Is the Tathāgata Permanent or Impermanent?
Mahāmati asks the most direct question yet: is the Tathāgata himself permanent, or impermanent? The Buddha's answer refuses both horns of the question at once, and does so by tracing out exactly what goes wrong with each: calling him "permanent" makes him nothing more than the outsiders' own permanent creator-self, and calling him "impermanent" makes him a conditioned thing that perishes the way a clay pot does. Yet the Buddha does not simply leave the question suspended — he goes on to explain the one sense in which "permanent" can rightly be said of him, a sense neither trap can touch.
Neither Permanent Nor Impermanent: Refuting Both Extremes
爾時，大慧菩薩復白佛言：「世尊！如來、應供、等正覺，為常無常？」佛告大慧：「如來、應供、等正覺，非常非無常。謂二俱有過。常者，有作主過。常者，一切外道說作者。無所作，是故如來常非常，非作常有過故。若如來無常者，有作無常過。陰所相，相無性，陰壞則應斷，而如來不斷。大慧！一切所作皆無常，如瓶衣等，一切皆無常過。一切智眾具方便應無義，以所作故。一切所作皆應是如來，無差別因性故。是故，大慧！如來非常非無常。「復次，大慧！如來非如虛空常。如虛空常者，自覺聖智眾具無義過。大慧！譬如虛空，非常非無常。離常無常、一異、俱不俱、常無常過，故不可說。是故如來非常。「復次，大慧！若如來無生常者，如兔馬等角。以無生常故，方便無義。以無生常過故。如來非常。
At that time, Mahāmati Bodhisattva again said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, is the Tathāgata, the Worthy One, the Truly and Fully Enlightened One, permanent, or impermanent?" The Buddha told Mahāmati: "The Tathāgata, the Worthy One, the Truly and Fully Enlightened One, is neither permanent nor impermanent — for both alternatives carry their own fault. As for 'permanent': this carries the fault of positing a maker, a lord — for it is precisely 'permanent' that every outsider uses to describe their own agent-creator. [The Tathāgata] has no such maker at all, and it is for this reason that the Tathāgata's 'permanence' is not [that kind of] permanence, since a permanence tied to a maker carries this very fault. Were the Tathāgata impermanent, this would carry the fault of being something made — bearing the mark of the aggregates, a mark with no fixed nature of its own, so that when the aggregates are destroyed, [the Tathāgata] ought likewise to be cut off — and yet the Tathāgata is never cut off. Mahāmati, everything that is made is impermanent, the way a vase or a garment is — everything made carries this very fault of impermanence. Were this so, then every skillful means and every meritorious equipment belonging to omniscience would be rendered meaningless, precisely because they too would be something 'made' — and everything made would then have to be the Tathāgata as well, since there would be no differentiating cause between them. It is for this reason, Mahāmati, that the Tathāgata is neither permanent nor impermanent. Furthermore, Mahāmati, the Tathāgata is not permanent the way space is permanent — for were he permanent in that way, his own self-realized noble wisdom and its meritorious equipment would be rendered meaningless. Mahāmati, space itself, for instance, is neither permanent nor impermanent, being apart from the very faults of permanent, impermanent, the same, different, both, and neither — and, for this reason, it cannot even be spoken of at all. It is for this reason that the Tathāgata is not 'permanent' [in that sense]. Furthermore, Mahāmati, were the Tathāgata permanent in the sense of being simply unborn, he would be like the horns of a hare or a horse — and, being permanent through mere unborn non-existence in that way, every skillful means [he employs to benefit beings] would be rendered meaningless. It is because of this very fault of an unborn kind of permanence that the Tathāgata is not 'permanent' [in that sense either].
The commentators explain why the Buddha rejects "permanent" so quickly, tying it directly to the outsiders' own doctrine of a permanent self: "若如來是常者，則同外道計神我為能作之常。主，即神我也。而如來言常者無所作，故常而非常，非彼有作之常而有過也" — "were the Tathāgata permanent [in the ordinary sense], he would be the same as the outsiders' notion of a permanent, agent-creating self. The 'lord' here means precisely this self. But when the Tathāgata is said to be 'permanent,' he has no maker at all — so his permanence is permanent yet not that kind of permanence, free of the fault that belongs to a permanence tied to an agent." And on why "impermanent" is refused just as quickly: "若如來無常者，是有所作，同於五陰，為有相之所相，其相無性，故陰壞應斷，而如來之常則不斷也" — "were the Tathāgata impermanent, he would be something made, the same as the five aggregates, marked by a mark that has no fixed nature of its own — so that when the aggregates are destroyed, he too ought to be cut off; yet the Tathāgata's own permanence is never cut off." Each of the two ordinary options quietly imports an entire wrong metaphysics along with it — one makes the Tathāgata a creator-god, the other makes him a compounded object subject to decay — which is exactly why neither can be affirmed.
On why even space, and the horns of a hare, are raised and then dismissed as models for the Tathāgata's permanence, the commentators note these forestall two further, subtler mistakes: "若是常者，應如虛空，不待因成。然自覺聖智乃如來修德究顯，則無是過...又復若是常者，則是無生，如免馬等角本來無生，則無方便益物之義" — "were he permanent, he ought to be like space, requiring no cause to bring it about. Yet self-realized noble wisdom is precisely the ultimate manifestation of the Tathāgata's own cultivated virtue, and so does not carry this fault... and again, were he permanent [merely by being unborn], this would make him unborn the way a hare's or horse's horns are unborn from the start — in which case, there would be no meaningful skillful means left by which to benefit beings at all." Space is permanent by simply never having been produced by anything, and a hare's horns are 'permanent' only because they never existed to begin with — neither model can accommodate a Tathāgata whose wisdom was genuinely cultivated and who genuinely acts to benefit beings, so both are set aside along with the cruder options before them.
The One Sense in Which the Tathāgata Is Permanent
「復次，大慧！更有餘事知如來常。所以者何？謂無間所得智常，故如來常。大慧！若如來出世，若不出世，法畢定住。聲聞、緣覺、諸佛如來，無間住，不住虛空，亦非愚夫之所覺知。大慧！如來所得智，是般若所熏。大慧！如來非心、意、意識、彼諸陰、界、入處所熏。大慧！一切三有，皆是不實妄想所生；如來不從不實虛妄想生。大慧！以二法故，有常無常，非不二。不二者寂靜，一切法無二生相故。是故如來、應供、等正覺，非常非無常。大慧！乃至言說分別生，則有常無常過。分別覺滅者，則離愚夫常無常見，寂靜慧者，永離常無常，非常無常熏。」爾時，世尊欲重宣此義而說偈言：「眾具無義者， 生常無常過，若無分別覺， 永離常無常。從其所立宗， 則有眾雜義，等觀自心量， 言說不可得。」
Furthermore, Mahāmati, there is a further matter by which the Tathāgata's permanence can be known. Why is this? It is because the wisdom ceaselessly attained is itself permanent, and this is why the Tathāgata is permanent. Mahāmati, whether or not the Tathāgata appears in the world, this Dharma abides fixed and unchanging throughout. The śrāvaka, the pratyekabuddha, and every buddha-tathāgata dwell within it ceaselessly — it does not dwell as [bare] empty space does, nor is it something the foolish and ignorant are able to be aware of. Mahāmati, the wisdom the Tathāgata attains is habituated by prajñā itself. Mahāmati, the Tathāgata is not habituated by mind, will, consciousness, or by the aggregates, sense-realms, and sense-fields. Mahāmati, every one of the three realms of existence is produced entirely from unreal false thought — but the Tathāgata is not produced from unreal, false thought at all. Mahāmati, it is because of these two [different] dharmas that 'permanent' and 'impermanent' are spoken of at all — this is not [what is meant by] 'non-dual.' What is non-dual is itself stillness, since no dharma at all bears the mark of a dual arising. It is for this reason that the Tathāgata, the Worthy One, the Truly and Fully Enlightened One, is neither permanent nor impermanent. Mahāmati, the very moment speech and discrimination arise, the fault of [fixing] 'permanent' or 'impermanent' follows with it. Once discriminating awareness itself ceases, one is thereby apart from the foolish and ignorant's own view of permanence and impermanence — and one whose wisdom has become still is forever apart from permanence and impermanence, no longer habituated by either 'permanent' or 'impermanent' at all." At that time, wishing to restate this meaning once more, the World-Honored One spoke in verse: "Meritorious equipment rendered meaningless — this is the very fault that gives rise to [fixing] permanence and impermanence; but were there no discriminating awareness at all, one would be forever apart from permanence and impermanence. From whatever tenet one takes as one's own foundation, a whole manifold host of entangled meanings follows — but observing, with equanimity, that this is simply the measure of one's own mind, not even speech itself can be apprehended there."
The commentators are careful to show this is not a contradiction of everything just said, but a shift to a different register entirely: "上云非常非無常，乃據性德圓離。然如來稱性圓證，亦得言常。言無間所得智者，謂究竟始覺無礙智也" — "the preceding statement that he is 'neither permanent nor impermanent' was made on the basis of his own nature and virtue being perfectly free [of both extremes]. Yet since the Tathāgata's realization perfectly matches his own nature, he may also, in that sense, rightly be called 'permanent.' By 'the wisdom ceaselessly attained,' what is meant is the unobstructed wisdom of ultimate original awakening." The refusal to say "permanent" earlier and the affirmation of "permanent" here are not two different answers to the same question — the first refused a permanence built on being an agent, a compounded thing, empty space, or mere non-existence, while this second affirms a permanence that belongs to wisdom itself, prior to any of those categories.
On the closing distinction between "two dharmas" and "non-dual," the commentators locate the entire resolution in a single move: "言二法者，謂虛妄生、真實生二法也...如來究竟實理，理本非常、非無常。但言常者，言偏意圓，然如來所證之常即無常" — "'the two dharmas' means the dharma of false arising and the dharma of true arising. The Tathāgata's ultimate real principle is, in itself, neither permanent nor impermanent to begin with. When 'permanent' alone is spoken of, the words are one-sided even though the meaning is complete — for the very permanence the Tathāgata has realized is itself impermanence [in the ordinary, dualistic sense of the term]." The entire passage's apparent tension — permanent in one breath, neither permanent nor impermanent in the next — dissolves once "permanent" is heard, in this final use, as pointing past the pair itself rather than picking one side of it.
Part 41 Complete
This closes Part 41: the Tathāgata shown to be neither permanent (which would make him an outsider's creator-self) nor impermanent (which would make him a perishable compounded thing), and the one sense in which he can rightly be called permanent — through the wisdom ceaselessly attained, a permanence that belongs to stillness itself rather than to either side of the pair. Part 42 turns to one of this sūtra's most celebrated passages: Mahāmati's question about how the aggregates, elements, and sense-fields arise and cease if there is truly no self, opening the Buddha's teaching on the tathāgatagarbha as the storehouse-consciousness itself.
Continue to Part 42 — The Tathāgatagarbha as the Storehouse-Consciousness →