The Guiding Doctrine of Each of the Four Treatises
This part carries the doctrinal center of the entire treatise: why the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā takes the two truths — not the middle way itself — as its own guiding thread, proven three separate ways and defended against three kinds of people who lose the two truths without knowing it. The part closes by giving the Hundred Treatise and Twelve Gate Treatise each their own distinct guiding doctrine, so that all four treatises this school defends end up illuminating one another rather than simply repeating the same claim four times over.
1. Closing the Two Wisdoms
A single closing line completes the account of the older, narrower interpretation of the two wisdoms mentioned at the end of Part 10, before Jizang turns to the treatise at the very heart of this school's own teaching.
方便既涉有即能鑒空。具如二智中說。
And since skillful means engages existence directly, it is thereby able to illuminate emptiness as well — this is set out in full in the discussion of the two kinds of knowledge elsewhere.
2. Why the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Takes the Two Truths as Its Guiding Doctrine
Jizang now turns to the treatise this whole school is named for, and states directly why the two truths — rather than any other candidate doctrine — are its guiding thread: the two truths are nothing less than the root of the entire Buddhist path, underlying both a buddha's own self-cultivation and his teaching of others alike.
次明中論以二諦為宗。所以用二諦為宗者。二諦是佛法根本。如來自行化他皆由二諦。自行由二諦者。如瓔珞經佛母品。明二諦能生佛故。二諦是佛母。蓋取二智為佛。二諦能生二智。故以二諦為母。即是如來自德圓滿由於二諦。化他德由二諦者。如來有所說法教化眾生常依二諦。故中論云。諸佛依二諦為眾生。說法也。
Next, making clear that the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā takes the two truths as its own guiding doctrine. The reason the two truths are taken as its guiding doctrine is this: the two truths are the very root of the Buddha's own teaching, and the Tathāgata's cultivation of himself and his transformation of others alike proceed entirely from the two truths. That his own cultivation proceeds from the two truths is shown, for instance, in the chapter on the Mother of the Buddhas in the Ratnamālā Sūtra, which makes clear that the two truths are able to give birth to a buddha — hence the two truths are called the mother of the Buddha. This is because the two kinds of knowledge are taken as constituting a buddha, and the two truths are able to give rise to these two kinds of knowledge — hence the two truths are called their mother. This is to say that the Tathāgata's own perfect fulfillment of virtue proceeds from the two truths. That his transformation of others proceeds from the two truths is shown in this: whatever the Tathāgata teaches in transforming sentient beings, he always relies on the two truths in doing so. Hence the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "The buddhas, in dependence on the two truths, teach the Dharma for the sake of sentient beings."
問何以知自他兩德並由二諦耶。答十二門論云。以識二諦故。即得自利他利及以共利。即其事也。以二諦是自行化他之本故。申明二諦以為論宗。即令一切眾生具得自他二利也。
Question: How is it known that both virtues, self-cultivation and the transformation of others, alike proceed from the two truths? Answer: The Twelve Gate Treatise says: "By knowing the two truths, one thereby attains the benefit of oneself, the benefit of others, and the benefit shared in common by both." This is exactly the matter in question. Because the two truths are the very root of self-cultivation and the transformation of others alike, this treatise sets forth the two truths as its own guiding doctrine, precisely so that all sentient beings may come to fully possess both benefits, for themselves and for others, at once.
The Ratnamālā Sūtra cited here (瓔珞經, more fully the Pusa Yingluo Benye Jing) supplies the striking image of the two truths as "the mother of the buddhas" — not merely a doctrine buddhas teach, but the very thing that generates a buddha's own two kinds of knowledge in the first place. This maternal image parallels the "father and mother of the Dharma-body" language already used of prajñā and skillful means for the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom in Part 10 — two treatises, two pairs of terms, one shared underlying claim about what actually produces buddhahood.
3. Three Kinds of People Who Lose the Two Truths
If the two truths are this fundamental, Jizang asks who actually fails to grasp them — and identifies three distinct groups, ranging from the five hundred Hīnayāna schools already discussed in earlier parts, through the Vaipulya-śramaṇas already named in Part 6, to the subtlest failure of all: those who correctly use the words "the two truths" while still getting their actual relationship wrong.
問何人迷二諦。論主破迷申二諦耶。答有三種人迷於二諦。一者小乘五百部。各執諸法有決定性。聞畢竟空如刀傷心。此人失第一義諦。然既失第一義諦亦失世諦。所以然者。空宛然而有。故有名空有。方是世諦。彼既失空。亦是迷有。故失世諦。故五百部執出如來二諦之外。
Question: Who, exactly, is confused about the two truths, such that the author of the treatise must refute this confusion in order to set forth the two truths correctly? Answer: There are three kinds of people confused about the two truths. First, the five hundred schools of the Hīnayāna, each of which clings to all dharmas as possessing a fixed, determinate nature, such that on hearing of ultimate emptiness it wounds their hearts as though cut by a knife. Such people lose the ultimate truth. And having lost the ultimate truth, they thereby lose the conventional truth as well — the reason being that emptiness, vivid as it appears, is itself existent, and it is precisely this that is properly called the conventional truth, "existence that is empty." Since they have already lost sight of emptiness, they are thereby confused about existence as well, and so they lose the conventional truth too. Hence the doctrine held by these five hundred schools falls entirely outside the Tathāgata's own two truths.
二者方廣道人。謂一切諸法如龜毛兔角。無罪福報應。此人失於世諦。然有宛然而空。故空名有空。既失空有。亦失有空。如斯之人亦失二諦。又諸外道亦失二諦。如有見外道迷於真諦。空見外道迷於世諦。又凡夫著有故迷真諦。二乘滯空迷世諦也。第三人得二諦名而失二諦旨。斯執甚多。今略出二種。或言二諦一體。或言二諦異體。並不成二諦之義。具如疏初序之。今破此之失申明二諦。故用二諦為宗也。
Second, the Vaipulya-śramaṇas, who hold that all dharmas are like the hair of a tortoise or the horns of a hare, and that there is no karmic retribution for either sin or merit at all. Such people lose the conventional truth. And existence, vivid as it appears, is itself empty, and it is precisely this that is properly called "emptiness that is existent." Since they have already lost sight of existence, they are thereby confused about emptiness as well — people of this kind likewise lose both truths at once. The various outsiders, too, lose the two truths: outsiders who hold the view of existence are confused about the ultimate truth, while outsiders who hold the view of emptiness are confused about the conventional truth; and, more broadly, ordinary unenlightened beings, clinging to existence, are confused about the ultimate truth, while the two lesser vehicles, mired in emptiness, are confused about the conventional truth. The third kind of person retains the very name "the two truths" while still losing their true purport. Positions of this kind are exceedingly numerous; let two be briefly set forth here. Some say the two truths are a single substance; others say the two truths are two separate substances — neither succeeds in accounting for what the two truths actually mean, exactly as already discussed in full at the very opening of this treatise's own commentary. It is precisely to refute this loss, and to set forth the two truths correctly, that this treatise takes the two truths as its own guiding doctrine.
This threefold diagnosis closely parallels, and in places repeats nearly verbatim, the three-way loss of the two truths already set out against the mistaken Mahāyāna teacher back in Part 6 — a sign that this treatise regards the confusion about the two truths as a single recurring pathology capable of infecting outsiders, Hīnayāna schools, and self-styled Mahāyāna teachers alike, rather than a mistake unique to any one sect. "The hair of a tortoise" and "the horns of a hare" are stock Buddhist images for something that does not exist even conventionally — used here to characterize the Vaipulya-śramaṇas' error as denying provisional existence altogether, the exact mirror image of the five hundred schools' error of clinging to existence as fixed and real.
4. Three Proofs That the Two Truths Are This Treatise's Guiding Doctrine
Jizang now offers direct textual proof, in three parts, that the two truths really are what the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā takes as central — drawing on the same Ratnamālā Sūtra passage cited above, on Piṅgala's own commentary already translated on this site, and on a second, independent preface by a fellow member of Kumārajīva's translation circle.
問何以得知此論用二諦為宗耶。答略有三種。一者瓔珞經佛母品明二諦不生不滅乃至不來不去。今論正明八不。故知即是辨於二諦。故以二諦為宗。二者青目序論意。明外人失二諦。龍樹菩薩為是等故造此中論。即知破外迷失申明二諦。故以二諦為宗也。三者關內曇影中論序云。此論雖無理不窮。無言不盡。統其要歸。會通二諦。今還述舊釋。故知二諦為宗也。
Question: How can it be known for certain that this treatise takes the two truths as its guiding doctrine? Answer: There are, in brief, three proofs. First, the chapter on the Mother of the Buddhas in the Ratnamālā Sūtra makes clear that the two truths are unborn and unceasing, and likewise neither coming nor going; and this present treatise makes clear precisely these eight negations. From this it is known that the treatise is discriminating exactly the two truths, and this is why it takes the two truths as its guiding doctrine. Second, Piṅgala's own intention in his preface to the treatise makes clear that outsiders have lost the two truths, and that Nāgārjuna composed this Mūlamadhyamakakārikā precisely on their account — from which it is known that the treatise refutes the loss of outsiders' confusion in order to set forth the two truths, and this is why it takes the two truths as its guiding doctrine. Third, Tanying's preface to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, written within the Pass, says: "Although this treatise leaves no principle unexhausted and no statement incomplete, gathering up its essential purport, it converges on and reconciles the two truths." This account, given here, simply restates that older explanation — from which it is likewise known that the two truths are its guiding doctrine.
Piṅgala's commentary is the very text this site has already translated in full alongside Nāgārjuna's root verses as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, so the second proof here is Jizang citing this school's own foundational document directly. Tanying (曇影, sometimes given as Tanying "of the region within the Pass," referring to the area around Chang'an) was a fellow member of Kumārajīva's translation bureau alongside Sengzhao and Sengrui, both already familiar figures from earlier parts of this collection; his independent preface to the same treatise, agreeing with Piṅgala's own framing, is offered here as a second, corroborating witness. "The eight negations" — not born, not ceased, not permanent, not annihilated, not one, not different, not coming, not going — are the treatise's own opening dedicatory verse, and Jizang's claim here is that these eight negations simply are the two truths stated in their most compressed form.
5. Why Not Call It "the Middle Way" Instead?
An obvious objection follows: the treatise is named the Zhonglun, "the Middle Treatise" — so why isn't the middle way itself named as the guiding doctrine, rather than the two truths? Jizang's answer collapses the apparent alternative: the two truths simply are the middle way, correctly understood, and naming one is naming the other under a different aspect.
問既名中論。何故不用中道為宗。乃以二諦為宗耶。答即二諦是中道。既以二諦為宗。即是中道為宗。所以然者。還就二諦以明中道故。有世諦中道。真諦中道。非真非俗中道。但今欲名宗兩舉故。中諦互說。故宗舉其諦名題其中。若以中道為名。復以中道為宗者。但得不二義失其二義故也。
Question: Since the treatise is named the Zhonglun, why does it not take the middle way as its guiding doctrine, taking the two truths as its guiding doctrine instead? Answer: The two truths simply are the middle way. Having already taken the two truths as its guiding doctrine, it has, by that very fact, taken the middle way as its guiding doctrine as well. The reason is this: it is always with reference to the two truths that the middle way is made clear in the first place — hence there is a middle way of the conventional truth, a middle way of the ultimate truth, and a middle way that is neither the ultimate nor the conventional. It is only because the present purpose requires that the name and the guiding doctrine each be raised up as two distinct things that "the middle" and "the truths" are spoken of interchangeably in this way — the guiding doctrine raises up the truths, while the title names the middle. Were "the middle way" used both as the name and as the guiding doctrine at once, this would grasp only the sense of non-duality while losing the sense of the two truths' own distinctness.
This brief exchange anticipates, in compressed form, the enormous exegesis of the title Zhonglun that closes this entire collection in Parts 13 and 14, where the fourfold "middle" (against bias, exhausting bias, absolute, and constituting the provisional) receives its own dedicated treatment. The core insight stated here — that title and guiding doctrine are deliberately kept as two distinct labels for what is, at bottom, one and the same insight, precisely so that both the non-dual middle and the two truths' own functional distinctness can each be kept in view — is a methodological principle this treatise applies consistently, and it is worth carrying forward to that later, fuller discussion.
6. Why Scripture Establishes Two Truths At All
Jizang closes the treatment of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's guiding doctrine with a cluster of reasons, offered together rather than singly, for why the Buddha taught in terms of two truths rather than one — ranging from avoiding the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism, to the practical necessity of teaching the conventional before the ultimate.
問經何故立二諦耶。答此有兩義。一者欲示佛法是中道故。以有世諦。是故不斷。以第一義。是故不常。所以立於二諦。又二慧是三世佛法身父母。以有第一義故生般若。以有世諦故生方便。具實慧方便慧。有十方三世佛。是故立二諦。又知第一義是自利。知世諦故能利他。具知二諦即得共利。故立二諦。
Question: Why does scripture establish the two truths at all? Answer: There are two aspects to this. First, it is in order to show that the Buddha's own teaching is the middle way: because there is the conventional truth, the teaching is thereby not annihilationist; because there is the ultimate truth, the teaching is thereby not eternalist — and this is why the two truths are established. Moreover, the two kinds of wisdom are the father and mother of the Dharma-body of the buddhas of the three times: because there is the ultimate truth, prajñā is thereby generated; because there is the conventional truth, skillful means is thereby generated. It is by fully possessing both real wisdom and skillful wisdom that there come to be buddhas throughout the ten directions and the three times — and this is why the two truths are established. Moreover, knowing the ultimate truth constitutes the benefit of oneself, while knowing the conventional truth enables the benefit of others; fully knowing both truths together yields the benefit shared in common — and this is why the two truths are established.
又有二諦故佛語皆實。以世諦故說有是實。第一義故說空是實。又佛法漸深。先說世諦因果教化。後為說第一義。又成就得道智者說第一義。無有說世諦。又若不先說世諦因果。直說第一義。則生斷見。是故具明二諦也。
Moreover, it is because there are two truths that everything the Buddha says is true: by virtue of the conventional truth, saying "there is existence" is true; by virtue of the ultimate truth, saying "it is empty" is true. Moreover, the Buddha's teaching deepens by stages: he first teaches the conventional truth of cause and effect in order to transform beings, and only afterward teaches them the ultimate truth. Moreover, it is precisely the wise who have already accomplished the path and attained it who are taught the ultimate truth — there is no teaching of the conventional truth given to such people any longer, since they have no further need of it. Moreover, if one did not first teach the conventional truth of cause and effect, and instead spoke of the ultimate truth directly from the outset, this would give rise to the view of annihilation in the hearer. It is for all these reasons together that the two truths are set forth in full.
7. The Hundred Treatise's Guiding Doctrine: The Two Kinds of Wisdom
Turning to the Hundred Treatise, Jizang faces an apparent redundancy: it too, on its own terms, expounds the two truths — so why should it not simply share the same guiding doctrine as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā? His answer is again the "mutual avoidance" principle from Part 10: to keep the four treatises distinct and mutually illuminating, the Hundred Treatise is instead assigned the two kinds of wisdom, tracking Āryadeva's own historical role as a debater rather than an expositor.
次明百論宗者。百論破邪申明二諦。具如空品末說。亦應以二諦為宗。但今欲與中論互相開避。中論以二諦為宗。百論用二智為宗。即欲明諦智互相成也。問百論何故用二智為宗耶。答提婆與外道對面擊揚鬪。一時權巧智慧。但提婆權智巧能破邪巧能顯正。而實無所破亦無所顯。故名實智。一論始終明此二智。故以二智為宗。中論不與內諍一時權巧。但共同學二諦之人諍二諦得失。故以二諦為宗。則中論用所申為宗。百論用能申為宗。欲明佛與菩薩能所共相成也。
Next, making clear the guiding doctrine of the Hundred Treatise. The Hundred Treatise refutes the false and sets forth the two truths in full, exactly as stated at the close of its own chapter on emptiness, and so it too ought properly to take the two truths as its guiding doctrine. But since the present purpose is to keep this treatise and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā each opening up its own distinct approach, avoiding overlap with the other, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā takes the two truths as its guiding doctrine, while the Hundred Treatise takes the two kinds of wisdom as its guiding doctrine instead — precisely in order to make clear how the truths and the wisdom that knows them mutually complete one another. Question: Why does the Hundred Treatise take the two kinds of wisdom as its guiding doctrine? Answer: Āryadeva engaged the outsiders face to face, striking and parrying in open contest, and this called for a wisdom skilled in expedient means in the moment. Āryadeva's own expedient wisdom was skillful enough to refute the false and skillful enough to reveal the true — and yet, in reality, there was nothing he actually refuted and nothing he actually revealed; hence this is named real wisdom as well. The treatise, from beginning to end, makes clear precisely these two kinds of wisdom — and this is why it takes the two kinds of wisdom as its guiding doctrine. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, by contrast, was not engaged in a face-to-face contest calling for expedient wisdom in the moment; it simply disputes, with fellow students of the two truths, over where they have gotten the two truths right or wrong — and this is why it takes the two truths as its guiding doctrine. Thus the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā takes as its guiding doctrine what is set forth, while the Hundred Treatise takes as its guiding doctrine what does the setting forth — precisely in order to make clear how the Buddha and the bodhisattva, the one setting forth and the one who sets forth, mutually complete each other as well.
This distinction maps neatly onto the actual literary form of the two texts as this site has already presented them: the Hundred Treatise is structured throughout as live debate between an Outsider and an Insider, exactly the "face to face contest" register Jizang describes here, while the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā reads as a sustained internal examination of what the two truths actually mean, addressed to those who already broadly accept the framework rather than to outside opponents needing to be defeated in open contest.
8. The Twelve Gate Treatise's Guiding Doctrine: Object and Wisdom
The part closes with the third and final guiding doctrine assigned in this section: the Twelve Gate Treatise, which also expounds the two truths at bottom, is instead given "object and wisdom" as its distinguishing thread, drawn directly from the treatise's own opening statement about the profound meaning it means to convey.
次明十二門論宗者。此論亦破內迷申明二諦。亦以二諦為宗。但今欲示三論不同。宜以境智為宗。所言境智者。論云。大分深義所謂空也。若通達是義即通達大乘。具足六波羅蜜無所障礙。大分深義謂實相之境。由實相境發生般若。由般若故萬行得成。即是境智之義。故用境智為宗也。
Next, making clear the guiding doctrine of the Twelve Gate Treatise. This treatise, too, refutes confusion from within and sets forth the two truths, and so it too could properly take the two truths as its guiding doctrine. But since the present purpose is to show how the three treatises each differ from one another, it is fitting instead to take object and wisdom as its guiding doctrine. As for what is meant by "object and wisdom": the treatise itself says, "The great share of the profound meaning is precisely what is called emptiness. If one thoroughly penetrates this meaning, one thereby thoroughly penetrates the Mahāyāna, fully possessing the six perfections without any obstruction whatsoever." "The great share of the profound meaning" refers to the object that is the real character of things; from this object, the real character of things, prajñā is generated; and by means of prajñā, the ten thousand practices are brought to completion. This is precisely the sense of "object and wisdom" — and this is why the treatise takes object and wisdom as its guiding doctrine.
With this, all three treatises already translated on this site have now each been assigned their own distinct guiding doctrine: two truths for the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, two kinds of wisdom for the Hundred Treatise, and object-and-wisdom for the Twelve Gate Treatise — together with the two wisdoms already assigned to the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom in Part 10. Jizang's own summary point, repeated with slight variation across this entire section, is that none of these four doctrines actually differs from any other at the level of what is realized — only in which facet of one shared realization each treatise's own historical situation called on it to foreground.
Part Eleven Complete
This closes Part Eleven: the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's two truths established as the root of both self-cultivation and teaching others, three kinds of people diagnosed as losing the two truths, three independent proofs of this guiding doctrine, the collapse of "the middle way" and "the two truths" into a single insight named two ways, and the Hundred Treatise and Twelve Gate Treatise each given their own distinguishing thread — two kinds of wisdom, and object-and-wisdom, respectively.
Part Twelve turns to how the four treatises actually go about refuting and establishing their teaching — the different patterns of refutation each employs, why they are called "three treatises" despite numbering four, and the different kinds of provisional truth each is built from.