Gate 5 of 14 (Part 2 of 2) · 南山律在家備覽 · 持犯篇 · 持犯總義門

The Grammar of Keeping and Breaking, Part Two: From the Anatomy of an Offense to the Rebuke of Its Despisers

Where Part One laid down the four-fold grammar of upholding and violating a precept, Part Two dissects the machinery by which a violation actually completes itself — the three stages of preparation on the way to a consummated offense, the seven ways an act can fall short and stall short of "root offense," the object-perception formulas that fix a violation's exact weight, and the difference focused versus diffuse intent makes across the four gravest precepts. It closes with Dao Xuan's own pastoral teaching that a single lapse never shatters every other precept at once, and his sustained rebuke of those who dismiss the Vinaya itself as a lesser, merely Hīnayāna concern — bringing the fifth gate, and the general theory of observance and violation, to its close.

Translator: Ru-Yi Meditation Center Status: translation in progress Source: 弘一律師《南山律在家備覽略編》(bfnn.org public-domain text)

1. Milestone: The Anatomy of an Offense — Prior, Root, and Subsequent Preparation

This gate's second half opens directly into the fifth chapter of the general theory, "Preparatory Stage and the Consummated Fruit" (方便趣果). Every act that ends in a violation passes through three periods: a preparatory stage before the act is complete, the root-stage at which it actually completes, and — a distinctively Nanshan refinement — a subsequent stage afterward, in which lingering satisfaction with the deed already done becomes a small offense in its own right. This section works through all three in turn, using the precept against unchastity as its running example.

Chinese Source

▲事鈔云『然造修前境、必有三時。 是以大聖隨時而制、意令智士剋志不為。』 資持釋云『初示三時。即方便根本成已也。 是下顯制意。剋猶約也。』見事鈔記卷二十七

Ru-Yi Translation

The Procedural Commentary says: "Now, whenever one carries out an act with respect to the object confronted, there are necessarily three periods involved. It is for precisely this reason that the Great Sage legislated according to these periods, his intent being to make the wise resolve firmly and simply not act at all." The Zichi Commentary explains: "The first part shows the three periods — namely, the preparatory stage, the root-stage, and the stage of completion. What follows reveals the intent behind the regulation: here 'resolve' (剋) is used in the sense of 'restrain.'" [Zichi Commentary, fascicle 27]

Chinese Source

方便趣果中分為三節┬一前方便├二中根本└三後方便

第一節 前方便

▲資持云『通三方便、望後根本、俱名為前。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Preparatory Stage and the Consummated Fruit divides into three sections: (1) prior preparation, (2) the root-stage, (3) subsequent preparation.

Section One: Prior Preparation. The Zichi Commentary says: "Taken together, the three preparatory stages, considered in relation to the root-stage that follows them, are all alike called 'prior.'"

Chinese Source

▲事鈔云『今約婬戒以明。如內心婬意、身口未現、名遠方便。此犯下罪。 二動身口、未到前境、名次方便。犯中罪。 三者臨至境所、身分相交、未至犯處已來、名近方便。是重中罪。』

△事鈔續云『已下雖輕重多少不同、大相可準。』已上皆見事鈔記卷二十七

Ru-Yi Translation

The Procedural Commentary says: "Let us explain this now by reference to the precept against unchastity. When lustful intent has arisen within the mind but body and speech have not yet manifested it, this is called the distant preparatory stage; this incurs a lower-grade offense. When body and speech have already moved but the object has not yet been reached, this is called the next preparatory stage; this incurs a middle-grade offense. When one has actually arrived at the site of the object and bodily contact has begun, but the point of consummation has not yet been reached, this is called the near preparatory stage; this is a middle-grade offense of the graver sort."

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Below this point, although the relative weights differ somewhat from case to case, the general pattern can be inferred from this model." [Both passages from Zichi Commentary, fascicle 27]

All three preparatory stages apply to the upper-grade offenses; the pattern may be inferred from the case just given. For offenses that stand alone at the middle or lower grade, following the various commentaries, only a distant and a near preparatory stage are distinguished — the distant stage being the same as above, while the next and near stages are merged together under the single name "near preparatory stage," both uniformly resulting in a lower-grade offense, with no further distinction drawn between them.

Chinese Source

▲戒疏云『言方便者、乃是趣果之都名。 業未成前、諸緣差脫、故令此罪壅住方便。』 行宗釋云『前示名。 業下釋義。』見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "As for the term 'preparatory stage' (方便): this is the general name for whatever is en route to the fruit. Before the karmic act is completed, if the various conditions it depends on fall short or drop away, then this offense remains blocked and lodged at the preparatory stage." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The first part shows the name; what follows explains its meaning." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The companion guide reads this chapter as Nanshan working out, in fine grain, exactly what it means for an intention to "become" an offense rather than simply flickering and dying. Using unchastity as the test case, the guide walks the same three-stage ladder: a distant preparatory stage where lustful intent has arisen but body and speech have not yet moved at all (a lower-grade offense on its own); a next stage where body and speech have already set out but have not yet reached the object (a middle-grade offense); and a near preparatory stage, where the parties have physically arrived at the point of contact but consummation itself has not yet occurred (already a middle-grade offense of the graver sort, one step short of the full root-offense). The guide stresses that this is not legalistic hair-splitting for its own sake — it reflects a considered view that moral responsibility accumulates in real, measurable increments well before any "final" act, and that the precepts are meant to intervene at the earliest possible point.

2. Milestone: The Root-Stage, and What Comes After It

Having laid out the three sub-stages of "prior" preparation, the chapter turns to the root-stage itself — the exact instant at which each of the four grave offenses actually consummates — and then, in a section distinctive to this compendium, to what happens in the mind immediately afterward.

Chinese Source

第二節 中根本

▲事鈔云『本相如何。 謂入如毛頭名婬、舉離本處名盜、斷其命根名殺、言章了知名妄。 若結罪之時、並攬前因、共成一果。不同他部、因成果已、更有本時方便。』 資持釋云『前明根本之相二、初句通問。 謂下別釋。 若下明攬因成果。簡異他宗、使無濫用。』見事鈔記卷二十七

Ru-Yi Translation

Section Two: The Root-Stage. The Procedural Commentary says: "What is the mark of the root-stage itself? Penetration to the depth of a single hair's breadth is called consummated unchastity; lifting the object clear of its original place is called consummated theft; severing the life-faculty is called consummated killing; and speech fully understood by the hearer is called consummated false speech. At the moment the offense is settled, our school gathers up the prior cause together into the single resulting fruit; it is not like other schools, in which, once the cause has already become the fruit, there remains some further, separate preparatory stage belonging to the original moment." The Zichi Commentary explains: "The first part clarifies the mark of the root-stage under two heads: the first sentence poses the question generally; what follows answers it point by point. What follows that clarifies how the prior cause is gathered up to form the fruit, distinguishing this from other schools so that no confusion arises." [Zichi Commentary, fascicle 27]

Chinese Source

第三節 後方便

▲事鈔云『何者後方便。謂所造事暢決稱懷、發喜前心、未思悔改。復結其罪、通得下罪。』 資持釋云『不論本罪重輕、並制一下罪、故云通也。翻前方便、二三不同、中罪下罪有異故也。』見事鈔記卷二十七

上來持犯總義中第五章方便趣果竟

Ru-Yi Translation

Section Three: Subsequent Preparation. The Procedural Commentary says: "What is meant by 'subsequent preparatory stage'? It means that once the deed accomplished has fully satisfied one's intent, and one's earlier mind gives rise to gladness over it without any thought of repentance — this itself constitutes a further offense, and, uniformly, only a lower-grade offense results." The Zichi Commentary explains: "Regardless of whether the original offense was heavy or light, this subsequent stage is uniformly assigned only a lower-grade offense — hence the word 'uniformly.' This is the reverse of the prior preparatory stage, where two or three grades of severity differ, since there middle-grade and lower-grade offenses are distinguished." [Zichi Commentary, fascicle 27]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide singles out "subsequent preparation" as a genuinely distinctive move: most legal thinking about an offense stops at the moment of consummation, but Nanshan's system reaches forward into the psychological aftermath as well. Savoring a completed wrong without any impulse toward regret is treated as its own small but real offense — a lower-grade offense regardless of how grave the original act was — precisely because it signals that the karmic momentum behind the deed has not actually stopped. The guide also draws out the definitional core of the root-stage itself: penetration "to the depth of a single hair" for unchastity, lifting an object clear of its place for theft, severing the life-faculty for killing, and a statement actually understood by the hearer for false speech — deliberately concrete, physical thresholds chosen so that a practitioner always has a clear, checkable answer to "has this already become the full offense, or not yet."

3. Milestone: Three Lesser-Known Deficiencies — General Deficiency, an Overpowering Object, and Circumstantial Divergence

The gate now turns to its sixth chapter, "Deficient Conditions and What Fails to Complete an Offense" (闕緣不成) — the core mechanics of why a violation can stall at the preparatory stage and never reach the root-offense. Dao Xuan identifies seven distinct ways a violation can fall short; this section covers the first three, which are comparatively brief.

Chinese Source

第六章 闕緣不成

闕緣不成中分為二節┬一顯相└二校量

第一節 顯相

▲戒疏云『闕緣方便、隨相眾多。且以事約分為七種、所謂闕緣乃至心息。』見戒疏記卷四

顯相中分為七項┬一闕緣├二境強├三緣差├四境差├五想差├六疑心└七善心息

Ru-Yi Translation

Chapter Six: Deficient Conditions and What Fails to Complete an Offense. This chapter divides into two sections: (1) showing the mark [of each condition], (2) weighing them together.

Section One: Showing the Mark. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "The preparatory-stage offenses arising from deficient conditions take many forms depending on the particular circumstance. Taking the matter in outline, they may be divided into seven kinds, namely from 'deficient conditions' through to 'the cessation of the [violating] mind through a good thought.'" [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Showing the mark divides into seven items: (1) deficient conditions, (2) an object too strong, (3) circumstantial divergence, (4) object divergence, (5) perception divergence, (6) doubting mind, (7) cessation through a good mind.

Chinese Source

第一項 闕緣

▲戒疏云『初明闕緣、泛解有三。 一通名闕緣。七方便者闕不至果、並為緣來豈非通也。』

△戒疏續云『二別名闕緣。如諸戒下各有闕緣、不可以盜而開殺戒、各不相通、故名別也。』 行宗釋云『上二泛論總收一切、第三兩亦正示初緣。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Item One: Deficient Conditions. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "First, concerning 'deficient conditions' in general, there are, broadly speaking, three explanations. First, as a general name: since all seven of the preparatory-stage categories share the feature of falling short and failing to reach the fruit, and all come about through some condition being deficient — how could this not count as the general sense?"

The Commentary continues: "Second, as a specific name: each individual precept has its own particular deficient condition beneath it; one cannot, for instance, use theft to exempt the precept against killing, since these do not carry over from one to another — hence this sense is called 'specific.'" The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The first two senses above discuss the matter broadly, gathering in everything at once; the third sense, below, is what properly identifies the first of the seven conditions." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『三者亦通亦別。何者是耶。 凡是犯戒、體是婆塞。 若造罪未果。或自命終、捨戒、邪見、二形生等。或病狂癡。 但有二緣不名犯戒、俱為造因。、未成至果、故名闕婆塞緣。望下六別、對戒並通、故兼二號。』 行宗釋云『初標徵。 凡下示相三、初標緣。 若下次明闕相。罪未果者方便義也。列相有二、初列四捨體壞無法、後病狂等自不了知。初則體相俱壞、後謂體具相乖。鈔中仍加受戒不得等。 但下三總結、初結闕緣。望下次結兩亦。 問、已下六緣可例此否。答。亦可例也。以互望皆別、對戒並通。但境強一種不必盡通。如是思之。』已上皆見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Third, 'both general and specific at once' — what does this mean? Whoever commits any violation must, at that moment, still possess the essential status of an upāsaka. Suppose the offense has been undertaken but not yet completed as a fruit: perhaps the person's own life comes to an end, or the precepts are relinquished, or a wrong view arises, or the person's sex physically changes, and so on; or perhaps illness, madness, or derangement intervenes. Whenever either kind of condition is present, the act cannot be called a completed violation — both nonetheless still count as contributing to the cause, since it has not yet reached the fruit; hence this is called 'deficiency in the condition of being an upāsaka.' Considered in relation to the six other, specific conditions, this condition is, toward every precept alike, general — and that is why it carries both names at once." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "What follows, beginning 'whoever,' shows the mark of this condition under three headings: the first names the condition itself; the second clarifies the mark of its deficiency — 'the offense not yet completed as a fruit' is precisely the sense of 'preparatory stage.' The marks listed are of two kinds: first, the four ways the very essence of upāsaka-hood is relinquished or destroyed so that no precept-body remains; second, illness, madness and the like, where the person is simply incapable of understanding what is happening. What follows draws the threefold conclusion. One might ask: can the six other conditions discussed below be understood along the same lines? Answer: yes, since, considered in relation to one another, they are each specific, while, considered in relation to the precept as a whole, they are general — only the case of 'an object too strong' need not always carry over this way." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Chinese Source

第二項 境強

▲戒疏云『二境強者。如欲行殺前境反強、倒欲害我。差此進趣、壅住在因、故曰方便。 然境強非中罪、中罪由強而生。餘之上下、類此可釋。』 行宗釋云『初敘緣。 然下定罪。強非罪緣故曰非中罪、因強壅住故云由生也。餘下指例。如云、闕緣非中罪、中罪由闕緣而生等。 問、境差中亦有境強、與此何別。答。此本境強、下異境強。故不同也。』見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Two: An Object Too Strong to Overcome. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Second is 'an object too strong to overcome': as when, wishing to carry out a killing, the intended object instead proves too strong, and turns to attack and harm the assailant instead. This divergence blocks the intended course of action, so that it remains lodged, still at the stage of cause — hence it is called a preparatory-stage offense. The object's being too strong is not itself the middle-grade offense; rather, the middle-grade offense arises on account of that strength. The remaining upper- and lower-grade cases may be explained by the same pattern." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Question: object divergence, discussed below, also involves an object too strong to overcome — how does this differ from the present case? Answer: the present case concerns the strength of the original object itself, while the case below concerns the strength of a substituted object — hence the two are not the same." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Chinese Source

第三項 緣差

▲戒疏云『三者緣差方便。如欲殺盜。往逢異人、或恐有事、或刀杖毀壞、或要期未遂。 總號緣差。就義通名、七緣皆是。隨相取別、唯此第三。』 行宗釋云『初列相有四。一非本所期、二慮他所獲、三殺具有闕、四如不見前境等。 總下結名。以名通七緣、相局四位。』見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Three: Circumstantial Divergence. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Third is the preparatory-stage offense of circumstantial divergence: as when, intending to kill or to steal, one goes to the place and encounters some other, unexpected person; or fears that the matter will be discovered; or one's knife or weapon is damaged or lost; or the appointed occasion simply fails to come about. All of these together are called 'circumstantial divergence.' In its general sense, this name could apply to all seven conditions alike; but taken according to its own specific mark, it belongs properly only to this third category." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The first part lists four marks: encountering someone other than expected; fearing discovery; the killing implement being deficient; and failing to actually see the intended object. As a name it applies broadly to all seven conditions, but its specific mark is confined to these four situations." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide frames this whole chapter around a single, load-bearing idea: the complete "conditions constituting a violation" for any precept — five conditions for killing, for instance — function like a checklist, and if any single item on that checklist is missing, the act cannot reach the root-offense and instead remains stalled at the preparatory stage. The seven items catalogued here are simply the seven distinct ways such a checklist item can go missing. "Deficient conditions" in the narrow sense covers cases where the perpetrator's own basic eligibility to violate the precept at all — being, at the moment of the act, a person who actually holds the precept — drops out partway through, whether through death, apostasy, a change of sex, or sudden madness. "An object too strong" and "circumstantial divergence" cover the more mundane ways an attempt can simply fail in execution — a would-be victim who turns out to be able to fight back, or a plan derailed by some unexpected turn of events. None of these, the guide stresses, make the original intent any less real or any less blameworthy in itself; they simply mean that, as a formal matter, the full offense was never actually completed.

4. Milestone: Object Divergence I — Killing "Zhang" but Striking "Wang"

The fourth of the seven deficient conditions, object divergence (境差), is by far the largest topic in this chapter — Dao Xuan devotes to it a running case study that will occupy several sections of this page. The example is deliberately concrete: a killer fixes targeted intent on one person, "Zhang," but a different person, "Wang," comes to take his place at the critical moment.

Chinese Source

第四項 境差

▲戒疏云『四境差者。隨戒並有。 且據大殺、四境來差。謂人、非人、畜生、杌木。』 行宗釋云『初示緣通。 且下次標所出。人是同類、非畜是異趣、杌木即無情。』見戒疏記卷四

境差中分為二支┬一明人異境└二明餘異境

第一支 明人異境

明人異境中分為三類┬一正明├二問答└三指廣

第一類 正明

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Four: Object Divergence. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Fourth is object divergence, which occurs, in principle, with every precept. Taking the grave precept against killing as the primary example, there are four kinds of object that may substitute for the intended one: a human being, a non-human being, an animal, and an inanimate stump or piece of wood." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "A human is of the same kind as the intended victim; a non-human or animal is of a different destiny; a stump or piece of wood is simply without sentience." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Object divergence divides into two branches: (1) clarifying a divergent human object, (2) clarifying every other kind of divergent object. Clarifying a divergent human object divides into three groups: (1) direct explanation, (2) question and answer, (3) a fuller reference.

Group One: Direct Explanation.

Chinese Source

▲戒疏云『如欲殺人、剋心在張、王人異境而代張處。 緣王張解、望人不殊、究竟成重。 由異境來、張人不死、殺意又息、壅住方便、故曰境差。』 行宗釋云『初明差相。且舉張王兩姓、以分本異二境。 緣下二結犯又二、初結異境。 由下結本境。罪是中罪、號闕緣方便也。』見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "For instance, wishing to kill a person, one fixes focused intent on 'Zhang'; but 'Wang,' a different human object, comes to take Zhang's place. Since one takes Wang for Zhang, and, considered simply as 'a human being,' there is no difference — this consummates as the graver offense. But because a divergent object intervened, Zhang the intended person does not die, and the intention to kill him has itself now ceased — this remains lodged at the preparatory stage; hence it is called 'object divergence.'" The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The two conclusions: with respect to the divergent object [Wang] — a completed grave offense; with respect to the original object [Zhang] — a middle-grade offense, termed the preparatory-stage offense of deficient conditions." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide calls this the chapter's single largest set-piece: the Zhang-and-Wang case. The core intuition it is built to test is simple — does killing the wrong person "count" as murdering the person you meant to kill? Nanshan's answer splits the question in two. Toward Wang, the actual victim, the offense is fully consummated and graded as the gravest offense, because "human being" is the operative category the precept actually protects, and Wang unquestionably belongs to it. But toward Zhang, the originally intended victim, something real still happened — a fully formed intent to kill, carried into action — even though Zhang never came to any harm at all. Rather than simply letting that intent evaporate as though nothing occurred, Nanshan insists it must be accounted for as its own, separate middle-grade preparatory offense: "object divergence." The guide underscores why this matters pastorally as much as legally — it refuses to let a would-be killer off the hook merely because circumstance intervened to save the intended victim.

5. Milestone: Object Divergence II — Two Hard Questions About Intent and Cause

Two objections immediately press on the Zhang-and-Wang ruling. First: if there was never any intent at all toward Wang specifically, how can killing Wang possibly count as the graver offense? Second, and more technical: if the cause originally aimed at Zhang is simply absorbed into the fruit actually consummated against Wang, does "object divergence" even remain a coherent, separately existing category at all?

Chinese Source

第二類 問答

問答中分為二端┬一問異境無心└二問因果差別

第一端 問異境無心

▲戒疏云『問、本殺王時、但作張解、無殺王心、何因得重。 答。張王非罪緣、人是殺境。雖無王心、然有人想、殺緣既具、何得非重。 是故律云。男想、殺女。佛言、上罪。可以類之。』 行宗釋云『初問。以心境既差、理非結重。 答中、初正答。望張境差、望王心差、故云非罪。張王是別、人趣是通、今就通結故成殺重。 是故下例證。』見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

Group Two: Question and Answer. This divides into two threads: (1) does divergence toward the object mean no intent at all?, (2) a difficulty about the relation between cause and effect.

Thread One. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Question: at the moment one actually kills Wang, one is only construing him as Zhang, with no intent at all toward Wang — how can this consummate as the graver offense? Answer: 'Zhang' and 'Wang' as such are not what the offense actually turns on; it is 'human being' that is the object of the killing. Although there is no intent specifically toward Wang, there is nonetheless the perception 'a human being' — and since the conditions constituting the offense of killing are thereby all present, how could this fail to be the graver offense? This is exactly why the Vinaya states: perceiving a male, one kills a female — the Buddha declared this too an upper-grade offense. The present case may be understood on the same pattern." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "'Zhang' and 'Wang' are particular individuals, but 'human being' is the shared category; here the offense is settled according to the shared category, and so it consummates as the graver offense." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Following the Commentary's text above, it would appear that, for the precept against killing, focused intent is never exempted where a divergent human object is involved. But according to the later chapter distinguishing nature-offenses in detail, in the section on misapprehension-in-the-moment and mistaken-belief, misapprehension-in-the-moment is exempted while mistaken-belief still constitutes a violation.

Chinese Source

第二端 問因果差別

▲戒疏云『問、本殺王罪重、乃取張因而成極果、為望張邊別有方便。』 行宗釋云『初敘問。意謂果成因沒、應無方便。古有異解、故問以決之。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Thread Two. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Question: if the graver offense against Wang is consummated by taking over the cause originally directed at Zhang, does this mean there remains, considered from Zhang's side, some separate preparatory-stage offense at all?" The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The implication being that once the cause has become the fruit, the original cause should simply vanish, leaving no preparatory-stage offense behind. The older masters held differing interpretations on this point, hence the question is raised to settle it."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『解云。張王姓別、人境不殊。重果位同、輕因相等。故攬張因、用成王重。 如律本中、列過五因、用成五重。』 行宗釋云『二引解二、初古解為二、初立理。謂本並人、因果無別、故攬相成。 如下引例。如律、盜戒有四句。一方便求過五錢、得過五錢、上罪。二若方便求過五錢、得五錢、上罪。三方便求過五錢、得減五錢、中罪。四方便求過五錢、不得、中罪。今引第二過五方便、能成五果。此亦因果兩別、相攬而成、可為今例。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "The explanation is this: Zhang and Wang are distinct as names, but as objects belonging to 'human being' they are not different; the graver fruit occupies the same status, and the lesser cause is equivalent. Hence the cause originally directed at Zhang is taken over to consummate the graver offense against Wang — just as in the root Vinaya text, where a cause aimed at exceeding five coins is listed as consummating the graver, five-coin offense." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "In the Vinaya's precept against theft there are four formulas: (1) seeking more than five through preparatory action and obtaining more than five — upper-grade; (2) seeking more than five but obtaining exactly five — upper-grade; (3) seeking more than five but obtaining less than five — middle-grade; (4) seeking more than five but obtaining nothing — middle-grade. The present citation invokes the second, where preparatory action aimed at 'more than five' nonetheless consummates the five-coin fruit — cause and fruit two distinct things, yet one taken over to consummate the other, a parallel for the present case."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『問。既攬張因成王果者。本立境差方便。今因成果、無境差矣。』 行宗釋云『二今解三、初難破。以攬因成果、果成因滅、境差不立。故知非矣。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Question: if the cause originally directed at Zhang is indeed taken over to consummate the fruit against Wang, then the 'object divergence' preparatory offense originally posited for Zhang simply disappears — since now the cause has become the fruit, there is, after all, no object divergence at all." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "A refutation: since the cause is taken over to consummate the fruit, and once the fruit is consummated the cause is extinguished, 'object divergence' cannot be established — hence the older interpretation is mistaken."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『今正解云。人趣乃同、形者有異、不攬相成。 與王未交、屬前張因。對王已去、別起方便、即攬王因還成正果。 本境張因、壅住方便、號此方便名王境差。』 行宗釋云『二立義中二、初通示因果各異。 與下二釋成二、初明王果。 本下釋張因。言王境差者以張是本境不得名差、故從異境以彰差義。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "The correct explanation is this: although Zhang and Wang belong to the same destiny, 'human being,' their physical forms are distinct, and the cause is not simply taken over to consummate the fruit. Up until the moment of actual contact with Wang, what has occurred still belongs to the cause originally directed at Zhang; but once one turns toward Wang, a separate preparatory act arises anew, and it is this cause specifically directed at Wang that is taken over to consummate the actual graver fruit. The cause originally directed at Zhang remains lodged at the preparatory stage; and it is this preparatory offense that is properly called 'object divergence with respect to Wang.'"

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『問、不攬張因以成王果、何故律文攬過五因成五重果。 答。彼以同損一主、元來有心、故得相成。張王既別、何得例也。』 行宗釋云『三釋防中。以向古師執此為例、須為通之、令無後惑。 答中。顯示境有一、不例可知。』已上皆見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Question: if the cause directed at Zhang is not taken over to consummate the fruit against Wang, then why does the Vinaya take a cause aimed at 'more than five' as consummating the graver, five-coin fruit? Answer: in that case, both amounts alike diminish the same single owner, and the intent was present from the outset — hence the one may be taken over to consummate the other. But Zhang and Wang are altogether distinct individuals; how could the two cases be treated as parallel?" The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The answer shows that the object there is genuinely one and the same — from which the present point may be understood." [All of the above from Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide treats this back-and-forth as Nanshan actively working out — and correcting — an older generation's answer, not just reporting settled doctrine. The older interpretation tried to solve the "no intent toward Wang" problem by simply merging Zhang's cause straight into Wang's fruit, the way a theft aimed at "more than five coins" can be credited toward an actual haul of exactly five, since both cases involve harming the very same owner throughout. Nanshan's own, final position rejects that shortcut: Zhang and Wang are different individuals, so the cause aimed at Zhang cannot simply migrate over to explain the harm done to Wang. Instead, the moment attention actually shifts to Wang, an entirely new preparatory act springs up on the spot and is what completes the graver offense — while the original cause aimed at Zhang is left standing on its own, unconsumed, as an independent middle-grade offense in its own right. The guide reads this as the chapter's real payoff: it is precisely because Nanshan insists on this separation that "object divergence" survives as its own coherent category at all, rather than dissolving the instant the actual victim is struck.

6. Milestone: Object Divergence III — Eighteen Formulas Across Four Kinds of Substitute Object

Having settled the core Zhang-and-Wang case, Dao Xuan reports how earlier vinaya masters — above all Zhishou, whose commentary Nanshan himself studied under — worked the same logic out into a complete grid: eighteen distinct formulas covering every combination of a human, non-human, animal, or inanimate substitute, crossed with settled perception or mere doubt, and with the substitute object proving weak enough to kill or too strong to overcome.

Chinese Source

第三類 指廣

▲戒疏云『昔來諸師、於人異境、更立諸相。通列六緣、中加疑想用分多句。事理境心、不無其致。』 行宗釋云『諸相即下六緣及餘句法。一是人二人想三有殺心四興方便五命斷更加第六疑想、以殺但五緣故言中加也、復於疑想分出句法。且依首疏、三趣各有五句、杌木非情無境強義但有三句、總十八句。文中但云人異境、至於作句則通四境、今備列之。

Ru-Yi Translation

Group Three: A Fuller Reference. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "The masters of former generations, with respect to a divergent human object, established further distinctions still. Taken together they list six conditions, adding doubt and settled perception in the middle to divide out multiple formulas. As to the matters of fact, the underlying principle, the object, and the mind involved — this approach is not without its own real value." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The six conditions are: (1) the victim is human, (2) perceived as human, (3) intent to kill arises, (4) the means is undertaken, (5) life is cut off — with doubt-or-perception added as a sixth, since killing itself needs only five conditions, hence 'added in the middle.' Following Zhishou's commentary, each of the three destinies [human, non-human, animal] has five formulas; a stump, being without sentience, has no 'too strong' case and so only three — eighteen formulas in all. The text speaks only of a divergent human object, but once actual formulas are constructed, all four kinds of object are involved; they are set out here in full."

Zhishou's commentary is the twenty-fascicle vinaya commentary composed by the Sui-dynasty vinaya master Zhishou, whom Nanshan himself studied under.

The Eighteen Formulas for a Substituted Object (依首疏所立十八句)
Substitute destinyState of mindCaseToward Zhang (the intended object)Toward the actual substitute
1. Human (Wang) — 5 formulasSettled perception (2 cases)Object not strong; killing succeedsObject divergence — middle-gradeRoot offense — upper-grade
Object too strong; killing failsObject divergence — middle-gradeObject too strong — middle-grade
Doubting mind (3 cases)Object not strong; killing succeedsSame as aboveSame as above
Object too strong; killing failsSame as aboveSame as above
Doubt causes a good mind to arise; act ceasesObject divergence — middle-grade—
2. Non-human — 5 formulasSettled perception (2 cases)Object not strong; killing succeedsObject divergence — middle-gradeNo offense
Object too strong; killing failsObject divergence — middle-gradeNo offense
Doubting mind (3 cases)Object not strong; killing succeedsObject divergence — middle-gradeDoubting mind — lower-grade
Object too strong; killing failsObject divergence — middle-gradeDoubting mind — lower-grade
Doubt causes a good mind to arise; act ceasesObject divergence — middle-gradeDoubting mind — lower-grade
3. Animal — 5 formulas (parallel to Non-human, above)Settled perception (2 cases)Object not strong; killing succeedsObject divergence — middle-gradeNo offense
Object too strong; killing failsObject divergence — middle-gradeNo offense
Doubting mind (3 cases)Object not strong; killing succeedsObject divergence — middle-gradeDoubting mind — lower-grade
Object too strong; killing failsObject divergence — middle-gradeDoubting mind — lower-grade
Doubt causes a good mind to arise; act ceasesObject divergence — middle-gradeDoubting mind — lower-grade
4. Stump or wood — 3 formulasSettled perception (1 case)Object not strong; killing succeedsObject divergence — middle-gradeNo offense
Doubting mind (2 cases)Object not strong; killing succeedsObject divergence — middle-gradeNo offense
Doubt causes a good mind to arise; act ceasesObject divergence — middle-gradeNo offense

"An object too strong" here has no bearing on the stump/wood case, since an inanimate object can never itself resist — hence only three formulas rather than five.

Chinese Source

事即制罪、理謂業道、方便究竟皆兼兩業。境即四、心謂想疑。』見戒疏記卷四

疏中四云殺誑張人等、如別簡性重章錯誤節委釋。

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary concludes: "'Matters of fact' refers to the formal offense; 'underlying principle' refers to the path of karma — both the preparatory and the consummated stage involve these two kinds of karmic act together. 'Object' refers to the four kinds just listed; 'mind' refers to settled perception or doubt." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

The Commentary's fourth position above, speaking of "killing or deceiving Zhang," is explained in full detail in the later chapter on nature-offenses in detail, in the section on misapprehension-in-the-moment and mistaken-belief.

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide treats this eighteen-formula grid mainly as evidence of how systematically the vinaya tradition worked out the logic already established for the Zhang-and-Wang case, rather than introducing any new principle. The pattern holds steady across every row: whatever actually happens to the substitute object — whether it lives, dies, or is never even the right kind of being to generate an offense on its own — the original object always keeps its own middle-grade "object divergence" offense, undisturbed. What changes, row by row, is only what happens on the substitute's own side: a human substitute who is actually killed completes the gravest offense in full; a non-human or animal substitute who dies generates no offense at all when perception was settled (since there was never any intent toward "a non-human" or "an animal" as such), but does generate a small, separate lower-grade offense of its own once doubt was present; and an inanimate stump, lacking any capacity to be a proper object of killing whatsoever, never generates any offense no matter what.

7. Milestone: Object Divergence IV — Substitutes Beyond the Human Realm, and Two More Difficulties Resolved

The branch on divergent human objects now gives way to the second branch: what happens when the substitute is a non-human, an animal, or a stump. Two further difficulties are raised and resolved along the way, including a direct challenge drawn from the Vinaya's own object-perception formula.

Chinese Source

第二支 明餘異境

明餘異境中分為二類┬一通示└二釋疑

第一類 通示

▲戒疏云『餘有非人畜杌來作異境。通望本境不死、中罪若若望異境無心、無罪。』見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

Branch Two: Every Other Kind of Divergent Object. This divides into two groups: (1) a general statement, (2) resolving difficulties.

Group One: General Statement. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "As for the remaining cases where a non-human, an animal, or a stump comes to serve as the divergent object: considered generally, since the original human object does not die, this is a middle-grade offense; but considered with respect to the divergent object itself, since there is no intent toward it at all, there is no offense." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Chinese Source

第二類 釋疑

釋疑中分為二端┬一釋人異境難└二釋律境想難

第一端 釋人異境難

▲戒疏云『問、王人異境、亦是無心、何為結重。 答。人想而殺、境心相應、是故成重。不起非人想、故無罪也。』 行宗釋云『初躡前人異境、相並為難。 釋中。以餘三境、趣類全乖、不可相例。』見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

Group Two: Resolving Difficulties. This divides into two threads: (1) resolving a difficulty about the human-substitute case, (2) resolving a difficulty from the Vinaya's own object-perception formula.

Thread One. The Commentary says: "Question: in the case of Wang substituting as a human divergent object, there is likewise no intent toward Wang specifically — why does this consummate as the graver offense? Answer: one kills while perceiving 'a human being,' so that object and mind correspond — this is exactly why it consummates as the graver offense. In the non-human, animal, and stump cases, no perception of 'non-human' ever arose at all — hence no offense results there." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Since the remaining three kinds of object belong to an entirely different category from human, they cannot be treated as parallel." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Chinese Source

第二端 釋律境想難

▲戒疏云『問。若無罪者。云何律中、非人人想、中罪者。』 行宗釋云『初敘難。引律者即殺戒境想第四句。』

此段疏文與上端連續、故先牒上文而後徵難。

已下疏文六段共有三釋、初二為古解、後一為今義。文六段中、第一段為初師釋、第二三四段先示次師釋後由初師斥辨、第五六段為今義先詰破初師後詳申正解。文繁義密、故先預明大意、學者自易貫通。

Ru-Yi Translation

Thread Two. The Commentary says: "Question: if there is no offense, then why does the Vinaya rule that 'a non-human perceived as a human' is a middle-grade offense?" The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The Vinaya passage cited is the fourth of the object-perception formulas for the precept against killing."

This passage continues directly from the preceding thread; hence it first restates the earlier text before raising the further difficulty. The six passages of commentary that follow contain three distinct interpretations in all: the first two are older interpretations, the third is Nanshan's own final position. Of the six passages, the first presents one earlier master's view; the second, third, and fourth present a second master's view before Nanshan refutes it; the fifth and sixth first refute the earlier masters and then set out Nanshan's own correct explanation in full. Because the argument is dense and closely reasoned, its overall shape is sketched here first, so the reader may follow it more easily.

Chinese Source

▲戒疏續云『答。此由境差、方便罪也。 由非人來、人想不捨、殺張心成而境乖異。望張方便、望非人邊本無罪也。具足五緣殺非人者、但中罪。如何其因已是中罪、義不然也。』 行宗釋云『二引釋二、初引他師約本境釋二、初約想心解又三、上二句定罪。 由下釋所以。彼謂律結中罪、還從本境、不望非人。 具下引殺非人罪質成上義。五緣者一是非人、二非人想、三有殺心、四興方便、五命斷。如何等者以非人作人想、在人為境差、望非人為想差、故是殺非人因也。謂果罪但中罪、豈得因罪即結方便中罪耶、以非人方便但下罪故。此明律結中罪、不望非人。斥他異解、故云不然也。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Answer: this is a case of the preparatory-stage offense of object divergence. Because a non-human came in place of the intended object, and the perception 'a human being' was never relinquished, the intent to kill Zhang was fully formed even though the object diverged. Considered from the standpoint of the preparatory act toward Zhang, it is middle-grade; considered from the standpoint of the non-human itself, there is fundamentally no offense at all. As for the objection that killing a non-human under the complete five conditions is only a middle-grade offense — how, then, could a mere cause already amount to a middle-grade preparatory offense? — this reasoning does not hold." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "This cites another master's interpretation, based on the original object: that master held the Vinaya's middle-grade ruling refers back to the original object, not to the non-human. [His five conditions for killing a non-human: (1) the victim is non-human, (2) perceived as non-human, (3) intent to kill arises, (4) the means is undertaken, (5) life is cut off — since the resultant fruit-offense there is itself only middle-grade, a mere cause could not already carry that same weight.] This shows that the Vinaya's middle-grade ruling does not, after all, refer to the non-human — refuting the other interpretation." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『有人言。上立異境想疑心中。想則決徹、人差結重、餘則無心但屬本境。疑則不爾、緣兩境生、故就兩境雙結二罪。』 行宗釋云『二斥疑心解三、初示他解。彼謂想心同上。疑心不同、以未決徹、本異二境並有心故。云二罪者本境方便中罪。人異境是上罪、餘三異境並疑心中罪。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Someone says: among the perception and doubt cases established above, where perception is fully settled, a human divergent object consummates as the graver offense, while in the remaining cases there is no intent toward the substitute at all, and the offense belongs only to the original object. Doubt, however, is not like this: since it draws on both objects at once, an offense is settled with respect to both objects together, doubled." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "In speaking of 'two offenses,' he means a middle-grade preparatory offense with respect to the original object, together with either an upper-grade offense in the human-divergent case, or a middle-grade doubting-mind offense in the remaining three."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『今解不然。但列本境縱使四異來差本境、若強若疑、皆列本境。 何以明之。畜是小愆、杌非生罪、如何來差俱犯中罪。豈不望人從本境結。』 行宗釋云『次約義斥。還即古義、對破前解故云今耳。下云今明正解始是今義。文中、初判定。云但列者即指律文境想句中。 何下徵釋。且舉畜杌難破前義。據此破詞、則知前解異境皆中罪。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "The correct explanation is not so. The Vinaya's object-perception formula lists only the original object; even though any of the four kinds of divergent object may come to substitute for it, whether through the object's strength or through doubt, all are entered under the original object alone. How can this be shown? An animal is a lesser fault, and a stump generates no offense at all — how could their substitution both result in a middle-grade offense if credited to the substitute rather than the original? Is this not proof that it must be settled with respect to the human, taken as the original object?" The Xingzong Commentary explains: "This is still the older interpretation, restated here only to be refuted by what follows — the truly final position comes only in the next passage."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『問、異境有強、方便屬何。 答。強想猶懷本境、故知此強不望異結。如是類例、若疑若想皆從境、故云強想。如下例通。據此立義、不問想疑、異境之上永無罪也。前門境強乃約本境、此明異強。須知兩別。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Question: when the divergent object itself proves too strong, to which case does the resulting preparatory offense belong? Answer: even where the divergent object is too strong, the perception still holds to the original object — hence we know this 'too strong' case is not settled with respect to the divergent object. On this basis, whether doubt or settled perception is involved, there is never an offense with respect to the divergent object itself. The earlier discussion of 'an object too strong' concerned the strength of the original object; the present discussion concerns the strength of a divergent object — one must recognize these as two distinct cases."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『問。異境若強、差我不殺。強是本境、異非罪者。 異境忽弱、而被我害。未害之前、方便屬誰。 若見異已 、別有方便、此則本境方便是自立。若見異已去、無別方便、害異果罪、因還本境、若此立義則無境差。』 行宗釋云『二明今釋約兩境難二、初躡境強難破又三、初牒前義。 異下反以境弱為問。 若見下雙難、初約有方便難。則本異兩境皆有罪故。次以無方便難。則異境果成、本境因沒、故云無境差也。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Question: if the divergent object proves too strong and this thwarts me from killing it, while 'strong' pertains to the original object and the divergent object incurs no offense — suppose instead the divergent object proves suddenly weak, and I do kill it. Before the killing occurs, to whom does the preparatory offense belong? If, upon perceiving the divergent object, a separate preparatory act arises, then the preparatory offense toward the original object stands as an independent thing. But if no separate preparatory act arises at all, then the divergent object's fruit-offense absorbs everything and the cause simply reverts to the original object — and on this view there would be no 'object divergence' at all!"

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『今明正解。本境一品齊是中罪。 異境來差、人境緣人、有強有疑、莫不殺心皆結中罪。 若至非畜、例有強疑。 以懷人想、強從本境、非畜異境一向無罪。若兼疑心、從兩境生、本境疑中罪、非畜疑下罪。若至杌並結本境、以杌異境非生罪緣。』 行宗釋云『二申今正解中二、初明本境通結。 異下明異境別結又復為二、初明人異境。 若至下次明非畜境又二、初通標強疑。 以下別釋、初釋境強。若兼下釋疑心。非畜二、正犯中罪下罪、疑故並下罪。杌非罪緣故無所犯。 初師局就本境、異則不結。次師疑心兩緣、異境皆中罪、不簡輕重。觀今所判、文理精詳、比前可鑒。』已上皆見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Now the correct explanation is made clear. The original object, in every case, is uniformly a middle-grade offense. As for a divergent human object — whether too strong or doubted — since the intent to kill is present throughout, a middle-grade offense is settled with respect to the original object. For a non-human or animal, the same pattern applies: since the perception 'a human being' is still held throughout, the 'too strong' case is credited entirely to the original object, and the substitute itself incurs no offense at all; but where doubt is also involved, an offense arises with respect to both — a middle-grade offense as to the original object's doubt, and a lower-grade offense as to the non-human or animal's doubt. For a stump, the offense is likewise settled entirely with respect to the original object, since a stump does not constitute a condition capable of generating any offense at all." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The earlier master confined the matter strictly to the original object; a second master held that wherever doubt is present, the divergent object is always middle-grade, without distinguishing degrees. Compared against these, the judgment given here is textually and logically the most thorough and precise." [All of the above from Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Structural outline of the argument above (as recorded in the source)

  • 1 Opening statement of the difficulty
  • 2 Citing and resolving it
    • 2.1 Citing another master's interpretation, based on the original object
      • 2.1.1 Interpretation based on perception
      • 2.1.2 Refuting the doubt-based interpretation
        • presenting it — refuting it on principle — citing "too strong" as a parallel case
    • 2.2 Nanshan's own explanation, raised as a difficulty about both objects at once
      • 2.2.1 Taking up the "object too strong" case
        • restating the earlier view — reversing it with a weak object — the double difficulty (with / without a separate preparatory act)
      • 2.2.2 Setting out the correct explanation
        • the original object settled generally — the divergent object settled separately (human; then non-human/animal, strong and doubtful cases)
Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide's account of this stretch is that Nanshan is not simply reporting a doctrine but actively adjudicating between two older, competing schools of thought before setting out his own final position — and that the payoff is the same asymmetry seen throughout this chapter: the original, intended object always keeps its own steady, unwavering middle-grade offense, no matter what actually happens to whatever substitute crosses its path. What differs, case by case, is only the substitute's own side of the ledger. Where the substitute is human, matters are already settled from the earlier Zhang-and-Wang case. Where it is a non-human or animal, Nanshan rules that settled perception generates no separate offense at all with respect to the substitute — since the killer never actually held any intent toward "a non-human" as such — while doubt does generate a small, independent lower-grade offense, precisely because doubt, unlike settled perception, never fully lets go of either object. Where the substitute is a stump, there is simply nothing there capable of being wronged, and no offense results under any circumstance.

8. Milestone: Perception Divergence and the Doubting Mind

The fifth and sixth of the seven deficient conditions turn from the object itself to the mind confronting it: perception divergence, where mind and object come apart from each other in one of eight distinct configurations, and the doubting mind, worked out through a parallel eight-position grid built around the precept against false speech.

Chinese Source

第五項 想差

▲戒疏云『第五想差方便、義張八位。 初心差境、方便。如律、人非人想等。 二、境差心、方便。如律、非人人想等。 三、心差境、究竟。如律婬酒戒、若懷非道非酒想疑、但是正境皆結究竟。 四、境差心、究竟。如欲殺誑張人、張去王來、緣王張解、若誑若殺、是境俱差、齊成究竟。 五、心境俱差、成方便。 六、即此互差、成究竟。以事思取。 七、心境不差、成方便。如出佛身血、境強緣差之類。 八、心境不差、成究竟。諸戒並是。』 行宗釋云『此門八位、前四互歷、後四具兼。一三全是想差、五六心境兼差、此門唯收四句二四屬前境差、七八即境想初句、故此四句皆非科意、句法相從故為八位耳。 五六二句令以事思者。五中、如欲殺張、王人替處是境差、心復轉想謂為非人即想差、成方便。第六、如欲殺張、王人替處、心作李想、還成究竟。言互差者互即是俱。承上第五故云即此。 七中出血一罪永無根本。境強緣差事不究竟、心境無改。』

疏中四云殺誑張人等、如別簡性重章錯誤節委釋。

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Five: Perception Divergence. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Fifth, the preparatory offense of perception divergence: its sense lays out in eight positions. (1) Mind diverges from object, a preparatory offense — as in 'a human perceived as non-human.' (2) Object diverges from mind, a preparatory offense — as in 'a non-human perceived as human.' (3) Mind diverges from object, yet consummates fully — as with unchastity or drinking wine, where, so long as it is the actual forbidden object, doubt or misperception makes no difference. (4) Object diverges from mind, yet consummates fully — as when Zhang departs and Wang comes in his place, and one takes Wang for Zhang; whether the act is deception or killing, both are fully consummated. (5) Mind and object diverge together, resulting only in a preparatory offense. (6) This same mutual divergence instead results in full consummation — worked out by reflecting on the case. (7) Mind and object do not diverge, yet only a preparatory offense results — as in drawing a Buddha's blood, or 'an object too strong, a circumstance diverging.' (8) Mind and object do not diverge, and full consummation results — this is the case with every ordinary precept." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Positions one and three are, in full, perception divergence; five and six combine mind- and object-divergence together — this section properly gathers in only these four. Positions two and four belong to object divergence; seven and eight are simply the first formula of the object-perception system — included here only because the pattern naturally follows on, making eight in all. As for 'reflecting on the case' in five and six: in five, wishing to kill Zhang, Wang comes to take his place — object divergence; if the mind then also shifts to 'non-human,' this is perception divergence too, resulting in a mere preparatory offense. In six, the same substitution occurs, but the mind instead forms the perception 'Li' [a third identity] — this still results in full consummation."

The Commentary's fourth position, "killing or deceiving Zhang," is explained in full detail in the section on misapprehension-in-the-moment and mistaken-belief within the chapter distinguishing nature-offenses in detail.

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『就此想中。或有從輕向重。如殺盜畜生、轉想向人者是。 或從重至輕。即反上句是。 或互轉者。如彼婬酒、俱是正境、想疑或生無非究竟。』 行宗釋云『初殺畜盜畜、方便但下罪。轉作人想、殺盜皆中罪。 二殺人盜人、轉為非畜後心並下罪、故云反上。 三互轉俱重。如婬前作非道想後作正道想、或前正後非、無非果本。 私釋。更立互轉俱輕。如非人畜生、心想互差、可以明之。』已上皆見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Within this matter of perception, some cases shift from lighter to heavier — as when one begins to kill or steal from an animal, and perception then shifts to 'a human being' partway through. Some shift from heavier to lighter — simply the reverse. And some involve mutual shifting — as with unchastity or drinking wine, where, the object being the genuine forbidden one throughout, whether perception or doubt happens to arise makes no difference; full consummation results regardless." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Killing or stealing from an animal is only a preparatory offense; shifting to 'human' makes both middle-grade. Killing or stealing a human, shifting to 'non-human,' results only in a lower-grade offense afterward — hence 'the reverse.' Mutual shifting is, in every instance, the graver offense: as in unchastity, perceiving 'not the path' and then 'the path,' or the reverse — there is no case that fails to reach the full offense." [All of the above from Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Chinese Source

第六項 疑心

▲戒疏云『第六疑心方便者、相對義張八位方盡。 我疑方便。人非人疑也。 他疑我、方便。身現妄語相、前疑不了是。 他疑我、究竟。我疑他、究竟。如口造語業、但使言章了了、不問自他疑也。』 行宗釋云『前四互句。初即境想中第二句。 、與前境差中疑心何別。答、前對異境、此就本境。 餘三約妄語配對。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Six: The Doubting Mind. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Sixth, the preparatory offense of a doubting mind: laid out relationally, its sense fills eight positions. Doubt in oneself, resulting in a preparatory offense — doubt over 'human or non-human.' Another's doubt about oneself, resulting in a preparatory offense — as when one's body displays the outward appearance of false speech, but the other's doubt is never resolved. Another's doubt about oneself, resulting in full consummation. One's own doubt about another, resulting in full consummation — as in the karmic act of speech, where, so long as the utterance is fully understood, it makes no difference whether doubt was present in oneself or the other." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The first is simply the second formula within the object-perception system. One might ask how this differs from the doubting-mind case already discussed under object divergence — the earlier case concerned a divergent object, the present case concerns the original object itself. The remaining three positions are matched against the precept of false speech."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『上四句單疑也。今此雙舉、何者是耶。 自他俱疑、成方便。如身口互造也。 即成究竟者。妄語言了也。 自他俱不疑、成方便。如出血在佛也。 即成究竟者。一切戒是也。』 行宗釋云『後四俱句。前二還約妄戒、但具兩疑與前為異。言互造者亦即台上身造口業。 後二亦是相從而出。』已上皆見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "The four positions above involve doubt in a single party alone. Now consider doubt in both parties at once. Where both oneself and the other are in doubt, a preparatory offense results — as when body and speech act jointly. Full consummation results instead when the false statement is actually understood. Where neither party is in any doubt at all, a preparatory offense still results — as in drawing blood from a Buddha. Full consummation results, in this case, with every ordinary precept." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The last four are paired-doubt formulas; the first two are likewise matched against false speech, differing from the earlier set only in that both parties' doubt is present at once." [All of the above from Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide's treatment of this chapter concentrates its closest attention on the object-divergence cases already covered above, but the same underlying method carries straight through into perception divergence and doubt: both are simply further, finer-grained ways that "mind" and "object" — the two poles the guide identifies as running through this entire door of the compendium — can fail to line up with each other. Perception divergence covers cases where a settled but mistaken belief substitutes one object for another in the mind, sometimes making the resulting offense heavier, sometimes lighter, sometimes leaving it exactly where it was; doubt covers the messier, unresolved middle ground between them, and — matched here against the precept of false speech — extends even to cases where it is the listener's doubt, not the speaker's own, that determines whether the offense is only preparatory or fully consummated.

9. Milestone: A Good Mind Arising Mid-Act, and Weighing All Seven Deficiencies Together

The seventh and final deficient condition turns to something genuinely hopeful within this otherwise clinical taxonomy: what happens when a good thought arises in the middle of a wrongdoing already underway, and manages to stop it. The chapter then closes by weighing all seven conditions against one another as a set.

Chinese Source

第七項 善心息

▲戒疏云『第七關頭中心自方便者。如欲造罪、身口雖發、未鄰究竟、忽起善心便止前業、壅礙不暢但居方便。』 行宗釋云『初正明。鄰近也。云忽起者或因他勉、或遇勝緣、或思佛戒、或畏因果。若非此類、善心寧發[text uncertain here]、居先者、前心中罪。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Seven: Cessation Through a Good Mind. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Seventh, the preparatory offense of a mind that of itself changes course at the critical juncture: as when, intending to carry out an offense, body and speech have already set out but have not yet drawn near to consummation, and a good thought suddenly arises and halts the deed already underway — the act remains blocked and unable to proceed, and so remains lodged only at the preparatory stage." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "'Suddenly arises' may come about through another's exhortation, through encountering some superior condition, through recollecting the Buddha's precepts, or through fear of karmic cause and effect. Were it not for causes of this kind, how could a good mind ever arise at all? — what occupies the earlier stage remains the middle-grade offense of the prior mind."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『問、此乃善心生、今何言息。 答。實如來問。向若不生、惡必趣果。由此善心能息惡 想、即所息處號為方便。 又如律文、捨者中罪。捨時非罪。由能捨故、前惡不至後果、故號前因為方便也。』 行宗釋云『二釋難中。此即善生惡息、於義易知。欲生下答、故皮為問。 答文為二、初正答。 又下引例。能捨則同善生、所捨可類惡息。』已上皆見戒疏記卷四

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Question: this is simply a good mind arising — why is it spoken of here as a 'cessation'? Answer: your question is indeed apt. Had this good mind not arisen, the evil deed would certainly have proceeded to its fruit. It is precisely because this good mind is able to bring the evil intention to a halt that the point at which it is halted is called a preparatory-stage offense. Consider also the Vinaya text: one who relinquishes the precepts partway through an offense incurs a middle-grade offense, but at the very moment of relinquishing, there is no offense at all — precisely because relinquishing is possible, the earlier evil never reaches its later fruit, hence the earlier cause itself is called a preparatory-stage offense." [All of the above from Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Chinese Source

第二節 校量

▲行宗云『二校量者即總料簡前七位也。』

▲戒疏云『初以自身造境、對置殺具、明方便多少者。 身自造境、具七方便。 設置懸擬、既非自身、故闕想疑、但五方便。』 行宗釋云『初明多少寬狹二、初自造置具多少又二、初標示。 身自下別釋、初明自造故多。 設下次釋置具則少。以想差疑心必約到境、懸擬相成不可論故。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Section Two: Weighing Together. The Xingzong Commentary says: "'Weighing together' means gathering up and sorting through all seven of the preceding positions as a whole."

The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "First, comparing acting on the object oneself in person against merely setting up a device, to clarify how many preparatory offenses apply: acting on the object oneself in person, all seven are possible. Merely setting a device in place at a distance — since one is not present in person, perception divergence and doubting mind are necessarily absent, and only five of the seven are possible." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Perception divergence and doubting mind necessarily depend on actually reaching the object in person, and cannot possibly apply to something merely set up and left to work at a distance."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『剋心辨差、其境則寬。以元在張。王非畜杌、後來差故。 漫心辨差、其境則狹。以通三趣、有境齊害。唯有杌境、用分輕相。』 行宗釋云『二剋漫寬狹。言寬狹者謂異境多少初明剋心寬。王非畜杌即四異境。 次明漫心狹。杌境輕者非情無過、止有方便。 上據大漫。若約小漫、如欲通害人趣、望剋為狹、對大猶寬。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Distinguishing divergence under targeted intent, the range of possible divergent objects is broad, since the original object was fixed on Zhang, and Wang, a non-human, an animal, or a stump may each come to diverge from it. Distinguishing divergence under diffuse intent, the range is narrow, since diffuse intent already extends across all three destinies and treats any object equally — only a stump marks out any distinction at all." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Wang, a non-human, an animal, and a stump make four possible divergent objects under targeted intent — the broader case. A stump under diffuse intent is the lighter case, since, being without sentience, it generates no fault beyond a mere preparatory offense — the narrower case."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『二心境分別。境差、境強緣差、據前境論。闕婆塞緣、想、疑、心息、據自心辨。』 行宗釋云『二心境分別。三種屬境、四種屬心。闕婆塞緣或約四捨、或是狂癡、故屬心也。』已上皆見戒疏記卷四

上來持犯總義中第六章闕緣不成竟

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Second, distinguishing by mind versus by object: object divergence, an object too strong, and circumstantial divergence are all discussed with reference to the object confronted; deficiency in the upāsaka condition, perception divergence, doubting mind, and cessation through a good mind are all distinguished with reference to one's own mind." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Three of the seven belong to the category of object, and four belong to the category of mind." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 4]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide highlights the "cessation through a good mind" section as one of the rare moments in the entire door where the tone turns genuinely encouraging rather than clinical: even after body and speech have already set an offense in motion, a good thought — prompted by another's exhortation, some fortunate circumstance, remembering the Buddha's precepts, or plain fear of karmic consequence — can still reach in and stop the act before it consummates, and the whole preceding effort is thereby demoted permanently to a mere preparatory offense rather than the full violation it was heading toward. The guide draws an explicit parallel to relinquishing the precepts mid-act: in both cases, it is precisely the fact that a person retains the power to stop that keeps the earlier momentum from ever fully ripening into its worst possible fruit. On the closing "weighing together" section, the guide notes only that it functions as a tidy summary chart — targeted intent casts a wider net of possible divergent objects than diffuse intent does, and three of the seven conditions turn on the object confronted while the remaining four turn on the state of one's own mind.

10. Milestone: Why the Object-Perception Formulas Exist, and Which Precepts Actually Have Them

The gate now turns to its seventh chapter, "Distinguishing the Object-Perception Formulas" (境想分別) — the standard grid, built into the Vinaya itself, that fixes the exact gravity of an offense according to what the object actually was and what the perpetrator actually perceived it to be. This section covers why the formulas exist at all, and which of the six precepts relevant to lay life actually carry one.

Chinese Source

第七章 境想分別

境想分別中分為五節┬一明制意├二明有無├三定四五句├四互四五句└五輕重

第一節 明制意

▲戒疏云『初明制意。若無境想、不可定罪輕重。』 行宗釋云『以心有是非、境有錯誤。婬酒、前三句重、後二句輕。餘戒、初句相應故重、後四句乖差故輕。』見戒疏記卷六

Ru-Yi Translation

Chapter Seven: Distinguishing the Object-Perception Formulas. This chapter divides into five sections: (1) clarifying the intent of the regulation, (2) clarifying presence or absence, (3) fixing four or five formulas, (4) four and five interchanging, (5) gravity.

Section One: Clarifying the Intent of the Regulation. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "First, clarifying the intent behind this regulation: without the object-perception formulas, there would be no way to fix the relative gravity of an offense." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "This is because the mind may be correct or mistaken, and the object may be misapprehended or wrongly believed. For unchastity and drinking wine, the first three formulas are graver and the last two lighter. For the remaining precepts, the first formula, where mind and object correspond exactly, is graver, while the last four, where they diverge, are lighter." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 6]

Chinese Source

第二節 明有無

▲戒疏云『二明有無者。準律約戒、不必具有今解、無者是略無也、無別所以。』見戒疏記卷六

五戒八戒中、律出境想句者、有殺盜婬妄飲酒非時食六戒。今依資持記中引律四重戒句法、具錄如下。餘可準知。

Ru-Yi Translation

Section Two: Clarifying Presence or Absence. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Second, clarifying presence or absence: measured against the Vinaya's treatment of the various precepts, an object-perception formula is not necessarily present in every case. My own explanation is this: where it is absent, this is simply an abbreviated omission — there is no further special reason behind it." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 6]

Among the five and eight precepts, the Vinaya supplies object-perception formulas for six: killing, theft, unchastity, false speech, drinking wine, and eating past the appointed hour. Following the Zichi Commentary's citation of the Vinaya's formulas for the four grave precepts, they are recorded in full below; the rest may be inferred by the same pattern.

Object-Perception Formulas for the Four Grave Precepts (境想句)
PreceptObjectPerceived / doubted asGrade
Unchastity — 5 formulasThe [forbidden] pathPerceived as the pathUpper-grade
The pathDoubted as perhaps not the pathUpper-grade
The pathPerceived as not the pathUpper-grade
Not the pathPerceived as the pathMiddle-grade
Not the pathDoubted as perhaps the pathMiddle-grade
Theft, exceeding five coins — 4 formulasBelonging to an ownerPerceived as belonging to an ownerUpper-grade
Belonging to an ownerDoubted as perhaps belonging to an ownerMiddle-grade
Belonging to no ownerPerceived as belonging to an ownerMiddle-grade
Belonging to no ownerDoubted as perhaps belonging to no ownerMiddle-grade
Theft, not reaching five coins — 4 formulasBelonging to an ownerPerceived as belonging to an ownerMiddle-grade
Belonging to an ownerDoubted as perhaps belonging to an ownerLower-grade
Belonging to no ownerPerceived as belonging to an ownerLower-grade
Belonging to no ownerDoubted as perhaps belonging to no ownerLower-grade
Killing — 5 formulasHumanPerceived as humanUpper-grade
HumanDoubted as perhaps humanMiddle-grade
HumanPerceived as non-humanMiddle-grade
Non-humanPerceived as humanMiddle-grade
Non-humanDoubted as perhaps non-humanMiddle-grade
False speech — given as 4 formulas in the source, though headed "five"
(a formula appears to have dropped from the source text here; see report)
HumanPerceived as humanUpper-grade
HumanDoubted as perhaps humanMiddle-grade
Non-humanPerceived as humanMiddle-grade
Non-humanDoubted as perhaps non-humanMiddle-grade
Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide's summary of this chapter is compact but pointed: without some standard grid crossing what the object actually was against what the perpetrator actually took it to be, there would be no principled way at all to fix how grave a given offense really is — "clarifying the intent of the regulation" is Nanshan's own name for exactly this necessity. The guide also flags something easy to miss on a first read: not every precept carries a full object-perception formula, and Nanshan is explicit that this is not some deep doctrinal statement but a mere textual economy — where the Vinaya omits a formula for a given precept, "this is simply an abbreviated omission, with no further special reason behind it." The four grave-precept tables that follow, the guide notes, are the working reference every later casuistic discussion in this compendium quietly assumes.

11. Milestone: Four Terms or Five?

Why do some precepts carry five object-perception formulas while theft carries only four — and why can the very same precept sometimes be worked with four terms and sometimes with five, depending on the case at hand? This section supplies the underlying logic.

Chinese Source

第三節 定四五句

▲戒疏云『三定四五句者。』 行宗釋云『以律中列句、四五不定。如婬殺妄三戒並五句、盜戒四句。但由第三一句結罪有無、故句法不定。如殺戒、人非人想、轉想中罪、本迷下罪。以作非人殺故盜戒無第三句者、以有主無主想、轉想亦中罪、本迷無罪。以無主物罪緣故』

Ru-Yi Translation

Section Three: Fixing Four or Five Formulas. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Third, on fixing whether there are four or five formulas." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Because the Vinaya's listed formulas are not fixed: unchastity, killing, and false speech each have five, while theft has four. This is simply because the presence or absence of the third formula determines whether an offense results at all. Take killing: 'a human perceived as non-human' — since the perception has shifted, this is a middle-grade offense; since one intended and acted to kill 'a non-human' who turned out human, this is a lower-grade offense. As for why theft lacks a third formula: the corresponding case, 'belonging to an owner, perceived as belonging to no owner,' is likewise middle-grade by the shift in perception — but the original mistaken intent, aimed at something believed ownerless, generates no offense at all, since there is no condition constituting an offense with respect to an ownerless item."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『若輕重相望、境是可學、生不可學迷、同是五句。』 行宗釋云『初輕重明定五。迷重為輕、如人作畜殺、有主作非畜盜等。皆緣罪境、定有第三句、故同五句。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Where gravity is weighed against gravity, and the object belongs to a category one is obligated to learn to distinguish, while the mistaken belief runs toward a category not so obligated, the formula is fixed alike at five." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Mistaking the graver for the lighter — as in killing a human under the belief it is an animal — remains a condition constituting an offense, and hence the formula-count is fixed at five."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『若犯不犯相形、則四則五。 謂前後俱迷、非緣罪境、即定四句、除第三位如無主想等。 迷雖是定、而緣罪境、即定五句。如非道想、非人想、減五想等。』 行宗釋云『二犯不犯明四五中、初標舉。 謂下別釋、初明定四。無主想者律無此句。 迷雖下次明定五。此即總收輕重二位。減五想者此謂盜戒若作無主則是四句、若盜滿五迷為沽五亦隨結犯故入五句。意顯隨義不定、不必依文。』見戒疏記卷六

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Where committing an offense is weighed against not committing one, the formula-count is sometimes four and sometimes five. Where the perception, earlier or later, fails to correspond to any offense-constituting object at all, the count is fixed at four, omitting the third position — as with 'belonging to no owner.' But where the mistaken belief, though fixed, still corresponds to some offense-constituting object, the count is fixed at five — as with 'not the path,' 'non-human,' or 'less than five coins.'" The Xingzong Commentary explains: "The point being made is that the formula-count follows the actual meaning of each case and is not fixed; one need not mechanically follow the bare wording." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 6]

Chinese Source

第四節 互四五句

▲戒疏云『四互四五者。由是可學生不可學迷、即互輕重。 或從四以至五。如實無主體唯四句、後轉為主即為五也。 若本緣人、轉想當杌、約從後心則唯 四句。』 行宗釋云『初標。 二隨釋二、初從四至五。即約前心本迷、後心轉入罪 境故。 二從五至四。亦合標云從五至四。謂本是心境相當、後轉緣非罪境、故云轉想。當杌即人作杌木想。』見戒疏記卷六

Ru-Yi Translation

Section Four: Four and Five Interchanging. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Fourth, on four and five interchanging: because a mistaken belief may run from an obligatory category toward a non-obligatory one, or the reverse, gravity itself shifts back and forth accordingly. Sometimes a case moves from four to five: an item genuinely ownerless has only four formulas, but if perception shifts to 'belonging to an owner,' it becomes five. Or, if the original object was a human being but perception shifts to 'a stump,' then, from the standpoint of this later mind alone, only four formulas remain." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "'Perceived as a stump' means taking a human being for a stump." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 6]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide treats these two sections as a single piece of technical housekeeping rather than a doctrinal claim in their own right: the number of formulas the Vinaya bothers to list for any given precept is not fixed by some deep principle, but simply tracks whether the third, "shifted-perception" position actually generates an offense at all. Killing, unchastity, and false speech each get five formulas because misperceiving even a lesser object as the forbidden one still incurs some offense; theft drops to four because mistaking someone's property for ownerless property, when it turns out to have an owner after all, is a case the Vinaya's own text simply never bothers to spell out. The guide's real point is methodological: a reader should never assume the bare word-count of a formula list reflects anything doctrinally deep — the count itself is downstream of a single underlying question, whether a genuine offense-object is actually involved.

12. Milestone: Weighing Doubt Against Perception

The seventh chapter closes with its most psychologically detailed argument: a careful weighing of doubt against settled perception, and of the original object against a divergent one, that yields a genuinely counter-intuitive result — sometimes doubt is the graver state of mind, and sometimes settled perception is, depending entirely on which object is actually in view.

Chinese Source

第五節 輕重

▲戒疏云『五輕重者。如文次第。前疑重。後疑輕、以境是、輕本境故。 前想重、結本方便、心境相當故後想輕、以正犯時、有心無境。』 行宗釋云『初約疑想分二、前釋兩疑後釋兩想。制教同罪、心業重輕、故分兩異前疑重下準鈔應云、以本緣人、人境不捨、臨殺有半緣人心故。後疑雙闕、故輕。 後釋兩想中。有心無境者闕本境也。』 資持云『兩疑中、疑心不別、境分本、故說重輕。後想亦爾。 前想中云本方便者取前心也、望後正對心不當境。』見事鈔記卷二十七

殺戒五句。此文前釋兩疑、約第二句及第五句。後釋兩想、約第三句及第四句。

Ru-Yi Translation

Section Five: Gravity. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Fifth, concerning gravity: as the formulas run in sequence, the earlier instance of doubt is graver and the later instance lighter, because the earlier object is the actual forbidden object. The earlier instance of settled perception is graver, since it settles the original object as a preparatory offense, mind and object corresponding to each other; the later instance is lighter, since, at the moment of the offense, mind is present but the actual object is not." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "As for why the earlier doubt is graver: since the original object confronted was a human being, and the perception 'human' was never relinquished, at the moment of killing there remained at least a partial, lingering mind directed toward the human object. In the later instance, this residual perception is doubly absent — hence it is lighter." The Zichi Commentary adds: "Among the two instances of doubt, the doubting mind itself does not differ, but the object differs — hence gravity and lightness are distinguished accordingly. The same holds for the two instances of settled perception." [Zichi Commentary, fascicle 27]

This passage concerns the five formulas of the precept against killing. The earlier part, on the two instances of doubt, refers to the second and fifth formulas; the latter part, on the two instances of settled perception, refers to the third and fourth.

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『又就本境中、疑重想輕。以疑半心、不捨本境、故重想則捨本從、故輕。 就後異境、想重疑輕。以想緣本、但是境差、故重以疑減半、緣於異境、故輕。』 行宗釋云『二約本異分二、初明本境二句。 次明異境二句。疑減半者以疑猶豫、半涉是非。是於異境復減半心、故輕於想。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Furthermore, within the original object itself, doubt is graver and settled perception lighter, because doubt still holds half its mind to the original object without relinquishing it, whereas settled perception has already relinquished the original entirely — hence lighter. But with respect to the later, divergent object, settled perception is graver and doubt is lighter, because settled perception, though directed at the divergent object, still traces back entirely to the original — this is simply object divergence, and therefore graver — whereas doubt, already reduced by half, and directed toward the divergent object on top of that, is therefore lighter." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "'Doubt reduced by half' means that doubt, being inherently hesitant, is already only half committed to either side; directed now toward a divergent object as well, the mind is reduced by half again — hence lighter than settled perception."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『此輕重、據本重異輕為言。若本輕異重、例之即是。 如殺非畜、人為異境。可以例諸。』 行宗釋云『三明本異重輕中、初立義。 如下顯相。』已上皆見戒疏記卷六

上來持犯總義中第七章境想分別竟

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "This discussion has been framed in terms of the original object being graver and the divergent object lighter; where instead the original is lighter and the divergent object graver, the same pattern applies by analogy — as when one intends to kill a non-human or an animal, and a human being instead comes to serve as the divergent object." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 6]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide singles this section out as containing one of the door's most genuinely delicate pieces of moral psychology: the gravity of doubt versus settled perception flips depending entirely on which object is in view. With respect to the original, intended object, doubt is actually the graver state of mind, precisely because a lingering doubt still keeps half the mind clinging to that object, refusing to fully let go — whereas settled perception, having already moved on entirely, is in a real sense lighter, since it no longer touches the original object at all. But with respect to a divergent, substitute object, the ranking flips: settled perception there is graver, since it traces a clean, complete path back to the original object by way of object divergence, while doubt is diluted twice over — first by its own inherent hesitancy, then again by being split toward a substitute object on top of that. The guide reads this as Nanshan insisting that moral responsibility is not simply a function of "how wrong was the belief," but of exactly how much of the mind's attention that belief still holds onto the object that actually matters.

13. Milestone: Focused Intent Versus Diffuse Intent Across the Four Grave Precepts

The gate now enters its eighth and richest chapter, "Distinguishing the Nature-Grave Precepts Individually" (別簡性重) — five sections working out, precept by precept, exactly how the general machinery already covered applies to killing, theft, unchastity, and false speech. This section opens with the distinction between focused intent (aimed at one specific target) and diffuse intent (spread broadly or narrowly across a whole class of possible targets).

Chinese Source

第八章 別簡性重

別簡性重中分為五節┬一剋漫├二錯誤├三身口互造├四教遣└五重犯戒

第一節 剋漫

▲戒疏云『言其剋者、本情專唯在一境。若言漫者、通涉無準。』 行宗釋云『剋唯有一、漫通大小。剋即訓定、漫猶遍也。』見戒疏記卷五 資持云『剋謂情專一境、漫謂心涉多緣。漫復有二。一者大漫、如本標心遍通三趣、俱是所期、隨作成犯。者小漫、但該人道、不兼非畜。』見事鈔記卷二十七

Ru-Yi Translation

Chapter Eight: Distinguishing the Nature-Grave Precepts Individually. This chapter divides into five sections: (1) focused versus diffuse intent, (2) misapprehension-in-the-moment and mistaken-belief, (3) body and speech as joint agents, (4) instructing or ordering another, (5) repeated violation.

Section One: Focused Versus Diffuse Intent. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "As for what is meant by 'focused': the original intent is fixed exclusively on a single object. As for what is meant by 'diffuse': it extends broadly across multiple objects without any fixed standard." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "'Focused' admits of only one object; 'diffuse' may be broad or narrow." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5] The Zichi Commentary adds: "'Diffuse' further divides into two: broad-diffuse, where the mind from the outset is set broadly across all three destinies, each equally intended, so that whichever is actually acted upon results in a violation; and narrow-diffuse, which covers the human path alone, not extending to non-humans or animals." [Zichi Commentary, fascicle 27]

Chinese Source

剋漫中分為三項┬婬├盜殺└妄

第一項 婬

▲戒疏云『約婬為言。犯無剋心、同成極重。 何以明之。 但有染心將欲成犯、初期在此而後會彼。或男女境亂張王者別、或人畜趣乖境心雙轉、但使境交無非大重。』 行宗釋云『初判犯。 何下二釋成。初句徵。 但下釋有二、初四句通示染心將欲即起方便、期此會彼即至果本。或下別顯。餘人非畜為境轉想疑名心轉、或境心俱轉。』見戒疏記卷五

Ru-Yi Translation

Focused versus diffuse intent divides into three items: unchastity; theft and killing; false speech.

Item One: Unchastity. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Speaking with reference to unchastity: violation here involves no need for targeted intent at all — every case alike consummates as the gravest offense. How can this be shown? The moment a defiled mind is present and one is about to consummate the violation, one's original intent may be fixed on this object and yet meet with a different one instead — whether the male or female object becomes confused, so that Zhang and Wang change places, or a human and an animal exchange destinies, with object and mind shifting together — so long as bodily union actually takes place, it is, in every instance, the gravest offense." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5]

Chinese Source

第二項 盜殺

▲戒疏云『盜殺剋心相當、方成重罪。心境俱違、吉方便。』 行宗釋云『盜殺中略示剋心。以剋有重輕、漫唯通犯。但明剋異、漫則可知。』見戒疏記卷五 資持云『盜殺二戒。大漫則隨境成犯。小漫則異趣非犯。剋定一人、三趣非犯。』見事鈔記卷二十七

剋定一人三趣非犯者、盜戒可爾。殺戒張去王來、緣王張解、誤亦成重。如下節。

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Two: Theft and Killing. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "For theft and killing, only where targeted intent actually corresponds to the object does the graver offense result; where mind and object diverge entirely, only a minor preparatory offense results." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5] The Zichi Commentary adds: "Under broad-diffuse intent, a violation results whichever object is actually acted upon; under narrow-diffuse intent, acting on a different destiny is not a violation; and where the intent is fixed on one particular individual, acting on someone from the other destinies is not a violation." [Zichi Commentary, fascicle 27]

"Fixed on one particular individual, [acting on] the three destinies [otherwise] is not a violation" holds true for theft. For killing, however, where Zhang departs and Wang comes in his place, and one takes Wang for Zhang, this is mistaken-belief, and the graver offense still results — as discussed in the following section.

Chinese Source

第三項 妄

▲戒疏云『若三趣齊現、內知歷然、犯無剋心、通境隨犯。三趣不現、隨剋隨犯。』 行宗釋云『妄語論剋、不同殺盜。但有多境則不成剋。單對一境方成剋義、如本期人、畜現非犯。』見戒疏記卷五

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Three: False Speech. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Where all three destinies are simultaneously present before the speaker, and this is inwardly known with full clarity, violation requires no targeted intent — a violation results regardless of which object the statement addresses. Where the three destinies are not simultaneously present, violation follows the targeted intent in each instance." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Wherever multiple objects are actually present at once, targeted intent simply cannot be formed; only a single object confronted alone allows the sense of 'targeted' to apply — as when one originally intends a human being, but an animal instead appears, this is not a violation." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5]

Focused Versus Diffuse Intent Across the Four Precepts (剋漫別配四戒)
PreceptScope of intentResult
UnchastityRegardless of focused or diffuse intentAll three destinies — uniformly a violation
TheftBroad-diffuseProperty of all three destinies — uniformly a violation
Narrow-diffuseHuman property — violation; non-human or animal property — not a violation
Focused intentZhang's intended property — violation; Zhang's other property or a substitute's (e.g. a king's) property — not a violation
KillingBroad-diffuseAll three destinies — uniformly a violation
Narrow-diffuseHuman destiny — violation; non-human or animal destiny — not a violation
Focused intentHuman destiny, misapprehension-in-the-moment — not a violation; human destiny, mistaken-belief — violation (regardless of Zhang or Wang); non-human or animal destiny — not a violation
False speechBroad-diffuseAll three destinies — uniformly a violation
Narrow-diffuseAll three destinies simultaneously present, or two present — uniformly a violation, same as broad-diffuse; only one destiny present: human — violation, non-human or animal — not a violation
Focused intentSame as narrow-diffuse, immediately above

Surveying all four precepts together: of the three categories — broad-diffuse, narrow-diffuse, and focused intent — only the precept against theft treats all three fully; unchastity disregards the distinction altogether; false speech's focused intent is identical to its narrow-diffuse intent; and killing's focused-intent mistaken-belief case runs parallel to its narrow-diffuse case.

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide treats this table as the chapter's real anchor, since every later discussion of casuistry across the four grave precepts assumes it. Unchastity is the odd one out, refusing the distinction altogether — any violation, focused or diffuse, is graded the same, gravest way, "so long as bodily union actually takes place." Theft is, in the guide's words, "the most complete" of the four, honoring the full three-way distinction cleanly: broad-diffuse intent catches anything in any of the three destinies, narrow-diffuse intent catches only human property, and truly focused intent catches only the one specific item actually meant. Killing and false speech each collapse part of this structure in their own distinctive ways — the guide highlights, in particular, that killing's focused-intent case still results in a violation under mistaken-belief (Zhang-for-Wang) even though it does not under simple misapprehension-in-the-moment, a distinction worked out fully in the next section.

14. Milestone: Misapprehension-in-the-Moment and Mistaken-Belief — Unchastity and Theft

The second section of Chapter Eight formally defines the distinction the compendium has been leaning on since Part One: misapprehension-in-the-moment (錯), where two objects are both actually, presently confronted and become confused with each other; and mistaken-belief (誤), where the mind simply lapses from an earlier moment to a later one without ever confronting both objects at once. This section works the distinction through unchastity and theft.

Chinese Source

第二節 錯誤

▲戒疏云『夫立錯誤義者、並是不當本心之謂也。 錯就現緣境差為義。誤就不現緣境差、心謬忘為義。 所以然者。現緣二境相別顯然、及至造趣事容舛錯、即名眾境交涉為錯。若論誤者、心通前後不可雙緣、如前心謂此後心謂彼、心想謬忘故謂之誤。』 行宗釋云『初通示。 錯下二別釋、初略分。 所下委釋、初釋錯義。若下釋誤義。準文顯相、不出境心論境有二、一現不現別、二多與少別。心亦有二、一忙亂迷謬、二臨機前後。如是尋之、不更繁釋。』見戒疏記卷五

Ru-Yi Translation

Section Two: Misapprehension-in-the-Moment and Mistaken-Belief. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Now, in establishing these two categories, both alike refer to something not corresponding to one's original intent. Misapprehension-in-the-moment is defined by an object diverging while the relevant circumstance is actually, presently confronted; mistaken-belief is defined by an object diverging where the circumstance is not presently confronted at all, but the mind itself has simply gone astray and forgotten. When a circumstance is presently confronted, the two objects stand distinctly apart and are plainly visible, yet, at the moment of actually carrying out the act, error may still creep in — this crossing and confusion of objects, both actually present, is misapprehension-in-the-moment. As for mistaken-belief: the mind runs across an earlier moment and a later one and cannot hold both at once — as when the earlier mind takes the object to be this one, and the later mind takes it to be that one instead; it is the mind's own perception going astray and lapsing into forgetfulness that is called mistaken-belief." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5]

Chinese Source

錯誤中分為四項┬一婬├二盜├三殺└四妄

第一項 婬

▲戒疏云『初之一戒、無論錯誤。患起內心、通皆障道。 但是正道、不問迷誤。或此彼男女非畜諸境、緣此謂彼、誤亦犯重。 境雖交涉、錯亦犯重。』 行宗釋云『初示不立。 但下顯犯二、初明誤犯。 境下明錯犯。』見戒疏記卷五

Ru-Yi Translation

Misapprehension-in-the-moment and mistaken-belief divide into four items: unchastity, theft, killing, false speech.

Item One: Unchastity. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "For this first precept alone, misapprehension-in-the-moment and mistaken-belief are not even at issue: the affliction arises from within the mind itself, and obstructs the path in every case regardless. So long as it is in fact the forbidden path, it makes no difference whether confusion or forgetfulness was involved. Whether this or that object — male or female, human or non-human or animal — is confused with another, taking one for another still results in the graver offense, even under mistaken-belief. And where the objects are actually, presently confronted and become confused, the graver offense results even under misapprehension-in-the-moment." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5]

Chinese Source

第二項 盜

▲戒疏云『語盜而言。漫心無寄、三趣有物緣欲盜奪。及至往趣、縱境差舛心有迷忘、皆稱欲心、錯誤齊重。』 行宗釋云『初約三趣二、初明大漫。不論錯誤、三趣隨犯。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Two: Theft. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Speaking of theft: where the mind is diffuse and fixed on no particular object, and property belonging to any of the three destinies is intended for theft, then, once one actually carries out the act, even if the object diverges through confusion, or the mind simply lapses through forgetfulness, both are alike counted as fulfilling the intent to steal, and misapprehension-in-the-moment and mistaken-belief are equally graded as the graver offense." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Under broad-diffuse intent, misapprehension-in-the-moment and mistaken-belief are not even distinguished; a violation results regardless of which of the three destinies the property belongs to."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『若先剋定要取人物、不盜餘趣。 及往盜時、境交想轉、雖舉離處不成罪攝。 不稱本心。猶屬本主、以於此物元無盜心。心境既非、何過之有、故錯與誤俱不名犯。 後知錯誤、即應還主。不還起盜、後方成重。』 行宗釋云『二明小漫中有二、初示起心。 及下二明造境三、初判非犯。境交是錯、想轉即誤。若得人物犯重無疑、若非畜物則開無犯。 不稱下次釋所以、初句示心非。言不稱者本期在人故。猶下三句明境非。屬本主者猶是非畜物故。心等四句雙結。 後下三明後犯。前開離處、後知起盜則非所開。非畜中罪下罪、望盜云重。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "But if one has beforehand fixed one's intent specifically on a human's property, not intending to steal from the other destinies — then, when one actually goes to steal, if the object becomes confused or the perception shifts, then even though the item has already been lifted from its place, this is not counted as the full offense. It does not correspond to one's original intent; the item still belongs to its original owner, since there was never any intent to steal this particular item. Since mind and object simply fail to correspond, both misapprehension-in-the-moment and mistaken-belief here are not counted as violations. But once the confusion is later recognized, the item should immediately be returned; if it is not returned, and the intent to steal is instead taken up afresh, then only from that later point does the graver offense result." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "If the item obtained genuinely belongs to a human, the graver offense results without question; only if it is a non-human's or an animal's property is this case exempted from violation."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『二對人趣辨錯誤者、俱亦非犯。 如欲盜張、忽得王物。既非所期即是境差。物非本物又是想差。 據此為異、境不稱心。後物無心、心不當境。 故錯與誤並同不犯。』 行宗釋云『二對人趣中三、初標示。 如下次顯相又二、初示心境俱差。 據下二明開犯所以、初二句躡上境差。據此為異者本期張人故。境不稱者得王物故。次二句躡上想差。 故下三結示。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Second, distinguishing misapprehension-in-the-moment from mistaken-belief with respect to the human destiny specifically: in both cases, again, no violation results. As when, intending to steal from Zhang, one instead unexpectedly comes upon Wang's property — this was never what was intended, and is thus object divergence; the item is not the intended item, and is thus, further, perception divergence. On this basis the object fails to correspond to the mind, and the item taken carries no intent behind it at all — hence both misapprehension-in-the-moment and mistaken-belief here are alike exempted from violation."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『三對同主辨錯誤者、俱非犯也。 故善生云、盜金得銀、還置本處、不得盜罪。 如律、男想盜女物者犯。據漫心也。』 行宗釋云『三對同主中三、初通標。 故下引示。得銀許還、則知離處不即成犯。知銀不還、後心自結。 如下點異。律文結重、似不開誤、故須引決與上無違。據漫心也者謂小漫也。』已上皆見戒疏記卷五

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Third, distinguishing misapprehension-in-the-moment from mistaken-belief with respect to items belonging to the same owner: in this case too, both alike are not violations. Hence the Sutra on the Layman's Precepts says: taking gold and obtaining silver instead, from the same owner's holdings, if put back in its original place, no offense of theft results. As in the Vinaya: perceiving a male, one steals a female's property — this is a violation; but that ruling refers to the case of diffuse intent." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5]

Chinese Source

▲行宗云『前之三門。初是漫心兼含大小、後二剋心別開自他。又前對異趣、二對異人、三約異物。』已上皆見戒疏記卷五

Ru-Yi Translation

The Xingzong Commentary says: "Of the three sections just given: the first concerns diffuse intent, encompassing both broad and narrow; the last two concern targeted intent, distinguished separately as toward another destiny and toward another item. Or again: the first treats a different destiny, the second a different person, and the third a different item." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide is careful to keep these two terms from collapsing into a single generic "mistake." Misapprehension-in-the-moment happens when two real, present objects are both right there and simply get crossed in the confusion of actually carrying out the act; mistaken-belief happens when the mind's grip on the object simply slips between an earlier thought and a later one, with no second object ever actually confronted at all. For theft under focused intent, the guide highlights a genuinely practical result: if one meant to steal specifically from a human being, and the item taken turns out to belong to a non-human or animal instead, neither error counts as a violation — but only up to the point of actually recognizing the mistake. Once the truth is known, the item must be returned; keeping it anyway restarts the clock as a fresh, deliberate theft. The same logic, even more strikingly, exempts taking the wrong item from the very same owner — gold mistaken for silver — provided it too is simply put back once the error is noticed.

15. Milestone: Misapprehension-in-the-Moment and Mistaken-Belief — Killing and False Speech

The same distinction now turns to killing, where it produces the compendium's sharpest asymmetry with the theft rulings just given, and to false speech, where the two errors are graded very differently depending on whether the actual claim made concerns an ordinary human matter or a spiritual attainment.

Chinese Source

第三項 殺

▲戒疏云『論殺戒者。漫無所寄、三趣同害。及至行事、不稱初期、雖有少乖、不防本不害意、故使錯誤同成一重。 若論剋局、但是一緣。造趣行害、相應成重。 若非本期、則非殺境。及往加害、境則交涉或以迷忘、非畜雖死、不稱本期、又無殺心、錯誤不犯。』 行宗釋云『初明三趣中二、前明大漫。同上無開。 若論下次明小漫。而云剋者對大為言。文中二、初明本趣成犯。 若非下二明異趣俱開、初示乖期。 及下明開犯。交涉是錯、迷忘即誤。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Three: Killing. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Discussing the precept against killing: where the intent is diffuse and fixed on nothing in particular, harm to any of the three destinies alike results in a violation. Once one actually carries out the act, even if it does not correspond exactly to the original intent, this does not undermine the underlying intent to do harm in the first place — hence misapprehension-in-the-moment and mistaken-belief are alike graded as the same graver offense. But where the intent is targeted, confined to a single object: carrying out the act as intended, mind and object correspond and the graver offense results. But where the actual victim was not the original intended object at all, and one goes to inflict harm, the objects become confused, or the mind lapses in forgetfulness — even though a non-human or an animal dies, since this does not correspond to the original intent, and there was in fact no intent to kill it, neither misapprehension-in-the-moment nor mistaken-belief here constitutes a violation."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『二就人趣 以論錯誤。 如剋心害張、不欲害王。現境歷然、心緣亦別。及以殺具害張之時、而彼王人忽然與我刀輪相應、王命雖斷、由非心故、錯則不犯。 若論其誤、張去王來、緣王張解、加害者犯。若望後王、雖非本期、以心不了、緣此謂彼、既人想不差、殺緣具故、雖誤犯重。如上方便已為分別。』 行宗釋云『二就人趣中二、初總標。 如下二別釋又二、前釋開錯為三、初明標心。現下明對境。張王並現故云歷然。期意在張故云心別。及下示錯相。 若論下次釋誤犯為三、初文斷犯。若下釋犯所以。如下指廣。即境差方便中。』已上皆見戒疏記卷五

即境差方便中者、見本篇前闕緣不成章、顯相中、第四境差文。

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Second, discussing this with respect to the human destiny specifically. As when, with targeted intent to harm Zhang and no intent at all toward Wang, both objects are actually confronted with full clarity, and the intent is likewise clearly distinguished; yet, at the very moment one's implement strikes at Zhang, Wang unexpectedly crosses into the path instead — even though Wang's life is thereby cut off, since this was not the perpetrator's actual intent, this is misapprehension-in-the-moment, and no violation results. But considering mistaken-belief instead: Zhang departs and Wang comes in his place, and one takes Wang for Zhang and inflicts the harm — this is a violation. Considered with respect to Wang, though this was not the original intended object, since the mind never grasped the situation clearly, the perception 'a human being' has never diverged, and the conditions constituting the offense of killing are thereby fully present — hence, even under mistaken-belief, the graver offense results. This has already been distinguished above, in the discussion of the preparatory-stage offense." [All of the above from Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5]

"Discussed above, in the discussion of the preparatory-stage offense" refers to the earlier material in this gate, in the chapter on deficient conditions, within the discussion of the marks of the seven conditions, under the fourth heading, object divergence.

Chinese Source

第四項 妄

▲戒疏云『論妄語業、異趣通辨。錯犯、誤非。 漫心無簡、錯誤隨犯。』 行宗釋云『初明三趣二、初明小漫。本欲誑人、非畜境交、錯亦隨犯。前後互差、境想開迷、故誤非犯。 下二句明大漫。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Four: False Speech. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "Discussing the karmic act of false speech, considered broadly across the different destinies: misapprehension-in-the-moment results in a violation, while mistaken-belief does not. Under diffuse intent, no such distinction is made — both result in a violation regardless." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Under narrow-diffuse intent: originally intending to deceive a human being, if the object becomes confused with a non-human or animal, a violation still results even under misapprehension-in-the-moment; but where an earlier and later moment diverge, mistaken-belief here is not a violation."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『二對人趣、錯誤俱犯。由詐顯道德謀誑在人、表聖招利境損義一、但使言竟、錯誤同重』 行宗釋云『二對人趣中。亦即小漫。準知大妄不開剋心。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Second, with respect to the human destiny specifically: both misapprehension-in-the-moment and mistaken-belief are, alike, violations. This is because falsely displaying virtue is schemed specifically to deceive a human being, and claiming sagehood in order to obtain gain works the same harm on the object in either case — so long as the statement is actually completed, both are alike graded as the graver offense." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "From this one may infer that the great false-speech offense admits no exemption at all under targeted intent."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『三就所稱凡聖二法。 心欲說聖、口錯稱凡。既非聖法、前無所損、故錯非重。 若就聖法明於錯誤。如善見云、錯說三四禪皆同一重。』 行宗釋云『三約所稱法中二、初總標。 心下是釋又二、初約凡聖互論。文唯明錯、誤亦就開。 若下二單就聖法以辨。心雖錯誤、說聖不殊、故無差降。』已上皆見戒疏記卷五

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "Third, with respect to the two categories of claim that may actually be uttered, ordinary and sagely: if one's mind intends to claim a sagely attainment, but one's mouth mistakenly names an ordinary one instead — since this is not a claim to the Dharma of a sage, no harm has been done to the hearer, and this misapprehension does not constitute the graver offense. But where the misapprehension or mistaken-belief occurs entirely within claims to the sagely Dharma itself: as the Samantapāsādikā says, mistakenly naming the third dhyāna for the fourth, or the reverse, is in every case alike graded as the same graver offense." [All of the above from Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5]

Misapprehension-in-the-Moment and Mistaken-Belief Across the Four Precepts (錯誤別配四戒)
PreceptScopeError typeResult
UnchastityRegardless of scopeEither typeAll three destinies — uniformly a violation
TheftBroad-diffuseEither typeAll three destinies' property — uniformly a violation
Narrow-diffuseMisapprehension-in-the-momentNon-human/animal property — not a violation
Mistaken-beliefNon-human/animal property — not a violation
Focused intentEither typeWang's (or other divergent) property — not a violation
KillingBroad-diffuseEither typeAll three destinies — uniformly a violation
Narrow-diffuseMisapprehension-in-the-momentNon-human/animal destiny — not a violation
Mistaken-beliefNon-human/animal destiny — not a violation
Focused intentMisapprehension-in-the-momentWang (divergent human) — not a violation
Mistaken-beliefWang (divergent human) — a violation, applying to the human destiny generally regardless of Zhang or Wang
False speechBroad-diffuseEither typeAll three destinies — uniformly a violation
Narrow-diffuse (three or two destinies present)Either typeA violation, same as broad-diffuse — doubt need not even be resolved first
Narrow-diffuse (one destiny present)Human destinyA violation
Non-human/animal destinyNot a violation

This last table's focused-intent row for false speech follows the same pattern as narrow-diffuse intent, immediately above. Considered by the letter of this section alone, one might conclude that mistaken-belief for false speech applies only to the human destiny; but in truth mistaken-belief always concerns the human destiny specifically, while misapprehension-in-the-moment carries through generally — matching the pattern already given for narrow-diffuse intent.

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide treats the killing-versus-theft contrast here as the single most important payoff of this whole section, and builds one of its discussion questions directly around it: under focused intent, mistaken-belief toward theft is exempted entirely, while the exact same structure of error — Zhang for Wang — still incurs the graver offense under killing. Why the difference? The guide's answer is that the underlying logic tracks what can and cannot actually be undone. A wrongly taken item can simply be returned once the mistake is discovered, restoring everything to exactly where it was; a human life, once ended, cannot be given back under any circumstance. Since "the person" was never actually mistaken — only the specific name attached to that person — the offense against killing stands regardless, while theft's structure allows the error itself to be corrected before any lasting harm remains. The guide reads this asymmetry as expressing something the whole compendium takes for granted but rarely states outright: the four grave precepts are not simply four equally severe items on a list, but are themselves internally ranked by how irreversible the harm they prohibit actually is.

16. Milestone: Body and Speech as Joint Agents of an Offense

The third section of Chapter Eight asks a question with real stakes for how an offense is actually attributed: can speech alone, without any bodily act, ever consummate a violation on its own — and, conversely, can a mere thought, without either body or speech, ever do the same? Nanshan reports the Sarvāstivāda position before setting out his own school's more expansive answer.

Chinese Source

第三節 身口互造

身口互造中分為三項┬一婬├二殺盜└三妄

第一項 婬

▲戒疏云『婬戒成犯、事在形交、故唯在身。口非犯意、由無語故。』 行宗釋云『由無語者非口能成故。律中、教他作婬、他作犯中罪、不作但下罪。』見戒疏記卷五

Ru-Yi Translation

Section Three: Body and Speech as Joint Agents. This section divides into three items: unchastity; killing and theft; false speech.

Item One: Unchastity. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "The precept against unchastity is violated through physical union itself, and so the offense lies with the body alone; speech does not carry the intent to violate here, since no utterance is involved." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "In the Vinaya: if one instructs another to commit unchastity, and the other actually does so, this is a middle-grade offense; if the other does not do so, it is only a lower-grade offense." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5]

Chinese Source

第二項 殺盜

▲戒疏云『殺盜二戒。身口互造、兩得相成。然身為根本、口為枝條。 所以然者。損財害命、身自獨成、不待語助、故知身本。 口語教死、言了未成、待前命斷方得重罪、要由彼身助口成業、故知枝條。』 行宗釋云『初明不互造二、初立義。上二句明造成通互、容相助故。下二句明結業不互、局本枝故。本即正位、枝謂旁兼。 所下二徵釋所以、初釋根本。 口下釋枝條。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Two: Killing and Theft. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "For these two precepts, body and speech may jointly bring about the offense, each capable of assisting the other; yet the body is the root, and speech merely a branch. Harming property or taking life can each be accomplished by the body alone, without any need for speech — hence the body is the root. Speech that instructs another to kill is not, by the mere completion of the utterance, itself yet a consummated offense; it must wait until the victim's life is actually cut off, and this requires the other's body to assist speech in completing the karmic act — hence speech is merely a branch."

Chinese Source

△戒疏又云『二明互造二、初出前所計為二、初示宗。多雜等論皆有部所計。 所下二出不互所以則有二意、初約業異釋。若約能色、身是可見有對、口即不可見有對。若據所造過、身造婬盜殺、口作誑妄。若約所發、業性不混。若取來報、感果不同。 事下次約事不竟釋、初句立意。言下釋成。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary further says: "Now, clarifying the case where body and speech do consummate the offense interchangeably: [the school just described, e.g.] the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and similar treatises represent the position of the Sarvāstivāda school [holding that they do not]. Their reasoning rests on two considerations: first, the karmic acts are distinct in kind — the body is visible and has resistance, while speech is invisible yet still has resistance; the body produces unchastity, theft, and killing, while speech produces deception and false speech; the natures generated do not mix, and the resulting future retribution differs as well. Second, [in the case of speech alone,] the deed is simply not yet complete on its own."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『若依本律、成論所通。三業互造、各自成業 故彼文云。殺不善業、身亦可造、隨以自身殺害眾生。口亦可造、或教人死、或以咒殺。心亦可造、有人發心能令他死。 故彼論云。如和利經說、外道神仙起一瞋心、殺那羅國。如檀特等諸險難處、皆諸仙人瞋所作。』 行宗釋云『二正示今宗中為二、初示宗各自成者隨約能造、結業成。不同多雜、從所作事、判定身口。 故彼下二引示。且明殺業、餘可準知。文同之。 故下二別示心造論文二節、初引經證。那羅國者具云那羅千陀羅國。如下次舉事證。言檀特者即西土山名。經音義云、或言單多羅迦山、此云蔭山。此明仙人心業強猛、證上起心即能害故。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "But according to our own root Vinaya and the position shared by the *Satyasiddhi Śāstra*: all three kinds of karmic action — body, speech, and mind — may each independently consummate the offense on its own. Hence that treatise states: the karma of killing may be accomplished by the body itself; it may also be accomplished by speech, whether by instructing another or by killing through an incantation; and it may also be accomplished by mind alone — there being persons who, simply by giving rise to a thought, are able to cause another's death. Hence that treatise further states: as the *Helitraya Sūtra* relates, a non-Buddhist sage-ascetic, giving rise to a single moment of anger, destroyed the kingdom of Nārāyaṇa; and the perilous places such as Daṇḍaloka were, in every case, brought about by the anger of such sage-ascetics." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "This shows our own school judges body and speech according to the deed actually done, not according to any fixed hierarchy between them, unlike the Sarvāstivāda position — proving that a mere thought arising is sufficient to cause actual harm."

Chinese Source

第三項 妄

▲戒疏云『妄語一戒。本希名利、非言不成。 亦有身現、無疑成重。比前互造可以類之。』 行宗釋云『初明正業。 亦下明互造。現相必約前信、故須無疑。』見戒疏記卷五

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Three: False Speech. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "The single precept of false speech is, at root, motivated by seeking fame or gain, and cannot be consummated without speech. Yet there are also cases where it is accomplished through bodily display alone, and, where no doubt remains in the hearer's mind, the graver offense still results. This may be understood on the same pattern as the interchangeable consummation discussed above." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide flags the mind-alone killing case as an extreme, boundary-testing example rather than a template for everyday judgment — Nanshan cites it specifically to prove a philosophical point, that karma is genuinely generated by mental action on its own, not to suggest that ordinary practitioners should worry about causing harm through anger alone. The guide is careful to mark the distinction: this discussion belongs to the doctrinal, principle-level register (what the tradition calls the "transformative teaching," concerned with the deep nature of karma) rather than the ordinary, rule-governed register that determines what actually counts as a formal violation in daily practice — where, as the earlier section on "single-mindedness" established, only a thought that develops into deliberate, repeated planning, not a mere flash of anger, rises to the level of an actual offense.

17. Milestone: Instructing Another, or Ordering the Act on One's Own Behalf

The fourth section distinguishes two ways a violation can involve a second person: instructing someone else to commit an offense on their own initiative, where the benefit runs mainly to the person instructed; and ordering someone else to carry out an act that directly benefits the instigator, which the Vinaya treats as a distinctly graver matter.

Chinese Source

第四節 教遣

教道中分為二項┬一教人└二遣人

第一項 教人

▲戒疏云『先明教人。言婬戒者、自作成重。教人為非、樂染前人、於我無預、不得同犯。』 行宗釋云『初婬中於我無預言能教人不預其樂也。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Section Four: Instructing and Ordering. This section divides into two items: instructing another, and ordering another on one's own behalf.

Item One: Instructing Another. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "First, clarifying the case of instructing another. As for the precept against unchastity: acting on it oneself consummates the graver offense; but instructing another to commit it is not so, since the defiled pleasure belongs entirely to the other person and has nothing at all to do with oneself — one cannot be held to have committed the same offense." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "'Has nothing at all to do with oneself' means that the one who instructs does not share in the other's pleasure."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『殺盜二戒、過通損益。自作教人、損境暢思、期契相同、彼我同犯。 或能教者剋所使意、或時節早晚坐立乖契。或互顛狂捨戒、緣闕。但有少差、於此犯法、教者不犯。 漫心無寄、隨作相應、皆名為犯。』 行宗釋云『二殺盜中二、初通明犯相。損益者謂損他益。以婬唯適己而非惱他、殺盜兩兼故通損益。 或能下二別簡剋漫、初科中。或時等者且列五。時節坐立緣闕此三並約所教、顛狂捨戒則通能所故云互也。 問、如教殺坐人、彼立即害、云何非重。答。既云剋心、能教應言、見坐可害、立不應害。此則不犯。若不指定、同下漫心。時節早晚亦同此釋。 此明漫心者即不定早晚等也。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "For killing and theft, the fault involves both harm and benefit at once. Whether one acts oneself or instructs another, the harm inflicted and the satisfaction of one's own intent correspond to one another — hence both parties are alike guilty of the same offense. But if the instructor had fixed a targeted intent specifying exact circumstances, and these turn out otherwise — the timing earlier or later, the victim sitting rather than standing, or either party becomes deranged or relinquishes the precepts — then, so long as even a slight discrepancy is present, the one who instructs is exempted in that particular case. But where the mind was diffuse and fixed on nothing specific, whatever is actually carried out corresponds to the intent regardless, and both parties alike are guilty." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Question: if one instructs another to kill a seated person, and the victim happens to be standing when killed, why is this not the graver offense? Answer: since this was specified as targeted intent, the discrepancy indeed exempts the offense. But if no such specification was made, this falls under diffuse intent instead."

Chinese Source

△戒疏續云『大妄語者、自說成重。教人稱聖、免得上擁彼、於我無潤、故不同犯。』 行宗釋云『三妄語中。問文云教他不犯者。如教他稱己、自得名利、豈不犯重。答、此落後遣、非此所明。』已上皆見戒疏記卷五

Ru-Yi Translation

The Commentary continues: "As for the great false-speech offense: claiming it oneself consummates the graver offense; but instructing another to claim sagehood brings the instructor no personal benefit at all, and so does not count as the same offense." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "One might ask: suppose one instructs another to praise oneself, and thereby personally obtains fame and gain — would this not be the graver offense? Answer: this falls instead under 'ordering on one's own behalf,' discussed next, and is not what is being addressed here." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5]

Chinese Source

第二項 遣人

▲戒疏云『教者利己義疏、遣者向己義親。 何以明之。且如戒中。遣人就己行婬、遣人說己得聖、利樂是我、犯齊究竟。殺盜兩戒無有遣義、故非所論。』 行宗釋云『初分示。 何下推釋。可解。 問、殺盜何以無遣義耶。答。遣人殺己、罪不至果。豈有令他盜取我物。是則婬妄二戒遣重教輕、殺盜兩戒有教無遣。』見戒疏記卷五

Ru-Yi Translation

Item Two: Ordering on One's Own Behalf. The Commentary on the Precept-Text says: "In the case of instructing another, the benefit to oneself is only indirect; in the case of ordering another on one's own behalf, it bears directly on oneself. Consider: ordering another to come and commit unchastity with oneself, or ordering another to proclaim on one's own behalf that one has attained sagehood — in either case the benefit and pleasure both belong to oneself, and the offense is, in every instance, fully consummated. The two precepts of killing and theft admit of no such 'ordering' case at all, and are therefore not discussed here." The Xingzong Commentary explains: "Question: why do killing and theft admit of no 'ordering' case? Answer: if one orders another to kill oneself, the offense does not reach its fruit; and how could one possibly order another to steal one's own property? Hence: for unchastity and false speech, 'ordering' is the graver case and 'instructing' the lighter; for killing and theft, there is 'instructing' but no 'ordering' at all." [Xingzong Commentary, fascicle 5]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide reduces this whole section to a single, memorable formula drawn straight from the Commentary itself: for unchastity and false speech, ordering is the graver case and instructing the lighter one; for killing and theft, there is instructing but no ordering at all. The logic, the guide explains, is simply about who actually benefits. Unchastity and the great false-speech claim both deliver their reward directly back to whoever orders them — the pleasure, or the fame and gain, land squarely on the instigator — so ordering them is treated exactly like doing them oneself. Killing and theft, by contrast, have no coherent "ordering" version at all: one cannot meaningfully order another to kill oneself (the offense simply never reaches its fruit from the instigator's own side), and one plainly cannot order another to steal one's own property. The guide also draws attention to the practical exemption embedded in the instructing-case discussion of killing: if the instructor specified exact circumstances — say, only if the victim is found seated — and reality turns out otherwise, the instructor is genuinely exempted, precisely because targeted intent, by its nature, only covers what was actually specified.

18. Milestone: Repeated Violation — Why One Fall Does Not Break Every Precept at Once

The eighth chapter closes with what may be the single most pastorally consequential section in the entire gate: what actually happens, precept-wise, when someone violates the same precept more than once. Dao Xuan's answer directly confronts — and firmly rejects — a despairing conclusion he says he has seen practitioners draw in real life.

Chinese Source

第五節 重犯戒

此節文中重字、有平呼去呼二別、宜細分之。平呼者是犯是、云呼者如四重戒是。

▲事鈔云『若論重犯、律自明斷、隨犯多少一一上罪。 婬眾多重犯、餘盜殺妄重犯亦爾』 資持釋云『重犯有二、一同名之罪謂四重互望、二同種之罪謂四戒各論上通十誦、下局本宗文約四戒各別論重、即明今宗同種之義。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Section Five: Repeated Violation. In this section's text, the character 重 carries two distinct readings that should be carefully distinguished: read in the level tone, it means "repeated," as in "repeated violation"; read in the departing tone, it means "grave," as in "the four grave precepts."

The Procedural Commentary says: "As for repeated violation: the Vinaya itself rules on this plainly — however many times the violation is committed, each single instance is, in every case, an upper-grade offense. Unchastity committed repeatedly across many instances is judged this way; repeated violation of theft, killing, and false speech is judged the same way." The Zichi Commentary explains: "'Repeated violation' admits of two senses: offenses that share the same name — meaning the four grave precepts weighed against one another — and offenses of the same kind — meaning each precept considered on its own, repeated. The first sense, taken broadly, extends as far as the *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya*; the present text concerns specifically the second, our own school's position on offenses of the same kind."

Chinese Source

△事鈔續云『此說別解脫戒、由境緣別、得戒不同。故後犯時、還隨別犯。 如薩婆多云、寧可一時發一切戒、不可一時犯一切戒。 且如婬戒、女人身上發得二十一戒、男子身上得十四戒。餘法界中男女亦爾。今或貪心、犯一女一道、但名汙一婬戒。自餘諸婬、戒體光潔、無行可違、稱本受體。』 資持釋云『初敘宗意。律儀從境故名別脫、道定從心即是總脫。 如下引論委釋二、初舉文。受是懸擬故可總發、犯是臨境故唯別犯。 且下二歷示、初明總發。文中別舉婬支以明、餘可例顯。婬境約道、女三男二。婬心三毒、三單三複一具。隨緣間起、以心歷境、故發多戒、如文所列。今下明別犯。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Procedural Commentary continues: "This principle concerns the prātimokṣa precepts specifically: because they are obtained separately with respect to each distinct object and condition, the precept-essence obtained for each is likewise distinct. Hence, when a later violation occurs, it too follows and violates only that particular, separate instance. As the *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya* says: it is acceptable to give rise to every precept at a single moment, but never acceptable to violate every precept at a single moment. Take the precept against unchastity: with respect to a woman's body, twenty-one distinct precepts are obtained at ordination; with respect to a man's body, fourteen are obtained. Now, suppose a greedy mind arises and one violates the precept with respect to one woman, through one orifice — this is called defiling only that one instance. All the other instances remain untouched, their precept-essence still bright and pure, with no conduct at all committed against them, remaining exactly as originally received." The Zichi Commentary explains: "The śīla precepts follow the object, and are hence called 'separately liberating'; reception is a matter of anticipatory intent and may give rise to all the precepts at once, while violation, being a matter of actually confronting a particular object, can only ever violate a single, separate instance."

Chinese Source

△事鈔又云『世中有人、犯一婬戒、初乃惶懾。後復思審、謂言失戒、遂即雷同隨過皆犯。 豈不由愚於教網、自陷流俗。 焉知但犯一婬、諸婬並皆不犯。餘殺盜等常淨儼然。』 資持釋云『初敘非。 豈下正斥。 焉下重示。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Procedural Commentary further says: "In this world there are people who, having violated one instance of the precept against unchastity, are at first thrown into fear and alarm. But then, upon further reflection, they conclude that they must have simply lost the precepts altogether, and thereupon indiscriminately go on to violate every subsequent instance in just the same way. Is this not simply falling, through sheer ignorance of the precept's true structure, into the worst of worldly habit? Little do they know that violating only one instance of unchastity leaves every other instance of that same precept entirely untouched — and that the remaining precepts, against killing, theft, and the rest, remain, throughout, perfectly and solemnly pure." The Zichi Commentary explains: "The first part describes the error; what follows directly rebukes it; what follows that drives the point home once more."

Chinese Source

△事鈔續云『故同法之儔、理須明察。 若先嚴淨識。託對五塵、欲染不生、由前方便。 若先非攝慮、對境不能不犯。既犯業成、必須無覆早懺、還成本淨。』 資持釋云『初二句囑其所告。受隨一等故名同法。 若下二正勸又二、初示持行。嚴謂謹攝、淨識即心、五塵皆境。所謂方便正念、常擬對治也。嗚呼。末世凡流沈溺滋久、攝念離染未見其人。自非宿善資熏、明師訓匠。勤求聖教、精擇良明。志慕孤高、行希清卓。時時不懈、日日如新。或體達前塵反求欲本、或冥心所受專意通持。故得對境蕭然、遇緣確翔而後集、默而識之。其猶揮手於空了無滯矣、著鎧入陣何所畏乎。然惑業未銷、生死可懼。豈唯言說、即是清昇。在欲遠塵良恐非爾所及、居凡學聖故且抑而為之勿事悠悠、宜應切切。因茲言及、一為深思。 若下次勸犯悔、上二句明成犯。既下示懺益。大慈博受、於物無遺。雖惡行下愚、亦苦加提引。祖恩所及、無得而知。』已上皆見事鈔記卷十四

上來持犯總讒第八章別簡性重竟

Ru-Yi Translation

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Hence, fellow practitioners under this same teaching must, in principle, understand this clearly. If one's awareness has beforehand been kept rigorously pure, then, when confronted by the five sense-objects, no defiled desire will even arise, through the strength of one's prior discipline. But if one's mindfulness has beforehand not been well guarded, then, when confronted by such an object, one will be unable to avoid violation. And once the violation has occurred and the karmic act is complete, one must, without concealment, repent early — so as to be restored once more to one's original purity." The Zichi Commentary explains: "Alas — in this degenerate age, ordinary people have long sunk deep into worldly attachment, and one scarcely ever meets anyone who actually guards the mind and stays free of defilement... In this way one is able to remain utterly untroubled when confronted with any object, gathering oneself only after carefully surveying the situation — like waving a hand through empty space, meeting no obstruction whatsoever; like a soldier armored and entering battle, with nothing left to fear. And yet, so long as afflictions and karma are not yet extinguished, birth-and-death remains genuinely fearful — this is by no means a matter of mere words... The Buddha's great compassion embraces all beings broadly, leaving not a single one out; even those of base conduct and inferior wit are still painstakingly drawn forward and guided. The reach of this ancestral kindness is beyond what words can fully convey." [All of the above from Zichi Commentary, fascicle 14]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide treats this section as the pastoral center of gravity for the entire gate, and it is worth quoting the *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya*'s own formula in full, since the guide does: "it is acceptable to give rise to every precept at a single moment, but it is never acceptable to violate every precept at a single moment." Reception, the guide explains, is anticipatory and can leap forward all at once — a woman's body alone carries twenty-one distinct instances of the precept against unchastity, obtained together in a single moment of ordination — but violation can only ever touch the one specific instance actually confronted. Break faith with one woman, through one act, and only that one twenty-first of the precept is defiled; the other twenty stand exactly as bright and untouched as the moment they were received, and every other precept entirely is likewise untouched.

The guide singles out Dao Xuan's own real-world observation as the section's emotional core: people who, having genuinely violated once, talk themselves into believing the precepts are now simply "lost" altogether, and thereupon abandon all further restraint — "is this not simply falling, through sheer ignorance of the precept's true structure, into the worst of worldly habit?" The guide reads this as a direct, explicit refutation of the all-or-nothing thinking that turns one lapse into a permanent excuse for many more, and closes by noting how the chapter itself ends: not with triumphant certainty, but with the sober admission that even a genuinely disciplined practitioner, once actually confronted with temptation, may simply be unable to avoid violation — and that what matters most, at that point, is neither self-congratulation nor self-abandonment, but confessing without concealment and starting again.

19. Milestone: Refuting the Contempt for the Vinaya as "Merely a Hīnayāna Teaching"

With the technical machinery of observance and violation now fully laid out, the gate's final chapter, "Broadly Rebuking a Foolish Teaching" (廣斥愚教), turns polemical. Dao Xuan names and directly answers a real current of opinion in his own day — self-styled Mahāyāna practitioners who dismissed the entire Vinaya as a lesser, merely Hīnayāna concern, no longer binding on anyone pursuing the greater path.

Chinese Source

第九章 廣斥愚教

▲事鈔云『今時不知教者、多自毀傷。云此戒律所禁止、是聲聞之法。於我大乘棄同糞土。猶如黃葉木牛木馬、誑止小兒。此戒法亦復如是、誑汝聲聞子也。』 資持釋云『初敘倚濫毀傷。自毀者身為佛子、反毀佛教故。又自身稟戒、反毀戒律故。 如黃葉等此明倚濫、即佛經中有此言故。涅槃云。嬰兒啼哭之時。喻小機也父母即以楊樹黃葉而語之言、莫啼、我與汝金喻如來施權也嬰兒見已、生真金候、便止不啼、謂得涅槃然此楊葉實非金也。非大涅槃木牛木馬木男木女、嬰兒見已、亦復生於男女等想。喻亦同上此明如來追述爾前施小之意。至涅槃時、決了權疑、同歸常住、寧復有小耶。此所謂不知教也。』

Ru-Yi Translation

Chapter Nine: Broadly Rebuking a Foolish Teaching. The Procedural Commentary says: "In these times, those who do not understand the teaching are, in large part, guilty of self-inflicted harm. They say: these restrictions of the Vinaya belong to the Dharma of the śrāvakas alone; as for our own Great Vehicle, we cast such things aside like so much dung and dirt. It is just like the yellow leaf, the wooden ox, or the wooden horse — used only to quiet a crying child; and this precept-teaching, they say, is exactly the same, a mere device to fool you śrāvaka disciples." The Zichi Commentary explains: "It is 'self-inflicted' because, being oneself a disciple of the Buddha, one turns instead to slander the Buddha's own teaching. As for 'the yellow leaf': the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says — when an infant is crying, its parents take a willow tree's yellow leaf and say, 'Do not cry; here, I give you gold,' and the infant, believing it real gold, stops crying at once — even though this leaf is not, in truth, gold at all. A wooden ox, a wooden horse — an infant, upon seeing these, likewise forms the notion 'boy' or 'girl.' This shows the Tathāgata retrospectively explaining his own earlier intent in teaching the lesser vehicle provisionally. By the time of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra itself, the provisional teaching's remaining doubts are all fully resolved, and everything alike returns to the single, ever-abiding reality — how, then, could there remain any genuinely separate 'lesser vehicle' at all? This is exactly what is meant by 'not understanding the teaching.'"

Chinese Source

△事鈔續云『原夫大小二乘、理無分隔。 對機設藥、除病為先。 故鹿野初唱、本為聲聞、八萬諸天便發大道。雙森告滅、終顯佛性、而有聽眾果成羅漢。 以此推之。悟解在心、不唯教旨也。』 資持釋云『二無分隔耳。 對下明因機故。 故下引證、初證說小悟大。即無量義經。雙下證說大悟小。即涅槃經。 以下準經顯意。此謂如來一音演法、眾生隨類得解。然此但望言教是一、至於佛意不無密赴、故使隨類得益也。此明不以所學、即判大小。但達其大者、一切歸大、何妨學律。志之小者、所為皆小、徒自窮經。故曰。在心不唯教也。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Procedural Commentary continues: "Consider the matter at its root: between the Great and Lesser Vehicles there is, in principle, no real division at all. The Buddha prescribes the medicine according to the patient's own capacity, always putting the cure of the actual illness first. Hence, at the very first turning of the Dharma-wheel in the Deer Park — a teaching originally given for the śrāvakas — eighty thousand gods nonetheless gave rise, right there, to the mind set on the great path. And at the twin śāla trees, where the Buddha's passing into final nirvana was announced — a teaching ultimately revealing the Buddha-nature itself — there were listeners in that very assembly who attained only the fruit of arhatship. From this we may infer: awakened understanding lies in the mind itself, not solely in the outward intent of whichever teaching happens to be given." The Zichi Commentary explains: "This shows one should never judge 'greater' or 'lesser' merely by which teaching happens to have been studied. One who has genuinely penetrated to the great teaching finds everything alike returning to the great; what objection could there be to also studying the Vinaya? One whose aspiration remains merely small will find everything he does remaining small regardless, exhausting the sutras to no real purpose."

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide notes that Dao Xuan's opponents here are not straw men but a real, documented current of opinion in his own time, quoted almost verbatim: "these restrictions of the Vinaya... we cast aside like so much dung and dirt... a mere device to fool you śrāvaka disciples." The guide highlights how precisely Dao Xuan turns their own proof-text against them: the "yellow leaf" and "wooden ox" images his opponents cite do genuinely appear in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra — but read in context, that very sutra uses them to explain how the Buddha's earlier, provisional teachings are ultimately reconciled with and absorbed into the final, complete truth, not to license discarding them as worthless fictions. The guide's real payoff is the closing inference: since eighty thousand gods gave rise to the greatest possible aspiration while listening to what was nominally "only" a śrāvaka-level teaching in the Deer Park, and some in the Buddha's own final audience attained only arhatship while hearing the ultimate Nirvāṇa teaching itself, genuine awakening plainly tracks the depth of the listener's own mind, not merely which label — "Hīnayāna" or "Mahāyāna" — happens to be stamped on the teaching received. Studying the Vinaya carefully is, on this logic, no obstacle to the Great Vehicle at all.

20. Milestone: Precepts First, and the Parable of the Two Quarreling Disciples

The gate's final section completes Dao Xuan's rebuke with two further arguments — why the training in precepts must come first among the three trainings of precepts, concentration, and wisdom, and a vivid parable warning that mutual contempt between the two vehicles destroys the Buddha's teaching on both sides at once — before Master Hongyi's compendium closes the fifth gate for good.

Chinese Source

△事鈔續云『故世尊處世、深達物機。凡所施為、必以威儀為主。 但以身口所發事在戒防、三毒勃興要由心使。今先以戒捉、次以定縛、後以慧殺、理次然乎。 今有不肖之人、不知己身位地、妄自安託云是大乘。輕弄真經、自重我教。即勝鬘經說、毗尼者即大乘學。智論云、八十部者即尸波羅密。如此經論、不入其耳、豈不為』悲 資持釋云『二三學次第為二、初推戒功二、先敘佛偏弘。施為者通語一期化物軌度。威儀即目戒學。主猶尊也。 但下次出所以、初明對病。身口即業、心使是惑。勃卒也。今下明次治。顯戒學居初、釋成為主耳。 今有下二斥誑妄三、初敘所計。位地謂薄地凡夫。安託謂無疑畏。輕真經者毀律教也、重我教者黨所習也。即下據教反質。二文並約開會之義。由本小教、歸一佛乘、故兩皆云即八十即目段數、部即指根本一部。聲聞但云尸羅、菩薩則加波羅密、即六度之一。如下傷其愚暗。教雖顯了、聞而不信、故云不入耳。』

(The source text is disrupted here by an apparent page break: the closing quotation mark falls before the single character 悲 ["how lamentable"], which properly belongs to the end of the preceding sentence.)

Ru-Yi Translation

On the Order of the Three Trainings. The Procedural Commentary continues: "Hence the World-Honored One, dwelling in this world, thoroughly penetrated the capacities of all beings. In everything he undertook to establish, he invariably took proper conduct as the foundation. This is simply because, although the actual karmic acts arise through body and speech, and it is these the precepts exist to guard against, the three poisons that suddenly arise are, at root, driven by the mind alone. Hence one must first seize hold with the precepts, next bind fast with concentration, and only afterward cut through with wisdom — is this ordering of the three trainings not entirely reasonable? Yet there are, today, unworthy persons who, not even recognizing their own actual station, recklessly claim for themselves the name of the Great Vehicle, making light of the genuine scriptures while puffing up their own preferred teaching instead. But the Śrīmālā Sūtra itself states that the Vinaya is precisely a Great Vehicle study; and the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra states that the eighty divisions of the canonical Vinaya are precisely śīla-pāramitā itself. When scriptures as clear as these fail even to enter such a person's ears, is this not truly lamentable?" The Zichi Commentary explains: "'Foundation' is much like 'the most honored.' The training in precepts occupies the very first place, which is precisely what explains why it is called 'the foundation.' 'Station' refers to their being, in truth, still ordinary worldlings of the shallowest capacity. Even though the teaching itself is perfectly clear, they hear it and simply do not believe — hence 'fail even to enter such a person's ears.'"

Chinese Source

△事鈔又云『故百喻經云。昔有一師、畜二弟子、各當一腳隨時按摩。其大弟子、嫌彼小者、便打折其所當之腳。彼雙嫌之、又折大者所當之腳。 譬今方等學者非於小乘、小乘學者又非方等。故使大聖法典、二途兼亡。 以此證知、今自目睹。』 資持釋云『三相非滅法、初引經。師喻如來、第子喻學者。腳喻兩乘、按摩喻尋究。其下喻學大毀小、彼下喻學小毀大。 譬下法合。可解。方等即大乘之通名。 以下顯驗。』

Ru-Yi Translation

The Parable of the Two Disciples. The Procedural Commentary further says: "Hence the Sutra of the Hundred Parables relates: once there was a teacher who kept two disciples, each assigned to massage one of his legs at the appointed time. The elder disciple, resenting the younger one, struck and broke the leg the younger disciple was responsible for. The younger disciple, resenting this in turn, struck and broke the leg the elder disciple was responsible for. This is a parable for how, today, students of the Mahāyāna scriptures disparage the Lesser Vehicle, while students of the Lesser Vehicle in turn disparage the Mahāyāna scriptures — causing the Great Sage's own Dharma-teaching, in both its branches at once, to be destroyed together. This may be verified by what we ourselves actually witness today." The Zichi Commentary explains: "The teacher is a metaphor for the Tathāgata, the disciples for students of the two vehicles; the legs are a metaphor for the two vehicles themselves, and the massaging for diligent study. 'Mahāyāna scriptures' is simply a general name for the Great Vehicle."

Chinese Source

△事鈔又云『恐後無知初學、為彼塵蒙。故曲引張。 猶恐同染悲夫。』 資持釋云『三示意結勸中、初示廣斥之意。彼即濫大不肖之者。塵蒙謂邪言惡見壞信喪道、猶如塵垢、穢於淨物故也。 猶下囑累。所謂素絲易染、朱紫難分。雖委曲指陳、猶未能知返。豈非禁情節欲舉世之所難、縱意為非是人之所欲。且祖師之世、其風尚然。況及於今、無足怪矣。』已上皆見事鈔記卷十四

上來持犯篇中第一門持犯總義竟

Ru-Yi Translation

The Closing Exhortation. The Procedural Commentary further says: "I fear that later beginners, lacking proper knowledge, may be clouded over by the very dust of such wrong views — this is why I have gone to such trouble to draw out and elaborate the point at such length. And yet I still fear that some will be defiled by the same error regardless — how truly lamentable this would be." The Zichi Commentary explains: "As the saying goes, plain white silk is easily dyed, and once dyed, red and purple are difficult to tell apart again; even though the point has now been laid out in the fullest possible detail, some will still fail to recognize the need to turn back. Is this not simply because restraining one's feelings and curbing one's desires is difficult for the whole world alike, while indulging the mind in wrongdoing is exactly what people naturally desire? Even in the age of the patriarchs themselves, this same tendency already prevailed — how much more so today; there is nothing here that should really surprise us." [All of the above from Zichi Commentary, fascicle 14]

Reading note — after the Ru-Yi Study Group companion guide

The guide reads the three-trainings argument as Dao Xuan's structural, rather than merely rhetorical, answer to his opponents: precepts are placed first among precepts, concentration, and wisdom not as some lesser, preliminary formality to be outgrown, but because the three poisons are, at root, driven by the mind, and it is precisely the training in precepts that first "seizes hold" of the karmic acts of body and speech through which those poisons would otherwise run riot — concentration then "binds fast" what remains, and only then can wisdom actually "cut through" to the root. The guide singles out the two proof-texts Dao Xuan marshals as deliberately chosen to outflank his opponents on their own ground: the Śrīmālā Sūtra and the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra are unimpeachably Mahāyāna texts, yet both state plainly that the Vinaya itself is a Great Vehicle study.

The guide reads the parable of the two quarreling disciples as the chapter's emotional climax: mutual contempt between the two vehicles does not raise either one at the other's expense — it breaks both legs, and the whole teaching is left, in Dao Xuan's own words, "destroyed together." The guide's closing note is that Dao Xuan does not end on a note of confidence that his own argument has settled the matter — his final image, "plain white silk is easily dyed, and once dyed, red and purple are difficult to tell apart again," is offered as a sober acknowledgment that clear argument alone rarely undoes an already-formed prejudice, even as he still commits the effort to making it as fully and carefully as he can. This closing chapter brings the fifth gate to its end, and the compendium now moves on to its sixth gate, the specific particulars of the four gravest offenses themselves.

上來持犯篇中第一門持犯總義竟
The above concludes the fifth gate, the General Theory of Observance and Violation, within the Persistence-and-Violation Fascicle.