Is the Tathāgata Made or Unmade?
Fascicle Four opens with Mahāmati asking, without preamble, whether the Tathāgata's own true and complete enlightenment is something made or unmade, a cause or an effect, a mark or what bears a mark, speech or what is spoken, awareness or what is aware — and whether these paired terms are identical or different. The Buddha's answer works through each pair and finds both horns flawed: calling the Tathāgata "made" would make him impermanent, calling him "unmade" would make every skillful means an empty gesture. The same logic runs through mark and mark-bearer, wisdom and its object, all the way down to a single chain — apartness from measure, then from speech, then from arising, then from ceasing, ending in buddhahood itself.
Is the Tathāgata Made or Unmade?
爾時，大慧菩薩白佛言：「世尊！唯願為說三藐三佛陀。我及餘菩薩摩訶薩，善於如來自性，自覺覺他。」
佛告大慧：「恣所欲問，我當為汝隨所問說。」
大慧白佛言：「世尊！如來、應供、等正覺，為作耶？為不作耶？為事耶？為因耶？為相耶？為所相耶？為說耶？為所說耶？為覺耶？為所覺耶？如是等辭句，為異為不異？」
佛告大慧：「如來、應供、等正覺，於如是等辭句，非事，非因。所以者何？俱有過故。大慧！若如來是事者，或作或無常。無常故，一切事應是如來。我及諸佛，皆所不欲。若非所作者，無所得故，方便則空，同於兔角、般大之子，以無所有故。大慧！若無事無因者，則非有非無。若非有非無，則出於四句。四句者，是世間言說。若出四句者，則不墮四句。不墮故，智者所取。一切如來句義亦如是，慧者當知。如我所說，一切法無我。當知此義，無我性是無我。一切法有自性，無他性，如牛馬。大慧！譬如非牛馬性、馬牛性。其實非有非無，彼非無自相。如是，大慧！一切諸法，非無自相有自相，但非無我愚夫之所能知。以妄想故，如是一切法空，無生，無自性。當如是知。如是如來與陰，非異非不異。若不異陰者，應是無常。若異者，方便則空。若二者，應有異。如牛角，相似故不異；長短差別故有異。一切法亦如是。大慧！如牛右角異左角，左角異右角，如是長短種種色各各異。大慧！如來於陰、界、入，非異非不異。如是如來解脫，非異非不異。如是如來以解脫名說。若如來異解脫者，應色相成；色相成故，應無常。若不異者，修行者得相應無分別，而修行者見分別。是故非異非不異。如是智及爾炎，非異非不異。大慧！智及爾炎，非異非不異者，非常非無常，非作非所作，非有為非無為，非覺非所覺，非相非所相，非陰非異陰，非說非所說，非一非異，非俱非不俱。非一非異，非俱非不俱故，悉離一切量(見聞覺識識名為量)。離一切量，則無言說。無言說，則無生。無生，則無滅。無滅，則寂滅。寂滅，則自性涅槃。自性涅槃，則無事無因。無事無因，則無攀緣。無攀緣，則出過一切虛偽。出過一切虛偽，則是如來。如來則是三藐三佛陀。大慧！是名三藐三佛陀。佛陀者，離一切根量。」
Then Mahāmati Bodhisattva said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, I beg you to teach true and complete enlightenment, so that I and the other bodhisattva-mahāsattvas may be skilled in the Tathāgata's own own-nature, and may thereby awaken both ourselves and others."
The Buddha told Mahāmati: "Ask freely whatever you wish; I shall answer whatever you ask."
Mahāmati said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, is the Tathāgata, the Worthy One, the Truly and Fully Enlightened One, something made, or unmade? Is he a matter, or a cause? A mark, or what bears that mark? Speech, or what is spoken? Awareness, or what is aware? Are terms such as these identical, or are they different?"
The Buddha told Mahāmati: "With respect to terms such as these, the Tathāgata, the Worthy One, the Truly and Fully Enlightened One, is neither a matter nor a cause. Why is this? Because both alternatives carry their own fault. Mahāmati, if the Tathāgata were a matter, he would either be something made, or something impermanent; and, being impermanent, every matter whatsoever would then have to be the Tathāgata — this is something neither I nor any buddha desires at all. If he were not something made, then nothing at all could be attained through him, and every skillful means would be empty, no different from a rabbit's horns or a barren woman's child, since there would be nothing there at all. Mahāmati, if he were neither a matter nor a cause, he would be neither existent nor non-existent; and, being neither existent nor non-existent, he would step outside the four extremes altogether. The four extremes are themselves merely worldly speech. Stepping outside the four extremes, he does not fall into any of them — and, not falling into them, this is precisely what the wise take hold of. Every term applied to the Tathāgata should be understood by the wise in just this same way. As I have taught, every dharma is without self — one should understand that this means the very nature of no-self is itself no-self. Every dharma has its own own-nature, and no other's nature, just as with an ox and a horse. Mahāmati, it is like [saying] there is no nature of an ox in a horse, nor a nature of a horse in an ox — in truth, [each] is neither existent nor non-existent, and yet each is not without its own mark either. Just so, Mahāmati, no dharma is without its own mark, and yet each does have its own mark — only this is simply not something the ignorant, lacking [true realization of] no-self, are able to know, on account of their own false thought. In just this way, every dharma is empty, unborn, and without own-nature — one should understand this accordingly. Just so, the Tathāgata is neither different from the aggregates nor not different from them. Were he not different from the aggregates, he would have to be impermanent; were he different from them, every skillful means would be empty; and were he simply two separate things together with them, there would have to be some [further, discoverable] difference between them. It is like an ox's horns: because they resemble one another, they are not different; because they differ in length, they are different. Every dharma is just the same. Mahāmati, just as an ox's right horn differs from its left, and its left differs from its right, so too do things of every length and every kind differ, each from the other. Mahāmati, the Tathāgata is neither different from the aggregates, elements, and sense-fields, nor not different from them. Just so, the Tathāgata is neither different from liberation, nor not different from it; and it is on this very basis that the Tathāgata is spoken of by the name 'liberation.' Were the Tathāgata different from liberation, he would have to be constituted by form and mark, and, being so constituted, would have to be impermanent; were he not different from liberation, then a practitioner who attains correspondence with it would have to be free of all discrimination — and yet a practitioner still does see discrimination. It is for this reason that he is neither different nor not different. Just so, wisdom and the knowable are neither different nor not different. Mahāmati, wisdom and the knowable, being neither different nor not different, are neither permanent nor impermanent, neither a making nor a made thing, neither conditioned nor unconditioned, neither an awareness nor what that awareness is aware of, neither a mark nor what bears that mark, neither an aggregate nor apart from the aggregates, neither speech nor what is spoken, neither one nor different, neither both together nor neither. Because they are neither one nor different, neither both together nor neither, they are entirely apart from every measure (seeing, hearing, awareness, and consciousness's own knowing are called 'measure'). Being apart from every measure, there is no speech. Being without speech, there is no arising. Being unborn, there is no ceasing. Being unceasing, there is utter stillness. Being utterly still, this is nirvāṇa as one's own nature. Being nirvāṇa as one's own nature, there is neither matter nor cause. Being without matter or cause, there is nothing to be grasped at all. Having nothing to be grasped, this passes entirely beyond every falsehood. Passing entirely beyond every falsehood, this is precisely the Tathāgata. The Tathāgata is precisely true and complete enlightenment. Mahāmati, this is what is called true and complete enlightenment. The Enlightened One is one apart from every measure of the senses."
The commentators trace the entire passage's method as a single sustained argument that both horns of every paired question carry their own distinct fault, never resolving the pair by choosing one side: "若如來是事者，或作或無常...若非所作者，無所得故，方便則空" — "if the Tathāgata were a matter, he would be either something made or something impermanent... if he were not something made at all, then nothing could be attained through him, and every skillful means would be empty." Neither horn of "made or unmade" survives scrutiny — the first collapses the Tathāgata into just one more impermanent thing among others, while the second empties every buddha's compassionate activity of any real effect at all. The commentators note this same double-refutation runs through every subsequent pair — Tathāgata and the aggregates, Tathāgata and liberation, wisdom and its object — each resolved not by picking a side but by showing both sides fail for structurally identical reasons.
On the ox-horn simile illustrating "neither different nor not different," the commentators draw out precisely what work the image is doing: "如牛角相似故不異、長短差別故有異，一切法亦如是" — "just as an ox's horns are not different from each other because they resemble one another, and yet are different because they differ in length, every dharma is exactly the same." The Tathāgata and the aggregates are like the two horns of a single ox — sharing a single underlying reality closely enough that "different" fails to capture the relationship, while still admitting a real, describable distinction closely enough that "not different" fails just as badly. On the closing chain running from apartness-from-measure down to buddhahood, the commentators are explicit it culminates not in a further attribute added to the Tathāgata but in the collapse of every attribute-language at once: "惟一法身逈然獨立，不見諸法為所攀緣，故出一切虛偽，名為如來三藐三佛陀" — "it is only the dharma-body, standing utterly alone, seeing no dharma at all as something to be grasped, that thereby passes beyond every falsehood — and this alone is what is named the Tathāgata's own true and complete enlightenment."
The Closing Verse
爾時，世尊欲重宣此義而說偈言：
「悉離諸根量， 無事亦無因，
已離覺所覺， 亦離相所相。
陰緣等正覺， 一異莫能見，
若無有見者， 云何而分別？
非作非不作， 非事亦非因，
非陰不在陰， 亦非有餘雜，
亦非有諸性， 如彼妄想見。
當知亦非無， 此法法自爾，
以有故有無， 以無故有有；
若無不應受， 若有不應想。
或於我非我， 言說量留連，
沈溺於二邊， 自壞壞世間。
解脫一切過， 正觀察我通，
是名為正觀， 不毀大導師。」
Then the World-Honored One, wishing to restate this meaning, spoke in verse:
"Entirely apart from every measure of the senses, without matter and without cause,
already apart from the aware and what it is aware of, and apart, too, from the mark and what bears that mark.
The aggregates, and their conditions, and true enlightenment itself — no identity, no difference can be found there at all;
and where there is no one there to see [either], how could any discrimination even be made?
Neither a making nor a not-making, neither a matter nor a cause,
neither the aggregates nor apart from the aggregates, nor is there anything further mixed in besides;
nor does it have any [fixed] nature at all, the way that deluded false thought would see it.
And yet know, too, that it is not nothing at all — this dharma is simply as it is, of itself;
it is because of existence that non-existence comes to be spoken of, and because of non-existence that existence comes to be spoken of;
if it were nothing, one ought not to accept it; if it were something, one ought not to conceive of it.
Whether lingering over 'self' or 'not-self,' held fast by the mere measure of speech,
one thereby sinks into one of the two extremes, destroying both oneself and the world along with it.
Liberated from every fault, rightly observing what I myself have penetrated —
this alone is called right observation, and does not slander the great guide."
The commentators single out the couplet warning that non-observation does not mean non-existence, tracing its logic to the pairing of terms itself: "以有故無、以無故有，此有無相待而立。有無既各無自體，豈應取著" — "'non-existence' is spoken of because of 'existence,' and 'existence' because of 'non-existence' — the pair stands only in mutual dependence on one another. Since neither existence nor non-existence has any independent essence of its own, why should either be grasped at?" Existence and non-existence are not two independent facts about the Tathāgata, one of which must be true; they are terms that only make sense paired against each other, which is exactly why the verse insists neither acceptance nor conception is the right response to either one.
On the closing line's warning against "slandering the great guide," the commentators locate the specific failure the whole passage has been building toward: "其或未了二我本空，滯於言說，此乃溺於有無二見，非獨自壞亦且壞他，何由出於生死" — "should one fail to understand that the two kinds of self are, from the outset, empty, and instead remain stuck on the mere level of speech, this is to sink into the two views of existence and non-existence — destroying not only oneself but others as well, with no way out of birth-and-death left open at all." Getting this particular question wrong is not a minor doctrinal slip; misreading the Tathāgata's own nature, in either direction, reproduces the very two-extreme trap this entire sūtra has spent three fascicles working to dismantle — which is why the commentators treat "right observation" here as identical with actually honoring, rather than slandering, the teacher who taught it.
Part 34 Complete
This closes Part 34: Mahāmati's ten-fold question about whether the Tathāgata is made or unmade, resolved by showing every paired term fails on both sides at once, dissolving into a single chain running from apartness-from-measure through apartness-from-speech, apartness-from-arising, and apartness-from-ceasing, down to buddhahood itself. Part 35 turns to a related question the Buddha has already used freely: why "unborn and unceasing" is not merely a description of reality but one of the Tathāgata's own names — and the astonishing number of other names, drawn from every tradition Mahāmati's own world would recognize, that name the very same reality without multiplying it at all.
Continue to Part 35 — The Tathāgata's Many Names →