Sound, Fire, and the Measure That Measures Itself

Next, the refutation of the Sāṃkhya should be understood. Insider: "Your position holds that sound possesses self-nature, since sound is not different from its own self-nature — but this does not hold. Why? If sound possessed self-nature, sound would have to be identical with the very basis of hearing itself: one would have to say that sound is the ear, and the ear is sound — only then could one say self-nature is sound and sound is self-nature. If you do not grant that the ear is identical with sound, then neither can you grant that sound is identical with its self-nature. If you say instead that sound is what is heard, while the ear is not identical with what is heard — this does not hold either. Why? Is your 'sound' one with the ear, or different from it? If sound, as what is heard, is different from the ear, then, being already something heard, it is likewise different from self-nature. If sound is not different from the ear, then why do you not also say that sound can hear the ear? If you say sound is a quality analogous to the ear — this too does not hold. Why? Because the ear too should perish when sound perishes, given that sound and ear are supposedly one and the same. Since even ear and sound cannot be established as a single thing, the same reasoning applies to every other case you might propose. Hence we know that dharmas decisively have no self-nature, and are, every one, empty."

"If you ask how, on this view, direct perception itself can be accounted for — this poses no difficulty. Why? What I establish here is that direct perception itself reveals the twofold emptiness: because dharmas are empty, self-nature cannot be found. It is like the direct perception involved in seeing a conjured illusion — what is seen there is not real as it appears. Dharmas are exactly the same: they are seen, yet not as they are seen to be. Because their essence is unreal, they do not truly exist; yet because they are directly perceived, they are not simply non-existent either. Because their essence is empty, the truth of emptiness is established; and because they are directly perceived, their status as conventionally existing is not lost."

Furthermore, no dharma whatsoever possesses self-nature. Why? Because all arise dependent on causes and conditions. Fire, for instance, arises dependent on something else — apart from firewood it cannot be seen, and the same is true even of a firefly's glow. If fire possessed self-nature, it should be able to burn of itself, in empty space, apart from any firewood. If it could burn of itself, it should be independent of any fuel — in which case its further arising would serve no purpose, and fire, having no dependent function at all, could then never be extinguished by any water. If you say it can nonetheless be extinguished precisely because it has self-nature — while, if it had no self-nature, it would be like a conjured, illusory fire with no real nature, and, having no real antidote, water could not extinguish it — this does not hold. Why? I ask you this: is this fire's nature originally existent, or originally non-existent? If originally existent, then it must remain existent at the end as well; and if existent both at the beginning and the end, it should be permanent, and should never be extinguishable at all. Furthermore, if things possessed their own distinct self-natures, they could then mutually destroy one another — as when one act, once accomplished, destroys the prior act, as fire is extinguished by water. But if every dharma possessed its own independent self-nature, how could any of them destroy one another at all? If you say that, absent self-nature, fire and firewood could not be told apart — this does not hold either. Why? This claim carries many faults, since it fails to distinguish agent from object. If they are one and not different, what agent and object could there even be? Fire and firewood can indeed be spoken of as agent and object — the wood as that which is illuminated, the fire as that which illuminates. If this were not so, your own thesis of "oneness" could not be established in the first place.

Outsider: "If you say fire is neither one with nor different from firewood, then how can you still say fire arises dependent on causes and conditions?" Insider: "Just as the five sense-qualities of form and the rest within the firewood, at a given moment, no longer constitute 'firewood,' but instead, all at once, constitute the nature of heat. The eight substances — the four great elements and the four subtle elements — are, in every case, neither one nor different. If you say the eight substances, cold and hot and the rest, are either identical or different — this does not hold. Why? If identical, then the coldness of the wood should itself become the heat of the fire, which falls into the view of permanence. If you say they are different, then the heat would arise apart from and unrelated to the cold, which falls into the view of annihilation — yet in fact heat does arise dependent on cold. So, if they were simply different, there would have to be eight separate fires, one for each of the eight substances; and if fire were eightfold in this way, then no single, unified fire could ever arise, as explained above. Therefore all dharmas arise entirely dependent on conditions. Why? Because of continuity without permanence: because of continuity, there is no utter discontinuity, and because there is no permanence, there is no fixed, unchanging eternity. For this reason, the views of both annihilation and permanence are dispelled; being neither one nor different, 'oneness' and 'difference' are spoken of only in accordance with worldly convention."

Furthermore, if you say that the measuring subject and the measured object are two things each independently established, and that dharmas therefore each possess their own self-nature and are not empty — this does not hold. Why? Because the measure arises only relative to its object — there is no such thing as a measuring cognition establishing itself without depending on the object measured. And if there were no object measured, on what could the very name "measuring subject" be based — what, then, would the measure be measuring? If you say the measuring subject is established precisely by observing the object measured — this does not hold either. Why? If the object did not previously exist, what would the measure take as its condition? "The measured" refers to the object that is the condition; "the measuring" refers to the cognition that takes the condition. If the object measured is already established, what further use is there for a measuring subject? Only because the object depends on the subject does it receive the name "object" at all. If the measuring subject did not yet exist while the object measured were already established, the measuring subject would serve no purpose. And if the object measured could be established entirely independent of any measuring subject, what agent and object would there even be? If you say the measuring subject and the measured object mutually establish one another — that these two, each already possessing its own self-nature, come together and are thereby named, one "the measuring" and the other "the measured" — this does not hold either. Why? If the two things were already established prior to being brought into relation, and only afterward received their names, four faults follow: first, being brought into relation would serve no purpose — for all dharmas, before any condition takes hold of them, would already be "the measured," and cognition, likewise, before it takes any condition, would already be "the measuring." Since their self-nature is already established, what use would there be for relating them at all? Second, what, then, would still be lacking, requiring them to be related? If it is only the name that requires the relating, then, their essence already being established, why should they lack a name beforehand? If you say their essence inherently exists but simply lacks a name until related, this cannot be — lacking a name, how could their essence as such-and-such exist at all? Third, if the object measured is established first and the measuring subject established afterward — if the object measured is already established, thereby becoming "the measured," what would the measuring subject, not yet established, be related to, that it should be called "the measured"? Fourth, if the measuring subject and the object measured are established simultaneously, then the very sense of "subject" and "object" collapses, as when two horns of an ox grow forth together and there is no priority of one over the other. Since, whether examined as prior, as subsequent, or as simultaneous, self-nature can nowhere be found, we know that all dharmas are entirely empty.

Furthermore, if you say — just as a lamp is that which illuminates and a pot is that which is illuminated, the lamp and the pot each originally existing in their own right, and only when brought into relation are they respectively named "illuminator" and "illuminated" — that the sense of measure is thereby established: this does not hold. Why? Because the lamp analogy itself is not established — it is not even analogous to the case of measure, so how could it serve as an analogy at all? You ask how it is not established? A lamp contains no darkness within itself, and therefore does not illuminate its own substance. But if it did require illumination in order for its own substance to be revealed, then, just as a pot needs a separate lamp to illuminate it, the lamp itself would need yet another separate lamp to illuminate it — and this leads to the fault of illumination requiring illumination without end. Since this is not the case, the disanalogy stands: you take the lamp as an analogy because you suppose it resembles direct perception, but I say precisely that it does not resemble it, and so cannot serve as an analogy. Why? Because a lamp illuminates only other things, and never itself. If a substance contained darkness, it might need illumination from itself or another; but since a lamp's own substance contains no darkness, what need would there be for it to be illuminated by itself or by another? It is unlike a pot and similar things, whose substance, being dark, cannot manifest itself, and so requires a lamp to illuminate it. If the lamp itself in turn required illumination, there would have to be yet another separate lamp to illuminate it. Since this is not so, we know for certain that a lamp is only ever an illuminator, never something illuminated. Direct perception, however, is not like this — it is both subject and object at once. That which takes hold of a prior object is called the "measuring subject," this being cognition taking its own object; and insofar as it in turn becomes the object taken by a further cognition, it is called the "measured object." As to taking its own object: the visual consciousness, functioning as direct perception, is set directly upon the form before it, but cannot itself discriminate and form the thought "this is blue." To form that thought is already the work of mental consciousness — in which case two minds arise together. Visual consciousness takes hold of form, but cannot take hold of itself; mental consciousness discriminates blue from yellow, and this discriminating is itself a further "taking hold." Visual consciousness cannot take hold of itself, since it only sees its own object, the visible form. Only what is thus discriminated and apprehended by a further discriminating consciousness is properly "the measured"; the discriminating consciousness itself is "the measuring subject." Direct perception, therefore, is established precisely because it is apprehended by another act of cognition. A lamp is not like this — it is only ever the illuminator, never the illuminated, and its status as illuminator is not established through being illuminated by anything else. For this reason, this analogy cannot properly be applied to direct perception.

If a lamp can illuminate itself without needing a further separate lamp, then a pot too should be able to illuminate itself without needing a separate lamp. If a lamp, its substance being dark, ought to illuminate its own substance without needing a separate lamp to illuminate it, then a pot should likewise be so — a pot's substance being dark, it too should illuminate its own substance, without troubling itself over a separate lamp. If a pot should illuminate itself, then lamp and pot alike should both illuminate themselves without depending on anything else — in which case what difference would remain between a pot and a lamp at all? If a lamp ought not to illuminate itself, since it contains no darkness, then how could it illuminate its own substance, as your analogy requires? If its substance contains no darkness and needs no illumination, then what need is there for illumination at all? And if it does illuminate its own substance, two faults follow: first, its substance would have to contain darkness in order to require illumination — in which case it becomes identical with the pot, which also has darkness; but if it cannot illuminate itself, and the lamp too has darkness, how could it illuminate anything? Second, if illuminator and illuminated are one and the same, being a single substance, then who, finally, would be the illuminator and who the illuminated? Since your lamp analogy cannot be established, the case for direct perception collapses along with it.

Furthermore, a pot is not made of a single color alone but of eight substances combined — yet we see only a single color, so how could a "pot" ever be apprehended? If seeing a single color were itself apprehending a pot, then color alone would be the pot — which shows that to perceive color is not to perceive a pot. And even color itself cannot be established as truly perceived. Why? Because the atom, the "neighbor of emptiness," cannot itself be established. You hold that atoms are permanent and can never be reduced to nothing, and that it is by their aggregation that a visible mass of color is formed — but does a single atom have six sides, or not? If it has six sides, it thereby has six parts; and if it has no six sides, it cannot properly be called a form at all. If it has six parts, it can then be further divided; and if it has sides yet no parts, then all six of its neighboring atoms would have to merge into this one single atom, and the same would have to hold for every atom without limit — in which case no large aggregate mass could ever be formed at all. Again, when sunlight strikes a single atom, does it illuminate only one side, or reach both east and west sides at once? If it illuminates only one side, the atom has parts; if it reaches both sides at once, then it cannot truly have extension at all. Hence we know that spatial parts are unreal, and are, every one, empty. What, then, could ever be directly perceived? And since there is no direct perception to begin with, inference and every other means of valid cognition built upon it must likewise collapse of themselves. Just as self-nature, apart from color and the rest, can never be inferred, so too a pot cannot be inferred. If you say that direct perception must first occur, and inference follows afterward — as one who has previously seen fire together with smoke can, on later seeing smoke alone without seeing fire, infer from that earlier perception that fire is present — this does not hold either. Why? You hold that it is by means of qualities such as color that self-nature is inferred. But if self-nature has never once been directly perceived beforehand, how could one, through color and the rest, infer a pot in just the same way as inferring fire from smoke? Since it has never been directly perceived to begin with, how could seeing color allow one to infer a pot at all? Inference, in other words, depends on direct perception having already occurred — and this cannot be established. Since direct perception cannot be established, inference, analogy, and reliable testimony — every means of valid cognition built upon it — likewise fail. There is a further fault as well: because cause and effect would have no distinguishing difference, inferential cognition itself cannot be established. If you hold that self-nature gives rise to the five subtle elements as its effect — self-nature being the cause, the five subtle elements the effect — then, since the effect already exists within the cause, and the cause remains present within the effect, self-nature is never truly lost even once the five subtle elements have arisen; the five subtle elements' own self-nature was, from the start, identical with it — so that the substance of self-nature and of the five subtle elements is, in the end, one and the same. But if cause and effect have no real difference at all, how could you claim that the five subtle elements allow one to infer self-nature? This would be nothing more than the substance inferring itself — what, then, would such an "inference" even mean?

Next, a further refutation of the Vaiśeṣika should be understood. If you hold that a pot is something different from its color and other qualities, how could such a thing ever be established by direct perception? If a substance apart from color and its other qualities could be directly perceived, then a barren woman's son, bathing in mirage-water, wearing a robe of tortoise-hair, putting on shoes made from a rabbit's horns, wearing a garland of sky-flowers, entering the city of the gandharvas, or sporting with a conjured woman ought likewise to be directly perceivable. And if these cannot be perceived, then a pot, apart from its qualities, cannot be either. Since color and the other qualities do not, in the end, establish it, how could a "pot" exist at all? As with the pot, so with every other means of valid cognition: none can be established, and self-nature, in every case, can nowhere be found. Hence we know that all dharmas, every one, are empty.