General and Particular Treatises, and How They Are Named

Next, making clear the sense of general and particular among the various treatises. Treatises are of two kinds: first, general treatises; second, particular treatises. Whatever refutes the confusions of both great and small vehicles together, and sets forth the teachings of both together, is named a general treatise — this describes the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā itself, whose first twenty-five chapters refute the great confusion and set forth the great teaching, and whose last two chapters refute the small confusion and set forth the small teaching. The second kind, particular treatises, refute the confusions of great and small separately, and set forth the teachings of great and small separately. Works such as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Bodhisattvabhūmi-śāstra are Mahāyāna general treatises; works such as the Daśabhūmika-śāstra and the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom are Mahāyāna particular treatises. Works such as the Satyasiddhi-śāstra, which sets forth the Three Baskets as a whole, are Hīnayāna general treatises.

Aśvaghoṣa's own teacher, the monk Pārśva, composed the Upadeśa on the Four Āgamas, a work devoted specifically to explaining the sūtra basket alone. The Samantapāsādikā is devoted specifically to explaining the Vinaya basket alone; the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom says that eighty divisions of Vinaya are explained by eighty divisions of Vibhāṣā commentary. The Samantapāsādikā Vinaya is devoted specifically to explaining the essentials transmitted in Sri Lanka, drawing on the Sarvāstivādin Daśabhāṇavāra Vinaya. Śāriputra's own work is devoted specifically to explaining the Buddha's ninefold Abhidharma. Since works of this kind each explain only one of the Three Baskets separately, they are Hīnayāna particular treatises. And within the explanation of the Three Baskets themselves, there is, again, a further general and particular distinction: whatever explains one whole basket in full is named a general treatise; whatever explains only one single school's own version within one basket is named a particular treatise.

Question: Since the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā explains both great and small vehicles together, it ought properly to be named a great-and-small general treatise, and should not be called a Mahāyāna treatise at all. Answer: Although it explains both great and small, its purpose throughout is to reveal the great — and this is why it is a Mahāyāna treatise. The reason is this: its opening section makes the Mahāyāna clear; its middle section makes the Hīnayāna clear; and its final section returns once more to making the Mahāyāna clear. On this basis, it is properly named a Mahāyāna treatise.

Question: What kind of treatise is the Twelve Gate Treatise? Answer: It is a Mahāyāna general treatise. From beginning to end it refutes the great confusion and sets forth the great teaching as a whole, without ever refuting the small confusion or separately setting forth the small teaching — and so it is a Mahāyāna general treatise. Question: And what of the Hundred Treatise? Answer: The Hundred Treatise refutes as a whole the erroneous views that obstruct both great and small, and sets forth as a whole the correct teaching that the Tathāgata gave for both great and small alike — and so it is a great-and-small general treatise. Yet since its purpose from beginning to end is to make the Mahāyāna clear, it, too, belongs among the Mahāyāna general treatises.

Next, making clear the different ways the various treatises are named. There are, in all, three ways a treatise is named. First, named from the dharma it expounds — as with the Satyasiddhi-śāstra and the like: "real" (實) refers to the principle of the four truths, and "establishing" (成) refers to the text that does the establishing — hence it is said that the treatise was composed in order to establish this very dharma, which is what is meant by naming it from the dharma. Second, named from a person — as with "Śāriputra's Abhidharma" and the like; the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom says that a follower of the Vātsīputrīya upheld and transmitted a certain Abhidharma, which is accordingly also named "the Vātsīputrīya Abhidharma." Third, named from a simile — as with the Amṛtarasa Abhidharma, "the Abhidharma of the Flavor of Sweet Dew," and the like, or as with Harivarman's own teacher Kumāralāta's composition, the Sūryodaya-śāstra, "the Treatise of the Rising Sun," and other such works.

The naming of the four treatises central to this school, however, is entirely from the dharma in every case — never from a person, and never from a simile — and within this single category, four further distinct approaches are opened up. The Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom is named from the very sūtra it explains: "great" translates mahā; "wisdom" translates prajñā; "perfection" translates pāramitā — the treatise explains the sūtra's own title, and so it is named from what it explains. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is named from the underlying reality of its principle. The Twelve Gate Treatise is named from its own verbal teaching. The Hundred Treatise is named from its verse count.

Speaking of the matter in general terms, however, all four treatises alike reveal the underlying reality of the middle way as their principle, and so all four could equally well be named from their principle. All four alike possess verbal teaching that opens up and reveals this underlying reality, and so all four could equally well be named for their teaching. And all four alike contain verses, and so all four could equally well be named from their verses. It is only because each was meant to open up its own distinct approach, avoiding overlap with the others, that these four separate works came to differ from one another in this way — and this is why their naming turns out to differ as it does.

Next, making clear the guiding doctrine of the various treatises. Speaking generally of both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna sūtras together, they alike make clear one single way, and so they share unattainable correct contemplation as their common guiding doctrine. It is only that, within the Hīnayāna teaching, correct contemplation still lies at a great remove, and so it takes the teaching of the four truths as its own guiding doctrine instead; the Mahāyāna, by contrast, directly makes correct contemplation clear, and so the various Mahāyāna sūtras alike take non-dual correct contemplation as their common guiding doctrine. It is only with respect to differing skillful applications that the various schools come to differ among themselves — as when clarifying what should and should not be taught, and reconciling the present teaching with the past, this is named the Lotus Sūtra's own approach; or when refuting the eightfold inversion and discriminating the functions of permanence and impermanence, this is named the Nirvāṇa Sūtra's own approach. Yet when it comes to the non-dual correct way itself, there is, in the end, no difference between them whatsoever. As it stands among the sūtras, so too among the treatises: though the various schools differ from one another, they alike make use of non-dual correct contemplation as their shared guiding doctrine.

Moreover, sūtra and treatise share this same guiding doctrine in common: the Buddha's own speaking of correct contemplation constitutes sūtra; a treatise-author's setting forth of correct contemplation constitutes treatise. Sūtra and treatise differ only in their function, while correct contemplation itself admits of no difference between them. Hence the Sūtra of Immeasurable Meaning says: "It is like water washing away filth — the meaning is the same, though it differs according to whether one draws from a well or from a pond." From ancient times down to the present, every single teaching alike remedies the sickness of annihilationism and eternalism, and alike opens up the correct way; they differ only according to the differing function of present teaching against past teaching. Now, since the four treatises differ from one another in their respective function, this treatise will accordingly discriminate the differing guiding doctrine proper to each of these four schools of thought.

The Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom is devoted directly to explaining the Larger Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, and Nāgārjuna there opens up the Larger Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra into two paths: the first makes clear the path of prajñā; the second makes clear the path of skillful means. These two paths are precisely the father and mother of the Dharma-body. Hence the Larger Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra takes real wisdom and skillful wisdom as its own guiding doctrine, and the treatise, in setting forth the sūtra's own two kinds of wisdom, in turn takes these same two kinds of wisdom as its own guiding doctrine as well — exactly as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, in setting forth the two truths, in turn takes the two truths themselves as its own guiding doctrine.

Question: Why does the Larger Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra make prajñā clear first, and skillful means clear only afterward? Answer: In reality, prajñā and skillful means have no such sequence of before and after at all; the reason they are spoken of in this order is that prajñā serves as the essence, and skillful means serves as the function. Hence the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom says: "It is like gold serving as the essence, and fine workmanship upon the gold serving as the function" — this is why the essence is made clear first, and the function discriminated only afterward. Moreover, it is said that bodhisattva conduct is neither the conduct of the ordinary unenlightened person nor the conduct of the noble sage: prajñā transcends the ordinary person, while skillful means goes beyond even the sage — and one must first transcend the ordinary before one can go on to surpass the sage, which is why prajñā is made clear first and skillful means discriminated only afterward. Moreover, the views that arise among sentient beings are, in all, of two kinds: first, the view of existence; second, the view of non-existence. Prajñā breaks their view of existence; skillful means rebukes their view of non-existence — and this too is why prajñā is made clear first and skillful means discriminated only afterward.

As for accounting for this ordering directly: the Three Baskets speak mostly of the teaching of existence, in order to refute the outsiders — yet since people then become sealed within, and cling to, this very existence taught in the Three Baskets, the Perfection of Wisdom next teaches emptiness. And since those who are confused then become attached to this very emptiness taught in the Perfection of Wisdom, skillful means is taught next, in order to free them from this emptiness as well. Hence the preface to the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom says: "Knowing that heterodox sickness arises of itself, the Āgamas were composed on that account; taking the affliction of being mired in existence as the concern, the Perfection of Wisdom was composed to illuminate it" — this is precisely the sense intended here. Speaking in terms of the bodhisattva stages, prajñā is assigned to the sixth ground, and so is made clear first; skillful means belongs to the seventh ground, and so is taught only afterward.

Question: The old interpretation likewise held that the Larger Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra takes the two kinds of wisdom as its guiding doctrine — how does the present account differ from it? Answer: The present account makes clear that the sage's own mind has never, in truth, actually been dual; it is solely for the sake of sentient beings that, without there being any real duality, two are spoken of at all — precisely so as to lead beings, by means of these two, to awaken to the non-dual. This is why the present account differs from the old. Moreover, although both alike speak of two kinds of wisdom, the present account differs from the old one in this respect as well: the old doctrine held that real wisdom illuminates emptiness alone and does not reach existence, while skillful means illuminates existence alone and does not reach emptiness — which simply confines and limits the sage's own mind, and ends up producing two separate views. The present account makes clear that the consummate person's own way is itself unobstructed, and therefore has an unobstructed function as well: prajñā, having already illuminated emptiness, is thereby also able to perceive existence in turn.