Does Milk Contain Curd?
Lion's Roar presses his hardest line of questioning yet: is buddha-nature already, secretly present in every being — the way curd is said to already be present in milk — or does it come to exist only through cultivation, the way curd comes to exist only through the dairyman's own work? Neither answer alone will do, and the ensuing debate ranges from a knife's reflection to an unhatched chick, from a king's forgotten curse to a nyagrodha seed no eye can find a tree inside, before turning to the reasons a bodhisattva falls back from the path, the extraordinary vow of one who never will, and the karmic history behind each of the thirty-two marks.
The Amra Fruit, and Two Kinds of Precept-Keeping
◎爾時師子吼菩薩摩訶薩白佛言:「世尊!如先所說,菴羅果喻四種人等。有人行細,心不正實。有人心細,行不正實。有人心細,行亦正實。有人心不細,行不正實。是初二種,云何可知?如佛所說,雖依是二,不可得知。」佛言:「善哉,善哉!善男子!菴羅果喻二種人等,實難可知。以難知故,我經中說,當與共住;住若不知,當與久處;久處不知,當以智慧;智若不知,當深觀察;以觀察故,則知持戒及以破戒。善男子!具是四事,共住、久處、智慧、觀察,然後得知持戒破戒。善男子!戒有二種,持戒亦二:一究竟戒、二不究竟。有人以因緣故受持禁戒,智者當觀是人持戒,為為利養?為究竟持?善男子!如來戒者無有因緣,是故得名為究竟戒。以是義故,菩薩雖為諸惡眾生之所傷害,不生恚礙,是故如來得名成就畢竟持戒、究竟持戒。善男子!我昔一時,與舍利弗及五百弟子,俱共止住摩伽陀國瞻婆大城。時有獵師追逐一鴿,是鴿惶怖,至舍利弗影,猶故戰慄如芭蕉樹,至我影中身心安隱,恐怖得除。是故當知如來世尊畢竟持戒,乃至身影猶有是力。善男子!不究竟戒,尚不能得聲聞緣覺,何況能得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提?
At that time, Lion's Roar Bodhisattva Mahāsattva said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, as was said before, the amra fruit gives a simile for four kinds of people: one whose conduct is refined, yet whose mind is not upright and true; one whose mind is refined, yet whose conduct is not upright and true; one whose mind is refined, and whose conduct, too, is upright and true; and one whose mind is not refined, and whose conduct, too, is not upright and true. How, then, can one come to know which of the first two kinds a given person is? As the Buddha himself has said, though one relies upon these two categories, one still cannot come to know for certain." The Buddha said: "Excellent, excellent! Good son, the amra fruit's two harder kinds of people are, in truth, difficult indeed to know. Because they are so difficult to know, I teach, within my own scriptures: one ought to dwell together with such a person; should dwelling together not reveal it, one ought to remain with him for a long time; should remaining with him for a long time not reveal it, one ought to apply wisdom; should wisdom not reveal it, one ought to observe deeply — and it is through this deep observation that one comes to know whether he upholds the precepts or breaks them. Good son, it is only once these four things — dwelling together, remaining long, applying wisdom, and deep observation — are all complete that one comes to know whether the precepts are upheld or broken. Good son, the precepts are of two kinds, and precept-keeping, likewise, is of two kinds: final, and not yet final. There is a person who upholds the precepts on account of some particular cause and condition — the wise ought to observe of this person whether he upholds them for the sake of gain, or upholds them all the way to their final completion. Good son, the Tathāgata's own precept-keeping has no cause or condition behind it at all, and it is for this very reason that it may be named final precept-keeping. It is for this very reason that, though a bodhisattva is harmed by every kind of evil being, he gives rise to no resentment or obstruction at all, and it is for this very reason that the Tathāgata may be named one who has accomplished ultimate precept-keeping, final precept-keeping. Good son, I once dwelt together with Śāriputra and five hundred disciples in the great city of Campā, in the land of Magadha. At that time, there was a hunter pursuing a single dove — the dove, terrified, fled into Śāriputra's own shadow, and yet still trembled there like a plantain tree; only upon entering my own shadow did its body and mind find peace, and its terror was entirely removed. One should therefore know that the Tathāgata, the World-Honored One, possesses final precept-keeping to such a degree that even the mere shadow of his body carries this very power. Good son, precept-keeping that is not yet final cannot even attain the fruit of the śrāvaka or the pratyekabuddha — how much less could it attain unsurpassed, complete awakening?
「復有二種:一為利養,二為正法。為利養故,受持禁戒,當知是戒不見佛性及以如來,雖聞佛性及如來名,猶不得名為聞見也。若為正法受持禁戒,當知是戒能見佛性及以如來,是名眼見,亦名聞見。復有二種:一者根深難拔,二者根淺易動。若能修習空無相願,是名根深難拔。若不修習是三三昧,雖復修習為二十五有,是名根淺易動。復有二種:一為自身,二為眾生。為眾生者,能見佛性及以如來。持戒之人復有二種:一者性自能持,二者須他教勅。若受戒已,經無量世初不漏失,或值惡國、遇惡知識、惡時、惡世,聞邪惡法、邪見同止。爾時雖無受戒之法,修持如本,無所毀犯,是名性自能持。若遇師僧白四羯磨,然後得戒,雖得戒已,要憑和上、諸師、同學、善友誨喻,乃知進止,聽法說法備諸威儀,是名須他教勅。善男子!性能持者,眼見佛性及以如來,亦名聞見。戒復有二:一聲聞戒,二菩薩戒。從初發心乃至得成阿耨多羅三藐三菩提,是名菩薩戒。若觀白骨乃至證得阿羅漢果,是名聲聞戒。若有受持聲聞戒者,當知是人不見佛性及以如來。若有受持菩薩戒者,當知是人得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提,能見佛性、如來、涅槃。」
"There are, further, two kinds: for the sake of gain, and for the sake of the true Dharma. Should one uphold the precepts for the sake of gain, know that this precept-keeping does not see buddha-nature or the Tathāgata — though he may hear the name of buddha-nature and of the Tathāgata, this still cannot be named seeing through hearing. Should one uphold the precepts for the sake of the true Dharma, know that this precept-keeping is able to see buddha-nature and the Tathāgata — this is named seeing with the eye, and also named seeing through hearing. There are, further, two kinds: roots deep and hard to uproot, and roots shallow and easily shaken. One who is able to cultivate the three samādhis of emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness has roots deep and hard to uproot. One who does not cultivate these three samādhis, though he may still cultivate the twenty-five states of existence, has roots shallow and easily shaken. There are, further, two kinds: for one's own sake, and for the sake of beings. One who upholds them for the sake of beings is able to see buddha-nature and the Tathāgata. One who upholds the precepts is, further, of two kinds: one whose very nature is able to uphold them of itself, and one who requires the instruction of others. Should one, having received the precepts, pass through countless lifetimes without ever once lapsing — even encountering an evil land, an evil companion, an evil time, an evil age, hearing wicked and evil teachings, and dwelling among those of wrong view — and yet, at such a time, though there be no formal precept to hold him to it, still cultivate and uphold them exactly as before, violating nothing at all, this is named one whose very nature is able to uphold them of itself. Should one instead receive the precepts only through a formal assembly of monks and the fourfold proclamation, and, having received them, still need to rely upon the guidance of his preceptor, his teachers, his fellow students, and good friends in order to know how to proceed, and to be fully equipped with proper bearing in listening to and teaching the Dharma, this is named one who requires the instruction of others. Good son, one whose very nature is able to uphold the precepts sees buddha-nature and the Tathāgata with the eye, and this is also named seeing through hearing. The precepts are, further, of two kinds: the śrāvaka's precepts, and the bodhisattva's precepts. From the very first arising of the mind of awakening all the way through the attainment of unsurpassed, complete awakening is named the bodhisattva's precepts. Contemplating the bare skeleton all the way through to the attainment of the fruit of arhatship is named the śrāvaka's precepts. Should one uphold the śrāvaka's precepts, know that this person does not see buddha-nature or the Tathāgata. Should one uphold the bodhisattva's precepts, know that this person attains unsurpassed, complete awakening, and is able to see buddha-nature, the Tathāgata, and nirvāṇa."
師子吼菩薩言:「世尊!何因緣故,受持禁戒?」佛言:「善男子!為心不悔故。何故不悔?為受樂故。何故受樂?為遠離故。何故遠離?為安隱故。何故安隱?為禪定故。何故禪定?為實知見故。何故為實知見?為見生死諸過患故。何故為見於生死過患?為心不貪著故。何故為心不貪著?為得解脫故。何故為得解脫?為得無上大涅槃故。何故為得大般涅槃?為得常樂我淨法故。何故為得常樂我淨?為得不生不滅故。何故為得不生不滅?為見佛性故。是故菩薩性自能持究竟淨戒。善男子!持戒比丘雖不發願求不悔心,不悔之心自然而得。何以故?法性爾故。雖不求樂、遠離安隱、真實知見,見生死過,心不貪著。解脫涅槃、常樂我淨、不生不滅,見於佛性而自然得。何以故?法性爾故。」
Lion's Roar Bodhisattva said: "World-Honored One, for what cause and condition does one uphold the precepts?" The Buddha said: "Good son, for the sake of the mind's own freedom from regret. Why freedom from regret? For the sake of receiving bliss. Why receiving bliss? For the sake of departure. Why departure? For the sake of tranquility. Why tranquility? For the sake of meditative concentration. Why meditative concentration? For the sake of true seeing and knowing. Why true seeing and knowing? For the sake of seeing every fault of birth-and-death. Why seeing the faults of birth-and-death? For the sake of the mind's own freedom from craving and attachment. Why the mind's freedom from craving and attachment? For the sake of attaining liberation. Why attaining liberation? For the sake of attaining the unsurpassed great nirvāṇa. Why attaining the great nirvāṇa? For the sake of attaining the dharma of permanence, bliss, self, and purity. Why attaining permanence, bliss, self, and purity? For the sake of attaining the unborn and the unceasing. Why attaining the unborn and the unceasing? For the sake of seeing buddha-nature. It is for this very reason that the bodhisattva's very nature is able, of itself, to uphold the final, pure precepts. Good son, though a precept-keeping monk does not vow or seek a mind free of regret, this freedom from regret is attained naturally, of itself. Why is this? Because the very nature of dharmas is exactly so. Though he does not seek bliss, departure, tranquility, or true and real seeing and knowing, seeing the fault of birth-and-death, his mind is free of craving and attachment. Liberation, nirvāṇa, permanence, bliss, self, purity, the unborn and the unceasing, and the seeing of buddha-nature are all attained naturally, of themselves. Why is this? Because the very nature of dharmas is exactly so."
The amra-fruit typology (refined mind, refined conduct, both, or neither) sets up a genuinely practical epistemic problem this section then solves procedurally rather than doctrinally: since the two hardest cases cannot be told apart by any single observation, the sūtra prescribes an escalating four-step protocol — cohabitation, then duration, then applied wisdom, then deep observation — treating the discernment of genuine virtue as itself a discipline requiring method, not just insight. The pigeon fleeing to Śāriputra's shadow yet trembling, only to find peace in the Buddha's own shadow, gives this abstract "final versus not-yet-final" precept-keeping a strikingly concrete demonstration: the difference between an arhat's own genuine attainment and a buddha's own complete attainment registers even in something as passive and unwilled as a shadow.
The closing fifteen-step chain of "why" questions (precept-keeping → freedom from regret → bliss → departure → tranquility → concentration → true seeing → seeing birth-and-death's faults → freedom from craving → liberation → great nirvāṇa → permanence-bliss-self-purity → the unborn-unceasing → seeing buddha-nature) is this fascicle's own restatement, in a single unbroken chain, of the causal architecture Parts 25 and 27 built separately (the four near-causes of nirvāṇa, and the twelve links' cause/fruit framework) — and its closing claim, that a bodhisattva of genuine nature attains every one of these without ever having sought them as separate goals, previews the section immediately following, where Lion's Roar presses exactly this claim into a formal challenge about causation itself.
Is Nirvāṇa a Result Without a Cause?
師子吼菩薩言:「世尊!若因持戒得不悔果,因於解脫得涅槃果者,戒則無因,涅槃無果。戒若無因,則名為常。涅槃有因,則是無常。若爾者,涅槃則為本無今有。若本無今有,是為無常,猶如然燈。涅槃若爾,云何得名我樂淨耶?」佛言:「善男子!善哉,善哉!汝以曾於無量佛所種諸善根,能問如來如是深義。善男子!不失本念,乃如是問也。我憶往昔過無量劫,波羅㮏城有佛出世,號曰善得。爾時彼佛三億歲中演說如是大涅槃經,我時與汝,俱在彼會,我以是事諮問彼佛。爾時如來為眾生故,三昧正受,未答此義。善哉,大士!乃能憶念如是本事。諦聽,諦聽,當為汝說。戒亦有因,謂聽正法。聽正法者是亦有因,謂近善友。近善友者是亦有因,所謂信心。信心者是亦有因,因有二種:一者聽法,二思惟義。善男子!信心者因於聽法,聽法者因於信心。如是二法,亦因、亦因因,亦果、亦果果。善男子!譬如尼乾立拒舉瓶,互為因果不得相離。善男子!如無明緣行,行緣無明。是無明行,亦因、亦因因,亦果、亦果果。乃至生緣老死,老死緣生,是生老死,亦因、亦因因,亦果、亦果果。善男子!生能生法,不能自生,不自生故,由生生生;生生不自生,復賴生故生。是故二生,亦因,亦因因,亦果、亦果果。善男子!信心、聽法,亦復如是。
Lion's Roar Bodhisattva said: "World-Honored One, if the fruit of freedom from regret is attained through the cause of precept-keeping, and the fruit of nirvāṇa is attained through the cause of liberation, then the precepts have no cause of their own, while nirvāṇa has a fruit. If the precepts have no cause, they should be named permanent; if nirvāṇa has a cause, it should be impermanent. If this is so, then nirvāṇa would be something originally absent and now present — and, if it is originally absent and now present, it is thereby impermanent, exactly like a kindled lamp. If nirvāṇa is like this, how could it possibly be named self, bliss, and purity?" The Buddha said: "Good son, excellent, excellent! Because you have, in ages past, planted every kind of wholesome root at the feet of countless buddhas, you are able to ask the Tathāgata a question of such profound meaning as this. Good son, it is because you have not lost your original recollection that you are able to ask in just this way. I recall that, in ages past, beyond countless kalpas, there appeared in the world, in the city of Vārāṇasī, a buddha named Well-Attained. At that time, that buddha, across three hundred million years, proclaimed this very Great Nirvāṇa Sūtra, and I, together with you, was present in that very assembly, and I put this very question to that buddha. At that time, the Tathāgata, for the sake of beings, entered proper absorption in samādhi, and did not yet answer this question. Excellent, great being, that you are able to recall this very event from so long ago! Listen closely, listen closely, and I shall now explain it for you. The precepts, too, have a cause — namely, listening to the true Dharma. Listening to the true Dharma, too, has a cause — namely, drawing near to a good friend. Drawing near to a good friend, too, has a cause — namely, faith. Faith, too, has a cause, and this cause is of two kinds: listening to the Dharma, and reflecting on its meaning. Good son, faith has listening to the Dharma as its cause, and listening to the Dharma has faith as its cause — these two dharmas are thus both cause and cause-of-cause, both fruit and fruit-of-fruit. Good son, it is like two jars propped up leaning against one another, each holding the other up as both cause and effect, unable to be separated from one another. Good son, it is just as ignorance conditions formations, and formations condition ignorance — this pairing of ignorance and formations is thus both cause and cause-of-cause, both fruit and fruit-of-fruit; and, all the way up to birth conditioning old age and death, and old age and death conditioning birth, this pairing of birth and old-age-and-death is thus, likewise, both cause and cause-of-cause, both fruit and fruit-of-fruit. Good son, that which is able to produce birth cannot produce itself — because it cannot produce itself, it is through a further birth that this birth is itself produced; yet this further birth, too, cannot produce itself, and must, in turn, rely upon a birth to be produced. It is for this very reason that these two births are thus both cause and cause-of-cause, both fruit and fruit-of-fruit. Good son, faith and listening to the Dharma are exactly the same.
「善男子!是果非因謂大涅槃。何故名果?是上果故、沙門果故、婆羅門果故、斷生死故、破煩惱故,是故名果。為諸煩惱之所呵責,是故涅槃名果,煩惱者名為過過。善男子!涅槃無因,而體是果。何以故?無生滅故、無所作故、非有為故、是無為故、常不變故、無處所故、無始終故。善男子!若涅槃有因,則不得稱為涅槃也。槃者言因,般涅言無,無有因故,故稱涅槃。」師子吼菩薩言:「如佛所說,涅槃無因,是義不然。若言無者,則合六義:一者畢竟無故,故名為無,如一切法無我、無我所。二者有時無故,故名為無,如世人言,河池無水、無有日月。三者少故,故名為無,如世人言,食中少醎,名為無醎,甘漿少甜,名為無甜。四者無受故,故名為無,如旃陀羅不能受持婆羅門法,是故名為無婆羅門。五者受惡法故,故名為無,如世人言,受惡法者不名沙門及婆羅門,是故名為無有沙門及婆羅門。六者不對故,故名為無,譬如無白,名之為黑,無有明故,名之無明。世尊!涅槃亦爾,有時無因,故名涅槃。」
"Good son, that which is a fruit and not a cause is named the great nirvāṇa. Why is it named a fruit? Because it is the supreme fruit, the fruit of the śramaṇa, the fruit of the brahmin, the severing of birth-and-death, and the destruction of affliction — it is for these reasons that it is named a fruit. Because it is what every affliction is censured for the sake of, nirvāṇa is named a fruit, and affliction is named the fault-of-faults. Good son, nirvāṇa has no cause at all, and yet its own essence is a fruit. Why is this? Because it is without arising or ceasing, without any activity, not a conditioned thing, but the unconditioned itself; because it is permanent and unchanging, without any location, and without beginning or end. Good son, if nirvāṇa had a cause, it could not be named nirvāṇa at all — 'vāṇa' means cause, and 'nir' means absence; because it is without any cause at all, it is therefore named nirvāṇa." Lion's Roar Bodhisattva said: "As the Buddha has taught, that nirvāṇa is without cause is not, I think, correct. Should one speak of 'absence,' this must accord with one of six meanings: first, absence named for what is, in the end, utterly nonexistent — as when every dharma is said to be without self or without anything belonging to a self; second, absence named for what is merely absent at a given time — as when people say a river or pond is 'without water,' or that there is 'no sun or moon'; third, absence named for scarcity — as when people say that food with little salt is 'without salt,' or that a sweet drink with little sugar is 'without sweetness'; fourth, absence named for the failure to receive something — as when a caṇḍāla, unable to receive and uphold the brahmin's own teaching, is therefore said to be 'without brahminhood'; fifth, absence named for having received an evil teaching — as when people say that one who has received an evil teaching cannot be named a śramaṇa or a brahmin, and is therefore said to be 'without any śramaṇa or brahmin' in him; sixth, absence named for the lack of a contrasting opposite — as when the absence of white is named black, and the absence of light is named darkness. World-Honored One, nirvāṇa is exactly the same: it is merely absent of a cause at a given time, and it is for this reason that it is named nirvāṇa."
佛言:「善男子!汝今所說如是六義,何故不引畢竟無者以喻涅槃?乃取有時無耶?善男子!涅槃之體畢竟無因,猶如無我及無我所。善男子!世法、涅槃終不相對,是故六事不得為喻。善男子!一切諸法悉無有我,而此涅槃真實有我,以是義故,涅槃無因,而體是果,是因非果,名為佛性。非因生故,是因非果。非沙門果,故名非果。何故名因?以了因故。善男子!因有二種:一者生因,二者了因。能生法者,是名生因;燈能了物,故名了因。煩惱諸結,是名生因;眾生父母,是名了因。如穀子等是名生因;地水糞等是名了因。復有生因,謂六波羅蜜、阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。復有了因,謂佛性、阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。復有了因,謂六波羅蜜、佛性。復有生因,謂首楞嚴三昧、阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。復有了因,謂八正道、阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。復有生因,所謂信心、六波羅蜜。」
The Buddha said: "Good son, of these six meanings you have just given, why do you not draw upon the first — the utterly nonexistent — to illustrate nirvāṇa, and instead take up the merely-absent-at-a-given-time? Good son, the very essence of nirvāṇa is utterly without a cause at all, exactly like the absence of self or of anything belonging to a self. Good son, worldly dharmas and nirvāṇa can, in the end, never be set against one another as parallel cases, and it is for this reason that none of your six examples can serve as a fitting simile. Good son, every worldly dharma is, without exception, without any self at all, and yet this very nirvāṇa truly possesses a self — it is for this very reason that nirvāṇa is without cause, and yet its own essence is a fruit; and it is itself a cause and not a fruit, and this is what is named buddha-nature. Because it is not produced by any cause, it is a cause and not a fruit; because it is not the fruit of the śramaṇa's own path, it is named not-a-fruit. Why, then, is it named a cause? Because it is a revealing cause. Good son, cause is of two kinds: the generative cause, and the revealing cause. That which is able to produce a dharma is named the generative cause; a lamp, which is able to reveal an object, is named the revealing cause. Affliction and every fetter is named a generative cause; a being's own parents are named a revealing cause. Grain seed and the like is named a generative cause; earth, water, and manure are named a revealing cause. There is, further, a generative cause — namely, the six perfections, in relation to unsurpassed, complete awakening. There is, further, a revealing cause — namely, buddha-nature, in relation to unsurpassed, complete awakening. There is, further, a revealing cause — namely, the six perfections, in relation to buddha-nature. There is, further, a generative cause — namely, the Śūraṅgama samādhi, in relation to unsurpassed, complete awakening. There is, further, a revealing cause — namely, the eightfold noble path, in relation to unsurpassed, complete awakening. There is, further, a generative cause — namely, faith, in relation to the six perfections."
Lion's Roar's opening challenge presses a genuine logical worry: if every step in a causal chain (precepts → freedom from regret → ... → nirvāṇa) is, in fact, a cause producing a fruit, then nirvāṇa itself, sitting at the chain's far end, is a produced fruit — and a produced fruit, like a kindled lamp, is precisely the kind of thing that can also go out. The Buddha's answer reframes the entire chain rather than defending nirvāṇa's place within it: faith and hearing the Dharma, examined closely, are not a simple one-directional sequence at all but a genuinely reciprocal pair (the "two jars leaning against each other" and the ignorance/formations pairing from the twelve links), each requiring the other to arise — and this reciprocity is offered as the general pattern of causation within saṃsāra, against which nirvāṇa is then declared the one exception: a fruit that is not the product of any cause at all.
The generative-cause/revealing-cause (生因/了因) distinction introduced here — a seed generates a sprout it did not contain, while a lamp merely reveals an object that was already there in the dark — becomes this fascicle's central analytical tool for the entire milk-and-curd debate that follows: whether buddha-nature is "produced" by practice (as a sprout is produced by a seed) or merely "revealed" by it (as an object is revealed by a lamp) is exactly the question Lion's Roar is about to press through the curd analogy, and the answer given here — that buddha-nature is a revealing cause for awakening, while the six perfections are a generative cause for the same awakening, and a revealing cause for buddha-nature itself — previews the two-causes (正因/緣因) framework that will resolve that debate.
Seeing the Formless Tathāgata
師子吼菩薩言:「世尊!如佛所說,見於如來及以佛性,是義云何?世尊!如來之身無有相貌,非長非短、非白非黑,無有方所,不在三界,非有為相,非眼識識,云何可見?佛性亦爾。」佛言:「善男子!佛身二種:一者常,二者無常。無常者,為欲度脫一切眾生,方便示現,是名眼見。常者,如來世尊解脫之身,亦名眼見,亦名聞見。佛性亦二:一者可見,二不可見。可見者,十住菩薩、諸佛世尊。不可見者,一切眾生。眼見者,謂十住菩薩、諸佛如來,眼見眾生所有佛性。聞見者,一切眾生、九住菩薩,聞有佛性。如來之身復有二種:一者是色,二者非色。色者,如來解脫;非色者,如來永斷諸色相故。佛性二種:一者是色,二者非色。色者,阿耨多羅三藐三菩提;非色者,凡夫乃至十住菩薩,十住菩薩見不了了,故名非色。善男子!佛性者復有二種:一者是色,二者非色。色者,謂佛菩薩;非色者,一切眾生。色者,名為眼見;非色者,名為聞見。佛性者非內、非外,雖非內外,然非失壞,故名眾生悉有佛性。」
Lion's Roar Bodhisattva said: "World-Honored One, as the Buddha has taught, that one sees the Tathāgata and buddha-nature — what, exactly, does this mean? World-Honored One, the Tathāgata's own body has no bodily appearance at all — it is neither long nor short, neither white nor black, has no location, does not dwell within the three realms, is not a conditioned mark, and is not known by the eye-consciousness — how, then, could it possibly be seen? Buddha-nature is exactly the same." The Buddha said: "Good son, the buddha-body is of two kinds: permanent, and impermanent. The impermanent body is manifested through skillful means, for the sake of delivering every being — this is named seeing with the eye. The permanent body is the Tathāgata's, the World-Honored One's, own liberated body — this, too, is named seeing with the eye, and also named seeing through hearing. Buddha-nature, too, is of two kinds: visible, and invisible. The visible is seen by the bodhisattva of the ten abidings and by every buddha, every world-honored one. The invisible is not seen by any ordinary being. Seeing with the eye means that the bodhisattva of the ten abidings and every tathāgata sees, with the eye, the buddha-nature possessed by beings. Seeing through hearing means that every being, and the bodhisattva of the ninth abiding, hears that buddha-nature exists. The Tathāgata's own body is, further, of two kinds: form, and not-form. Form is the Tathāgata's own liberation; not-form is because the Tathāgata has forever severed every mark of form. Buddha-nature, too, is of two kinds: form, and not-form. Form is unsurpassed, complete awakening itself; not-form describes the ordinary being, up through the bodhisattva of the ten abidings — the bodhisattva of the ten abidings sees it without complete clarity, and it is for this reason that it is named not-form. Good son, buddha-nature is, further, of two kinds: form, and not-form. Form describes the buddhas and bodhisattvas; not-form describes every ordinary being. Form is named seeing with the eye; not-form is named seeing through hearing. Buddha-nature is neither internal nor external — yet, though it is neither internal nor external, it is not thereby lost or destroyed, and it is for this reason that every being, without exception, is said to possess buddha-nature."
Lion's Roar's question here presses the same worry that opened the previous fascicle's fourteen-fold catechism — how can something without any of form's defining properties (length, color, location) be an object of seeing at all? — but the Buddha's answer takes a different route than the earlier apophatic catalogue: rather than negating every predicate, he sorts buddha-nature (and the buddha-body itself) into paired categories — permanent/impermanent, visible/invisible, form/not-form — each pairing tracking a different practical distinction (whether skillful manifestation or unconditioned essence is meant; whether the seer has reached the ten abidings or beyond) rather than a single univocal answer. This sets up the chapter's next and longest debate directly: if buddha-nature can be called "form" at all under any of these three pairings, in what sense is it already present in a being the way curd is said to be already present in milk — a question Lion's Roar raises in the very next section and pursues at greater length than any other topic in this fascicle.
Does Milk Contain Curd?
師子吼菩薩言:「世尊!如佛所說,一切眾生悉有佛性,如乳中有酪。金剛力士、諸佛佛性如淨醍醐,云何如來說言佛性非內非外?」佛言:「善男子!我亦不說乳中有酪,酪從乳生故言有酪。」「世尊!一切生法各有時節。」「善男子!乳時無酪,亦無生蘇、熟蘇、醍醐,一切眾生亦謂是乳,是故我言乳中無酪。如其有者,何故不得二種名字?如人二能,言金、鐵師。酪時無乳、生蘇、熟蘇及以醍醐,眾生亦謂是酪,非乳、非生熟蘇及以醍醐,亦復如是。善男子!因有二種:一者正因,二者緣因。正因者,如乳生酪,緣因者,如醪煖等。從乳生故,故言乳中而有酪性。」
Lion's Roar Bodhisattva said: "World-Honored One, as the Buddha has taught, every being, without exception, possesses buddha-nature, just as milk contains curd — and the buddha-nature of Vajrapāṇi and of every buddha is like pure ghee. How, then, can the Tathāgata teach that buddha-nature is neither internal nor external?" The Buddha said: "Good son, I, too, do not teach that milk contains curd — it is only because curd is produced from milk that it is said to 'have' curd." "World-Honored One, everything that is produced has its own proper season." "Good son, at the time of milk, there is no curd at all, nor is there fresh butter, clarified butter, or ghee — every being also takes it simply to be milk, and it is for this reason that I say milk does not contain curd. Were it truly present, why could it not bear two names at once? — just as a single person skilled in two crafts is called both goldsmith and blacksmith. At the time of curd, there is no milk, fresh butter, clarified butter, or ghee at all — beings likewise take it simply to be curd, not milk, not fresh or clarified butter, and not ghee — exactly the same. Good son, cause is of two kinds: the primary cause, and the conditional cause. The primary cause is as milk producing curd; the conditional cause is as the curdling agent and warmth. It is only because curd is produced from milk that milk is said to 'have' the nature of curd."
師子吼菩薩言:「世尊!若乳無酪性,角中亦無,何故不從角中生耶?」「善男子!角亦生酪。何以故?我亦說言緣因有二:一醪、二煖。角性煖故,亦能生酪。」師子吼言:「世尊!若角能生酪,求酪之人何故求乳而不取角?」佛言:「善男子!是故我說正因、緣因。」師子吼菩薩言:「若使乳中本無酪性,今方有者。乳中本無菴摩羅樹,何故不生?二俱無故。」「善男子!乳亦能生菴摩羅樹。若以乳灌,一夜之中增長五尺,以是義故,我說二因。善男子!若一切法一因生者,可得難言,乳中何故不能出生菴摩羅樹?善男子!猶如四大,為一切色而作因緣,然色各異,差別不同。以是義故,乳中不生菴摩羅樹。」「世尊!如佛所說,有二因者,正因、緣因。眾生佛性為是何因?」「善男子!眾生佛性亦二種因:一者正因,二者緣因。正因者謂諸眾生,緣因者謂六波羅蜜。」
Lion's Roar Bodhisattva said: "World-Honored One, if milk has no nature of curd at all, then neither does a horn — why, then, does curd not come from a horn?" "Good son, a horn, too, produces curd. Why is this? I have already said that the conditional cause is of two kinds: the curdling agent, and warmth. A horn's own nature is warm, and it, too, is therefore able to produce curd." Lion's Roar said: "World-Honored One, if a horn is able to produce curd, why does one who seeks curd seek out milk, and not take a horn instead?" The Buddha said: "Good son, it is for this very reason that I speak of the primary cause and the conditional cause." Lion's Roar Bodhisattva said: "If milk originally has no nature of curd at all, and curd only comes to exist now — milk, likewise, originally has no amra tree in it at all, so why, then, does an amra tree not grow from it? Both are equally absent to begin with." "Good son, milk is, in fact, able to produce an amra tree — should one water it with milk, it grows five feet taller within a single night. It is for this very reason that I speak of these two causes. Good son, were every dharma produced by a single cause alone, one could well raise the objection: why, then, can milk not produce an amra tree? Good son, it is just as the four great elements serve as the cause and condition for every form, and yet each form remains distinct, each entirely different from the others. It is for this very reason that milk does not produce an amra tree." "World-Honored One, as the Buddha has taught, there are these two causes, the primary and the conditional — as what kind of cause is a being's own buddha-nature to be understood?" "Good son, a being's own buddha-nature, too, has these two kinds of cause: the primary cause, and the conditional cause. The primary cause is every being himself; the conditional cause is the six perfections."
師子吼言:「世尊!我今定知乳有酪性。何以故?我見世間求酪之人,唯取於乳,終不取水,是故當知乳有酪性。」「善男子!如汝所問,是義不然。何以故?一切眾生欲見面像,即便取刀。」師子吼言:「世尊!以是義故,乳有酪性。若刀無面像,何故取刀?」佛言:「善男子!若此刀中定有面像,何故顛倒,豎則見長,橫則見闊?若是自面,何故見長?若是他面,何得稱言是己面像?若因己面,見他面者,何故不見驢馬面像?」師子吼言:「世尊!眼光到彼,故見面長。」
Lion's Roar said: "World-Honored One, I now know for certain that milk possesses the nature of curd. Why is this? I observe that, in the world, those who seek curd take only milk, and never take water instead — one should therefore know that milk possesses the nature of curd." "Good son, as you have asked, this is, I think, not correct. Why is this? Every being who wishes to see his own facial reflection takes up a knife-blade to do so." Lion's Roar said: "World-Honored One, it is for this very reason that milk possesses the nature of curd — for, if a knife-blade contained no facial image at all, why would one take it up at all?" The Buddha said: "Good son, if this knife-blade truly, fixedly contained a facial image, why does it appear distorted — long when held upright, and wide when held sideways? If it is one's own face, why does it appear long? If it is another's face, how could it be called an image of one's own face? And if, in dependence on one's own face, one is seeing another's face, why does one never see the face of a donkey or a horse in it instead?" Lion's Roar said: "World-Honored One, it is because the light of the eye reaches all the way to the blade that the face appears long."
佛言:「善男子!而此眼光實不到彼。何以故?近遠一時俱得見故,不見中間所有物故。善男子!光若到彼而得見者,一切眾生悉見於火,何故不燒?如人遠見白物,不應生疑鶴耶?幡耶?人耶?樹耶?若光到者,云何得見水精中物、淵中魚石?若不到見,何故得見水精中物,而不得見壁外之色。是故若言眼光到彼而見長者,是義不然。善男子!如汝所言,乳有酪者,何故賣乳之人但取乳價,不責酪直。賣草馬者,但取馬價,不責駒直。善男子!世間之人,無子息故,故求娉婦。婦若懷妊,不得言女。若言是女,有兒性故,故應娉者,是義不然。何以故?若有兒性亦應有孫,若有孫者則是兄弟。何以故?一腹生故。是故我言女無兒性。若其乳中有酪性者,何故一時不見五味?若樹子中有尼拘陀五丈質者,何故一時不見芽莖、枝葉、花果形色之異?善男子!乳色時異、味異、果異,乃至醍醐亦復如是,云何可說乳有酪性?」
The Buddha said: "Good son, this light of the eye, in truth, never reaches the blade at all. Why is this? Because things both near and far are seen at one and the same time, and because nothing lying in between is ever seen at all. Good son, if the light reaching an object were what allowed it to be seen, then every being, upon seeing fire, would see it because the light reached it — why, then, is he not burned? It is like one who, seeing a white object far off, cannot help but wonder: is it a crane? A banner? A person? A tree? If the light truly reaches its object, how could one see an object inside crystal, or a fish or stone at the bottom of a deep pool? And, if seeing does not require the light to reach its object, why, then, can one see an object inside crystal, and yet not see a color on the far side of a wall? It is for this reason that to say the eye's light reaches the blade and thereby sees a long face is, I think, not correct. Good son, as you yourself have said, if milk possesses curd, why does one who sells milk take only the price of milk, and never additionally charge for the curd? One who sells a mare takes only the price of the mare, and never additionally charges for her foal. Good son, a person in this world, lacking any child, seeks out a bride for himself — should this woman become pregnant, she still cannot yet be called 'mother.' Should one say that, because she already possesses the nature of a child within her, she should therefore be sought in marriage on that account, this is, I think, not correct. Why is this? If she truly possessed the nature of a child, she ought also to possess the nature of a grandchild — and, were there truly a grandchild present, this grandchild and the child would then be siblings to one another. Why is this? Because they would have been born from the very same womb. It is for this very reason that I say a woman does not possess the nature of a child within her. And, if milk truly possessed the nature of curd, why does one not see all five flavors in it at one and the same time? And if a tree seed truly contained within it a nyagrodha tree fifty feet tall, why does one not see, all at one time, its sprout, stem, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruit, each in its own distinct form and color? Good son, milk's color, taste, and fruit each change with the season, and this is true of ghee as well — how, then, could one possibly say that milk possesses the nature of curd?"
「善男子!譬如有人明當服蘇,今已患臭。若言乳中定有酪性,亦復如是。善男子!譬如有人,有筆紙墨,和合成字。而是紙中本無有字,以本無故假緣而成;若本有者,何須眾緣?譬如青黃,合成綠色,當知是二,本無緣性;若本有者,何須合成?善男子!譬如眾生因食得命,而此食中實無有命。若本有命,未食之時,食應是命。善男子!一切諸法本無有性,以是義故我說是偈:『本無今有,本有今無。三世有法,無有是處。』善男子!一切諸法,因緣故生,因緣故滅。善男子!若諸眾生內有佛性者,一切眾生應有佛身,如我今也。眾生佛性不破不壞、不牽不捉、不繫不縛。如眾生中所有虛空,一切眾生悉有虛空,無罣礙故,各不自見有此虛空。若使眾生無虛空者,則無去來、行住坐臥、不生不長,以是義故,我經中說一切眾生有虛空界,虛空界者,是名虛空。眾生佛性亦復如是,十住菩薩少能見之,如金剛珠。善男子!眾生佛性諸佛境界,非是聲聞緣覺所知。一切眾生不見佛性,是故常為煩惱繫縛,流轉生死。見佛性故,諸結煩惱所不能繫,解脫生死,得大涅槃。」
"Good son, it is like a man who, though he will not drink ghee until tomorrow, already today complains of its rank smell — to say that milk definitely already possesses the nature of curd is exactly the same kind of error. Good son, it is like a man who, having brush, paper, and ink, combines them to form written characters — yet this paper does not, in itself, originally contain these characters; it is only because they are originally absent that they must be formed through borrowed conditions. Were they originally present, what need would there be for these many conditions at all? It is like blue and yellow combining to form green — one should know that neither of these two colors originally contains the conditioned nature of green within it; were it originally present, what need would there be for this combination at all? Good son, it is like a being who obtains his very life through food — and yet this food, in truth, contains no life within it at all. Were life originally present within it, then, even before it was eaten, the food itself would already have to be alive. Good son, no dharma at all originally possesses any fixed nature — it is for this very reason that I speak this verse: 'What was not, is now present; what was, is now absent. That a dharma should exist across all three time-periods at once could not possibly be so.' Good son, every dharma, without exception, arises through causes and conditions, and ceases through causes and conditions. Good son, were buddha-nature already, internally present within every being, then every being, without exception, ought already to possess a buddha-body, exactly as I do now. A being's own buddha-nature can never be broken, destroyed, dragged away, seized, bound, or fettered. It is like the empty space that exists within every being: every being, without exception, possesses this empty space, and yet, because it offers no obstruction at all, no being sees for himself that he possesses this very space. Were a being to be entirely without empty space, he could not go or come, walk, stand, sit, or lie down, nor could he be born or grow at all — it is for this very reason that, within my own scriptures, I teach that every being possesses the realm of empty space, and this realm of empty space is what is named empty space itself. A being's own buddha-nature is exactly the same: even the bodhisattva of the ten abidings is able to see only a little of it, as one glimpses a vajra jewel. Good son, a being's own buddha-nature is the very domain of every buddha, and is not something known by any śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha. It is only because every being fails to see buddha-nature that he is forever bound by affliction, turning endlessly through birth-and-death; and it is only through seeing buddha-nature that no affliction or fetter is able to bind him any longer, that he is liberated from birth-and-death, and attains the great nirvāṇa."
Huiyuan reads Lion's Roar's opening claim ("I now know for certain that milk possesses the nature of curd") and the Buddha's reply as opening a structured four-part refutation, each part disproving the fixed presence of curd in milk by appeal to a different piece of ordinary human behavior: people take up a blade to see their own face (yet the reflected face is visibly distorted — long when held upright, wide when held sideways — which no fixed image inside the metal could explain); a milk-seller charges only for milk, never separately for the curd it might become; a man does not call his pregnant wife "mother," on pain of an absurd regress into grandchildren and siblings; and no one sees all five flavors, or a nyagrodha tree's full sprout-to-fruit sequence, present all at once in a single seed. He further divides the knife-face exchange's own middle section — Lion's Roar's fallback claim that the eye's own light reaches the blade to explain the distortion — into six distinct counter-arguments (near and far objects seen at once; nothing seen in between; fire not burning the eye that sees it; doubt about a distant white object if the light truly reached and resolved it; sight of objects embedded in crystal or underwater; sight of crystal's interior yet not of what lies past an opaque wall), reading this unusually granular breakdown as evidence the debate engages a real, contemporary theory of vision (that seeing occurs via a ray extending from the eye to its object) rather than a strawman built only to be knocked down.
On the closing string of similes — brush-and-paper forming characters neither the paper nor the ink previously contained, blue and yellow combining into a green neither singly possessed, food producing a life it does not itself possess — Huiyuan reads these as jointly establishing the chapter's key point about the "primary cause" (正因) and "conditional cause" (緣因) distinction: a result's dependence on assembled conditions is not weak evidence for some fainter, pre-existing version of that result already lying latent within one of those conditions, but is, if anything, the very opposite — proof that the result is genuinely new, brought about only by the meeting of conditions, exactly as buddha-nature itself is said to require conditions (the six perfections) without this making it any less real, present, or universally possessed once seen. The virtual-space simile closing the passage — a space every being possesses yet none directly perceives, evidenced only indirectly by the very fact that movement and growth remain possible at all — gives this abstract principle its clearest illustration: absence-from-perception, once again, is never the same claim as absence-from-being.
Lamp, Pot, and Seed: The Debate Over the Revealing Cause
師子吼菩薩言:「世尊!一切眾生有佛性性,如乳中酪性。若乳無酪性,云何佛說有二種因,一者正因、二者緣因?緣因者,一醪、二煖。虛空無性,故無緣因。」佛言:「善男子!若使乳中定有酪性者,何須緣因?」師子吼菩薩言:「世尊!以有性故,故須緣因。何以故?欲明見故,緣因者即是了因。世尊!譬如闇中先有諸物,為欲見故,以燈照了。若本無者,燈何所照?如泥中有瓶,故須人、水、輪、繩、杖等而為了因。如尼拘陀子,須地、水、糞而作了因。乳中醪煖,亦復如是,須作了因。是故雖先有性,要假了因,然後得見,以是義故,定知乳中先有酪性。」「善男子!若使乳中定有酪性者,即是了因。若是了因,復何須了?善男子!若是了因,性是了者,常應自了;若自不了,何能了他?若言了因有二種性:一者自了、二者了他,是義不然。何以故?了因一法,云何有二?若有二者,乳亦應二。若使乳中無二相者,云何了因而獨有二?」
Lion's Roar Bodhisattva said: "World-Honored One, every being possesses this very buddha-nature-ness, just as milk possesses the nature of curd. If milk has no nature of curd at all, why does the Buddha teach that there are two kinds of cause — the primary cause and the conditional cause? The conditional cause is, first, the curdling agent, and, second, warmth — and empty space, having no such nature at all, therefore has no conditional cause of its own." The Buddha said: "Good son, if milk truly, fixedly possessed the nature of curd, what need would there be for any conditional cause at all?" Lion's Roar Bodhisattva said: "World-Honored One, it is precisely because this nature is already present that a conditional cause is needed — why is this? Because it is needed only to make it manifest and seen — the conditional cause is itself none other than the revealing cause. World-Honored One, it is like objects already present in the dark: it is only in order to see them that a lamp is lit to reveal them — were they not originally present at all, what would the lamp's light possibly be revealing? It is like a pot already present in clay, which therefore requires a potter, water, a wheel, cord, and a rod to serve as its revealing cause; or a nyagrodha tree already present in its seed, which requires soil, water, and manure to serve as its revealing cause. The curdling agent and warmth within milk are exactly the same, requiring only a revealing cause to manifest what is already there. It is for this reason that, though the nature is already present beforehand, it still requires the aid of a revealing cause before it can be seen — and it is for this very reason that one may know for certain that milk already possesses the nature of curd beforehand." "Good son, if milk truly, fixedly possessed the nature of curd, this would itself already be a revealing cause. And, if it is itself already a revealing cause, what further need would there be to reveal it at all? Good son, if this is a revealing cause, and its very nature is to reveal, it ought forever to reveal itself; and, if it cannot reveal itself, how could it possibly reveal anything else? Should you say that a revealing cause is of two natures — one that reveals itself, and one that reveals another — this, I think, is not correct. Why is this? A revealing cause is a single thing — how, then, could it be of two kinds? Were it truly of two kinds, milk, too, ought to be of two kinds. And, if milk itself bears no such twofold characteristic at all, how, then, could a revealing cause alone possess these two?"
師子吼言:「世尊!如世人言,我共八人,了因亦爾,自了、了他。」佛言:「善男子!了因若爾,則非了因。何以故?數者能數自色、他色,故得言八。而此色性,自無了相,無了相故,要須智性,乃數自他。是故了因,不能自了,亦不了他。善男子!一切眾生有佛性者,何故修習無量功德?若言修習是了因者,已同酪壞。若言因中定有果者,戒、定、智慧,則無增長。我見世人本無禁戒、禪定、智慧,從師受已,漸漸增益。若言師教是了因者,當師教時,受者未有戒、定、智慧。若是了者,應了未有,云何乃了戒、定、智慧令得增長?」師子吼菩薩言:「世尊!若了因無者,云何得名有乳有酪?」「善男子!世間答難凡有三種:一者轉答,如先所說,何故名戒?以不悔故,乃至為得大涅槃故。二者默然答,如有梵志來問我言,我是常耶?我時默然。三者疑答,如此經中,若了因有二,乳中何故不得有二?善男子!我今轉答。如世人言,有乳酪者以定得故,是故得名有乳有酪,佛性亦爾,有眾生有佛性,以當見故。」
Lion's Roar said: "World-Honored One, it is like people saying, 'I, together with seven others, make eight' — a revealing cause is exactly the same, revealing both itself and another." The Buddha said: "Good son, if a revealing cause were like this, it would then not be a revealing cause at all. Why is this? It is the counter who is able to count both his own form and another's, and it is on this account that one may say 'eight' — this form itself has, of itself, no capacity to reveal at all; it is only because it lacks this very capacity that an intelligent nature is needed at all in order to count self and other. It is for this reason that a revealing cause can neither reveal itself, nor reveal another. Good son, if every being already possesses buddha-nature, why does he still need to cultivate immeasurable merit at all? Should you say that this very cultivation is itself the revealing cause, this is already the same error as the ruined curd. Should you say that the fruit is already, fixedly present within the cause, then moral discipline, concentration, and wisdom could never increase at all — yet I observe that people in the world, originally without any precepts, concentration, or wisdom, gradually increase in these very things once they have received instruction from a teacher. Should you say that a teacher's own instruction is itself the revealing cause, then, at the very moment of that instruction, the one receiving it does not yet possess any precepts, concentration, or wisdom at all. If this instruction is truly a revealing cause, it ought only to reveal what is not yet present — how, then, could it possibly reveal precepts, concentration, and wisdom in such a way as to cause them to increase?" Lion's Roar Bodhisattva said: "World-Honored One, if there is no revealing cause at all, how, then, can one speak of 'having milk' and 'having curd' at all?" "Good son, there are, in general, three kinds of answer given in the world to a difficult question: the redirected answer, as in what was said earlier — why is a precept so named? Because of freedom from regret, and so on, up through the attainment of the great nirvāṇa; the silent answer, as when a certain brahmin ascetic once came and asked me whether the self is permanent, and I remained silent; and the answer given in doubt, as within this very sūtra — if a revealing cause is of two kinds, why, then, can milk not likewise be of two kinds? Good son, I shall now give you a redirected answer. Just as people in the world say that milk and curd 'exist' because they are certain to be obtained, buddha-nature is exactly the same: a being is said to 'possess' buddha-nature because it is certain to be seen."
師子吼言:「世尊!如佛所說,是義不然。過去已滅,未來未到,云何名有?若言當有名為有者,是義不然。如世間人,見無兒息,便言無兒。一切眾生無佛性者,云何說言一切眾生悉有佛性?」佛言:「善男子!過去名有,譬如種橘,芽生子滅,芽亦甘甜,乃至生果,味亦如是,熟已乃醋。善男子!而是醋味,子芽乃至生果悉無,隨本熟時,形色相貌則生醋味,而是醋味本無今有,雖本無今有,非不因本。如是本子,雖復過去,故得名有。以是義故,過去名有。云何復名未來為有?譬如有人種植胡麻,有人問言:『何故種此?』答言:『有油。』實未有油,胡麻熟已,收子熬烝、擣壓,然後乃得出油。當知是人非虛妄也。以是義故,名未來有。云何復名過去有耶?善男子!譬如有人,私屏罵王,經歷年歲,王乃聞之。聞已即問:『何故見罵?』答言:『大王。我不罵也。何以故?罵者已滅。』王言:『罵者,我、身二俱存在,云何言滅?』以是因緣喪失身命。善男子!是二實無,而果不滅,是名過去有。云何復名未來有耶?譬如有人,往陶師所,問有瓶不?答言有瓶。而是陶師實未有瓶,以有泥故,故言有瓶,當知是人非妄語也。乳中有酪、眾生佛性,亦復如是。欲見佛性,應當觀察時節形色,是故我說一切眾生悉有佛性,實不虛妄。」
Lion's Roar said: "World-Honored One, as the Buddha has taught, this, I think, is not correct. The past has already ceased, and the future has not yet arrived — how, then, can either be named 'existent'? Should you say that what is certain to come into being can already be named 'existent,' this, too, is not correct — for, in the world, when people see that a couple has no children, they simply say they have no child. If every being, in truth, has no buddha-nature at all, how, then, can it be taught that every being, without exception, possesses buddha-nature?" The Buddha said: "Good son, the past is named 'existent' in this way: it is like planting an orange seed — the sprout arises and the seed itself ceases, and this sprout, too, is sweet, all the way through to the fruit it eventually bears, which is likewise sweet in taste, until it fully ripens and only then turns sour. Good son, this very sour taste was entirely absent in the seed, the sprout, and even the newly formed fruit — it is only once the fruit reaches its own proper ripening that this form, color, and appearance gives rise to this sour taste; and, though this sour taste was originally absent and is now present, it does not arise apart from its own original seed. This original seed, though it has already passed away, may therefore still be named 'existent' — and it is for this very reason that the past may be named 'existent.' How, then, may the future also be named 'existent'? It is like a man who plants sesame — someone asks him: 'Why do you plant this?' He answers: 'Because there is oil in it.' Though there is, in truth, no oil present yet, once the sesame has ripened, its seeds are gathered, steamed, pounded, and pressed, and only then is the oil actually extracted — one should know that this man has spoken no falsehood at all. It is for this very reason that this is named 'future existence.' How, then, may the past also be named 'existent' in another sense? Good son, it is like a man who, in private, curses the king — years pass, and only then does the king come to hear of it. Having heard of it, he asks: 'Why did you curse me?' The man answers: 'Great king, I did not curse you at all — why is this? Because the one who cursed you has long since ceased to exist.' The king says: 'The one who cursed me — his self, his very body, both still exist even now — how could you say he has ceased to exist?' — and, on account of this very affair, the man loses his own life. Good son, though this self and this body, in the philosophical sense the man intended, are, in truth, absent, the fruit of his own past action does not thereby cease at all — and this, too, is what is named 'past existence.' How, then, may the future also be named 'existent' in this further sense? It is like a man who goes to a potter's workshop and asks whether a pot is to be had there — the potter answers that a pot is indeed to be had, though, in truth, no pot has yet been made at all; it is only because clay is present that he says a pot is to be had, and one should know that this potter, too, has spoken no falsehood at all. Milk's possession of curd, and a being's own possession of buddha-nature, are exactly the same. One who wishes to see buddha-nature ought to observe its own proper season and its own form and color — it is for this very reason that I teach that every being, without exception, possesses buddha-nature, and this is, in truth, no falsehood at all."
Huiyuan reads Lion's Roar's fallback position — that the "conditional cause" is really a "revealing cause," uncovering a pre-existing curd-nature the way a lamp uncovers an object already sitting in the dark — as the debate's most sophisticated move, since it seems to preserve both universal possession and the genuine need for practice at once. He tracks the Buddha's refutation as four successive blows against this single position: first, an already-existing revealing cause would need no further revealing itself, an infinite regress Lion's Roar tries to escape by proposing a cause that reveals both itself and other things; second, this proposed self-revealing capacity would have to be single (a "revealing cause" is one thing, not two), yet self-revealing and other-revealing are clearly two different functions, so the singular cause cannot coherently perform both; third, the "I, together with seven others, make eight" counting simile fails because a counted color or form never counts itself — the counting capacity belongs to intelligence, not to the counted object — so a "revealing cause" modeled on this analogy still cannot reveal itself; and fourth, if the effect (buddha-nature fully attained) already sat fixed within the cause (a being's present, unawakened state), moral discipline, concentration, and wisdom could never actually increase through training, which plainly contradicts what is observed of students under a teacher.
On the three-times debate that follows, Huiyuan's broader point — echoed by every one of the four similes given (the orange's sourness absent from seed and sprout yet inseparable from them; the sesame oil not yet pressed yet truthfully promised; the king's curse whose speaker "no longer exists" yet whose consequence still lands; the potter's pot not yet thrown yet truthfully answered for) — is that ordinary language already uses "existence" flexibly across all three times without anyone taking this as dishonesty, so the sūtra is not inventing a special exception for buddha-nature so much as making explicit a distinction ordinary speech already relies on: a thing can be truthfully called "existent" in virtue of what it is certain to become, without this collapsing into the false claim that it already, fully is that thing right now.
The Nyagrodha Seed, and Lion's Roar's Hardest Challenge
師子吼言:「一切眾生無有佛性者,云何而得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提?以正因故,故令眾生得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。何等正因?所謂佛性。世尊!若尼拘陀子,無尼拘陀樹者,何故名為尼拘陀子,而不名為佉陀羅子?世尊!如瞿曇姓不得稱為阿坻耶姓,阿坻耶姓亦復不得稱瞿曇姓。尼拘陀子亦復如是,不得稱為佉陀羅尼子,佉陀羅尼子不得稱為尼拘陀子。猶如世尊不得捨離瞿曇種姓,眾生佛性亦復如是,以是義故,當知眾生悉有佛性。」
Lion's Roar said: "If every being truly has no buddha-nature at all, how, then, could he possibly attain unsurpassed, complete awakening? It is precisely through a primary cause that a being is able to attain unsurpassed, complete awakening — and what is this primary cause? It is none other than buddha-nature. World-Honored One, if a nyagrodha seed contained no nyagrodha tree within it at all, why would it be named a nyagrodha seed, rather than a khadira seed? World-Honored One, just as the Gautama lineage can never be called the Ādityā lineage, nor the Ādityā lineage ever be called the Gautama lineage, a nyagrodha seed, likewise, can never be called a khadira seed, nor a khadira seed ever be called a nyagrodha seed — exactly as the World-Honored One himself can never depart from his own Gautama lineage. A being's own buddha-nature is exactly the same — it is for this very reason that one should know that every being, without exception, possesses buddha-nature."
佛言:「善男子!若言子中有尼拘陀者,是義不然。如其有者,何故不見?善男子!如世間物,有因緣故不可得見。云何因緣?謂遠不可見,如空中鳥跡。近不可見,如人眼睫。壞故不見,如根敗者。亂想故不見,如心不專一。細故不見,如小微塵。障故不見,如雲表星。多故不見,如稻聚中麻。相似故不見,如豆在豆聚。尼拘陀樹不同如是八種因緣,如其有者,何故不見?若言細障故不見者,是義不然。何以故?樹相麁故。若言性細,云何增長?若言障故不可見者,常應不見。本無麁相,今則見麁。當知是麁本無其性,本無見性今則可見,當知是見亦本無性。子亦如是,本無有樹,今則有之,當有何咎?」
The Buddha said: "Good son, to say that a nyagrodha tree is already present within its seed is, I think, not correct. Were it truly present, why, then, is it not seen? Good son, an object in the world may fail to be seen for any of eight reasons: it is too distant to be seen, as a bird's track across the sky; it is too near to be seen, as one's own eyelash; it is destroyed and thus not seen, as with a sense-faculty that has decayed; it is not seen on account of a scattered, distracted mind; it is too subtle to be seen, as a fine speck of dust; it is obstructed and thus not seen, as a star behind a cloud; it is too numerous to be seen distinctly, as a single grain of sesame lost within a pile of rice; and it is not distinguished for being too similar to what surrounds it, as one bean lost within a heap of beans. A nyagrodha tree does not resemble any of these eight causes at all — were it truly present, why, then, would it not be seen? Should you say that it is not seen because it is both subtle and obstructed, this, I think, is not correct. Why is this? Because a tree's own characteristic form is coarse, not subtle. And, were its nature truly subtle, how, then, could it possibly grow larger at all? And, were it truly unseen merely because it is obstructed, it ought to remain forever unseen — yet, though it originally has no coarse mark at all, one now sees it in a coarse form. One should therefore know that this coarse form originally had no nature of its own at all; and this seeing, too, originally had no nature of its own — one should know that this seeing, too, originally has no fixed nature. The seed is exactly the same: it originally has no tree within it at all, and now it comes to have one — what fault could there possibly be in this?"
師子吼言:「如佛所說,有二種因:一者正因,二者了因。尼拘陀子以地、水、糞作了因故,令細得麁。」佛言:「善男子!若本有者,何須了因?若本無性,了何所了?若尼拘陀中本無麁相,以了因故乃生麁者,何故不生佉陀羅樹?二俱無故。善男子!若細不見者,麁應可見。譬如一塵,則不可見、多塵和合則應可見。如是子中麁應可見。何以故?是中已有芽、莖、花、果,一一果中有無量子,一一子中有無量樹,是故名麁,有是麁故,故應可見。善男子!若尼拘陀子,有尼拘陀性,而生樹者,眼見是子為火所燒,如是燒性亦應本有;若本有者,樹不應生。若一切法本有生滅,何故先生後滅不一時耶?以是義故,當知無性。」師子吼菩薩言:「世尊!若尼拘陀子,本無樹性而生樹者,是子何故不出於油?二俱無故。」「善男子!如是子中亦能生油,雖無本性,因緣故有。」師子吼言:「何故不名胡麻油耶?」「善男子!非胡麻故。善男子!如火緣生火、水緣生水,雖俱從緣,不能相有。尼拘陀子及胡麻油亦復如是,雖俱從緣,各不相生。尼拘陀子,性能治冷。胡麻油者,性能治風。善男子!譬如甘蔗,因緣故生。石蜜、黑蜜,雖俱一緣,色貌各異,石蜜治熱,黑蜜治冷。」
Lion's Roar said: "As the Buddha has taught, there are two kinds of cause: the primary cause, and the revealing cause. It is through soil, water, and manure serving as its revealing cause that a nyagrodha seed causes what is subtle to become coarse." The Buddha said: "Good son, if it were already originally present, what need would there be for a revealing cause at all? And, if it originally has no such nature at all, what, then, could a revealing cause possibly be revealing? If a nyagrodha seed originally has no coarse mark at all, and it is only through a revealing cause that this coarseness comes to arise, why, then, does a khadira tree not likewise arise from it? For both are equally absent to begin with. Good son, if something is unseen merely because it is subtle, then, once it becomes coarse, it ought to become visible — it is like a single mote of dust, which cannot be seen, and yet, once many motes of dust are gathered together, they become visible. The coarse form within the seed, then, ought likewise to become visible in just this way — why is this? Because, already present within it, are the sprout, the stem, the flower, and the fruit; and within each and every fruit are countless seeds, and within each and every seed are countless trees — it is for this reason that it is named coarse, and, since this coarseness is truly present, it therefore ought to be visible. Good son, if a nyagrodha seed truly possessed the nature of a nyagrodha tree, and a tree grows from it, then, when one sees this very seed being burned by fire, this very capacity to burn ought likewise to have been originally present within it — and, were it truly originally present, the tree ought never to have been able to grow from it in the first place. And, if every dharma truly possessed the nature of both arising and ceasing from the very outset, why, then, does arising always come first and ceasing only afterward, rather than both occurring at one and the same time? It is for this very reason that one should know that it possesses no such fixed nature at all." Lion's Roar Bodhisattva said: "World-Honored One, if a nyagrodha seed originally has no nature of a tree at all, and yet a tree grows from it, why, then, does this same seed not also produce oil? For both are equally absent to begin with." "Good son, a seed of this kind is, in fact, also able to produce oil — though it possesses no such nature originally, it comes to exist through causes and conditions." Lion's Roar said: "Why, then, is it not called sesame oil?" "Good son, because it is not sesame. Good son, it is just as fire arises in dependence on its own conditions, and water arises in dependence on its own conditions — though both alike arise from conditions, neither is able to possess the other's own nature. A nyagrodha seed and sesame oil are exactly the same: though both alike arise from conditions, neither produces the other. A nyagrodha seed's own nature is able to cure cold; sesame oil's own nature is able to cure wind-disorders. Good son, it is like sugarcane, which arises through its own causes and conditions — rock candy and black molasses, though they arise from one and the same source, differ entirely in color and form: rock candy cures heat-disorders, and black molasses cures cold-disorders."
師子吼菩薩言:「世尊!如其乳中無有酪性,麻無油性,尼拘陀子無有樹性,泥無瓶性,一切眾生無佛性者,如佛先說一切眾生悉有佛性,是故應得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提者,是義不然。何以故?人天無性。以無性故,人可作天,天可作人,以業因緣,不以性故。菩薩摩訶薩以業因緣故,得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。若諸眾生有佛性者,何因緣故,一闡提等斷諸善根,墮于地獄?若菩提心是佛性者,一闡提等不應能斷;若可斷者,云何得言佛性是常?若非常者,不名佛性。若諸眾生有佛性者,何故名為初發心耶?云何而言是毘跋致、阿毘跋致?毘跋致者當知是人無有佛性。世尊!菩薩摩訶薩一心趣向阿耨多羅三藐三菩提,大慈大悲,見生老病死煩惱過患,觀大涅槃無生老死煩惱諸過,信於三寶及業果報,受持禁戒,如是等法名為佛性。若離是法有佛性者,何須是法而作因緣?世尊!如乳不假緣必當成酪,生蘇不爾要待因緣,所謂人功、水瓶、攢繩。眾生亦爾,有佛性者,應離因緣得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。若定有者,行人何故見三惡苦、生、老、病、死,而生退心。亦不須修六波羅蜜,即應得成阿耨多羅三藐三菩提,如乳非緣而得成酪。然非不因六波羅蜜而得成於阿耨多羅三藐三菩提,以是義故,當知眾生悉無佛性。如佛先說僧寶是常,如其常者,則非無常;非無常者,云何而得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提?僧若常者,云何復言一切眾生悉有佛性?世尊!若使眾生從本已來無菩提心,亦無阿耨多羅三藐三菩提心,後方有者,眾生佛性亦應如是,本無後有。以是義故,一切眾生應無佛性。」
Lion's Roar Bodhisattva said: "World-Honored One, if milk has no nature of curd at all, sesame has no nature of oil at all, a nyagrodha seed has no nature of a tree at all, and clay has no nature of a pot at all, then, likewise, no being at all has buddha-nature — and, if this is so, then the Buddha's earlier teaching that every being, without exception, possesses buddha-nature, and therefore ought to attain unsurpassed, complete awakening, is, I think, not correct. Why is this? Human beings and heavenly beings possess no such fixed nature at all — it is precisely because they possess no fixed nature that a human being can become a heavenly being, and a heavenly being can become a human being, through the cause and condition of karma, and not through any fixed nature at all. A bodhisattva mahāsattva, too, attains unsurpassed, complete awakening through the cause and condition of karma. If every being truly possesses buddha-nature, then for what cause and condition does the icchantika sever every wholesome root and fall into hell? If the bodhi-mind is itself buddha-nature, then the icchantika ought never to be able to sever it at all; and, if it can indeed be severed, how, then, can buddha-nature possibly be called permanent? And, if it is not permanent, it cannot be named buddha-nature at all. If every being truly possesses buddha-nature, why, then, is there any such thing as 'the first arising of the mind' of awakening at all? And how, then, can one speak of a bodhisattva as either retrogressing or non-retrogressing? One who retrogresses, one should know, is a person entirely without buddha-nature. World-Honored One, a bodhisattva mahāsattva who single-mindedly turns toward unsurpassed, complete awakening, who possesses great loving-kindness and great compassion, who sees the faults and calamities of birth, old age, sickness, death, and affliction, who contemplates the great nirvāṇa as free of every such fault, who has faith in the three jewels and in the fruit of karmic action, and who upholds the precepts — dharmas of exactly this kind are what should be named buddha-nature. And, if buddha-nature exists apart from these very dharmas, what need would there be for these dharmas to serve as its cause and condition at all? World-Honored One, milk, without needing any further condition at all, is bound to become curd — yet fresh butter is not like this, and must instead depend upon causes and conditions, namely human effort, a water-vessel, and a churning cord. A being is exactly the same: if he already possesses buddha-nature, he ought to attain unsurpassed, complete awakening entirely apart from any cause or condition at all. And, if it is truly fixed and already present, why, then, does the practitioner, upon seeing the suffering of the three evil destinies, and of birth, old age, sickness, and death, give rise to a mind of retreat at all? Nor, in that case, would he need to cultivate the six perfections at all — he ought simply to attain unsurpassed, complete awakening directly, exactly as milk becomes curd without any further condition. And yet it is certainly not the case that unsurpassed, complete awakening is attained without depending on the six perfections at all — it is for this very reason that one should know that no being at all truly possesses buddha-nature. Furthermore, as the Buddha has earlier taught, the jewel of the Saṅgha is permanent — and, if it is truly permanent, it cannot be impermanent; and, if it is not impermanent, how, then, could it possibly attain unsurpassed, complete awakening at all? And, if the Saṅgha is truly permanent, how, then, can it also be said that every being, without exception, possesses buddha-nature? World-Honored One, if beings, from the very beginning, originally had no bodhi-mind at all, nor any mind of unsurpassed, complete awakening, and only came to possess it afterward, then a being's own buddha-nature ought to be exactly the same — originally absent, and only present afterward. It is for this very reason that every being, without exception, ought to have no buddha-nature at all."
Huiyuan reads the eight-reasons-for-non-seeing catalogue as Lion's Roar's own strongest possible move on behalf of hidden presence — if a nyagrodha tree fails to be seen in its seed only because of some ordinary perceptual limitation (too distant, too subtle, too obstructed, and so on), then non-seeing would indeed be compatible with the tree's genuine presence. The Buddha's refutation, on Huiyuan's reading, does not deny that things can be unseen for such reasons in general — it denies only that a nyagrodha seed's own case fits any of the eight, since a tree's characteristic form is precisely coarse, not subtle or easily obstructed, so the seed's own visible coarseness (root, stem, leaf, and fruit already discernible in gross outline) rules out exactly the excuses that would let a fine-grained, hidden tree escape detection. The burning argument that follows then closes off a different escape route: were "burnability" and "growability" both fixed properties already present in the seed from the start, both ought to be equally actual at every moment, yet a seed that is burned never also produces a tree, which is only intelligible if neither property was ever a fixed, pre-existing feature of the seed to begin with, but something that comes to be only through whichever set of conditions the seed actually meets.
Lion's Roar's culminating rebuttal here is the sharpest and most comprehensive challenge to the buddha-nature teaching raised anywhere in the sūtra so far, gathering nearly every thread of this fascicle's debate into a single, coordinated attack: if human and heavenly rebirth already show that karma, not fixed nature, explains transformation, why posit a fixed nature for awakening specifically? If buddha-nature is truly present and permanent, how can the icchantika sever it, and why does any bodhisattva ever retrogress at all? And if it is genuinely a cause requiring conditions — precepts, compassion, the six perfections — in what sense was it ever "already there" rather than simply "not yet produced"? Note that this challenge does not get a dedicated point-by-point rebuttal in the verses immediately following it — the Buddha's actual response, taken up in the next section, works instead by relocating the entire debate: rather than defending buddha-nature's fixed presence against each objection in turn, he distinguishes the impermanent bodhi-mind (which genuinely can retrogress, and is not itself buddha-nature) from buddha-nature proper (which the icchantika's severing never actually touches, precisely because it operates at an entirely different level than mental states or karmic causation) — a distinction that, in effect, concedes much of Lion's Roar's logical pressure on "the bodhi-mind as buddha-nature" while preserving the deeper claim intact.
The Mind Is Not Buddha-Nature
佛言:「善哉,善哉!善男子!汝已久知佛性之義,為眾生故作如是問。一切眾生實有佛性。汝言眾生若有佛性,不應而有初發心者,善男子!心非佛性。何以故?心是無常,佛性常故。汝言何故有退心者?實無退心。心若有退,終不能得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提,以遲得故名之為退。此菩提心實非佛性。何以故?一闡提等斷於善根,墮地獄故。若菩提心是佛性者,一闡提輩則不得名一闡提也。菩提之心,亦不得名為無常也。是故定知菩提之心實非佛性。
The Buddha said: "Excellent, excellent! Good son, you have already long known the true meaning of buddha-nature, and have raised this question only for the sake of beings. Every being, without exception, truly possesses buddha-nature. You say that, if every being possesses buddha-nature, there ought to be no such thing as 'the first arising of the mind' of awakening — good son, the mind is not buddha-nature. Why is this? Because the mind is impermanent, while buddha-nature is permanent. You ask why there is any such thing as a retrogressing mind — in truth, there is no such thing as a truly retrogressing mind at all. Were the mind truly capable of retrogression, it could never, in the end, attain unsurpassed, complete awakening at all — it is only because its attainment is delayed that it is named 'retrogression.' This bodhi-mind, in truth, is not buddha-nature at all. Why is this? Because the icchantika severs every wholesome root and falls into hell. If the bodhi-mind were itself buddha-nature, the icchantika could then never be named an icchantika at all — and the bodhi-mind, too, could then never be named impermanent. It is for this very reason that one may know for certain that the bodhi-mind, in truth, is not buddha-nature.
「善男子!汝言眾生若有佛性,不應假緣,如乳成酪者,是義不然。何以故?若言五緣成於生蘇,當知佛性亦復如是。譬如眾石,有金、有銀、有銅、有鐵,俱稟四大,一名一實,而其所出各各不同。要假眾緣,眾生福德、爐冶人功,然後出生,是故當知本無金性。眾生佛性不名為佛,以諸功德因緣和合,得見佛性,然後得佛。汝言眾生悉有佛性,何故不見者?是義不然。何以故?以諸因緣未和合故。善男子!以是義故,我說二因,正因、緣因。正因者名為佛性,緣因者發菩提心。以二因緣,得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提,如石出金。
"Good son, you say that, if every being possesses buddha-nature, it ought not to require any borrowed condition at all, the way milk becomes curd — this, I think, is not correct. Why is this? Just as five conditions together produce fresh butter, you should know that buddha-nature is exactly the same. It is like the various kinds of ore: there is gold, silver, copper, and iron — all alike composed of the four great elements, all sharing a single name, 'ore,' and a single underlying reality, and yet what each one yields is entirely different from the others. It is only by relying on many conditions together — a being's own merit, the smith's own furnace, and human effort — that gold is finally produced, and it is for this reason that one should know that no fixed nature of gold was originally present within the ore at all. A being's own buddha-nature is not, in itself, yet named 'buddha' — it is only once every kind of merit's own causes and conditions have come together in harmony that buddha-nature is seen, and only then that buddhahood itself is attained. You ask: if every being truly possesses buddha-nature, why, then, is it not seen? This, too, is not correct. Why is this? Because its every cause and condition has not yet come together in harmony. Good son, it is for this very reason that I speak of these two causes, the primary cause and the conditional cause. The primary cause is what is named buddha-nature; the conditional cause is the arising of the bodhi-mind. It is through these two causes and conditions together that unsurpassed, complete awakening is attained — exactly as gold is produced from ore.
「善男子!汝言僧常,一切眾生無佛性者,善男子!僧名和合,和合有二:一者世和合,二者第一義和合。世和合者名聲聞僧,義和合者名菩薩僧。世僧無常,佛性是常。如佛性常,義僧亦爾。復次有僧謂法和合,法和合者謂十二部經,十二部經常,是故我說法、僧是常。善男子!僧名和合,和合者名十二因緣,十二因緣中亦有佛性,十二因緣常。佛性亦爾,是故我說僧有佛性。又復僧者謂諸佛和合,是故我說僧有佛性。」
"Good son, you say that the Saṅgha is permanent, and yet that no being at all possesses buddha-nature — good son, 'saṅgha' means 'harmonious assembly,' and this harmony is of two kinds: worldly harmony, and harmony in the ultimate sense. Worldly harmony is named the śrāvaka saṅgha; harmony in the ultimate sense is named the bodhisattva saṅgha. The worldly saṅgha is impermanent, while buddha-nature is permanent — and, just as buddha-nature is permanent, the saṅgha in the ultimate sense is exactly the same. Furthermore, there is a saṅgha named for the harmony of the Dharma — this harmony of the Dharma is the twelve divisions of scripture, and, since the twelve divisions of scripture are permanent, it is for this reason that I teach that the Dharma and the Saṅgha are both permanent. Good son, 'saṅgha' means 'harmonious assembly,' and this harmonious assembly is named the twelve links of dependent origination — buddha-nature, too, is present within the twelve links of dependent origination, and the twelve links of dependent origination are themselves permanent. Buddha-nature is exactly the same, and it is for this reason that I teach that the Saṅgha possesses buddha-nature. And, further, the Saṅgha is named for the harmonious assembly of every buddha — it is for this reason, too, that I teach that the Saṅgha possesses buddha-nature."
Huiyuan reads the Buddha's answer here not as a point-by-point rebuttal of Lion's Roar's preceding challenge but as a reframing that dissolves much of its force at once: the bodhi-mind and buddha-nature are quietly separated into two different things sharing a confusingly similar vocabulary. The bodhi-mind is impermanent, capable of the "delay" loosely called retrogression, and is exactly what the icchantika severs — none of which is any longer a problem for buddha-nature proper, since buddha-nature was never identical to this mental event in the first place. Huiyuan reads the ore-and-gold simile as this section's positive account of how a "primary cause" can require a "conditional cause" without either collapsing into the other: gold, silver, copper, and iron all share the name and substance "ore," yet only the right combination of a smith's furnace and human effort draws out gold specifically from ore that could equally have yielded another metal — establishing, against Lion's Roar's charge that conditioned production disproves prior existence, that a substance's dependence on conditions to become manifest is compatible with its already being the specific kind of substance it is. He reads the concluding restatement — buddha-nature as primary cause (正因), the arising of the bodhi-mind as conditional cause (緣因) — as the fascicle's own final settlement of the entire causal debate opened at the very start of this part: the two-causes framework survives every objection because it was never claiming that the effect (buddhahood) already, fully exists within the cause, only that the specific cause capable of yielding it (buddha-nature, as opposed to some other substance) is already, genuinely present.
The Vow of a Bodhisattva Who Will Never Turn Back
「善男子!汝言眾生若有佛性,云何有退、有不退者?諦聽,諦聽!我當為汝分別解說。善男子!菩薩摩訶薩有十三法,則便退轉。何等十三?一者心不信;二者不作心;三者疑心;四者悋惜身財;五者於涅槃中生大怖畏,云何乃令眾生永滅;六者心不堪忍;七者心不調柔;八者愁惱;九者不樂;十者放逸;十一者自輕己身;十二者自見煩惱無能壞者;十三者不樂進趣菩提之法。善男子!是名十三法,令諸菩薩退轉菩提。復有六法壞菩提心。何等為六?一者悋法、二者於諸眾生起不善心、三者親近惡友、四者不勤精進、五者自大憍慢、六者營務世業。如是六法則能破壞菩提之心。善男子!有人得聞諸佛世尊是人天師,於眾生中最上無比,勝於聲聞辟支佛等。法眼明了,見法無礙,能度眾生於大苦海,聞已即復發大誓願。如其世間有如是人,我亦當得。以是因緣,發阿耨多羅三藐三菩提心,或復為他之所教誨發菩提心。或聞菩薩阿僧祇劫修行苦行,然後乃得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。聞已思惟:『我今不堪如是苦行,云何能得?』是故有退。「善男子!復有五法退菩提心。何等為五?一者樂在外道出家、二者不修大慈之心、三者好求法師過惡、四者常樂處在生死、五者不憙受持讀誦書寫解說十二部經,是名五法退菩提心。復有二法退菩提心。何等為二?一者貪樂五欲、二者不能恭敬尊重三寶。以如是等眾因緣故,退菩提心。
"Good son, you ask how, if every being possesses buddha-nature, there can still be such a thing as retrogression and non-retrogression at all. Listen closely, listen closely, and I shall distinguish and explain this fully for you. Good son, a bodhisattva mahāsattva retrogresses through any of thirteen dharmas. What are these thirteen? First, a mind without faith; second, a mind that does not act; third, a doubting mind; fourth, being miserly with one's own body and wealth; fifth, giving rise to great dread within nirvāṇa itself, thinking, 'How could this possibly cause beings to be extinguished forever?'; sixth, a mind unable to endure; seventh, a mind that is not gentle and pliant; eighth, sorrow and vexation; ninth, an absence of joy; tenth, heedlessness; eleventh, holding oneself in contempt; twelfth, seeing one's own affliction as something nothing at all is able to destroy; and thirteenth, taking no delight in advancing toward the dharmas of bodhi. Good son, these are named the thirteen dharmas that cause bodhisattvas to retrogress from bodhi. There are, further, six dharmas that destroy the bodhi-mind. What are these six? First, being miserly with the Dharma; second, giving rise to an unwholesome mind toward other beings; third, keeping close company with evil friends; fourth, a lack of diligent exertion; fifth, arrogance and pride; and sixth, being consumed by worldly affairs. Dharmas of exactly these six kinds are able to destroy the bodhi-mind. Good son, there is a person who, hearing that the buddhas, the world-honored ones, are the teachers of gods and humans, supreme and beyond compare among all beings, surpassing even the śrāvaka and the pratyekabuddha, possessed of a Dharma-eye of perfect clarity, seeing every dharma without obstruction, and able to deliver beings across the great sea of suffering, at once gives rise to a great vow upon hearing this, thinking: 'Since such a person truly exists in the world, I, too, shall attain this very thing.' It is through this very cause and condition that he gives rise to the mind of unsurpassed, complete awakening — or else he gives rise to the bodhi-mind through the instruction of another. Yet, upon hearing that a bodhisattva must cultivate austerities across countless kalpas before he finally attains unsurpassed, complete awakening, he reflects, upon hearing this: 'I cannot possibly endure austerities of this kind now — how, then, could I ever attain it?' — and it is for this very reason that he retrogresses. "Good son, there are, further, five dharmas that cause retrogression from the bodhi-mind. What are these five? First, delighting in renouncing the world among non-Buddhist paths; second, failing to cultivate the mind of great loving-kindness; third, delighting in seeking out the faults of Dharma-teachers; fourth, forever delighting in dwelling within birth-and-death; and fifth, taking no pleasure in upholding, reciting, copying out, and expounding the twelve divisions of scripture — these are named the five dharmas that cause retrogression from the bodhi-mind. There are, further, two dharmas that cause retrogression from the bodhi-mind. What are these two? First, craving and delighting in the five desires; and second, being unable to honor and revere the three jewels. It is through causes and conditions of every kind such as these that one retrogresses from the bodhi-mind."
「云何復名不退之心?有人聞佛能度眾生生老病死,不從師諮,自然修習得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。若菩提道是可得者,我當修習必令得之。以是因緣發菩提心,所作功德若多若少,悉以迴向阿耨多羅三藐三菩提,作是誓願:『願我常得親近諸佛及佛弟子,常聞深法五情完具,若遇苦難不失是心。復願諸佛及諸弟子,常於我所生歡喜心,具五善根。若諸眾生斫伐我身、斬截手足、頭目支節,當於是人生大慈心,深自喜慶,如是諸人為我增長菩提因緣,若無是者,我當何緣而得成就阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。』復發是願:『莫令我得無根、二根、女人之身,不繫屬人、不遭惡主、不屬惡王、不生惡國,若得好身種姓真正,多饒財寶不生憍慢,令我常聞十二部經,受持讀誦、書寫解說。若為眾生有所演說,願令受者敬信無疑,常於我所不生惡心。寧當少聞,多解義味,不願多聞,於義不了。願作心師,不師於心,身口意業不與惡交,能施一切眾生安樂,身戒心慧不動如山,欲為受持無上正法,於身命財不生慳悋。不淨之物不為福業,正命自活心無邪諂,受恩常念,小恩大報。善知世中所有事藝,善解眾生方俗之言,讀誦書寫十二部經,不生懈怠懶墮之心。若諸眾生不樂聽聞,方便引接,令彼樂聞。言常柔軟,口不宣惡,不和合眾能令和合,有憂怖者令離憂怖,飢饉之世令得豐足,疾病之世作大醫王,病藥所須財寶自在,令疾病者悉得除愈。刀兵之劫,有大力勢斷其殘害,令無遺餘。能斷眾生種種怖畏,所謂若死、閉繫、打擲、水火王賊、貧窮破戒、惡名惡道,如是等畏,悉當斷之。父母師長深生恭敬,怨憎之中生大慈心,常修六念、空三昧門、十二因緣、生滅等觀,出息入息、天行梵行及以聖行,金剛三昧、首楞嚴定,無三寶處令我自得寂靜之心。若其身心受大苦時,莫失無上菩提之心,莫以聲聞辟支佛心而生知足。無三寶處常在外道法中出家,為破邪見不習其道,得法自在,得心自在。於有為法,了了見過,令我怖畏二乘道果,如惜命者怖畏捨身,為眾生故樂處三惡。如諸眾生樂忉利天,為一一人於無量劫受地獄苦,心不生悔。見他得利,不生妬心,常生歡喜,如自得樂。若值三寶,當以衣服、飲食臥具、房舍醫藥、燈明花香、伎樂幡蓋、七寶供養。若受佛戒,堅固護持,終不生於毀犯之想。若聞菩薩難行苦行,其心歡喜不生悔恨,自識往世宿命之事,終不造作貪瞋癡業。不為果報而集因緣,於現在樂不生貪著。』善男子!若有能發如是願者,是名菩薩終不退失菩提之心。亦名施主,能見如來,明了佛性,能調眾生度脫生死,善能護持無上正法,能得具足六波羅蜜。善男子!以是義故,不退之心不名佛性。
"How, then, is the non-retrogressing mind named? There is a person who, hearing that the Buddha is able to deliver beings from birth, old age, sickness, and death, without relying on any teacher's instruction, naturally cultivates the path and attains unsurpassed, complete awakening, thinking: 'If the path to bodhi can truly be attained, then I, too, shall cultivate it and shall certainly attain it.' It is through this very cause and condition that he gives rise to the bodhi-mind, and, whatever merit he then performs, whether great or small, he dedicates it entirely to unsurpassed, complete awakening, making this very vow: 'May I forever draw close to the buddhas and to the buddhas' own disciples, forever hear the profound Dharma with all five senses complete, and, should I encounter any suffering or hardship, never lose this very resolve. May every buddha and every disciple, further, forever give rise to a joyful mind toward me, endowed with the five wholesome roots. Should any being hack at my body, or sever my hands, feet, head, or limbs, may I give rise, toward this very person, to a mind of great loving-kindness, and rejoice deeply within myself, thinking: this person, too, is increasing the very causes and conditions of my own bodhi — were there no such person at all, by what cause and condition could I possibly accomplish unsurpassed, complete awakening at all? May I never be born without sexual organs, with both sexual organs at once, or in a woman's body; may I never be bound in servitude to another, never encounter an evil master, never belong to an evil king, and never be born in an evil land; may I obtain a fine body and a true and proper lineage, be richly endowed with wealth yet never give rise to arrogance, and may I forever hear the twelve divisions of scripture, upholding, reciting, copying out, and expounding them. Should I expound the Dharma for the sake of beings, may every listener receive it with reverence and faith, free of doubt, and forever give rise to no ill will toward me. May I rather hear little yet understand its meaning deeply, than hear much yet fail to grasp its meaning at all. May I become a master over my own mind, rather than a servant to it; may my actions of body, speech, and mind never mix with any evil; may I be able to grant peace and happiness to every being; may my bodily discipline, mind, and wisdom remain unmoved as a mountain; may I, wishing to uphold the unsurpassed true Dharma, never be stingy with my own body, life, or wealth. May I never perform any meritorious act with impure things; may I sustain myself only through right livelihood, my mind free of deceit and flattery; may I remember every kindness received, and repay even a small kindness with a great one. May I be well versed in every worldly skill and craft, well understanding the languages and customs of every being; may I recite, copy out, and read the twelve divisions of scripture, never giving rise to any laziness or indolence. Should any being take no delight in listening, may I skillfully draw him in, so that he comes to delight in listening. May my speech forever be gentle, my mouth never proclaiming anything evil; may I bring harmony to those who are not in harmony, free those who are anxious and afraid from their anxiety and fear, bring abundance in a time of famine, and, in a time of sickness, become a great king of physicians, freely possessing whatever medicine and wealth the sick may need, so that every sick person is entirely cured. In an age of warfare and calamity, may I possess great power and strength to put an end to its cruelty, leaving nothing of it behind. May I be able to sever every kind of fear a being might hold — the fear of death, of imprisonment, of beating, of flood, of fire, of kings, of thieves, of poverty, of breaking the precepts, of ill repute, of an evil rebirth — fears of every such kind, may I sever them all entirely. May I show the deepest reverence toward my parents and teachers, and give rise to a mind of great loving-kindness even toward those who hate and resent me. May I forever cultivate the six recollections, the gate of the emptiness samādhi, the twelve links of dependent origination, the contemplation of arising and ceasing, the in-breath and the out-breath, heavenly conduct, pure conduct, and noble conduct, the vajra samādhi, and the Śūraṅgama concentration — and, in a place without the three jewels, may I attain a tranquil mind entirely of my own accord. Should my body and mind ever undergo great suffering, may I never lose the unsurpassed bodhi-mind, nor ever settle for contentment with the mind of a śrāvaka or a pratyekabuddha. In a place without the three jewels, may I forever become a renunciant within some non-Buddhist path, so as to refute wrong views without ever actually practicing that path myself, thereby attaining mastery over the Dharma and mastery over my own mind. May I see, with perfect clarity, every fault of every conditioned dharma, so that I come to dread the fruit of the two lesser vehicles exactly as one who cherishes his own life dreads casting away his body — and, for the sake of beings, may I delight in dwelling even among the three evil destinies. Just as other beings delight in the Trāyastriṃśa heaven, may I, for the sake of each and every single being, endure the suffering of hell across countless kalpas, my mind never giving rise to any regret at all. Seeing another attain some gain, may I never give rise to envy, but forever rejoice, exactly as though I myself had attained that very happiness. Should I encounter the three jewels, may I make offerings to them of robes, food and drink, bedding, dwelling, medicine, lamps and incense, flowers, music, banners and canopies, and the seven treasures. Should I receive the Buddha's own precepts, may I uphold them firmly, never once giving rise to any thought of violating them. Should I hear of a bodhisattva's difficult practices and arduous austerities, may my mind rejoice, giving rise to no regret at all; may I remember for myself the affairs of my own past lives, and never again commit any action born of greed, hatred, or delusion. May I never accumulate causes and conditions for the sake of some future fruit, nor give rise to craving or attachment toward any present happiness.' Good son, should anyone be able to give rise to a vow of exactly this kind, this is named a bodhisattva who, in the end, never loses or retrogresses from the bodhi-mind. He is also named a true donor, one who is able to see the Tathāgata, who understands buddha-nature with complete clarity, who is able to tame beings and deliver them from birth-and-death, who is well able to uphold and protect the unsurpassed true Dharma, and who is able to fully complete the six perfections. Good son, it is for this very reason that even the non-retrogressing mind itself is not named buddha-nature."
The four escalating lists of retrogression-causes (thirteen, then six, then five, then two) work like the ten-things passage of Part 27: not redundant repetition but successive tightenings, each list naming failure at a different grain — the thirteen catalogue interior psychological states (doubt, dread, self-contempt), the six name relational and behavioral failures (miserliness, bad company, worldly entanglement), and the closing five and two narrow to the barest essentials (non-Buddhist company, craving, irreverence). Read together, they make the same point from four angles: retrogression is never one single failure but a whole ecology of smaller ones, any single strand of which can unravel the whole.
The vow that follows is the longest sustained first-person statement in the sūtra so far, and its scale is itself the argument: rather than defining "non-retrogression" abstractly, the text simply lets a bodhisattva speak in his own voice at enough length that the reader feels the sheer comprehensiveness of what a genuinely unshakeable resolve would have to cover — bodily harm met with gratitude rather than resentment, worldly competence (languages, crafts, medicine, statecraft) placed entirely in service of others, austerity chosen rather than feared, and even birth among non-Buddhist teachers accepted as a deliberate strategy for undermining wrong view from within. Its closing line — that even this vow, sustained to its end, is still not itself buddha-nature — completes the same maneuver as the previous section's separation of the bodhi-mind from buddha-nature proper: however total a practitioner's resolve becomes, resolve itself remains an act of mind, and buddha-nature, by this fascicle's own repeated insistence, is what no act of mind, however vast, can be identical to.
The Seven-Jewel Mountain
「善男子!汝不可以有退心故,言諸眾生無有佛性。譬如二人俱聞他方有七寶山,山有清泉,其味甘美,有能到者,永斷貧窮,服其水者,增壽萬歲,唯路懸遠,嶮阻多難。時彼二人,俱欲共往,一人莊嚴種種行具,一則空往無所齎持。相與前進,路值一人,多齎寶貨七珍具足。二人便前問言:『仁者!彼土實有七寶山耶?』其人答言:『實有不虛,我已獲寶,飲服其水,唯患路嶮多有盜賊,沙鹵棘刺乏於水草,往者千萬,達者甚少。』聞是事已,一人即悔,尋作是言:『路既懸遠,艱難非一,往者無量,達者無幾,而我云何當能到彼?我今產業粗自供足,若涉斯路,或失身命,身命不全,長壽安在?』一人復言:『有人能過,我亦能過。若得果達,則得如願,採取珍寶,飲服甘水。如其不達,以死為期。』是時二人,一則悔還,一則前進到彼山所,多獲財寶,如願服水,多齎所有,還其所止,奉養父母,賑給宗親。時悔還者見是事已,心中生熱:『彼去已還,我何為住?』即便莊嚴,涉道而去。七寶山者喻大涅槃,甘美之水喻於佛性,其二人者喻二菩薩初發道心,嶮惡道者喻於生死,所逢人者喻佛世尊,有盜賊者喻於四魔,沙鹵棘刺喻諸煩惱,無水草者喻不修習菩提之道,一人還者喻退轉菩薩,其直往者喻不退菩薩。善男子!眾生佛性常住不變,猶彼嶮道,不可說言人悔還故,令道無常,佛性亦爾。善男子!菩提道中終無退者。善男子!如向悔者,見其先伴獲寶而還,勢力自在,供養父母,給足宗親,多受安樂。見是事已,心中生熱,即復莊嚴復道還去,不惜身命,堪忍眾難,遂便到彼七寶山中,退轉菩薩亦復如是。善男子!一切眾生定當得成阿耨多羅三藐三菩提,以是義故,我經中說,一切眾生,乃至五逆、犯四重禁及一闡提,悉有佛性。」
"Good son, you cannot, merely because there is such a thing as a retrogressing mind, say that beings therefore have no buddha-nature at all. It is like two men who both hear that, in a distant land, there is a mountain of the seven treasures, upon which flows a clear spring whose water is sweet — whoever is able to reach it will forever put an end to poverty, and whoever drinks of its water will have his lifespan increased by ten thousand years; only the road there is impossibly distant, steep, and beset with every kind of danger. At that time, these two men both wished to make the journey together — one equipped himself with every kind of provision, while the other set out with nothing at all. As they journeyed on together, they met, along the road, a man richly laden with treasure and all seven kinds of jewels. The two men came forward and asked him: 'Good sir, does that land truly contain a mountain of the seven treasures?' The man answered: 'It truly exists, without falsehood — I have already obtained its treasure, and drunk of its water; only the road is perilous, beset with many bandits, its sands and salt-flats and thorns leaving it bare of water and grass — those who set out for it number in the thousands and tens of thousands, yet those who actually arrive are very few indeed.' Upon hearing this, one of the two men at once repented, saying: 'Since the road is so impossibly distant, and its hardships so many, and those who set out number beyond count while those who arrive are almost none — how, then, could I possibly reach it? My own household affairs, as things stand, roughly provide for themselves already — should I set out upon this road, I might well lose my very life, and, my body and life no longer whole, what use would a long lifespan even be to me then?' The other man said, further: 'Since another has been able to cross it, I, too, am able to cross it. Should I succeed in arriving, I shall attain exactly what I wished — gathering its treasure, and drinking its sweet water. And, should I fail to arrive, then death itself shall simply be my appointed end.' At that time, of these two men, one repented and turned back, while the other pressed onward and reached that very mountain, where he gathered great wealth, drank the water exactly as he had wished, and, laden with all he had gained, returned to his own home, where he supported his parents and provided generously for his own kin. The man who had repented and turned back, upon seeing this, felt his own heart burn within him, thinking: 'He who went has now returned — why, then, do I remain here?' — and at once equipped himself and set out upon that very road. The mountain of the seven treasures is a likeness for the great nirvāṇa; its sweet, delicious water is a likeness for buddha-nature; these two men are a likeness for two bodhisattvas who have both newly given rise to the mind of the path; the perilous, evil road is a likeness for birth-and-death; the man they encountered is a likeness for the Buddha, the World-Honored One; the bandits present along the way are a likeness for the four Māras; the sands, salt-flats, and thorns are a likeness for every affliction; the absence of water and grass is a likeness for the failure to cultivate the path to bodhi; the man who turned back is a likeness for the retrogressing bodhisattva; and the man who pressed straight onward is a likeness for the non-retrogressing bodhisattva. Good son, a being's own buddha-nature abides forever, unchanging, exactly like that perilous road itself — one cannot say that, merely because a man repented and turned back, the road itself thereby became impermanent; buddha-nature is exactly the same. Good son, along the path to bodhi, there is, in the end, no such thing as true retrogression at all. Good son, it is exactly as with the man who repented: seeing his former companion return with treasure in hand, possessed of power and ease, supporting his parents and providing amply for his kin, enjoying great happiness in abundance — upon seeing this, his own heart burned within him, and he, too, at once equipped himself and set out once more upon that very road, sparing not his own body or life, enduring every hardship, until he, too, finally reached that very mountain of the seven treasures. The retrogressing bodhisattva is exactly the same. Good son, every being, without exception, is certain to attain unsurpassed, complete awakening — it is for this very reason that, within my own scriptures, I teach that every being, without exception — even one who has committed the five heinous crimes, violated the four gravest precepts, or is an icchantika — possesses buddha-nature."
The seven-jewel mountain simile resolves the whole retrogression debate through a shift of reference, not a denial of the facts: what turns back is never the road, the mountain, or the water — only, temporarily, one traveler's own resolve — and the man who turns back is shown, in the story's own telling, eventually completing the journey after all, spurred on by seeing his companion succeed. This structurally answers Lion's Roar's sharpest objection several sections earlier (if buddha-nature is fixed and permanent, why does anyone ever retrogress at all?): retrogression describes a temporary interruption in the traveler, describable and real, without implying anything at all about the permanence of the destination itself, which is precisely the distinction the sūtra has been building since separating buddha-nature from the impermanent bodhi-mind two sections earlier. The story's insistence that the road "never becomes impermanent" merely because a traveler turns back translates directly: a bodhisattva's retrogression is a fact about bodhisattvas, not a fact about buddha-nature, and the two must never be confused despite how naturally the debate keeps sliding between them.
The closing formula — that even the one who committed the five heinous crimes, violated the four gravest precepts, or is an icchantika possesses buddha-nature — closes the entire causation debate opened at this fascicle's very start on the same note this whole chapter has struck since Part 26's lute simile: universal possession was never a claim about universal, guaranteed, effortless success, but about what remains permanently, truly present beneath even total, if temporary, incapacity.
The Thirty-Two Marks
師子吼言:「世尊!云何菩薩有退、不退?」「善男子!若有菩薩修習如來三十二相業因緣者,得名不退,得名菩薩摩訶薩也,名不動轉、名為憐愍一切眾生、名勝一切聲聞緣覺、名阿毘跋致。善男子!若菩薩摩訶薩持戒不動,施心不移,安住實語如須彌山,以是業緣,得足下平,如奩底相。「若菩薩摩訶薩於父母所、和上、師長乃至畜生,以如法財供養供給,以是業緣得成足下千輻輪相。「若菩薩摩訶薩不殺不盜,於父母、師長常生歡喜,以是業緣得成三相:一者手指纖長,二者足跟長,三者其身方直。如是三相,同一業緣。「若菩薩摩訶薩修四攝法攝取眾生,以是業緣,得網縵指,如白鵝王。「若菩薩摩訶薩,父母、師長若病苦時,自手洗拭,捉持案摩,以是業緣,得手足軟。「若菩薩摩訶薩持戒聞法,惠施無厭,以是業緣,得節踝[跳-兆+庸]滿身毛上靡。「若菩薩摩訶薩專心聽法,演說正教,以是業緣,得鹿王[蹲-酋+(十/田/ㄙ)]。「若菩薩摩訶薩於諸眾生不生害心,飲食知足常樂,惠施瞻病給藥,以是業緣,其身圓滿如尼拘陀樹。立手過膝,頂有肉髻,無見頂相。「若菩薩摩訶薩見怖畏者為作救護,見裸跣者施與衣服,以是業緣得陰藏相。「若菩薩摩訶薩親近智者,遠離愚人,善憙問答,掃治行路,以是業緣,皮膚細軟,身毛右旋。「若菩薩摩訶薩常以衣服飲食、臥具醫藥、香花燈明施人,以是業緣,得身金色,常光明曜。「若菩薩摩訶薩行施之時,所珍之物能捨不悋,不觀福田及非福田,以是業緣,得七處滿相。「若菩薩摩訶薩布施之時,心不生疑,以是業緣,得柔軟聲。「若菩薩摩訶薩如法求財,以用布施,以是業緣,得缺骨充滿,師子上身,臂肘傭纖。「若菩薩摩訶薩遠離兩舌、惡口、恚心,以是業緣,得四十牙齒白淨齊密。「若菩薩摩訶薩於諸眾生修大慈悲,以是業緣,得二牙相。「若菩薩摩訶薩常作是願:『有來求者,隨意給與。』以是業緣,得師子頰。「若菩薩摩訶薩隨諸眾生所須飲食悉皆與之,以是業緣得味中上味。「若菩薩摩訶薩自修十善,兼以化人,以是業緣,得廣長舌。「若菩薩摩訶薩不訟彼短、不謗正法,以是業緣,得梵音聲。「若菩薩摩訶薩見諸怨憎,生於喜心,以是業緣,得目睫紺色。「若菩薩摩訶薩不隱他德,稱揚其善,以是業緣,得白毫相。善男子!若菩薩摩訶薩修習如是三十二相業因緣時,則得不退菩提之心。
Lion's Roar said: "World-Honored One, how, then, does a bodhisattva either retrogress or not retrogress?" "Good son, should a bodhisattva cultivate the karmic causes and conditions of the Tathāgata's thirty-two marks, he attains the name of one who does not retrogress, the name of a bodhisattva mahāsattva, the name of one unmoved and unshaken, the name of one who has compassion for every being, the name of one who surpasses every śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha, and the name avaivartika. Good son, should a bodhisattva mahāsattva uphold the precepts unwaveringly, never shift from a generous mind, and abide in truthful speech as firmly as Mount Sumeru, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains the mark of level soles, flat as the bottom of a jewel-casket. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva provide for his parents, his preceptor, his teachers, and even animals, with wealth rightfully obtained, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains the mark of a thousand-spoked wheel upon the soles of his feet. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva refrain from killing and from stealing, and forever rejoice in the presence of his parents and teachers, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains three marks together: slender, tapering fingers; long heels; and a body that is upright and squared — these three marks share one and the same karmic cause. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva practice the four means of attracting beings in order to draw them in, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains webbed fingers, like a white swan-king's own. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva, when his parents or teachers are ill and suffering, wash and wipe them with his own hands, and hold and massage them himself, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains soft hands and feet. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva uphold the precepts, listen to the Dharma, and give generously without ever tiring of it, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains full, rounded ankles, and body-hair that lies smooth, curling upward. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva listen to the Dharma single-mindedly and expound the true teaching, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains calves like a royal antelope's. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva give rise to no intent to harm toward any being, be content with whatever food and drink he receives, forever rejoice, and give generously in tending to the sick and providing medicine, through this very karmic cause and condition his own body becomes full and rounded like a nyagrodha tree; his outstretched arms reach past his own knees; the crown of his head bears a fleshy protuberance; and his crown cannot be seen even from above. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva, upon seeing one who is afraid, come to his rescue and protection, and, upon seeing one who is naked and bare-footed, give him clothing, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains the mark of a concealed, sheathed organ. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva draw close to the wise and keep distant from the foolish, delighting in questions and answers, and sweep clean the roads others must travel, through this very karmic cause and condition his skin becomes fine and soft, and his body-hair curls to the right. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva forever give to others robes, food and drink, bedding, medicine, incense, flowers, and lamps, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains a body of golden color, forever radiant with light. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva, in the act of giving, be able to give up his own most treasured possessions without any stinginess at all, giving no thought to whether the recipient is or is not a worthy field of merit, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains the mark of seven full, rounded parts of the body. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva, in the act of giving, give rise to no doubt at all in his own mind, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains a soft, gentle voice. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva seek wealth only by rightful means, and use it for giving, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains full, unhollowed collarbones, a torso like a lion's, and arms and elbows both rounded and slender. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva keep far from divisive speech, harsh speech, and a resentful mind, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains forty teeth, white, pure, even, and closely set. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva cultivate great loving-kindness and great compassion toward every being, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains the mark of the two eye-teeth. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva forever make this very vow — "Whoever comes to ask of me, I shall give freely, according to his own wish" — through this very karmic cause and condition he attains a lion's own cheeks. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva give to every being whatever food and drink each one requires, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains the supreme taste among every flavor. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva himself cultivate the ten wholesome deeds, and, further, use them to transform others, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains a broad, long tongue. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva never dispute another's faults, nor slander the true Dharma, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains a voice like Brahmā's own. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva, upon seeing those who hate and resent him, give rise to a joyful mind, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains eyelashes of a deep, dark blue. Should a bodhisattva mahāsattva never conceal another's own virtue, but praise and extol it, through this very karmic cause and condition he attains the mark of the white tuft of hair between the eyebrows. Good son, should a bodhisattva mahāsattva cultivate the karmic causes and conditions of these thirty-two marks in just this way, he attains a bodhi-mind that never retrogresses."
「善男子!一切眾生不可思議,諸佛境界、業果、佛性,亦不可思議。何以故?如是四法,皆悉是常,以是常故不可思議。一切眾生煩惱覆障,故名為常;斷常煩惱故,故名無常。若言一切眾生常者,何故修習八聖道分為斷眾苦?眾苦若斷則名無常,所受之樂則名為常。是故我言,一切眾生煩惱覆障不見佛性,以不見故不得涅槃。」
"Good son, every being is inconceivable, and the domain of every buddha, the fruit of karma, and buddha-nature are, likewise, inconceivable. Why is this? Because these four dharmas are all, without exception, permanent, and it is precisely because they are permanent that they are inconceivable. Every being is covered over by affliction, and it is for this reason that he is named permanent; and it is through severing this very affliction that he is named impermanent. Should one say that every being is simply permanent, why, then, does he cultivate the eightfold noble path in order to sever every suffering at all? Once suffering is severed, it is then named impermanent, while the bliss he thereby receives is then named permanent. It is for this very reason that I say: it is only because every being is covered over by affliction that he fails to see buddha-nature, and it is only because he fails to see it that he fails to attain nirvāṇa."
The thirty-two marks list deliberately answers Lion's Roar's causation debate on its own terms rather than by appeal to buddha-nature: each mark is traced to a specific, ordinary virtuous act — nursing sick parents, sweeping the road for others, never disputing another's faults — with no hidden metaphysical claim that the mark was somehow already latent in the bodhisattva beforehand. This is the fascicle's own worked demonstration that "non-retrogression" can be discussed entirely in the vocabulary of karmic cause and effect, without needing buddha-nature to do any explanatory work at all — which is exactly the register in which the earlier debate showed the bodhi-mind, unlike buddha-nature, actually operates.
The closing paradox — that beings, the buddha-domain, karmic fruit, and buddha-nature are all "permanent," and inconceivable precisely because they are permanent, and yet beings are also correctly called "impermanent" once the eightfold path severs their affliction — completes this fascicle's running theme (already raised through the six-meanings-of-'without' debate and the three-times analysis of past, present, and future existence) that a single word can carry two legitimate but distinct senses depending on what, exactly, is being tracked: a being covered by affliction is "permanent" only in the sense that this covering has always applied and buddha-nature beneath it is untouched by time, while the very same being is "impermanent" in the sense that his suffering itself, once severed, does not return. Fixing which sense is meant, rather than picking one usage as simply correct, is this entire fascicle's method from its opening precept debate onward.
Part 28 Complete
This closes Part 28 (fascicle 28 of 40), the sūtra's longest and most sustained debate over buddha-nature's mode of existence. Lion's Roar's amra-fruit question on discerning genuine precept-keeping opens onto a challenge that nirvāṇa, as a caused fruit, ought to be impermanent — resolved through the reciprocal, "cause and cause-of-cause" structure of faith and hearing, and the distinction between a generative cause and a merely revealing one. The chapter's central debate then asks, at exhausting and exhilarating length, whether milk already secretly contains curd: a knife's distorted reflection, a pregnant woman not yet called "mother," a nyagrodha seed no eye can find a tree inside, and the etymology of "existence" across all three times each test whether buddha-nature is already, fully present or merely certain to be revealed — resolved through the two-causes framework (buddha-nature as primary cause, the six perfections and the bodhi-mind as conditional cause) and the sharp separation of the impermanent, retrogression-capable bodhi-mind from buddha-nature proper, which no icchantika's severing can ever actually touch. The fascicle closes with the seven-jewel mountain's answer to why anyone ever turns back from a permanent goal, the extraordinary vow of a bodhisattva who never will, and the karmic history behind each of the thirty-two marks. Part 29 continues 師子吼菩薩品第十一之三, carrying the chapter's inquiry into buddha-nature further still.
Continue to Part 29 →