The Basis of the Knowable: The Ālayavijñāna

Here, first of all, we speak of the basis of the knowable: it is the ālayavijñāna. Where did the World-Honored One speak of the ālayavijñāna by the name ālayavijñāna? The Bhagavat says, in a verse of the Abhidharma-mahāyāna-sūtra:

So much for the scriptural proof cited here. Now, for what reason is this consciousness named the ālayavijñāna? Because all arising, defiled dharmas are gathered and stored within it as its effect; and because this very consciousness is gathered and stored within them as their cause — for this reason it is named the ālayavijñāna. Or: because sentient beings gather and store this consciousness as their own self — for this reason too it is named the ālayavijñāna.

Furthermore, this consciousness is also named the ādāna-consciousness. The scriptural proof here is as the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra says:

For what reason is this consciousness also named the ādāna-consciousness? Because it appropriates all the physical faculties, and because it is the support for the taking-up of every bodily existence. Why is this? Because it is through this appropriation that the physical faculties remain unimpaired and continue for the entire span of life. And, further, at the very moment of taking up rebirth within the life-continuum, it is by taking up that birth that it appropriates a bodily existence. For this reason, this consciousness is also named the ādāna-consciousness.

This consciousness is also named "mind" (citta), as the World-Honored One said: "mind, intellect, and consciousness — these three." Here, "intellect" (manas) is of two kinds. The first serves as the support providing the immediately-preceding condition: the consciousness that has just ceased is able to serve as the support for the arising of the mental consciousness. The second is a defiled manas, constantly and always associated with four afflictions — first, the view of a substantial self; second, self-conceit; third, self-love; fourth, ignorance — and this is the support for consciousness's own defilement. Consciousness, in turn, arises through the first kind of manas as its support, and becomes defiled through the second. In the sense of discerning an object, [it is called] consciousness; in the sense of "the immediately preceding," and in the sense of "deliberating," "intellect" becomes twofold.

Furthermore, how is it known that a defiled manas exists? Because, if it did not exist, unshared ignorance could not exist — which would be a fault. And the fivefold parallel could not exist — which would also be a fault. Why is this? Because each of the five sense-consciousnesses must have a co-present support, such as the eye-faculty. And the etymology of the word "manas" could not exist — which would also be a fault. And there would be no distinction between the attainment of no-thought and the attainment of cessation — which would also be a fault: the attainment of no-thought is marked by the presence of this defiled manas, the attainment of cessation is not; if this were not so, the two attainments would have no distinction at all. And in the heavens of no-thought, there would, for the whole span of that life, be no defilement at all — which would also be a fault, since without this manas there could be no self-grasping and self-conceit there either. And self-grasping is, in fact, found operating at all times — in wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral states of mind alike; if this were not so, since [ordinary self-grasping] is associated only with unwholesome mind, the affliction of "I" and "mine" could arise only in unwholesome states, never in wholesome or neutral ones. Therefore, once one posits manas as a constant, co-present activity — not merely an occasional associated one — none of these faults arise.

Because this manas is defiled, it has the nature of the obscured-but-neutral, and is constantly associated with the four afflictions — just as the afflictions bound to the form and formless realms are likewise classed as obscured-but-neutral, being gathered in and concealed by calming meditation; this manas, in just the same way, subtly follows along at all times.

As for this third [scriptural name], "mind" — apart from the ālayavijñāna, no separate substance for it can be found. Therefore it is established that the ālayavijñāna itself is the substance of "mind"; and it is from this, as seed, that both manas and the [six active] consciousnesses arise. For what reason is it also named "mind"? Because it is where the seeds habituated by manifold dharmas are gathered and accumulated.

Furthermore, why does the Śrāvaka Vehicle not speak of this mind by the name ālayavijñāna, or by the name ādāna-consciousness? Because it belongs to a deep and subtle domain. Why is this? Because śrāvakas do not set out toward the wisdom of every object; therefore, even without this teaching, their wisdom is still brought to completion, and their liberation still accomplished — and so it is not taught to them. Bodhisattvas, however, are set on operating toward the wisdom of every object; therefore it is taught to them. Apart from this wisdom, the wisdom that knows all things in every mode is not easily attained.

Furthermore, the Śrāvaka Vehicle, too, has already spoken of the ālayavijñāna through a hidden intent, under a different name — as the Ekottarika-āgama says: "The beings of the world love the ālaya, delight in the ālaya, are pleased by the ālaya, rejoice in the ālaya; and it is in order to cut off this very ālaya that, when the true Dharma is taught, [the wise] listen with reverence, attend with ears inclined, abide with a mind seeking understanding, and practice in accordance with the Dharma. The Tathāgata's appearance in the world — so rare and wondrous a true Dharma — has thus appeared in the world." In the Śrāvaka Vehicle's Sūtra on the Four Virtues of the Tathāgata's Appearance, the ālayavijñāna has, through this same hidden intent, already been revealed. In the scriptures of the Mahāsāṃghika school, too, it is spoken of, under a different name, as the "root consciousness" — as a tree depends on its root. In the Mahīśāsaka school, too, it is spoken of, under a different name, as the "aggregate that runs through birth and death to its end." The objection that, in certain places and at certain times, form and mind are seen to be cut off does not mean that the seeds within the ālayavijñāna are ever themselves cut off.

Such, then, is the ālayavijñāna as the basis of the knowable — spoken of as having the nature of the ālayavijñāna, the nature of the ādāna-consciousness, the nature of mind, the nature of ālaya, the nature of the root consciousness, the nature of the aggregate that runs through birth and death, and so on. Through these different names, the ālayavijñāna becomes like a great royal road, which every school's teaching, under one name or another, actually travels.

There is one view that holds "mind," "intellect," and "consciousness" to be one and the same in meaning, differing only in wording. This does not hold: since intellect and consciousness can be found to differ in meaning, "mind" too should be understood to differ from them. There is another view, concerning the Bhagavat's saying that beings "love the ālaya" and so on at length, which holds that it is the five appropriated aggregates that are named "ālaya" there. Others hold that it is pleasurable feeling bound up with craving that is so named. Others still hold that it is the view of a substantial self. These various teachers, through misreading both scripture and reasoning, are simply ignorant of the storehouse consciousness, and so hold to these views — and positing the name "ālaya" in this way does not even fit the Śrāvaka Vehicle's own way of establishing things. But for one who is not ignorant of the storehouse consciousness — taking this very consciousness as what "ālaya" means — this positing is the most excellent. Why is it most excellent?

If the five appropriated aggregates were named "ālaya," then, since a being born into the evil destinies — a place of one-directional suffering, utterly repugnant — would never give rise to any love or delight there, clinging and storing would make no sense, since such a being only ever seeks to cast those aggregates off as quickly as possible. If pleasurable feeling bound up with craving were named "ālaya," then, since this does not exist above the fourth meditative absorption, beings who have attained that state would always feel repugnance toward it, and clinging and storing would likewise make no sense.

If the view of a substantial self were named "ālaya," then those within this true Dharma who have come to believe and understand non-self would always feel repugnance toward it, and clinging and storing would likewise make no sense. The ālayavijñāna, however, is included within one's very sense of an inner self: even though a being born into the evil destinies seeks to be free of that mass of suffering, it has still never once sought to be free of the self-love bound to the storehouse consciousness. Even though a being born above the fourth meditative absorption always feels repugnance toward pleasurable craving, it is still bound by self-love to the storehouse consciousness. And even one who has come, within this true Dharma, to believe and understand non-self, and so feels repugnance toward the view of self, is still bound by self-love to the storehouse consciousness. For this reason, positing the name "ālaya" for the ālayavijñāna is what succeeds most excellently of all.

Having thus spoken of the different names given to the ālayavijñāna, how may its actual characteristics be seen? These, briefly stated, are of three kinds: first, the self-characteristic; second, the cause-characteristic; third, the effect-characteristic. Here, the self-characteristic of the ālayavijñāna is this: in dependence on the habituation left by every kind of defiled dharma, it serves as their generating cause, since it is what holds and retains their seeds. Here, the cause-characteristic of the ālayavijñāna is this: it is this very all-seeds ālayavijñāna that, at all times, serves as the present cause for defiled dharmas of every kind. Here, the effect-characteristic of the ālayavijñāna is this: it is in dependence on the beginningless habituation left by these defiled dharmas that the ālayavijñāna itself arises in an unbroken continuity.

Furthermore, what is meant by "habituation"? "Habituation" is the term; what does it actually refer to? It refers to this: in dependence on a given dharma, something arises and ceases together with it, and carries within it, thereafter, a capacity to generate that same thing again as its cause — this is what the term refers to. It is like the scent-habituation found in sesame seeds: the sesame seed and the flower [once placed beside it] arise and cease together, so that the sesame seed comes to carry within it the cause capable of generating that same fragrance again. Or take one habituated to craving: the habituation of craving arises and ceases together with the craving itself, so that the mind comes to carry within it the cause capable of generating that craving again. Or take one of great learning: the habituation of great learning arises and ceases together with the attention paid in hearing, so that the mind comes to carry within it the cause capable of remembering it again — and it is because of this habituation's capacity to hold and retain that such a person is called "one who holds the Dharma." The principle of habituation at work in the ālayavijñāna should be understood in just the same way.

Furthermore, are the seeds of the various defiled dharmas within the ālayavijñāna present as distinct, separate things, or as not distinct at all? Neither: it is not that these seeds are some separate, substantially real thing residing within it, nor is it simply that they are not different from the consciousness itself. Rather, the ālayavijñāna arises in just such a way that it possesses a differentiated capacity able to generate those dharmas — and it is this that is named the all-seeds consciousness.

Furthermore, how may it be seen that the ālayavijñāna and defiled dharmas serve as each other's cause at one and the same time? It is like a burning lamp, whose flame and wick simultaneously generate and consume one another. Or it is like a bundle of reeds, which stand upright only by mutually supporting one another at the same time. The principle of mutual causality here should be understood in just this way: just as the ālayavijñāna is the cause of defiled dharmas, defiled dharmas are equally the cause of the ālayavijñāna. It is only in this manner that a causal condition can be established here at all, since no other kind of causal condition can be found for it.

How can habituation, itself undifferentiated and unmixed, serve as the cause of dharmas that are differentiated and mixed? It is like a garment being tie-dyed in many patterns: at the moment the ties are being applied, no differentiated, multiple pattern can yet be found on it; only after it has been placed into the dye-vat do differentiated, multiple colors, cords, and figured patterns then appear upon it. The ālayavijñāna is just the same. While it is being habituated by the manifold, mixed things that habituate it, no differentiation can yet be found within the habituation itself; only once the result appears — once it has, so to speak, entered the dye-vat — do differentiated dharmas of immeasurable kinds then appear.

Such dependent origination, within the Great Vehicle, is extremely subtle and profound. Briefly stated, it is of two kinds: first, the dependent origination that differentiates own-nature; second, the dependent origination that differentiates the desirable and the undesirable. Here, the arising of dharmas in dependence on the ālayavijñāna is named the dependent origination that differentiates own-nature, since it is able to differentiate the various own-natures of things by serving as their condition. And there is, further, the twelvefold dependent origination, which is named the dependent origination that differentiates the desirable and the undesirable, since it is able to differentiate the various desirable and undesirable embodiments experienced in the fortunate and unfortunate destinies, by serving as their condition.

Concerning the ālayavijñāna: if one is ignorant of the first kind of dependent origination, one variously imagines own-nature as the cause, or a prior act as the cause, or a sovereign power's transformation as the cause, or a real self as the cause, or that there is no cause and no condition at all. If one is ignorant of the second kind, one further imagines a self as the agent, and a self as the one who experiences the result.

It is like a great many men blind from birth, who have never seen an elephant, to whom an elephant is described and then brought near. Some of these blind men touch its trunk, some its tusks, some its ears, some its legs, some its tail, some the ridge of its back. When asked, "What does an elephant look like?", some say it is like a plow-handle, some say like a pestle, some like a winnowing basket, some like a mortar, some like a broom, and some say an elephant is like a rocky mountain.

Those blinded by ignorance, failing to understand these two kinds of dependent origination, are just the same: some conceive own-nature as the cause, some a prior act as the cause, some a sovereign power as the cause, some a real self as the cause, some that there is no cause and no condition at all; and some conceive a self as agent, and a self as the one who experiences the result. The ālayavijñāna's own self-nature, cause-nature, and effect-nature, misunderstood in this way, are exactly like the elephant's actual nature, which those blind men each failed to grasp.

Briefly stated, then: the ālayavijñāna, using the ripening consciousness and all seeds as its own nature, is able to embrace every bodily existence and every destiny throughout the three realms.

If, within the first kind of dependent origination, these two consciousnesses serve as each other's causal condition, then within the second kind of dependent origination, what kind of condition do they serve as? They serve as a dominant condition. And by how many conditions are the six active consciousnesses themselves produced? By the dominant condition, the object-condition, and the immediately-preceding condition. Thus these three kinds of dependent origination — the one running through birth and death, the one producing desirable and undesirable destinies, and the one involving enjoyment — are, altogether, endowed with all four conditions.

Having thus established the different names and characteristics of the ālayavijñāna, how is it known that these names and characteristics apply, definitively, only to the ālayavijñāna, and not to the active consciousnesses? Because, apart from positing the ālayavijñāna in just this way, neither defilement nor purification could be established at all: afflictive defilement, karmic defilement, and birth-defilement would none of them be established, and worldly purification and transcendent purification would likewise not be established.

Why is it that afflictive defilement could not be established without the ālayavijñāna? Because it is unreasonable that the seeds produced by the habituation of the afflictions and secondary afflictions should reside within the six active consciousnesses themselves. Why is this? Suppose one holds that craving and the other afflictions arise and cease together with the eye-consciousness, and that it is through this alone that they become seeds. Once this eye-consciousness has already ceased, and other consciousnesses have intervened, this habituation — and the very support for this habituation — can no longer be found at all. For the eye-consciousness, already past, intervened upon by other consciousnesses, presently without any substance, to arise together with that craving again makes no sense, since it is, at present, without substance, being past — exactly as unreasonable as expecting a ripened result to arise from an action that is past and presently without substance. Moreover, the habituation supposedly co-arising with the eye-consciousness and craving does not even succeed to begin with: it cannot reside within the craving itself, since craving is dependent, not stable; nor can it reside within the other consciousnesses, since each has its own separate support, with no fixed co-arising and co-ceasing between them; nor, again, can it reside within the eye-consciousness's own continuum, since that continuum definitely lacks any co-arising and co-ceasing with itself. For all these reasons, it is unreasonable that the eye-consciousness should be habituated by craving and the other afflictions. Nor, moreover, is this consciousness habituated by any other consciousness. As has been said of the eye-consciousness, so it should be understood of each of the remaining active consciousnesses as well.

Furthermore: when a being, falling from the higher stages such as the attainment of no-thought, is reborn into this world, the very first afflicted consciousness that then arises would, at the moment of its arising, have to be without any seed at all — since both its support and its habituation are already entirely past, and presently without substance.

Furthermore: once a consciousness that counteracts the afflictions has arisen, and every other worldly consciousness has ceased, then — apart from the ālayavijñāna — it makes no sense for the seeds of the remaining afflictions to reside within this very counteracting consciousness, since this counteracting consciousness is, by its own nature, liberated, and does not arise and cease together with the remaining afflictions. And when, later, a worldly consciousness arises once more — apart from the ālayavijñāna, all its habituations and support having long since become past and presently without substance — it would have to arise anew without any seed at all. For all these reasons, apart from the ālayavijñāna, afflictive defilement could not be established.

Why is it that karmic defilement could not be established without the ālayavijñāna? Because, without it, "volitional formations" serving as condition for "consciousness" — [the second and third links of the twelvefold chain] — would not hold together. And if this does not hold, then "grasping" serving as condition for "existence" [the ninth and tenth links] would not hold together either.

Why is it that birth-defilement could not be established without the ālayavijñāna? Because the moment of taking up rebirth in the life-continuum would not hold together without it. Suppose a being falls from a non-absorbed state and is then reborn: in dependence on the intermediate-state condition, a defiled mental consciousness arises and takes up the continuity of rebirth; this defiled mental consciousness ceases within the intermediate state, and, within the mother's womb, a consciousness unites together with the embryonic kalala. Suppose it is this very mental consciousness that unites with the kalala; then, having united, it is this same consciousness, resting on this union, that would go on operating as the mental consciousness within the womb. If so, there would have to be two mental consciousnesses operating simultaneously within the womb. Moreover, it is unreasonable that this uniting consciousness should have the nature of the mental consciousness at all — because it is continuously defiled, because it is uninterrupted in time, and because no object that the mental consciousness normally takes can be found for it. Suppose, then, that this uniting consciousness simply is the mental consciousness: is this uniting consciousness itself the all-seeds consciousness? Or is some other mental consciousness, arising in dependence on this one, the all-seeds consciousness? If the uniting consciousness is itself the all-seeds consciousness, then it simply is the ālayavijñāna, and you have merely given it a different name, calling it "mental consciousness." But if it is instead some dependent consciousness arising from this one that is the all-seeds consciousness, then the supporting, causal consciousness would not be the all-seeds consciousness, while the dependent, resultant consciousness would be — which makes no sense. Therefore it is established that this uniting consciousness is not the mental consciousness at all, but is the ripening consciousness — the all-seeds consciousness.

Furthermore, once the continuity of rebirth has been taken up, apart from the ripening consciousness, the appropriation of the physical faculties could not be found at all — since each of the remaining consciousnesses has its own separate support and is not stable, the physical faculties ought not to be left without some supporting consciousness. Apart from the ripening consciousness, the scriptural teaching that consciousness and name-and-form mutually depend on one another, like a bundle of reeds mutually supporting one another, could likewise not be established. Apart from the ripening consciousness, the nourishment that is consciousness, needed by beings already born, could not be established either. Why is this? Because it cannot be found that any single one of the six active consciousnesses, taken alone, is able to perform the function of nourishment for beings already born throughout the three realms.

If, falling from here, one is reborn precisely into an absorbed state, it is by means of a non-absorbed, defiled mental consciousness that the continuity of rebirth is taken up — and since this non-absorbed, defiled mind belongs to an entirely different stage, apart from the ripening consciousness, no other seed-substance capable of bridging the two could possibly be found. Furthermore, for one born in the formless realm, apart from the all-seeds ripening consciousness, the tainted wholesome mind of that realm's absorption would have to be without a seed, and would have to be without any support.

Moreover, in that same realm, if a transcendent mind should become manifest, then, since every worldly mind would be entirely extinguished at that moment, that very destiny ought to be annihilated on the spot. And if, for one born in the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, a transcendent mind belonging to the sphere of nothingness should become manifest, then both destinies ought to be annihilated at once. Yet this transcendent consciousness cannot take the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as the destiny it depends on, nor the sphere of nothingness, nor nirvāṇa itself. Moreover, at the moment of dying, whether one has done good or done evil, the body grows cold gradually, from below upward or from above downward accordingly — and if one does not accept that the ālayavijñāna exists, none of this, either, could be established. For all these reasons, apart from the all-seeds ripening consciousness, birth-defilement could not be established.

Why is it that worldly purification could not be established without the ālayavijñāna? Take one who has not yet become free of desire-realm craving, and has not yet attained a form-realm mind: relying on a wholesome desire-realm mind, such a person diligently cultivates preparatory practice in order to become free of desire-realm craving. This desire-realm preparatory mind does not arise and cease together with the form-realm mind it aims to produce; it is therefore unreasonable that it should habituate that form-realm mind, serving as its seed. Moreover, any past form-realm mind has long since been separated by countless intervening minds and, being simply nonexistent now, cannot serve as the seed for the settled meditative mind of the present. It is, therefore, established that it is the all-seeds ripening consciousness — carrying forward the seed of the settled form-realm mind, transmission after transmission — that serves as the causal condition for attaining it in the present; the preparatory wholesome mind serves only as a dominant condition. The same principle should be understood to apply throughout every stage of becoming free from desire. Thus, apart from the all-seeds ripening consciousness, worldly purification could not, in principle, be established.

Why is it that transcendent purification could not be established without the ālayavijñāna? The World-Honored One taught that right view arises through two causes: hearing another's spoken teaching, and one's own inward, correct attention. Does this spoken teaching and correct attention habituate the ear-consciousness? Does it habituate the mental consciousness? Or does it habituate both together? While one is correctly reflecting on the teaching, the ear-consciousness, for its part, does not even arise; and the mental consciousness, too, is constantly interrupted by other consciousnesses arising amid various distractions. Even when a mind later arises in association with correct attention, this mental consciousness habituated by hearing, together with its habituation, has already long since ceased and is entirely past — definitely without substance now. How, then, could it possibly serve as a seed able to give rise, later still, to a mind associated with correct attention? Moreover, this mind associated with correct attention is still a worldly mind, while the mind associated with right view is a transcendent mind — the two have never once arisen and ceased together. Therefore this worldly mind is not habituated by that transcendent one; and since it is not habituated by it, it is unreasonable that it should serve as its seed. Thus, apart from the all-seeds ripening consciousness, transcendent purification, too, could not be established — for the hearing-habituation, on its own, could not in this way come to hold such a seed at all.

Furthermore: how can the very same all-seeds ripening consciousness be both the cause of defilement and, at the same time, the seed of the pure mind that transcendently counteracts it? Moreover, since the transcendent mind has never once been practiced before, its habituation, too, would definitely have to be nonexistent — and if there is no habituation, from what seed could it possibly arise? The answer to be given, therefore, is this: it arises from the seed of correct hearing-habituation, which flows forth from the utterly pure dharma-realm itself.

Is this hearing-habituation itself the intrinsic nature of the ālayavijñāna, or is it not the intrinsic nature of the ālayavijñāna? If it were the intrinsic nature of the ālayavijñāna, how could it possibly be the very seed that counteracts it? But if it is not the intrinsic nature of the ālayavijñāna, where can the support for this hearing-habituation's seed be found? The answer: right up until the attainment of the buddhas' own bodhi, this hearing-habituation, wherever it happens to reside as its support, lodges within the ripening consciousness, mingling and moving together with it just as water mingles with milk — yet it is not itself the ālayavijñāna, since it has the nature of the very seed that counteracts it.

Here, in dependence on a lesser-grade habituation, a middling-grade habituation is formed; in dependence on a middling-grade habituation, a superior-grade habituation is formed — through the diligent practice, again and again, of hearing, reflection, and meditative cultivation.

Moreover, this correct hearing-habituation's seed, whether of lesser, middling, or superior grade, should also be understood as the seed of the dharma-body. It stands opposed to the ālayavijñāna, and is not included within it, since it has the nature of what flows forth from the utterly pure, transcendent dharma-realm — though it is, in one sense, worldly, it has the nature of the seed of a transcendent mind. Moreover, even before the transcendent mind itself has actually arisen, this habituation is already able to counteract the entanglement of the afflictions, already able to counteract the perilous, evil destinies, already able to bring about the decay of every evil action one has committed, and is able, further, to bring one into accord with meeting and serving all buddhas and bodhisattvas. Though it is, in this sense, worldly, it should be understood that what a bodhisattva newly setting out on the practice attains through it is likewise included within the dharma-body; while what śrāvakas and solitary buddhas attain through it is included only within the body of liberation.

This habituation, then, is not the ālayavijñāna — it is included within the dharma-body and the body of liberation. Just as this habituation, of lesser, middling, and superior grade, increases stage by stage, so too does the ripening consciousness correspondingly decrease, stage by stage — this is precisely what is meant by the transformation of the basis. Once the support for all seeds has thus been transformed, the ripening consciousness, together with all its seeds, then continues on without any further defiled seed at all — every seed of defilement is permanently cut off.

Furthermore, in what sense is this like water and milk? In this sense: the non-ālaya habituation and the ālayavijñāna operate together, in the same place, at the same time, yet the ālayavijñāna's seeds are entirely exhausted while the non-ālaya habituation's seeds entirely increase — just as, when milk has been mixed into water, a goose is said to drink out only the milk, leaving the water behind. Or again, just as, in the ordinary world, when one becomes free of desire, the habituation of the non-absorbed stage gradually decreases while the habituation of the absorbed stage gradually increases — and it is thus that the transformation of the basis is attained.

Furthermore, when one enters the attainment of cessation, consciousness does not leave the body — this the noble ones themselves have taught. Here, it must be the ripening consciousness that is what does not leave the body, since this attainment of cessation does not arise in order to counteract the ripening consciousness itself. Nor does this same consciousness simply arise anew upon emerging from the attainment: for if the ripening consciousness had actually been interrupted, then, once separated from the continuity of rebirth, there would be no way for it to arise again at all.

Furthermore, if one holds that it is by means of the mental consciousness that mind is present within the attainment of cessation, this cannot be established — because, on this view, the attainment itself could not properly be established at all; because no object or mode of activity proper to it can be found; because it would incur the fault of being associated with wholesome roots, which the attainment excludes; because classifying it as unwholesome or neutral would likewise make no sense; because it would incur the fault of perception and feeling actually being present; because contact would then have to be findable, in a state defined by its absence; because it would have to retain functional capacity within concentration, contradicting the attainment's own purpose; because it would incur the fault of only perception, and not feeling, being extinguished; because it would incur the fault of volition, faith, and the other wholesome roots actually being present; because it makes no sense to pull a dependent mental factor away from its support while claiming the support itself still remains; because there is a decisive analogy that rules this out; and because, like a non-universal mental factor, this simply does not occur under such conditions. Moreover, for one who holds it is by means of the mental consciousness that mind is present in this attainment, that mind could not coherently be established as wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral at all — therefore this view does not hold.

If, further, one holds that form and mind, arising in immediate succession to their own prior moments, are themselves the seeds of these dharmas — this cannot be established, as has already been explained above. Moreover, on such a view, falling from the formless realm or the heaven of no-thought, or emerging from the attainment of cessation, would make no sense at all; and an arhat's final moment of mind could not be accounted for either — only the immediately-preceding condition could possibly obtain, and that alone is not enough. Thus, apart from the all-seeds ripening consciousness, neither defilement nor purification could be established at all. It is therefore established that the ālayavijñāna, possessing the characteristics already described, definitely exists.

Furthermore, what are the distinctions within this ālayavijñāna? Briefly stated, it should be understood as having either three kinds, or four kinds, of distinction. Here, the three kinds are distinguished by three kinds of habituation: first, the distinction of name-habituation; second, the distinction of self-view-habituation; third, the distinction of existence-link-habituation. The four kinds are: first, the distinction of induction; second, the distinction of ripening; third, the distinction of the object-condition; fourth, the distinction of appearance.

Here, the distinction of induction refers to newly-arisen habituation. Without this, "volitional formations conditioning consciousness" and "grasping conditioning existence" — links of the twelvefold chain — could not be established. The distinction of ripening refers to the differentiated ripening, throughout the various destinies, that comes about with volitional formations and existence as conditions. Without this, there would be no seed, and the arising of dharmas in a future existence could not be established. The distinction of the object-condition refers to the self-grasping object found within the defiled manas itself. Without this, the object of self-grasping within the defiled manas could not be established. The distinction of appearance refers to this: this very consciousness has a shared aspect and an unshared aspect, a seedless-of-rebirth aspect and a seed-of-rebirth aspect, and so on.

The shared aspect refers to the seeds of the shared external world; the unshared aspect refers to the seeds of each individual's own separate internal sense-bases. The shared aspect is precisely the seedless-of-rebirth aspect; the unshared aspect is precisely the seed-of-rebirth aspect. When the counteracting wisdom arises, only the unshared aspect is eliminated by that counteraction. The shared aspect, being sustained also by others' own discrimination, is only ever seen as purified once all involved have themselves attained purity — just as, when many practitioners of yoga direct their minds toward one and the same object, each one's differing resolve produces a correspondingly different thing seen, and each such seeing is equally established as valid.

Without this shared aspect, the arising of the differentiated external world, and of the differentiated world of sentient beings, could not be established. There is, further, a coarse-and-heavy aspect, and a light-and-pliant aspect: the coarse-and-heavy aspect refers to the seeds of the afflictions and secondary afflictions; the light-and-pliant aspect refers to the seeds of contaminated wholesome dharmas. Without this, the differentiated capacity or incapacity of the resulting ripened effect and its support could not be established.

There is, further, an exhausted aspect and an unexhausted aspect: the exhausted aspect refers to the wholesome or unwholesome seeds whose ripened effect has already fully matured; the unexhausted aspect refers to the seeds of name-habituation — the seeds of manifold, discursive proliferation flowing on since beginningless time. Without this, the exhaustion of results already received for wholesome and unwholesome actions already performed could not be established, and the arising of newly-formed name-habituation could not be established either. There is, further, an illustrative aspect: this refers to the ālayavijñāna's being illustrated by such things as an illusion, a mirage, a dream, and a cataract-induced blur. Without this, the deluded, discriminated object arising from unreal, imagined seeds could not be established.

There is, further, a complete aspect and an incomplete aspect: those still fully bound by all the fetters are said to have the complete aspect; those in the ordinary world who have become free of desire are said to have the diminished aspect; śrāvakas still in training, and bodhisattvas, are said to have the aspect of one portion permanently extracted; arhats, solitary buddhas, and tathāgatas are said to have the aspect of the afflictive obstruction entirely and permanently extracted, or, for tathāgatas alone, both the afflictive and cognitive obstructions entirely and permanently extracted, according to what is appropriate to each. Without this, the sequential order in which defilement is reversed could not be established.

For what reason are wholesome and unwholesome dharmas able to bring about a ripened result that is itself morally neutral, unobscuring? Because a morally neutral ripened result does not conflict with either wholesome or unwholesome dharmas, whereas wholesome and unwholesome dharmas conflict with each other. If the ripened result were itself wholesome or unwholesome in nature, the reversal of defilement could not be established. For this reason, the ripening consciousness is, without exception, morally neutral.