The Treatise That Teaches Right Reasoning

Proof and refutation, together with their fallacious counterparts, serve only to awaken others. Direct perception and inference, together with their fallacious counterparts, serve only to awaken oneself.

These eight together comprehensively gather the essential meaning of the whole science. Among them, a group of statements built around a thesis is called "proof": a group of statements consisting of a thesis, a reason, and an example, which makes clear, to whoever has raised a question, a meaning they did not yet understand.

Here, a "thesis" means this: taking as its subject a locus that both parties already accept as established, and taking as its predicate a distinguishing property that both parties already accept as established, and combining the two exactly as the proponent himself wishes to establish them — this combination is called a thesis. For example, one might set up the thesis: "Sound is impermanent."

A valid reason has three characteristics. What are the three? That it pervades the property of the subject; that it is definitely present among the instances of the homologous class; and that it is entirely absent from the instances of the heterologous class.

What are meant by "the homologous class" and "the heterologous class"? A class of things sharing, in equal measure, the very property being established is called the homologous class. For instance, if one is establishing "impermanent," then pots and the like, being impermanent, count as the homologous class. The heterologous class consists of whatever lacks the property being established — for instance: "whatever is permanent is seen not to be produced, as with space and the like." Here, "being produced" — or, in another phrasing of the same reason, "being brought about through effort, without interruption" — pervades the property of the subject. That it is definitely present among the homologous instances and entirely absent from the heterologous instances is what makes it a valid reason for "impermanent," and so on.

There are two kinds of example: the example by agreement and the example by difference.

The example by agreement shows the reason to be definitely present among the instances of the homologous class — for instance: "Whatever is seen to be produced is seen to be impermanent, as with a pot and the like." The example by difference states that, wherever the property being established is absent, the reason is entirely absent as well — for instance: "Whatever is permanent is seen not to be produced, as with space and the like." Here, the word "permanent" expresses "not impermanent," and "not produced" expresses "the absence of being produced" — in the same way that negating "existent" gives "non-existent."

When a group of statements consisting of the thesis and the rest, as just explained, is used to awaken another person, it is called "proof." Thus, in the statement "Sound is impermanent" — this is the statement of the thesis. "Because it is produced" — this is the statement of the reason. "Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, as with a pot and the like" — this is the statement that follows the homologous class. "Whatever is permanent is seen not to be produced, as with space" — this is the statement that withdraws from the heterologous class. Only these three parts together are called "proof."

Although one may wish to establish it, a thesis that contradicts direct perception or the like is called only a "fallacious thesis." There are nine kinds: contradicting direct perception; contradicting inference; contradicting one's own scripture; contradicting the world; self-contradiction; the predicate not established; the subject not established; neither established; and stating what is already agreed upon by both parties.

Contradicting direct perception: saying, "Sound is not something heard." Contradicting inference: saying, "A pot and the like are permanent." Contradicting one's own scripture: a Vaiśeṣika asserting, "Sound is permanent." Contradicting the world: saying, "The hare seen in the moon is not the moon, because it exists," or saying, "The crown of a person's skull is pure, being part of a sentient being, just like a conch shell." Self-contradiction: saying, "My mother is a barren woman." The predicate not established: a disciple of the Buddha, addressing a Sāṃkhya opponent, asserting, "Sound perishes." The subject not established: a Sāṃkhya, addressing a disciple of the Buddha, saying, "The self is [pure] thought." Neither established: a Vaiśeṣika, addressing a disciple of the Buddha, asserting, "The self serves as the cause that unites [substance, quality, and action]." Already agreed upon by both parties: saying, "Sound is something heard."

Statements of this kind fail as a thesis because they wrongly exclude what the thing itself actually is, because they cannot possibly be established, or because setting them up yields no result — hence they are called the faults of a fallacious thesis.

The fallacious theses have now been explained; the fallacious reasons will be explained next. Non-establishment, inconclusiveness, and contradiction — these are called the fallacious reasons.

There are four kinds of non-establishment: non-establishment for both parties; non-establishment for one party; non-establishment through doubt; and non-establishment of the basis.

For example, in establishing "Sound is impermanent," if one says "because it is something seen by the eye" — this is non-establishment for both parties (sound is plainly not seen by the eye at all). If one says "because it is produced" while addressing a follower of the Sound-Manifestation school, this is non-establishment for one party only, since that school does not accept sound as produced. When doubt has already arisen over whether something like mist is really smoke, and one nonetheless argues from it that "there is fire, because the elements have combined" — this is non-establishment through doubt. Arguing that "space truly exists, because it is the substrate of a quality," addressed to a school that denies space exists at all, is non-establishment of the basis.

There are six kinds of inconclusiveness: common; exclusive; present in part of the homologous class and throughout the heterologous class; present in part of the heterologous class and throughout the homologous class; present in part of both classes; and mutually contradictory yet equally well-formed.

Common: saying, "Sound is permanent, because it is an object of cognition." Both the permanent and the impermanent class share this reason equally, so it is inconclusive — is sound impermanent, being an object of cognition as a pot is? Or permanent, being an object of cognition as space is? Exclusive: saying, "Sound is permanent, because it is something heard." Both the permanent and the impermanent class are entirely apart from this reason — nothing outside the two exists for it to apply to — so it leaves the matter simply in doubt: this property of "being heard," what does it actually resemble?

Present in part of the homologous class, throughout the heterologous class: saying, "Sound is not produced through effort without interruption, because it is impermanent." For this thesis, lightning and space count as the homologous class; impermanence holds of lightning but not of space. Pots count as the heterologous class, and impermanence holds of them throughout. Since the reason applies to both lightning and pots alike, it is inconclusive: is sound not produced through effort, being impermanent as lightning is? Or produced through effort, being impermanent as a pot is?

Present in part of the heterologous class, throughout the homologous class: setting up the thesis, "Sound is produced through effort without interruption, because it is impermanent." Here pots count as the homologous class, and impermanence holds of them throughout; lightning and space count as the heterologous class, and impermanence holds of lightning but not of space. So, as before, this too is inconclusive.

Present in part of both classes: saying, "Sound is permanent, because it lacks resistant materiality." For "permanent," space and atoms count as the homologous class — lacking resistant materiality holds of space but not of atoms. Pleasure and pots count as the heterologous class — it holds of pleasure but not of pots. Since the reason applies to both pleasure and space alike, it too is inconclusive.

Mutually contradictory yet equally well-formed: one side sets up "Sound is impermanent, because it is produced, like a pot"; another sets up "Sound is permanent, because it is something heard, like the very nature of sound." Both are reasons that leave the matter in doubt, so both are called inconclusive.

There are four kinds of contradiction: the reason contradicting the manifest nature of the predicate; the reason contradicting a further implication of the predicate; the reason contradicting the manifest nature of the subject; and the reason contradicting a further implication of the subject.

Contradicting the manifest nature of the predicate: saying, "Sound is permanent, because it is produced" — or, "because it is brought about through effort, without interruption." This reason is present only among the heterologous instances (things that are impermanent), so it actually contradicts the very thesis it was meant to prove — it proves that sound is impermanent instead.

Contradicting a further implication of the predicate: saying, "The eye and the other [sense faculties] necessarily exist for the use of another, because they are aggregations, like a bed or a mat." Just as this reason can establish that the eye and the rest exist for another's use, it equally establishes a contrary further implication: that they exist for another's use only as an aggregation is put to use and then set aside — the way a bed or a mat is used by a guest and then left behind, not the way the proponent actually intends "another" to be understood.

Contradicting the manifest nature of the subject: saying, "Universality is neither substance, quality, nor action, because it possesses a single [nature as] substance, and because it possesses quality and action, like [the Vaiśeṣika category of] sameness-and-difference." Just as this reason can negate substance and the rest being identical with universality, it equally negates universality itself as any real, singular entity apart from them — both conclusions follow with the same necessity.

Contradicting a further implication of the subject: this same reason, just as it can establish, for the subject of the prior thesis, a further implication that it serves as a real condition for something, can equally establish the contrary — that it serves as a condition for nothing existent — since, again, negating substance and the rest holds with the same necessity either way.

The fallacious reasons have now been explained; the fallacious examples will be explained next.

The fallacious reasons have now been explained; the fallacious examples will be explained next. There are five kinds of fallacious example by agreement: the proving property not established; the property to be proved not established; neither established; no connection stated; and the connection stated in reverse.

The proving property not established: saying, "Sound is permanent, because it lacks resistant materiality. Whatever lacks resistant materiality is seen to be permanent, as with an atom." But for an atom, the property to be proved (permanence) does hold, while the proving property (lacking resistant materiality) does not — atoms do possess resistant materiality. The property to be proved not established: using cognition as the example. But for cognition, the proving property (lacking resistant materiality) does hold, while the property to be proved (permanence) does not, since all cognition is impermanent.

Neither established: this has two forms, according to whether the example exists or not. Using a pot as the example is neither-established-with-existence; using space as the example, addressed to a school that denies space exists, is neither-established-without-existence. No connection stated: when the proving and the to-be-proved properties are simply shown together in a pot or the like, with no explicit connection drawn between them — for instance, "In a pot, being produced and being impermanent are both seen." Reversed connection: saying, instead of "Whatever is produced is entirely impermanent," the reverse — "Whatever is impermanent is entirely produced." These are the fallacies of the example by agreement.

The property to be proved not excluded: saying, "Whatever is impermanent is seen to have resistant materiality, as with an atom." But for an atom, the property to be proved (permanence) is not excluded, since the opponent holds atoms to be permanent — only the proving property (lacking resistant materiality) is correctly absent from it. The proving property not excluded: using karma [action] as the example. This excludes only the property to be proved, not the proving property, since that same opponent holds actions to lack resistant materiality.

Neither excluded: addressing a school that accepts space as real, using space as the example — that school excludes neither permanence nor the lack of resistant materiality from space, since it holds space to be both. Not [shown to be] inseparable: saying, "As with a pot, in which impermanence and resistant materiality are both seen" — without stating that wherever one is absent, so is the other. Reversed exclusion: saying, "Whatever has resistant materiality is entirely impermanent," instead of properly stating that whatever is permanent lacks resistant materiality.

Statements of the thesis, the reason, and the example of these kinds do not amount to a genuine proof.

Next, for the sake of awakening oneself, one should know that there are only two valid means of knowledge: direct perception and inference.

Direct perception here means cognition free of conceptual construction. Whenever correct cognition, with respect to an object such as visible form, is free of all the conceptual construction bound up with names, universals, and the like, and instead arises vividly, distinctly, in direct contact with each particular — this is called direct perception.

Inference means observing an object indirectly, by way of a set of characteristics. The characteristics are of three kinds, as already explained above — the three characteristics of a valid reason. When correct cognition of the object to be inferred arises on the basis of these as the cause — coming to know, for instance, that there is fire, or that something is impermanent — this is called inference. Within these two means of knowledge, it is the resulting cognition itself that is called the "result," since it is what verifies the object; and because it functions in this way, making the object manifest, it too is called a "means of knowledge."

Cognition involving conceptual construction, which turns toward its object in a distorted way, is called fallacious perception. Any cognition that arises through conceptually recognizing something as "a pot," "a cloth," and so on, is called fallacious perception, because it does not take the object's own particular, unmediated characteristic as its objective sphere.

Any cognition of a merely apparent object, arising on the basis of a preceding cognition that used a fallacious reason, is called fallacious inference. The fallacious reasons are of the many kinds already explained above. Using one of these as a cause, various cognitions arise concerning what is only apparently to be inferred, without producing genuine understanding — these are called fallacious inference.

Next, correctly pointing out the faults of an opponent's proof is called "refutation." That is: pointing out that the proof is missing one of its opening parts, that the thesis is faulty, that the reason is unestablished, that the reason is inconclusive, that the reason is contradictory, or that the example is faulty — when a statement making one of these points clear brings understanding to the one who raised the question, it is called "refutation."

If a statement does not truly point out a fault in the opponent's proof, it is called "fallacious refutation." That is: declaring a complete proof to be deficient; declaring a faultless thesis to be faulty; declaring a valid reason to be unestablished; declaring a conclusive reason to be inconclusive; declaring a non-contradictory reason to be contradictory; or declaring a faultless example to be faulty. Statements of this kind are called fallacious refutation, since they fail to point out any actual fault in the opponent's thesis — there being no fault there to begin with.

Let this much suffice on this matter.

I have now set forth, in a few brief words, the essential meaning of this science — enough to establish, as a beginning, its four corners. The finer distinctions within it, of what is sound reasoning and what is not, are argued skillfully, at length, elsewhere.

As for the Nyāyapraveśa — it is the very threshold of debate: it sets forth a thesis, and it crushes the false to reveal the true. "Hetu" [因, "reason"] speaks of illuminating what is real; "vidyā" [明, "science"] speaks of making principle manifest; "entering" [入] speaks of proceeding to the root; "right" [正] means departing from the false; and "treatise" [論] means weighing words to their essential point, examining and clarifying what matters most.

Long ago, this meaning was already complete beneath the bodhi tree; by the time the Buddha rose to teach at Deer Park, this same wind was already stirring. The six [heterodox] teachers bowed their heads to the ground and fell silent; even the ancient seers sought guidance in order to know where to turn. Yet the divine light did not shine everywhere without interruption, and heterodox currents still stirred their waves — companions in error flourished, and their followers were many. And so Vasubandhu spread its splendor before, and Dignāga gathered its remaining fragrance after — raising up the true, eliminating the false, leveling every difficulty and untangling every dispute. Of the fullness of this achievement, other treatises give the complete account.

Then Bodhisattva Deva-lord [Śaṅkarasvāmin] arose, a sage second only to the greatest — broadly learned, thorough in his study, he carried forward what his teacher had begun, composing a concise and refined digest suited to the capacities of his time. He opened it with eight approaches, making its two benefits accessible; he pruned away the [older] five-part [form] to fix on the three. Its meaning, though brief, is clear; its text, though concise, is plain. Scholars of the Western lands, probing it ever more deeply, found in it exactly this: that without first walking this common path, one is not yet fit to take part in the higher discourse [of the larger treatises].

The Emperor of the great Tang, meeting his moment, opened forth his sagacity — unfurling the golden mirror [of good rule] and turning the golden wheel; receiving the mandate and carrying its brightness forward; sounding the jade drum and tuning the jade candle. Thoroughly he spread his transforming virtue abroad, and wove anew its proper order; he lit the torch of wisdom to illuminate the benighted city, and moored the boat of wisdom to ferry beings across the sea of suffering.

Our Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang, whose spiritual insight was extraordinary and whose lofty integrity stood above the crowd, practiced diligence in all things as though he could never do enough, and, looking up to the three vehicles, loved to inquire. The accomplished scholars of China each specialized in their own field; whatever met his eye, he was sure to examine its subtlety, and whatever he took to heart, he exhausted its meaning fully. Alas — the Buddha's sacred traces had grown ever more distant, and the teaching had fallen into decline; he could never come upon a corrupted text without a sigh, or handle a doubtful passage without a long lament. He looked toward the Pamirs with lofty aspiration, and set his hope on a distant journey to Vulture Peak.

And so, braving every danger, he sought out teachers and inquired after the way, until he reached the kingdom of Kashmir in northern India. There he met the great treatise-master Saṅghayaśas, with whom he examined doubtful points across the eight canons and settled questions concerning the five vehicles. The Master, recognizing the firm foundation of learning Xuanzang already carried, instructed him in the subtle art of hetuvidyā where his understanding was not yet complete — and on hearing the Sanskrit exposition, every doubt melted like ice in his heart. Later, in the kingdom of Magadha in central India, he met Bodhisattva Śīlabhadra, who extended his examples still further, drawing out one class of things to illuminate another, refining his understanding further still. From there he called on every remaining trace of the sacred teaching and questioned every surviving master of renown; though he met debaters said to bind an iron plate around their own bellies for fear their learning would burst them, his eloquence, unmatched, laid every heterodox current to rest. This treatise, carried among them, was swiftly spread on every side, and fortune gathered and flourished around it.

On the sixth day of the eighth month of autumn, in the twenty-first year of the Zhenguan era [647 CE], the translation was completed by imperial decree at Hongfu Monastery. The monk Ming-jun of Hongfu Monastery took down the text and verified its wording; the monk Xuanmo of Hongfu Monastery verified the Sanskrit; the monk Xuanying of Great Zongchi Monastery corrected the characters; the monks Daohong of Great Zongchi Monastery, Mingyan of Shiji Monastery, Huigui of Luohan Monastery, Faxiang of Baochang Monastery, Wenbei of Hongfu Monastery, Daoshen of Fajiang Monastery in Guozhou, and Shentai of Qiyan Monastery in Puzhou examined and verified its essential meaning. Xu Jingzong, Silver-and-Blue Grand Master of the Palace, Acting Vice Director of the Left of the Household of the Heir Apparent, Founding Baron of Gaoyang County, received the decree to supervise the translation.

The Tripiṭaka Master, emptying himself to meet each occasion, opened up this hidden gate; the sea of its meaning is so vast as to be fathomless, and the peak of its diction so steep as to be hard to look up to — yet outstanding scholars of foreign lands received it alike in person, and the record of its profound chapters now circulates together throughout the world. As for myself, unworthy as I am, I have been entrusted beyond my merit with adding my own small praise; having received the charge to verify the text, I happened upon this fortunate occasion, and I have dared to record these events of the time to hand down to those who come after — may this excellent example, and the far-reaching cause behind it, never be extinguished in the ages to come.