The Four Grave Wrongs, Part One: Killing and Stealing

The nature-offenses listed above differ in gravity. A brief table is given here first, to sketch the overall picture in advance; the remainder is set out in full detail in the text that follows.

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "The scriptures, in setting out the nature-offenses, most often place this precept first. Is this not precisely because the body is the very foundation of all karmic action, and the karma of killing stands first among all karmic causes? As for calling it a nature-offense of grave weight: this is because the nature-offense itself contains both graver and lighter degrees within it — grave in the case of the human destiny, light in the case of non-humans and animals. It is by dividing the mind's intent according to the object that the offense is graded into three tiers." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 7]

The Procedural Commentary states: "'Human being' — the vinaya says: from the first moment of consciousness to the last moment of consciousness, cutting off that life. 'First moment of consciousness' means the consciousness first present in the womb, while it is still dim and merely a viscous mass — this is what consciousness depends on. And so on up to the very last thought at the end of life, not yet relinquishing its hold, following which warmth dissolves — this too counts."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The note's opening clause, down through 'depends on,' explains the phrase 'first moment of consciousness' above. The Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra says: at the kalala stage — meaning 'mixed impurity' — seven days after entering the womb, the embryo resembles curdled cream; this is precisely the 'viscous mass.' At this point three things are already present: life, warmth, and consciousness. The breath going in and out is life; not being foul or decaying is warmth; the mind and its consciousness, sustained by karma and the fire-element, not foul or decaying in form, is consciousness. If this viscous mass is destroyed, then what consciousness depends on is destroyed, and life and warmth dissolve accordingly — this is called committing killing.

The passage from 'and so on' explains the phrase 'last moment of consciousness' above: it means that although the four great elements are about to come apart, the spirit of consciousness has not yet departed, and to do harm at that point still constitutes the grave offense. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: wherever warmth still remains, consciousness resides within it — that is precisely the seat of consciousness, and it is included within the life-faculty." [Zichi Commentary on the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Procedural Commentary states: "The conditions constituting a violation are five in full: (1) the victim is human, (2) perceived as human, (3) the intent to kill arises, (4) the means is undertaken, (5) life is cut off." [Zichi Commentary on the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "The above explains the human destiny. Doing harm to a non-human or an animal follows the identical pattern; only the gravity of the offense differs."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Killing a non-human and killing an animal are both violations under these same five conditions; whether the conditions are fully present or defective is judged the same way in each case." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 7]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "If the first condition is lacking: where the mind is narrow-diffuse, only three middle-grade offenses are incurred, because a non-human, an animal, or a stump can each substitute as the object. Where the mind is broad-diffuse, only a single middle-grade offense is incurred, because across all three destinies the offense does not differ regardless of which is actually killed. Where the case involves targeted intent, and some other object — say, a king — comes to substitute for the intended victim, say, Zhang, there are then four further cases, to be reasoned out along the same lines as above."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The opening distinguishes three cases: broad-diffuse, narrow-diffuse, and targeted intent. As for the single middle-grade offense under broad-diffuse intent: since all three destinies are equally liable to be harmed, and only a stump comes to substitute as the object, then even though the intent was diffuse, weighed against the standard of a human victim it is graded as the heavier, middle offense. Had the intent instead specifically arisen toward a stump under the belief it was a non-human or an animal, a lower-grade offense ought to result — but this is not spelled out here; the text simply omits it.

"As for the summarizing cases here: under broad-diffuse intent, there is one case — a stump perceived as a person. Under narrow-diffuse intent, there are three cases: first, a non-human perceived as a person; second, an animal perceived as a person; third, a stump perceived as a person. Under targeted intent, only one further case is added — a king perceived as [the intended victim] Zhang, where the killing is graded the same as the grave offense; the other three run parallel to what came before — hence 'four cases,' which, added to the two diffuse cases already given, makes eight in all." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 7]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "Second, the condition of perception being lacking. This too has both broad- and narrow-diffuse forms, as well as a targeted-intent form."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The opening raises all three cases at once. Within each of the three, there is further a distinction of settled-perception, doubt, and single or double defect, as indicated summarily below."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Taking targeted intent first: where a mistaken settled perception arises, there are four cases — one upper-grade offense and three middle-grade offenses. Where doubt arises under targeted intent, there are ten cases — one upper-grade offense and nine middle-grade offenses, comprising four cases of direct doubt and six cases of mutual doubt; these too may be reasoned out along the same lines. Where targeted intent suffers a double defect in two conditions at once, there are forty cases — as when the king comes to substitute as the object while the mind holds this doubt, yielding ten cases, and likewise for the cases where a non-human, an animal, or a stump comes to substitute, each worked out by analogy."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Second, the detailed explanation of the targeted-intent cases. The pattern of cases here is genuinely tangled and requires a diagram to be made clear. There are three distinct tiers." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 7]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "As for the remaining broad-diffuse and narrow-diffuse cases, the pattern of what is lacking in mind and in object may be reasoned out along the same lines."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Third, this briefly points to the two diffuse cases. Under narrow-diffuse intent, simply remove the king and the [specific] person from the targeted-intent scheme: the settled-perception cases become three, the doubt cases become nine. Under double defect, remove the substitution by a king, leaving only the three remaining objects, likewise nine cases each. Taken together across all three tiers, there are thirty-nine cases in all — broadly matching the diagram given above, except that in each tier of direct doubt the first case [involving the king] is removed, and throughout, the word 'Zhang' should be read as simply 'a person.' This is easily seen by reference to what came before, and is not repeated in full.

"Under broad-diffuse intent, harm falls equally across all three destinies, and only a stump serves as the differing object; there are only thirteen cases in all. Fearing this might still be hard to follow, it must be set out in a table." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 7]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "Third, where the intent to kill is lacking: in some cases there is simply no offense, as set out under the exemptions below. In other cases a middle-grade offense is still incurred — as when one punishes someone harshly, or wrongly administers medicine to a sick person, bringing them close to death by such means, even though no actual intent to kill was present."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "'Punishing harshly' means someone who, having committed a fault, dies as a result of the penalty imposed. 'Wrongly administering medicine to a sick person' means caring for them without real diligence, such that the illness is instead made worse." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 7]

The Procedural Commentary states: "The Sarvāstivāda Mātṛkā says: a sick person who does not wish to rise, does not wish to be moved, and who would die if forced to rise — if the one caring for them forces food or medicine on them and they die as a result, this is a middle-grade offense. Where an abscess has not yet ripened and is forced open regardless, resulting in death, the same applies. Where food is withheld, or treatment is withheld, and death results from this, this too is a middle-grade offense."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "This makes clear that death resulting from incompetent care, where there was no actual intent to harm, is nevertheless graded a middle-grade offense in every case. In the first two instances — forcing food, and forcibly opening an abscess — the fault lies in giving what should not have been given. In the cases that follow, the fault lies in withholding what should have been given.

The Zichi Commentary further states: "In every instance cited above from the Mātṛkā, a middle-grade offense is imputed. If there were truly no intent to harm at all, no offense ought to follow; yet if there were genuine intent to harm, a full grave offense would follow — the matter is difficult to fix at either extreme. Reasoning it through: the caregiver's state of mind admits of degrees. Where the care is undertaken out of genuine compassionate concern, and death nevertheless results, this is exactly what the vinaya's own exemption covers. Where it is done carelessly, with no real regard for the consequences, and the patient dies from mismanaged treatment — because there was, at root, no intent to kill, no grave offense is imputed; yet because this comes close to the karma of killing through the very absence of due care, a middle-grade offense still follows. This deserves careful reflection." [Zichi Commentary on the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "Fourth, where the means is lacking: because it has not yet been undertaken, the bare arising of intent alone is not what is regulated here. In some cases a lower-grade offense is still incurred — even though the mind has already fixed on killing, since the body has not yet moved, and the intention is then relinquished. In other cases a middle-grade offense is incurred — as in the Ten Recitations Vinaya, where weariness, laziness, and poor care of a sick person lead to death: only a middle-grade offense is imputed, because no [deliberate] means was actually undertaken."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The opening case explains 'lacking' in terms of no offense at all: 'not yet undertaken' means it has not yet reached the grave-condition stage. The next case explains 'lacking' as a lower-grade offense: this concerns the distant preparatory offense short of the grave condition. The third case explains 'lacking' as a middle-grade offense: 'lacking a [deliberate] means' here in fact means a [negligent] means was present, which is what draws in the grave-condition classification." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 7]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "Where the fifth condition is lacking, life has not yet been cut off. Corresponding to the seven [degrees of] means given above, there are then seven middle-grade offenses. As the Ten Recitations Vinaya says: where a person is struck with intent to kill but has not yet died, and the assailant then goes mad or the precepts are relinquished, only a middle-grade offense is imputed."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "'Lacking the cutting-off of life' refers back to the seven conditions given above. What follows, citing the Ten Recitations Vinaya, briefly verifies the first of those conditions." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 7]

The Procedural Commentary states: "The Four-Part Vinaya says: killing is of two kinds. The first is committing directly. This means presenting a bodily appearance, verbally praising the appearance of death, digging a pitfall, arranging a support to be leaned or pressed against, setting up an implement of killing, or giving poison, and so forth."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "This first addresses committing directly; the opening phrase gives the heading. What follows, from 'this means,' lists the specific modes. Against the fuller Commentary-Annotated Prātimokṣa, there are eight modes in all; the present Procedural Commentary omits two, which are supplied below to complete the list. 'Presenting a bodily appearance' means causing fright so that the victim falls or plunges to their death, or displaying the appearance of death, and the like. 'Verbally praising the appearance of death' — the Commentary-Annotated Prātimokṣa phrases this as 'presenting a verbal appearance' — means using speech to urge and instruct, or using a loud voice to frighten and intimidate; the present Procedural Commentary's wording covers only the first sense. 'Digging a pitfall' means knowing the path someone will walk, and so setting a pitfall there to cause a fatal fall. 'Arranging a support to be leaned or pressed against' means ascertaining where the victim will lean or press, and there setting a blade or staff, so that leaning against it causes death. 'Setting up an implement of killing' means placing a rope, a blade, or a staff so as to bring about death. 'Giving poison' is self-explanatory. Where the text says 'and so forth,' this refers to killing carried out by one's own action, whether by body or by staff — whatever brings about death counts. Where both body and speech together present the appearance, this combines the bodily mode with the verbal-praise mode."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Second, instructing another to kill — following whatever intermediary is actually used. This includes instructing and praising, instructing to send a messenger, an intermediary who goes and returns, a repeated intermediary, a chain-relayed intermediary, seeking out a strong man, instructing another to seek out a strong man, sending a letter, and instructing another to send a letter, and so on. Whatever means is employed, so long as the death that follows matches the original intent, then among the three moral qualities of the act, it is the one who does the instructing who commits the grave offense."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "In the section on instructing another, the opening gives the heading. What follows, from 'this includes,' lists the specific modes. The fuller Commentary-Annotated Prātimokṣa lists eleven in full; the present Procedural Commentary likewise omits two, supplied here. 'Instructing and praising' — the Commentary-Annotated Prātimokṣa phrases this as sending a messenger to praise death, meaning one sends someone to speak to the victim directly. 'Instructing to send a messenger' means pointing out to the one instructed, and having them send someone to go do the harm. 'An intermediary who goes and returns' means one who receives the order, goes to do the harm, and comes back again to report and go again. 'A repeated intermediary' means using successive messengers, one after another, even up to a hundred or a thousand, all directed at killing a single person. 'A chain-relayed intermediary' means the messenger does not go himself but relays the order to yet another, even up to a hundred or a thousand, until the last person in the chain actually kills — whichever intermediary is ultimately used, all are equally guilty of the grave offense. 'Seeking out a strong man' means selecting someone bold and sending him to do the harm. 'Instructing another to seek out a strong man' means having someone else do this seeking. 'Sending a letter' means putting the matter down in ink on paper, directing that death be brought about by it. 'Instructing another to send a letter' means having someone else write it on one's behalf. The remaining two modes covered by 'and so on' are: seeking out one who carries a blade, meaning one capable of killing, and instructing another to seek out such a blade-bearer.

"What follows, from 'whatever means,' gives the overall summary. Its purpose is to show that the modes listed above are not exhaustive, and further, to close off any escape for a wicked person who might avoid one listed mode only to devise another — hence this general phrase is used to gather in every case. 'The one who instructs commits the grave offense' refers, strictly speaking, to the original offender doing the instructing; but as for the one instructed, this applies equally to laypeople and to monastics — and if the one instructed is himself a monastic, then both the instructor and the instructed are guilty." [All from the Zichi Commentary on the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Procedural Commentary states: "The Sarvāstivādin Vibhāṣā: a bhikṣu who knows astrology, the yin-yang arts, and the reading of omens — if, on account of that bhikṣu's advice, another country is attacked and defeated, and killing and plunder result, he is guilty of both an upper-grade offense of stealing and an upper-grade offense of killing at once. An upāsaka is held to the identical standard."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "'On account of that bhikṣu's advice' means this falls under the karma of instructing another. The additional charge of stealing follows because the attack and plunder cause loss of others' property. That an upāsaka is held to the same standard follows because both the Five Precepts and the Eight Precepts equally prohibit this." [Zichi Commentary on the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Procedural Commentary states: "The Sarvāstivādin Vibhāṣā: if one praises death to a single specific person, and that person does not understand, but someone standing nearby does understand and, following this method, dies as a result — this is not an offense."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "This is because the speaker's targeted intent was fixed entirely on the one specific object, with no intent directed at anyone else. If the intent had instead been diffuse, then whoever actually died as a result, the speaker would be guilty."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "There are today many people who set themselves on fire; and there are many foolish members of the sevenfold assembly who praise and extol such a person, causing joy and eagerness to arise in them — all such cases are graded, in line with the root vinaya text, as the grave offense."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "That this is graded as the grave offense, in accordance with the vinaya, is because it is identical to praising death." [Both from the Zichi Commentary on the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Procedural Commentary states: "The Five-Part Vinaya and the Four-Part Vinaya: one who kills himself incurs a middle-grade offense" — meaning that only the preparatory offense is imputed.

The Zichi Commentary explains: "This is because, once life is cut off, the precept-body is itself lost, and there is no longer anything left to be violated." [Zichi Commentary on the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Xingzong Commentary adds: "There are also, today, people who, without understanding the real principle, throw themselves into fire or drown themselves, hoping thereby to transcend and ascend. But the causes of suffering have not thereby been removed — how could the retribution of the three realms of existence simply vanish? To die without regret is truly nothing more than the reckless courage of a single moment. One who imagines this brings final extinction and no further rebirth fails to see that a disappearance here is only a reappearance there. One ought instead to diligently cultivate the three trainings, and broadly carry forward the four great vows; to recite and uphold the Vaipulya Great Vehicle scriptures, and hold the excellent names of the Buddhas in mind; to hope for crossing over at the assembly beneath the Nāga-Puṣpa tree, and to set one's aim on the Land of Peace and Nurture as one's true refuge. To deeply abhor birth-and-death, and to rightly understand cause and effect — this, and nothing else, is the essential way to remove the root of suffering." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 7]

The Procedural Commentary states: "The Ten Recitations Vinaya: one must not injure oneself or disfigure one's own body; even severing a single finger constitutes an offense."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "As for severing a finger constituting an offense — tradition holds this is uniformly graded as a lower-grade offense." [Zichi Commentary on the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Commentary-Annotated Prātimokṣa states: "If one kills a non-human, or an animal that understands human speech or is capable of changing its own shape, and the means employed [is sufficient to be capital in nature though the killing is not consummated], this is a middle-grade offense; if the victim does not die, a lower-grade offense. Where an animal is incapable of changing its shape, killing it is a lower-grade offense." [Commentary-Annotated Prātimokṣa, fascicle 1]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text explains: "As for a being whose intelligence and capacity for transformation are superior, such that doing it harm is graded a middle-grade offense: this is because it resembles a human in its faculties, and how could one do harm to such a being without a correspondingly weighty intent? Where the harm is done knowingly, it is graded in accordance with the principle just stated; where it is done unknowingly, it is instead graded according to the plain rule of the vinaya."

The Xingzong Commentary explains this passage: "The opening clarifies the intent behind the offense. What follows settles the grading: where graded 'in accordance with the principle,' by reference to the offender's actual knowledge, a middle-grade offense follows; where 'unknowingly,' following the plain rule of the vinaya as usual, a lower-grade offense follows." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 7]

The Procedural Commentary states: "As for what does not count as an offense: the vinaya says: if one throws a knife, a staff, a tile, a stone, or a piece of timber, and it inadvertently strikes someone's body and they die; or one dies while being supported or embraced during care as a sick person; or one dies in connection with medicine, food, or simply in the course of coming and going — in every such case, where there was no intent to harm at all, this is not an offense."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The first clause opens the exemption for inadvertent mishap. What follows, from 'or,' opens the exemption for caring for the sick. 'In connection with medicine or food' means death resulting from something given in care. 'Coming and going' — the Commentary-Annotated Prātimokṣa speaks of supporting a sick person in and out of their room and back again; this overlaps with 'supported or embraced' above, except that the earlier phrase concerns lying down and rising, while this one concerns going back and forth — or it may instead be read as covering a caregiver's absence during their own coming and going. 'Where there was no intent to harm at all' is stated broadly here to gather in every such case; the governing principle throughout is simply the absence of intent, not limited to only these two examples." [Zichi Commentary on the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Xingzong Commentary adds: "This 'inadvertent' here arises from some unrelated matter, with no intent to harm whatsoever present at all — it is not the same as the 'error' discussed earlier under misidentification error. Students should take note of the distinction." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 7]

The Zichi Commentary states, citing the Commentary on the Precept-Text: "What is taken from another through improper loss is called stealing; what is taken openly and by force is called robbery; what is taken while dreading that the owner will notice is called burglary. The term 'stealing' is used here in a sense broad enough to cover all three together — which is precisely why it is singled out as the heading for this whole precept."

The Procedural Commentary states: "The nature-offenses contain both grave and light degrees within them. Among the grave nature-offenses, stealing is the one hardest to guard against. For this reason the various vinaya schools treat it at the greatest length, while the other precepts are, by comparison, only briefly summarized. When the treatises come to discuss this precept, each devotes three or even five full fascicles to it. One must thoroughly master and organize this material before one can hope to avoid transgressing it. There have even been those who singled out this one precept on stealing and compiled it into a private commentary all its own — this too reflects the same spirit of exhortation and caution."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The opening shows that this precept's specific character makes it hard to guard against. The first clause speaks generally of the nature-offenses as a class; the next narrows this to the four grave precepts; the final clause singles out stealing alone as hardest of all. What follows, citing the various texts, demonstrates this difficulty, pointing first to the vinaya and its treatises: the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya treats stealing across five fascicles, the Ten Recitations Vinaya across four, and the Samantapāsādikā across three. What follows, from 'there have even been,' further points to a separate private commentary devoted to this precept alone — it is not known who compiled it." [Zichi Commentary on the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 17]

The Procedural Commentary states: "As for the object of the offense: this means anything among the six sense-objects or the six elements that has an owner, and that the owner values and guards. Where loss is improperly brought about with respect to such a thing, this constitutes a violation of the precept. Where the object has no owner, or is actually one's own property, or where circumstances have substituted one object for another, or the object has been carried off by someone else, or the mind's perception has shifted into doubt — then even though the intent to steal is present, since the object actually confronted is not a genuine object of theft, no completed violation follows in any of these cases; only the preparatory offense of the original intent remains."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The opening shows the object: the six sense-objects and the six elements between them cover absolutely everything, as the text itself goes on to explain. What follows, from 'where,' explains two ways a condition can be lacking. The first singles out the pattern of what is missing: the two clauses above, together with the case below of the object being carried off, are all called 'object lacking' — because a non-human's or an animal's property has substituted in, this is called 'carried off.' 'Circumstances have substituted' means the conditions fail to line up in some other, unfixed way — as when the intent lapses, or the object is moved, or some obstacle intervenes beforehand, and so on. 'Perception has shifted into doubt' refers to the mind's condition being lacking: with respect to a person's property, there are three possible alternate perceptions — that it belongs to a non-human, to an animal, or to no one at all — and doubt works the same way. What follows, from 'though,' draws the overall conclusion of non-violation. Taken at face value, the text concludes this is a case of the object condition being lacking; but considered in terms of the mind condition being lacking, even though the actual object encountered is fixed, insofar as the mind, at the very moment of acting, holds a doubtful perception that it might be a non-human's or an animal's property, the mind and object fail to correspond, and this too is not a genuine object of theft. Hence the summary statement that follows — 'only the preparatory offense of the original intent remains' — confirms that the ruling is not decided by the object condition alone." [Zichi Commentary on the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 17]

The Procedural Commentary states: "Second, as to the mode of the offense: the conditions constituting a violation are six in full. (1) the property has an owner, (2) it is perceived as having an owner, (3) the intent to steal arises, (4) the property meets the grave-value threshold, (5) the means is undertaken, (6) it is removed from its original place. Only when all are present does a full violation result."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "Measured against the Commentary on the Precept-Text, there are only five conditions there, without the fifth condition given here. The present Procedural Commentary does not explain the discrepancy, but its intent may still be seen: taken together, the conditions constituting a violation reduce to nothing more than mind and object. The first and fourth are matters of object; the second, third, and fifth are matters of mind; the sixth combines both at once, since mind and object must join together in it." [Zichi Commentary on the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 17]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "This precept has five conditions. First, the object belongs to a human being — because stealing property belonging to any of the other destinies does not constitute the grave offense."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Even where the item in question is genuinely valuable, the grading of the grave offense is most often decided by reference to who holds and controls it as its keeper — which is why the first condition speaks broadly of 'a human being's property.' The contrast with property belonging to non-humans or animals is worked out separately, later in the text, on its own terms."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Even where the property genuinely belongs to a human owner, at the actual moment of stealing and causing loss, a perception of it as human property must still be present. Should some other perception arise instead — a doubt suggesting it might belong to some different sort of object — this is only a lighter violation. This is why the second condition is the perception of it as human property."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The passage clarifies that 'doubt' and 'perception' here correspond to the second and third cases within the object-perception formula."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Even where the perception genuinely matches the object, if what is stolen is a lesser item falling short of the grave-value threshold, this does not constitute the grave offense. Hence the third condition, next, establishes that the property must meet the grave-value threshold."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Even where the property genuinely meets the five-coin threshold, if the intent to steal is absent, there is fundamentally no fault at all. Hence the fourth condition, next, establishes that the intent to steal must be present."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Even where the intent to steal has genuinely arisen, if the property has not yet been removed from its place, the owner's loss has not yet been brought to completion, and possession has not yet visibly passed to oneself — this too does not yet constitute the grave offense. Hence the fifth condition, next, establishes removal from its original place."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Question: is there a difference between the two mental states of 'perceiving' and 'knowing'? Answer: there is both sameness and difference between them. Grasping the object with no doubt at all is called 'knowing'; holding a settled sense of the object in mind is called 'perceiving.' Insofar as both are capable of grasping the object, perceiving and knowing are the same. But knowing is confined strictly to a correct grasp of the object, whereas perceiving extends to cover both correct grasp and outright delusion alike — and it is in this respect that perceiving differs from knowing. If this condition were framed in terms of a mind that 'knows' it to be human property, then, in the later cases where the condition is defective and the perception has shifted, this would become unworkable — for 'knowing' implies a mind that has genuinely and correctly reached the object, not one caught in delusion or confusion. If instead this condition is framed in terms of a mind that 'perceives' it as human property, this properly accommodates the cases where the condition is defective, and does not conflict with the vinaya text's own usage of alternating between perception and its object."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "In the question: the questioner has proposed 'knowing it is human property,' and so raises the question in order to settle the matter. In the answer: the first part answers the question of the difference between knowing and perceiving — the opening clause states this generally, what follows from 'grasping' distinguishes the two further, and what follows from 'both' shows their sameness and difference. What follows, from 'if,' next explains the rightness or wrongness of how the condition should be framed: it first sets out the difficulty in framing it as 'knowing' — the point being that, were the condition stated in terms of 'knowing,' this would imply that, in the later cases where the condition is defective and the perception shifts, the mind involved is in every case a mind of clear and correct comprehension, which cannot be sustained. What follows, from 'if,' next shows that framing it in terms of 'perceiving' accords with the teaching, since the vinaya itself speaks only of a shift in perception, and never speaks of 'knowing' — the alternation is precisely a matter of perception."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Question: for every other precept discussed both before and after this one, the conditions constituting a violation include an undertaken means. Why does the present condition-list for stealing include none? Answer: causing loss to another's property is what defines stealing — this alone constitutes the grave offense. Where stealing constitutes the grave offense, no separate means need be shown at all, precisely to avoid the confusion that would otherwise result. Even where some means genuinely was employed, this text simply does not spell it out separately; one need only understand that whatever precedes the point where the loss has not yet been prevented is all subsumed under 'means.'"

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The question is self-explanatory: measured against the Procedural Commentary, which requires six conditions in full, with the undertaking of a means as its fifth, the present text has dropped this condition — hence the question is raised. In the answer: the first part shows the outer limit of what constitutes a completed violation. What follows, from 'where,' next explains how confusion is avoided without spelling this out further: cases such as improperly using property belonging to the Three Jewels interchangeably, burning it, burying it, defacing its color, or misappropriating something lent or entrusted, and the like — so long as loss actually results, the karma of stealing is already constituted, without any separate means needing to be shown. Yet it is not that no means is ever present at all — hence the qualification, 'even where some means genuinely was employed, this is simply not spelled out.'" [Both from the Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "If the first condition — the object — is lacking, three middle-grade offenses result. First, a non-human's property substitutes for the place of human property, and is taken while perceived as human property; second, an animal's property substitutes in the same way; third, ownerless property substitutes in the same way. Measured against the original human property actually intended, which could not be obtained, this is graded as the middle-grade preparatory offense of an object-substitution case. As for these same three kinds of property taken under their own correct perception — since there was fundamentally no relevant intent in those cases, no offense results at all. This may be worked out by reference to the same principle given earlier.

This account is stated in terms of narrow-diffuse intent, taking human property broadly as the object. As for targeted intent: where a king's property substitutes in the place of Zhang's property, the same ruling as above applies — the object condition is lacking, yet the offense still stands. Once one has grasped this pattern in this way, raising a single case allows a thousand others to follow by analogy — this may truly be called mastering the grammar of upholding and violation."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The foregoing is stated in terms of narrow-diffuse intent; broad-diffuse intent incurs the offense regardless of which object is actually struck, and so is not under discussion here — this stands as the overall heading. What follows, from 'first,' gives the specific account: three kinds of differing object substitute for the place of human property, yet are not the object originally intended — hence this is called the object condition lacking. What follows, from 'in each case,' shows the offense incurred; what follows, from 'this may be worked out,' points to material treated more fully elsewhere, namely the middle-grade preparatory offense of an object-substitution case. What follows this, next explaining targeted intent, first picks up the foregoing to make the point: 'the same ruling as above' means that, in the case of Zhang's property, since it cannot be obtained, this is the middle-grade preparatory offense of an object-substitution case; in the case of the king's property taken under its own correct perception, since there was no relevant intent, no offense results at all. Set against the narrow-diffuse case above, where the human-destiny object was in no way lacking, hence the phrase 'yet the offense still stands.' What follows, from 'once one has,' draws the concluding tribute." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "Where the second condition is lacking, according to narrow-diffuse intent, nine middle-grade offenses result — namely, shifted perception, doubt, and double defect, each contributing three cases, making nine in all."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Where the second condition is lacking, this means the perception of it as human property is lacking. Under both shifted perception and doubt, the object is held fixed while the mind alone diverges; under double defect, both mind and object diverge together. Using these three patterns, each running through three cases, nine cases in all result."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "As for 'shifted perception': at first a perception of it as human property must be present, matching the actual object; but at the very moment of taking it, the perception shifts to that of non-human property. Judged at this later moment, a lower-grade offense results in every such case. Yet the vinaya imputes only the offense of the earlier moment's mind — the preparatory offense of stealing human property — hence the phrasing 'taken while perceiving it first as human property, then as non-human property, is a middle-grade offense.' Since this one case is so, every other case, and every other precept, is to be understood along the same lines. Second, a perception of human property shifting to animal property. Third, a perception of human property shifting to ownerless property — in this last case the offense may or may not follow: if one first knew it to be human property and only later formed the perception that it was ownerless, then the offense of the earlier moment's mind still stands; but if, from the very start, the perception was that it was ownerless, then, since there was no relevant mind involved at all, no offense results."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Among the three cases of shifted perception, the first — a shift to non-human property — itself divides into three parts. The first clarifies the shift of mind: 'a perception of human property must be present' indicates the original perception; mind and object correspond to each other, hence 'matching.' 'At the very moment of taking it' and what follows clarifies the later mind. What follows, from 'judged,' next distinguishes the character of the offense; what follows this applies the same reasoning generally — 'every other case' refers to the eight cases that follow, and 'every other precept' refers to killing, false speech, and the rest, though the killing precept, even where it likewise sets out its own case-count, does not go on to explain this point about the earlier and later mind's offense being imputed differently. Second, a shift to a perception of animal property. Third, a shift to a perception of ownerless property. As for 'the offense may or may not follow': this is stated in terms of whether the shifted perception traces back to a genuine original delusion or not. The present passage is chiefly concerned with clarifying the shift of perception itself, while only incidentally indicating the case of an original delusion."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Second, clarifying the case of doubt: at first it is human property, but doubt arises when confronting the object — whether it is human property or non-human property; whether it is human property or animal property; whether it is human property or ownerless property."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Third, clarifying the case of double defect: first, one steals what is believed to be human property, but non-human property has substituted in — this is the object condition lacking. Then, with respect to this non-human property, doubt further arises as to whether it is human property or non-human property — this is the mind condition also lacking. Second, animal property has substituted in — is it human property or animal property? Third, ownerless property has substituted in — is it the property of an owner, or is it ownerless? All are to be understood by the same pattern."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Doubt and double defect are alike in both being cases of a doubting mind; the difference is that the earlier case of doubt holds the object fixed, while double defect involves the object itself shifting."

The Xingzong Commentary states: "A diagram is given to illustrate this." [All from the Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "Where the third condition is lacking: taking grave-value property while perceiving it as lesser-value property incurs the preparatory middle-grade offense stated earlier."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "As when one takes property that in fact meets the five-coin threshold, while believing it falls short of that threshold." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "Where the fourth condition is lacking: where the intent to steal was present and then abandoned, the earlier moment's mind incurs a lower-grade offense; where there was fundamentally never any such intent at all, there is no offense."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The first case concerns intent present at first and absent later; 'the earlier moment's mind incurs a lower-grade offense' refers to the distant preparatory offense. The following clause concerns the case where the mind lacked such intent from beginning to end — as under the exemptions below, such as taking discarded rubbish, or taking on the basis of genuine friendship. Because the earlier listing of conditions did not separately spell out a 'means,' the present treatment of a lacking condition must be divided into these two kinds: 'present at first, absent later' is precisely the means condition lacking, while 'lacking from beginning to end' is precisely the mind condition lacking. Question: if the earlier moment's mind already incurs a lower-grade offense, how can this still be called 'the mind lacking'? Answer: measured against the point where the body has not yet moved at all, this still falls short of stealing proper, and so it is called 'the mind lacking.' If that is so, then once the case progresses to the next stage of means and then reverts to having no intent, is this also called 'the mind lacking'? Answer: the moment the body itself begins to move, the karma of stealing has already manifested; it is only that the property has not yet been removed and the root offense not yet completed — this is why holding back at this near stage is instead called 'the fifth condition lacking.' Question: what is the difference between the mind changing after the earlier moment here, and the case of shifted perception discussed above? Answer: shifted perception still involves intent present throughout; the present case concerns intent being wholly absent. Moreover, the earlier case concerns a shift occurring after the body has moved, while the present case concerns the shift occurring at the very first moment of mind. This distinction should be carefully considered." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "Where the fifth condition is lacking: the property has not yet been removed from its place. There are two middle-grade offenses here, distinguished according to their particular circumstances."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The two middle-grade offenses are: first, where one has not yet actually come into contact with the property — the more distant preparatory stage; second, where contact has been made but removal has not yet occurred — the nearer preparatory stage. Whether distant or near, where some obstacle prevents completion, this is called the preparatory offense of holding back. Since distant and near are not fixed in advance, the offense is graded case by case according to the particular circumstances." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "First, clarifying the property of the Three Jewels: for the one who serves as custodian and makes use of this property, both offense and merit run exceedingly deep. As the Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra says: without being a noble one, without being pure, how could anyone properly oversee and protect it, free of blemish?"

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The foregoing recounts offense and merit; that both run 'exceedingly deep' is because the object involved is so supremely worthy. What follows, from 'as,' selects the proper person by reference to the scripture's own teaching. That sūtra says: Sangha property is difficult to administer, and the Buddha's Dharma has no ordinary owner. I permit only two kinds of persons to administer the property of the Three Jewels: first, an arhat; second, a stream-enterer. These two kinds of noble ones further divide into two: one who is capable of purely upholding the precepts and understands the workings of karmic retribution; and one who dreads the karma of a future life, and so maintains a genuine sense of shame together with a capacity for repentance. Persons of these two kinds are themselves free of blemish." (Here "blemish" serves as a metaphor for precept-breaking and unwholesome karma.)

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "As for stealing from the Three Jewels generally speaking: wherever there is a custodian actually guarding the property, stealing anything meeting the five-coin threshold is in every case the utmost grave offense. Where the Buddha's own property has no custodian guarding it, the same still holds, as the Nidāna-vinaya explains, on the grounds of cutting off the donor's merit."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The first case is measured against a guarding custodian; what follows, from 'the Buddha's,' is measured instead against cutting off the donor's store of merit — both incur the upper-grade offense. The Nidāna-vinaya says: if one steals a banner or canopy belonging to a Buddha-stūpa, this is in every case measured against cutting off the donor's store of merit, on the principle that what has been discarded and abandoned is no longer receivable by ordinary means — hence the upper-grade offense results." [Both from the Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "As for the Buddha's property, there are four distinct categories."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "First, property actually received and used by the Buddha: such as halls and dwellings, robes, or objects of gold, stone, clay, or earth that have actually served as the substance of a Buddha-image — such property may not be interchanged or diverted to other use. It is to be kept perpetually set aside for offerings, and generates vast merit in this life. As the vinaya says: the Buddha's own garden or seating-mat, and the like, are all to be venerated by gods and men alike, on the same footing as a stūpa. The reason such interchange is not permitted is that there is nothing here that does not directly embody the mark of the Dharma-body itself; the significance of such an object runs profoundly deep, and it must not be treated lightly."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The opening shows the character of the property. What follows, from 'as,' cites the vinaya as proof. What follows, from 'the reason,' inquires into why: the Dharma-body has no fixed mark of its own, and manifests only through such physical objects — hence these very objects are themselves the substance of the Dharma-body."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Second, property that belongs to the Buddha without having been directly received and used by him. The reason such property may be converted is that the original donor intended it broadly for the Buddha's general use, and so it may be traded or exchanged. This differs from the previous category, which, having once actually served as the exalted physical form itself, must remain permanently fixed."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Property belonging to the Buddha in this sense refers to money, valuables, servants, and livestock."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Third, offering-objects. That banners, flowers, and the like may be traded or exchanged follows the same principle as property belonging to the Buddha, and may be reasoned out accordingly."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Fourth, property offered to the Buddha as food. This category permits use by those who attend and guard the shrine, because such use falls within the meaning of what belongs to the Buddha's own household."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Such property refers to food, fruit, and the like. Those who today serve as custodians of a Buddha-shrine may, in principle, be either monastics or laypeople. The Samantapāsādikā says: rice offered before the Buddha may be eaten by the bhikṣu who attends the Buddha; a layperson attending the Buddha may likewise eat it. An older commentary raises the question: if food belonging to the permanent communal stores of the Sangha is used to make offering to the Buddha, may it afterward be used freely by others as well? The answer, citing the Fayuan Zhulin, is: it afterward reverts back into the permanent communal stores." [Both from the Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "As for stealing the Dharma's property, this too divides into four categories."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "First, property actually received and used by the Dharma: this means paper, silk, bamboo, or wood bearing written scripture or painted images, or boxes, containers, vessels, and wrappings that have actually held and stored such things, once formally and permanently dedicated to this use. Such property may not be altered or diverted; it is fixed, and to be venerated on the same footing as the sacred teaching itself, for all of it serves as the physical support for the principle of cessation. Hence whatever loss or benefit occurs to such property is, in every case, measured against nirvāṇa itself in generating offense or merit."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The foregoing sets out the substance of the property. What follows, from 'for,' shows the reason why: paper, silk, boxes, and containers are, in themselves, merely worldly objects — but measured against the truth they convey, which is supreme and beyond price, their violation carries correspondingly grave weight."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "There are people, lacking real understanding, who burn and destroy worn scriptures, saying, 'I am now purifying them by fire,' and claiming this generates merit. This is a mistaken and self-deceiving notion. The story of giving up one's very body for half a verse of the Dharma is recorded plainly in the canonical scriptures; the teaching that even two characters can dispel delusion is likewise set out in the authentic sūtras. How, then, could one be justified in burning and destroying scripture? To do so is to lose the very substance in which merit resides."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The foregoing sets out the mistaken view — a false claim, current in the world, holding that reciting a verse justifies burning old scripture; without consulting this very commentary, how would one ever recognize that one has misled others by it? What follows next refutes this on the strength of the textual evidence cited: the half-verse and the giving up of the body, cited above, illustrate, first, how diligently the Tathāgata sought the Dharma; second, how greatly the Tathāgata himself valued the Dharma; and third, how rare and hard to encounter the true Dharma actually is. What follows, citing the sūtra as proof of two characters dispelling delusion, shows how profound the merit of the Buddhadharma truly is — citing so small an amount only makes the gravity of the opposite fault, destroying scripture, all the more apparent. If one truly fears future suffering, one should not follow after such deluded companions. Both citations come from the Nirvāṇa Sūtra."

The Zichi Commentary adds: "Measured against this clear admonition, the earlier wrongdoing is fully confirmed. Where an image or scripture has genuinely been damaged by insects or decay, it is entirely proper simply to store it away reverently in a clean place." [Procedural Commentary, fascicle 17]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "The remaining three categories may be reasoned out by reference to what came before, under the Buddha's property."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The first two of these three categories follow the same rule of permitted conversion as before; the last follows the same rule of use by attendants — both are graded exactly as in the corresponding case above." [Both from the Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "Within Sangha property, then, there are no more than these four distinct categories."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Among Sangha property, the first two categories both belong permanently to a fixed location, and so are jointly called 'permanent'; but the first admits no division among individuals while the second can be divided, hence the qualifiers 'permanent' and 'of the ten directions' are added to distinguish them. The last two categories are both property immediately designated for present use, and so are jointly called 'currently on hand'; but the first is confined to the local assembly while the second extends to visitors from elsewhere, hence the qualifiers 'currently on hand' and 'of the ten directions' are added to tell them apart."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "First, permanently-fixed communal property: such as halls and dwellings, fields and gardens, servants and livestock, rice and flour. Once its place of belonging is fixed, it may not be divided up. Should one genuinely wish to give it as a gift to another monastery, this must be done through a formal saṃgha-karman procedure with the full assembly's consent; to simply send it off directly is to commit loss through stealing. Where a custodian himself steals from such property, without regard to whether it falls short of the full ten-directions total, the mere taking of an amount reckoned at five coins already incurs the utmost grave offense."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The opening sets out the substance of the property. What follows, from 'once its place,' shows the reasoning behind its name. What follows, from 'should one,' clarifies how the violation is graded. Where someone other than the custodian steals, measuring the offense against the true owner is straightforward, which is why the text spells out only the case of the custodian himself stealing."

The Zichi Commentary adds: "As for the custodian himself stealing — this refers to a caretaker's using the property on his own authority, or interchanging its use improperly, and the like. Where there is no formal custodian, the same principle applies to anyone else as well." [Procedural Commentary, fascicle 17]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Second, communal property of the ten directions: such as cooked rice, cakes, and other food currently prepared and ready. This is originally intended so that, on hearing the summoning bell, all visitors from the ten directions may share equally in the meal. Where this food is stolen, measured against the custodian who guards it, the grave offense results; measured against the Sangha as a body, only a lighter offense results, since the Sangha's own apportioned share never meets the five-coin threshold."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The opening lists the substance of the property. What follows, from 'this is originally,' shows its distinguishing name — the general name for this category is the same as before, and so is not repeated. What follows, from 'where,' clarifies that the offense has two aspects: measured against the custodian, the offense is grave, referring to someone other than the Sangha stealing; measured against the Sangha, only a middle-grade offense follows, whether it is an outsider and the custodian stealing jointly, or the custodian stealing alone."

The Zichi Commentary adds: "There has been some doubt as to whether fermented sauces and the like, being already-prepared foodstuffs, should be classed under the ten-directions category. On reflection, the classification should not turn on whether the food is raw or cooked at all — so long as it has not yet actually entered the day's allotted portion for feeding the assembly, it belongs to the previous category: stored preserves and sauces set aside in reserve are permanently-fixed communal property; once drawn out for the day's actual use, they become communal property of the ten directions."

The Zichi Commentary further adds: "Question: permanently-fixed communal property likewise never meets the five-coin threshold when apportioned — why, then, is it graded as the grave offense? Answer: the difference between grave and light here turns entirely on whether the property is, in principle, divisible or not." [All from the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 17]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Question: when the summoning bell is rung to gather the assembly, all present members of the Sangha share in the meal — but is it permitted to make use of another monastery's servants or livestock in the same way? Answer: this is not permitted. The Sangha is constituted by the six forms of harmony, which hold wherever the Sangha itself is present; but servants and livestock belong separately to their own particular monastery, and by their very nature cannot be put to shared use across monasteries. Since their use is thus confined to their own place, the same holds for food as well."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The question supposes that another monastery's servants and livestock, being shared in common among all Sangha members everywhere, ought to be usable. In the answer, the first clause settles the matter; what follows, from 'the Sangha,' explains the reasoning, first showing the sense in which the Sangha is shared in common, then, from 'servants,' showing that servants and livestock are not shared in this way. The Procedural Commentary says: one who travels to another monastery and privately makes use of its servants, livestock, or property commits the grave offense — because the donor intended these to serve the Sangha of that particular place, not some other community, which is not a proper field of merit for them. Where the Sangha's own servants and livestock are used for such private purposes, a lower-grade offense results. Today there are many who, on private business, bring along servants who then eat the food belonging to that Sangha — the text makes plain that this constitutes the grave offense. Let this serve as a warning."

The Zichi Commentary adds: "That the Sangha's own servants and livestock incur only the lighter offense further requires that the task being carried out is itself genuine Sangha business; even where called 'the Sangha's servants,' private errands still incur the grave offense." [Procedural Commentary, fascicle 17]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Third, property currently on hand for the local assembly: such as what laypeople today offer to the Sangha, whether robes, medicine, dwelling-furnishings, or anything else — all of it is treated identically as property currently on hand for the assembly."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Fourth, property currently on hand for the ten-directions assembly: such as offerings received by the Sangha as a whole, or property left behind by a deceased member of the fivefold assembly." [Both from the Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Procedural Commentary states: "Now, though stealing applies across all Three Jewels alike, stealing Sangha property is the gravest of all. Any loss whatsoever, down to a single hair's breadth, is measured against noble ones and ordinary beings across all ten directions at once, and the offense is imputed accordingly, case by case, against every one of them. Hence, in the Five-Part Vinaya and the other schools alike, there are many accounts of people wishing to make offerings directly to the Buddha, to which the Buddha invariably replied: you may make the offering to the Sangha instead — I myself am counted among the Sangha, and offerings made to the Sangha yield the greater fruit."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The first two clauses trace out why this offense is graver than the rest. What follows, from 'any loss,' shows the mark of its gravity: 'noble ones and ordinary beings across all ten directions' gathers in the fivefold assembly and the three vehicles' causes and fruits together. 'Imputed... case by case' does not mean that multiple offenses result — rather, a single upper-grade offense is measured against the many objects involved all at once, which is why it is described this way. What follows, citing the text as proof: in the Four-Part Vinaya, King Bimbisāra offering his garden to the Buddha, and Queen Mallikā offering a robe to the Buddha, both receive this identical reply from the Buddha."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "The Vaipulya scriptures further say: even the five heinous transgressions and the four grave offenses, I myself am still able to save one from — but one who steals Sangha property, this I cannot save. The rest is set out at length in the Sūtra of the Storehouse of the Sun, the account of Saṃgharakṣa, and other such scriptures."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The first part cites the scriptural text; by singling out the five heinous transgressions and the four grave offenses specifically, it sets in relief just how extreme this evil is. 'This I cannot save' means that even the Buddha's own majestic spiritual power cannot be brought to bear here — not that the Buddha abandons such a person outright. What follows, from 'the rest,' points to material treated at greater length elsewhere." [Both from the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 17]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "The first case here matches precisely what the Procedural Commentary itself cites. The Samantapāsādikā says: where one guards another's property carefully and without slackening, and a thief nevertheless steals it away in secret, or takes it by open force — in either case the offense is measured against the original owner, because the custodian was never in a position to have prevented it in the first place. Where the opposite is true — where the custodian was careless in storing the property — the custodian himself must make restitution, because it was precisely the custodian's own negligence that invited the thief; restitution to the owner is therefore required, and failure to make it is itself a violation."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The first clause points to material treated more fully elsewhere: that text distinguishes seven kinds of 'owner' across two categories — first, the owner who suffers loss under a custodian's care; second, the owner who suffers loss of property entrusted for safekeeping; third, the owner of stolen property itself; fourth, the owner of property a thief gives to a bhikṣu; fifth, the owner in the case of an arrested and bound thief; sixth, the owner in the case of a madman who gives away property; seventh, the owner acting as a night-watchman. All are treated fully there; those who wish to pursue the matter further should consult it there. What follows, citing the Samantapāsādikā, corresponds to the first of these seven categories; within that treatise, the first part clarifies careful and diligent guarding. That the offense is 'measured against the original owner' rests on two grounds: first, the custodian was not in a position to prevent the theft; second, the custodian bears no liability for restitution — were the original owner to demand restitution from the custodian in such a case, this would itself amount to a kind of theft. What follows, from 'where,' next clarifies careless storage — the reverse of the two grounds just given, and so liability falls on the custodian instead." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "Second, the case where property has been seized by robbers. As cited in the Procedural Commentary, the principle divides into two positions — whether the taking occurs face-to-face or not. In grading the offense, one must look to whether each of the two parties' minds — the original owner's, and the robber's — has actually let go or not. Where the original owner's mind has already let go of the property, and the robber's claim to it has become settled, this may then no longer be reclaimed — as when the vinaya speaks of a robber subsequently robbing another robber. Second, where the owner's mind has settled into letting go, but the robber's claim has not yet become settled, this may still be reclaimed, because the conditions for a completed act of robbery are not yet fully present. Third, where the owner still hesitates, but the robber's claim has already become settled, this may no longer be reclaimed, because the conditions are already complete, regardless of what the original owner might still wish. Fourth, where neither party's mind is settled either way, the property may simply be taken back, because with the mind on neither side yet fixed, the karma of the act has not become fully operative. These four cases may be judged accordingly."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The opening raises face-to-face and not-face-to-face together — meaning theft that occurs directly in the victim's presence, and theft that does not. The 'two parties' refers to the property owner and the robber. What follows, from 'where,' lists the cases individually; the first and the last are both self-explanatory. In the second case, because the robber's own mind is still hesitant, the karma of robbery is not yet complete, hence 'the conditions are not fully present.' The third case is the reverse of this, and so may no longer be reclaimed." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "Third, as to what is actually stolen: a brief summary gathers everything in — sentient and non-sentient objects alike are all included without exception."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "As the Clarifying Treatise explains: the meaning of stealing is exceedingly broad. If one carries out an unlawful act by way of any of the six faculties, or steals by way of any of the six elements, the grave offense results equally."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The six faculties frame theft in terms of the one who steals, so as to encompass what is stolen; the six elements frame theft in terms of what is stolen, so as to reveal the one who steals. From this one may understand that the objects theft can reach are truly without limit."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Consider the various seers who serve as physicians of snakebite: when someone is bitten by a snake, they compose a written charm which, once seen, cures the affliction — but a fee must be paid for it. If a bhikṣu, harmed in this way, secretly views the charm without payment, then regardless of whether this actually causes the physician any material loss, the very act of viewing it constitutes the offense. By this example, all secret formulas and specialized techniques that their possessors do not permit to be transmitted freely fall under the same rule: to view them by stealth, against the possessor's wishes, is no small matter — this is called 'theft through the eye.' What follows applies the same reasoning by way of example: as when one wishes to learn a curative mantra, for which a fee must properly be paid — if a bhikṣu secretly listens in and reckons up its value without paying, the grave offense results. Theft through smelling, tasting, and touching are to be understood by the same analogy. Where a curative technique, once its conditions are met, actually cures the ailment — only once the fee is paid may it properly be transmitted, and only once the fee is paid may it properly be heard and copied down — if a bhikṣu receives and learns it under conditions that in fact bring about the cure, without paying the required fee, the grave offense results."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Among the six faculties, the first is explained in full detail here: the eye faculty. 'Physicians of snakebite' — following the treatise, this should properly read 'physicians who move on their chests, of snake-venom' — meaning that a snake moves upon its chest, and its bite injects venom; this refers to a creature that moves like a worm and carries poison. What follows applies the same pattern to the remaining five faculties."

The Zichi Commentary adds: "The first case is theft through the eye, of visual form; the case beginning 'as when one wishes to learn' is theft through the ear, of sound; the case beginning 'theft through' briefly indicates the remaining three sense-objects; the case beginning 'where a curative technique' is theft through the mind, of a mental object." [Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text continues: "Next, consider the six elements. Earth, water, and fire, the first three, may be understood without further comment. As the vinaya says: there is a fan treated with a mantra and medicinal ointment, applied for its cooling effect — if a bhikṣu secretly fans himself with it without paying the fee, this is called 'theft of wind.' If one raises a building or projects it at a slant so as to obstruct another's own construction, this is called 'theft of space.' 'Consciousness' here means the element of discernment: where a person possesses some skill or expertise and never freely gives it away, teaching only once a fee has been paid — if a bhikṣu, through some device, learns it from that person without paying the fee owed, this is precisely 'theft of consciousness.' Consciousness itself cannot literally be stolen away, having no physical form; but one may still, by taking advantage of the circumstance, steal the use of another's discernment."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Next, among the six elements: 'elements' here means that all six are vast and all-pervading; it also carries the sense of six distinct characteristics, one in essence but differing in name — hence the two terms are each set out in turn. Within the text, the opening briefly points to the first three. What follows, citing the vinaya, explains the remaining three: the first clarifies theft of wind; what follows, from 'if one raises,' gives theft of space; what follows, from 'consciousness,' finally clarifies theft of consciousness. 'Skill or expertise' means an art or ability. 'Consciousness cannot literally be stolen away' means it cannot be carried off bodily — it is only that another's cleverness and skill are learned by such a person, which is why this too is still called theft." [Both from the Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "Third, clarifying non-human and animal property: this has already been made clear above under the establishment of principles; one may consult the Procedural Commentary for how the grading of grave and light offenses actually works out."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "'Established above' refers, in its nearer sense, to the present precept's conditions constituting a violation and its defective conditions, and, in its more distant sense, to the discussion of object-substitution earlier in this gate. What follows, pointing to the Procedural Commentary: that text explains that, in stealing a non-human's property, where it has an owner, the offense is measured against that owner and graded as the upper-grade offense; where it has no owner, the offense is measured against the non-human itself and graded as the middle-grade offense. As for stealing an animal's property, the older commentators held this to be the upper-grade offense, but the present master, following the Ten Recitations Vinaya and the Mahāvibhāṣā, holds that only the lower-grade offense results." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Procedural Commentary states: "Second, clarifying the perception of the object as having an owner. Where the perception, from beginning to end, that it has no owner never shifts at all, there is no offense. Where the perception shifts back and forth between the two, the grading of the offense correspondingly shifts between lighter and heavier."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The vinaya sets out four cases in full: property with an owner, perceived as having an owner, incurs the upper-grade offense; the first variant case, where doubt is present instead, incurs the middle-grade offense; the next case, ownerless property perceived, with doubt, as having an owner, incurs the middle-grade offense. Of the remaining third and fourth cases, the text here omits the third — ownerless property genuinely perceived as ownerless — though this is necessarily implied. Within the text, the opening establishes the condition constituting a violation, corresponding to the first of these four cases. What follows, from 'where,' distinguishes the case of a lacking condition, corresponding to the third case, taken first in terms of an original, unchanging delusion, which incurs no offense. What follows, from 'where... back and forth,' is based instead on a shift of perception: where the perception was first that it had an owner and then shifted to no owner, the middle-grade offense results; where the perception was first that it had no owner and then shifted to having one, the upper-grade offense results — hence the phrase 'shifts between lighter and heavier.'" [Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Procedural Commentary states: "Third, clarifying the intent to steal. Now, this one matter, even those of genuine virtue have not always escaped. For in this world, the offense of theft is settled by the mind alone, without regard to whether the object itself was rightly or wrongly obtained. Hence the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya records that a monastery director who, out of a genuinely good-hearted motive, used the property of the Three Jewels interchangeably still committed the upper-grade offense of theft — this being a violation committed out of sheer ignorance."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The opening shows why this is so hard to guard against: because greed and attachment run so deep, contact with any object stirs a thought; a coarse mind fails even to notice this happening, so how could it ever recognize a deviant motive at work within itself? Failing to see through such self-deceiving sentiment, one ends by falling into the net of offense — even those of genuine virtue have not always escaped it, let alone the ordinary run of people caught up within it. All who share this same tendency of mind must therefore redouble their resolve. What follows, from 'for,' shows how the karma is settled: 'without regard to whether the object itself was rightly or wrongly obtained' — the object here being the property just mentioned — using property of the Three Jewels interchangeably without any private motive is, in one sense, 'rightly obtained'; appropriating it into one's own private, improper use is 'wrongly obtained' — yet both incur the grave offense all the same, which is why it is said that no such distinction is actually drawn. What follows, from 'hence,' cites the proof text: because the motive was genuinely directed toward the Three Jewels, it is called 'good-hearted'; but considered in terms of the ignorant misapplication involved, it remains, after all, a thieving mind."

The Procedural Commentary further states: "The Four-Part Vinaya sets out ten kinds of thieving mind. First, the mind of dark ignorance — meaning a deluded mind, misapplying a teaching it merely believes could be learned, and confusedly acting on that delusion; whatever it then does, the grave offense results. The monastery director in the Mahāsāṃghika account is exactly such a case. Second, a deviant mind — meaning a mind of greed that schemes for personal gain, teaching the Dharma through deviant means of livelihood, and hoarding wealth for oneself. Third, a mind twisted with resentment — this is precisely the mind of anger: bearing even a slight grudge, one seizes property under cover of one's anger; or one merely feigns outward anger and rage while one's real intent lies in gaining property — in either case, obtaining the property incurs the grave offense. Fourth, a mind of intimidation — whether by direct threats and shouting, or by preaching the Dharma so as to frighten someone into giving, or by feigning one's own fear in order to extract property. Fifth, a mind that habitually harbors the intent to steal from others — one that constantly nurses schemes of seizure. Sixth, determined taking — where, inwardly, one has already deliberated and planned, and the means is already fully formed; the cause here necessarily produces its result, and the moment the object is actually disturbed, the violation is complete. Seventh, taking by means of entrusted property — either flatly denying the entrustment altogether, or returning only a lesser portion than what was actually entrusted. Eighth, taking through intimidation — displaying a bodily or verbal manner such that the other party, out of fear and deference, hands over the property. Ninth, taking by opportunity — watching for another's negligence, and using one gain as the springboard to seek a further gain. Tenth, taking by reliance — whether relying on one's own reputation and authority, or using some pretext bound up with one's own name; or relying on a powerful friend or ally, meaning one borrows another's threatening power in order to take; or relying on clever, persuasive speech, meaning one uses ornate and specious argument to draw the other party in, leading them to false expectations, and thereby extracting wealth or gain. As for 'deceiving and confusing' — this means speaking of what is not the Dharma as though it were the Dharma, or of the Dharma as though it were not, purely for the sake of gaining an advantage over the other party, and thereby bewitching the sentiments of ordinary people."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: the vinaya sets out in full two groups of five thieving states — the first is called the five minds, the latter the five modes of taking. 'Taking' refers to the actual karmic act, the concrete conduct undertaken in confronting the object. In the first: 'a teaching it merely believes could be learned' means that although a teaching is, in principle, something that can rightly be learned, failing actually to learn it properly is what produces the delusion. In the second: 'schemes' means to seek after; 'hoarding' is like accumulating. In the third: the two readings, feigned and genuine anger, are distinguished from each other. In the fourth: measured against the Commentary on the Precept-Text, it further says: or by invoking the threatening power of officials and government. This overlaps in name with the eighth mode below but differs in its actual character — the distinction between the two turns strictly on mind versus taking: 'mind' does not necessarily result in actual taking, while 'taking' necessarily involves the mind as well. In the tenth: five distinct forms are given in explanation — the first three are bodily karma, the last two verbal karma. And among the first three, the first relies on oneself, the second relies on another's name, and the third relies on another's power; among the last two, the former is mere clever speech, while the latter is outright deception."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "By means of these various passages, one may verify and come to know the karma of the mind, whose general character has now been clearly shown. This suffices to serve as a protective wall, warding off and guarding against every deluded encounter with an object."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "Deluded sentiment chases after its objects in ten thousand different calculations — how could the list given above possibly exhaust them all? And yet, by raising a single instance, the rest may be extended by analogy; so, although what came before was only a brief indication, it still serves to guard the mind. Once one knows the teaching's own account of these characteristics, and has come to recognize deluded mental states even a little, one becomes able to check them before they ever arise — hence the comparison to a protective wall. The mind arises in pursuit of its objects; where the mind is deluded, its object is likewise rendered deluded — hence the phrase 'deluded encounter.'" [Both from the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Procedural Commentary states: "Fourth, grave-value property: this means five coins. Where the value of some other, miscellaneous item is equivalent to five coins, the same threshold applies."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The opening indicates coins and goods together in general terms. 'Five coins' refers to actual coin currency itself; 'equivalent to five coins' applies the same reckoning to goods valued by the standard of coinage. The reason the threshold is fixed at five is that, under the secular law of that kingdom, taking property meeting this amount was punishable by death; the Buddha, following the standard set by secular law, likewise made the grave offense turn on meeting this same threshold."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "The Mahāvibhāṣā asks: stealing five coins constitutes the grave offense — but which coinage does this actually refer to? Answer: there are three interpretations. The first says: whatever coinage was used under the law of the kingdom of Rājagṛha, the standard should follow that coinage. The second says: whatever coinage is used, wherever the Buddhadharma happens to be present, that coinage should serve as the standard. The third says: the Buddha, on the basis of Rājagṛha's own law, whereby stealing five coins carried the death penalty, established this precept accordingly. In whatever place the Buddhadharma is now present, the standard should follow however many units of that place's own goods its own law fixes as the threshold for a capital sentence. Though three interpretations are given, the treatise's own author holds that the third is correct."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "Second, determining the actual coinage in question, in two parts: the first cites the various treatises' interpretations. In the answer: the first two interpretations both fix the threshold at five coins; the last interpretation instead follows the capital-punishment standard, without being confined to any fixed number of coins. The first matches the Ten Recitations Vinaya; the second accords with the present school's own position; the third is what the treatise's author himself adopts. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: as in the Mahāvibhāṣā, the account of what constitutes stealing here is genuinely confused throughout — the first interpretation, in trying to fix the original coinage, offers no way of actually determining it; the third interpretation, following whatever each locality currently fixes as its capital threshold, is likewise far too loose and difficult to rely upon."

The Xingzong Commentary adds: "Because coinage varies so greatly from place to place, the question is raised to settle the matter. The first interpretation, following Rājagṛha, holds because the Buddha established this precept while in that kingdom; there, a large bronze coin was worth sixteen small ones, so stealing small coins would require a full eighty of them to meet the threshold. The second interpretation, following whatever coinage is locally used, disregards the actual substance of the coin and simply requires the number five to be met. The last interpretation disregards any fixed quantity at all, following only whatever standard the local capital-punishment law happens to set. The treatise adopts this last position; the present interpretation instead follows the second." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Now, as to the meaning of 'five coins,' the vinaya and the treatises interpret it differently from one another. In actually grading an offense, the standard should be applied broadly and flexibly; but in guarding oneself against violation in the first place, one must be strict and urgent about it. Hence the vinaya says: do not steal so much as a single blade of grass."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "Second, settling the matter on grounds of principle, in three parts: the first shows the underlying intent. That 'the vinaya and the treatises interpret it differently' — the vinaya's own account is cited below, while the treatise's account is the passage cited above. 'Grading an offense' refers to how a violation, once already committed, is to be judged; 'guarding against violation' refers to holding and upholding the precept with focused diligence beforehand. The present passage follows the standard of guarding against violation in settling what actually counts as the coinage in question."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Now, the interpretation most widely followed among teachers today mostly relies on the Ten Recitations Vinaya. That text says: stealing five coins, reckoned in the old large bronze coinage, incurs the grave offense; if stealing in small coins, eighty of them are required."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "This exposes a case of loose practice: abandoning the strict standard in favor of the lenient one fails to grasp the teaching's true intent. The old coinage was worth sixteen to one, so five large coins works out to eighty small ones."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Whatever coinage is actually used at the place where the theft occurs, the five-coin threshold should be reckoned in that coinage. The Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya says: since kings have no single fixed standard, the amount that triggers a death sentence for theft is not fixed either; one should instead take King Bimbisāra's own ancient legal standard — four coins and three-quarters of a coin — as constituting the grave threshold. The Four-Part Vinaya simply says five coins. Following this, the earlier interpretations from the vinaya and the treatises should be set aside, and this later account taken as authoritative. And even taking four coins and three-quarters as the standard, the Samantapāsādikā's own interpretation still amounts to the same five-coin threshold."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "Settling the correct ruling: the first two clauses follow the treatise's second interpretation to fix the present school's own position. What follows, from 'the Mahāsāṃghika,' cites the supporting evidence. 'Kings have no single fixed standard' refers broadly to the various kingdoms in general. 'King Bimbisāra's own ancient legal standard' is what the Buddha relied upon in establishing this precept, and so may properly serve as the standard. 'Four coins and three-quarters' falls within the five-coin threshold; two and a half quarters would instead fall under stealing only four coins. Reckoning by 'quarters' reflects the fact that the coin of that region was cast in a square mold — coins circulating today are round, so the reckoning here is simply expressed using the character for 'quarter.' What follows, from 'the Four-Part Vinaya,' settles the matter according to the present school's own position; 'the later account taken as authoritative' means the second interpretation is preferred over the first. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: one might instead follow the Mahāvibhāṣā's own middle interpretation, taking whatever coinage is locally used and reckoning the five-coin threshold accordingly, so that the whole dispute settles itself. What follows, from 'and even,' reconciles the positions: the Samantapāsādikā and the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya both reckon by the old large bronze coinage, which is simply adopting Rājagṛha's own ancient legal standard to interpret the meaning of 'five coins'; but when it comes to actually deciding the threshold in practice, this should still follow whatever coinage is locally used, as that same treatise itself says: do not take so much as a blade of grass. From this one may see that the principle of strict guardedness accords rather well with the present school's own position." [Both from the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Procedural Commentary states: "The principles governing valuation divide into six distinct cases. First, the Ten Recitations Vinaya and the Mahāsāṃghika Mātṛkā say: coinage has times of being dear and times of being cheap. This does not prevent a single coin, taken when coinage is dear, from meeting the grave threshold, nor does it prevent even a hundred or a thousand coins, taken when coinage happens to be cheap, from incurring only the lighter offense."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "Coinage being 'dear' or 'cheap' refers to the fact that goods themselves carry more or less weight in value, and that times of abundance or scarcity vary. When coinage is dear, one unit suffices for its full use; when cheap, many units are needed to do the work of few — the text explains itself along these lines."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Second, the Four-Part Vinaya, the Five-Part Vinaya, and the Samantapāsādikā say: where property is stolen in a place where it is dear, and later sold in a place where it is cheap, the valuation should still follow the place where the theft originally occurred."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "All three texts agree on this point, which is why all three are cited together. This means the valuation is reckoned in terms of the loss to the owner at the place the theft actually occurred, not adjusted downward because the later sale happened to fall short of the threshold."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Third, the Samantapāsādikā says: where property is stolen at a time when it is dear, and later sold at a time when it is cheap, in actually fixing the offense the valuation should still follow the original time of the theft. These three cases run in the reverse direction of one another, yet all agree in never letting the offense be reduced by any subsequent drop in value."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The underlying sense is the same as above — as when something worth ten in spring is worth only one by summer. What precedes and follows here together indicate three cases in all: the first is fully given in the text; the second should properly read, stolen in a place where it is cheap, sold in a place where it is dear; the third, stolen at a time when it is cheap, sold at a time when it is dear — in every case, the valuation is fixed according to the original circumstance."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Fourth, the Mātṛkā-piṭaka: even taking a total of five thousand coins does not constitute the grave offense, so long as it is done by repeatedly taking four coins at a time, with a fresh decision to stop formed after each separate taking. And there are also cases where the grave offense results even though the property was never actually obtained at all — as in the Four-Part Vinaya's account of burning it, burying it, defacing its color, or having another carry it out, and the like."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "Stealing a large total in many small increments incurs only the lighter offense, because no single act ever actually reaches the threshold on its own. Incurring the grave offense without ever obtaining the property at all follows simply because loss to the other party has already resulted."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Fifth, cases where the property, though falling short of five coins, still incurs the grave offense. As in the Four-Part Vinaya: where a group sends a single person to steal five coins, which the group then divides among themselves; or where a group jointly commits the theft together, treating it as a single undivided share — so long as the total meets the five-coin threshold, everyone involved is equally guilty of the grave offense, even though each individual's actual share falls short of it. And cases where the property, though exceeding five coins, still incurs only the lighter offense: as in the Ten Recitations Vinaya's account of stealing property belonging to a great many people that has not yet been divided among them."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "Falling short of five yet incurring the grave offense, and exceeding five yet incurring only the lighter offense: the first is cited from the Four-Part Vinaya. Both of its interpretations concern a case where there are many people and little property, so that each individual's share falls short of five; but measured against the property as a whole, all are equally subject to the grave punishment. The second is cited from the Ten Recitations Vinaya, and is measured against the group of owners as a whole, with no requirement that any individual share meet the five-coin threshold. This is analogous to the case of communal property of the ten directions discussed earlier."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Sixth, stealing one coin apiece from five different people still incurs the grave offense. As in the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya: where five people each entrust one coin to a single custodian to hold and guard, and this is then stolen, the offense is measured against the custodian. The Samantapāsādikā says: to understand the marks of theft properly, consider a case such as a teacher and three disciples instructing one another, jointly stealing six coins belonging to a single person: each of them incurs one upper-grade offense and one middle-grade offense — one's own individual act, falling short of the five-coin threshold on its own, does not itself amount to the grave offense; only the middle-grade offense results from one's own act, while instructing another to steal incurs the upper-grade offense besides. This distinction should be understood."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "This sixth case shows that stealing even a small amount can still constitute the grave offense. The first citation is from the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya. In the Samantapāsādikā's case, 'instructing one another' refers to something like a teacher instructing three disciples, saying: that person has six coins — the eldest disciple should take three, and each of the others one apiece; and, instructing the others to take enough to meet the five-coin threshold, the teacher himself takes one. One's own individual act falls short of the threshold — down even to the youngest disciple, who in turn says: the preceptor takes three, my fellow disciples each take one, and I myself take one. The offenses are graded exactly as above: the upper-grade offense is for instructing another, and the middle-grade offense is for one's own direct act." What follows, from "one's own," explains the reasoning behind imputing the middle-grade offense, out of concern that one might otherwise mistakenly suppose that joint theft should always be graded as the full grave offense. [Both from the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Xingzong Commentary adds: "The Mahāsāṃghika account frames its case in terms of the original owner; but measured against the custodian, the grave offense results simply because the theft as a whole meets the five-coin threshold. The Samantapāsādikā's four people instructing one another is stated in terms of successive, staggered acts; where all act at a single moment, only one person can actually be the one instructing, with the other three being instructed. The one who instructs, by taking even a single coin, has thereby already committed theft of the full amount, meeting the grave threshold." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Procedural Commentary states: "The meaning of 'removal from its place' is set out through ten distinct cases."

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Though a completed violation of the stealing precept turns on removal from place, the actual mark of 'removal' need not always mean the physical object itself is carried away — hence ten approaches are used together to capture the full range of distinctions." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Procedural Commentary continues: "First, completion by written document determines removal. As when a vinaya-master unlawfully authorizes the use of Sangha property in a document, and the like. The Samantapāsādikā says: writing on the ground to record the boundary — writing only one end incurs the lighter offense, writing both ends incurs the grave offense."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The first case concerns an official ruling that establishes the violation — 'unlawful use' refers to falsely recording it in a register or ledger, and the like. What follows, citing the Samantapāsādikā, concerns a written land-boundary deed. 'One end, lighter' means writing down only the starting point — the preparatory middle-grade offense; 'both ends, heavier' means going on to also write down the destination point — the completed upper-grade offense."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Second, establishment through speech. The Samantapāsādikā says: if, with the intent to steal, one declares aloud, 'this is certainly my land,' and the landowner's mind is thereby only brought to doubt, the middle-grade offense results; where the landowner's mind is thereby brought to give up the claim entirely, the grave offense results. Similarly, where two parties dispute over a garden or field, and an unjust ruling awards it to one side, both the one who renders the unjust ruling and the one to whom it is unjustly awarded commit the offense — and so on through every other manner of settling a dispute by speech, all incurring the grave offense in the same way. This matches the Four-Part Vinaya's own account: wherever property is taken through clever, persuasive speech that deceives and confuses another, the grave offense results in every case."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The next case concerns a violation constituted purely by a verbal ruling. The Samantapāsādikā gives two parts: the first concerns stealing land through such a declaration; what follows, from 'similarly,' concerns settling a dispute this way — the one who unjustly renders the ruling in another's favor is guilty, as is the one to whom it is unjustly awarded. What follows, citing the Four-Part Vinaya, concerns persuasive speech, matching the passage cited earlier."

The Xingzong Commentary adds: "'Settling a dispute by speech in every manner' means using forceful and cunning argument to render an unjust ruling. 'Deceiving and confusing' in the vinaya text means using deviant persuasion to mislead. In every such case, once the statement has been made and the matter genuinely settled beyond doubt, the upper-grade offense is fully constituted." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Third, moving a boundary-marker. The Samantapāsādikā says: moving one marker incurs the middle-grade offense, moving two markers incurs the grave offense — meaning that, in measuring and surveying land, even a single hair's or a single grain's width of encroachment incurs the grave offense, because land itself has no fixed price. The same holds for moving a marking-cord."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "'Marker' is explained below by way of a note, meaning something like today's measuring rods and units. The text here cites specifically the case of moving two markers to constitute the offense. According to the treatise, if three markers are stolen, moving the first incurs the lower-grade offense, the second the middle-grade offense, and the third the grave offense; and so on up through ten markers, where moving each of the first eight incurs the lower-grade offense, the ninth the middle-grade offense, and the tenth the grave offense."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Fourth, dropping a counting-token. The Four-Part Vinaya: stealing by secretly concealing a counting-token used to tally numbers, or a token used to apportion goods, so as to bring about a shortfall in what is actually distributed."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "'Dropping a counting-token' means dropping in more tokens than are warranted so as to make the resulting share of goods smaller for others; or, conversely, taking a larger share of goods without actually dropping in the corresponding token at all — though this is not strictly what the text has in mind, such things do happen in the world."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Fifth, altering the pattern. The Ten Recitations Vinaya and the Mahāvibhāṣā say: a woven felt rug or carpet has, worked into its pattern, the branches, leaves, and flowers of a tree; if one now pulls threads from the leaf-portion of the pattern over into the flower-portion, this incurs the grave offense, because the original pattern has thereby been altered. Or again, as when one borrows another's robe or bowl and improperly uses it in a way that damages it, diminishing its value by an amount reaching five coins, this too incurs the grave offense — as the vinaya says, on the grounds of defacing its original character."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The opening cites the Ten Recitations Vinaya and the Mahāvibhāṣā, concerning the offense of altering a pattern — as when wool or thread has been woven into the shape of flowers, birds, or beasts, and is then pulled and shifted out of place, causing damage to the piece as a whole. What follows, from 'or again,' follows the root vinaya itself, concerning the offense of damaging an object's original character."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Sixth, shifting a die. As in the Ten Recitations Vinaya's account of a gambling game, moving a game-piece, and the like."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "'Shifting a die' is like ordinary gambling in the world, where dice made of bone are commonly cast to wager on goods; shifting one with the intent to steal completes the violation, according to whatever goods are actually at stake."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Seventh, a case that looks like removal but is actually not removal. As in the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya's account: stealing another's ox or horse, but not yet having formed the settled sense of having actually obtained it — even though all four of the animal's legs have already moved off the ground, this does not yet constitute the grave offense."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "This itself clarifies the case of the animal's four legs: where it is driven toward the intended destination, and every one of its legs has stepped through the full motion, the grave offense results; where it moves in some direction other than the one intended, the lighter offense results — even though it has technically left its place, only the middle-grade offense is incurred. Where the original intended destination was never fixed to begin with, then once every leg has completed its motion, the grave offense results regardless. Where the original owner comes in pursuit and the thief's mind has not yet settled into a sense of having actually obtained the animal, the lighter offense results — this is precisely what the text means by 'not yet having formed the settled sense of having obtained it.'"

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Eighth, a case that looks like non-removal but is actually removal. As in the Samantapāsādikā: stealing in an empty, deserted place, where success is already certain beyond any doubt — like throwing a staff up into the empty air, which will inevitably, without exception, come back down — the moment it is set in motion, the grave offense is already complete."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "In the Samantapāsādikā's case, the mind has already settled into certainty of obtaining the object, so even the slightest motion constitutes the violation, without needing to wait for actual removal from place. What follows, giving the analogy, is self-explanatory."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Ninth, distinguishing removal in a case where, strictly speaking, there is no 'place' from which to be removed at all. As in the Four-Part Vinaya's account of stealing another's field or dwelling, attacking and destroying a village, burning it, burying it, or defacing its character — all of these constitute the grave offense."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "Property such as a field or a dwelling can, in principle, never actually be 'removed' from its place at all — unlike the previous case, which genuinely could be either removed or not removed."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Tenth, a miscellany of further cases clarifying removal — such as stealing a bird carried on the wind through empty air, a wattle enclosure, or the diversion of a flowing water channel, and so forth. These are not spelled out in full here; the fuller account may be found in the Commentary on the Precept-Text itself."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "For the tenth case, only three specific marks are given here: empty air, a wattle enclosure, and a water channel. The vinaya, in its own account, actually distinguishes thirteen distinct kinds of place, which the Commentary on the Precept-Text goes on to explain in turn; a brief account is given here for reference. The first, 'ground,' refers to buried treasure: where it has an owner, the offense is measured against that owner; ground belonging to the Buddha or the Sangha is measured against the Buddha or Sangha respectively. The second, 'above ground,' is as when property is found lying on a road today. The third, 'a mount,' refers to a riding animal such as an elephant or horse: if one steals property carried upon the mount, the offense is completed only once the property itself is separated from the mount; if the mount is stolen together with what it carries, the offense is completed the moment the mount itself moves off. The fourth, 'a burden,' is treated the same way as a mount, splitting into the same two cases. The fifth, 'empty air,' refers to clothing, goods, or a bird carried on the wind, which one intends to steal — it is this empty space itself that determines the mark of removal. The Samantapāsādikā: in stealing a bird in flight, moving it from the left wing's position past the right wing's, or from the tail's position to the head's, and likewise moving it up or down, in every such case the grave offense results. The sixth, 'a rack,' refers to a wattle frame: if the property itself is stolen, the offense is completed once the property leaves the rack; if the rack itself is stolen together with what hangs on it, the offense is completed once the rack itself is moved. The seventh, 'a village,' refers either to stealing property within a village, or to stealing the village itself as a physical entity — attacking, destroying it, and the like. The eighth, 'a forest hermitage,' refers to open ground outside a village, to be understood the same way as the village case. The ninth, 'a field' — per the Ten Recitations Vinaya: where a dispute over a field is brought before an official, and one side wins the case, the grave offense results if the victory was obtained unjustly; if the case is lost, only the lighter offense results; and where a boundary-marker is set up claiming more than one's fair share and this excessive claim succeeds, the grave offense likewise results. The tenth, 'a place,' such as a shop or place of business: stealing goods within it, or stealing the place itself, follows the same pattern as the village case above. The eleventh, 'a boat': stealing property aboard a boat takes the boat itself as the relevant place; stealing the boat itself is completed only once its mooring-rope is cut and it is separated from its place. The twelfth, 'stealing water,' refers to diverting a flowing water channel. The Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya: irrigation water may be valued, for a single night's use, at one coin, or as much as four or five; if one damages the channel itself, the lower-grade offense results; if the water actually enters someone else's field, the middle-grade offense results; and where the value reaches the full five-coin threshold, the upper-grade offense results. The thirteenth, privately evading a checkpoint toll: as the vinaya says, a bhikṣu owes no toll, but a layperson should properly pay one — smuggling goods through on the layperson's behalf incurs the grave offense. The Ten Recitations Vinaya: where a bhikṣu who should pay the toll fails to do so, this too incurs the grave offense. The rest is treated at greater length in the Commentary on the Precept-Text itself." [All from the Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Xingzong Commentary adds: "In the fifth case, empty air: 'the left wing's position past the right wing's' is stated in terms of horizontal flight; 'the tail's position to the head's' is stated in terms of straight, direct flight; 'up or down' may be understood similarly. Since empty space itself has no fixed boundaries, the mark of removal must instead be determined by reference to the bird's own flight and movement. In the ninth case, the field: 'brought before an official' means bringing the dispute to a magistrate's court for judgment. 'Winning unjustly' means obtaining the judgment through improper means. As for 'an excessive claim,' that text says: if one has failed to win, and then sets up a further false boundary-marker, and the land thereby obtained reaches the five-coin threshold, the upper-grade offense results — meaning that a marker is set up to stake the false claim. In the tenth case, 'a place': the term 'place' is used broadly; the vinaya says, whether a household, a market stall, an orchard, a vegetable garden, the courtyard in front, the area behind the house, or any other such place, and so on." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Procedural Commentary states: "Now, the marks of the stealing precept are subtle and deeply hidden, extraordinarily difficult to fully sort out and understand. Were one to lay out its full contours and details in exhaustive form, this would only swell the pages to no purpose, and reading through it in search of genuine understanding would inevitably become an unwieldy burden. Hence only a brief listing of the conditions constituting a violation is given here, sufficient to grasp the rough outline, with the intent of economizing effort while still knowing where the boundary lies.

For one whose mind is genuinely apprehensive and set on the path, the range of circumstances they engage with is naturally limited, and so a modest degree of purity should already be within reach. But for one who takes on many worldly affairs while aspiring to rise ever higher, such a person is bound to be caught in the net of stealing, with no way out in the end. Why is this so? Because such a mind harbors the wish to surpass others, and its inverted view of things has not yet been overturned — only one who has attained at least the first fruit, free of further training, is truly fit to manage such worldly affairs. For one whose mind genuinely cherishes the path, reading closely, applying the teaching to one's own actual circumstances, and reflecting deeply — only in this way does real understanding come. Still, fearing that some unworthy reader might complain this account is too elaborate, I confess my own intent has genuinely not been fully expressed even here. What has been given is only a rough outline as above, and so the rest has, for now, been left out."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The opening shows the intent behind the earlier brevity. What follows, from 'for one whose mind is genuinely apprehensive,' clarifies that people either accord with or run against this intent: the first shows that a person who knows when enough is enough dreads violation and holds back in reserve. 'Apprehensive' refers to a mind that finds itself genuinely fearsome and hard to restrain — the slightest indulgence completes the karma, and the resulting misfortune extends across many lifetimes, which is precisely why it should be a source of apprehension. 'Set on the path' means aspiring to genuine liberation. 'The range of circumstances is limited' means being restrained by the teaching itself. What follows, from 'but,' clarifies that one who takes on many affairs while striving upward is thereby ensnared by theft. 'Many worldly affairs' means either delighting in acting as a teacher to others, or delighting in managing worldly merit-making projects. 'Aspiring to rise ever higher' means seeking a reputation and standing beyond one's proper station. 'Caught in the net of stealing' means the karma has become fully bound; 'no way out' means the resulting suffering is without end. What follows, from 'why,' verifies and clarifies the underlying point, matching the same kind of person singled out earlier in the Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra passage above. What follows, from 'for one whose mind genuinely cherishes the path,' offers three exhortations to practice: the opening clause calls out to later readers; 'reading closely' exhorts one to seek out the teaching; 'applying it to one's own actual circumstances' means illuminating one's own situation by the teaching's light; 'reflecting deeply' means examining one's own mind by way of that situation; 'understanding comes' means genuine insight gained through this self-examination. What follows, from 'still,' forestalls a later reader's mistaken complaint, and thereby makes plain the true intent behind this brevity." [Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Commentary on the Precept-Text states: "This precept is one that people commonly violate in secret without ever realizing it — not because the offense itself is somehow less grave, but simply because the mind involved is coarse and inattentive. Even though the Procedural Commentary and the present Commentary on the Precept-Text treat the matter at such length, I still fear genuine understanding has not yet been reached, and one should reason out the actual marks of a violation by analogy with what has been given here. Hence the Samantapāsādikā says: among all the precepts, this one calls for guarding oneself with particular urgency. This second precept's actual circumstances are especially difficult to grasp, and could not be explained without going into such elaborate, minute detail. Its underlying principles and distinctions are things you yourself must reflect upon carefully. Such is the treatise's own text — faced with the real circumstances of daily life, how could one fail to exert oneself accordingly?"

The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The opening recounts the reason such frequent, unwitting violations occur. What follows, from 'the Procedural Commentary,' points to the compendium's own composition as an exhortation to practice. What follows, from 'hence,' cites the treatise's own text as a further exhortation to study. The final two clauses point to the text itself as the basis for this exhortation." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]

The Zichi Commentary adds: "In the treatise citation, the opening clause indicates the teaching's intent generally, and what follows singles out this present precept specifically as one that necessarily requires such elaborate treatment. 'Explained... in such elaborate, minute detail' reflects the fact that the treatise itself runs to three full fascicles on this precept. 'Its underlying principles and distinctions,' and the rest, exhorts careful, thorough consideration." [Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Procedural Commentary states: "Third, clarifying what does not count as an offense. The Four-Part Vinaya says: taking something under the perception that it was given to one; taking something under the perception that it is already one's own; taking something under the perception that it is discarded rubbish; taking something only temporarily; or taking something out of a genuine bond of close friendship — in every such case, there is no violation. The vinaya sets out seven qualities that together constitute genuine close friendship: (1) doing for the other what is difficult to do; (2) giving to the other what is difficult to give; (3) enduring from the other what is difficult to endure; (4) confiding one's private concerns to the other; (5) mutually covering for and protecting one another; (6) never abandoning the other in times of hardship and suffering; (7) never looking down on the other on account of poverty. Whoever is able to practice these seven qualities is a genuinely good and close friend. This standard should be used to judge whether the exemption for close friendship truly applies."

The Zichi Commentary explains: "The opening cites five kinds of perception, all of which mean that no intent to steal was actually present. 'Perceiving it as given' means believing another has given it to oneself. 'Perceiving it as already one's own' means believing it is not, in fact, someone else's property. 'Perceiving it as discarded rubbish' means believing it has no owner at all. 'Taking it only temporarily' means intending to return it. 'Close friendship' means there being no real distinction of self and other between the two parties. What follows, citing the vinaya, explains the fifth exemption in detail. Among the seven qualities: the first is exerting oneself to the utmost on the other's behalf, without ever growing weary of it; the second is giving even one's own most valued possessions to the other without any reluctance; the third is enduring even the most extreme provocation from the other without harboring any resentment at all; the fourth is disclosing one's own private thoughts to the other, holding nothing back; the fifth is concealing the other's faults and praising their good qualities, out of concern for how they are seen by others; the sixth is doing everything possible to rescue the other when they are imprisoned or in dire distress; the seventh is treating the other exactly the same whether they are noble or lowly, rich or poor, from beginning to end without ever wavering. What follows, from 'whoever,' draws the concluding point: only where such genuine sincerity is truly present does the exemption properly apply — any other, merely pretended claim to friendship falls under the ordinary rule of the offense, not the exemption." [Procedural Commentary, fascicle 18]

The Xingzong Commentary adds: "Among these five exemptions from violation, the first three concern an exemption grounded in the mind, while the last two concern an exemption grounded in the actual circumstances." [Commentary on the Precept-Text, fascicle 6]