Does the Dharmakāya Exist?

Next, the mark of the dharmakāya is spoken of: the stilling of every suffering is the mark of the dharmakāya, for it is the condition on which suffering is stilled. Next, the taste of the dharmakāya is spoken of. "Taste" carries two senses: it is called taste because it is non-retrogressing, and it is called taste because it is blissful. Sentient beings, throughout saṃsāra, have never once seen it, even in their dreams; but if a practitioner of correct conduct seeks to see this dharma, then, at the moment of seeing it, he attains bliss that never retrogresses — hence bliss is taken as its taste. Next, the function of the dharmakāya is spoken of. "Function" here means having signlessness as its function, since the marks of the five aggregates are, within it, utterly extinguished without remainder. It also means having freedom from mental proliferation as its function. Mental proliferation is of three kinds: craving, conceit, and views — these three, the Tathāgata has already utterly extinguished, and hence freedom from mental proliferation is its function. Mental proliferation carries three senses: it is able to obstruct true principle; it is called false and deceptive with respect to the world; and it obstructs and blocks liberation — the first violating the correct object, the second violating correct practice, the third violating correct attainment. Combining these three senses is what is called mental proliferation.

Further, mental proliferation is of nine kinds: general attachment to a self, specific attachment that this is the self, the view that the self will be reborn, the view that the self will not be reborn again, the view that the self will be reborn with form, the view that the self will be reborn without form, the view that the self will be reborn with perception, the view that the self will be reborn without perception, and the view that the self will be reborn into neither-perception-nor-non-perception. As to the first, general attachment: this attaches, generally, to the existence of a self somewhere among the five aggregates, without being able to distinguish whether the self is identical with or separate from them — a diffuse attachment only. As to the second, this-is-the-self: this takes some one of the five aggregates in the present life and attaches to it, specifically, as the self.

As to the third, the view that the self will be reborn: every view falls into one of two kinds, existence or non-existence — holding the view of existence gives rise to attachment to eternalism. Within the view of non-existence, there are, further, two kinds: wrong view, which holds that there is no cause and no effect at all, and denies the three times entirely; and the view of annihilation, which holds that only the present exists, and does not believe in any future. As to the fourth, the view that the self will not be reborn again: this view arises on the basis of the view of annihilation.

As to the fifth, the view that the self will be reborn with form: within the desire and form realms, one takes form as the self — this attachment arises on the basis of the view of eternalism. As to the sixth, the view that the self will be reborn without form: within the formless realm, one takes feeling and the mental dharmas as the self, observing that form has perished while these dharmas have not — this too arises on the basis of eternalism. As to the seventh, the view that the self will be reborn with perception: throughout the three realms, apart from the heaven of no-perception and the peak of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, in every other place one takes perception to be the self. As to the eighth, the view that the self will be reborn without perception: one takes the heaven of no-perception, or even plants and trees, to be the self, on account of their sharing a mind free of perception. As to the ninth, the view that the self will be reborn into neither-perception-nor-non-perception: this takes the peak of existence as the self, regarding perception itself as a fetter and nirvāṇa as a pit — without eliminating perception there is no liberation, since it is a fetter, yet if one eliminates it entirely, one fears losing the self and falling into the pit of nirvāṇa, since perception and self, on this view, cannot be separated. Unable either to discard it or not to discard it, wishing to eliminate it as a fetter, this is called "no perception"; yet fearing the loss of self, one dares not eliminate it entirely, and so it is called "not no-perception" either. It is because of this very confused mind that nirvāṇa cannot be attained — hence all these are called mental proliferation. If one is able to contemplate and realize the dharmakāya, no mental proliferation whatsoever arises again.

Outsider: "What use is there in establishing all these marks and meanings with respect to the dharmakāya? On your own account, the dharmakāya ought to be decisively non-existent, since it cannot be grasped at all. If a thing is not apprehended by any of the six consciousnesses, it is decisively non-existent — as with a rabbit's horns. A rabbit's horns, not being apprehended by any of the six consciousnesses, are decisively non-existent. The dharmakāya is exactly the same — hence the dharmakāya is decisively non-existent. What use, then, is there in all these meanings?"

Answer: "Your claim that the dharmakāya does not exist because it is not seen by the six consciousnesses does not hold. Why? Because nirvāṇa can be realized by means of skillful means. Thought that accords with correct practice is what is called skillful means, and it is by means of this skillful means that the dharmakāya can be known and seen — just as, by means of the meditative power of knowing another's mind, one is able to see the transcendent mind of a sage."

Explanation: the power of knowing another's mind is attained through three causes and conditions — two of them being external means, one being the proper means of the path itself. The two are: by way of the divine ear, and by way of the divine eye. By way of the divine ear, one hears the sounds of another's reflective thought, and thereby comes to know their mind. By way of the divine eye, one is able to see, within the aperture of another's fleshly heart, a watery reflection — black indicating delusion, yellow indicating craving, red indicating anger, blue-white indicating wholesomeness, and pale blue-grey indicating an indeterminate state. It is by means of these two, ear and eye, that one comes to infer another's mind. As to the proper means of the path itself: if one wishes to attain the power of knowing another's mind, one must first take one's own mind as the object. First, one cultivates contemplation without using the present mind to observe the present world, since the mind's own substance cannot be seen at one and the same moment that it is doing the seeing — instead, one uses the present mind to observe a past mind, since a past mind can still be traced and taken as an object, moving from what is more distant to what is nearer, in due sequence, backward through time. At first, one observes an immeasurable number of moments of thought; then, gradually, one narrows this down to a single instant, until, even within that single instant, one attains mastery over one's own mind in contemplation. Only then does one take another person's mind as one's own object, and cultivate contemplation upon it. On first entering this contemplation, one must form a resolved intention, giving rise to a firm resolve. First, one must imaginatively visualize the other person's body, complete with all its physical marks, and then progressively strip away the marks of skin, flesh, and bone, until nothing remains but the mind — cultivating this, ever more finely. Taking hold of that other person's mind, whether sharp or dull, near or far, hurried or slow, one becomes able to see through to it entirely of oneself. Just as one is thus able to see whatever mind is taken as an object, in all its variety, so too, though a sage's own mind lies beyond the reach of the six sense-faculties and their objects, it too can still be seen. The Tathāgata's dharmakāya is exactly the same: though it is not seen by the six consciousnesses, it can nonetheless be known and seen by means of skillful means and correct practice — hence we know it exists, and cannot be equated with non-existence.

Furthermore, there is another sense in which one may know the dharmakāya is not non-existent. Why? Because if the dharmakāya did not exist, then every instance of correct practice would have to come to nothing. Since correct practice takes right view as its guide, and gathers in wholesome dharmas such as discipline, concentration, and wisdom, the correct practice one cultivates is not empty of fruit — and it is because this correct practice is able to attain its fruit that we know the dharmakāya is not non-existent. If you say that the dharmakāya is decisively non-existent, yet correct practice is able to bring about the utter extinction of the five aggregates and sense-fields, and that this shows correct practice is not without fruit — this does not hold. Why? Because, on this reading, nirvāṇa would not truly exist. If the mere absence of the five aggregates were nirvāṇa, then the absence of aggregates in the past and future would equally have to be nirvāṇa — yet this is not, in fact, held to be nirvāṇa. Hence we know that a mere place of the aggregates' absence is not what is called nirvāṇa. And further, if you take this as nirvāṇa, then a person who is insane or drunk ought equally to possess nirvāṇa — yet they do not. Hence we know that a mere place where the aggregates are absent is not nirvāṇa.