Why "All Dharmas Are Unborn" Should Never Be Asserted as a Fixed Thesis
Mahāmati presses a demanding question about how false thought about one thing depends on false thought about something else, with no genuine own-nature findable anywhere along the chain — and how this differs from the noble ones' own direct knowledge of the same reality. The Buddha's answer distinguishes an ordinary person's grasping from a buddha's own unmediated seeing, then turns to a warning worth holding onto for the rest of this sūtra: a bodhisattva should never turn even "all dharmas are unborn" — the very teaching this text has spent three fascicles building toward — into a fixed philosophical thesis to be defended, since a formal assertion this sweeping collapses under the weight of its own logic the moment it is actually proposed.
How False Thought Depends on Own-Nature
大慧復白佛言：「如世尊所說，以彼彼妄想，妄想彼彼性，非有彼自性，但妄想自性耳。」
大慧白佛言：「世尊！若但妄想自性，非性自性相待者，非為世尊如是說煩惱清淨無性過耶？一切法妄想自性，非性故。」
佛告大慧：「如是，如是！如汝所說。大慧！非如愚夫性自性妄想真實。此妄想自性，非有性自性相然。大慧！如聖智有性自性，聖知、聖見、聖慧眼，如是性自性知。」
大慧白佛言：「若使如聖，以聖知、聖見、聖慧眼，非天眼，非肉眼，性自性如是知，非如愚夫妄想。世尊！云何愚夫離是妄想，不覺聖性事故？世尊！彼亦非顛倒，非不顛倒。所以者何？謂：不覺聖事性自性故，不見離有無相故。世尊！聖亦不如是見，如是妄想，不以自相境界為境界故。世尊！彼亦性自性相，妄想自性如是現，不說因無因故，謂墮性相見故。異境界，非如彼等，如是無窮過。世尊！不覺性自性相故。世尊！亦非妄想自性，因性自性相。彼云何妄想非妄想，如實知妄想？世尊！妄想異，自性相異。世尊！不相似因，妄想自性想。彼云何各各不妄想，愚夫不如實知，然為眾生離妄想故，說如妄想相不如實有？世尊！何故遮眾生有無見事自性計著，聖智所行境界計著墮有見，說空法非性，而說聖智自性事？」
佛告大慧：「非我說空法非性，亦不墮有見說聖智自性事，然為令眾生離恐怖句故。眾生無始已來計著性自性相，聖智事自性計著相見，說空法。大慧！我不說性自性相。大慧！但我住自得如實空法，離惑亂相見，離自心現性非性見。得三解脫，如實印所印。於性自性，得緣自覺觀察住，離有無事見相。」
Mahāmati again said to the Buddha: "As the World-Honored One has taught: 'it is by way of that other thing's false thought that this thing's own-nature comes to be falsely conceived — that other thing has, in truth, no own-nature of its own; it is simply the own-nature of false thought.'"
Mahāmati said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, if it is merely the own-nature of false thought, standing opposite [what has] no [fixed] own-nature at all, does the World-Honored One not thereby fall into the fault of saying that affliction and purity alike have no [real] nature? [This would follow] because every dharma's own-nature would then be nothing but false thought, having no [fixed] nature at all."
The Buddha told Mahāmati: "Just so, just so — exactly as you have said. Mahāmati, it is not that the ignorant person's own [supposed] own-nature, which he takes through false thought to be real, is genuine. This own-nature bound up with false thought does not, in fact, possess the mark of any real own-nature at all. Mahāmati, it is only through noble wisdom that own-nature [in the genuine sense] is known — through noble knowing, noble seeing, and the noble wisdom-eye that own-nature is known in just this way."
Mahāmati said to the Buddha: "Granting that it is only through noble knowing, noble seeing, and the noble wisdom-eye — neither the heavenly eye nor the fleshly eye — that own-nature is known in this way, unlike the ignorant person's own false thought, World-Honored One, how does an ignorant person leave this false thought behind, given that he fails to perceive the noble matter of own-nature to begin with? World-Honored One, is he, then, neither in an inverted state nor free of one? Why is this? Because he fails to perceive the noble matter of own-nature, and because he does not see [reality] apart from the mark of existence and non-existence either. World-Honored One, the noble ones, too, do not see [own-nature] in the very same way [an ignorant person's] false thought does, since they do not take their own mark's own domain as an object confronting them at all. World-Honored One, they, too, have the mark of own-nature — and yet the own-nature of false thought equally appears [to the ignorant] — without the difference being explained by saying one has a cause and the other has none, since [that framing] itself falls into the view of [fixed] nature and mark. Their respective domains genuinely differ, [and] not [merely] as those [outsiders would put it, who fall into] just this kind of endless regress. World-Honored One, [the ignorant fail] because they do not perceive the mark of own-nature. World-Honored One, nor is it that the own-nature of false thought itself supplies the mark of a genuine cause and own-nature. How, then, does one come to know false thought as false thought, and to know it exactly as it really is? World-Honored One, false thought differs [from case to case], and the mark of own-nature differs [from case to case] as well. World-Honored One, [and yet] it is through a dissimilar cause that the notion of the own-nature of false thought arises in each case — how, then, does each such case come to be free of false thought, when the ignorant fail to know this in accordance with reality? Yet is it not so that, for the sake of freeing sentient beings from false thought, [the Buddha] teaches that the mark of false thought does not exist exactly as it appears to? World-Honored One, why is it that [the Buddha] restrains sentient beings from the attached view of existence or non-existence with respect to actual matters, and yet [seems to allow] attachment to the domain in which noble wisdom operates to fall into the view of existence — teaching emptiness as having no fixed nature, while still speaking of the very matter of noble wisdom's own-nature?"
The Buddha told Mahāmati: "It is not that I teach emptiness as having no fixed nature, nor do I fall into the view of existence in speaking of the matter of noble wisdom's own-nature — rather, it is so as to free sentient beings from the very terror such phrasings would provoke. Sentient beings, from beginningless time, have been attached to the view of a mark of own-nature, and to the view that even the matter of noble wisdom itself must have such a mark — it is for this that emptiness is taught. Mahāmati, I do not, in fact, teach any mark of own-nature at all. Mahāmati, it is only that I abide in the very emptiness I have realized for myself, exactly as it really is, apart from the view of confusion, apart from the view that what my own mind manifests either has a fixed nature or lacks one. Having attained the three gates of liberation, sealed by the seal of what accords with reality, I abide, with respect to own-nature, in the very observation attained through self-realization alone, apart from the view that fixes on either existence or non-existence as a real matter."
The commentators identify Mahāmati's underlying worry precisely: if false thought is what supplies every dharma's apparent own-nature, does this not mean the Buddha secretly teaches that affliction and purity are equally without real nature — collapsing the very distinction the whole path depends on? "大慧意以一切法無自性，妄想有自性為難" — "Mahāmati's point is to press the difficulty that, if every dharma has no own-nature at all, while false thought itself is treated as having its own [functioning] nature, [something has gone wrong]." The Buddha's answer does not deny the asymmetry Mahāmati has spotted, but relocates it: an ignorant person's supposed "own-nature," which he takes through false thought to be real, is simply not real in the way he takes it to be — but this is entirely different from denying that noble wisdom itself has a genuine object it knows, "非如愚夫性自性妄想真實" ("it is not that the ignorant person's own-nature, taken through false thought to be real, is genuinely real") — the fault lies specifically in the ignorant grasping, not in there being nothing at all for noble wisdom to know.
On why the Buddha explains his own use of the word "emptiness" so carefully here, the commentators locate the entire passage's motive in one line: "眾生聞空生怖、聞有生著，故說聖智自性事以導之...是知說空說有皆為眾生，未常說有實法也" — "sentient beings, hearing of emptiness, grow afraid; hearing of existence, grow attached — hence the matter of noble wisdom's own-nature is spoken of, precisely to guide them past both reactions... one should understand that speaking of emptiness and speaking of existence are both, alike, done entirely for the sake of sentient beings; [the Buddha] has never actually asserted that any real dharma exists in either case." Neither "emptiness" nor "own-nature" is offered here as a settled metaphysical claim; both are calibrated interventions, chosen according to which fear or attachment a given audience is currently caught in.
Why "All Dharmas Are Unborn" Should Never Be a Fixed Thesis
「復次，大慧！一切法不生者，菩薩摩訶薩不應立是宗。所以者何？謂宗一切性非性故，及彼因生相故。說一切法不生宗，彼宗則壞。彼宗一切法不生彼宗壞者，以宗有待而生故。又彼宗不生，入一切法故，不壞相不生故。立一切法不生宗者，彼說則壞。大慧！有無不生宗，彼宗入一切性，有無相不可得。大慧！若使彼宗不生，一切性不生而立宗，如是彼宗壞。以有無性相不生故，不應立宗。五分論多過故，展轉因異相故，及為作故，不應立宗分，謂一切法不生，如是一切法空、如是一切法無自性，不應立宗。大慧！然菩薩摩訶薩，說一切法如幻夢，現不現相故，及見覺過故，當說一切法如幻夢性，除為愚夫離恐怖句故。大慧！愚夫墮有無見，莫令彼恐怖，遠離摩訶衍。」
爾時，世尊欲重宣此義而說偈曰：
「無自性無說， 無事無相續，
彼愚夫妄想， 如死尸惡覺。
一切法不生， 非彼外道宗，
至竟無所生， 性緣所成就。
一切法不生， 慧者不作想，
彼宗因生故， 覺者悉除滅。
譬如翳目視， 妄見垂髮相，
計著性亦然， 愚夫邪妄想。
施設於三有， 無有事自性，
施設事自性， 思惟起妄想。
相事設言教， 意亂極震掉，
佛子能超出， 遠離諸妄想。
非水水相受， 斯從渴愛生，
愚夫如是惑， 聖見則不然。
聖人見清淨， 三脫三昧生，
遠離於生死， 遊行無所畏。
修行無所有， 亦無性非性，
性非性平等， 從是生聖果。
云何性非性？ 云何為平等？
謂彼心不知， 內外極漂動；
若能壞彼者， 心則平等見。」
"Furthermore, Mahāmati, a bodhisattva-mahāsattva should not establish 'all dharmas are unborn' as a fixed thesis. Why is this? Because a thesis about every [fixed] nature being without a nature already presupposes something arising through a cause. To assert 'all dharmas are unborn' as a thesis is for that very thesis to collapse — for the thesis that all dharmas are unborn collapses precisely because any thesis, by its nature, arises only in dependence on something opposed to it. Moreover, that very thesis of non-arising must enter into every dharma without exception — and, since the mark of non-arising cannot itself be destroyed, [it cannot be selectively asserted as a special thesis either]. To establish 'all dharmas are unborn' as a formal thesis is, therefore, for that very assertion to collapse. Mahāmati, [the same holds for] a thesis of non-arising framed around both existence and non-existence together: that thesis, too, must enter into every [fixed] nature, and yet no mark of existence or non-existence can ultimately be apprehended there at all. Mahāmati, were one to establish, as a formal thesis, that non-arising itself is unborn, and that every [fixed] nature is unborn, this thesis, too, would collapse in just the same way — since neither existence nor non-existence, as a fixed nature or mark, is itself unborn [in the sense a thesis requires], no such thesis should be formally established at all. The five-part syllogism carries many faults of its own; the chain of reasoning shifts its own mark at every turn; and [any such formal thesis] still amounts to constructing something — for all these reasons, no thesis-component should be formally established saying 'all dharmas are unborn,' or, likewise, 'all dharmas are empty,' or 'all dharmas have no own-nature.' Mahāmati, a bodhisattva-mahāsattva may nonetheless say that all dharmas are like an illusion or a dream — since they appear and yet, [on examination,] do not truly appear — and, seeing the fault in [ordinary] awareness itself, he may properly teach that all dharmas have the nature of an illusion or a dream, [doing so] solely to free the ignorant from the very terror such phrasing would otherwise provoke. Mahāmati, the ignorant fall into the view of existence and non-existence — do not let them be so terrified [by a bare denial of everything] that they turn away from the Mahāyāna altogether."
Then the World-Honored One, wishing to restate this meaning, spoke in verse: "Without own-nature, without any teaching of it, without any actual matter, without any continuity —
the ignorant person's own false thought is like a corpse's own senseless awareness.
That all dharmas are unborn is not the outsiders' own thesis at all;
to the very end, nothing whatsoever is truly born — [what appears] is accomplished through nature and condition together.
That all dharmas are unborn is not something the wise ever turn into a fixed notion;
for that very thesis would still arise through a cause — and it is precisely this that the awakened entirely dissolve.
It is like a diseased eye's own sight, falsely seeing strands of floating hair;
attachment to a fixed nature is just the same — the ignorant person's own deluded false thought.
The three realms of existence are themselves provisionally established, with no actual matter possessing its own nature at all;
and provisionally positing that actual matters do have such a nature is itself what gives rise, through deliberation, to false thought.
Setting forth teaching by way of mark and matter leaves the mind confused and violently shaken;
only the Buddha's own children are able to pass entirely beyond this, far removed from every kind of false thought.
Mistaking what is not water for water is born from nothing but one's own thirst and craving;
the ignorant are confused in just this way — the noble ones' own seeing is not like this at all.
The noble ones see purity itself, from which the three gates of liberation and samādhi both arise;
far removed from birth-and-death, they wander freely, without any fear at all.
Practicing what has nothing at all, and likewise apart from both a nature and its absence,
nature and the absence of nature made equal — it is from this alone that the noble fruit is born.
What, then, is meant by 'nature' and 'the absence of nature'? What is meant by 'equality'?
It is that the mind, not knowing this, is tossed about, violently, both within and without;
should one be able to dismantle that very tossing, mind itself would see this equality directly."
The commentators lay out precisely why turning "all dharmas are unborn" into a formal thesis is self-undermining, tracing the argument through three distinct failures: "凡言不生，必因生立，既有待對，則不生成生，自壞不生義，其不應立宗一也...又彼宗不生，必入一切法中...其不應立宗二也...性即法也，謂有無不生亦遍一切法中，皆離有無之相...其不應立宗三也" — "whatever is spoken of as 'unborn' must, by the very act of asserting it, stand opposite something born — and once there is this opposition, the unborn itself becomes one more instance of something arising [as a counter-thesis], destroying its own meaning of non-arising: this is the first reason no such thesis should be formally established... moreover, that very thesis of non-arising must enter into every dharma without exception, [including the thesis-act itself]: this is the second reason... [and even reframing it around] existence and non-existence, both alike unborn, must likewise pervade every dharma, apart from any mark of existence or non-existence at all: this is the third reason." A formal philosophical thesis requires a position and its opposite to argue against; "unborn" applied universally and without exception leaves nothing standing on the other side for the thesis to be a thesis about — which is precisely why the sūtra insists it be lived and taught as a description, illustrated through similes like illusion and dream, rather than formally asserted and defended the way the outsiders defend their own twenty-five principles or nine transformations.
On why the Buddha nonetheless permits teaching "all dharmas are like an illusion or a dream" even after ruling out the formal thesis of non-arising, the commentators draw the distinction cleanly: "上既斥立宗之非，此顯其是...蓋愚夫墮於有無之見，不說如幻如夢不能離彼二見" — "having just refuted the fault of formally establishing a thesis, this passage now shows what is, by contrast, proper... since the ignorant have already fallen into the view of existence and non-existence, unless one speaks of illusion and dream, they cannot be freed from those two views at all." A simile is not a thesis defended by formal argument; it is a skillful description offered for a specific therapeutic purpose, withdrawn the moment it has done its work — which is exactly why it escapes the self-undermining trap a formally asserted "all dharmas are unborn" cannot avoid.
Part 29 Complete
This closes Part 29: the difference between an ignorant person's false-thought "own-nature" and the genuine own-nature known only through noble wisdom, and the sharp warning that even "all dharmas are unborn" — this sūtra's own central teaching — becomes self-defeating the moment it is formally asserted as a philosophical thesis, since any such thesis requires an opposing position to stand against, which the claim of universal non-arising cannot coherently supply. Part 30 turns to a searching cross-examination of what it actually means for wisdom to "not apprehend" its object, working through five possible explanations one by one before the Buddha corrects the entire premise behind the question.
Continue to Part 30 →