which is faith's result.

But precisely what is faith's own essential characteristic? Is it not already stated to be "the mind's own clarity"? This is not yet fully clear: if this "mind's clarity" simply means the mind itself when clear, then faith should not count as a mental factor at all; but if it means something that causes the mind to become clear, how does this differ from shame and the rest, which likewise are wholesome dharmas that clarify the mind when present together with it? The same difficulty would apply to any such dharma accompanying the mind.

Rather, faith's own nature is itself limpid and clear, and it is this that clarifies the mind and the rest — since mind is the more prominent factor, this clarity is named "the mind's clarity," just as a water-purifying jewel is said to clarify murky water. Shame and the other wholesome factors, though wholesome, do not have clarity as their defining characteristic — assigning clarity specifically to faith avoids any risk of confusing it with these others.

Furthermore, every defiled dharma has its own distinct characteristic, yet it is lack of faith alone whose own characteristic is itself turbid and murky, and which is, moreover, capable of further muddying the other mental factors that accompany it — just as an especially filthy object both is itself filthy and makes other things filthy too. Faith is precisely the opposite of this, and so has clarity as its defining characteristic.

Some hold: faith's defining characteristic is delight. If so, it should extend to all three moral qualities, and its essential nature would simply be aspiration — and, further, suffering and its origin could then never be objects of faith at all.

Some hold that faith's defining characteristic is conforming assent. If so, it should likewise extend to all three moral qualities, and would simply be resolve or aspiration — for if it means confirming assent, that is simply resolve; if it means delighted assent, that is simply aspiration; apart from these two, there is no separate characteristic of "conforming" to speak of. By this, it should be understood that the mind's own clarity is what faith truly is.

What is a sense of shame? Its nature is honoring and esteeming what is worthy and good, relying on the power of one's own self-respect and one's regard for the dharma; its function is counteracting shamelessness and bringing wrongdoing to a halt. That is: relying on the dominant influence of self-respect and regard for the dharma, one honors and esteems what is worthy and good, feels ashamed of one's own faults and misdeeds, counteracts shamelessness, and brings all wrongdoing to a halt.

What is a sense of embarrassment? Its nature is disdaining and rejecting violence and wrongdoing, relying on the power of worldly opinion; its function is counteracting shamelessness before others and bringing wrongdoing to a halt. That is: relying on the dominant influence of worldly reproach and disapproval, one disdains and rejects violence and wrongdoing, feels embarrassed before others over one's faults and transgressions, counteracts shamelessness before others, and brings all wrongdoing to a halt.

Feeling ashamed of one's faults is a characteristic shared by both of these — hence the scriptures sometimes speak of this shared feature as though it were their defining essence.

Should one instead hold that feeling ashamed of one's faults is itself the two factors' distinct defining characteristic — then shame and embarrassment would have no real difference in essence at all, and these two dharmas could then certainly never be mutually associated together, since no two factors sharing an identical essence, such as feeling and perception, could ever coexist in this way.

Should one instead establish the two as distinct with reference to self versus others — this would mean they are not genuinely, substantially real, which would contradict the scriptures' own teaching. Should one grant, instead, that shame and embarrassment are genuinely real and arise as distinct factors — this would again contradict the treatise's statement that ten factors are universal to every wholesome mind.

Should one hold that honoring-and-esteeming and disdaining-and-rejecting are themselves the two factors' distinct characteristics, with correspondingly distinct objects — then the two should never arise together at all. In reply: since this fault applies equally to your own position, why single out mine for criticism? Who said the two factors' objects must differ? Should you object: if not that, then what? In reply: whenever a wholesome mind arises, whatever object it takes, it always involves both honoring what is good and disdaining what is bad — hence shame and embarrassment are both universal to every wholesome mind, without any difference in object between them. But does your own position not equally involve this same point? Since you yourself grant that shame's and embarrassment's own characteristics are identical, by what reasoning could this possibly block the difficulty raised against you?

The scriptures, however, do speak of "regard for self, and for others": "self" refers to self-respect and regard for the dharma; "others" refers to worldly opinion. Or else, within this very framework, honoring the good and disdaining the bad, insofar as they benefit or harm oneself, are themselves what is meant by "self" and "others."

"Non-greed and the rest" — "the rest" means non-hatred and non-delusion. These three are called "roots," since they are especially capable of generating what is wholesome, and since they are the direct counteragents to the three unwholesome roots.

What is non-greed? Its nature is non-attachment with respect to existence and the means of existence; its function is bringing about wholesome action. What is non-hatred? Its nature is non-aversion with respect to suffering and the means of suffering; its function is bringing about wholesome action.

Whenever a wholesome mind arises, whatever object it takes, it always involves non-attachment and non-aversion with respect to existence and the rest — these are established with reference to existence and the like in general, not requiring that the object actually be existence itself. Just as shame and embarrassment, discussed above, are established with reference to good and bad in general, so too are these two universal to every wholesome mind.

What is non-delusion? Its nature is clear understanding with respect to principles and things; its function is bringing about wholesome action.

One view holds: non-delusion has wisdom as its very nature. The Abhidharmasamuccaya says: its essence consists in the discriminating capacity that comes from karmic ripening, from instruction, from realization, and from wisdom itself — that is, innate wisdom, and wisdom born of learning, reflection, and cultivation, respectively corresponding to each of these. Although this is simply wisdom, it is discussed separately here in order to highlight its especially pronounced function within the wholesome category — just as the affliction of wrong view is discussed separately even though it, too, is simply a form of wisdom.

Another view holds: non-delusion is not simply identical with wisdom, but has its own distinct nature, directly opposed to ignorance — just as non-greed and non-hatred, too, are included among the wholesome roots in their own right. The treatise states that great compassion is included under non-hatred and non-delusion, not under the powers as a distinct category. If non-delusion had wisdom as its very nature, then great compassion, like the powers and the rest, would have to be included under wisdom and the roots equally. Furthermore, if non-delusion had no distinct nature of its own — like non-harming and the rest — it should then not be a genuinely real, substantial thing, which would contradict the treatise's statement that, among the eleven wholesome factors, three are conventionally designated while the rest are all genuinely real.

As for the Abhidharmasamuccaya's statement that wisdom is its essence — this simply cites its cause and effect in order to display its own nature, in just the same way that acceptance and delight were used above to display faith's own essential nature; this must be understood the same way here.

Craving, hatred, and delusion, being associated with the six consciousnesses, are properly classified as afflictions in the strict sense — and because they are especially capable of giving rise to wrongdoing, they are established as the unwholesome roots. Severing them requires both a general and a specific counteragent: the general counteragent is simply wholesome wisdom; the specific counteragents are these very three roots. By this, non-delusion, too, must certainly have its own distinct existence.

Diligence means vigorous effort: its nature is courage and fortitude in cultivating the wholesome and abandoning the unwholesome; its function is counteracting laziness and bringing the wholesome to full completion. "Courage" indicates superior advancement, distinguishing it from every defiled dharma; "fortitude" indicates purity and genuineness, distinguishing it from the morally neutral. Together, these show that vigorous effort belongs exclusively to the wholesome category.

Its distinct aspects, broadly speaking, number five: donning armor, applying effort, not faltering, not retreating, and not being satisfied. This corresponds to what the sūtra calls: possessing power, possessing diligence, possessing courage, being firm and vigorous, and not abandoning the wholesome yoke — each should be understood in the same order.

These five are distinguished as follows: with reference to the initial arousal of intention, one's own portion of practice, and superior advancement — within one's own portion of practice further divided into three grades; or with reference to distinct stages of cultivation — the initial arousal, the sustained long duration, uninterrupted continuity, earnest intensity, and leaving nothing incomplete; or with reference to the distinct stages of the path — the provisions and the rest, five stages in all. The two vehicles' ultimate path delights in great awakening; the buddhas' ultimate path delights in benefiting and bringing happiness to others; or else these are distinguished according to the two kinds of practice — preliminary effort, uninterrupted progress, liberation, and superior advancement.

"Pliancy" means tranquil ease: its nature is being free of coarseness and heaviness, harmonizing and refreshing body and mind, and being fit for use; its function is counteracting torpor and transforming one's basis. That is: it suppresses and removes the dharmas that obstruct concentration, causing what one relies on to become transformed into a state of ease.

"Heedfulness" means that diligence and the three wholesome roots, with respect to what is to be abandoned and what is to be cultivated, have guarding and cultivating as their nature; their function is counteracting heedlessness and bringing to full completion every mundane and supramundane wholesome undertaking. That is: it is precisely these four dharmas which, with respect to abandoning and cultivating, are capable of guarding against and cultivating — this capacity itself is called heedfulness. It has no separate essence of its own, since it has no characteristic distinct from theirs: apart from the functioning of these four, there is no separate function involved in guarding against wrongdoing and cultivating what is wholesome. Although faith, shame, and the rest also have some capacity in this direction, compared to these four their power and function are markedly weaker; and, not being roots, and not acting as the constant driving factor, they are not what heedfulness relies on.

But is not guarding-and-cultivating precisely this factor's own defining characteristic and function? How does guarding-and-cultivating differ from diligence and the three roots? Should one object that those depend on this factor in order to have their own function — then this factor would, in turn, have to depend on yet another factor, leading to an infinite regress. Diligence alone constantly drives the mind forward, and the roots serve merely as its support — so how could one still claim that heedfulness has some separate guarding-and-cultivating function of its own?

What, then, is the actual character of your proposed guarding-and-cultivating function? If it means universally serving as a support, that is simply non-greed and the rest. If it means constantly driving and directing, that is no different from diligence. If it means restraining evil and advancing the good, that is simply the combined function of these four factors together. If it means preventing distraction, that should simply be concentration. If it means causing a shared apprehension of the object, how does that differ from contact? If it means preventing forgetting, that should simply be recollection. Investigated this way, heedfulness's supposed function, apart from non-greed and the rest, can nowhere actually be found. Hence heedfulness certainly has no separate essence of its own.

What is equanimity? Diligence and the three roots, causing the mind to abide in evenness, uprightness, and effortlessness, are its nature; its function is counteracting restlessness and abiding in stillness. That is: it is precisely these same four dharmas which cause the mind to be free of restlessness and similar obstructions, and this stillness of abiding is called equanimity. "Evenness," "uprightness," and "effortless abiding" distinguish equanimity's initial, middle, and final stages, respectively. Heedfulness first removes defilement; equanimity then causes the mind to abide in this stillness.

This, too, has no separate essence — like heedfulness, apart from these four dharmas, it has no characteristic or function of its own. What actually brings about this stillness is simply these four dharmas; what is brought to stillness is simply mind and the rest.

What is non-harming? Its nature is non-hatred with respect to not causing sentient beings injury or distress; its function is counteracting harmfulness through compassion. That is: it is precisely non-hatred, applied to not causing sentient beings injury or distress, that is provisionally named "non-harming." Non-hatred is the direct opposite of the hatred that takes life; non-harming is what directly opposes the harm that injures and distresses beings. Non-hatred bestows happiness; non-harming removes suffering — this is the coarse-grained difference between the two.

In genuine reality, non-hatred alone has real, substantial existence; non-harming is provisionally established with reference to one portion of it, in order to display the distinct characteristics of loving-kindness and compassion respectively — since benefiting and bringing happiness to sentient beings is what these two excel at.

Some hold: non-harming is not simply identical with non-hatred, but has its own distinct essence, namely a wholesome, virtuous nature. In reply: what, then, is this characteristic? It is simply not causing injury or distress — but non-hatred is exactly the same in this respect, so how could it possibly have some separate nature of its own? Not causing sentient beings injury or distress, with loving-kindness, compassion, and virtue, is precisely what non-hatred itself is.

The word "and" indicates that, beyond these eleven, there are further mental factors distinguished in meaning — such as delight, aversion, and other such wholesome mental dharmas. Although they differ in meaning and are given various distinct names, their essence is no different from what has already been established, and so they are not separately listed.

"Delight," accompanied by aspiration, is a portion of non-hatred, since one feels no resentment or hostility toward the object one delights in. Non-wrath, non-resentment, non-vexation, non-envy, and the like are likewise so, each correspondingly the direct opposite of some portion of hatred. "Aversion," accompanied by wisdom, is a portion of non-greed, since one is not attached to the object one is averse to. Non-stinginess, non-arrogance, and the like should be understood the same way, each correspondingly the direct opposite of some portion of greed. Non-concealment, non-deceit, and non-flattery are portions of non-greed and non-delusion, each correspondingly the direct opposite of some portion of greed and delusion.

Some hold: non-concealment is only a portion of non-delusion, since nowhere is concealment itself said to be a portion of greed as well. Some hold: non-conceit is included as a portion of faith, since one who has faith in another does not feel conceit toward them. Some hold: non-conceit is included as a portion of equanimity, since one whose mind abides in evenness does not become arrogant. Some hold: non-conceit is included as a portion of shame, since one who honors and esteems another does not feel conceit toward them.

Some hold: non-doubt is simply included under faith, since one who has faith in something feels no hesitation regarding it. Some hold: non-doubt is simply correct resolve, since one who has reached a settled determination feels no hesitation. Some hold: non-doubt is simply included under correct wisdom, since one who holds correct view feels no hesitation.

Non-distraction's essence is simply included under correct concentration. Correct view and correct knowledge are both included under wholesome wisdom. Not forgetting is simply correct recollection. Regret, sleep, and coarse and subtle discursive thought extend to both defiled and undefiled states, like contact and aspiration, and have no separate opposite counterpart established for them.

Why is it that, among the wholesome dharmas opposing the various defiled ones, some are separately established as distinct factors while others are not? Wherever there is a distinct characteristic and function, a distinct factor is established; where this is not so for the remaining wholesome opposites, one should not press the objection. Furthermore, defiled dharmas that pervade all six consciousnesses, being especially significant, have their opposites separately established as distinct wholesome dharmas.

Conceit and the rest, wrath and the rest, are associated only with the mental consciousness — harmfulness, too, is like this, yet, because it repeatedly manifests to injure and distress others, and because it obstructs compassion, the supreme cause of the unsurpassed vehicle, its opposite, non-harming, is separately established, in order to make its especially serious fault clearly known. Forgetfulness, distraction, and incorrect knowledge, when opposed, fall back into the particular mental factors, and so are not separately discussed among the wholesome factors.

Since wholesome and defiled dharmas are mutual opposites, why are there fewer wholesome factors named than defiled ones? Wholesome states are superior in strength while defiled states are inferior, so a smaller number can match a greater. Furthermore, understanding is comprehensive, and so a single wholesome factor is said to share its essence across many cases, whereas deluded, afflicted states are narrow and particular, and so are divided into many distinct characteristics accordingly. Hence one should not press the same objection equally against both the wholesome and the defiled categories.

Of these eleven factors, three are merely conventionally existent — heedfulness, equanimity, and non-harming — as already explained above. The remaining eight are genuinely, substantially real, since each has its own distinct characteristic and function.

One view holds: of these eleven, four are universal to every wholesome mind — diligence and the three roots — since these pervade the wholesome category as a whole. The remaining seven are not fixed: while still investigating a matter and not yet reaching a settled conclusion, faith does not arise; shame and embarrassment, though of the same general kind, rely on distinct bases, so that whenever one arises at a given moment, the other is absent; pliancy is present only when severing afflictions by way of a mundane path; heedfulness and equanimity arise only on the uncontaminated path; and non-harming is present only when feeling compassion for sentient beings.

The treatise states: these eleven arise across six distinct occasions — at the moment of settled determination, faith is associated; when bringing defilement to a halt, shame and embarrassment arise, with regard for self and for others respectively; in a wholesome state generally, diligence and the three roots are present; on the mundane path, pliancy arises; on the supramundane path, equanimity and heedfulness are present; and when gathering sentient beings to oneself, non-harming is present.

Another view holds: that account does not yet properly accord with reason. While still investigating a matter and not yet settled, if faith did not arise at all, that state should then not be wholesome in the first place — just as a defiled state of mind, lacking pure faith, is not wholesome. Shame and embarrassment, though differing in kind, rely on the same general object, and are both universal to every wholesome mind, as already explained above.

If pliancy did not arise on the supramundane path, then this factor of awakening should then not be uncontaminated at all. If the mundane path lacked equanimity and heedfulness, it should then be incapable of stillness, of guarding against wrongdoing, and of cultivating the good; nor could it suppress restlessness and heedlessness. Since a contaminated wholesome mind already possesses these four factors, the supramundane path, by the same token, should certainly possess them as well. Whenever a wholesome mind arises, it never harms any being, being directly opposed to whatever is capable of causing harm — hence non-harming, too, is present.

The treatise's statement that "these eleven arise across six occasions" is spoken only with reference to whichever factor is especially pronounced on each occasion — hence that earlier account is certainly not correct.

It should be said, instead: among faith and the other eleven factors, ten are universal to every wholesome mind, while pliancy alone is not universal — pliancy, harmonizing and refreshing body and mind, is present only in a state of meditative concentration, and absent in every other state. The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī says: these ten wholesome mental factors are universal to every wholesome mind, whether in a state of concentration or not, while, in a mind in a state of concentration specifically, pliancy is additionally present.

Another view holds: the preliminary stage of concentration, too, can be called a "stage of concentration," since it, too, has a faint measure of harmonizing and refreshing. By this, pliancy can be present even in the desire realm. Were this not so, it would contradict the Basic Section's statement that faith and the other ten factors extend to every stage.

Another view holds: pliancy exists only in actual meditative concentration, since it is precisely concentration's nourishing power that produces this harmonizing refreshment. The treatise says: the mind and mental factors of the desire realm, lacking pliancy, are for this reason called "the stage without concentration." The statement that all eleven are present in every stage refers to their being present throughout the three stages that possess coarse and subtle discursive thought and the like.

These eleven factors have already been fully explained above. For the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, whether present or absent depends on the stage. For the sixth consciousness, all eleven are present in a state of concentration; outside of concentration, only pliancy is absent.

One view holds: the five sense-consciousnesses have only ten of these, since their very nature is scattered and unstable, lacking pliancy. Another view holds: the five sense-consciousnesses, too, can have pliancy, since wholesome states drawn forth by concentration also involve this harmonizing refreshment, and the wisdom of accomplished activity, which accompanies them, certainly involves pliancy as well.

With which feelings are these eleven wholesome factors associated? Ten of them are associated with all five feelings; one — pliancy — is associated with all except sorrow and pain, since these are oppressive feelings, incompatible with harmonizing refreshment.

These are all capable of being associated with the particular mental factors as well, since faith and the rest are not incompatible with aspiration and the rest. All eleven are exclusively wholesome. Pliancy is absent in the desire realm; the rest extend to all three realms. All eleven can belong to those in training, beyond training, or neither. None is eliminated on the path of seeing. The Yogācārabhūmi says: faith and the other five roots are eliminated only on the path of cultivation, never on the path of seeing. Further distinctions should be considered according to reason, as appropriate.

The wholesome category has now been explained. What is the nature of the afflictive mental factors? The verse states: "The afflictions are: craving, hatred, delusion, conceit, doubt, and wrong view." The treatise states: these six, being by nature included among the fundamental afflictions, receive the name "afflictions."

What is craving? Its nature is attachment and clinging with respect to existence and the means of existence; its function is obstructing non-greed and giving rise to suffering. That is: it is through the power of craving that the appropriated aggregates arise.

What is hatred? Its nature is aversion and hostility with respect to suffering and the means of suffering; its function is obstructing non-hatred, being itself an unsettled, disturbed nature, and serving as the basis for wrongdoing. That is: hatred invariably causes body and mind to burn with agitation, giving rise to various wrongful acts, being itself unwholesome by nature.

What is delusion? Its nature is being benighted and in the dark with respect to principles and things; its function is obstructing non-delusion, and serving as the basis for every kind of defilement. That is: it is through ignorance that doubt, wrong view, craving, and the other primary and secondary afflictions and karmic actions arise, and these are capable of drawing forth further defiled dharmas in future births.

What is conceit? Its nature is relying on oneself to hold oneself above others, swelling with pride; its function is obstructing non-conceit and giving rise to suffering. That is: wherever conceit is present, the mind refuses to humble itself before virtue or the virtuous, and it is because of this that one revolves endlessly through birth and death, undergoing every kind of suffering.

This conceit, in its distinct forms, numbers seven, or nine, arising with respect to three grades and with respect to self and virtue as objects. All are eliminated on both the path of seeing and the path of cultivation — and since even a noble one can still have self-conceit manifest, there is no contradiction in holding that the various kinds of conceit can likewise arise in such a person.

What is doubt? Its nature is hesitation with respect to the truths and principles; its function is obstructing non-doubt and wholesome qualities. That is: one who hesitates cannot give rise to what is wholesome.

One view holds: doubt has wisdom as its essence, since hesitant discrimination is what is called "doubt." The prefix "vi-" attached to "mati" gives the meaning of doubt, since "mati" itself is no different in meaning from wisdom.

Another view holds: doubt has its own distinct essence, since it is what prevents wisdom from reaching a decision, and so is not simply identical with wisdom. The Yogācārabhūmi says: "Among the six afflictions, wrong view is conventionally existent, since it is simply a portion of wisdom; the rest are genuinely real, each having its own distinct nature." If the prefix "vi-" attached to "mati" were taken to mean that wisdom itself becomes doubt, then, by the same logic, "vi-" attached to "jñāna" should mean that wisdom becomes mere consciousness — but a root's meaning shifts precisely because of such prefixes; hence this doubt does not, in fact, have wisdom as its essence.

What is wrong view? Its nature is defiled wisdom, inverted speculation with respect to the truths and principles; its function is obstructing correct view and drawing forth suffering. That is: one who holds wrong views mostly undergoes suffering as a result.

This view's mode of activity, in its distinct forms, numbers five. First, the view of a substantial body: clinging to the five grasped aggregates as "self" and "what belongs to self"; its function is serving as the basis for every other view and speculative position. This view's distinct forms, comprising twenty specific cases, sixty-five variants, and the like, are all included among the discriminated, acquired kind.

Second, the extremist view: clinging, with reference to that same self, to either annihilationism or eternalism; its function is obstructing the middle way and liberation. This view's distinct forms, among the various speculative positions, include: with reference to the past, the four theories of total eternalism and the theory of partial eternalism; and, with reference to the future, the sixteen theories positing a percipient afterlife, the eight theories each positing a non-percipient and a neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient afterlife, and the seven theories of annihilation, and the like — all included among the discriminated, acquired kind.

Third, wrong view proper: denying cause and effect, causal function, and real entities, along with every other wrongful clinging not included among the other four views — its scope and definition are as broad as that of a dominant condition. This view's distinct forms, among the various speculative positions, include: with reference to the past, the two theories of no cause, the four theories of a finite or infinite world and the like, and eel-wriggling equivocation; and, with reference to the future, the five theories of a presently-manifest nirvāṇa; or holding that Īśvara, the lord of the world, Śakra, Brahmā, or other such beings are permanent and unchanging; or holding that Īśvara and the like are the cause of all things; or various wrongly-conceived notions of liberation; or falsely taking what is not the path to be the path — all such positions as these are included under wrong view proper.

Fourth, clinging to views: clinging to one's own views, together with the aggregates they depend on, as supreme and capable of bringing about purity; its function is serving as the basis for every kind of dispute and contention.

Fifth, clinging to rules and rituals: clinging to rules and rituals that accord with one's views, together with the aggregates they depend on, as supreme and capable of bringing about purity; its function is serving as the basis for fruitless, exhausting hardship.

In certain passages, however, it is said that clinging to something as supreme is called "clinging to views," while clinging to something as capable of bringing purity is called "clinging to rules and rituals" — this is an abbreviated way of speaking, or else a provisional, conventional mode of exposition. Were this not so, how could mistaking what is not cessation for cessation, and what is not the path for the path, be classified under wrong view proper rather than under these two kinds of clinging?

Among these ten afflictions, general and specific together, six extend to both the innate and the discriminated, acquired kind, since they can arise either spontaneously or through deliberate reflection. Doubt, and the last three views, are exclusively of the discriminated, acquired kind, since they can arise only through the influence of a bad companion or a wrong teaching, requiring one's own deliberate reflection to come about.

As for the extremist view's extension to the innate kind: one view holds it applies only to the annihilationist form, since the eternalist form has a coarser character, requiring the influence of a bad companion and the like to be drawn forth. The Yogācārabhūmi and similar texts say: "What extremist view is innate? It is the annihilationist kind." Those training toward direct realization give rise to a fear like this: "Where, now, will I, myself, go?" — hence even birds and beasts, when encountering an adverse condition, all become afraid that their self will be annihilated, and give rise to terror.

Another view holds: that treatise speaks only with reference to the coarser aspect; in genuine reality, the innate kind extends to the eternalist form as well. Consider birds and beasts, who cling to their self as permanently enduring, and eagerly accumulate provisions for the long term. Hence the Prakaraṇāryavācā-śāstra and other treatises all say: clinging to the five grasped aggregates as annihilated or as permanent can be either innate or discriminated, acquired.

Among these ten afflictions, which can be associated with which, and how many at once? Craving and hatred, and craving and doubt, certainly never arise together, since the objects of love and of hatred can never be the same; and with respect to an object still undecided, there is no attachment to speak of.

Craving, and conceit or wrong view, sometimes can and sometimes cannot be associated: since the object one loves and the object one looks down upon need not be the same, they are sometimes said not to arise together; but since the object one is attached to and the object one relies on for pride can be the same, they are also said to be capable of association. Since the objects of all five views can themselves be objects of craving, craving can be associated with all five views without contradiction.

Hatred, and conceit or doubt, sometimes can and sometimes cannot arise together: since the object one hates and the object one relies on for pride need not be the same, they are sometimes said not to be associated; but since the object one disdains and the object one hates can be the same, they are also said to be capable of arising together. At the very first moment of hesitation, since one has not yet come to hate the object, they are said not to arise together; but after prolonged, unresolved deliberation, irritation and anger can result, and so they are also said to be capable of association. Doubt with respect to agreeable or disagreeable matters should be understood correspondingly in the same way.

Hatred and the two kinds of clinging are certainly never associated, since one holds these as supreme and as the true path, and so does not hate them. Hatred, and the remaining three views, sometimes can and sometimes cannot be associated: giving rise to the view of a substantial body or the eternalist view with respect to a pleasant set of aggregates does not give rise to hatred, and so they are said not to be associated; but giving rise to the view of a substantial body or the eternalist view with respect to a painful set of aggregates does give rise to hatred, and so they are said to be capable of arising together. The annihilationist view is the reverse of this in whether hatred is present or absent. Wrong view, in denying either something bad or something good, is said, correspondingly, to be sometimes without hatred and sometimes with it.

Conceit is fixed with respect to its object, whereas doubt is not — hence conceit and doubt can never be associated. Conceit and the five views can all arise together, since their modes of activity, considered in turn, are not mutually opposed. Yet conceit and the annihilationist view certainly never arise together, since, at the very moment one clings to the self as annihilated, there is nothing left to look down upon or to take pride in — and the same holds for a portion of the view of a substantial body and of wrong view.

Doubt, lacking settled confirmation, is directly opposed to view — hence doubt and any of the views certainly never arise together. The five views, considered pairwise, certainly never arise together, since a single mind cannot contain more than one act of discriminating wisdom at once.

Delusion, however, is certainly associated with all nine of the other afflictions, since every affliction arises only through delusion.

With which consciousnesses are these ten afflictions associated? The storehouse consciousness has none of them at all; manas has four; the mental consciousness has all ten; the five sense-consciousnesses have only three — craving, hatred, and delusion — since, lacking discrimination, they cannot give rise to conceit and the rest, which require weighing and comparing.

With which feelings are these ten afflictions associated? Craving, hatred, and delusion — whether innate or discriminated, acquired — can all be associated with any of the five feelings, since craving can encounter an adverse condition and thus be associated with sorrow or pain, and hatred can encounter a favorable condition and thus be associated with joy or pleasure.

One view holds: conceit, whether innate or discriminated, acquired, can be associated with any of the four feelings other than pain, since relying with pride on an inferior, suffering aggregate is associated with sorrow. Another view holds: the innate kind can be associated with pain as well, since the mental consciousness can have the pain-faculty, as already explained above. The discriminated, acquired kind of conceit and the rest is absent in realms of unmixed suffering, since these lack the wrong teachers and wrong teachings needed to produce it — yet beings there still do not create the karma that draws them into the lower destinies, since only the discriminated, acquired kind is capable of giving rise to that.

Doubt, and the last three views, can be associated with any of four feelings: even in the desire realm, doubt and the rest can be associated with joy as well; and the two kinds of clinging, when taking as their object a view itself associated with sorrow, can at that time be associated with sorrow too.

One view holds: the innate forms of the view of a substantial body and the extremist view are associated only with joy, pleasure, and equanimous feeling, since they are never associated with the five sense-consciousnesses, being exclusively morally neutral. The discriminated, acquired forms of these two views can be associated with any of four feelings, since one can cling to an aggregate accompanied by suffering as "self" or "what belongs to self" — the eternalist and annihilationist views, conversely, are then associated with sorrow.

Another view holds: even the innate forms of these two views, when they arise, can be associated with pain as well, since, in realms of unmixed suffering, taking an extremely painful aggregate as one's object is associated with pain. The treatise states: every innate affliction can manifest in association with any of the three basic feelings, as explained at length above; the rest is as already stated.

This is according to genuine reality; considered with reference to the coarser, more general pattern: craving, conceit, and four of the views are associated with pleasure, joy, and equanimity; hatred is associated only with pain, sorrow, and equanimity; delusion can be associated with all five feelings; wrong view and doubt are associated with four, excluding pain. Craving and delusion, associated with pleasure, extend through the lower four stages; the remaining seven, associated with pleasure, extend through three realms excluding the desire realm; doubt, and delusion operating independently, are associated only with sorrow and equanimity in the desire realm, and with the remaining feelings elsewhere, as should be understood according to reason.

With how many of the particular mental factors can these be mutually associated? Craving, hatred, delusion, and conceit can all be associated with all five, since they can focus single-pointedly on an object, and so can involve concentration. Doubt, and the five views, can each be associated with only four: doubt excludes resolve, since it lacks settled determination; the views are never associated with wisdom, since they are not distinct from wisdom to begin with.

To what moral category do these ten afflictions belong? Hatred is exclusively unwholesome, since it harms both oneself and others; the remaining nine extend to both unwholesome and neutral. Those bound to the upper two realms are exclusively morally neutral, since they are held in check by meditative concentration. Discriminated, acquired afflictions bound to the desire realm are exclusively unwholesome, since they give rise to wrongdoing; innate afflictions that give rise to wrongdoing are likewise unwholesome, since they harm both oneself and others; the rest are morally neutral, being too subtle to obstruct the wholesome, and not severely harming oneself or others. It should be understood that the innate view of a substantial body and the innate extremist view are exclusively morally neutral, since they never give rise to wrongdoing — even though they manifest repeatedly, they do not obstruct what is wholesome.

To which realm are these ten afflictions bound? Hatred is bound only to the desire realm; the remaining nine extend to all three realms.

When born in a lower realm, and not yet free of that realm's own defilement, the afflictions of an upper realm do not manifest. Only once one attains that upper realm's fundamental meditative absorption can that realm's afflictions manifest. That is: although a contaminated path cannot suppress discriminated, acquired afflictions or subtle, innate ones, it can suppress and remove the coarser, innate afflictions, and thereby gradually attain the fundamental absorption of a higher realm — since it is precisely being deluded about particular objects, operating through the outward-facing sense-doors, being scattered and coarsely agitated, that directly obstructs concentration. Once that absorption is attained, both the discriminated, acquired and innate afflictions of that realm can manifest.

When born in an upper realm, the afflictions of a lower realm, both discriminated, acquired and innate, can also manifest. Consider one in the intermediate state after the fourth absorption: through slandering liberation, such a being can be reborn in hell — that is, while still embodied in the upper realm, at the very moment of being about to be reborn below, the innate craving that moistens and nourishes rebirth in the lower realm arises. As for the statement that a being born in the upper realm does not give rise to lower-realm afflictions, this is spoken with reference to what holds for the most part, or else as a merely provisional exposition.

A lower realm's afflictions can also take an upper realm as their object. The Yogācārabhūmi and similar texts say: craving bound to the desire realm can seek rebirth in an upper realm, delighting in that realm's absorption. And since it is said that hatred can resent and be jealous of cessation and the path, it should likewise be able to resent and be jealous of the realm free of desire. Taking all conditioned phenomena generally as its object, clinging to a self and to what belongs to self, whether annihilated or permanent, conceit can equally take an upper realm as its object. That the remaining five can take an upper realm as their object is thereby well established.

Yet in certain passages it is said that craving, hatred, conceit, and the rest do not take an upper realm as their object — this is spoken with reference to their coarser, more general pattern, or with reference to a more specific object, since one does not ordinarily see beings clinging to a dharma of another realm as their own self, and since the extremist view necessarily arises in dependence on the view of a substantial body.

An upper realm's afflictions can likewise take a lower realm as their object: a being born in the upper realm can rely on their own superior virtue to look down upon beings in the lower realm. Taking all conditioned phenomena generally as its object, clinging to a self and to what belongs to self, whether annihilated or permanent, or with craving, can equally take a lower realm as its object. Doubt, and the last three views, should be understood accordingly, following the same reasoning. As for the statement that an upper realm's afflictions do not take a lower realm as their object, this too is spoken with reference to what holds for the most part, or with reference to a more specific object.

To which of the three categories — trainee, beyond-training, or neither — do these ten afflictions belong? None of them belongs to trainee or beyond-training, since those categories are exclusively wholesome. On what path are these ten afflictions eliminated? None of them is beyond elimination altogether, since they are, by nature, defiled. The discriminated, acquired kind is eliminated only on the path of seeing, being coarse and easily eliminated; the innate kind is eliminated only on the path of cultivation, being subtle and difficult to eliminate.

The ten afflictions eliminated on the path of seeing are, in genuine reality, all severed together, all at once, since the true path of seeing takes the four truths together, as a whole, as its object. Yet the way each affliction is deluded with respect to the truths has both a general and a specific aspect. Generally speaking, all ten are deluded with respect to all four truths, since suffering and its origin are the basis they depend on as their cause, while cessation and the path are what they find fearsome.

Specifically speaking, each is deluded with respect to a distinct aspect of the four truths: two are deluded only with respect to suffering, while eight extend to delusion regarding all four. The view of a substantial body and the extremist view arise only with reference to the domain of the result, specifically emptiness and no-self, which belong to the truth of suffering.

Doubt, and the remaining three views, are directly deluded regarding the principle of suffering. The two kinds of clinging, holding these three views, the rules and rituals, and the aggregates they depend on to be supreme and capable of purifying, give rise, correspondingly, to craving, hostility, or conceit toward one's own view and its adherents, or toward another's. Associated ignorance is deluded together with these nine in the same way; exclusive ignorance is directly deluded regarding the principle of suffering. Doubt and wrong view are directly deluded regarding the origin of suffering, and so on. The two kinds of clinging, craving, and the rest should be understood correspondingly, following the pattern already given for suffering. Hatred, too, can be directly deluded regarding cessation and the path, since fear of these gives rise to resentment and jealousy toward them.

The direct and indirect delusion regarding the truths, in coarse outline, is as described above. Considered in fuller detail: the innate forms of craving, hatred, conceit, the three views, and doubt follow the corresponding pattern already given. The innate forms of the view of a substantial body and the extremist view, together with the craving, conceit, and ignorance associated with them, though deluded regarding the truth of suffering, are subtle and difficult to eliminate, and so are eliminated only on the path of cultivation. Hatred and the remaining forms of craving arise with respect to particular objects, and do not conflict with direct contemplation of the truths, and so are likewise eliminated on the path of cultivation.

Although every affliction has a perceived aspect, the underlying basis it relies on may or may not exist — hence they are called afflictions that take a real or an unreal basis as their object. What they directly take as their object is always contaminated, yet the underlying basis they rely on may itself be uncontaminated — hence they are called afflictions that take a contaminated or an uncontaminated basis as their object. Those that take their own realm as their object have a perceived aspect resembling their underlying basis, and so are called afflictions taking a genuine object as constructed by discrimination; those that take cessation, the path, or another realm as their object have a perceived aspect that does not resemble their underlying basis, and so are called afflictions taking a merely nominal object as constructed by discrimination. Further distinctions should be considered according to reason, as appropriate.

The nature of the six fundamental afflictions has now been explained. What is the nature of the secondary afflictions? The verse states: "The secondary afflictions are: wrath, resentment, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, harmfulness, and arrogance; lack of shame and lack of embarrassment; restlessness and torpor; lack of faith and laziness; heedlessness and forgetfulness; distraction and incorrect knowledge."

The treatise states: these are called "secondary afflictions" because they are simply distinct phases of the fundamental afflictions, outflows sharing their same nature. These twenty kinds, by category, are of three sorts: wrath and the other nine, each arising separately and independently, are called the minor secondary afflictions; lack of shame and lack of embarrassment, pervading every unwholesome state, are called the intermediate secondary afflictions; restlessness and the other seven, pervading every defiled mind, are called the major secondary afflictions.

What is wrath? Its nature is indignant outburst in response to a currently present, unfavorable object; its function is obstructing non-wrath and taking up a weapon. That is: one who harbors wrath frequently gives rise to violent, wrongful bodily expression. This has, as its essence, simply a portion of hatred, since apart from hatred there is no separate characteristic or function of wrath to be found.

What is resentment? Preceded by wrath, its nature is harboring ill will without letting go, binding oneself to a grudge; its function is obstructing non-resentment and causing burning distress. That is: one who binds themselves to a grudge cannot tolerate and forbear, and so is constantly burning with distress. This, too, has, as its essence, simply a portion of hatred, since apart from hatred there is no separate characteristic or function of resentment to be found.

What is concealment? Its nature is concealing one's own committed wrongdoing, out of fear of losing gain or reputation; its function is obstructing non-concealment and causing regret and distress. That is: one who conceals their wrongdoing will inevitably later feel regret and distress, being unable to find peace.

One view holds: this concealment is included as a portion of delusion, since the treatise speaks of it only as a portion of delusion — one conceals one's own wrongdoing without fearing the future suffering it will bring.

Another view holds: this concealment is included as a portion of both craving and delusion, since one also conceals one's own wrongdoing out of fear of losing gain and reputation. The treatise, speaking with reference to the more conspicuous, general pattern, mentions only the portion of delusion — just as it speaks of restlessness as a portion of craving, and yet also states that restlessness pervades every defiled mind, so restlessness cannot be held to be exclusively a portion of craving either.

What is vexation? Preceded by wrath and resentment, its nature is recalling and being struck by fierce heat, becoming obstinate and perverse; its function is obstructing non-vexation and stinging others like a scorpion. That is: recalling past wrongs, and being struck by present adverse conditions, the mind becomes obstinate and perverse, frequently giving rise to clamorous, violent, vicious, and coarse speech, stinging others like a scorpion. This, too, has, as its essence, simply a portion of hatred, since apart from hatred there is no separate characteristic or function of vexation to be found.

What is envy? Pursuing one's own fame and gain, unable to bear another's glory, its nature is jealousy and resentment; its function is obstructing non-envy and causing sorrow and distress. That is: one who is jealous, upon hearing or seeing another's glory, harbors deep sorrow and distress, unable to find peace. This, too, has, as its essence, simply a portion of hatred, since apart from hatred there is no separate characteristic or function of envy to be found.

What is stinginess? Indulging in attachment to wealth or to the dharma, unable to release it with wisdom, its nature is secretive hoarding; its function is obstructing non-stinginess and base accumulation. That is: one who is stingy has a mind that is largely base and ungenerous, hoarding wealth and the dharma, unable to let go of them. This has, as its essence, simply a portion of craving, since apart from craving there is no separate characteristic or function of stinginess to be found.

What is deceit? In order to gain profit or reputation, falsely presenting oneself as possessing virtue, its nature is deceptive fraudulence; its function is obstructing non-deceit and wrongful livelihood. That is: one who practices deceit harbors ulterior schemes in the mind, frequently presenting false, wrongful means of livelihood. This has, as its essence, simply a portion of craving and delusion, since apart from these two there is no separate characteristic or function of deceit to be found.

What is flattery? In order to ensnare others, falsely putting on a different manner, its nature is treachery and crookedness; its function is obstructing non-flattery and honest instruction. That is: one who is crooked and flattering, in order to ensnare and deceive others, bends and accommodates to suit the occasion, falsely devising expedient means, either to win over another's intentions or to conceal one's own faults. Being thereby unable to accept the correct instruction of a teacher or friend, this, too, has, as its essence, simply a portion of craving and delusion, since apart from these two there is no separate characteristic or function of flattery to be found.

What is harmfulness? Its nature is a mind without compassion toward sentient beings, injuring and distressing them; its function is obstructing non-harming and oppressing others with distress. That is: one who is harmful oppresses others with distress. This, too, has, as its essence, simply a portion of hatred, since apart from hatred there is no separate characteristic or function of harmfulness to be found. The distinct characteristics of hatred and harmfulness should be understood by analogy with non-hatred and non-harming, discussed above among the wholesome factors.

What is arrogance? Its nature is deep attachment to one's own flourishing circumstances, becoming intoxicated with pride; its function is obstructing non-arrogance and serving as the basis for defilement. That is: one intoxicated with arrogance generates and nourishes every kind of defiled dharma. This, too, has, as its essence, simply a portion of craving, since apart from craving there is no separate characteristic or function of arrogance to be found.

What is lack of shame? Its nature is disregarding self-respect and regard for the dharma, disdaining and rejecting what is worthy and good; its function is obstructing shame and nourishing wrongdoing. That is: one who disregards self-respect and regard for the dharma disdains and rejects what is worthy and good, feels no shame over faults and misdeeds, and thereby obstructs shame and nourishes all wrongdoing.

What is lack of embarrassment? Its nature is disregarding worldly opinion, honoring and esteeming violence and wrongdoing; its function is obstructing embarrassment and nourishing wrongdoing. That is: one who disregards worldly opinion honors and esteems violence and wrongdoing, feels no embarrassment over faults and transgressions, and thereby obstructs embarrassment and nourishes all wrongdoing.

Feeling no shame over one's faults is a characteristic shared by both of these — hence the scriptures sometimes speak of this shared feature as though it were their defining essence.

Should one instead hold that feeling no shame is itself the two factors' distinct defining characteristic — then these two dharmas would have no real difference in essence at all. By this, the two dharmas should then certainly never be mutually associated together, since no two factors sharing an identical essence, such as feeling and perception, could ever coexist in this way. Should one instead establish the two as distinct with reference to self versus others — this would mean they are not genuinely, substantially real, which would contradict the scriptures' own teaching. Should one grant, instead, that these two are genuinely real and arise as distinct factors — this would again contradict the treatise's statement that both pervade every unwholesome mind equally.

Whenever an unwholesome mind arises, whatever object it takes, it always involves both disdaining the good and honoring the bad — hence these two dharmas are both universal to every unwholesome mind, without any difference in object between them, and so no fault arises from holding them to be distinct.

The scriptures, however, do speak of "disregard for self, and for others": "self" refers to self-respect and regard for the dharma; "others" refers to worldly opinion. Or else, within this very framework, rejecting the good and honoring the bad, insofar as they benefit or harm oneself, are themselves what is meant by "self" and "others." As for the treatise's classifying these as portions of craving and the like — this refers to their being mere outflows of craving and the rest, not that they are simply identical with these in essence.

What is restlessness? Its nature is causing the mind to be unsettled with respect to its object; its function is obstructing equanimity and calm-abiding.

One view holds: restlessness is included as a portion of craving, since the treatise speaks of it only as a portion of craving — it arises through recollecting past pleasurable matters.

Another view holds: restlessness is not exclusively included under craving, since the treatise states that restlessness pervades every defiled mind; furthermore, restlessness's own characteristic is simply being unsettled, which is said to be a shared characteristic common to every affliction — apart from this, restlessness has no separate characteristic of its own. Although it is provisionally established with reference to every affliction generally, since it intensifies especially in states of craving, it is spoken of as a portion of craving.

Another view holds: restlessness has its own distinct nature, pervading every defiled mind, just as lack of faith and the rest do — one should not, merely because it is spoken of as a portion of something else, conclude that its essence is thereby unreal, lest lack of faith and the rest, too, would have to be considered merely conventional. As for the treatise's calling it conventionally existent, this is spoken with reference to its resembling another factor's characteristic, just as with sleep and the like. Restlessness's own distinct characteristic is precisely agitation, causing the dharmas that accompany it to be unsettled. If restlessness had no distinct characteristic of its own apart from the afflictions in general, the treatise should not have separately stated that it obstructs calm-abiding specifically — hence "unsettled" cannot be its distinct characteristic.

What is torpor? Its nature is causing the mind to be unfit for use with respect to its object; its function is obstructing pliancy and insight.

One view holds: torpor is included as a portion of delusion, since the treatise speaks of it only as a portion of delusion — being benighted and heavy is delusion's own characteristic.

Another view holds: torpor is not exclusively included under delusion, since being unfit for use is torpor's characteristic, and every affliction is, in some sense, unfit for use — apart from this, torpor has no separate characteristic of its own. Although it is provisionally established with reference to every affliction generally, since delusion's characteristic intensifies especially within it, it is spoken of merely as a portion of delusion.

Another view holds: torpor has its own distinct nature — although called "a portion of delusion," it is in fact simply delusion's outflow, just as lack of faith and the rest are, not identical with delusion itself. It is said to be conventionally existent with reference to its resembling another factor's characteristic, just as with sleep — but its actual nature is genuinely real. Torpor's own distinct characteristic is precisely heaviness and dullness, causing the dharmas that accompany it to be unfit for use. If torpor had no distinct characteristic of its own apart from the afflictions in general, the treatise should not have separately stated that it obstructs insight specifically — hence "unfit for use" cannot be its distinct characteristic either.

The difference between torpor and delusion's own characteristic is this: delusion has, as its characteristic, being benighted and in the dark with respect to its object, directly obstructing non-delusion, without necessarily being heavy and dull; torpor has, as its characteristic, being heavy and dull with respect to its object, directly obstructing pliancy, without necessarily being benighted.

What is lack of faith? Its nature is the mind's own turbidity, lacking acceptance, delight, and aspiration with respect to what is real, what possesses virtue, and what has capability; its function is obstructing pure faith and serving as the basis for laziness. That is: one who lacks faith is largely lazy as a result.

Lack of faith's three aspects should be understood as the reverse of faith's three. Yet whereas every other defiled dharma has its own distinct characteristic, it is lack of faith alone whose own characteristic is itself turbid and murky, and which is, moreover, capable of further muddying the other mental factors and mind that accompany it — just as an especially filthy object both is itself filthy and makes other things filthy too — and this is why it is said to have the mind's own turbidity as its defining nature.

It is because of this lack of faith that one lacks acceptance, delight, and aspiration with respect to what is real, what possesses virtue, and what has capability — this is not some further, separate characteristic; and if, with respect to other matters, one has a wrongful acceptance, delight, or aspiration, that is this factor's cause or effect, not its own essential nature.

What is laziness? Its nature is indolence with respect to cultivating the wholesome and abandoning the unwholesome; its function is obstructing diligence and increasing defilement. That is: one who is lazy nourishes and increases defilement thereby. Even exerting oneself vigorously toward defiled undertakings is likewise called laziness, since it causes wholesome qualities to regress. Exerting oneself vigorously toward morally neutral undertakings, since this neither advances nor regresses any wholesome quality, is simply a matter of aspiration and resolve, and has no separate essential nature of its own — just as, with respect to something morally neutral, one's acceptance, delight, and aspiration are themselves neither pure nor defiled, being neither faith nor lack of faith.

What is heedlessness? Its nature is being unable to guard against defilement or cultivate purity, indulging in unrestrained abandon; its function is obstructing heedfulness and serving as the basis for increasing wrongdoing and diminishing what is wholesome. That is: it is precisely because of laziness together with craving, hatred, and delusion that one is unable to guard against defiled dharmas or cultivate pure ones — this incapacity itself is called heedlessness; it has no separate essence of its own. Although conceit, doubt, and the rest also have some capacity in this direction, compared to these four their power and function are markedly weaker, since these four directly obstruct the three wholesome roots and constantly drive the mind forward. Investigating this characteristic further follows the same pattern already given for heedfulness among the wholesome factors.

What is forgetfulness? Its nature is being unable to clearly remember one's objects; its function is obstructing correct recollection and serving as the basis for distraction. That is: one who forgets has a scattered mind as a result.

One view holds: forgetfulness is included as a portion of recollection, since it is said to be recollection associated with affliction. Another view holds: forgetfulness is included as a portion of delusion, since the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of it only as a portion of delusion — delusion causes recollection to fail, hence the name "forgetfulness." Another view holds: forgetfulness is included as a portion of both, since the two passages just cited are each an abbreviated way of speaking, and the treatise elsewhere also states that this pervades every defiled mind.

What is distraction? Its nature is causing the mind to scatter and wander among its objects; its function is obstructing correct concentration and serving as the basis for false wisdom. That is: one who is distracted gives rise to false wisdom as a result.

One view holds: distraction is included as a portion of delusion, since the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of it only as a portion of delusion. Another view holds: distraction is included under craving, hatred, and delusion together, since the Abhidharmasamuccaya and similar texts speak of it as a portion of all three — the statement that it is a portion of delusion refers to its pervading every defiled mind, since craving, hatred, and delusion cause the mind to scatter and wander more powerfully than any other dharma, and this is why it is called "distraction."

Another view holds: distraction has its own distinct essence — the statement that it is a portion of the three refers to its being their outflow, just as lack of shame and the rest are, not that it is simply identical with them. It is said to be conventionally existent with reference to its resembling another factor's characteristic. Distraction's own distinct characteristic is precisely agitated turbulence, causing the dharmas that accompany it all to scatter and wander. If distraction had no distinct essence of its own apart from these three, the treatise should not have separately stated that it obstructs concentration specifically.

What is the difference in function between restlessness and distraction? Restlessness causes the understanding to shift; distraction causes the object to shift. Although, within a single instant, neither the understanding nor the object actually shifts, across a continuous succession of moments this shifting does occur. In a defiled mind, through the power of restlessness and distraction, the understanding and the object would constantly shift from moment to moment — unless held in check by the power of recollection and the rest, the way a tethered monkey can be made to stay still for a time. Hence restlessness and distraction are both universal to every defiled mind.

What is incorrect knowledge? Its nature is mistaken understanding with respect to an object under examination; its function is obstructing correct knowledge and giving rise to transgression. That is: one with incorrect knowledge frequently commits transgressions as a result.

One view holds: incorrect knowledge is included as a portion of wisdom, since it is said to be wisdom associated with affliction. Another view holds: incorrect knowledge is included as a portion of delusion, since the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of it only as a portion of delusion — it causes one's knowledge to become incorrect, hence the name "incorrect knowledge." Another view holds: incorrect knowledge is included as a portion of both, since the two passages just cited are each an abbreviated way of speaking, and the treatise elsewhere also states that this pervades every defiled mind.

The words "with," "and," and "together with" show that the secondary afflictions are not limited to these twenty alone, since the Kṣudrakavastu and similar texts speak of many further kinds of secondary afflictions arising from craving and the rest. The term "secondary affliction" also includes the fundamental afflictions themselves, since these, too, are outflows of the still-earlier afflictions; but other defiled dharmas of the same general kind as the fundamental afflictions are called only "secondary afflictions," not included among the fundamental afflictions proper. The reason only these twenty are specifically discussed is that they are not themselves fundamental afflictions, and are exclusively defiled and coarse; every other defiled dharma is either a distinct phase of these, or an outflow of these, and so is already included within them. Their further classification should be understood according to reason, category by category.

Among these twenty secondary afflictions, the ten minor ones and three of the major ones are certainly conventionally existent; lack of shame, lack of embarrassment, lack of faith, and laziness are certainly genuinely real, since this is established by both scripture and reason. As for restlessness, torpor, and distraction, one view holds them conventionally existent, another holds them genuinely real — the reasoning and scriptural citations given for each should be understood as already presented above.

All twenty extend to both the innate and the discriminated, acquired kind, since they arise through the power of whichever of the two kinds of fundamental affliction underlies them.

Among these twenty, the ten minor ones certainly never arise together with one another, considered pairwise, since they are mutually opposed, each having a coarse, forceful mode of activity, and each acting as its own governing factor. The two intermediate ones are present together with every unwholesome mind, and, correspondingly, can arise together with either the minor or the major ones. The treatise states that the eight major ones pervade every defiled mind — considered pairwise, they, and the minor and intermediate ones, can all arise together with one another.

In certain passages it is said that six pervade every defiled mind, since torpor and restlessness, when each is especially intensified, do not arise together. In other passages it is said that only five pervade, since torpor, restlessness, and the rest are opposed only to what is wholesome. Since these are exclusively defiled, they do not accompany the eighth consciousness. Within the seventh consciousness, only the eight major ones are present, their presence or absence to be understood as already explained above. Within the sixth consciousness, all twenty can potentially be present. The ten minor ones, being coarse and forceful, are absent from the five sense-consciousnesses; the intermediate and major ones, however, can be present in the five sense-consciousnesses as well.

By this, the intermediate and major secondary afflictions are associated with all five feelings. One view holds: among the ten minor ones, excluding three, wrath and the rest are associated only with joy, sorrow, and equanimous feeling; flattery, deceit, and arrogance are associated with four, excluding pain. Another view holds: wrath and the rest are associated with four, excluding pleasure; flattery, deceit, and arrogance are associated with all five feelings, since the mental consciousness can have the pain-faculty, as already explained above.

Their compatibility with each feeling should be understood as already stated for the fundamental afflictions. This is according to genuine reality; considered with reference to the coarser, more general pattern: wrath, resentment, vexation, envy, and harmfulness are associated with sorrow and equanimity; concealment and stinginess are associated with joy and equanimity; the remaining three are additionally associated with pleasure. The intermediate and major ones, considered with reference to this coarser pattern, likewise follow genuine reality.

These twenty are all capable of arising together with the five particular mental factors, since they are not mutually opposed. Defiled recollection and defiled wisdom, though not identical with genuine recollection and wisdom, being merely portions of delusion, can nevertheless be associated with them. Recollection can also take a presently or previously familiar object of the same general kind, and wrath, too, can take as its object something that has just passed — hence wrath, too, can be associated with recollection. When a defiled state of concentration arises, the mind can still be agitated and turbulent, and so distraction and concentration can be associated without contradiction. The two intermediate and eight major secondary afflictions are all associated with the ten fundamental afflictions.

The ten minor secondary afflictions certainly never arise together with view or doubt, since their mode of activity is coarse and agitated, while view and doubt are subtle and deliberate. Wrath and the other four can arise together with conceit and delusion, but not together with craving and hatred, since they are themselves portions of hatred. Stinginess can arise together with delusion and conceit, but not together with craving and hatred, since it is itself a portion of craving. Arrogance can arise together only with delusion, being distinct from conceit's own resolve, since it is itself a portion of craving. Concealment, deceit, and flattery can arise together with craving, delusion, and conceit, their modes of activity not being mutually opposed, since they are themselves portions of craving and delusion.

Seven of the minor ones, and the two intermediate ones, are exclusively unwholesome. Three of the minor ones, and the eight major ones, extend to the morally neutral as well. Seven of the minor ones, and the two intermediate ones, are bound exclusively to the desire realm. Deceit and flattery are bound to the desire and form realms; the rest extend to all three realms.

When born in a lower realm, one can still give rise to the upper realm's eleven afflictions capable of taking an upper realm as their object, since one can, out of attachment to concentration or with regard to others, give rise to arrogance, deceit, and flattery directed at that upper attainment. When born in an upper realm, one can give rise to the lower realm's last ten, since wrong view can arise together with craving, and thereby give rise to these. The ten minor ones, when born in an upper realm, have no basis for arising with reference to a lower realm, since they are not the kind that genuinely moistens and nourishes rebirth, and since they involve slandering cessation. The two intermediate and eight major ones, when bound to a lower realm, can also take an upper realm as their object, since they can arise associated with craving and the rest, which themselves take the upper realm as object.

One view holds: the ten minor ones, when bound to a lower realm, do not take an upper realm as object, since their mode of activity is coarse and immediate, not reaching toward anything distant. Another view holds: envy and the like can also take an upper realm as object, since one can give rise to envy and the like toward a superior realm's dharmas. Among the eight major ones, flattery and deceit, when bound to an upper realm, can also take a lower realm as object, since a lower realm's conceit and the rest can arise associated with them — as when Brahmā gave rise to flattery and deceit toward the son of Śakya. Arrogance does not take a lower realm as its object, since a lower realm gives it nothing to rely on for pride.

All twenty belong to neither the trainee nor the beyond-training category, since these twenty are exclusively defiled, while those two categories are exclusively pure. The last ten — the major secondary afflictions — are eliminated on both the path of seeing and the path of cultivation, since they arise in association with both the discriminated and the innate kinds of fundamental affliction.

Those eliminated on the path of seeing follow the corresponding general or specific pattern of delusion regarding the truths, arising together with their associated fundamental affliction — hence, correspondingly, they can all extend to any of the four truths. Their direct or indirect delusion regarding the truths, and so forth, should all be understood as already explained for the fundamental afflictions.

As for the first ten, the minor secondary afflictions: one view holds they are eliminated only on the path of cultivation, since they arise spontaneously with respect to coarse, particular objects. Another view holds they extend to both the path of seeing and the path of cultivation as well, since they arise through the power of both kinds of fundamental affliction — one can, for instance, give rise to wrath and the like toward another's wrong view. Those eliminated on the path of seeing, correspondingly, through the power of the general or specific underlying affliction they take as object, can all extend to any of the four truths.

On this point, one view holds: wrath and the rest arise only by taking as their object an affliction that is itself deluded regarding the truths, without being themselves directly deluded regarding the truths — their mode of activity being coarse and shallow, not reaching deeply into the matter. Another view holds: envy and the like can also be directly deluded regarding the truths, since one can give rise to envy and the like even with respect to cessation and the path. Yet wrath and the other nine minor afflictions can only take a genuinely existent thing as their object, since they require an actual underlying basis in order to arise at all. As for whether they take a contaminated or uncontaminated object, this should be understood by analogy with what was already explained above.